

From the CWIHP Director

Despite the end of the Cold War almost a decade-and-a-half ago, its legacy still besets US foreign policy and the world at large. Cold War flashpoints, such as North Korea, Cuba, Afghanistan, and the Middle East continue to impose important challenges on the international community. Recent crises and conflicts underline the importance of gaining a better understanding of the sources of these and other countries' foreign policies, cultural patterns, and world outlooks. This issue of the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) *Bulletin* highlights recent findings from the former Communist world and other international archives on a range of critical issues that affect us today no less than they concerned policymakers and the public during the Cold War.

Of all the United States' former Cold War adversaries, North Korea poses perhaps the most dangerous security problem. North Korea's vitriolic and seemingly unpredictable rhetorical outbursts and actions confront international policymakers on an almost daily basis, yet information on the inner workings and motivations of this highly secretive country is scarce. To address this significant information gap, this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin* features a treasure trove of previously unpublished documents from erstwhile communist allies of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The documents are the result of a special effort by the Project to mine the archives of North Korea's former allies. Coordinated by Kathryn Weathersby and funded by The Korea Foundation, the **CWIHP Korea Initiative** has been systematically exploring East European, Russian, and (to a lesser extent) Chinese archives for insights into perceptions and policymaking in Pyongyang. The Korea Initiative presented its first findings at a workshop hosted in conjunction with the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW) in March 2003 ("**North Korea's Crisis Behavior, Past and Present: New Light from the Archives of its Former Allies**"), at which leading Korea specialists from academia, research centers, and government agencies in the United States, the Republic of Korea and Eastern Europe provided a first analysis of the significance of the new documents on North Korea.¹ The newly accessible documentation bears on such questions as North Korea's reaction to aid and external pressures, the internal workings of the Kim regime and the ideological prism of the North Korean leadership. The documents were featured in a front-page article in the *Christian Science Monitor* in July 2003 ("Files Show a Stubborn North Korea"). As with other materials that the CWIHP Korea Initiative is uncovering, the materials are also accessible online through CWIHP's Virtual Archive.

Reading through the Afghanistan section of this *Bulletin* issue today remains just as eerie an experience as editing the materials by defected KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin's on "The KGB in Afghanistan" (which the Project published as CWIHP Working Paper No. 40) while the US and its allies were fighting the Taliban in late 2001 and early 2002. To assess the legacies and lessons of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in light of new evidence, CWIHP organized a major international conference on the conflict in April 2002, "**Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989.**" Held in cooperation with the Center's Asia Program and Kennan Institute, GWCW, and the National Security Archive, the "critical oral history" meeting centered on newly released and translated US, Russian, Bulgarian, East German, Czech, and Hungarian documents on the war. Conference participants included former Soviet officials and National Security Council (NSC), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials from the Carter, Bush, and Reagan administrations, as well as scholarly

experts from around the world. The Russian materials featured in the Afghanistan section of this issue, generously provided by Anatoly Chernyaev, A. A. Lyakhovsky, and the late Vasiliy Mitrokhin, allow fascinating insights into Soviet intelligence operations in the region, Gorbachev's relationship with Afghan communist leader Najibullah, and the debate over withdrawal from Afghanistan within the Kremlin. Documents from the Bulgarian, East German, and Hungarian archives provide a glimpse at the bloc-wide repercussions of the Soviet intervention. Mitrokhin's special contribution, moreover, extends the documentary shadow of the Soviet invasion to the larger history of Soviet policy on the South Asian subcontinent.



As in past issues, this *Bulletin* reflects the activities of the international network that constitutes the Cold War International History Project. Mark Kramer's edition of **Ukrainian archival documents** continues CWIHP's effort to document the spill-over effects and repercussions of crises within the Soviet empire, in this case the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.² Svetlana Savranskaya highlights findings from the October 2002 Havana Conference on the 1962 **Cuban Missile Crisis**. Organized by the National Security Archive in partnership with Brown University's Watson Institute for International Affairs and Cuban institutions, the conference brought together US, Russian, and Cuban veterans of the 1962 Cuban Crisis.³ The documents introduced by Jim Hershberg and Vladislav Zubok add to CWIHP's unique corpus of Soviet documents on the **Korean War**.⁴ The **Zhivkov Dossier**, provided by Jordan Baev, is the most recent archival coup by CWIHP's Bulgarian partner, the Cold War Group Bulgaria.

The Armenian and Georgian archival documents featured in this issue are a result of CWIHP's continued cooperation with Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian (as well as US and Russian) scholars to uncover the hidden history of Soviet policies in the Southern Caucasus. They were among the materials presented at a workshop in July 2002 in the Tsinandali Conference Center in the Kakhety Valley in Georgia. The workshop was the second meeting held in the framework of the initiative, "**Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War**," launched in the summer of 1999 by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. The main goal of the project is to explore the archives in Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku to determine to what extent Cold War era documents, still classified in the central archives in Moscow, would be accessible there, and to bring scholars from the three republics into the larger international network of Cold War scholars.⁵



Since the publication of the last *Bulletin*, CWIHP has sponsored or co-sponsored a series of conferences in addition to those mentioned above. Together with CWIHP and the National Security Archive, the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA), a newly created federation of Cold War programs at Italian universities, sponsored a critical oral history conference on "**The Road to Helsinki: The Early Steps of the CSCE**" in September 2003. The meeting, held in cooperation with the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), gathered more than a dozen former CSCE diplomats and some fifty scholars to discuss key issues in the national policies and international negotiations that led

to the 1975 Helsinki Accords.⁶ The conference built on an international conference on the history of détente (“**NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Rise of Détente, 1965-1972**”), sponsored by CIMA and CWIHP in Dobbiaco in September 2002.⁷ A November 2002 conference on “**Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean during the Cold War,**” held in Mexico City in cooperation with Yale University’s Council on Latin American & Iberian Studies and the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (Mexico City), inaugurated collaborative efforts with Mexican and other Latin American researchers and archivists to relate the Latin American Cold War experience to the emerging international history of the post-1945 world.

A workshop on “**China and its Frontier Issue**” with China’s leading Cold War scholars in the Wuyi Mountains in August 2002 intensified collaborative ties with CWIHP’s Chinese partners. In October 2002, CWIHP co-sponsored a conference with the Institute of Political Studies at the Romanian Ministry of Defense and the PHP in Bucharest on “**Romania and the Warsaw Pact.**” Showcasing the first major release of documents from the Romanian, United States, and other archives on the subject, the conference drew considerable public attention to problems of access and research in Romania. Other meetings (co-)organized and sponsored by CWIHP included a March 2003 workshop at the Wilson Center on the recent declassification of US documents on **Argentina’s “Dirty Wars”**⁸ (co-sponsored with the Center’s Latin American Program). Pushing the boundaries of international history into the lives and the communities of peoples the world over, the International Security Studies Program at Yale University and CWIHP sponsored a meeting on “**Lives and Consequences: The Local Impact of the Cold War**” in April 2003.⁹ For two days, more than a dozen scholars traced the real-world effects of diplomacy on everyday life. In September 2003 the Project teamed up with the Finnish Academy of Sciences and the Russian State Archives for a conference on “**The Economic Cold War**” in Helsinki, exploring trade relations and trade embargos during the Cold War.¹⁰ Hosted by the Cold War Research Center in Budapest, directed by former CWIHP Scholar Csaba Békés, a November 2003 conference on “**Central and Eastern European Archival Evidence on the Cold War in Asia**” produced fascinating new evidence and exchanges on the impact of the Sino-Soviet rift on the Soviet alliance system and intra-bloc relationships. With graduate students and junior scholars steeped in archival research across the region as central participants, the meeting sponsored by GWCW and co-sponsored by CWIHP was in many ways the international debut of a new generation of Cold War historians.¹¹ A special CWIHP/GWCW *Bulletin* issue will present many of the new materials to the scholarly community and public at large.



Broadening the debate on the history of the Cold War and its legacy based on new evidence has remained a central focus of CWIHP’s activities since the publication of the last *Bulletin*. With funding from the National Endowment for Humanities, GWCW and the Cold War International History Project hosted two summer institutes for about twenty high-school teachers in 2002-2003 to develop an interactive teaching tool for students. Featured in *Humanities* (“The Unknown Cold War”) in March/April 2003, the project will result in a new website that will provide access to the wealth of new documentary resources. Now in its final developmental stage, the new site, “**The Cold War Files-Interpreting History Through Documents,**” is set to go online in late 2004. CWIHP also participated in the Graduate Student Conference spon-

sored by GWCW and the University of California–Santa Barbara as well as the first Annual “Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research” at George Washington University. (For a report by Cambridge University PhD candidate Sutayut Osornprasop, see <http://cwiwhp.si.edu>). In September 2003, the Cold War International History Project hosted a pioneering international conference on “**Cold War Memory: Interpreting the Physical Legacy of the Cold War.**” Co-sponsored by the Association of Air Force Missileers, the Cold War Museum, the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC), the Harry S. Truman Library, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and organized in cooperation with the Norwegian Aviation Museum, the Eisenhower Foundation and Eisenhower Presidential Library, and the National Coalition for History, the conference was designed to foster a dialogue between Cold War scholars and individuals and organizations charged with interpreting the physical legacy of the Cold War in the United States and abroad. About one hundred cultural resource specialists, leading international scholars, Cold War veterans, media and foundation representatives, government officials, and other professionals from around the world met for two intense days to discuss new findings on the Cold War and their meaning for the conflict’s “public history.” CWIHP is publishing a report on the proceedings of the meeting on its website.



CWIHP also continues its **Cold War seminar series** at the Woodrow Wilson Center, designed to bring new findings and publications to the attention of Washington’s policy and scholarly community. Recent events included a discussion of “**Lyndon Johnson and Europe,**” the new book by former Wilson Center Fellow Thomas Alan Schwartz; a panel on William Taubman’s new biography of **Nikita Khrushchev** (with commentaries by Clinton Administration Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott and NPR’s Daniel Schorr) before a standing room-only audience; a discussion of Milton Bearden’s and James Risen’s new book on intelligence and the end of the Cold War (“**The Main Enemy**”); and book launches for CWIHP Senior Scholar Hope Harrison (“**Driving the Soviets Up the Wall**”), Jeremi Suri (“**Power and Protest**”), and Jeffrey Kimball (“**The Vietnam War Files**”). A full list of the meetings and meeting reports is available on the Project’s website (<http://cwiwhp.si.edu>)

Thanks to the support by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Project was able to award additional CWIHP scholarships. In 2003, CWIHP hosted Russian scholar **Sergey Mazov** (Russian Academy of Sciences) as its most recent CWIHP Scholar. During his stay in Washington, Sergey Mazov conducted extensive research on Soviet policy towards West Africa. The Project was also fortunate to host **Melvyn Leffler** (University of Virginia), **Jussi Hanhimaki** (Graduate Institute, Geneva), **Keith R. Allen** (Washington), **Marilena Gala** (University of Florence) and **Trudy Huskamp Peterson**, former acting National Archivist and former director of the Open Society Archives in Budapest as Wilson Center Fellows and Public Policy Scholars.

CWIHP has been building its website presence, and the Project is currently restructuring its “**Virtual Archive**” of declassified and translated documents to facilitate full-text searching and collating of original and translated versions of documents. With support from the Andrew Mellon Foundation, CWIHP has been exploring the possibilities for developing search engines that would allow harvesting across several online archives and collections. Additional web features go online in the spring and summer of 2004.

CWIHP’s varied activities would not be possible without the support of a broadening **international network** of individuals and

institutions. The Project is pleased to welcome the establishment of a Mongolian Cold War Group, host to the March 2004 workshop in Ulaanbaatar. Spurred by the efforts of Sergey Radchenko and former Wilson Center Fellow Tsedenbar Batbayar, fascinating new materials on the Sino-Soviet split are becoming available in the Mongolian archives. A November 2003 workshop with Serbian scholars in Belgrade, organized by Svetozar Rajak of the London School of Economics, provided first glimpses at the potential riches of the Yugoslav archives on topics ranging from the Cold War on the Balkans to the non-alignment movement. Cooperation has also intensified with a group of Cold War scholars in Tirana (led by Ana Lalaj), who, with support by CWIHP, are in the process of mining the Albanian archives. CWIHP's Italian partner CIMA, led by Ennio Di Nolfo, Massimiliano Guderzo and Leopoldo Nuti, is spearheading a systematic exploration of the Détente years. Following my recent trip to Yalta, Kyiv and Lviv, plans are underway for a Cold War conference in Ukraine that would build on the work of Mark Kramer and others featured in this *Bulletin* issue. Our partners in Beijing and Shanghai, the Modern History Research Center at Beijing University and the Cold War Studies Center at East China Normal University are playing central roles in collaborative efforts to assess the history of Chinese foreign policy in a series of meetings over the next three years, sponsored by the Henry Luce Foundation. Thanks to CWIHP Senior Research Scholar Dennis Deletant (University of London) and his partners in Bucharest, we are incrementally gaining access to Romanian party, foreign ministry and military archives. Just how significant the archives of smaller powers can be is demonstrated by the prolific activities of former CWIHP Fellow Jordan Baev and his colleagues in Sofia. From the Warsaw Pact to Latin America to Afghanistan, the Bulgarian archives turn out to be an ever widening "backdoor" into Soviet policy. CWIHP Senior Scholar Vojtech Mastny and his colleagues at the Zurich-based Parallel History Project continue to document the history of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the future, the Project hopes to intensify its contacts with scholars and institutions in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and well as Africa.



This *Bulletin* issue—and the activities mentioned above—would not have been possible without the generous support by The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), The Andrew Mellon Foundation (New York), The Henry Luce Foundation (New York), The Korea Foundation (Seoul), and as well as individual donors. I am indebted to my colleagues at the Woodrow Wilson Center, in particular Lee H. Hamilton, Michael van Dusen, Lauren Crowley, Robert Hathaway, Robert Litwak, Blair Ruble, and Samuel F. Wells, as well as the members of the CWIHP Advisory Committee, chaired by William Taubman, for their steadfast support. CWIHP scholars and partners, in particular Keith Allen, Jordan Baev, Csaba Békés, Tom Blanton, Gregg Brazinsky, William Burr, Malcolm Byrne, Sandra Cavalucci, Chen Jian, Massimiliano Cricco, Jeffrey Engel, Laura Fasanaro, Ilya Gaiduk, Gary Goldberg, Jim Goldgeier, Christopher Goscha, Hope Harrison, Jamil Hansanli, Jim Hershberg, Mihail Ionescu, Tvrtko Jakovina, Gilbert Joseph, Karl Kleve, Sue Lamie, Vojtech Mastny, Neamat Nojumi, Leopoldo Nuti, Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Sergey Radchenko, Hannu Rautkallio, Svetlana Savranskaya, Bernd Schäfer, Thomas Schwartz, Douglas Selvage, Daniela Spenser, Balazs Szalontai, Shen Zhihua, Oldrich Tuma, Yu Weimin, Odd Arne Westad, Kathryn Weathersby, David Wolff, and Vladislav Zubok provided essential support in the making of this issue and the activities underlying it. The Project's outstanding staff, M. Dee Beutel, Nancy Meyers, Mircea Munteanu,

and Richard Thomas, as well as a talented group of interns, in particular Jeffrey Becker, Hedi Giusto, Jörn Käsebier, Conor Savoy, dealt patiently and skillfully with the editorial and production demands of an ever growing publication. Finally, I am deeply grateful to this issue's patient contributors.

—Christian F. Ostermann

NOTES

¹ The conference received generous support from The Henry Luce Foundation and the Korea Foundation.

² Conferences on Cold War flashpoints included: "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," Jachranka-Warsaw, 8-10 November 1997, co-organized with the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Warsaw) and the National Security Archive; "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, 10-12 November 1996, co-organized with the Center for Contemporary History Research (Potsdam) and the National Security Archive; "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, co-sponsored with the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution (Budapest) and the National Security Archive; and "Czechoslovakia and the World, 1968: The New Archival Evidence," Prague, 18-20 April 1994, co-sponsored with The Prague Spring 1968 Foundation (Prague) and the National Security Archive. For information on these conferences, see past CWIHP *Bulletin*, in particular nos. 8/9, 10 and 11. See also Mark Kramer, "Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 1): New Evidence from the Diary of Petro Shelest," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998), pp. 234-247.

³ The conference featured extraordinary discussions and new revelations from the archives from ten countries — including memoranda of conversation between Cuban and Soviet leaders, detailed information on Cuban-Soviet military ties, recently declassified US intelligence analyses, and new information about nuclear dangers arising from the crisis that have been unknown until now. See "The Missiles of 1962 Haunt the Iraq Debate," by Todd S. Purdum, *Week In Review, New York Times*, 13 October 2002; "When the World Stood on Edge And Nobody Died Beautifully," by Tim Wiener, *New York Times*, 13 October 2002; "Soviets Close to Using A-Bomb in 1962 Crisis, Forum is Told", by Marion Lloyd *Boston Sunday Globe*, 13 October 2002, p. A20; "Cold War foes visit Soviet-made missile silo in Cuba," by Anthony Boadle, *Reuters English News Service*, 13 October 2002; "40 Years After Missile Crisis, Players Swap Stories in Cuba," by Kevin Sullivan, *Washington Post*, 13 October 2002, p. A28; "Meeting Between Soviet, Cuban and American Officials to Discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis, 40 Years Later," by Tom Gjelten, *Weekend Edition Saturday National Public Radio*, 12 October 2002; "Nightline Cuban Missile Crisis," by George Stephanopoulos, *ABC News Nightline*, 12 October 2002; "Reflections on the Cuban missile crisis," by Randall Pinkston, *CBS Evening News*, 12 October 2002. For more information on the conference, see the National Security Archive website: <http://nsarchive.org>.

⁴ See in particular the articles and compilations by Kathryn Weathersby in *CWIHP Bulletins* nos. 4, 5, 6-7 and 11.

⁵ The first meeting of scholars from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the United States took place in Tbilisi in October 2000. See *CWIHP Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001).

⁶ Diplomat-veterans included Ambassador Jim Goodby (US), Ambassador John Maresca (US), Sir Crispin Tickell (UK), Sir Rodric Braithwaite (UK), Ambassador Yuri Kashlev (Russia), Ambassa-

dor Yuri Dubinin (Russia), Ambassador Jacques Andréani (France), Ambassador Nicolae Ecobescu (Romania), Ambassador Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (Italy) and Ambassador Eduard Brunner (Switzerland).

⁷ The conference was organized in the framework of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

⁸ Panelists included Juan Gabriel Tokatlián, San Andrés University; Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute; Beatriz Nofal, Eco-Axis and a former Under-Secretary of Industry and Trade; Carlos Osorio, National Security Archive; Carlos Sersale di Cerisano, former director general for human rights in the Argentine Foreign Ministry; Kathryn Sikkink, University of Minnesota; John Dinges, Columbia University School of Journalism; F. A. “Tex” Harris, a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires at the height of the Dirty War; and María José Guembe, Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS). The conference proceedings have been published as *Argentina-United States Bilateral Relations: An Historical Perspective and Future Challenges*, ed. by Cynthia Arnson. For a complimentary copy, please contact the Wilson Center at lap@wwic.si.edu. The book was launched in Buenos Aires on 4 December 2003 during a conference on the “Dirty War.” The meeting was covered by Mexico’s largest daily: “Kissinger pidió acelerar la represión en Argentina: El ex secretario buscaba evitar una condena a la dictadura,” *El Universal*, 5 December 2003, p. 2.

⁹ The conference proceedings, edited by Jeffrey Engel, are slated for publication in the CWIHP book series.

¹⁰ Conference proceedings are to be published.

¹¹ Additional sponsorship of the conference was provided by the National Security Archive; The 1956 Institute (Budapest), Temple University’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the CWIHP Korea Initiative, the London School of Economics Cold War Studies Program and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center and History Department.

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New Evidence on North Korea

Introduction

By Kathryn Weathersby

Among the states that played a key role in the Cold War, none has been, or remains, more enigmatic than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). To its allies within the communist world, North Korea's secretiveness, its cult of Kim Il Sung, and its violent provocations against the South were a source of exasperation, embarrassment, and unease. Nonetheless, North Korea's fraternal allies never permanently withdrew their patronage from the Pyongyang regime, without which the DPRK could not survive. As O.B. Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, explained to an East German party official in February 1973, "in the interest of our common tasks, we must sometimes overlook their stupidities. None of us agree with the idolatry of Kim Il Sung."¹

For the United States and its allies, North Korea's insistence on maintaining an outsized, forward deployed military force, its refusal to moderate its hostile rhetoric against Seoul and Washington, and its unpredictable outbursts of violence against South Korea, coupled with its extreme secretiveness and highly idiosyncratic version of communism, created the longest lasting and one of the most acute security problems of the Cold War era. With no history of diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and few sources of information on this unusually closed country, it has been, and remains, difficult for North Korea analysts in the non-communist world to assess the intentions behind the DPRK's troublesome actions, whether they are working with or without classified information. As former CIA officer in Korea and Ambassador to Seoul Donald P. Gregg recently noted, "North Korea remains one of the longest-running intelligence failures in the history of US espionage. North Koreans were difficult to approach and almost impossible to recruit and control."²

In an effort to fill part of this significant information gap, CWIHP has launched a special effort, begun with generous support from the Korea Foundation, to mine the archives of the DPRK's former allies for insights into North Korean policymaking. The Korea Initiative is combing East European and Russian archives, and to a more limited extent those of China, to uncover and analyze the documentary record of North Korea's relations with its fraternal allies. We have discovered that although Pyongyang's communist allies also suffered from the unusual secretiveness of Kim Il Sung's regime, their extensive dealings with the DPRK nonetheless provided them with a far more intimate view of North Korea than that enjoyed by persons outside the communist world. Moreover, in his communications with his East and Central European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung



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spoke with striking candor about the international and domestic problems facing his embattled state. Thus, as long as the DPRK's own archives remain inaccessible, the records of its close allies provide the best available view from inside North Korea.

This special section of the *Bulletin* presents the results of the first two years of the Korea Initiative, during which the project has focused on the East German and Hungarian archives, as well as on Chinese sources that are available for analysis by selected researchers, though not for photocopying or translation in full.

In part one, the Beijing-based historian Shen Zhihua examines Chinese archival and memoir evidence regarding the serious tensions that complicated relations between China and North Korea during the Korean War. His analysis reveals that the characteristics of the Kim Il Sung regime that caused friction with its allies in the postwar period cannot be attributed solely to the impact of the devastating war of 1950-53, since they had, in fact, been prominent as early as 1949-50. Shen adds an important new perspective to the debate over the relative influence of China and the Soviet Union on

North Korea's war plans against South Korea. He demonstrates that Mao Zedong's government was quick to offer military support to the DPRK, but the North Korean leadership refused to accept Chinese assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel. Shen attributes Kim's reluctance to overconfidence in his military judgments and the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs. Kim's concerns over national sovereignty also led him to resist Chinese efforts to create a joint Sino-Korean com-

German Democratic Republic (GDR) based on a large body of records available in the archives of the Foreign Ministry and the Socialist Unity Party, as well as on the published memoir of the last GDR ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki. Viewing North Korea's history within the context of the history of other small states within the communist camp, Schäfer pinpoints the distinctive features of the DPRK. After Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's cult of personality at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, GDR officials strongly disap-

In his communications with his East European counterparts, such as Erich Honecker, Kim Il Sung spoke with striking candor about the international and domestic problems facing his embattled state.

mand after Chinese troops entered the war. It was only under Soviet pressure that Kim eventually agreed to the militarily necessary joint command. He likewise resisted placing North Korean railroads under Chinese military management, agreeing to this important step only after he was pressured to do so by the Soviets—a capitulation that, in Shen's estimate, "left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il Sung."

In part two, the Hungarian scholar Balazs Szalontai analyzes North Korean relations with the Soviet Union during the Khrushchev years, drawing on extensive research in the Hungarian archives. Although Hungarian leaders did not develop a special relationship with Kim Il Sung comparable to that of the East Germans, their diplomats were able to gain excellent information on the internal workings of the Kim regime thanks to communications from Koreans who had been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with Hungarian embassy personnel after returning to the DPRK. Comparing North Korea to other communist countries, Szalontai singles out the DPRK's dependence on foreign assistance, despotic political system, and isolationism as its distinguishing characteristics. In addition, Pyongyang's continued rivalry with Seoul shaped North Korea's domestic and foreign policies in distinctive ways. Attributing Moscow's failure to ensure de-Stalinization in the DPRK to Kim Il Sung's skill at exploiting events such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Khrushchev's purge of 1957, as well as to Soviet arrogance, Szalontai presents a persuasive and original analysis of the roots of North Korea's remarkable autonomy. He examines in detail the conflict with Moscow in 1959-60 over Pyongyang's unification plans and the sharp deterioration in relations following the Sino-Soviet split. Szalontai concludes that Kim's victory over the Soviet and Yenan factions in 1959 marked a turning point in Soviet-North Korean relations, after which Pyongyang pursued an increasingly independent and despotic course. Translations of selected documents follow the article.

In part three, the German historian Bernd Schäfer presents a cogent history of North Korea's relations with the

proved of the ongoing cult of Kim Il Sung. They were shocked by the scale of Korean demands for economic assistance and were offended by Pyongyang's refusal to acknowledge the considerable aid it received from its allies. After the Sino-Soviet split erupted into the open, Pyongyang enjoyed the anomalous position of being wooed by both its giant neighbors. Since the GDR had to remain absolutely faithful to the Soviet Union, East German representatives in Pyongyang banded together with their Soviet counterparts to exchange information and discuss the disturbingly unpredictable actions of the North Koreans. East German documents therefore provide important insight into Soviet attitudes toward the Kim Il Sung regime as Moscow attempted to exert leverage over Pyongyang. Schäfer traces the twists and turns in the DPRK's foreign policy as Kim turned back toward Moscow in the wake of Mao's Cultural Revolution, and then opened negotiations with Seoul in response to the Sino-American rapprochement of 1972. The warm personal relations that Kim developed with Erich Honecker following the East German leader's visit to the DPRK in 1977 led to what Schäfer terms "reciprocal byzantinism," the record of which reveals the autocratic delusions of both leaders. Translations of selected documents follow the article.

Part four presents translations of additional documents from the Hungarian National Archives, provided to the Korea Initiative by Csaba Békés of the Cold War History Research Center in Budapest, and a letter from Kim Il Sung to Wladyslaw Gomulka found in the Modern Records Archive in Warsaw by KI advisory board member Vojtech Mastny. A meeting with Hungarian Minister Károly Pásztor in March 1953, during the final phase of the Korean War, provides a starting point by revealing the warm relations that existed between the two countries during the war, buttressed by the material, technical, and educational aid provided by Hungary, and the increased stature Kim Il Sung had gained by the end of the war, despite his humiliating submission to Chinese military control. A meeting with Hungarian Ambassador Pál Szarvas in June 1955 suggests the extent to which domestic

political affairs of any one state were at that time regarded as the common concern of all states within the Soviet bloc. Such solidarity deteriorated sharply in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in Moscow, as revealed in Kim Il Sung's meeting in September 1956 with Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth. A letter from Kim Il Sung a decade later to Wladyslaw Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party, rejecting the Polish proposal to convene a conference of communist parties to discuss coordination of assistance to North Vietnam in its war against the United States, reveals how seriously Kim regarded the disagreements within the communist camp, by then greatly exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet split. The reports from the Hungarian embassies in Pyongyang and Beijing presented in this section are in some respects even more revealing than the records of conversations at the highest level, since they provide more detailed discussions of Pyongyang's domestic and international policies. The Hungarian diplomats reported on issues such as North Korea's approach to the political conference following the Korean War, Kim Il Sung's cult of personality, DPRK relations with the Third World, the complexities of North Korea's unification policy, and the effects of the Sino-Soviet split on the DPRK.

In its third year, the Korea Initiative is examining other East European archives, exploring the sources available in Russia, and continuing its research in East German, Hungarian, and Chinese documents. A second *Bulletin* section will offer additional new evidence indispensable for understanding the frame of mind that accounts for North Korea's continued preeminence as a source of international instability.

Dr. Kathryn Weathersby is a CWIHP Senior Research Scholar and the coordinator of CWIHP's Korea Initiative. Based on extensive research in Russian archives on the Soviet role in North Korea, her numerous publications include: "Should We Fear This?' Stalin and the Danger of War with America," CWIHP Working Paper No. 39, July 2002; "Stalin, Mao and the End of the Korean War," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance (Stanford University Press, 1998); "Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea," CWIHP Bulletin 11 (1998); "New Russian Documents on the Korean War: Introduction and Translations," CWIHP Bulletin 6/7 (1996); "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (1995).

NOTES

¹ Axen visits CC KPSS from 27 Feb—2 March 1973, East German Socialist Unity Party Archive [SAMPO], DY 30 IV B2/2.028 (Buro Norden), File 55. Translated by David Wolff for the conference, "*The Sino-American Opening and the Cold War*," held at George Washington University 8-9 February 2002. I am grateful to David Wolff for drawing my attention to this passage.

² Donald P. Gregg. "A Long Road to Pyongyang" *The Korea Society Quarterly*, Volume 3, Number 1 (Spring 2002), p 7.

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Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War

By Shen Zihua

Translated by Dong Gil Kim and Jeffrey Becker

Scholarship on intra-alliance relations during the Cold War, particularly on the Cold War in Asia, has focused primarily on relations between great powers such as the Soviet Union and China.¹ Relatively little research has been done on the development of relations between larger and smaller countries within the communist camp.² The subject of this case study, Sino-Korean relations during the Korean War, has been characterized as a friendship, forged by shared difficulties, that was “as close as lips to teeth.” While this ancient description of relations between China and Korea aptly describes some aspects of the wartime alliance, the simile fails to capture the significant conflict that existed between the two countries at the highest levels. This paper, which is based on archival documents and the recollections of individuals involved in the events, explores the tensions in Sino-Korean relations at the highest levels during the Korean War and the methods used to mitigate those tensions, which were shaped by the larger pattern of Cold War relations in Asia. Space limitations prevent me from making a comprehensive analysis of the cultural and historical causes behind these tensions and their repercussions, which would shape Sino-Korean relations for the remainder of the Cold War. It is my hope that this paper will serve as a basis for broader future studies on this subject.

China’s Deployment of Troops to North Korea

Based on research into archival materials that have become available in the past several years, scholars have reached a near consensus of opinion that the leadership of the PRC—or at least Chairman Mao Zedong—firmly intended to assist North Korea even before the Korean War began.³ What has not become well known, however, is that the North Korean leadership steadfastly refused to accept Chinese offers of assistance until forced to do so by the UN advance across the 38th parallel.

As Russian archival documents have established, in January 1950 Soviet leader Joseph Stalin informed his North Korean protegee Kim Il Sung that he would support the latter’s request to mount a military offensive against South Korea and would allow Kim to visit Moscow to discuss the matter.⁴ In the three meetings between the Soviet and North Korean leaders that followed, held 10-25 April, Stalin emphasized two preconditions that had to be met before he would give his final approval for military action against South Korea: that he could be assured that the US would not interfere, and that China would agree to support North Korea. Kim assured Stalin that since the DPRK had the support of the USSR and the PRC, the US would refrain from interfering because it would not risk a major war. On the second point, Kim stated that

Mao Zedong had always supported the idea of liberating all of Korea. Kim explained that Mao had repeatedly expressed his view that China would help Korea once it completed its own revolutionary victory, and, if necessary, would provide military assistance. Kim insisted that his own forces were sufficient, however. Stalin nonetheless emphasized that the Soviet Union was not prepared to get directly involved itself in Korea, especially if the United States risked deploying troops, and that Kim therefore had to consult with Mao and obtain his support.⁵

Accordingly, on 13 May Kim secretly visited Beijing and informed Mao of his plan to attack the South. Mao was surprised by this plan, but after he received a telegram from Stalin the following day confirming that the Soviet leader had agreed to the campaign, he expressed his support. In a meeting with Kim on the fifteenth, Mao suggested that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) should fight a quick, decisive war. It should outflank the larger cities, in order to avoid a protracted war, and concentrate instead on destroying the enemy’s main areas of strength. Mao explained that he had intended to help North Korea attack the South once Taiwan was liberated, but since North Korea had decided to attack now and this was their common cause, China was prepared to provide the necessary aid. Mao promised the North Koreans that if the Americans intervened in the war, China would send troops. He also asked whether it was necessary to deploy Chinese forces on the Korean border, and whether they should provide weapons and ammunition. Kim expressed his thanks for this offer, but did not accept it.⁶ In Kim’s view, since Moscow had already agreed to give all necessary support, his trip to China was undertaken only to satisfy Stalin’s order to secure Mao’s approval to launch the war. Consequently, as soon as the meeting with Mao was concluded, Kim announced to Soviet Ambassador N.V. Roshchin, in Mao’s presence, that he and Mao were in complete agreement on the matter.⁷ It is easy to picture how awkward Mao’s position was in front of the smug Kim Il Sung.

The Chinese leadership received no prior notification of the launching of the attack on South Korea on 25 June. They, in fact, learned of it via foreign news services.⁸ Some Chinese leaders resented this lack of notification, but they nonetheless expressed their support for North Korea once the US became directly involved. In early July, the Chinese government agreed to send to the KPA two hundred Chinese cadres of Korean descent who were stationed in China’s Northeast Military Region. At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai informed Ambassador Roshchin that China agreed to the Soviet government’s requests to use the Chinese Changchun Railroad to transport military supplies and to

travel through Chinese air space en route to North Korea.⁹

Chinese leaders also raised the issue of providing military support to the North Koreans during other conversations with Soviet representatives. In a meeting with Ambassador Roshchin on 2 July, Zhou Enlai relayed his government's estimate that the US might increase its forces in Korea by landing in southern ports and proceeding north via railroad. He thus recommended that the KPA hasten its southward push to occupy those ports. He also presciently recommended that the KPA strengthen the defenses around the western port of Inchon, both to protect Seoul and to prevent the US army from landing there. Zhou complained to the Soviet ambassador that the North Korean leaders had ignored Mao's repeated warnings that US military intervention was imminent. He emphasized that if US forces crossed the 38th parallel, China would organize an expeditionary force dressed in North Korean uniforms to engage the US army. Zhou reported that 120,000 troops of the 3rd Army Corps had already assembled in the Northeast, and he hoped the Soviet Union would be able to provide air cover for them.¹⁰ On 4 July, the head of the Chinese intelligence bureau, Zhou Dapeng, even described to Roshchin a plan to transport North Korean forces to South Korea via a port on the Shandong Peninsula, as well as to send Chinese military experts to South Korean battlefields to help the KPA.¹¹

Stalin immediately expressed his support of the Chinese suggestions. "We consider it correct," the Soviet leader wrote to Mao on 5 July, "immediately to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Sino-Korean border for volunteer actions in North Korea in case the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide air cover for these units."¹² Since the Chinese ambassador to North Korea, Ni Zhiliang, was still in China recuperating from illness, Stalin also urged Chinese leaders quickly to dispatch representatives to Korea to increase contact and to resolve the issues involved in China's intervention.¹³ In fact, Zhou Enlai had already on 30 June replaced Ni with Chai Junwu (who would later change his name to Chai Chengwen), with the goal of strengthening ties with North Korea. Before Chai departed, Zhou instructed him:

Right now, the Korean people are on the front lines of the struggle, and we must express support for our Korean comrades. If there is anything else they want us to do, tell them to ask and we will do our best. Maintaining contact between the two parties and armies, and quickly understanding the changing battlefield situations are currently the most important missions of the embassy.¹⁴

Chai Chengwen found it difficult, however, to fulfill this mission because North Korean leaders withheld all information from the Chinese embassy. According to Chai's recollections, Kim Il Sung received him with high protocol as soon as he arrived on 10 July, telling him "if you need anything else, just look for me at any time." He also instructed the Deputy Director of the Chief Political Department of the KPA, So Hwi, to give the Chinese Military Attaché daily briefings

on the battlefield situation. However, the Chinese embassy soon discovered that the briefings delivered by So Hwi were mostly just reports garnered that evening from the North Korean Foreign News Service. Moreover, Chai did not have regular access to top-level Korean leaders. DPRK leaders also declined to answer the Chinese embassy's request for permission to send a vice-attaché to study with the KPA. From his other contacts with North Koreans, Chai formed the opinion that they had been forbidden from sharing any military intelligence with the Chinese. Although Minister of Internal Affairs Pak Il-yu had worked in China and often went to the Chinese embassy for meals, Chai could never discuss the internal military situation due to the strict restrictions and discipline imposed by the North Korean government.¹⁵ At the same time, the Chinese Army's request to send a group of staff officers to North Korea for the purpose of understanding the current battlefield situation was refused.¹⁶

As the KPA's position worsened, the Chinese leaders felt that they had to prepare for military assistance to North Korea. On 11 August, the 13th Army Corp, which had already assembled in the Northeast on Mao's order, conducted a meeting of cadres from all the attached Army Corps and divisions. Gao Gang, head of the Northeast Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, thoroughly explained the purpose and significance of preparing troops to fight abroad, stating that China had to take the initiative and help liberate the North Korean people in order to make Korea an independent, democratic, and unified country. "Going to Korea will be done in the name of the Volunteer Army, [hereafter referred to as the Chinese Volunteer Army, or CVA] wearing North Korean uniform and using the North Korean unit numbers, and flying the flag of the Korean People's Army, and major cadres must adopt Korean names."¹⁷

In meetings with Soviet adviser Pavel Yudin on 19 and 28 August, Mao stated that if the US army continued to escalate its troop numbers, the North Koreans would be unable to cope and would need direct assistance from China.¹⁸ That was the only way they could defeat the US army and postpone the outbreak of a third world war. Recent intelligence had made it clear that the US had decided quickly to increase its troop strength in Korea on a grand scale. Chinese leaders reminded the North Korean leaders that they needed to prepare for the worst in the war. Even though they did not directly refer to the issue of the entry of Chinese troops, the implication was clear. In August and early September, Mao met twice with North Korean representative Lee Sang Cho to discuss the progress of the war. Mao pointed out that the KPA's mistake was in not preparing sufficient reserve forces while deploying their troops on a broad front, and in conquering territory rather than destroying the enemy. Mao specifically pointed out that the enemy might suddenly attack the key areas from Inchon to Seoul and from Nampo to Pyongyang, and the Koreans should therefore consider retreating and redeploying their troops to protect these areas. CCP Politburo member Liu Shaoqi also pointed out that it would be necessary to prepare the people for the possibility

of a protracted war.¹⁹

The North Korean officials paid no heed to Chinese suggestions, even though these recommendations included warnings from Soviet advisers.²⁰ One reason is that their estimates for the war were overly optimistic. On 4 September, when Chai told Kim that the war was locked in a stalemate, the North Korean leader declared confidently that the Pusan campaign had already begun and that as soon as the highly

should play upon western fears that China and the Soviet Union would enter the war and “take steps to show our intentions.” Roshchin agreed to report immediately to Moscow, and suggested dispatching a cadre to Korea to clarify the situation and remove any misconceptions. On the twentieth Moscow responded that for North Korea not to provide Beijing with military intelligence was “abnormal,” but due to inexperience.²⁴ Moscow also agreed with Beijing’s recom-

Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war.

trained strike forces went forward, the KPA would break the deadlock. When asked about the Americans’ ability to land troops behind the North Korean frontline, Kim answered “we estimate that presently, a US counterattack is not possible; they do not possess sufficient troop support, and therefore a landing in our rear ports would be difficult.”²¹

The North Koreans believed in a quick victory and also had a tendency towards adventurism. Chai reported that North Korean leaders had initially not planned on US intervention and had predicted victory within a month. Even after the US entered the war, they repeated the slogans “solve the problem before 15 August,” and “August is the month of victory.” We can see from their mobilization of large groups of technicians and students for military service and their serious waste of manpower and financial resources that the North Koreans had decided to “put all their eggs in one basket.” Chai returned to China on 10 September to deliver his report, and after his return to Pyongyang, told Kim, on Zhou’s order, that he hoped the North Korean army would consider a strategic withdrawal. Unmoved, Kim answered only, “I have never considered retreat.”²²

The North Koreans were thus not prepared to invite the Chinese to send troops, if for no other reason than the severe disagreements between China and North Korea concerning the state of the war and strategic planning. After the successful UN landing at Inchon, however, the situation changed completely. The Chinese leaders felt that sending troops to Korea was already unavoidable.²³ When Zhou met with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin and Moscow’s military attaché on 18 September he asked first about the situation in Korea, complaining that except for what they read in the newspapers and heard from Pyongyang Radio, the Chinese leaders knew nothing about the war situation. Even the Chinese ambassador to Pyongyang was unable to receive reports concerning the progress of the war. Zhou also pointed out that he had little contact with North Korean leaders regarding military matters and that the Chinese leadership did not even understand the basic strategies of the KPA. China had once attempted to send a high-level military mission to observe the developing situation, but to date, Pyongyang had not responded. Zhou suggested that if the KPA did not have sufficient reserve troops, they should withdraw their main forces north and establish reserve assault forces. They

should play upon western fears that China and the Soviet Union would enter the war and “take steps to show our intentions.” Roshchin agreed to report immediately to Moscow, and suggested dispatching a cadre to Korea to clarify the situation and remove any misconceptions. On the twentieth Moscow responded that for North Korea not to provide Beijing with military intelligence was “abnormal,” but due to inexperience.²⁴ Moscow also agreed with Beijing’s recom-

mendation that the main force of the People’s Army should withdraw north. On 21 September Liu Shaoqi again reported to Roshchin that the CVA’s morale was high. If necessary, they would be willing to fight, and they were confident they could defeat the American armed forces. Chinese leaders believed that if the US threatened the existence of North Korea, the Chinese would have to aid their Korean comrades. On the same day Zhou told Roshchin that except for being told by Kim that “the Korean people were prepared for a long war,” Beijing had received no further information from Pyongyang.²⁵ Although Stalin’s personal representative to Pyongyang, General Matvei V. Zakharov, had urged Kim to seek Chinese aid,²⁶ it was only a week later, on 28 September, that the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party called an emergency meeting to discuss the issue. After heated debate, the Politburo unanimously decided that once Seoul fell, there would be no way to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel, and if they did so, it would be impossible for the remnants of the KPA to offer any effective resistance. Faced with imminent defeat, North Korean leaders unanimously agreed to send formal letters to Stalin and Mao requesting direct military assistance from the Soviet Union and China. Despite Stalin’s explicit warnings to Kim in April that he would not send Soviet troops to Korea if the Americans intervened, North Korean leaders nonetheless first turned to Moscow.

Before sending the letter to Stalin, Kim Il Sung asked Soviet Ambassador Shtykov how best to broach the subject of requesting Soviet troops. Shtykov avoided his question, and a “confused, lost, hopeless, and desperate” Kim Il Sung and his Foreign Minister Pak Hon-yong swallowed their pride and sent the letter to Moscow.²⁷ Stalin replied on 1 October that the best plan was to send the CVA, after first consulting with the Chinese.²⁸ With no other choice, Kim urgently summoned the Chinese ambassador late that night and requested that China send the 13th Army Corps, which had already been deployed along the Yalu River, to support the North Korean war effort.²⁹

Two factors led the North Korean leaders initially to refuse direct military assistance from China. The first was Kim’s excessive confidence in his estimates of the military situation. The second was the long history of Chinese interference in Korean affairs, which gave North Korean leaders

cause for alarm. For these two reasons, Kim preferred to depend on Soviet aid and avoid having China intervene in the war. Even after Chinese troops entered the war, these two issues would continue to strain Sino-Korean relations.

Creating a Unified Sino-North Korean Command

Due to the difference of opinion between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships as to whether to send Soviet air force units to provide cover for Chinese troops, the dispatch of Chinese forces to Korea was repeatedly delayed. However, Mao's personal commitment to the cause never wavered.³⁰ When Zhou went to the Soviet Union to discuss the issue of military equipment and air cover, the Chinese and North Koreans were already discussing specific issues concerning Chinese troop deployment. However, because of the pressing situation, the two sides had not yet had time to discuss command, communication, re-supply and transportation, much less arrive at an agreement on these matters.

On 8 October, Mao informed Kim Il Sung that China had decided to send troops, and asked that Pak Il-u meet with Gao Gang and CVA Commander Peng Dehuai in Shenyang to discuss the various issues involved. At dusk that day, Pak arrived in Shenyang, and on Kim's orders, urged the Chinese to send troops immediately to control the areas of Hamhung and Sinuiju, an intervention necessitated by the continued escalation of the American troop presence. He also specified that the CVA would use only North Korean currency while in the DPRK, for which they would be reimbursed later according to the exchange rate. Their firewood would be purchased by the local North Korean governments, and supplied to the Chinese army according to market price. Pak explained that Kim Il Sung was then in Tokchon, and that he was of the opinion that the CVA command should be established there. The issue of joint command for Chinese and Korean forces was thus raised. According to Chai's observations, Kim's initial thinking was rather simplistic. Considering the urgent circumstances, he believed that since he had asked China to send troops to help the KPA, the power to command those troops would naturally belong to Korean leaders. Only after receiving word that China was preparing to send several hundred thousand troops to Korea did he understand the enormity of the situation. He then realized that it was not feasible to have Koreans command the CVA, and suggested that the two sides merge their command structures.³¹

Naturally, Peng saw the situation differently. First, Stalin had clearly stated in his telegram of 1 October that "the CVA must naturally be commanded by Chinese leaders."³² Second, their experience in Korea made the Chinese question the North Korean command capability. In his report to the Central Military Commission, Peng stated:

The Korean Party's recruitment situation is extremely serious. All men between the ages of 16 and 45 have been inducted into service. No one is caring for the families of drafted workers, and the masses have nothing to eat. There are no long-term plans, and adventurism

is all one can see! Military control has been extremely childish. On the nineteenth Pyongyang issued an order to defend to the death. As a result, 30,000 defenders could not escape [from advancing UN forces]. The North Koreans agreed to conduct party and political work in the KPA, but they have not agreed to construct a political commission system.

After the Shenyang meeting, Peng Dehuai exclaimed to Chai Chengwen, "I have a responsibility to the Chinese and Korean people, and to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers!"³³ In Peng's view, there was simply no question of giving North Koreans control over Chinese forces. He did not even understand the views the North Koreans advocated concerning the command of their own troops. The KPA's main force had already been routed, and new troops were currently organizing and training in China. It was impossible for them to participate directly in military maneuvers. This was not the time to point out such facts, however, so when Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai met for the first time on 21 October, neither leader raised the issue of a unified command structure. During their discussions about how to coordinate the actions of their two armies, Kim agreed to send Pak Il-u to serve as Peng's liaison officer.³⁴ On 25 September, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party formally appointed Pak as Assistant Commander of the CVA, Assistant Political Director and Assistant Secretary of the Party Committee.³⁵

With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified control of the two armies gradually reappeared on the agenda. During the first campaign, Peng repeatedly reported that the lack of coordination between the Chinese and North Koreans caused confusion over language, problems with Chinese unfamiliarity with the terrain, and the obstruction of roads from party, government, army, and civilian withdrawal, as a result of which "the CVA's ability to fight has been hindered."³⁶ Of special importance were the many incidents in which the Volunteer Army was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops. One such incident occurred on 4 November, when the 39th Volunteer Army encircled the US 24th Division southeast of Pochon. There they were mistakenly attacked by a KPA tank division that had been ordered to proceed to Sunchon, and the US forces were consequently able to escape. Re-supply and transportation efforts were also hampered by a lack of coordination.³⁷

Because of such problems, Peng asked the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang to raise the issue of a coordinated command structure with Kim Il Sung, hoping that the KPA would relocate its headquarters closer to the CVA. Since Shtykov supported Peng's suggestion, Kim on 7 November reluctantly agreed to the Chinese proposal to open new fronts in the enemy's rear areas. He accordingly decided to send the Bang Hosan and Choi Inyang Army Corps behind enemy lines. However, although Kim continued to send advisers to act as liaison officers and trade intelligence, he did not agree to relocate the army's headquarters or to establish any kind of unified command. Kim disregarded Peng's personal letter

explaining the Chinese policy regarding prisoners of war (POW), which was prompted by North Korea's severe mistreatment of prisoners, particularly British and American embassy workers. Kim agreed to allow the CVA to help return Korean deserters to service, but in actuality planned to try them for treason.³⁸

Peng next asked the Central Military Commission to relay a message to Kim that the KPA's 6th Division still had

Peng's suggestion, reading:

I hope Comrade Kim and Comrade Shtykov will remain in the front line, and that Kim, Shtykov, and Peng will form a three-man group to decide military policy, including the establishment of military organization, the conduct of the war on the front and behind enemy lines, and all the working policies related to the war effort. In

With the expansion of the war, the issue of unified control of the two armies gradually reappeared. [...] Of special importance were the many incidents in which the Volunteer Army was mistakenly attacked by North Korean troops.

more than 6,200 soldiers, who had merged with the CVA's 125th Division. He hoped those men could remain with the Volunteer Army, but Kim refused. Later, more than 5,000 men of the 7th Division merged with the 125th Volunteer Army Division, and again Peng requested that those men remain. Kim did not respond. The North Korean leaders and Soviet military advisors also opposed Peng's proposal to withdraw several kilometers and prepare ambushes. They proposed instead that the CVA continue to pursue the enemy south along the Chongchon River.³⁹

At the core of these problems lay the issue of who was in command of the army. In order to solve the problem, Mao decided to invite the top-level commanders of the two armies for face-to-face talks, hoping to coordinate the positions of the two sides and to gain Moscow's support. On 15 November, Kim and Shtykov were invited to the CVA headquarters, and Gao Gang joined them from Shenyang. As soon as the meeting began, Peng stated frankly that the command structures of the two armies must be unified. Gao explained that because the Korean peninsula was so narrow, tactics required a combined command structure. Shtykov stated clearly that command should be exercised by the Chinese. He criticized the KPA for losing battles despite using the Soviet Union's best equipment, and praised the CVA for being able to neutralize large numbers of enemy troops despite having inferior equipment. In his opinion, there was no doubt that the Chinese should command.

When it was his turn, however, Kim spoke only of the current status of the KPA and did not mention the issue of a unified command structure. Given the pressing situation, Peng took the initiative and proposed his own plan, according to which he, Kim, and Shtykov would form a three-man group that would consult each other concerning problems and would exercise power through a unified command structure. Kim gave no response at all to this suggestion, and Shtykov was not able to respond without instructions from Moscow. They therefore decided to defer the issue until the end of the second campaign, at which time they would meet again for discussions.⁴⁰

On 13 November Mao sent a telegram to Stalin relaying

order to reach agreement, which will benefit the war effort, we agree with these suggestions and ask for your instructions. If you agree, please instruct your officers to advise comrades Shtykov and Kim appropriately. Right now, the most important issue is the unification of military and government policy of the leaders of the three countries of Korea, the Soviet Union, and China. If the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer Army can cooperate, coming together according to your suggestions (while preserving the institutions of the Korean People's Army) then victory is assured.⁴¹

On the seventeenth Mao sent a telegram to Peng and Gao informing them that Stalin had completely endorsed the plan of the Chinese comrades to establish a joint command structure and had sent a telegram to that effect to Kim and Shtykov. Mao instructed Peng to observe Kim's reaction to this development.⁴²

Once the Soviet Union made its position clear, Kim expressed a desire to go to Beijing for discussions with Mao. At a subsequent meeting on 3 December, Kim stated that Stalin, in his telegram, had agreed to a Sino-Korean joint command.⁴³ Kim further stated that because the CVA had experience, they should take the lead role while the Korean comrades would take supporting roles, which the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party had agreed to. After the meeting, Zhou Enlai drafted the "Sino-Korean Bilateral Agreement Regarding the Establishment of Sino-Korean Joint Command."⁴⁴ The main points of the agreement were that Mao recommended Peng to serve as Commander and Political Commissioner, while Kim recommended Kim Ung as Vice-Commander and Pak Il-u as Vice Political Commissioner. The KPA and all garrison forces, as well as the CVA, would be jointly directed by the unified command. All orders would be passed through the general headquarters of the KPA and the headquarters of the CVA. The unified command was given the power to direct all means of transportation related to the war effort (highways, railroads, ports, airports), as well as wire and wireless telephone and telegram communications, grain storage and the mobilization of manpower and resources.

The unified command would report and make suggestions to the North Korean government—based on the actual situation and the needs of the war—concerning rear mobilization work, supplemental training, and the reestablishment of local administration in Korea. The unified command would be responsible for clearing all news items concerning the war and distributing them to the Korean news agency, which would publish them in the name of the general headquarters of the KPA.

After Kim returned to Korea, he met with Peng again on 7 December in a very friendly atmosphere to discuss specific matters. The two leaders agreed to set up a unified command structure within several days, and Kim guaranteed that there would be no further interference in the military command. He also accepted the Chinese suggestion to abolish the previously deployed 3rd Army, and ordered them to merge with the Volunteer Army 9th Group.⁴⁵ Peng was satisfied with the situation and repeatedly pointed out that “the bravery and stubborn spirit of the People’s Army and its strict military command system are worthy of study.” He ordered the cadres of the 9th Military Group to study and learn from the situation of the Korean 3rd Army Corp, in order to “relay realistically the experience of the Chinese army in political and local work.” But should conflict arise with the established Korean system, the Chinese army “should not be harsh and unyielding.”⁴⁶

In early January 1951, Stalin’s envoy to Beijing, Semen Egorovich Zakharov announced that two divisions of the Soviet air force had recently entered Korea, and were providing two lines of air cover from Jian to Jiang Jie, and from Andong to Anju. In addition, by early April, the Chinese planned to send five air force divisions, and three Korean air force divisions were already participating in the war. Consequently, the Chinese expressed a desire to create a unified air force command structure. After consultations, a Sino-Korean unified command structure was established based on the coordinated command structure.⁴⁷

Thus, under pressure from Moscow, China and Korea were able to resolve the issue of joint command of their armed forces. Unlike the joint command of US and UN forces, which had been accomplished smoothly, the unified command of Chinese and Korean forces was only accomplished with great difficulty. The Koreans were concerned about national sovereignty. Korea’s long-standing relationship with China as a subsidiary and tributary state made handing over the command of their army very difficult for them to accept. For the Chinese, victory was paramount. Both in military power and in combat experience, the Chinese held a clear advantage. Thus, from a realistic viewpoint, it was essential to place the joint command in the hands of the Volunteer Army.

The Debate Over Advancing South of the 38th Parallel

After the CVA’s victorious second campaign, which pushed the front line toward the 38th parallel, Peng Dehuai requested permission for his forces to regroup. He reported to Beijing that due to the recent victories, the Korean Work-

ers Party, the North Korean government, as well as the army and the people were all in high spirits and looking for a quick victory. “The Soviet ambassador has said that the American army has retreated and [he] wanted our army to advance quickly. This was not only the attitude of the Soviet ambassador, but also the request of the majority of comrades in the North Korean Party.” Peng, however, believed “the Korean campaign was still difficult and long-term. Because the enemy had shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy and the front lines had shortened and narrowed, enemy military power had become more concentrated, which benefited the UN forces.” Though enemy morale was lower, they still had approximately 260,000 soldiers and would not retreat from Korea. Consequently, he urged that the CVA “adopt a plan of gradual advancement.”⁴⁸ For political reasons, however, Mao overruled these suggestions and ordered the volunteer forces immediately to launch the third campaign and cross the 38th parallel.⁴⁹

With regard to tactics, Mao approved Peng’s recommendation to advance gradually and agreed that after crossing the 38th parallel, the main army forces (including the KPA) should withdraw several kilometers to rest and regroup.⁵⁰ Peng’s forecast proved accurate. Although the third campaign resulted in the KPA/CVA advance across the 38th parallel and the capture of Seoul, UN forces managed to carry out an orderly retreat. Thus, although the Sino-Korean army captured some territory, it did not inflict many casualties on the enemy. On 3 January 1951, Peng informed Kim Il Sung by telegram that the enemy had quickly retreated after its defenses had been broken, and the victory was therefore not very meaningful. Only 3,000 troops were captured. If the enemy continued to escape southward, the KPA/CVA would pursue them to Suwon and await orders, Peng explained. The third campaign would pause to reorganize and re-supply after Seoul, Inchon, Suwon, and Hongchon were taken. If the enemy mounted a heavy defense of Seoul, the CVA would not launch a strong attack, since conditions were not yet favorable.⁵¹ Mao relayed Peng’s decision to Stalin.⁵² Because the CVA was exhausted, like an arrow at the end of its flight, and “the enemy is trying to lure us into a trap along the Naktong River and lure us into assaulting its fortified position,”⁵³ on 8 January Peng ordered the advance to halt. This decision left the North Koreans extremely dissatisfied, and they strongly opposed it. In light of the lessons learned from earlier setbacks during the war, Kim agreed to regroup for two months after crossing the 38th parallel, but in his heart he still hoped to claim a quick victory. He was diplomatic, however, always pushing Pak Hon-yong and the newly appointed Soviet ambassador V.N.Razuvaev to the forefront. The day the attack halted, Kim told Chai Chengwen that the process of regrouping and reorganizing should not last very long, that one month should be sufficient. If too much time passed, he explained, the rivers and rice paddies would begin to thaw, hampering troop movements, while the enemy was attempting to slow the pace of the war in order to rest their forces and re-supply.⁵⁴

Kim was prepared to meet with Peng to discuss the

issue, and Peng agreed to send a telegram with Kim's proposal to Mao immediately. The CVA commander nonetheless maintained that his army had to regroup and rest.⁵⁵ On the morning of 9 January, when Zakharov was informed that the CVA and KPA had already stopped their advance, he expressed his objections, stating that he had never heard of any victorious army in the world not pursuing its enemies and not taking advantage of victory. This halt would give the enemy a chance to catch its breath and would thus squander the advantage that had been won. Even after listening to a patient explanation by Nie Rongzhen, Zakharov held to his opinion.⁵⁶ At this point, Stalin resolved the issue by sending a telegram stating that in order to avoid international condemnation of China, the CVA should remain north of the 38th parallel and its two coastal regions, while allowing the KPA to continue its southward advance. Mao immediately relayed this message to Peng.⁵⁷

On the evening of 10 January, Chai Chengwen accompanied Kim to Peng's headquarters, where Peng analyzed their military situation, emphasizing that their forces needed to regroup so that, after full preparation, they could destroy even more of the enemy during the next campaign. Kim agreed to regroup for one month. Peng thought that pushing the enemy right now might force them to relinquish a little more territory. But prematurely forcing them into a narrow region around Pusan would not help to divide and conquer the UN forces. Kim argued that even if they could not exterminate the enemy, it was still important to expand territory under CVA control. Peng replied that exterminating the enemy was better than expanding territory, because after the enemy army was destroyed, they would naturally gain territory. Kim, however, held his ground, arguing that it would be beneficial to have more territory and additional population under KPA control when the post-war elections and peace settlement took place. Peng replied that it was not necessary to consider this; the most important thing at present was to win victories and annihilate the enemy. Since the two could not agree, Peng showed Kim the telegram from Mao Zedong on the ninth. Kim still would not give ground, however, claiming that he was not expressing his individual opinion, but the collective opinion of the Politburo of the Korean Workers Party. To reinforce this point, Kim called Pak Hon-yong to join the meeting.⁵⁸

On 11 January, Peng received an emergency telegram from Mao concerning Kim's proposal to shorten the rest and reorganization period. Based on Stalin's telegram, Mao suggested that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th People's Army Corps be deployed at the First Corps' line south of the Han river, while the CVA would withdraw to Inchon and north of the Han river, to rest and reorganize for two or three months. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon and Seoul and the KPA would be re-supplied with the soldiers training in north-eastern China. If Kim felt it was unnecessary to re-supply and reorganize the Korean troops, they could continue their advance and the North Korean government could directly command their movements. The CVA would take charge of defending Inchon, Seoul, and the areas north of the 38th

Parallel.

That day at dusk, Peng Dehuai, Kim Il Sung, and Pak Hon-yong had a very heated debate. Kim and Pak thought that Stalin's idea of sending the KPA ahead alone was a sign that they held the advantage, and that the American troops would retreat from Korea. Pak mentioned several recent news items and intelligence reports provided by the Soviet Union indicating that the US army would soon withdraw from the Korean peninsula. The enemy would, however, not leave unless the Sino-Korean forces pursued them, Pak maintained, because they needed an excuse. Peng retorted that if the Chinese and Koreans did not pursue, the Americans could still withdraw on their own, with a perfectly good excuse. Pak stated once more that unless they pursued the Americans, the UN forces would not withdraw. China and Korea should utilize the internal contradictions of the American capitalist class, Pak declared. Peng replied that it was only after Sino-Korean forces had destroyed a few more US divisions that these contradictions would deepen. Only after the CVA had regrouped could it continue to fight.

Kim intervened at this point, repeating his idea of sending the 3rd Volunteer Army Corps south within half a month, then sending the remaining forces forward after a month's rest. Losing patience, Peng raised his voice and emotionally declared that their ideas were wrong and that they were dreaming.

In the past, you said that the US would never send troops. You never thought about what you would do if they did send troops. Now you say that the American army will definitely withdraw from Korea, but you are not considering what to do if the American army doesn't withdraw. You are just hoping for a quick victory and are not making concrete preparations, and this is only going to prolong the war. You are hoping to end this war based on luck. You are gambling with the fate of the people, and that's only going to lead this war to disaster. To reorganize and re-supply, the Volunteer Army needs two months, not one day less, maybe even three [months]. Without considerable preparation, not one division can advance south. I resolutely oppose this mistake you are making in misunderstanding the enemy. If you think I am not doing my job well, you can fire me, court marshal me, or even kill me.

Basing his remarks on a telegram from Mao, Peng Dehuai told Kim that the CVA would be responsible for all coastal defense, rear maintenance, transportation, and defense from north of the line between Inchon and Yangyang. "The 4th Army Corps, consisting of about 120,000 men, has already had approximately two months' rest. Command them yourself; let them advance south as you see fit. If the American army really does withdraw from Korea as you think, I will happily exclaim 'long live the liberation of Korea.' If the American army does not withdraw, the CVA will go ahead and attack south as planned." Under these circumstances, Kim had no choice but to admit that because the KPA was not pre-

pared, and had not recovered its strength, it could not advance alone. He admitted that he had hoped for quick victory, and reluctantly agreed to the CVA plan to regroup for two months. In the end, the two sides decided to call a joint meeting of top officers of the two armies to share experiences and unify their thinking.⁵⁹

After Stalin was informed of the argument concerning the military command, he stated in a telegram, “the leadership of the CVA is correct. Undoubtedly, the truth lies with com-

the war to an early end.⁶³

The Struggle Over Railroad Management

Because of the successful UN counter offensive in the spring of 1951, the Sino-Korean plan to regroup was not carried out. After armistice negotiations opened in July 1951, the war became a matter of “negotiating while fighting.” This new situation highlighted the importance of the Sino-Korean army’s supply line, and as a result, the conflict between China

Beijing was in agreement with Pyongyang and Moscow in wishing to use military means to force UN troops off the Korean peninsula and solve the Korean problem completely.

mander Peng Dehuai.” He praised Peng’s ability to defeat the supremely powerful American imperialist forces using inferior equipment, and said that he was a military genius. Stalin also criticized the Soviet ambassador for lacking understanding of military matters, and forbade him to interfere with Peng again.⁶⁰ At this point, Mao also stepped up the pressure. On 14 January he sent a telegram to Kim pointing out:

In the next two to three months, the Chinese Volunteers and the Korean troops must carry out serious and major work, in particular to replenish the troops with newly trained soldiers, to make sure that the newly trained soldiers imitate the experience of the old soldiers, to strengthen the troop armaments, to rebuild the railways, to lay in store food and ammunition, to improve the work of transport and the rear service. Carrying out this work can secure the final victory.

Mao believed that “it is necessary for us to prepare well so that it will be possible to continue the fight. We might repeat the mistakes the Korean troops allowed between June and September 1950... The Chinese and Korean comrades must be patient and carry out the necessary preparations.” The next day Mao sent a copy of this telegram to Stalin.⁶¹

During meetings with Peng from 16-18 January, Kim admitted that the idea of the KPA advancing south alone was risky. The Politburo then discussed the matter and decided that the Chinese were correct in suggesting that in order to conduct better offensives in the future, it was necessary to spend two months reorganizing.⁶² From a military perspective, Peng’s plan was the more realistic for many reasons. The naïve enthusiasm of North Korean leaders was clearly influenced by political factors. But the disagreement between the Chinese and North Koreans was only over tactics, not overall strategy. Beijing was in agreement with Pyongyang and Moscow in wishing to use military means to force UN troops off the Korean peninsula and solve the Korean problem completely. It was in this spirit that Mao and Kim ignored UN calls for a cease-fire, losing a good opportunity to bring

and North Korea over how to manage the railroad system intensified. Due to the severe damage to the Korean infrastructure inflicted by American bombing and the difficulties of operating on foreign soil, the CVA faced a supply shortage. The army could not get supplies locally, and because the American army was so well equipped and maneuverable, getting supplies delivered in a timely manner was difficult. Most goods and equipment were imported from China and had to travel along lengthy, difficult mountain routes. Road conditions were extremely poor, and the CVA faced a shortage of transportation from the very beginning. Moreover, US planes continued to bomb day and night, causing great damage and placing even greater strain and importance on railroad transportation.⁶⁴

Already in the late fall of 1950 Peng Dehuai had requested that the Northeastern Bureau of the Party take steps to strengthen rail transportation, including establishing a unified management structure with the Koreans. He had also asked the central government to dispatch railway soldiers to Korea to improve maintenance ability. A group of railroad soldiers and workers was immediately dispatched and began working alongside the KPA railroad construction forces and the Korean railway workers.⁶⁵ Peng then met with Gao Gang on 16 November to suggest the establishment of a joint Sino-Korean railway command.⁶⁶ Chinese representatives were sent to Korea to discuss the issue and attempted several times to meet with Korean officials, but with little result. Only after Kim’s trip to Beijing to speak with Chinese leaders on 3 December did the two sides arrive at an agreement in principle.⁶⁷ In late December, the Chinese established the Northeastern Military District Railroad Transportation Command (later renamed the Northeastern Military District Military Transportation Command), headed by Chinese military and political officers. At the same time, the Korean Railroad Military Management Bureau in Qiu Chang was established, managed by both Chinese and North Koreans.⁶⁸

Following a January 1951 meeting in Shenyang between representatives of the logistical department of each CVA army corps and the relevant departments of the Northeast People’s

Government,⁶⁹ railroad transportation was restored to service.⁷⁰ However, the basic contradictions in logistical work were still unresolved. Besides the destruction caused by US bombing, the most serious problem was the chaos surrounding the internal management of railroad transportation, which still lacked unified coordination. Because the various departments and work units were not cooperating, but were constantly emphasizing their own importance and fighting with each other for vehicles, there was constant conflict and friction. Lack of manpower was a greater than the paucity of vital materials. Moreover, enemy forces occupying mountain caves near the front succeeded in delaying trains. The area north of the Hee Chun caves was severely congested. At the end of December 1951, there was a backup of 329 train cars which had yet to arrive at their destination.⁷¹

Even though the Railroad Management Bureau had been established, a great rift still existed between the Chinese and Koreans. The two sides had not yet decided whether to adopt a military management system or simply institute a system of military representatives. They also debated whether military supplies or supplies for civilian use and economic construction would be given priority. Moreover, the Bureau's organization had not yet been completed, and the ideological consciousness and morale of railway personnel was low. Rail transport thus continued to face extremely difficult problems. Peng complained to Mao that "if we don't find a way to resolve this quickly, it will definitely prolong the war."⁷²

Keeping the railroad running smoothly and safely was the most pressing concern related to joint coordination and unified command. When Kim Il Sung visited Beijing in early December, the two sides worked out the basic principles for the establishment of a joint Sino-Korean rail transportation command structure. Alluding to the objections among Koreans that such an arrangement would violate their national sovereignty, Kim told Chai Chengwen after his return from Beijing that "previously, we discussed the issue of a military management system for the railroad many times, but on our side, there were always some who did not understand that without military victory, principled discussions would be pointless." He stated to Chai that the matter had been taken care of in Beijing and asked him to "please inform Comrade Gao Gang and let him appoint railway personnel."⁷³ However, the discussions between the two sides proved to be extremely difficult.

On 19 February 1951 chief Chinese negotiators Ye Lin (Minister of Transportation for the Northeast Government of China), Zhang Mingyuan (Vice-Commander of the East Logistical Corps), and Peng Min (a railway soldier), reported that during negotiations, the North Koreans frequently did not put enough thought into issues, and the ideas they raised often contradicted each other. Moreover, the Koreans objected to the Chinese principle to "see first to the transportation needs of the army," and instead thought more about North Korean economic recovery. Pak Hon-yong commented that economics is politics. The issue was thus left to Kim and Gao to resolve by themselves.

The Koreans also requested that the North Korean Min-

istry of Transportation participate in the management of the railroad. They agreed to establish a joint military transportation command structure headed by the Chinese and led by the Sino-Korean joint command, but they insisted that the new structure work together with the DPRK Ministry of Transportation. Pak suggested that China also establish a unit similar to the Korean Military Transportation Bureau, and he opposed instituting a system of military management for the railroads. He suggested instead that they restore the old Korean management bureaus, incorporating into them the provisional railroad management bureau that had already been established.⁷⁴

By mid-March, the two sides still had rather different opinions on the basic principles of railroad management. Merging military management and railroad administration during wartime was an effective way to maximize the efficiency of the railroad, and a railroad military management bureau was a form of organization through which China and Korea could implement joint military management. The North Koreans therefore could not oppose this point directly. Instead, they established their own military transportation bureau to control the railroads and take over the work of the original management bureau (Order No. 21 of the transportation ministry). This action weakened and limited the Military Management Bureau, and made it unable to exercise full power.

To resolve this problem as quickly as possible, Zhou compromised, agreeing that "aside from maintaining the established unified military management command, and jointly conducting railroad repair, during the present situation the Korean railroad administration will still manage the Korean railroads." Kim expressed his basic agreement with this proposal, but during talks between the Chinese representative and the minister of the North Korean Transportation Department, the Koreans raised additional demands. Not only should railroad administration be directed by the DPRK Transportation Minister, but the Military Management Bureau should not be responsible for developing plans. Its role would be restricted to inspecting and supervising railway transportation. The North Koreans also demanded that railway maintenance work have a separate organization headed by the DPRK Ministry of Transportation.

In actuality, these demands amounted to canceling the Sino-Korean joint military organization. Given the unpredictability of the North Koreans during negotiations and the rift in basic thinking between the two sides, the Chinese representative believed the problem to be very complicated. Even though an agreement had been reached on paper, it was still difficult to change anything in actual practice. He thus requested that "an authoritative and influential comrade be dispatched again to discuss the matter further." Peng suggested that he offer for Kim's consideration the opinion of the transportation minister, and let the two governments meet to resolve the matter. He requested only that the Koreans "guarantee timely completion of all military transportation work [and] confirm the particulars of railroad management and transportation."⁷⁵

Shortly thereafter, Gao Gang offered five suggestions

that he believed were in accordance with North Korean principles: 1) to continue the military management system of the Korean railroad, but institute a military representative system and establish military representatives at all levels, under a joint transportation command headed by the Chinese. Military representatives would have final decisions over all military transportation matters; 2) the Joint Transportation Command established in Shenyang would appoint one person to the DPRK Transportation Ministry to serve as chief representative with the power to supervise implementation of plans for military transportation; 3) the Korean side would guarantee that the Joint Transportation Command, and its chief representatives and military representatives at all levels, would have uninterrupted telephone communication; 4) a unified maintenance command, would be established under the unified transportation command and directed by the Korean Ministry of Transportation (MKT); 5) Chinese railroad workers in North Korea would be led by the Korean Railroad Bureau, but their political work would be directly under the Chinese military representative.

With these basic principles, the Chinese negotiated again with the Korean Transportation Minister. Except for the issue of who had authority over the maintenance command, about which the Koreans did not take a clear position, they basically accepted Gao's five points, but demanded confirmation that the Korean Transportation Command would have jurisdiction over railway management bureaus. The Koreans agreed in principle to open the entire network to railroad traffic, and to establish a unified transportation command that would determine and approve the ratio of military materials transported to the ratio of civilian economic materials transported. The Koreans also asked China to send people to serve in vice-chairman posts in each management bureau controlled by the Ministry of Transportation. Zhou consequently asked the Chinese representatives to include in the records a statement regarding who had authority over the unified maintenance command, and agreed that Ye, Zhang, and Peng should sign the records and bring the entire document to Beijing.⁷⁶ It was precisely at this point that Moscow's opinion was received, which changed things completely.

According to Zhang Mingyuan's observations, the stumbling block was the question of who would control the Joint Transportation Command. The Chinese representative pointed out that because most of the Korean railroads and trains had been destroyed, the majority of trains in service on Korean rails were those brought over from China. Moreover, most of the maintenance and transportation troops and train crews were also Chinese, and even the equipment used for maintenance and supplies for the Korean railway crews were the responsibility of the Chinese. This being the case, it would be difficult for the Koreans to conduct the normal operations of rail transport. Therefore, for the duration of the war, the Chinese should control the Sino-Korean railroad transportation effort. But the Koreans and Soviet advisors stubbornly maintained that the management of railroad transportation involved questions of national sovereignty, and therefore must be controlled by the Koreans. In response to this, Zhou

pointed out that the source of the problem may not lie in Pyongyang, but rather in Moscow, and expressed his desire to negotiate with the Soviets to find an appropriate solution.⁷⁷

On the day Zhou sent a telegram to the Chinese representatives instructing them to prepare to sign the agreement, Stalin sent his own telegram, which made clear the Soviet position. The full text of the telegram reads:

Our consul in Shenyang, Ledovsky, has just sent us a telegram explaining Comrade Gao Gang's view that for the purpose of correct organization and transportation of military materials to the front, the Korean railroad should be managed by the Chinese command. From the consul's report, it is clear that Prime Minister Kim supports this idea, but the Korean ministers seem opposed to it. They believe this plan is detrimental to Korean sovereignty. If you need my opinion, and the opinion of the CPSU CC, then we feel we must tell you we completely support Comrade Gao Gang's opinion. In order to proceed smoothly with the war of liberation, it is absolutely necessary to adopt this plan. In general, we believe that for the good of Korea itself, a more intimate national relationship must be built between Korea and China.⁷⁸

Zhou immediately forwarded this telegram to Gao and Peng, telling them to "continue to strive to place the unified railroad maintenance command under the direction of the unified command or unified transportation command, or place the Korean railroad management bureau directly under the military management system." The Chinese representative could delay signing the document, and could invite the Korean Transportation Minister to Shenyang for further talks.⁷⁹

Hereafter, the Chinese side became more uncompromising. On 16 April Zhou sent a message to Ni Zhiliang, forwarded to Kim, proposing "that in order to adapt to the needs of the war, the Korean Railroad must be placed under a unified military command system."⁸⁰ On 4 May, the two sides concluded 'An Agreement Concerning Military Control of the Korean Railroad During the War,' which clearly stipulated the rules governing the management system and the organization and allocation of transportation resources. In July the Korean Railway Military Management Central Bureau was accordingly established, responsible for the management, organization, and implementation of rail transportation in the Korean War zone. Five branch bureaus were also established, staffed by a total of 12,000 Chinese volunteers. On 1 August, the Sino-Korean Joint Railroad Transportation Command was established in Shenyang, and in November the Frontline Transportation Command was established in Anju, responsible for directing and coordinating the work of the Chief Military Management Bureau, the Railway Maintenance Management Group, and the Railroad Artillery Group. The railway corps was increased to 4 divisions, 3 regiments, and a Volunteer Engineering Brigade, for a total of 52,000 men. From this time on, under unified direction and organiza-

tion, the railroad transportation forces, maintenance forces, and high artillery forces cooperated closely, acted in concert, and adopted the approach of “using concentration to fight concentration” and “using mobility to fight mobility.” This greatly improved the efficiency of transportation.⁸¹

The issue of railroad jurisdiction was a unique problem among the various causes of Sino-Korean tension, because it involved North Korean sovereignty and internal affairs. Peng Dehuai did not evade acknowledging this, even when he suffered criticism in 1959. However, as Peng emphasized, in the wartime situation it was impossible to avoid placing

POW problem too quickly “could only lead to a weakening of Sino-Korean forces. Li Kenong believes that if they do not mobilize the forces of international opinion, and do not prepare for a protracted war, the Americans will not yield. Comrade Mao shares this same judgment about the prospect of negotiations, and has given Li Kenong these directions: ‘Only by adopting an unyielding position can you win the initiative and force the enemy to yield. To achieve these objectives, you should prepare for a test of strength against the enemy through several more months of negotiation.’”⁸⁶

By 2 May, the negotiators at Panmunjom had reached

In February 1952 Kim told Mao bluntly that he had “no desire to continue the war.”

the railroads under military management. Moreover, the rail lines were returned to Korean control immediately after the armistice was signed.⁸² However, the way the Chinese, backed by the Soviets, forced the North Koreans to accept their views left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il Sung.

The Opportunity for a Cease-Fire

In the second half of 1952, when the two opposing sides in the war had basically reached a balance of power, the cease-fire negotiations at Panmunjom became deadlocked over the issue of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, the question Mao initially thought would be the easiest to solve.⁸³ Stalin, who viewed the war in Korea in terms of his global Cold War strategy, encouraged Mao to continue fighting, and by no means to capitulate during peace negotiations. The North Koreans, however, advocated signing an armistice as soon as possible because of the severe losses they were suffering from American bombing. In February 1952 Kim told Mao bluntly that he had “no desire to continue the war.”⁸⁴

Soviet Ambassador Razuvaev reported to Moscow in early 1952 that “when Kim was discussing the reasons for the deadlocked negotiations with [DPRK negotiator] Nam Il, he advocated signing the cease-fire agreement and turning over all unsolved problems to a political meeting for further research.” According to Kim, “delaying negotiations was not beneficial, because the US Air Force was continuing to inflict damage on the DPRK. He does not see the rationale behind continuing the debate over POWs, because this debate is now leading to great losses.” Moreover, Kim believed that most of the Chinese POWs were former soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek’s [Jiang Jieshi] army, and were thus politically unreliable. Therefore, “expending a lot of effort on them is somewhat meaningless.” Kim instructed Nam Il “to get a clear sense of the Chinese attitude on this question,” and suggested making concessions on the POW problem “in the name of [PRC negotiator] Li Kenong.”⁸⁵

The Chinese concerns were quite different. Razuvaev reported that the Chinese leaders worried that much of the Soviet military aid would decrease or cease altogether once the war ended. They therefore believed that resolving the

agreement on four of the five points. However, with regard to the repatriation of POWs, the American side proposed returning only those who wished to go back, while the Chinese insisted upon the repatriation of all POWs. As a result, negotiations became deadlocked. Korean leaders had hoped that the Americans would sign a cease-fire agreement by May, and had planned to begin political and economic reconstruction work by the second half of 1952. They never expected the dispute over the POW issue to delay the negotiations so long. Razuvaev reported that “this has made the Korean leaders extremely disappointed.” Kim suggested that the Chinese comrades make concessions on the POW issue and strive for a cease-fire agreement.⁸⁷ On 13 July, after ignoring repeated concessions by the Chinese and North Koreans (including dropping demands for full repatriation of POWs), the US suggested a repatriation of 83,000 men, a total which included 80 percent of the men captured from the KPA and 32 percent of those captured from the CVA).⁸⁸ They claimed that this was their final, unalterable offer. The Chinese and Koreans were forced to make a decision.

The Chinese leaders were very resolute in their position. On 15 July Mao sent a telegram to Kim saying that in the face of the horrific bombardment by the enemy, to accept the enemy’s offer, which was provocative and seductive but represented no real concessions, would be extremely disadvantageous for the Sino-Korean side, both politically and militarily. Although continuing the war would mean continued destruction for the Korean people and the CVA, the Chinese and Korean people were growing stronger with the war and were strengthening the cause of peace throughout the world. The war was keeping the Americans tied down in East Asia and was draining their strength, while Soviet reconstruction grew stronger, thus promoting the development of people’s revolutions in all countries and delaying the outbreak of another world war. Mao guaranteed that the Chinese people would give all possible help to the Korean people to resolve their difficulties. In sum “to accept the proposals of the enemy in the present situation will inevitably make the enemy even more ambitious and undermine our prestige.” Finally, Mao told Kim that he would relay the Koreans’ pro-

posal to Stalin and request his recommendations.⁸⁹ On the same day however, Mao sent a telegram to Stalin informing the Soviet leader that the Chinese “resolutely refuse this provocative and seductive plan of the enemy and are prepared to expand the war. Kim Il Sung does not agree with this proposal.”⁹⁰

Two days later Kim capitulated, endorsing Mao’s analysis of the situation and thanking China for its promise of full support.⁹¹ However, in a telegram to Stalin that same day, Kim complained that because of poor defensive strategy, Korean cities and their citizens were suffering great losses from enemy bombing. Although he agreed with Mao’s viewpoints,



Communist Officers at the Kaesong Peace Talks

Source: National Archives

he still hoped for a quick cease-fire. “We must quickly and resolutely negotiate a cease-fire, stop actual fighting and exchange all prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. These demands are supported by all peace-loving people and will rescue us from our present passive position.”⁹²

Part of the reason the two sides differed in their views on resolving the POW issue was the different policies they held toward POW’s in general. Due to China’s recent civil war and its lack of experience in international conflict, from the very beginning of the war the Chinese did not want to detain POWs. On 17 November 1950, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission saying he was preparing to release one hundred POWs before the start of his campaign. On the eighteenth Mao replied that “releasing a group of POWs is a very good idea. From now on, to periodically release POWs, you do not need my permission.”⁹³ In actuality, the number of POWs the Chinese held was comparatively small. In November 1951, the Chinese and Koreans decided that the KPA would be responsible for South Korean POWs, while the CVA would handle POWs from other countries.⁹⁴ Thus, the small number of POWs in CVA custody limited

Chinese influence on the issue during the negotiations and was one reason Beijing demanded full repatriation.

By contrast, because of their need for labor after the war, the Koreans secretly detained large numbers of POWs. According to reports from Ambassador Razuvaev, “the Korean comrades believed that it would be better to retain large numbers of South Korean POWs, without considering their wish to return home.” As a result, they detained 13,094 of Syngman Rhee’s troops. Of those, 6,430 men served in the KPA, doing various work for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Railroad Ministry. They also detained 42,262 South Korean POWs who were “mobilized” in the early stages of the war for service in the KPA.⁹⁵ Under these circumstances, the Korean leaders could hardly call for “full repatriation.”

The issue was ultimately resolved in Moscow. In a 15 July telegram, Mao wrote Stalin “in the American plan, the proportion for the two sides was extremely unequal. The enemy is attempting to use this to break the wartime unity of the Korean and Chinese people. It would be extremely disadvantageous for us to submit to the enemy’s pressure.” Mao declared that even if talks broke down he would not concede, “because this is a question of politics, not just for Korea and China; it also has repercussions for the entire revolutionary camp.”⁹⁶ Two days later Stalin replied in a telegram to Mao, “Your position regarding the peace negotiations is completely correct.”⁹⁷

In August and September, Zhou Enlai had several discussions with Stalin in Moscow, joined in the later meetings by Kim Il Sung, Pak Hon-yong, and Peng Dehuai. Besides questions of Chinese economic development, the conversations focused on finalizing policy regarding the war. Zhou stated that the Sino-Korean forces are strong enough to launch longer offensives and had entrenched themselves well enough to withstand bombing raids. Regarding the POW issue, Stalin first pointed out that the Americans wanted to solve the issue according to their own wishes, whereas according to international law, hostile parties must repatriate all POWs, with the exception of war criminals. Stalin asked what Mao thought about the POW issue “Will he give in or will he hold his own?”⁹⁸

Zhou stated that the Koreans and Chinese had differing opinions on the matter, and that Mao’s viewpoint was that the Americans must repatriate all POWs. “The Koreans believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose return is being discussed.” Mao, on the other hand, “believes that continuing the war is advantageous to us, since it detracts the USA from preparing for a new world war.” Stalin immediately affirmed that “Mao is right; this war is getting on America’s nerves. The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties that they suffered during the war.” Stalin also touched a nerve with Chinese leaders by reminding Zhou that “one must be firm when dealing with America. The Chinese comrades must know that if America does not lose this war, then China will never recapture Taiwan.” Concerning the resolution of the POW question, Stalin and Zhou agreed to continue calling for full repatriation, and

to force the US to make the first concession. They could not shrink before the American threats.⁹⁹

After these talks, Kim did not again ask for a cease-fire, but instead focused on how to gain more material support from the Soviet Union. However, before the war ended, Sino-Korean conflict again emerged over the question of whether or not to sign the ceasefire immediately. This was the last difference between the two sides during the war. After Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet leadership changed its policy and promoted the conclusion of a ceasefire in Korea.¹⁰⁰ South Korean leader Syngman Rhee, however, did not want to conclude a ceasefire and tried to sabotage an agreement by releasing prisoners without authorization from the UN command. In response, the Chinese side wanted to launch a new offensive in order to secure more advantageous conditions for a ceasefire. The North Koreans demanded that an armistice be signed immediately, but Peng Dehuai, acting with Mao's support, overruled Kim Il Sung and began a new military campaign. Peng's final campaign was successful.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, since Kim Il Sung was no longer hoping to obtain victory in the war, he believed it would be best to end the war as soon as possible and push forward with economic reconstruction.

In conclusion, the conflicts between China and North Korea during the Korean War were the result of a clash between the interests of the entire camp (as expressed by the Chinese) and local interests (as expressed by the Koreans). As a result, Stalin was generally inclined to support the Chinese, since the positions China advocated were more in accordance with his view of the overall interests of the socialist camp in Asia. However, common interests tended to be defined in accordance with the perceptions of the country that played the leading role in the socialist camp. As a result, as soon as a country within the camp ceased to recognize its interests as being in line with the common goals, or when a change in leadership occurred in the camp, the subordination of local interest to global interest no longer held, and the alliance ran the risk of breaking down. This was the case in Sino-Korean relations, as well as eventually in Sino-Soviet relations.

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NOTES

¹ The most influential books and articles on this topic in the past decade include: Gordon Chang, *Friends and Enemies: China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990); Mineo Nakajima, "The Sino-

Soviet Confrontation: Its Roots in the International Background of the Korean War," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, 1, 1991; S. Goncharov, J. Lewis, Xue Litai *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); O.A. Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945-1963* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998); Yang Kuisong, *Mao Zedong yu Mosike En En Yuan Yuan* (Jiangxi: Peoples' Publishing Co., 1999); Shen Zhihua, *Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War* (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 1998)

² During an CWIHP conference held in Hong Kong in 1996, Russian scholars discussed Soviet-North Korean relations during the Korean War, e.g., the paper by A. Mansourov, "Soviet-North Korean Relations and the Origins of the Korean War." Chinese scholars also discussed Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Vietnam War at the CWIHP conference held in Hong Kong in 2000 entitled "China, Vietnam and the Indo-China War." See, e. g., Li Danhui ed., *China, and the Indo-China War* (Hong Kong: Tian Di Publishing Co., 2000).

³ See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994); Yang Kuisong, "Zhongguo Chubing Shimo," Inchoen University conference, 1999; Shen Zhihua, "Lun Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai," (21st Century, October 2000).

⁴ For the text of Stalin's telegram to Kim Il Sung on 30 January 1950, see Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack or Not to Attack?: Stalin, Kim Il Sung and the Prelude to War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, 5 (Spring 1995), p. 9. For additional details, see Shen Zhihua, "Zhongguo Tongmeng Tiaoyue yu Sulian Zai Yuandong de Zhanlue Mubiao" (*Dang Shi Yanjiu Ziliao*, No. 9, 1997), and "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origin of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol.2, No. 2 (Spring 2000), pp. 44-68.

⁵ E. P. Bajanov and N. Bajanova, *The Korean Conflict, 1950-1953: The Most Mysterious War of the 20th Century? Based on Secret Soviet Archives* (manuscript), pp. 40-42. For a detailed discussion of the documents presented by Bajanov and Bajanova, see Kathryn Weathersby, "'Should We Fear This? Stalin and the Danger of War with America,'" *CWIHP Working Paper* No. 39, (Spring 2002).

⁶ Ministerstvo inostrannykh del rossiskoi federatsii (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), "Khronologiia osnovnykh sobytiia na kanuna i nachal' nogo perioda koreiskoi voiny, ianvar' 1949-oktiabr' 1950 gg." (Chronology of basic events on the eve of and in the first period of the Korean War, January 1949-October 1950) (Manuscript), pp. 30-31. From the collection of Russian archival documents on the Korean War obtained by CWIHP in 1995, available at the National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

⁷ Ibid. p. 31.

⁸ Li Haiwen "Zhonggong Zhongyang Jiuqing Heshi Jueming Zhiyuanjun Chuguo Zuozhan" *Dangde Wenxian* No. 5 (1993), p. 85.

⁹ "Research on Selected Documents of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," *Zhou Enlai Nianpu (1949-1976)*, Vol. 1 (ZhongYang: WenXian Publishing Co., 1997), p. 54; "Khronologiia," p. 38.

¹⁰ "Khronologiia," pp. 35-37.

¹¹ 4 July 1950, *Memorandum of Roshchin's talks with Zhou Dapeng*, quoted from O.A. Westad's "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the United States: Wars, Policies, and Perceptions, 1950-1961" paper presented at the 1996 CWIHP Hong Kong conference.

¹² Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 5 July 1950, sending message for Zhou Enlai. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 43.

¹³ Telegram from Stalin to Roshchin, 8 July 1950. For full text see *Ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 51.

¹⁵ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. The memoir of Wang Dagang, Chinese deputy military attaché in North Korea, also describes how they learned of the military situation only through overseas Chinese and Korean soldiers who had served in the People's Liberation Army. See David Tsui, "Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact?" paper presented at the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference in 1996. Pak Il-Yu, whose Chinese name was Wang Wei, had worked in the Balujun Denghua Zhidui during the war against Japan and subsequently served as a county magistrate in the Pinxi base area.

¹⁶ In a military meeting on 26 August 1950, Zhou Enlai said that the main reason for not dispatching a military mission to North Korea immediately was due to Chinese considerations. See Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi (CCP Central Bureau of Archives and Manuscripts), Junshi Kexueyuan (Chinese PLA Academy of Military Sciences), ed., *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian*, Vol 4, (Renmin Press, 1997), pp. 45-46. However, he later told the Soviet Ambassador that the reason was that North Korea did not agree. See "Khronologiia," pp. 52-54; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, p.163.

¹⁷ Gao Gang, Talks during the Shenyang military meeting of 13 August 1950, cited in *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi* (The War to Oppose America and Aid Korea) ed. Chinese Academy of Military Sciences (Academy of Military Sciences Publishing Co., 2000), pp. 91-92.

¹⁸ "Khronologiia," pp.45-47.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49; Chen Jian, *Op.Cit.*, p.273. Lee Sang Cho confirmed this situation. See Sun Baosheng, "Mao Zedong ceng Yuyan Meijun Keneng zai Renchuan Denglu" [Mao Zedong had predicted that the US Army might land at Inchon] *Junshi Shilin* No. 5, 1990, p. 13.

²⁰ This is based on recollections of North Korean officers. Soviet military advisers also suggested the possibility of UN forces landing in rear ports. See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, p.171.

²¹ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

²² Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

²³ In a letter to Gao Gang, Mao Zedong said that based on the situation, we have to send our troops. You have to hastily prepare. See Chai Chenwen, Zhao Yongtian, *Banmendan Tanpan* (The Panmunjom Negotiations), (Beijing: PLA Press, 1989), p. 79.

²⁴ Khronologiia, pp.52-54.

²⁵ *Ibid.* pp.56-58.

²⁶ Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, *Uncertain Partners*, pp.174-175.

²⁷ A. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: September 16-October 15, 1950" *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7, (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 97-98.

²⁸ Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov and Matveev, 1 October, 1950. Collection of documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, obtained by CWIHP in 1995 and available at the National Security Archives, Washington, DC.

²⁹ Chai Chengwen, Zhao Yongtian, *Op. Cit.*, p. 80.

³⁰ Shen Zhihua, "Zhongguo Beipo Chubing Chaoxian: Juece Guocheng Jiqi Yuanyin," *Dangshi Yanjiu Ziliao*, Vol. 1, 1996; Shen Zhihua, "Zhongsu Tongmeng yu Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian de Juece" (The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Decision to Send

Troops to Korea) *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu* No. 5, 1996 and No. 1, 1997.

³¹ Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Mao Zedong, 8 October 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, 10 October 1950; Interview with Chai Chengwen.

³² Telegram from Filippov (Stalin) to Roshchin, 1 October 1950, transmitting message to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. For the full text see A. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 116-117.

³³ Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 25 October 1950. Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

³⁴ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

³⁵ Wang Yan, ed., *Peng Dehuai Nianpu* (Anhui: Renmin Publishing Co., 1998), p. 445.

³⁶ Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 25 October and 2 November 1950.

³⁷ Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 2, p.167.

³⁸ Interview with Chai Chengwen; Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol 2, p.167; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, 11 November 1950; Wang Yan, ed, *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 449.

³⁹ Telegram from Peng Dehuai via Central Military Commission to Kim Il Sung, 9 November 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 18 November 1950.

⁴⁰ Interview with Chai Chengwen; Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzhengshi* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol 2, p. 167; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong in 18 November 1950.

⁴¹ Department of History, Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi* (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 2000), Vol. 2, pp.167-168.

⁴² Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan*, (Selected Military Works of Zhou Enlai)Vol. 4 (Anhui: Renmin Publishing Co.) p. 100. It should be pointed out that Wenxuan published the words "command jointly by China Zhou Enlai," but the personnel of the Central Archive who looked at the manuscript of Zhou's telegram stated that "Tongzhi lai" (meaning Chinese comrade) was misread as "Zhou Enlai" in the Wenxuan compilation. See Xu Hong, Liu Deping: "Dingzheng (Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxian) Zhong de Liangge Suowu" *Dangshi Yanjiu Zhiliao*, No. 1, 2001, pp. 47-48.

⁴³ Chinese Academy of Military Science ed. *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Shi*. Vol. 2, p.167.

⁴⁴ Chinese Academy of Military Science, ed., *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 122-123. According to the agreement, the unified Sino-North Korean command gave orders only on the Corps and Division level. See, e.g., *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 454.

⁴⁵ Interview with Chai Chengwen; Telegram from Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, 6 December, 1950; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 7 December 1950; *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 453.

⁴⁶ Telegram from Peng Dehuai to the 9th Army Corps, 13, 16, 19 December, 1950; *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 465.

⁴⁷ Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi. pp. 178-79. [For a detailed discussion of the Soviet air force's participation in the Korean War, see] Shen Zhihua "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Kongjun," Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, No. 2, 2000.

⁴⁸ Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 19 December 1950; *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 456.

⁴⁹ For more detail, see Shen Zhihua, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu”, *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, No. 1, 2001.

⁵⁰ *Mao Zedong Junshi Wenxian* (Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong), Vol. 6 (Beijing: Military Science Publishing Co., 1993), pp. 245-246, 249-250.

⁵¹ *Peng Dehuai Junshi Wenxuan* (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai) (Central Documents Publishing Co., 1988), p. 383; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Kim Il Sung, 3 January 1951; *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 464.

⁵² Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin], 4 January 1951. For full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 53-54.

⁵³ The report of the Volunteer Army Party Commission: “At this time our army does not have enough soldiers and re-supply is extremely insufficient. If there is no regrouping, re-supply, and no improvement of transportation and ammunitions, our army cannot fight anymore” Telegram from the Volunteer Army Party Commission to Central Military Commission, 8 January 1951. See Yang Fengcheng, Wang Tiancheng, *Jiayu Chaoxian Zhanzheng de Ren.* (Beijing: Zhongyang Dangxiao Press, 1993), p. 222.

⁵⁴ *Peng Dehuai Zishu*. [Peng’s account, internal edition], p. 350.

⁵⁵ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Telegram from Chai Chengwen to Peng Dehuai, 8 January 1951; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao, 1 January, 1951: *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, pp. 465-466.

⁵⁶ Wang Yazhi, “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Zhongde Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen”, *Junshi Shilin*, vol. 1, 1994, p.11.

⁵⁷ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 465.

⁵⁸ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. Record of talks between Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, 10-11 January, 1951.

⁵⁹ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000. *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 466.

⁶⁰ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 461; Hong Xuezhi, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Huiyilu*, (People’s Liberation Army Art Publishing Co., 1990), pp. 111-112; Lei Yingfu, “Kangmei Yuanchao Jige Zhongda Juece de Huiyi” *Dang de Wenxian*, 5 November 1994, p. 41.

⁶¹ Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 16 January 1951, transmitting message from Mao to Peng Dehuai with message for Kim Il Sung. For the full text see Kathryn Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 55-56.

⁶² Telegram from Mao to Filippov [Stalin], 27 January 1951, transmitting 19 January telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao regarding meetings with Kim Il Sung. For the full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” pp. 56-57.

⁶³ For more details, see Shen Zhihua: “Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Juece Zhong de Sulian Yinshu” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, No.1, 2001; Shen Zhihua, “Lun Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian Juece de Shifei Cheng Bai” *21st century*, October 2000.

⁶⁴ In 1951, the loss rate of the Volunteer Army transportation was 84.6 percent, *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie*. *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace* (JinDun Publishing Co., 1987), p. 140.

⁶⁵ Zhang Mingyuan, “Fengxue Zhanqin—Yi Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng de Houqin Baozhang” *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu*, 2000, Vol. 6, p. 34; *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 449; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 29.

⁶⁷ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

⁶⁸ *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, p. 6.

⁶⁹ *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie Jiben*

Jingyan (JinDun Publishing Co., 1987), pp. 41-42; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 34.

⁷⁰ *Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng Houqin Jingyan Zongjie*. *Zhiliao Xuanbian Tielu Yunshu lei Xiace* (People’s Liberation Army Publishing Co., 1988), pp. 273, 282, 285.

⁷¹ *Zhiliao Xuanbian Tielu Yunshu Lei Xiace*, 1988, pp. 283-284; *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 33.

⁷² *Zhuanye Qinwu Xiace*, pp. 6, 3-4.

⁷³ Interview with Chai Chengwen, 12 September 2000.

⁷⁴ Telegram from Ye, Zhang, Peng to Gao Gang, 19 February 1951.

⁷⁵ Telegram from Ye, Zhang, Peng to Gao Gang, 15 March 1951; Telegram from Peng Dehuai to Gao Gang and Zhou Enlai, 22 March 1951.

⁷⁶ Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, 25 March 1951.

⁷⁷ *Fengxue Zhanqin*, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 25 March 1951.

⁷⁹ Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, 25 March.

⁸⁰ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, Vol. 2, pp. 204.

⁸¹ *Zhuanye Qinwu*, pp. 6-7; *Jiben Jingyan*, pp. 66-67.

⁸² *Peng Dehuai Zishu* (Peng’s account, internal edition), p. 352.

⁸³ At least until November 1951, Mao still believed that the POW problem would not be difficult to solve; See Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 14 November 1951, in K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 70-71.

⁸⁴ Telegram from Mao to Stalin, 8 February 1952.

⁸⁵ The first quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, “Peregovor o peremirriia v Koree, 1951-1953 gg.,” *Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka*, 2000 No.2, p.104.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ The second quarter working report of Razuvaev in 1952, cited in A. Volokhova, p. 104.

⁸⁸ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol 1, p.249-250.

⁸⁹ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Wenxuan*, Vol. 4, pp. 289-290. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), p.78.

⁹⁰ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, p. 280. For an extended discussion of Mao’s thinking regarding the need to continue fighting, see Zhang Shu Guang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), pp. 216-246.

⁹¹ Telegram from Mao Zedong to Stalin, 18 July, 1952. For the full text, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 78-79.

⁹² Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilevsky 17 July 1952.

⁹³ *Peng Dehuai Nianpu*, p. 449.

⁹⁴ *Zhou Enlai Junshi Huadong Jishi*, Vol. II, pp. 242.

⁹⁵ A. Volokhova, pp.106 and 108.

⁹⁶ *Zhou Enlai Nianpu*, Vol. 1, p. 250.

⁹⁷ Telegram from Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 16 July 1952. For the full text see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6/7, pp. 77-78.

⁹⁸ Record of conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952. For full text, see *CWIHP Bulletin*, 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 10-14.

⁹⁹ Record of meeting between Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August and 19 September 1952. For the full text, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 9-20. For differing interpretations, see Haruki Wada, paper submitted to the CWIHP Hong Kong conference; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The*

Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 147-148.

¹⁰⁰ Concerning discussions on this question, see “1953 Nian Chaoxian Tingzhan – ZhongSu Lingdaoren de Zhengzhi Kaolu”

Shijie Shi No.3, 2001. For the text of the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, 19 March 1953, calling for an end to the war, see K. Weathersby, “New Russian Documents on the Korean War,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 6/7, (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 80-83.

¹⁰¹ *Peng Dehuai Zishu*. (Peng’s account, internal edition), p. 352.

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Weathering the Sino-Soviet Conflict: The GDR and North Korea, 1949-1989

By Bernd Schäfer

The North Korean government has always been unusually secretive not only to the outside world and to the vast majority of its own citizens, but also to its supposed friends in the communist world. To the best of their ability, North Korea's rulers tried during the Cold War to hide "internal matters" from their comrades in the Soviet Union, China and the Eastern European countries of the Soviet bloc—the states on whom they depended for their country's existence. Nonetheless, banding together in the strange world of Pyongyang, the representatives of several of those allies learned much about their host country by exchanging pieces of information among themselves and puzzling out their meaning together.¹ Moreover, in the later years of his rule, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung spoke quite freely and frankly in his correspondence and conversations with leaders of other medium size communist countries. The archival record of the East European states' dealings with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can therefore shed considerable light on this enigmatic country. The evidence presented below comes from the files of the embassy of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Pyongyang, the East German Foreign Ministry, the Department of International Relations of the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR, and Erich Honecker's personal files on his meetings with Kim Il Sung, all of which became accessible to scholars following the demise of the GDR in 1989/90. In addition, the essay draws on the published memoir of the last East German ambassador to Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki, which provides a vivid account of the DPRK during the final years of the Soviet bloc alliance.

Setting the Stage, 1949-1955

The establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the Soviet occupation zone three months after the founding of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the American zone resembled what occurred in Germany just one year later. In May 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was established in the West and in October the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed in the East, again transforming former occupation zones into states under the tutelage of their former liberators. On 11 November 1949, one month after the GDR came into existence, the DPRK exchanged letters of mutual diplomatic recognition with the German communist state, but the outbreak of the Korean War in June of the following year delayed the establishment of official relations. In April 1951, as communist forces mounted what was to be their final offensive of the war, the GDR and DPRK agreed to conduct diplomatic communication using the channels of their respective ambassadors in the People's Republic of China. They then established full embassies in the first

half of 1954, several months after the conclusion of the armistice ending hostilities on the peninsula.² Kim Il Sung received GDR representative Richard Fischer on 5 August 1954 for a lengthy audience of three and a half hours, giving him lively demonstrations on ferrous metals and a lecture on cement. The North Korean leader predicted that Germany would be unified sooner than Korea due to its higher standard of living, which, according to Kim, made it easier to educate the population.³

The armistice signed in July 1953 created a heavily fortified demilitarized border zone between North and South Korea. Three years of intense fighting had left both Korean states in a deplorable condition, but the US bombing of the North had brought nearly total destruction of the physical infrastructure of the DPRK. Consequently, even though the Soviet Union, China, and most of the East European socialist states were themselves preoccupied with postwar rebuilding and economic competition with the West, they granted substantial aid and generous credits to the DPRK. Taken together, the result of this aid was enormous.⁴ To a large extent, the DPRK was rebuilt from the outside, with the North Koreans providing the labor force and their political leaders increasingly countering reality with an ideology of alleged self-reliance.

The GDR contributed its share to the reconstruction of the DPRK. Following Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in September 1953, a North Korean delegation headed by Minister of Finance Yi Chu-yon traveled to Berlin to negotiate the first of many bilateral agreements on economic and technological aid for the DPRK.⁵ The North Korean government sent an enthusiastic letter of thanks for this aid in December, signed by Kim Il Sung.⁶ East German support for the embattled North Koreans had in fact begun much earlier, when in September 1950, with UN forces advancing into North Korean territory, the GDR founded a Korea Solidarity Committee of the National Council, a mass organization representing all East German parties. The Korea Solidarity Committee channeled aid to the DPRK, raising a portion of the money by direct appeals to the East German population.⁷ As will be discussed below, between 1950 and 1957 the GDR sent aid to the DPRK totaling 60 million East German marks, a remarkable sum for a country that was itself suffering from wartime destruction.⁸ Between 1954 and 1956 alone, six East German "solidarity trains" with more than 160 cars full of consumer goods and medicine rolled through the USSR and China into North Korea.⁹

Most spectacular was the East German reconstruction of the city of Hamhung between 1955 and 1962. A group of 457 specialists from the GDR, headed by Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl's brother, directed a Korean workforce in con-

structing a complete city with 5,236 apartments, factories, power plants, hospitals, restaurants, and recreation facilities.¹⁰ The East German prime minister made this offer to his DPRK counterpart during the 1954 Geneva conference of foreign ministers. Kim Il Sung responded promptly, expressing deep gratitude and announcing the selection of the city of Hamhung.¹¹ The North Korean leader visited Hamhung on 15 May 1956, inspecting the work in progress, asking a

ing its 2 January session.¹⁶ The first Asian communists to take the GDR's offer for cooperation at face value were the North Koreans, since they were in desperate need of foreign aid. An extensive visit to the GDR was arranged for them for May 1956.

As a consequence of this prospective visit, GDR diplomats closely watched the Third Party Congress of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) held 24-30 April 1956. The Polit-

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wide range of technical questions and giving instructions of his own.¹² He made several return visits until the construction was completed in 1962, on each occasion meeting with the East German specialists and inquiring about their grievances. For the Korean leadership, the main problem seemed to have been to prevent Hamhung from becoming more advanced and attractive than Pyongyang. To avoid this politically unacceptable eventuality, they diverted substantial material designed for Hamhung to the capital.¹³

In contrast to Moscow's commitment to preserve its North Korean creation by mobilizing the Chinese as a military substitute, the Soviet Union did not unequivocally guarantee the existence of the GDR until after the failed domestic uprising in East Germany in June 1953.¹⁴ As a consequence of this uncertainty, contacts with East Asian states were not on the political agenda of the communists in East Berlin for quite some time. The first high-ranking communist leader from East Asia to pay an official visit to the GDR after 1949 was Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who was in the country 23-26 July 1954.¹⁵ His East German counterpart Otto Grotewohl led a return trip seventeen months later in December 1955 to the capitals of the People's Republic of China, the DPRK and Mongolia—the first visit by a GDR state and party delegation to their Asian comrades.

First Observations and Patterns, 1956-1961

When Grotewohl and his delegation returned from their mission to East Asia, the Prime Minister reported the results at the next session of the GDR Politburo, on 2 January 1956. He emphasized the joint bilateral declarations issued with all countries visited and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The conclusions the East German leadership drew at this time marked the beginning of the GDR's modest "Asia Policy," the first stage of which consisted of creating a basic awareness of the situation in East Asia. This meant intense work for GDR embassies and multiple forms of internal and public propaganda, all of which the Politburo ordered in detail dur-

buro sent a two-member delegation to the Congress from Berlin, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Otto Winzer.¹⁷ The East German embassy in Pyongyang received advance copies of the draft party statute that was to be discussed at the congress, and it obtained the texts of all the speeches given by the North Korean leadership. GDR officials paid particular attention to the party statute, subjecting it to a very meticulous and somewhat arrogant exegesis. The East Germans criticized the absence of a reference to a "peaceful way" to reunite Korea and the party's "shallow" notions of how to bring about reunification. They also judged the requirements imposed on members of the KWP as hardly sufficient in light of the allegedly poor qualifications of the vast majority of its membership. GDR officials also cited the lack of an appropriate awareness of the danger allegedly posed by many "hostile agents" supposedly still present in the DPRK after the chaotic transfer of people across the 38th parallel during the war. On the other hand, they sensed from the statute an awareness of the imminent danger posed by influential factions of "party enemies" within the KWP itself. They also noted critically that the obvious "problem" of personality cult in the DPRK had not been addressed.¹⁸ This "problem" had, of course, been tackled by Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev in shocking detail before the worldwide communist movement just two months earlier at the CPSU 20th Party Congress in Moscow.

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization initiative was particularly problematical for Kim Il Sung since the North Korean leader had shaped and "Koreanized" his autocracy and personality cult according to the model he had learned from the now suddenly demystified Joseph Stalin. Kim had lived as a Korean partisan in the Soviet Union during World War II and had arrived in Pyongyang only on 19 September 1945, after the Soviet liberation of Northern Korea from Japanese occupation had been completed. In subsequent years, he skillfully played to Korean nationalism and exceptionalism, minimizing the Soviet role in defeating Japan and posing instead as the triumphant liberator of the country from its foreign

yoke. He invented fictional battles against the Japanese in the North Korean Paekdu Mountains, followed by a military liberation campaign led by himself that culminated in a widely cheered public victory speech in Pyongyang.¹⁹ Even though he had advanced to the top position in the Korean Workers Party as a consequence of Soviet support, in November 1950 he purged Soviet-leaning members from the party leadership, primarily because of Moscow's failure to send troops to Korea during the Korean War. After the 1953 armistice, he turned against indigenous former partisans of Korea.²⁰

Since Kim Il Sung had criticized many failed practices and many functionaries at the Third Party Congress without suffering any openly voiced challenges to his leadership, he embarked soon afterwards on a lengthy tour to the USSR, Eastern Europe, and the GDR. The DPRK delegation was scheduled to stay in East Germany from 1 June through 11 June, visiting factories, memorial sites, and tourist attractions in all parts of the country, following the usual pattern of a "friendship visit." The East German Politburo carefully prepared the itinerary for the Korean guests and drafted a bilateral contract on cultural and economic cooperation as well as a joint government declaration stating, among other things, a determination to overcome the "imperialist" division of their respective countries by peaceful means.²¹

As it turned out, however, the Korean guests were much more practical and went straight to what their mission to Europe was really about; at their meeting with the GDR Politburo on June 8 they asked for extensive aid. The startled East German Politburo had to call an extraordinary session to discuss the new situation as soon as the North Korean delegation departed.²² In sharp contrast to his report at the KWP Party Congress a few weeks before, in his meetings with the East German communists Kim Il Sung painted a bleak picture of the economic situation in North Korea. The North Koreans were presently struggling to accomplish their three-year-plan to achieve the pre-war standard of 1950, Kim explained. They lacked sufficient quantities of many basic utilities, products, and goods: coal, electricity, fertilizer, textiles, iron, cement, and grain. Livestock breeding was inadequate, as were the catches of fish, and the country faced a grave housing shortage.

East German leader Walter Ulbricht asked the North Korean delegation to submit their requests in writing and the East Germans asked some tentative questions about North Korean reunification policy and living conditions in South Korea. The GDR was neither willing nor able to meet all the costly North Korean demands, but the Politburo was worried that their failure to do so would prompt the North Koreans to complain to the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).²³ East German negotiators had sensed some disappointment in the DPRK delegation as some of its expectations were not fully met.²⁴ Consequently, at their extraordinary session on 12 June the Politburo decided to inform Comecon in detail about the GDR's limited capacity to support the DPRK. East Germany was ready to send various technical experts to North Korea and to deliver basic goods worth 54 million rubles between 1956 and 1958,

in place of the assistance it had earlier pledged to the construction of a diesel engine factory and a metallurgical plant. But the GDR refused to grant North Korea the financial credits it requested and it postponed a decision on sending steel to the DPRK due to problems in domestic production. The Politburo also turned down the even more far-reaching Korean requests made later in 1956 and in subsequent years.²⁵ Altogether the GDR delivered roughly 500 million rubles of aid to the DPRK between 1950 and 1962.²⁶

Soon after returning from his visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1956, Kim Il Sung had to face an internal revolt in the KWP. Kim's leadership was called into question because of the country's economic problems, differences over strategies for achieving national unification, and, most importantly in the eyes of his opponents within the party, his personality cult, which continued to increase despite the new policy coming out of the USSR after the CPSU's 20th Party Congress. In two extraordinary plenary sessions of the KWP Central Committee in Pyongyang on 30-31 August and on 23 September, Kim and his loyalists managed to suppress the revolt of their opponents, who were officially denounced as "splittists." Some of them had walked into the Soviet embassy in P'yongyang and complained about Kim, and subsequently the Moscow leadership had asked Kim for an explanation of these events.²⁷

After a joint Soviet-Chinese intervention by a delegation sent to Pyongyang, some party functionaries ousted from the Central Committee in the August session were readmitted for "reeducation" purposes three weeks later only to be finally "purged" in March 1958.²⁸ Using a method adopted from the Soviet Union for organizing comprehensive "purges," in 1956 and 1957 all members of the KWP had to re-apply for party membership in order to "exchange party documents."²⁹

Kim Il Sung also demoted his ambassador to Moscow, Yi Sang-cho, who had criticized the North Korean leader's personality cult and refused to distribute official North Korean propaganda in Moscow. Yi Sang-cho decided to remain in exile in the Soviet Union, and Moscow refused Pyongyang's demands for his extradition.³⁰ In March 1958, after the final withdrawal of the Chinese "volunteers" who had been in the country since their intervention in the Korean War, Kim Il Sung removed his main rival, Chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Tu-bong, a well-respected partisan leader who operated from China during World War II and became the first chairman of the KWP in 1946. Even though Kim Il Sung had prevailed over all internal rivals, he nonetheless never lost his vindictiveness against perceived "enemies" in the party. In the changed political environment of 1962, for example, on a North Korean request the PRC extradited four former KWP Central Committee members. The four had been denounced as "enemies of the party" in 1956 and had fled the country to the North,³¹ only to be sent back six years later, presumably to their deaths.

Imitating foreign models while defining them as uniquely North Korean, Kim Il Sung imaginatively attempted to eternalize his autocracy by constructing a comprehensive nationalist ideology for domestic purposes—the infamous

“Juche.” He accepted the vital economic support provided by the USSR and Eastern Europe without acknowledgment. After 1958 he adapted the Chinese pretensions of “great leaps forward” in the economy, calling his version “Chollima” (flying horse). The Koreanized Great Leaps Forward proved as disastrous as those in the PRC, creating huge disproportions in economic development. These disruptions were aggravated by the economic problems China experienced after the failed “great leaps,” which prompted Beijing to cancel deliveries to the DPRK that the North Koreans sorely needed.

As the Sino-Soviet rivalry for leadership in the communist camp continued to grow, but before it had turned into an open split, the DPRK enjoyed the comfortable position of being politically wooed by both socialist neighbors. The GDR, however, was unable to match Pyongyang’s position. The East German state relied heavily on Soviet political support throughout its existence, but it was especially dependent on Moscow during the Berlin crisis of 1958-1961. During those years, the ties between East Germany and North Korea were a mirror image of the USSR-DPRK relationship. In fact, the Soviet and the Eastern European ambassadors in Pyongyang banded together to exchange information and share assessments of developments in the domestic and foreign policy of the secretive North Korean state.³²

For example, it was through his Soviet colleague Pusanov that GDR ambassador Kurt Schneidewind was informed in August 1960 about the trip Kim Il Sung took to the Soviet Union after his meetings with Mao Zedong in Beijing in May. In Moscow Kim had allegedly promised not to follow the Chinese on their course against the Soviets and had rejected Mao’s overtures. Khrushchev had promised him more economic support if the DPRK gave up the Chinese-inspired “flying horse” (Chollima). The Soviet leader had also advised him to become more flexible towards South Korea by learning from the experience of the supposedly more sophisticated East Germans. According to Pusanov, the Presidium of the KWP followed these suggestions by refraining from disproportionate leaps in the economy, by creating a special office for South Korean affairs and by financially supporting the Socialist Mass Party in the ROK. After Ambassador Schneidewind received his confidential briefing on these developments, he noted privately that his Soviet colleague was too optimistic and had minimized the problems posed by the ongoing economic and political “mistakes” of the North Korean communists. Schneidewind shared this more realistic assessment with his ambassadorial colleagues from Czechoslovakia, Poland and with “other diplomats from socialist countries.”³³

In a meeting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Kohousek on 2 February 1961, Ambassador Schneidewind exchanged impressions about what the KWP rank and file knew about the conflicts between the USSR and the PRC. Both came to the conclusion that the North Korean leadership was hiding such information even from members of their Central Committee, not to mention regional and local officials, in order not to disturb the faithful party functionaries. Furthermore, Schneidewind and Kohousek noted North Korean hypoc-

risy. Even in internal conversations the DPRK leadership had still not acknowledged the assistance the DPRK had received from the Soviet Union and East Europe since 1956, and instead maintained that they had achieved economic success “without foreign aid.” While the North Koreans were pressuring the Eastern Europeans for further credits, they simultaneously increased the service fees charged to foreign embassies, which prompted the Czechoslovak ambassador to request that the North Korean embassy in Prague be charged the same amount. What disturbed the socialist ambassadors even more was the increasing level of investment and trade in North Korea by Japan, West Germany and other Western countries.³⁴

In a report to the GDR Foreign Ministry the following month, [See Document 1] the Pyongyang Embassy noted that the DPRK still seriously underestimated the role of the Soviet Union and relied heavily on the Chinese Communist Party. The embassy harshly criticized the personality cult and the historical legends about Kim Il Sung displayed in the Museum of the Patriotic Liberation War, as well as all over the country. Instead of studying the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, the embassy reported, North Korean party propaganda was solely and completely oriented toward the “wise teachings of our glorious leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung.” “Mystic ideas of Confucianism” were prevalent, as well as “nationalist tendencies” to falsely portray feats accomplished in the DPRK by foreigners as resulting from indigenous “heroism” of a sort found exclusively in North Korea.³⁵

In a report from June 1961, however, the GDR embassy reported significant improvement with respect to each of these problems, with the notable exception of the personality cult. The North Koreans had publicly acknowledged the leading role of the Soviet Union in world communism, had recognized the economic support they had received from their Soviet and East European allies, and had followed the latter’s advice to distance themselves from the Chinese and Albanian communists. According to Ambassador Schneidewind’s analysis, the massive economic problems created by the reductions in Chinese exports to the DPRK made the North Koreans increasingly turn to the Soviet Union for economic help. For political reasons the USSR was ever more eager to comply, although, suffering from domestic economic shortages, it was not able to meet all the North Korean demands.³⁶

In the wake of these concessions, there was a honeymoon period in North Korean-Soviet relations, and consequently in North Korean-GDR relations as well. From 29 June to 10 July 1961, a DPRK delegation led by Kim Il Sung visited the Soviet Union and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that required both sides to fight with “Leninist unforgiveness against all forms of revisionism, dogmatism, sectarianism and deviations from the principles of socialist internationalism.” The Soviet Union was very pleased with this anti-Chinese commitment and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko generously declared that the earlier North Korean orientation toward China had been a temporary aberration. Soon after the visit to Moscow, Kim Il Sung and his delega-

tion traveled to Beijing and signed a friendship communiqué with China that welcomed the Soviet-North Korean treaty and focused its rhetorical attacks on the USA and South Korea, rather than on the Soviet Union.³⁷ The Fourth KWP Party Congress held 11-18 September 1961 confirmed in the eyes of the GDR and its allies the substantial progress made in relations with the DPRK. In his speech to the congress, Kim Il Sung recognized the leading role of the Soviet Union, accepted its policy of “peaceful coexistence” and acknowl-

Taiwan, during the first half of 1962 leading representatives of the DPRK began to discuss an offensive “liberation” of South Korea while ridiculing the Soviet concept of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries. When Pak Chun-hyok, head of the International Division of the KWP Central Committee, volunteered aggressive remarks to this effect to the acting GDR ambassador, the latter immediately informed his Czechoslovak colleague, who in turn briefed the Soviet ambassador, who then invited the GDR representative to the

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edged the international support North Korea had received. Kim proposed the creation of a Marxist-Leninist party for South Korea and made a commitment to the peaceful reunification of the country. With delegations from communist parties all over the world present and a second wave of de-Stalinization underway in the USSR, the KWP leadership made no reference to the personality cult. Even the display of propaganda in Pyongyang was toned down during the congress.³⁸

By the end of 1961, however, the honeymoon was over. Although Moscow and its allies counted the DPRK in the Soviet camp in September 1961, on 12 December Soviet Ambassador Pusanov reported to his communist colleagues in P’yongyang (except those from the PRC, Albania and Vietnam, who were pointedly excluded from his briefing) that the recent KWP Central Committee session had made unsatisfactory commentaries on the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU, where excessive personality cult had been condemned. The Soviet ambassador further noted that nationalistic propaganda was again appearing in the DPRK. For example, the North Koreans had boasted that they had created an entirely new type of tractor within one month. In fact, the tractor in question was an exact copy of a model from a factory in the Soviet city of Kharkov, a blueprint of which had been brought back by North Korean specialists who had been trained there. Such examples were not rare: “The present comrades ambassadors confirmed this by providing additional cases.”³⁹ Three days later the ambassadors of Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and the GDR met as a small group to further discuss the recent developments in the Soviet Union and in their host country. All of them agreed that the influence of the pro-Chinese forces in the KWP leadership had increased and that Kim Il Sung had made concessions to them. Since Kim was wedded to his own “personality cult,” he naturally viewed the Soviet critique of this phenomenon as a threat and thus shifted to an anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese stance.⁴⁰

Taking Sides in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1962-1965

Pro-Chinese tendencies markedly increased beginning in early 1962. Mirroring the PRC’s aggressive stance toward

Soviet embassy to discuss the conversation. The East German reported that Park had stated that real “war cannot be separated from class warfare” and that “peaceful reunification” could only come about by driving the “US imperialists” out of the South by force. After news of this report circulated among the fraternal diplomats, they all became worried about the unpredictable North Koreans, who were apparently following the radicalism of the Chinese and Albanians in disregarding the principle of “peaceful coexistence” propagated by Moscow.[See Document 2] The communist countries of the Soviet camp, whose support for an armed incursion into South Korea the DPRK wanted to solicit, regarded such military action against the South as extremely dangerous and “adventurist.”⁴¹ After the Soviet and East European governments signaled this position to Kim Il Sung in June 1962, the North Korean leader softened his rhetoric, and the talk about imminent military actions against the South subsided. A few months later Kim Il Sung again referred to the “peaceful solution” of the Korean question.

The DPRK leadership nonetheless did not completely abandon its anti-Soviet polemics and pro-Chinese stance. During and after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the Chinese declarations on the crisis were widely reported to the North Korean public, along with declarations of DPRK solidarity with the Caribbean island, but almost no mention was made of Moscow’s statements. Soviet reactions to the US ultimatum were portrayed as cowardly and defensive. One should not “beg the imperialists for peace, but fight them over it,” Pyongyang declared. To the even further dismay of the USSR, the DPRK fully sided with the PRC during the Sino-Indian border clashes. Subsequently, the Soviet Union decided to defer a decision on the North Korean request made by a DPRK military delegation to Moscow to deliver modern anti-aircraft systems free of charge.⁴²

Further evidence that North Korea was siding with the PRC came from reports the GDR embassy obtained from the new Czechoslovak ambassador to Pyongyang, Moravec, after he returned from the Party Congress in Prague in December 1962. The DPRK guest at the Czechoslovak Party Congress had fully supported the “provocative” statements

of the PRC delegation and the North Korean delegation's leader, Vice-premier Yi Chu-yon, had provided East European delegates with a telling performance. He had placed two apples on the table, defining the left one as China and the right one as the Soviet Union. He then placed a third one in the middle, called it "Korea" and cut it right through with a knife. He asked the bystanders whether one half of "Korea" should go to the right and one to the left. Answering the question himself, he declared that to be impossible and asked his listeners for understanding of North Korea's difficult situation. After Sino-Soviet differences became public, the North Koreans were forced to make a decision, Yi explained, but they would have preferred to maintain friendship with both the PRC and the USSR.⁴³

North Korean polemics against "peaceful coexistence" continued as the DPRK now openly adopted Chinese positions. To the GDR, these statements were "un-marxist and adventurist," according to an analysis of April 1963. It was indeed "adventurist," when the KWP declared in December 1962 that only "massive strikes" against the "imperialist enemy" would eliminate the danger of war in the long run, and that nuclear confrontation should not be feared since the "power of revolutionary spirit is stronger than any nuclear bomb." When Yi Chu-yon led a North Korean delegation to the GDR in September 1962, he lectured the East Germans that the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had been a half-hearted measure. Had they acted more aggressively, the moment would have arrived "to finish up Berlin." The "imperialists," according to Yi Chu-yon, would not go to war over Berlin. Now "the time had come" to courageously explore a favorable moment for action.⁴⁴

In October 1962 Kim Il Sung's speeches for domestic consumption again oriented the KWP towards the autarkic "Juche" policy, exhorting North Koreans that the proper course was to "create everything by one's own strength."⁴⁵ Aside from this rhetoric, however, which was intended for the general population and for lower-ranking party members, the North Korean leadership was actually quite pragmatic with regard to matters of foreign economic assistance. Their policy was to attempt to reap the utmost benefits from any socialist or capitalist country while giving as little as possible in return. In contrast to the political sphere, there were no real ideological predispositions in economic matters. In 1962 and 1963, despite all the pro-Chinese rhetoric, trade with the Soviet Union was greater than with the PRC. Such pragmatism, however, was rather the result of economic desperation than of astuteness.

When the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang met with the first secretaries of the embassies of the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in October 1963, the Soviet representative complained about the difficult negotiations with the North Koreans, the futile attempts to agree on trade based on reciprocity (Korean exports of precious and non-ferrous metals vs. imports of basic goods) and the tendency of the DPRK to play the socialist countries off their capitalist partners.⁴⁶ But the latter was not a realistic option. In 1964 the DPRK planned to have 10 percent of its foreign trade with non-socialist coun-

tries but it fell far short of those ambitions. In actuality, despite the boastful rhetoric of "Juche," North Korea relied heavily on other socialist countries. It had to accept massive trade deficits and repeatedly admit that the goods it had promised to deliver to its partners were of low quality and in insufficient quantity. Overall the DPRK lagged behind such obligations by 15 to 20 percent. When GDR Ambassador Otto Becker invited a North Korean delegation to the bi-annual Leipzig Spring Fair in 1964, Deputy Premier Yi Chu-yon had to turn down this offer, explaining that it would be 1967 before the DPRK would reach a quality standard for its products high enough to qualify it to attend a fair in Europe.⁴⁷

After 1963, North Korea's pro-Chinese policy resulted in its decision to significantly reduce its political contacts with all the East European socialist countries and the USSR, and the economic aid from those countries was consequently on the verge of expiring. Instead, the DPRK promoted contacts with "revolutionary" forces in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The years 1963 and 1964 marked the lowest point in the relations between the DPRK and the GDR,⁴⁸ notable for incidents of stone throwing, attempted burglaries and the "kidnapping" of the GDR embassy dog, named Dina.⁴⁹ With regard to cultural contacts, the GDR had no exchange with North Korea besides official delegations. Instead, the DPRK promoted contacts with "revolutionary" forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even marriages between Koreans and citizens from Eastern Europe were unwelcome. Without shying away from racism, the DPRK regime demoted Korean partners of such couples from Pyongyang to the countryside and pressured them to divorce their European spouses.⁵⁰ The GDR embassy, internally comparing those practices to Nazi Germany, sometimes obtained information about the fear, mistrust, poverty, and ignorance that increasingly characterized the DPRK. [See Document 5.] Their sources were North Koreans who had previously lived in the GDR or East German citizens who had joined them as spouses.⁵¹

In 1964, tensions between the DPRK and the Soviet bloc increased. Yi Chu-yon went on a tirade in an exchange with Soviet Ambassador Moskovski in June 1964, accusing the USSR, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia of unwillingness to help North Korea. The DPRK was poor, the vice-premier said, and in need of outside help. Even capitalist states would grant credits, but the socialist countries refuse them and "just like to see money." After having generously extended credits to North Korea for many years without realistic expectation of their being repaid, the East Europeans now turned a cold shoulder to the DPRK. Pyongyang's attempts to lure countries like the GDR from the Soviet orbit and improve economic relations with them one at a time were unsuccessful. The East Europeans and the Soviets resisted such pressure, calculating correctly that in the long run China's poor economic performance would aggravate problems within the DPRK and make Pyongyang reconsider its ideological leanings toward the PRC.⁵²

In July, the CPSU Central Committee sent a letter to the KWP Central Committee calling for an international meeting of all communist parties to discuss current tensions. The

Korean party responded the following month with a lengthy statement that it forwarded to all the foreign communist representatives in Pyongyang. This message was delivered to the GDR embassy in a sealed envelope without an address, cover letter or any further explanation. The North Korean statement blamed the USSR for being solely responsible for the division and consequent potential weakening of the worldwide communist movement.⁵³ At the time, this reply seemed to signal Pyongyang's definitive break with Moscow, but in actuality, North Korea never fully broke with any partner it regarded as potentially useful for navigating through the constantly changing politics of the communist camp. When a new Soviet ambassador arrived in Pyongyang in June 1965, Kim Il Sung received him personally just five days after he presented his credentials. At the meeting, Kim seemed pleased by the recent visit of Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin and thanked the ambassador for Moscow's renewed military aid. He stressed the need for unity within the communist movement, regretted that the Sino-Soviet conflict made it impossible for him to visit Moscow, and gave his approval for North Korean-Soviet contacts below the "official" level.⁵⁴ Soviet military and economic assistance then resumed and even substantially increased,⁵⁵ as the Chinese partners, true to Soviet predictions, proved their limited economic usefulness.

Indeed, according to a lucid analysis by GDR ambassador Horst Brie in July 1965, Kim Il Sung maintained that no country had suffered as much from the Sino-Soviet rivalry as the DPRK. North Korea had been unable to develop economically, and instead had been forced to endure four years of stagnation since 1961. They had quickly regretted their shift to the Chinese in late 1961 because they suspected that the Chinese aim was to make the DPRK "dependent" on the PRC. The Chinese had requested that a commission be established to monitor the use of aid from the PRC, which contributed to an anti-Chinese backlash among the North Korean leadership. Furthermore, the passive, anti-Moscow attitude of the PRC with regard to aiding North Vietnam demonstrated to the North Koreans that only the Soviet Union could deliver the desired military hardware and serve as a guarantor of the DPRK's existence. When in 1966 the Cultural Revolution suddenly turned the PRC into a threat to the survival of the Pyongyang leadership, China forever lost its exclusive grip on North Korea.

Equidistant and Back in Business, 1966-1977

China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao Zedong instigated in 1966, represented a serious threat to Kim Il Sung's autocracy, and consequently changed once again the course of DPRK foreign relations. At the KWP party conference held 5-12 October 1966, Kim Il Sung denounced the PRC ideologically, without calling it by name, as practicing "left opportunism," stimulating people with "arch-revolutionary slogans to act in extremes" and promoting "nihilist tendencies renouncing all of the past." This would be no less dangerous for the communist movement, he declared, than the "modern revisionism" with which he had

charged the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ As the Cultural Revolution progressed, Kim Il Sung was denounced in China as a "bourgeois revisionist." The PRC and the DPRK massed troops along their Yalu River border and even fought some minor clashes.⁵⁷ Kim perceived himself to be in a two-front-war against the Americans in the south and the Chinese in the north, a struggle he could not sustain.

This period was apparently traumatic for Kim Il Sung, as he confided years later to East German leader Erich Honecker. "Relations with China were poor during the Cultural Revolution," the North Korean leader told Honecker in 6 December 1977. [See Document 6.] "China agitated against the 'Korean revisionists' over loudspeakers that were set up along the entire Sino-Korean border. But if the DPRK improves relations with China, it need not worry about the US. The DPRK cannot simultaneously concentrate troops in the North and in the South. This is why the DPRK has endeavored to improve relations since the end of the 'Cultural Revolution.'" ⁵⁸ It had to wait five years for this improvement, however. "We had to be patient," Kim told Honecker in May 1984. He also admitted that both countries had been on the brink of war in 1969; "There were provocations in North Korea at the time of the Chinese/Soviet conflicts on the Ussuri. While I was recuperating in the countryside, I received a call from our Minister of State Security [telling me] that Chinese troops were crossing the Tyumen River onto our territory. I gave the order not to shoot, but to let them come ahead so that we could take them on our territory, if necessary. We sent a group of soldiers there. Then the Chinese withdrew."⁵⁹

During the years of the Cultural Revolution in China, the DPRK again moved closer to the USSR and its East European allies. Officially Pyongyang now claimed to maintain equidistance from Moscow and Beijing, but it signed a major economic assistance agreement with the Soviet Union on 2 March 1967.⁶⁰ The GDR had received several DPRK delegations since 1965, including ones from the North Korean military, and by 1967 Berlin again characterized the bilateral relations as positive.⁶¹ On a visit to the GDR in July 1967, Yi Yong-ho, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly, pleaded for concerted efforts by all socialist countries to save North Vietnam "using every means." [See Document 4.] The KWP advocated "unity and solidarity among all the socialist countries," and insisted that the communist parties "must truly fulfill the Moscow Declaration" of 1960, which had by then also been signed by the PRC. Differences between parties should be regarded as "internal matters of the parties," according to Pyongyang's new line.⁶²

While Sino-Soviet tensions were at their peak, the GDR and the DPRK exchanged several official delegations. Two of these visits resulted in agreements to extend credit and economic assistance to North Korea—the 5 February 1966 "Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Domestic German Trade of the GDR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the DPRK on the Supply of Complete Systems and Equipment" and the 20 March 1972 "Agreement on Providing a Loan from the GDR for Supplies and Services for Estab-

lishing a Facility for Processing Zinc Residue in the DPRK.” However, the Korean side was either unable or unwilling to meet the obligations it had agreed to. As a consequence, in December 1977 these agreements were annulled—treated as though they had never been active—and replaced with a new long-term and comprehensive follow-up agreement.⁶³

Domestically, after 1966 the DPRK increased military readiness and incited war hysteria. Although the policy of strengthening defense at the expense of economic develop-

considered it a privilege that the visit of its highest-ranking Politburo delegation since 1956 went ahead as scheduled in April 1968. Despite the tensions following the Pueblo affair, Kim Il Sung received the East German visitors and briefed them on DPRK-PRC relations.⁶⁹

Pyongyang’s bellicose stand changed abruptly in response to the Sino-American rapprochement that culminated in US President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in February 1972. In response to this political earthquake, the DPRK

China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Mao Zedong instigated in 1966, represented a serious threat to Kim Il Sung’s autocracy.

ment was apparently disputed within the KWP, at the plenary session held 28 June to 3 July 1963 Kim Il Sung succeeded in purging the Central Committee of opponents voicing such concerns.⁶⁴ In the aftermath of that event the personality cult around Kim Il Sung reached new heights. He was portrayed as having been the sole leader against the Japanese occupation before 1945. In the forest of the Paekdu Mountains historic fireplaces and trees were “discovered” where Kim Il Sung allegedly led the partisans in their struggle against the Japanese. North Korean propaganda announced that in the whole world there was no mother with such a magnificent son as Kim Il Sung. When the Foreign Minister of Cambodia visited the DPRK, he was encouraged to lay memorial wreaths at the graves of Kim Il Sung’s parents and grandparents.⁶⁵

The DPRK instigated numerous violent border incidents, and infiltrated special forces into South Korean territory as far as seven to ten kilometers south of the armistice line. These acts were accompanied by claims that “revolutionary uprisings” by “armed partisans” had occurred in the South and “patriotic forces” would further gain strength there. “Liberation” was near, and the North Korean masses were ready to “destroy the enemy” in the South whenever Kim Il Sung ordered them to do so.⁶⁶ North Korea gained international notoriety for the spectacular seizure of the American electronic intelligence ship USS Pueblo in January 1968.⁶⁷ For domestic consumption by the KWP membership and the North Korean population, official propaganda invented fictitious American and South Korean attacks and heroic stories about how those had been successfully repelled by the vigilant DPRK. Foreshadowing the seizure of the Pueblo, Yi Yong-ho had already announced to the East Germans in July 1967 the DPRK’s readiness to strike at the Americans when they were “doing dumb things.” As he explained, “now and then we have to break their bones so that they don’t get even more fresh. [...] The Korean People’s Army is trained as cadre. The people are armed. [...] More than 30 percent of the budget annually goes to military purposes. If our enemies attack us again, we fully intend to liberate South Korea.”⁶⁸ The GDR

joined the ROK in an unprecedented joint unification statement issued 4 July 1972, surprising both the communist and the non-communist worlds. In a conversation with East German communists on 31 July, DPRK ambassador to East Berlin, Lee Chang Su, explained this move as a “tactical measure” intended to reunite Korea by forcing American troops and Japanese investors out of the South. He claimed this new strategy had been authorized at a KWP meeting in November 1971,⁷⁰ shortly after Henry Kissinger’s second and “open” visit to Beijing that year. Regardless of their provenance, the plans for a confederation quickly fell apart over the insurmountable differences between the two Korean states and their rulers, as well as over the all too obvious strategy of the DPRK to gain everything while yielding little. Kim Il Sung explained the turn back to confrontation in a lengthy letter to the leaders of the communist parties in July 1973,⁷¹ predictably placing blame exclusively on the Americans and South Koreans.[See Document 5]

Bilateral relations between the DPRK and the GDR went smoothly and unspectacularly after the early 1970’s. Berlin and Pyongyang maintained a rather low key but constant exchange of delegations, conducted negotiations on trade issues, signed agreements and sometimes implemented them. Since the socialist countries loyal to Moscow came to view the PRC as an ever more dangerous enemy, the GDR considered its relations with the DPRK as a contribution toward helping the North Koreans steer the proper course between Moscow and Beijing.⁷²

In 1977 East German Secretary General Erich Honecker made the first visit ever by a GDR leader to East Asia, staying in Mongolia, Vietnam, and North Korea. In Pyongyang⁷³ he issued a joint declaration with Kim Il Sung [See Document 6]. His delegation signed a Consular Treaty and a carefully crafted Agreement of Economic and Scientific-Technological Cooperation for 1978 to 1984, which was based on a pattern of reciprocity proposed to Honecker by Kim Il Sung himself: East German technology and facilities vs. North Korean raw materials and labor. Besides the official talks, the GDR visitors received an “impressive reception by the people of

Pyongyang,” toured a tractor plant, attended an opera performance, and enjoyed a rally staged for both leaders in the Sports Palace, attended by 20,000 people.

As a matter of course, during their personal meeting, Honecker and Kim boasted to each other about the successful performance of their respective countries on the path towards socialism. Kim, the absolute ruler of a country famous as an economic laggard made the astonishing claim that “the higher the standard of living climbs, the more ideologically lazy and the more careless the activity” of the people is—a statement no East German leader could have gotten away with making. Concerning foreign policy, Honecker emphasized the leading role of the Soviet Union and the close and unshakeable ties between the GDR and the USSR. In harsh words the East German leader criticized the PRC, which had characterized the Soviet Union as the “number one enemy.” Beijing’s criticism of NATO for not building up enough arms against the Soviet Union was tantamount to “an encouragement to wage war against the GDR,” Honecker declared. Kim Il Sung was less willing to commit himself, invoking North Korean non-interference in the polemics between the PRC and the USSR. He cautiously put some distance between the DPRK and China, but also reminded Honecker that Korea had a 1,500 kilometer-long border with China. Although acknowledging that their bilateral relations had improved after the “Cultural Revolution,” Kim declared that the DPRK would “not agree with everything China does,” would not be a “blind follower” of the PRC and would not accept “Chinese assertions such as the characterization of the Soviet Union as Social Imperialism.” Noting that “there are people who believe the DPRK is more on China’s side,” Kim emphatically asserted that “this is not the case.”

Finally, the North Korean leader agreed to the drafting of a treaty of mutual friendship between the two countries in preparation for his forthcoming visit to the GDR. Although this visit would not take place any time soon, allegedly for reasons of Kim’s health and the situation on the Korean peninsula, drafting the various agreements between the two countries kept political and technical delegations busy. As a result of Honecker’s stay in Pyongyang, the GDR Politburo even followed suggestions from Pyongyang to change, effective immediately, the official German name for North Korea from KVDR (Korean People’s Democratic Republic) to KDVR (Korean Democratic People’s Republic). The newly emerged personal ties between the two leaders also sent a clear message to the East German embassy in Pyongyang and the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. Internal criticism of Kim Il Sung and his personality cult or open hints at the poor North Korean performance with regard to trade were from now on the equivalent of doubting the judgment of Erich Honecker, and thus suicidal for a political career in the GDR. An era of reciprocal byzantinism in North Korean–East German relations was emerging.

Byzantinism and the Embrace of the Autocrats, 1978-1989

Even though the exchange of delegation visits contin-

ued, as did GDR economic and technological assistance to the DPRK, it nonetheless took almost seven years for Honecker and Kim to resume where they had left off in December 1977. In May 1984, Kim Il Sung departed on an extensive tour to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, his first stay in Eastern Europe since his visits in 1956. Everywhere during his journey, the 72-year-old Kim had his special bed, his personal toilet, and his personal doctors from Eastern Europe.⁷⁴ In addition he received a staged North-Korean-style welcome, especially from the East Germans, with “enthusiastic masses” lining up along his travel route. Taking this organized demonstration of devotion at face value as an expression of friendship, he was even more deeply impressed that the people had gathered despite the rainy weather. Kim Il Sung mentioned the GDR “masses in the rain” frequently during his visit and over and over again years later to East German political visitors in Pyongyang.

In his first political talk with Erich Honecker on 30 May, [See Document 7] Kim Il Sung focused on the achievements and prospects of his country. With the achievement of the goals identified at the 6th Party Congress of the KWP in 1981, the DPRK would approach the economic level of developed nations by 1990, Kim declared. In order to fulfill these ambitious plans, the KWP set as its first task the reclaiming of marshland from the sea, to overcome the problem of limited arable land. “The entire party and all of the members of the army are engaged in realizing this,” Kim informed Honecker. Once the problem of water supply has been resolved, the North Korean slogan encapsulated all that would come true: “Rice—that’s Communism!”

If the planned output level of non-ferrous heavy metals was also achieved, then, according to Kim, the “currency” issue would be solved as well, and the DPRK could repay its foreign debt of 400 million dollars, which it owed primarily to France, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. For exploiting brown coal deposits, constructing electrical power plants and automating its industry, however, North Korea would rely on support from its socialist friends. According to Kim, the DPRK currently suffered from a shortage of labor because so many young people had to join the army to “confront imperialism.” With some East German help in setting up automated production, this problem could also be overcome. Since South Korean forces combined with the American troops stationed in the ROK would be militarily superior to the DPRK, there would be no way to attack them with any chance of victory. Therefore, with his vision focused on economic realities, Kim told Honecker how to bring about Korean unification: “We must also show the South Koreans the superiority of socialism, just as you show that to the West Germans.”⁷⁵

The second day of talks, 31 May, was devoted to a long presentation of East German achievements in building “socialism” and a discussion of foreign policy matters. [See Document 8.] Honecker primarily asked Kim questions about China, since the GDR had no “party relations” with the PRC, nor did the East Europeans or Soviets. Kim used this opportunity to praise his “long-time friend” Deng Xiaoping and the new party chairman Hu Yaobang. According to Kim, the

latter had a sincere desire to improve relations with Moscow and had asked him to convey that message to the Soviet leadership. The Chinese, Kim stated, “did not want war.” They would instead need time to overcome the negative consequences of the Cultural Revolution. For that reason, their relations with the United States and Japan were not directed against the Soviet Union, but rather toward “obtain[ing] developed technology and credit” from the capitalist countries. Every time the Chinese had met with the Japanese and the Americans, they had conveyed such an explanation to the DPRK, beginning with Mao and Zhou Enlai back in 1972. Urging that all socialist countries improve relations with the PRC, Kim Il Sung pleaded, “If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China’s face [...] How good would it be for all of us if the Soviet Union and China would reconcile.”⁷⁶

In their concluding conversation the next day [See Document 9], Kim Il Sung and Erich Honecker agreed finally to sign the first Treaty of GDR-DPRK Friendship and Cooperation, originally drafted in late 1977. They furthermore agreed on a new Agreement on Economic and Scientific Cooperation between the two states covering the period up to 1990. Kim Il Sung was delighted about the prospective East German support, particularly the delivery of a semi-conductor plant. He admitted that the DPRK had purchased “through unofficial channels” an incomplete plant from Japan. This purchase would not have been necessary, Kim explained, if he had learned earlier, and not just during the preparation for his visit to the GDR, of the advanced status of electronics in East Germany. He also stated that he had not known of the East German production of synthetic rubber and herbicides, goods the DPRK had thus far purchased from capitalist countries. Unfortunately, the North Korean “cadres had not been provided sufficient guidance” on assessing the economic power of the GDR, so that Kim, the infallible leader, “had to criticize the comrades in our embassy for their lack of information” on the spot in Berlin. All that had to change, Kim concluded, and the technological cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK had to be significantly expanded.⁷⁷

What expanded even more were the heartfelt personal ties between the autocrats in Berlin and in Pyongyang, although the former still could not rival the absolute power of the latter, not to mention his unparalleled personality cult. According to the last GDR ambassador in Pyongyang, Hans Maretzki, Honecker felt attracted to Kim Il Sung’s unrestrained personal power and was sincerely impressed by the orchestrated ceremonies during his second visit to the DPRK.⁷⁸ When the Deputy Chairman of the GDR State Council, Manfred Gerlach, talked to Kim Il Sung during a trip to Asia in May 1986 [See Document 10], the North Korean leader expressed his impatience while waiting for the arrival of Erich Honecker, “his best friend and comrade-in-arms.” Referring to the unforgettable “jubilation” of the East German people in 1984, Kim promised to receive Honecker “with extraordinary warmth and personally show him the progress that has been made over the nearly ten years since his last trip to the DPRK.”

Since he had received such a warm visit in the GDR, Kim had asked Honecker to come to North Korea this time in the warm season.⁷⁹

The East German leader reciprocated with an “official friendship visit” to the DPRK from 18-21 October 1986 [See Document 11], which the GDR later called “an impressive and powerful demonstration of the friendship and fraternity between the two parties, states and peoples.” Kim Il Sung pulled out all the stops orchestrating jubilation. In Pyongyang and Nampo hundreds of thousands lined up for Erich Honecker, who was totally taken aback. As he told Kim the next day: “I don’t have the words to describe this. These hours will be unforgettable in the life of our peoples.” The North Korean leader, who had pictures of his 1984 GDR visit shown beforehand on TV to motivate “his people,” seconded: “I do know how guests are welcomed here. But never has it been like yesterday.”

During his four-day stay in the DPRK the East German leader visited Kim’s birthplace in Mangyongdae, the heavy machinery construction plant in Taean and the new West Sea barrage and locks complex. A political demonstration in a P’yongyang stadium and a sports exhibition by 50,000 athletes completed the visit. The two states agreed to intensify relations between the People’s Assemblies and the Foreign Ministries, and signed a new trade agreement and a joint proposal for cultural exchange between 1987 and 1990. Finally, “Comrade Erich Honecker invited Comrade Kim Il Sung to visit the GDR. The invitation was accepted with great joy and sincere thanks.”⁸⁰

In their official meeting on 19 October in Pyongyang’s Presidential Palace, Kim and Honecker displayed a cordial and fraternal harmony in every respect. This time the guest began with an hour-long talk on GDR successes across the board. Re-opening the conversation after a break, the North Korean leader referred to the high chairs especially designed for him because of his back problems and informed his guest that he had his doctor’s permission to use airplanes to travel, for instance, to Moscow or the GDR. In contrast to Honecker, Kim began with a rather critical assessment of the conditions in his country. After almost 40 years of socialism and “juche” propaganda in the DPRK, he bluntly confessed in this intimate setting that North Korea is a “developing country confronted with three basic problems: supplying the population with food, housing and clothing.” He described in detail the process of reclaiming land from the sea by having 300,000 soldiers build the West Sea barrage at Nampo to filter salt water and grow rice on newly acquired fertile soil. On and on Kim Il Sung went in laying out ambitious plans for producing textiles for clothing, building apartments and introducing automation in factories to relieve the people of hard physical labor. Every North Korean citizen would be required to acquire at least one special degree of higher education, since only when they have “achieved a high ideological level, can we train our people to think in collective terms.”

In his foreign policy remarks Kim maintained firmly that the DPRK had no intention of invading South Korea: “We could not do that anyway and we are not going to do it.”

According to Kim, the American forces in the South had stationed 1,000 nuclear warheads and just two of them would be sufficient to completely destroy all of North Korea. He supported Soviet leader Gorbachev's disarmament proposals and enthusiastically welcomed the upcoming visit of Honecker to the PRC: "How nice that is, how positive for socialism," he exclaimed.⁸¹

In the following years several high level talks further deepened the GDR-DPRK relationship. When the First Party Secretary of the District of Berlin, Günter Schabowski, visited Pyongyang on his Asian tour to China, Mongolia, and North Korea, he met Kim Il Sung on 10 May 1988. [See Document 12] At that meeting byzantinism with greetings from and to Honecker continued as well as the relatively open talk by the North Korean leader. According to Kim's assertion, the explanation for the DPRK backlog in trade obligations, as he allegedly confided for the first time to a foreign delegation, were major floods in the DPRK in 1986 and 1987, which "had not been made publicly known internationally. All of the production facilities, railroad tracks, and roads were flooded in the valley where the sintered magnesite is found, production came to a standstill, and there was a great deal of destruction." But now, Kim maintained, all operations had fully resumed and everything that the DPRK had pledged would be delivered. At the same time the massive construction in the capital would continue, as thousands of military personnel engaged in a "200-day-battle" to complete the sites in time for the 13th World Games of Youth and Students in P'yongyang in 1989.⁸²

In July 1988 an official military delegation from the GDR led by Defense Minister Heinz Keßler visited North Korea for a full week, signed a mutual defense agreement, and enjoyed a tour of all the propagandistic sites of Kim Il Sung's regime. [See Document 13] Only the helicopter flight to the demarcation line at the 38th parallel had to be cancelled due to weather conditions. The East German delegation together with the DPRK Defense Minister even climbed 2,744 meters to the peak of Mount Paekdu at the Chinese border. When Minister Keßler handed a letter from Honecker to the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung asked: "How is my brother and best friend Erich Honecker doing?"⁸³

During the meeting with his "best friend" in October 1986, Kim Il Sung had shared something that he personally claimed to have sensed among the North Korean people, after they had read Erich Honecker's curriculum vitae in their press. "People are sad that such deserving revolutionaries also grow older. We don't have to worry, however, since we have done everything to ensure that future generations will continue our struggle."⁸⁴ It is difficult to imagine the shock and grief Kim Il Sung must have felt upon seeing Honecker ousted from power in October 1989, watching the GDR disintegrate and disappear from the map and seeing another close "friend" from Eastern Europe, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, being executed in December 1989.

As if to ensure that the Kim Il Sung dynasty was destined for a very different fate, Kim's distinctive cult reached new heights. The number of trees in the Paekdu Mountains

found with allegedly 50-year old inscriptions on their bark proliferated miraculously. The trees bore messages announcing to Kim Il Sung, the "Sun of Korea," in numerous variations, the birth of his son and worthy successor Kim Jong Il, the "Guiding Star of Korea." As the Soviet Union lost all of its former empire in Eastern Europe and all the socialist rulers of those countries fell from power, the official North Korean news agency announced on 6 January 1990 the discovery of 9,000 trees heralding the rise of Kim Jong Il—the next generation.⁸⁵

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NOTES

¹ Foreign diplomats comprised a small community in Pyongyang. By 1964 there were only twelve foreign embassies in the DPRK.

² Ingrid Muth. *Die DDR-Aussenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2000): 281.

³ Visit with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DPRK on 5 August 1954. GDR Embassy in P'yongyang. Political Archive of the Foreign Office (PolArch AA), Ministry for Foreign Relations (MfAA), A 5575.

⁴ See, e.g. Compilation of material on the aid of friendly countries for the reconstruction of the DPRK economy as summarized from the presentations of the friendly embassies in the Meeting of 24 January 1956. GDR Embassy P'yongyang. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 7013.

⁵ Report on the relations between the GDR and DPRK between 1950 and 1954. GDR Foreign Ministry. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 7077.

⁶ DPRK Embassy in Beijing to GDR Embassy in Beijing. 14 January 1954. GDR Foreign Ministry. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10213.

⁷ In November 1954 the Korea Solidarity Committee's assignments were extended to Vietnam. It finally ceased such activity in October 1957, when other Soviet bloc countries also replaced their respective solidarity committees with regular bilateral trade relations.

⁸ Communique of the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam with the National Council. 25 October 1957. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 5599.

⁹ Working results of the Solidarity Committee for Korea and Vietnam with the National Council regarding Korea. Undated. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 152/75.

¹⁰ Aid of the socialist states to the DPRK during and after the Korean War. GDR Embassy in Pyongyang. Undated. PolArch, MfAA, C 152/75.

¹¹ Kim Il Sung to Otto Grotewohl, July 1954. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 15148.

¹² Protocol on the visit of the DPRK Prime Minister in Hamhung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 18 May 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10211.

¹³ Protocol on the meeting with DPRK Prime Minister Kim Il Sung. German Working Committee Hamhung. 1 February 1958. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10257. Cf. also Rüdiger Frank, *Die DDR und Nordkorea: Der Wiederaufbau der Stadt Hamhung von 1954 bis 1962* (Aachen: Shaker, 1996).

¹⁴ Christian Ostermann, ed., *Uprising in East Germany 1953: The Cold War, the German Question and the First Major Upheaval behind the Iron Curtain* (New York/Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

¹⁵ Werner Meissner, ed., *Die DDR und China 1949 bis 1990. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie, 1995): 74-76.

¹⁶ Protocol of the extraordinary Session of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Politburo. January 2, 1956. Foundation Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archive (SAPMO-BA), SED Archive (DY 30), J IV 2/2A/464.

¹⁷ Protocol of the Session of SED Politburo. 17 April 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2 A/491.

¹⁸ On the Draft of the KWP Statute. 11 April 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/135.

¹⁹ Cf. an East German assessment of an internal KWP brochure from July 1962. Although the GDR Foreign Ministry could not imagine at that time that those distortions would become ever more fantastical, it bluntly called them in 1963 a ‘new link in the chain of misrepresentations of Korean history between 1930 and 1945’. Commentary on the internal party brochure ‘Our party’s revolutionary traditions, acquired during the period of the armed anti-Japanese struggle.’ GDR Foreign Ministry. 16 May 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/250.

²⁰ Hans Maretzki. *Kim-ismus in Nordkorea* (Böblingen: Tykve): 13, 14, 17, 33, 43, 45. The author was the last ambassador of the GDR in the DPRK, serving from 1987 through 1990.

²¹ Protocol of the Session of SED Politburo. 15 May 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2 /2A/496.

²² Protocol of the Extraordinary Session of SED Politburo. 12 June 1956. Protocol of the Meeting of the Politburo with the Korean comrades. 8 June 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/500.

²³ The DPRK had joined Comecon in 1957 as an observer, but withdrew from the organization for good in 1964 to avoid too much foreign knowledge of North Korean affairs and outside ‘interference’ with the DPRK’s ‘independence.’

²⁴ Report on the Negotiations conducted in Berlin during the visit of the DPRK Government Delegation. GDR Foreign Ministry. 29 June 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 10276.

²⁵ Protocol of Session of SED Politburo. 2 October 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/521. In 1960, when the GDR ran into serious economic trouble due to the increasing migration of East Germans to the West, Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl sent a letter to Kim Il Sung asking for his understanding of the GDR’s inability to fulfill its aid obligations regarding rebuilding the North Korean city of Hamhung (Telegram from Ambassador Kurt Schneidewind to Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp Schwab. 11 November 1960. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646). In May 1961 the DPRK Ambassador in Berlin urgently asked the GDR for 20,000 tons of wheat flour and offered 1,000 kilograms of gold in early 1962 in return. At that time, however, the GDR had no flour itself, nor hard

currency to buy it in the West, nor money to grant the DPRK a credit (Notice on some problems of economic aid for the DPRK. 29 May 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/20/134).

²⁶ Overview on the relations between the GDR and the KDVR. GDR Foreign Ministry. 9 April 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/253.

²⁷ Note on a conversation between Ambassador Fischer, USSR Ambassador Ivanov and Romanian Ambassador Tatu Shianu on 30 October 1956. GDR Embassy in Pyongyang. 27 November 1956. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 5651.

²⁸ For a discussion of this revolt and purge, see the article by Balazs Szalontai in this issue.

²⁹ Maretzki, p. 45. See also Overview. The sessions of the KWP Central Committee between the 3rd and 4th Party Congress. GDR Foreign Ministry. 4 September 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136.

³⁰ Transcript of handwritten Memorandum of GDR Embassy Attaché Glückauf on his conversation with First Secretary of USSR Embassy, Pimenov on 8 November 1956. Pyongyang, 28 November 1956. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646.

³¹ Information. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 16 February 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646 (Information from CSSR Ambassador Kohousek to GDR Ambassador Schneidewind).

³² By 1964 there were only twelve foreign embassies in the DPRK.

³³ Memorandum on a Conversation in the Soviet Embassy with Comrade Pusanov. GDR Embassy Pyongyang, 30 August 1960. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

³⁴ Notice on a conversation with CSSR Ambassador, Comrade Kohusek, on February 3, 1961. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 8 February 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

³⁵ Information on a few problems in the KWP and in the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 14 March 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

³⁶ Some remarks on developments in the DPRK and its relationships. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 13 June 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

³⁷ Some problems in the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 8 August 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J UV 2/20/136.

³⁸ Ambassador Schneidewind to Deputy Foreign Minister Schwab. Report on the 4th KWP Party Congress. 20 September 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/135.

³⁹ Report on information from the Ambassador of the USSR in the DPRK received on 12 December 1961. GDR Embassy Pyongyang, 20 December 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

⁴⁰ Report on a dinner with the Ambassador of the PR Bulgaria on 15 December 1961. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 21 December 1961. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

⁴¹ Notice on a conversation of Comrade Stark with Comrade Torbenkov, counselor at the USSR Embassy in the DPRK on 28 March 1962. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 29 March 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137; Information on the reunification policy of the KWP. GDR Foreign Ministry. 5 May 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136.

⁴² Information on the DPRK position regarding the measures of the Soviet government on peacefully solving the Cuban conflict and on the Chinese-Indian border conflict. GDR Foreign Ministry. 16 November 1962. SAPMO-BA, IV 2/20/136; Information on the 5th KWP Plenary Session from 10-14 December 1962. GDR Foreign Ministry. 22 December 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136.

⁴³ According to the Czechoslovak Ambassador, who returned to Pyongyang on the same airplane as the North Korean delegation, Yi Chu-yon was nervous during the flight about the consequences

awaiting him at home because of his frank political demonstration with the apples. Information on a conversation with the Czechoslovak Ambassador in the DPRK, Comrade Moravec., in the GDR Embassy on 21 December 1962. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 7 January 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/137.

⁴⁴ The influence of the Communist Party of China on the policy of the KWP. GDR Foreign Ministry. 8 April 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/250.

⁴⁵ Information on the governmental statement of Comrade Kim Ir Sen [Kim Il Sung] at the 5th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on 23 October 1962. GDR Foreign Ministry. 17 November 1962. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136.

⁴⁶ Memorandum on a conversation with Comrades Pimenow, Witek and Cicha on 27 October 1963. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 8 November 1963. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/253.

⁴⁷ Notice on a conversation with deputy premier and candidate of the Politburo of the KWP Central Committee, Comrade Yi Chuyon, on 9 January 1964. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 10 January 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/253.

⁴⁸ Information on positions of KWP leadership concerning the German Question and results of KWP policy on relations between the GDR and the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 2 September 1964. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 1087/70.

⁴⁹ Information on incidents concerning the GDR Embassy in P'yongyang and the DPRK Embassy in Berlin. GDR Foreign Ministry. 3 April 1964. PolArch AA, MfAA, A 7131.

⁵⁰ Short Version of the Report on Relations by the Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK for the Year 1963. GDR Foreign Ministry. 20 February 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251.

⁵¹ Memorandum on information from 29 April 1965. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 19 May 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. Quite spectacular were the attack on the dark-skinned Cuban ambassador in Pyongyang in March 1965 and the brutal reaction of the DPRK government to the incident. The GDR ambassador and his wife were immediately informed of the event by the shocked Cuban ambassadorial couple. See Incident with the Cuban ambassador and the delegation of physicians from Cuba. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 2 April 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251.

⁵² Memorandum on a conversation with the Ambassador of the USSR, Comrade Moskovski, on 27 June 1964. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 2 July 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251.

⁵³ Unofficial Translation of a Copy of the Letter from the KWP Central Committee to the Central Committee of the CPSU. 28 August 1964. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646.

⁵⁴ Memorandum on the first visit of the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade Gortschakov, on 6 June 1965. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 11 June 1965. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251.

⁵⁵ Lerner, *Failure of Perception*, pp. 663-664.

⁵⁶ Evaluation of the KWP Conference from 5-12 October 1966. GDR Foreign Ministry. 18 November 1966. MfAA Archive.

⁵⁷ Lerner, *Failure of Perception*, pp. 664-665.

⁵⁸ Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8 to 11 December, 1977. 13 December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123, p. 40.

⁵⁹ Memorandum of the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁶⁰ See details on the Soviet aid pledged and delivered in Memorandum on a conversation between Comrade Herrmann and Comrade Putivez, 2nd Secretary of the USSR Embassy, on 12 December

1968 in the USSR Embassy. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 23 December 1968. MfAA Archive.

⁶¹ On the relations between the GDR and the DPRK. GDR Foreign Ministry. 19 April 1967. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 1089/70.

⁶² Memorandum of a meeting between Comrade Hermann Matern, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate for the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, and the delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3 July 1967. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 18 July 1967. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035.

⁶³ Agreement on the development of economic and scientific-technological cooperation between the government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123.

⁶⁴ Information on the plenary session of the KWP Central Committee from June 28 to July 3, 1967. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 4 July 1967. MfAA Archive.

⁶⁵ Information on some new aspects of the KWP position in domestic and foreign policy matters. GDR Embassy Pyongyang. 18 August 1967. MfAA Archive.

⁶⁶ Ibid. See also Memorandum on a conversation of Comrade Werner Lamberz, secretary of the Central Committee, with the ambassador of the DPRK in the GDR, Comrade Ro Su Ek, on 26 February 1968. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 26 February 1968. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 3646.

⁶⁷ See Lerner, *Failure of Perception*; and James Bamford, (New York: Doubleday, 2001): 240-282.

⁶⁸ Memorandum of a meeting between Comrade Hermann Matern, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate for the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, and the delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3 July 1967. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 18 July 1967. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035.

⁶⁹ Note on the conversations between the Party and Government Delegations of the GDR and the DPRK in Pyongyang on 12 April 1968. Note on Visit of GDR Party and Government Delegation led by Comrade Prof. Kurt Hager with the General Secretary of the KWP and Prime Minister of the DPRK on 16 April 1968. Central Committee of the SED, Department of International Relations. 23 April 1968. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 159/75.

⁷⁰ Don Oberdorfer. *The Two Koreas, A Contemporary History* (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997): p. 25 (Conversation with SED Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, Hermann Axen. 31 July 1972).

⁷¹ Information for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED. 3 August 1973. Subject: Correspondence from Kim Ir Sen [Kim Il Sung], Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, to Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party. 7 July 1973. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁷² Continuous Chronology DPRK, 1973 (1972, 1971). GDR Foreign Ministry. 15 May 1973 etc. PolArch AA, MfAA, C 161/75.

⁷³ The following paragraphs are based on "Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8-11

December 1977.” 13 December 1977. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123.

⁷⁴ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 18.

⁷⁵ Stenographic record. Official friendship visit to the GDR by the Party and State Delegation of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic led by Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK. 30 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁷⁶ Memorandum on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁷⁷ Memorandum on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 1 June 1984. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁷⁸ Maretzki, *Kim-ismus in Nordkorea*, p. 101.

⁷⁹ Joachim Herrmann to Erich Honecker, Enclosure: On the meeting with Kim Il Sung (Report by Manfred Gerlach, ordered by Erich Honecker to be forwarded to all members and candidates of the GDR Politburo). 26 May 1986. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁸⁰ Report on the official friendship visit by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, to the DPRK from 18-21 October 1986. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁸¹ Stenographic report on the official negotiations between Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK, on 19 October 1986 in the Presidential Palace in Pyongyang. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁸² Memorandum on the meeting between Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the KWP, and Comrade Günter Schabowski in Pyongyang on 10 May 1988. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2205.

⁸³ Report on a visit of an official GDR military delegation in the DPRK in July 1988; Erich Honecker to Kim Il Sung. 18 July 1988. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2508.

⁸⁴ Stenographic report on the official negotiations between Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, and Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the KWP and President of the DPRK, on 19 October 1986 in the Presidential Palace in P’yongyang. SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460.

⁸⁵ Maretzki, *Kim-ismus in Nordkorea*, p. 34.

DOCUMENT No. 1**Report, Embassy of the GDR in the DPRK to the Foreign Policy and International Department of the Socialist Unity Party, GDR, 14 March 1961**

[Source: SAPMO-BA, Dy 30, IV 2/20/137. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Foreign Policy and International
19 and 22 March 61
Relations Department
Berlin, 14 March 1961
Confidential

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Information on a few problems in the Korean Workers Party and in the Democratic People's Republic of China.

(Prepared by the embassy of the GDR in the DPRK)

Addressing the following issues:

- I. The influence of Chinese interpretations and theories in the DPRK
- II. Kim Il Sung's cult of personality
- III. The status of repatriation to the DPRK of the Koreans living in Japan

I. The influence of Chinese interpretations and theories in the DPRK

1. Corresponding to the Chinese theory of the national economy developing in leaps, our Korean comrades have also attempted to achieve Socialism in great leaps. The Korean version is the so-called "Ch'ollima" movement. As in China, the symbol for it is a winged horse on which a worker is mounted.

(Ch'ollima = winged horse)

Even after the publication of the Moscow declaration, there is talk of "new, even greater and more successful leaps" in reports on the satisfaction of the Five Year Plan and in the formulation of tasks for the Seven Year Plan.

During the course of the Five Year Plan, this theory of leaps led to major disproportions in the national economy, just as it did in the People's Republic of China, and these disproportions were considered legitimate occurrences linked to the building of Socialism.

2. Only in the last year there were measures implemented with the consent agreement of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party that amounted to over-centralizing the management of the national economy. Having eliminated nearly all of the ministries and established two super-committees for managing the national economy, now they are again undertaking to form ministries for the individual branches of the national economy.

3. So-called "experimental economies" were created in two areas that include regions of up to 12,000 hectares, and they are organized in precisely the same manner as the Chinese people's communes.

They have even begun to establish a type of urban people's commune, called Housewives Street Brigades, in that housewives and family members form so-called home-worker cooperatives that decide issues of production, social life, and other things.

4. The same managerial methods are applied in the army as in the Chinese army. The generals must serve as soldiers. There is no individual responsibility. Orders are decided in advance in the Party organization. The army is both a military unit and self-reliant in all areas. Chinese methods have been applied with even greater vigor, especially since the visit by the Chinese military delegation during the last months of last year.

5. There is a strong orientation toward "black and yellow" brothers. This leads to violation of the principle of proletarian Internationalism, especially with regard to the importance of the struggle by the worker class in Europe and in other regions of the world. The roles of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are still seriously underestimated and the role of the Communist Party of China is overestimated.

II. Kim Il Sung's cult of personality

The cult of personality surrounding Comrade Kim Il Sung has been growing steadily for some time. Everything the Party and the Korean people earn is attributed to Comrade Kim Il Sung. There is no room, no classroom, no public building in which a photo of Kim Il Sung cannot be found. The Museum of the War of National Liberation is designed entirely around the role of Kim Il Sung. There are no less than 12 figures of Kim Il Sung in the rooms of the museum, each larger than the next.

The history of the revolutionary war and the formation of the Communist Party of Korea are not correctly portrayed. The decisive role of the Soviet Union in the liberation of Korea is completely downplayed. Its role is addressed on only a single panel. This is also expressed in the materials as well as in films and depictions. Thus, a legend of Kim Il Sung has been created that does not correspond to the actual facts if one considers what Comrade Kim Il Sung has actually done.

Party propaganda is not oriented toward studying the works of Marxism/Leninism, but rather is solely and completely oriented toward the "wise teachings of our glorious leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung". Many rules of Party life, such as the link to the masses, are portrayed as if they were discovered by Kim Il Sung rather than by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There are almost no articles or events in which Comrade Kim Il Sung is not mentioned. It is also a fact that all of those who are not in agreement with such an approach are

characterized as sectarians, and recently as revisionists. This demonstrates that criticism and self-criticism in the Party are very poorly developed and in many cases democratic rule is not guaranteed. This is particularly true of the army and state organizations.

How the Korean Comrades view the fight against domination is evident from a statement by Comrade Pak Tin Tsches (spelling from original German document) which he made in his lecture at the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the KWP: “We as Korean comrades have always fought the battle against dogmatism, we have always pursued our own standpoint against that of others”. That is naturally a vulgar and false interpretation of the battle against dogmatism. Dogmatism in the Korean Workers Party is closely linked to the mystic ideas of Confucianism, which extend to certain nationalist tendencies. It is frequently stated that only a people like the Korean people is capable of such feats and heroism. All successes, not the least those achieved with the great assistance of the fraternal Socialist nations, especially with the aid of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, are portrayed as their own successes. Great feats that were accomplished by the Soviet Union, the CSSR, Poland, and the GDR are portrayed as accomplishments of the Korean workers “without foreign” assistance. It is not coincidental that even after the Statement of the Communist and Workers Parties, neither international cooperation in all fields nor fraternal assistance from the Socialist nations were mentioned or shown any appreciation. Connected to this are also certain efforts not to take part in Socialist works and to underestimate the successes of other peoples in the Socialist camp. These nationalist tendencies are particularly prevalent in films, in the theater and performances, and in lectures.

III. The status of repatriation to the DPRK of the Koreans living in Japan

By the end of 1960, the DPRK had sent 54 repatriation ships to Japan to bring about 53,000 Koreans back to the DPRK. 94% of them had lived in South Korea prior to emigrating to Japan. Among these Koreans are 700 specialists, 300 scientists and artists, 3 doctors of medicine, and 1 doctor in another field. In addition, this group includes 1500 Japanese who also emigrated to the DPRK. (These were primarily Japanese spouses.)

By January 1961 there were markedly fewer announcements and reports on repatriations in the press and on the radio in the DPRK than there had been previously. On 3 February 1961 the Japanese Red Cross announced that the Red Cross of the DPRK had sent a telegram to its Japanese counterpart which read: “To prevent an epidemic of the flu that is in Japan, the repatriation transports are being temporarily suspended.” (Announcement in Vertr. Bulletin of the Ztak.)

On 8 February 1961, the Tokyo-based Japanese broadcaster “International Radio” reported that the Japanese Red Cross had sent a telegram to the DPRK that contained the

following:

- Request for immediate dispatch of the 55th repatriation ship
- There are 735 repatriates in Niigata, none of whom are ill with the flu
- Proposal that the repatriates be provided prophylactic inoculations
- Proposal that the DPRK send with the 55th ship physicians whose duties would be to conduct examinations and administer inoculations.

The reasons the repatriation activities were halted are as follows:

1. The repatriates who are already in the DPRK have sent word to those still living in Japan not to come to the DPRK due to the living conditions.
2. Keeping track of the repatriates has proved difficult for DPRK organizations. For instance, our embassy has been able to observe that the younger repatriates, in particular, form groups and show up in Pyongyang, for example. They have their meeting points in the city and in some cases turn out to be “troublemakers”.
3. Their clothing, attitude, and manner of personal appearance make them immediately recognizable in the DPRK. Some amenities that were commonplace for them in the past — portable radios, record players, etc., reach the Korean populace this way and lead to inconsistencies and complications in the education of the people, particularly the youth. (Tasks set forth for the youth at the last Central Committee meeting of the Democratic Youth Association: “Resolve difficult and complicated issues — Members of youth organization must be developed into “red soldiers of the Party”.
4. The so-called Order Shops (purchasing centrals) currently offer items repatriates brought with them from Japan. Especially bicycles, portable radios, watches, leather jackets, suits, record players, leather purses, records, etc. These things are sold for cash to provide the so-called “material foundation” for the repatriates. Young repatriates in particular sometimes live up to six months on this money and do not pursue any regular employment. They use this time to make deals. This results in perceptible stimulation of the “black market” in the streets.
5. The repatriates, settled by DPRK organizations across the entire country, even in the most remote villages, frequently leave, migrating primarily to major cities.
6. There is dissatisfaction among the women repatriates, as well. In Japan, they were accustomed to having access to a broad range of products in shops and department stores, which is currently not the case in the DPRK.
7. The independent Capitalists and former owners of small and mid-size businesses adapt best and most rapidly to life in the DPRK. The sale of the of the complete factory equipment they bring with them and models (machines,

spare parts, cars, etc. gave them high profits and great advantages, such as top jobs.

The specialists among the repatriates also fare well, since they are employed in accordance with their special knowledge and abilities. Repatriation has for the most part improved the lot of the farmers, since they were among the groups that suffered most in Japan. (High taxes, extremely poor living conditions.)

Repatriation also brought with it a host of problems for the DPRK in terms of security and vigilance. Since the border between North and South Korea is hermetically sealed, the enemy attempts to infiltrate agents and spies, especially through Japan. The great number of those returning to the DPRK makes it easier for certain trained cadre from foreign intelligence services to penetrate. The possibility of taking personal property [illegible lines]

[illegible] the repatriates also provides an opportunity to introduce technical means of espionage and sabotage into the DPRK (portable radios as transmitters, etc.)

This problem is not acknowledged publicly at all. The facts listed above are observations that have also been made by diplomats from other embassies and that have been confirmed in talks and meetings.



DOCUMENT No. 2
Report, First Extra-European Department, 3 May 1962

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/20/136. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

First Extra-European Department
A/27/219
Berlin, 3 May 1962
Classified Materials no. 101/62
6 copies
Copy 2, 5 pages
Information on the reunification policy of the Korean Workers Party

A new trend has become evident in the reunification policy of the Korean Workers Party since the call by the United Fatherland Front on 15 February 1962. Neither the call nor the campaign conducted thereafter contained any mention of peaceful reunification. This possibility has been replaced with "independent unification of Korea".

1. Comrade Pak Chun-hyok, Director of the First Department, laid out the Korean Workers Party's stance on reunification for the first time in a conversation with Comrade

Stark.

Comrade Pak stated that the current goal is to chase US imperialists out of South Korea. He said this was critical for resolving the national issue in Korea. He stressed that every resource must be used to force the US imperialists to withdraw, since they will not go willingly. This mission also promotes building socialism in the DPRK. He said that the socialist camp is very strong, the national liberation movement is becoming even stronger, etc., and therefore there is no need to ask the imperialists for anything. In this context, regarding the armistice of 1953, he stated that although the DPRK agreed to the armistice, it also agreed to continue to wage the war. There is no other way to wage the war against imperialism. He stressed that war and class struggle are integral parts of one another.

On the issue of driving the US imperialists out of South Korea, he stated that this is a matter for the entire Korean people and one could not wait until the population of South Korea starves. South Korea does not have the strength to drive the US imperialists out by itself.

On the issue of how to drive the US imperialists out, since they will not withdraw peacefully and this would mean war, Comrade Pak responded again that war cannot be separated from class struggle and stressed that the DPRK is fighting for what it sees in the future, that is, reunification of the homeland. He stated that the socialist revolution means eliminating the power of the bourgeoisie and establishing socialism. The only path to socialism is class struggle and socialist revolution.

Comrade Pak furthermore stated that the struggle against imperialism must be waged in all areas, not just in one realm, such as, for example, the economic realm. He stated that peaceful coexistence must serve the socialist revolution, the struggle against colonialism, national liberation, and class liberation. The struggle for peace alone would be something different.

He remarked that disarmament would also be good and that the DPRK would therefore support it, as well.

2. Comrade Kim Tae-hui, Deputy Foreign Minister, spoke to ambassadors and charges d'affaires on 13 April. Comrade Kim stated that the US imperialists had increased their hostile provocations and direct preparations for war in Korea to a new high. In lengthy remarks, he told about specific steps the US had taken and then said that our Korean comrades are currently increasing their defense readiness and have taken measures "to arm the entire population" in order to be prepared for an act of aggression.

He stated that nothing had changed in terms of reunification policy as it had been established at the IV Party Congress. The DPRK has made proposals for peaceful reunification and the population has fought valiantly to make these proposals a reality because there was the possibility of toppling the colonial system in the south. The Americans created a fascist regime since they saw this happening. He said that under these conditions there can be no talk of a policy of peaceful coexistence with respect to the American occupiers.

There can be no negotiations with South Korea if there is no democracy. Therefore, given current conditions, the main task is to fight for democratic rights and freedoms and to fight to topple the Park Chung Hee regime.

Our Korean comrades are for peaceful reunification, but if American imperialism pushes its war propaganda to the extreme, all resources must be used for defense readiness. There can be no peaceful reunification until the American occupiers have been chased out and the Park Chung Hee regime has toppled.

He said that the current situation must be considered more serious than the events in April of 1960. He stated that if the entire Korean populace rose up, as in April 1960, it will be possible to chase the American occupiers out. In conclusion, he said that our Korean comrades are mobilizing all their resources to maintain peace in Korea.

3. Foreign Minister Pak Song-ch'ol also addressed this problem at a meeting with Comrade Schneidewind. Comrade Pak remarked that, based on the situation in South Korea, there could be no talk of the DPRK pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence or confederation with respect to the south and the occupiers. But this does not mean that the liberation of South Korea will be accomplished by war. The DPRK continues to favor peaceful reunification. But if the DPRK were to speak of peaceful coexistence with regard to the south, democratic forces would lose hope that the Park Chung Hee regime will topple and that the Americans will withdraw.

Our Korean comrades are mobilizing all of their resources in the southern part of the country for toppling the Park Chung Hee regime and are increasing their endeavors for building socialism. They are firmly convinced that the democratic forces in their nation will find the strength to topple Park Chung Hee and to liberate the country from its American occupiers.

Remarks:

1. Comrade Pak Chun-hyok's remarks give the impression that the Korean Workers Party has now backed away from its line supporting peaceful reunification.

On the other hand, Comrades Pak Song-ch'ol and Kim Tae-hui assert that nothing has changed in terms of the objective of peaceful reunification. They base their rejection of the confederation and of peaceful coexistence between the two parts of Korea, and the measures they have undertaken to arm the populace, on stepped-up war preparations on the part of the US Imperialists and on the existence of a Fascist power in South Korea.

It must also be mentioned that Comrade Ch'oe Yong-gon spoke again of peaceful reunification of Korea on 25 April 1962 during an announcement.

It is therefore evident that our Korean comrades' remarks are contradictory.

4. The manner in which Pak Chun-hyok stressed the

strength of the socialist camp in his statements is meant to express the expectation that the socialist nations support this policy.

5. In its current policies, the DPRK is not willing to conduct negotiations with Imperialism. Negotiations with the Imperialists are portrayed as supplications to and weakness before the Imperialists.

6. The statements made by our Korean comrades indicate that they no longer agree that peaceful coexistence is the foundation for the foreign policy of the Socialist nations. This openly places in question the correctness of the resolutions regarding foreign policy at the Moscow Conference and the XXII Party Congress.

7. This Korean Workers Party policy reflects a stronger Chinese/Albanian interpretation.

[signature]
(Stude)
Department Director

Distribution:
1 x Min. Schwab
1 x Central Committee, Foreign Policy Department,
Comrade Ott
1 x Comrade Stude
1 x Information Department
1 x Embassy in Pyongyang
1 x Korea Section Remarks



DOCUMENT No. 3
Report, GDR Embassy in the DPRK, 2 April 1965

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV A2/20/251. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

GDR Embassy in the DPRK
Pyongyang, 2 April 1965

Confidential Matter No. 24/65
3 Copies

Subject: Incident with the Cuban ambassador and the delegation of physicians from Cuba

On 28 March, there was a serious incident at 6:00 p.m. while the Cuban ambassador, his family, and a delegation of physicians from Cuba were touring the city. The Cuban physicians wanted to photograph three columns of a destroyed building that was in an area of new construction and that

dated from the war against the US. A Korean passerby called to Korean residents in the vicinity to act against the Cuban delegation. A large crowd of people gathered quickly, including 100 children, and the crowd pounded the car with their fists, ordered the occupants to get out, and hurled insults, especially against the Cuban ambassador as a black man. It should be added that the Cuban ambassador is currently the only ambassador who has a relatively good basic knowledge of the Korean language and can take part in simple conversations in Korean. Although the Cuban ambassador identified himself as the ambassador of Cuba, both in Korean and in Russian, this had no effect on the crowd's actions.

The militia in the vicinity took no action at all.

The Cuban physicians urged the ambassador to open the car to get out. Once the Cuban ambassador exited the car, the delegation's cameras were taken away from them. At about this time a member of the security service arrived, and when he realized what was going on, he put his hands in front of his face, and, as the Cuban ambassador said, groaned. The Cuban ambassador told me that he believed that this security service member in part recognized the seriousness of what had happened. This member of the security service apparently called an armed security service unit for assistance. As the unit's troops arrived, they proceeded to exercise extraordinary brutality against the crowd, including the children. They struck these people, including the children, with the butts of their weapons. Once the crowd had been driven away from the car, the Cuban ambassador established that the Cuban flag had been torn off and was no longer there. He asked the leader of the security troops to return the flag. Then the security service troops committed even worse acts of brutality against the people in the street and in the nearby houses, demanding that the flag be returned. The Cuban ambassador remarked to me that their actions were so brutal that if he had been Korean and had had the flag, he would have preferred to eat it rather than to give it back.

The Cuban ambassador then proceeded to the Foreign Ministry, where he met first with the department director, then with Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Dam and acting Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam. According to the Cuban ambassador, the meeting did not end until 3:00 a.m. The Cuban ambassador told me that during this meeting he said that this incident was the result of incorrect political education in the DPRK. He furthermore asserted that during this long meeting he expressed his opinion on all issues related to the behavior of our Korean comrades with respect to foreigners and on issues of internal development (apart from questions about the cult of personality).

The main issue in this meeting was the issue of how this incident should be handled. The Cuban ambassador said that there were two ways to handle the incident. At the state level or at the Party level. The Korean side had to decide how it wanted to handle the incident. He said he was not in communication with Cuba and was thus acting on his own. However, if the decision was made to deal with this at the state level, he would be forced to take the next plane to Moscow and would not be able to return until the incident had been

resolved.

He said that after lengthy discussion our Korean comrades agreed to deal with it at the Party level. The Cuban ambassador then asked to speak with Kim Il Sung. Kim Yong-nam, acting Foreign Minister tried to prevent this at all costs. He proposed to the Cuban ambassador that he speak to Foreign Minister [illegible] in the hospital, since he was also a candidate for the Politburo. Finally, after the Cuban ambassador could not be dissuaded from his request, Kim Yong-nam agreed to convey the request to Kim Il Sung.

Kim Il Sung received the ambassador two days later. He said that he asked for understanding that this meeting had to be brief. This was not because of the incident, but because he was very busy. He asked the ambassador to express his regret for the incident to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, and made assurances that the guilty parties would be punished and measures would be taken to prevent similar incidents in the future. He furthermore said that his deputy, Yi Hyo-sun, was authorized to see to all of the details involved with handling the incident.

Yi Hyo-sun received the Cuban ambassador on the same day for a four-hour meeting. The meeting took place in the building in which the work for South Korea is performed. As they entered these spaces, Yi Hyo-sun told him that no ambassador had ever entered this house outside of Pyongyang. [Apparently a gesture meant to impress the Cuban ambassador.] First Yi Hyo-sun lectured for nearly an hour, stating among other things that the leadership of the Party in the DPRK was at a very low level. He said the cadre do not understand how to perform true political and ideological education, they command the masses and work with instructions and orders. The level of training of the masses is extremely low. They cannot differentiate between friends and foes. They completely misinterpret our call for revolutionary vigilance. All of the militia members who were involved in the incident have been arrested, as well as the members of the Party's district leadership and the Party cadre of the street committee. The Party secretaries of the district committee were also arrested; they were not in Pyongyang during the incident. Those arrested will be held until the investigation has concluded. The Cuban ambassador will be informed of the results. He said Kim Il Sung had also authorized him to hold meetings with the Party cadre in Pyongyang, and that officials from the Foreign Ministry would address issues of behavior toward foreigners at these meetings.

During this meeting, Yi Hyo-sun is also said to have made the following remarks about the issue of differences in views: The leadership of the Korean Workers Party is in complete agreement with Fidel Castro's speech. The DPRK would also like to take the same stance on issues of differences in views as the Cuban leadership. This is not possible at present. We will also not publish Soviet or Chinese articles in the future. We will make our own opinion on these issues known if it becomes necessary. But this will be a neutral stance—neither for the one side nor the other. Our actions will be reserved.

Remarks:

The incident is indicative of the difficult internal situation and of how little influence the leadership really has on the Korean masses. The incident transpired on the day on which approx. 10% of the residents of Pyongyang participated in a major rally against the Japanese/South Korean negotiations. And approx. 8 days after a similar rally in support of Vietnam, in which the Revolutionary Forces of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were at the center of the agitprop. The Cuban flag had to be familiar to many people from the agitprop. The Cuban ambassador has been in Korea for approx. 3 years, his picture has been published in the press many times.

The remarks by Yi Hyo-sun on not publishing Chinese and Soviet articles in the future appear credible.

We believe the Cuban ambassador has provided a faithful account of the incident. We have a particularly close relationship to the Cuban ambassador and were the only embassy that was immediately informed about the incident. The Soviet embassy was not told about it for 8 days. My wife also has a very close relationship to the Cuban ambassador's wife, to whom she provides weekly German lessons, and who described the events in the same manner. Witnessing the brutality the security services used against adults and children brought the wife of the Cuban ambassador to the brink of a nervous breakdown.

Horst Brie

Distribution:

1 x First AEA, Comrade Schneidewind

1 x Embassy/Secretariat

**DOCUMENT No. 4****Memorandum on a meeting with a delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on 3 July 1967.**

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV 2/2.035. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Department of International Relations

Berlin, 18 July 1967

Kö/ka

Memorandum

On a meeting between Comrade Hermann Matern, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, Comrade Hermann Axen, candidate for the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee, and the delegation from the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 3

July 1967.

The delegation was led by Comrade Yi Yong-ho, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly. Participants on the Korean side were the members of the delegation, two escorts, and the DPRK's ambassador to the GDR.

Participating from our side were:

Comrade Horst Schumann, member of the Central Committee

Comrade Paul Markowski, candidate for the Central Committee

Comrade Gerd König, Section Leader, Department of International Relations

Comrade Matern welcomed the delegation warmly and outlined a few issues that were identified at the VII Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party and at the Karlovy Vary conference. He stated that the conference in Karlovy Vary was very important for the development of the international Communist and workers movement. Agreement was reached on the basic issues of further development in Europe. Also, the conference of 46 fraternal parties, which took place in mid-June in Prague on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, demonstrated that cooperation between the fraternal parties is necessary and possible. The US imperialist global strategy would not be possible if we acted with unity and resolve. Comrade Matern then explained the imperialists' intentions to push back the socialist countries in a frontal attack—intentions that failed. Because of this fact, the imperialists attempt to light small fires in every corner. They strengthen the reactionary movement, as the Israeli aggression, the military coup in Greece, and the events in Ghana and Brazil have indicated. They try to bring reactionary regimes to power wherever they can. The events in Indonesia were a serious blow for the world Communist movement. The events in Vietnam speak for themselves. The US is using every resource to support the reactionary regime in South Vietnam and to force the Vietnamese people to their knees. All of these events demonstrate that they are trying to attack at as many points as possible. All of the events are closely related. Imperialist thrusts against the DPRK from South Korea also testify to this. The military coup in Greece is an attempt by imperialism to push into the Balkans. They are primarily attempting to penetrate into Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The unusual policy of our Romanian comrades is therefore no coincidence. Israel's aggression is meant to expand imperialism's base in this region. But this attempt will also fail, as did so many attempts in the past.

We hold that many meetings should be held among fraternal parties in order to create the conditions for preparing for an international conference. We believe that it is neces-

sary and possible to prepare for and hold such a conference. Unfortunately the US can still exploit the sharply different opinions the fraternal parties have. The unity and solidarity of the world Communist movement is particularly important for us and for you. West Germany has the strongest army in western Europe. It is also the strongest economic power. This military and economic force is hostile to the GDR, and is located right next to us.

The discord between the imperialist powers continues to increase. Today NATO is not what it was a few years ago. France is withdrawing from military integration. It also opposes letting England join the European Economic Community and opposes the Israeli aggression. It is ironic that Couve de Murville demanded that Israel return the territories taken and at the UN meeting told Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu that Romania should at least support France's position. Couve de Murville is a French nobleman, while Manescu is a member of the Communist Party. In other words, Romania currently stands to the right of France. Our Romanian comrades have demanded that Israel and the Arab nations negotiate directly with one another and that in this manner the UN be excluded from the process.

Discord is developing between the classes in West Germany, although slowly. Representatives of both the reactionary monopoly capital and the Social Democratic Party's leadership are currently included in the Bonn government. Students play a major role in West Germany in the opposition against the government. Apart from platonic statements in favor of the West German stance, West German monopoly capital will obtain hardly any active assistance from the other imperialist states in accomplishing their revanchist objectives. Their objective is to separate the GDR from the other socialist countries in order to be able to work on the GDR. West German imperialists are involved in all of the reactionary thrusts in the world.

It is becoming more and more difficult for the imperialists to spread their lies about the GDR. Two million West Germans come to the GDR every year, and 1 million travel to West Germany. You can draw your own conclusions about developments in the two German states. The backwardness the GDR experienced at first in a few areas has slowly been overcome. Today the fundamental differences between West Germany and the GDR are becoming increasingly evident, to the benefit of the GDR. At first there was a tremendous boom in West Germany. Eighty percent of Germany's heavy industry was in West Germany. It had a stronger raw material base than we did, and US imperialism pumped huge amounts into West Germany. West Germany was built up more rapidly. In addition, a fairy tale was spread around that capitalism had changed, that everyone had work and a high standard of living. This was not without its effect on the GDR. But now trends in West Germany are reaching crisis proportions, rising unemployment, and assaults on the populace's standard of living resulting from increased taxes, wage freezes, and other measures. The West German government is in fact to be militarized by the elimination of democratic rights, adoption of emergency laws, and other measures. In fact the same

thing is to be prepared that we already experienced in Greece. So conditions in Germany have changed rapidly since 1961. Our job is to force the Kiesinger government to accept that both German states can exist adjacent to one another. We do not stress unity for Germany. This process will take a long time and will require fundamental changes in West Germany. The current priorities are, first, a binding agreement on non-aggression by West Germany against the GDR, and second, reducing by half the number of arms in the two German states.

Our Party is extremely interested in an agreement among the Communist and workers parties. The Moscow Declaration of 1957 and 1960 was unanimously adopted by those present, including even the Communist Party of China. These documents established that we are in the transition phase from capitalism to socialism, that the socialist world system is increasingly becoming a determining factor in the world. Today communists in all nations of the world stand at the forefront of the movement for socialism, peace, and democracy. It is our goal to prevent a new world war, all of our policies are oriented toward achieving this goal. The socialist camp must be strengthened on all sides such that it is no longer possible for there to be world war. The urgent task is to make Israeli aggression ineffective. Perhaps it is healthy that some leaders of the Arab countries learn to find their support in the masses. We believe Nasser would have been overthrown had it not been for the Soviet Union. Naturally the Israeli aggression and its repercussions are a blow for the national liberation movement. The Soviet Union will certainly continue to supply weapons to the UAR and Syria and to support the strengthening of progressive forces.

Of course assistance for the Vietnamese people must also be increased. The war demonstrates that the Vietnamese people cannot be destroyed. We believe that the military, political, and diplomatic struggle must be coordinated even more. We must get the US to a point in which the war holds no prospects for the future. It cannot be waged until the last Vietnamese is annihilated. Our Vietnamese comrades will not be able to win by themselves, even with our substantial aid. They can see to it that the path is blocked to US imperialism, but victory will only be possible as a result of a worldwide political action. If all socialist countries were to come together, including the major fraternal parties in the capitalist lands, and using commensurate countermeasures were to demand that the war be ended, then it would probably be possible to end the war.

This is a broad-brush overview of how we see the international situation.

Comrade Yi Yong-ho expressed his thanks for the detailed information. He stated that militarism in West Germany has reappeared due to support from US imperialism, that the policies of West German imperialism have been directed against the GDR from the very beginning. The DPRK supported and continues to support the GDR. We must also support Vietnam in every way possible so that the US withdraws its troops and soldiers. The socialist camp must use every means to rescue Vietnam. If things go badly in Vietnam, then all socialist countries and the international revolu-

tionary movement will have suffered a great blow. We must therefore do everything we can to prevent this.

The Korean Workers Party has always advocated unity and solidarity among the socialist nations and the communist and worker's parties. We have urged this in the past, and we continue to urge it now. This is why all Marxist/Leninist parties and socialist countries must truly fulfill the Moscow Declaration. The socialist camp must be united and must act in a united fashion and exercise strong influence on the communist parties in the capitalist nations. It will not be possible to achieve this objective unless endeavors are consistent on all sides. We must consider the differences in views between the Parties to be an internal matter for the Parties.

West Germany is pursuing a policy of war against the GDR. Everyone must therefore protect the GDR. While West Germany is the warmonger in Europe, Japan is the warmonger in Asia.

Comrade Matern asked for an assessment of the situation in South Korea since the visits by Humphrey, Lübke, and Sato.

Comrade Yi Yong-ho said that Japan is a vassal state of the US. The Japanese government is pursuing the same imperialist policies as the US. The Japanese imperialists want to re-conquer Korea. Japanese capital has penetrated South Korea in 100,000 capitalist undertakings. They cloak this penetration with pretenses such as reparations to South Korea, assistance in developing mineral resources, developing the land, etc. But the purpose of all of it is to conquer Korea and to make the old Japanese dream a reality. The Japanese government is in fact involved in the war against Vietnam by making airfields available, repairing war materials, etc. Japan sends technical assistance to South Vietnam. But Japanese monopolies have also gotten a foot in the door in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They have invested more than \$3.6 billion there. The situation is similar to that with West Germany. Therefore the united anti-imperialist front absolutely must be created. The Korean government understands very well the issues of unity for Germany.

In closing, Comrade Yi Yong-ho conveyed his best wishes for a very successful election. He expressed his sincere wishes for great success, both economically and politically.

Comrade Hermann Matern responded to Comrade Yi Yong-ho's statements. He said that Japan is playing a role in the US' global strategy that is similar to the role West Germany plays. There is one difference, however. While the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, are head to head in Germany, this is not the case in Korea. So the situation is somewhat different. The US would run directly into the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations in Germany. There would be a blitzkrieg there provoked by them. The "October Storm" exercise proved this clearly. So the military path is closed to the West German imperialists. We must push back the power of monopoly capital in West Germany. Although this is complicated to do, progress is slowly being made. The classes in West Germany are becoming increasingly polarized. Both the reactionaries and the progressive

democratic forces are growing in number. But reactionary forces are growing more rapidly. Therefore we must make great efforts to promote the growing process for the progressive forces.

The economy of the GDR has made great progress. The process of developing agriculture was a stormy one. There were a good number of people who worried about whether we could create socialist agriculture. Now it has been proved that socialism can be employed in agriculture, as well. We have good returns and are transitioning to industrial types of production and management in agriculture. The most important thing is that our Party acts with complete unity. We have solid development. There is no change in Party or state leadership. We have found a correct transition in attracting younger people, and last but not least, our Party has always had a clear, proper relationship to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Soviet Union. We are quite intentionally aiming for an even closer melding of the GDR's economy with that of the Soviet Union. At the conference in Prague, which our Romanian comrades also attended, they stated that the Romanian workers movement was already further along in the last century than the Russian workers movement, and that the Romanian people had liberated themselves and the Hungarian people in 1944. It is hard to understand Romania's economic policy in some ways. They currently owe West Germany more than 1 billion marks. They built up 158 million marks of debt just in the first 4 months of 1967 alone. Now West Germany is to build major operations in Romania. But that is our Romanian comrades' business. We are not doing anything like that, anyway.

If we have debt in capitalist countries, we do not relinquish our positions by any means. Our policy toward West Germany has proved this clearly. The struggle against West German imperialism is very complicated. The main thing is the issue of who and whom, so you can't do something dumb and make mistakes, you have to proceed with great cleverness and deliberateness.

Comrade Yi Yong-ho responded that the Americans frequently do dumb things (he was referring to the raids on the South Korean border), so that now and then we have to give them a whipping so that they don't get even more fresh. He said it is no coincidence that provocative incidents on the border became more frequent after Johnson's visit in October 1966 and after Lübke's visit in early 1967. The Korean Workers Party paid close attention to this. The Korean People's Army is trained as cadre. The people are armed. The 7-year plan was extended by three years in order to improve defense readiness. We have 14 percent growth in industrial production annually in industry. Now our job is to build up the economy and at the same time improve defense readiness. More than 30 percent of the budget annually goes to military purposes. If our enemies attack us again, we fully intend to liberate South Korea. This is why the Korean People's Army is well armed, it has sufficient experience and well trained specialists. Both the People's Army and the populace are politically well prepared.

Comrade Yi Yong-ho then established that there will still

be an opportunity to discuss these issues in more detail.

Our Korean comrades once again thanked us for meeting with them and took their leave.



DOCUMENT No. 5

Letter to Erich Honecker from Kim Il Sung, 7 July 1973

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated for
CWIHP by Grace Leonard.]

Department of
Berlin, 3 August 1973
International Affairs

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80 -
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46 copies, each 7 pages
Copy 28, 7 pages
Information

for the Politburo of the Central Committee

Subj.: Correspondence from Kim Il Sung, Secretary
General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers
Party, to Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party

[s]

Markowski

Distribution:

Copies 1 - 28: Politburo

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Berlin

To Comrade Erich Honecker

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Socialist Unity Party of Germany

Dear Comrade Erich Honecker!

Highly gratified that friendly and cooperative relations between the Parties, governments, and peoples of our two countries are developing well, I hereby convey our sincerest fraternal greetings to you, and through you to your Party and government and the people of the German Democratic Republic.

I would like to express to you, the Central Committee of your Party, and your government deep gratitude that your country is taking an active role internationally in supporting the great issue of unifying our people's fatherland and that it supports the letter to the parliaments and governments of all of the countries in the world that was adopted at the second meeting of the 5th legislative period of our nation's Supreme People's Assembly, and has undertaken measures of solidar-

ity.

Permit me to take this opportunity to tell you, and through you to tell the Central Committee of your Party and your government, about the situation that has most recently arisen in our country and about our recently prepared Five Point Course for independent peaceful unification.

Today the division of Korea causes our people—a people that developed as one nation during a long history—great unhappiness and suffering day after day and also creates obstacles for achieving and maintaining peace in Asia and the world.

The US, which has compelled the territory to be divided and our nation to be cut in half for 28 years now, currently employs two-sided tactics and wants in this manner to let Koreans fight one another, to perpetuate the division of Korea, and to create two Koreas. In lockstep with these US machinations, the rulers in South Korea prattle on about a “confrontation” between South and North, employ every resource to increase South Korea's military might, and obstinately hold fast to intrigues for perpetuating the division of the country. Recently they went so far as to conspire to make two Korea's their policy and to announce this policy of division publicly.

Through all of this the dialogue between North and South has not developed as it should have, with no regard for our consistent efforts for independent peaceful unification, and the bright prospect that emerged for our people for unification of the fatherland when the Joint Communique between South and North was published a year ago has darkened again.

At a time in which there are unusual movements meant to bring about the permanent division of Korea, on 23 June of this year we again set forth the following policy line for independent peaceful unification, based on a sincere desire to overcome the difficulties that have occurred and to satisfy the national yearning for peaceful unification of the fatherland as soon as possible.

First, we have proposed eliminating the military confrontation between South and North and reducing tensions. Eliminating the military confrontation between North and South and reducing tensions are the most urgent and critical issues for dispelling misunderstanding and mistrust between North and South, for deepening mutual understanding and trust, for creating an atmosphere of great national coalition for improving relations between South and North, and for accomplishing peaceful unification of the country.

If the hidden knife is not discarded, it will not be possible to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and satisfactorily resolve the issue of cooperation and exchange between North and South. This is why we have repeatedly proposed to South Korean authorities that the build-up of military forces and arms be halted, all foreign troops be withdrawn, troops and arms be reduced, the importation of weapons from abroad be halted, and a peace treaty be signed as the first steps for achieving peaceful unification of the country.

Secondly, we have proposed that North and South cooperate and conduct exchanges in all areas of the various

arenas of politics, military affairs, foreign policy, the economy, and culture. We believe that accomplishing comprehensive cooperation and exchanges between North and South is very important to repair national bonds that have been torn asunder, to improve relations between South and North, and to bring about the conditions for unification.



**Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung,
18 October 1986**

Source: Bundesarchiv, Berlin

Once again, we stress that South Korean rulers must not rely on foreign forces, but must transition to developing the nation's natural resources with us and thus develop the economy in the best interest of our nation and make national cooperation in all areas a reality.

Third, we have proposed ensuring that the population, in all classes and walks of life of North and South, be able to participate in overall national patriotic work for unifying the fatherland.

Since, given the will of the entire population of South and North Korea, unification of the fatherland is an issue that must be resolved, we believe that the dialog between North and South must not be restricted to representatives of North and South, but must be conducted in an overall national framework.

We have therefore proposed calling a great national conference composed of representatives of the people from all classes and walks of life and all political parties and social organizations of the North and South, and discussing and resolving there the issue of unifying our nation according to the will and demands of our people.

Fourth, we have again proposed forming a confederation of South and North and calling it the Federative Republic of Koryo. We believe that forming a confederation between South and North, while maintaining the two systems currently existing in the North and South for a certain period based on the convocation of a great national confer-

ence and achieving a great national coalition is the most logical way to accomplish the unification of the country.

If a confederation between South and North is formed using the name Koryo, we have proposed calling it the Federative Republic of Koryo, under which name our country will become known in the world as a single nation.

Fifth, we have proposed that North and South pursue foreign relations jointly in order to prevent the division from becoming cemented in place and thus dividing our nation into two Koreas for all time. As one nation, which developed as a single entity with one culture and one language over a long history, our nation must not be cut in two. We believe that North and South must have common stances in the area of international relations, as well, in order to prevent the country from being divided forever.

In terms of establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, we also decisively oppose all machinations for creating two Koreas. We strongly maintain that North and South cannot separately join the UN and believe that if joining the UN is a goal, at the minimum this must not occur until the confederation is formed under the name of the Federative Republic of Koryo, at which time the UN can be joined as one nation. But if, distinct from the issue of joining the UN, issues regarding Korea are included in the UN's agenda and are to be discussed, we believe that a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must take part and participate as an interested party.

We believe that all of our proposals reflect the urgent desire of all Korean people to prevent the division of the country, to fundamentally improve and develop relations between South and North, to accomplish in the most rapid manner possible the unification of our fatherland, and furthermore reflect current demands for independence and peace and are therefore extremely reasonable and realistic proposals that can be accepted by anyone.

It has now become completely clear who wants peace and unification in Korea and who is really planning for war and division.

I am convinced that your Party, your government, and your people are very interested in the situation that has developed in our nation, and that you will actively undertake various measures to support this new policy of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for independent and peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis, without outside intervention.

I am convinced that the close relations of friendship and cooperation that exist between the Parties, governments, and peoples of our two nations will continue to improve and develop, as in the past, so also in the future, based on the principles of Marxism/Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and send you my sincere wishes for great success in your professional endeavors and for good health for you personally.

With comradely greetings

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party
Kim Il Sung
Pyongyang, 7 July 1973



DOCUMENT No. 6

Report on the official friendship visit to the DPRK by the Party and state delegation of the GDR, led by Com. Erich Honecker, 8-11 December 1977

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123.

Translated by Grace Leonard.]

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY
– Internal Party Archives –
From the files of: Politburo

Memorandum
No. 48
13 December 1977
DY30/
Sign.: J IV 2/2A–2123

Report on the official friendship visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the Party and state delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, from 8 to 11 December 1977.

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a Party and state delegation from the German Democratic Republic, led by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, made an official friendship visit to the DPRK from 8 to 11 December 1977.

I.

The visit was the first meeting of the highest representatives of the GDR and DPRK since Comrade Kim Il Sung's visit to the GDR in 1956. The meetings between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung, with both delegations present, were friendly.

The visit resulted in an agreement on a joint communiqué. A Consular Treaty and an Agreement on the Further Development of Economic and Scientific/Technical Cooperation were signed.

The Party and government of the DPRK organized an

impressive reception by the people of Pyongyang for the GDR's Party and state delegation. During its stay, the delegation toured the Kimsong tractor plant and attended the opera, "The Flower Girl," in the Mansuda Palace.

Comrades Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung spoke at a celebration of friendship, at which there were 20,000 participants and which took place in the Athletic Palace in Pyongyang.

During the official proceedings each side reported to the other about the realization of the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party and of the V Party Congress of the Korean Workers Party. There was a comprehensive exchange of views on the development of relations between the two Parties and nations, the international situation, and the Communist world movement. Willingness was expressed to expand in all respects the cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, and between the GDR and the DPRK. Comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly stressed the great importance of Comrade Erich Honecker's visit for deepening mutual understanding and bilateral relations.

The mass media of the DPRK reported in detail about the visit by the GDR's Party and state delegation. Press accounts of the toast by Comrade Erich Honecker at the reception by the Korean side did not report remarks on issues of European security and disarmament.

II.

In his remarks, Comrade Erich Honecker praised the DPRK's great achievements in building socialism and affirmed the GDR's support for proposals by the DPRK for resolving problems on the Korean peninsula.

Comrade Honecker reported in detail about the domestic and foreign policy of the GDR in realizing the resolutions of the IX Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party. He stressed that the successes of the GDR in building a developed socialist society are the result of intense work and creative initiative on the part of the workers of the GDR under the leadership of their Marxist/Leninist party. The indestructible bonds to and cooperation with the Soviet Union and fraternal Socialist nations are very important for stable and dynamic development in the GDR.

Preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution have turned into the greatest competition in the GDR.

The Socialist Unity Party is devoting special attention to further improving social democracy, especially in terms of broad inclusion of citizens in leading the state. Political/ideological work is the heart and soul of the Party's efforts. Its centerpiece is disseminating and popularizing the works of Marx and Lenin, educating for socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism.

The Socialist Unity Party strongly opposes the increasing ideological diversion and stepped-up agitation by FRG imperialism against the GDR. It completely rejects all appearances of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

Comrade Honecker outlined the mutual foreign policy

positions of the community of socialist states on issues of international development. He stressed that the solid alliance with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal nations is the foundation of our foreign policy. New friendship treaties entered into with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations are particularly important. They play an important role in consolidating the socialist world system as the greatest achievement of the international working class. He stressed the necessity of strengthening the Warsaw Pact in order to protect the peaceful building [of socialism] in our countries from NATO's aggressive intentions.

Relations between the GDR and the People's Republic of China are poor for reasons that are known. There are no Party relations. The XI Party Congress of the Communist Party of China characterized the Soviet Union as the number one enemy. Beijing is further improving its reactionary interplay with imperialism. Subversive activity with regard to the international Communist movement continues. Beijing criticizes NATO for not building up enough arms for a war against the Soviet Union. This is tantamount to a challenge to wage war against the GDR. The GDR completely rejects the policies of the Chinese leaders, which run counter to the interests of Socialist countries, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement. At the same time, it advocates normal development of state relations with the People's Republic of China and, given proper conditions, resuming Party relations, as well. But this is not possible at the cost of compromising principle issues, such as the unbreakable bond to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Union itself.

Comrade Honecker addressed in detail the situation in Europe, especially in the FRG, and the status of relations between the GDR and the FRG. He spoke about the NATO military forces directly arrayed against the GDR and relations between the FRG and South Korea.

In its policies towards developing nations, the GDR concentrates on supporting nations with a socialist orientation, such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau. It supports the efforts by many Asian states to create stable relations of peaceful coexistence on this continent, and thereby to ensure important conditions required for guaranteeing security in Asia. This includes ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula.

In his statements on the communist world movement, Comrade Honecker stressed that the Socialist Unity Party maintains good relations with the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties based on Marxism/Leninism and proletarian internationalism. He stressed the mutual responsibility of the communist parties and praised the Berlin Conference as a meaningful success by the Communist movement.

Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude for the selfless aid and support of the GDR, especially during the War of Liberation of the Fatherland and during the period that followed. Even today the GDR is providing valuable support to the Korean people in the struggle to unify the country.

The Korean Workers Party considers unification of the

fatherland to be its primary mission. To achieve this goal, at its V Party Congress the Party resolved to build up socialism in the north, to support the struggle of revolutionary forces in South Korea, and to consolidate solidarity with international revolutionary forces. Building Socialism in the DPRK is the foundation for establishing the new social order in the entire nation.

It is worthwhile to demonstrate the superiority of the socialist order to the south and to show the entire world that the DPRK is a sovereign, independent state. In contrast, South Korea is a base for American imperialism. After the victory over the Japanese militarists, the socialist countries, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the GDR as well provided great assistance to the Korean people. But this alone could not resolve every problem. So it was necessary to do everything in our power to become self-reliant. Since then an independent national economy has been created. Currently the ideological, technical, and cultural revolution are the focal points, which is in accord with the resolutions of the V Party Congress.

The DPRK stands directly before the enemy. Since there was no bourgeois revolution in Korea, the transition period to socialism and communism is relatively long. There is residual feudalism, Confucianism, Buddhism, sectarianism. Since Korea is surrounded by large countries, toadyism before the great foreign powers was very prevalent. The ideological revolution is no less important than creating the material foundations for socialism. The experience of the Korean Workers Party demonstrates that people very actively take part in the revolution, in smashing the old social order. The higher the material standard of living climbs, the more ideologically lazy people become and the more careless their activity is. All people must be transformed according to the model of the worker class.

The Korean Workers Party today has 2.2 million members. All of the other members of society are included in the various organizations. Organized Party life and learning occupy an important place in the ideological work. Nearly the entire population takes part in training that is conducted every Saturday. In addition, two hours of self-study are conducted daily.

The technical revolution is very important. The primary issues are reducing the differences between light and heavy physical labor, between industry and agriculture, and liberating women from heavy housework, actively drawing them into societal life.

Our cultural revolution is different from that in other countries. Its goal is to provide all people with knowledge. This is why the mandatory 11-year polytechnical school system was introduced. One million intellectuals have already been trained in the DPRK. The issue is repelling enemy attempts to infiltrate the cultural realm.

Turning to the economic situation, Comrade Kim Il Sung reported that a new 7-year plan begins in 1978. The objective of this plan is to develop modern industry, pervaded with science and based on the Juche principle. This does not mean rejecting economic cooperation with other countries.

But industry must still support itself based on native raw materials.

The main points of the 7-year plan cited by Kim Il Sung provide for industrial production to increase by approximately 100 percent and are to be approved at a Central Committee meeting and thereafter at a meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly on 15 December 1977.

Comrade Kim Il Sung addressed the complicated situation in the development of the South Korean revolution.

Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke out against the concept of two Korean states and rejected the US proposal for so-called cross-recognition (Soviet Union recognizes South Korea, US recognizes the DPRK). The DPRK will patiently continue its work with respect to the South, so that Park Chung Hee becomes even more isolated and the struggle for democratization can be continued. The DPRK holds fast to the three principles for unifying the land, which were announced in 1972. Negotiations with the South, which began in 1972 based on this foundation, have currently been broken off because those in power in South Korea have publicly come out in favor of two Koreas.

Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed the differences in the situations of the GDR and DPRK, both in the negotiations and in his speech at the friendship celebration. He stated that the existence of the GDR was historically necessary.

In his remarks on the international situation, Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed that the Korean Workers Party advocates joining all revolutionary forces, especially those of socialist nations, "Third World" countries, the non-aligned nations, the international workers movement, and the national liberation movement.

There are difficulties in joining the forces of Socialist nations due to relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Seen from a historical perspective, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are comrades-in-arms of the DPRK. The DPRK has a common border with the People's Republic of China that is approximately 1500 kilometers in length. Although the two countries are close, the DPRK does not agree with everything China does. Relations with China were poor during the "Cultural Revolution." China agitated against the "Korean revisionists" over loudspeakers that were set up along the entire Sino-Korean border.

But if the DPRK improves relations with China, it need not worry about the US. The DPRK cannot concentrate troops in the north and in the south simultaneously. This is why the DPRK has endeavored to improve relations since the end of the "Cultural Revolution." It has succeeded. However, the DPRK does not accept Chinese assertions such as the characterization of the Soviet Union as "Social Imperialism." The DPRK is not a blind follower of China.

The Soviet Union supported Korea in its war of liberation. After the war it provided political and material assistance in the amount of 2,220 billion [old denomination] rubles. The DPRK is striving for better, amicable relations, but cannot get involved in the polemics between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. In this issue, it favors

maintaining strict independence and supports anything that promotes joining forces.

There are people who believe that the DPRK is more on China's side. This is not the case. The principles of the DPRK for the joining of forces in the Communist world movement are the struggle against imperialism, for socialism and communism, for support of the international workers and democratic movements, and non-intervention in domestic matters. The DPRK maintains normal relations with the other socialist nations and has no differences of opinion with them.

The DPRK participates in the non-aligned movement because it is highly anti-imperialist in character. Relations between the DPRK and the countries of the Third World are good.

Comrade Kim Il Sung remarked on the danger of Japanese militarism recurring. Japanese militarists are no less dangerous than those in West Germany. He opposed the stationing of US troops in Asia and the transformation of ASEAN into a military organization.

III.

Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung praised how well relations between the two Parties and states have developed. The results of the visit have created favorable conditions for successfully further developing cooperation between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, the GDR and the DPRK. Comrade Erich Honecker addressed in detail the status of relations between the two Parties and states and passed on to Comrade Kim Il Sung written proposals for further cooperation in the political and economic arenas. The proposals he set forth for further developing scientific/technical and economic cooperation, and the written draft of a governmental agreement in this regard, were appraised by Comrade Kim Il Sung as a very useful foundation for further developing economic cooperation.

Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that a trade deficit has come about in the last five years due to certain economic difficulties in the DPRK, and the loans could not be repaid on time. The DPRK thinks it is possible to cooperate with the GDR in mining heavy metals. The GDR could supply facilities, while the DPRK has labor and raw materials. The FRG works very actively in South Korea, and this is why the DPRK and the GDR should work closely with one another.

He particularly stressed developing cooperation in joint development of heavy metals and the production of sintered magnesite.

He was particularly grateful for the GDR's willingness to intensify its scientific/technical support precisely in those areas that are of great importance for developing North Korea's own raw material resources, such as, for instance, calcium carbide chemistry and upgrading coal. He requested that the GDR provide good support in developing microelectronics for automation.

Comrade Kim Il Sung accepted the invitation Comrade Erich Honecker extended to visit the GDR and agreed to prepare an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation and to

enter into a long-term trade agreement.

IV.

In preparing for the visit, negotiations on communiques were held that resulted in joint statements on a few issues of international development and on how relations should proceed. The communique contained positive statements on international relations, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the unity and solidarity of Socialist countries and the Communist and workers parties, developments in Europe, for peace and cooperation in Asia, and on the importance of peaceful coexistence between the GDR and the FRG.

The Korean side praised the existence of the GDR as an important contribution to strengthening the forces of socialism in the world. The negotiations resulted in an agreement that the visit would contribute to deepening the friendship and cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK and would thereby strengthen the solidarity of socialist states.

Conclusions

1. Deliberate efforts shall be undertaken to bring to fruition the proposals Comrade Erich Honecker made on further developing relations between the Socialist Unity Party and the Korean Workers Party, the GDR and the DPRK.

For action: Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, International Relations Department

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
State Planning Commission
Ministry of Foreign trade

2. A draft of the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK shall be prepared and provided to the Korean side in preparation for Comrade Kim Il Sung's visit to the GDR.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, International Relations Department

3. The Agreement on Developing Economic and Scientific/Technical Cooperation between the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is approved. (Attachment)

Council of Ministers shall determine necessary measures.
For action: Chairman, Council of Ministers

4. A draft for a long-term trade agreement for the period 1978 - 1984 shall be prepared and, once approved in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, shall be provided to the Korean side.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Trade
State Planning Commission
Scheduled: March 1978

5. Comrade Minister Singhuber and a group of experts shall travel to Pyongyang to prepare and coordinate specific proposals for GDR involvement in developing raw materials in the DPRK that are important to the GDR.

For action: Chairman, Council of Ministers

Scheduled: January 1978

6. The rest of the goods and services required for assuring the scheduled start-up of the automation equipment plant in the DPRK in 1980 shall be realized for 1978 and 1979. A government representative shall be responsible for firm management and coordination and for assuring production.

For action: Minister of Heavy Machinery and System Construction
Minister of Electronics/Electrotechnology
Minister of Foreign Trade

7. Appropriate material on the situation and policies in the FRG, in particular attempts by the FRG to infiltrate the Quadripartite Agreement, shall be provided to the Korean side.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

8. The DPRK's Mansuda Ensemble shall be invited to the GDR as guest performers.

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Culture
Scheduled: February 1978

9. The former official designation, "Korean People's Democratic Republic", shall be changed in accordance with Korean usage to "Korean Democratic People's Republic".

For action: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

10. Uniform transcription of Korean names and words shall be assured.

For action: Ministry of Secondary Education
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Agreement

On the development of economic and scientific/technical cooperation between the government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The government of the German Democratic Republic and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the goal of comprehensive development of fraternal relations of friendship and cooperation between the two nations, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and with the intent of further developing economic and scientific/technical cooperation in areas of mutual interest, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Both sides shall enter into a long-term trade agreement for the period 1978 to 1984 with the goal of developing economic relations and expanding the exchange of goods.

Provided in this long-term trade agreement shall be the supply of goods that are traditionally traded by both sides and of new goods that are in demand on both sides.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall increase the quantity of annual deliveries of sintered magnesite to the German Democratic Republic during the term of the above long-term trade agreement. The German Democratic Republic shall provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea a proportionate amount of potash fertilizer annually.

Article 2

Both sides have agreed to develop stronger scientific/technical cooperation based on successes in science and technology achieved in recent years in both nations.

In this context, both sides agreed to examine the possibilities for long-term scientific/technical cooperation and to promote the development of mutual exchange of goods through suitable measures, such as the exchange of delegations in the fields of science and technology.

Both sides agreed to begin scientific/technical cooperation to their mutual interest in the fields of:

- methods of upgrading coal, including gasification of anthracite and brown coal;
- production of fertilizers, super phosphate, and sulfuric acid;
- production of synthetic and reclaimed fiber.

The German Democratic Republic is prepared to provide scientific/technical support in the following fields to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by providing projects, technological and other documentation, by sending specialists and training personnel, by awarding production licenses and in other ways:

- production of synthetic rubber based on calcium carbide;
- methods of processing oil, petrochemistry methods, and rationalization of petrochemical facilities;
- preparing technical mining and technical engineering projects for developing copper deposits;
- production of tool machines;
- production of ceramic tiles for panels.

Article 3

Both sides believe that economic cooperation is in their mutual interest and should be further developed taking into account the national economic possibilities of both nations.

For this purpose, the German Democratic Republic shall supply industrial equipment and machines and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall supply metallurgic products, minerals, machines, and other products.

3.1 Both sides shall accelerate deliveries of equipment and technical services for the automation equipment plant based on the Agreement dated 5 February 1966 such that it is

possible for the plant to start up in the first half of 1980.

3.2 Both sides agreed that the German Democratic Republic shall provide the Democratic People's Republic of Korea long-term support in the mining and processing of raw materials such as copper, zinc, magnesite, and other ores, by providing technical documentation, projects, and equipment, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall provide to the German Democratic Republic for a part of the value of the equipment products that are produced using the equipment delivered by the German Democratic Republic.

They agreed that the cooperation shall initially begin in expanding production of sintered magnesite in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in exploiting copper deposits in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Article 4

Both sides determined that the loan made available to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the amount of 18 million rubles by the German Democratic Republic with the Agreements dated 5 February 1966 and 20 March 1972 has not been used.

Both sides agreed to apply this sum to the delivery of equipment and machines in the fields of metallurgy, chemistry, electronics and automation, light industry, and the food-stuffs industry from the German Democratic Republic to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Experts from the two countries shall consult on and coordinate specific deliveries.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall make payments on the loans in 10 equal annual payments, each beginning one year after the shipment of the last delivery for each item. The interest rate is 2 percent.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall provide to the German Democratic Republic 35 percent of its annual payments as deliveries comprising equal portions of products from heavy metal metallurgy and black metallurgy.

The delivery of equipment shall be accomplished based on contracts that the respective foreign trade organizations shall enter into.

Article 5

Both sides agreed to delaying repayments of a total of 11.7 million rubles in loans provided by the German Democratic Republic to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Agreements dated 5 February 1966 and 4 November 1968 for the period 1977 up to and including 1979. In accordance with these Agreements, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall provide deliveries of electrolyte zinc, silver, and cadmium to the German Democratic Republic in the framework of the annual trade agreement.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall repay all loans made to it that are to be repaid by the end of 1979, including the sum that was not repaid in previous years, beginning 1 January 1980 in equal payments over the course of 5 years.

Article 6

The foreign trade banks of the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall agree separately how the payments related to this Agreement shall be regulated.

The foreign trade organizations of the two nations shall agree on the prices of goods delivered to both sides.

Article 7

Both sides shall authorize the appropriate organizations in their countries to agree on specific measures for realizing the tasks contained in the above articles to this Agreement.

The Advisory Committee for Economic and Scientific/Technical issues between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shall begin meeting soon in order to determine suitable measures for realizing this Agreement.

Article 8

With this Agreement, the agreement on supplying an office for metrology, as contained in "Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Domestic German Trade of the German Democratic Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Supply of Complete Systems and Equipment", dated 5 February 1966, is hereby no longer in effect.

The "Agreement on Providing a Loan from the German Democratic Republic for Supplies and Services for Establishing a Facility for Processing Zinc Residue in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," dated 20 March 1972, is hereby annulled.

This Agreement shall take effect upon signing.

Two copies of this Agreement were prepared on 11 December 1977 in Pyongyang, each copy written in German, Korean, and Russian, whereby the texts in German and Korean are equivalent in terms of validity. The Russian text shall take precedence should there be any differences in interpretation.

For the government of the German Democratic Republic
For the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Chairman, Council of Ministers, German Democratic Republic

Chairman, Council of Ministers, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DOCUMENT No. 7

Stenographic record of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 30 May 1984

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Stenographic record

Official friendship visit to the GDR by the Party and State Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea led by Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

First day of meetings: Wednesday, 30 May 1984

Start time: 9:30 a.m.

Erich Honecker: Dear Comrade Kim Il Sung! Dear Korean comrades who have accompanied Comrade Kim Il Sung here. Permit me to say as we officially begin our exchange of views that again we all welcome you to this friendship visit to the GDR in the name of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the State Council, the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, and in the name of all of the people of the GDR.

At this moment we feel transported back in time and think of our trip to the People's Republic of Korea, the warm welcome that awaited us as we arrived there. I am not betraying any secrets when I stress how much we have looked forward to this opportunity to renew our acquaintance in the GDR. Our relations have developed very well since then and have reached a new level. We are entirely convinced that our exchange of views here in Berlin and the rest of your stay in the German Democratic Republic will enhance the friendship, cordiality, and assertive community between our two Parties, states, and peoples.

Again, a warm welcome, dear Comrade Kim Il Sung and dear Korean comrades and friends! Now, as we agreed, I would like to give you the floor.

Kim Il Sung: Thank you very much. First I would like to thank you, Comrade Erich Honecker, for these warm words. I am paying this visit in return for the visit seven years ago, in December 1977, when Comrade Erich Honecker visited our country. At that time you told me that we would sign a Friendship Pact in Berlin. I also hoped that we would be able to sign this pact one year later here in Berlin, but it was not to be. I could not visit that soon because of the situation that developed in our country. I ask your pardon, therefore, that I could not make this visit until somewhat later. I am very pleased that I am able to visit you here today.

When we arrived, you, esteemed Comrade Erich Honecker, and also the leading comrades of your Party and state leadership, greeted us warmly and the people of the German Democratic Republic made us feel very welcome,

despite the rain. I believe that signifies the feelings of friendship your people have for our people. The people of the GDR have proved in this manner that they stand solidly behind the Central Committee of your Party with you at the top. I believe that this is a great success for your Party.

I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of all of my comrades and on my own behalf to offer our sincere thanks for your warm reception and to pass on to you fraternal greetings from the Central Committee of our Party and our government to the Central Committee of the SED, the government, and the people of the German Democratic Republic. I am extremely pleased that we are meeting here today to conduct these talks.

I would like then first to address our country's situation and relations between our two countries. I would like to tell you about the situation in South Korea and in the countries that surround our country. I will take this opportunity to personally provide you information about the non-aligned movement and other issues.

So I would like to tell you about the situation in our country, especially the issues that came up in our country after your visit. Since then there have been exchanges of many high-level delegations, which has improved the exchange of information between our countries.

After your visit to our country, we held the VI Party Congress and had many events related to the festivities surrounding the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. You sent high-level delegations to this Party Congress and to the festivities. You will be familiar with the situation in our country through these delegations.

After your visit to our country, we held the VI Party Congress of our Party, as I already said. We took stock at the VI Party Congress. We were able to determine that we have successfully had three great revolutions. We had the ideological, technical, and cultural revolutions. We assessed this at the VI Party Congress and set out new goals.

We also set forth new goals in the area of the economy and put forth a new proposal for accomplishing the peaceful unification of our country. We discussed issues of the movement of non-aligned countries and issues of sovereignty for the whole world. During our stock-taking, we were able to assess that we have successfully implemented the political/ideological program.

It was also found that the entire population has rallied solidly around the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and, with the policies of the Party, is armed to build socialism even more successfully. This is also important because our country is divided and the other part is dominated by US imperialists. It is therefore very important for us to make sure that capitalism does not penetrate our ideology. I will summarize once more: it was very important to train the population in the spirit of patriotism and class ideology so that the entire population could successfully build socialism. In short, the entire population and all Party members are in a good ideological position. That is, the entire population and all Party members are prepared to reject any type of anti-com-

munist propaganda.

The struggle for the organizational life of the entire population was also bolstered. Party members must organize their Party life well; the workers must consolidate their unions politically and organizationally, and all of our youth work in their youth organization. The farmers are enhancing communal life in their villages.

We have obtained excellent results arming and training all of our people in politics. Sometimes it was also necessary to exercise mutual criticism during the training. This is how all of the political work was conducted successfully.

Unity and solidarity in the ideological realm between the people and the Party were consolidated by reinforcing the ideological work and by studying the ideology of communism. We enhanced the struggle for ideological training.

I'd like to address the economic situation. Ten prospective goals for the 80's to 1990 were identified at our VI Party Congress; these goals testify to the fact that we want the economic level of our country to approach the level of developed nations. The goals are: to produce 15 million tons of steel; to increase coal production to 120 million tons; to increase energy production to 12 billion kWh, cement production to 20 million tons, production of chemical fertilizers to 7 million tons, production of non-ferrous heavy metals to 1.5 million tons, and production of textiles to 1.5 billion meters. Furthermore, to catch 5 million tons of fish, to produce 15 million tons of grain, and to reclaim 300,000 ha [hectars] of marshland.

If we have achieved all of these prospective goals at the end of the 80's, then we can say that we have also nearly reached the level of the developed nations. In order to achieve these ambitious goals, the Central Committee first posed the task of reclaiming marshland from the sea. In our country, there is a very limited amount of usable land, we have very little of it, only 2 million ha. But if you don't count the area devoted to fruit orchards, there are only 1.5 million ha of usable land, because 200,000 mountainside ha must also be deducted. But we can produce 15 million tons of grain with these 1.5 million ha. We have already achieved grain production as high as 9.5 million tons, now that we are applying the methods of intensification in the countryside. Now it is important for us to reclaim these 300,000 ha of marshland, because with this land we can achieve an additional 3 million tons of grain production. This marshland is flat, and we can farm it mechanically—we have already begun.

But what is most important is that later we also have the requisite water resources for this new land. For this reason we have begun to build the barrage¹ at Nampo. When we have built this lock, then we can bring water from the Taedong, the great river that flows through Pyongyang, to the marshland. We have made it a goal to finish this lock by October of next year, and it is realistic. Naturally this is a major planned construction. The entire Party and all of the members of the army are engaged in bringing it to fruition. But when we have accomplished this task, then we can also achieve grain production of 15 million tons. This is why the first task is to resolve the issue of water supply. We have encapsulated

this in the slogan, "Rice is Communism!" All of our Party members are now engaged in the struggle to achieve these goals.

The second most important task we put forth is to achieve our goal for non-ferrous heavy metals. We have rich mineral resources: copper, lead, and zinc. We came up with the solution at the Central Committee Plenum in 1982. First we must achieve 1.5 million tons of non-ferrous heavy metals and then attack the rest. We made this resolution in August 1982. Within a year we unleashed the battle and for this reason we were able to reach 1.5 million tons. That is, we built a metallurgical plant with a capacity of 1.5 million tons. We accomplished this in less than a year. Including this mining, we can obtain an additional approximately 700,000 to 800,000 tons of ore. Next year we want to recover 200,000 tons of copper.

If we have largely achieved our goals in terms of non-ferrous heavy metals in the next year, we will also have solved the currency issue. While we are still in debt to West European countries, next year we will be able to pay it all off. We are not very deeply in debt to the West European countries. The total is about 700 to 800 million, and this is owed to France, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. Not so much for the other West European countries. This year we will make substantial re-payments and next year we will have paid everything back. The world market price for one ton of zinc has risen to about 720 pounds. Once we have largely solved the currency issue, we will introduce the required facilities for metallurgy, mining, coal mining, and the electrical industry.

Altering our domestic structure will play a large role in steel production, for instance, building silicon plants. We are already producing some, but it does not satisfy the engineering industry. We must also produce stainless steel pipes. We need a plant for producing high voltage lines. If we bolster this industry, then we can increase steel production and better develop the engineering industry.

Naturally we have rich deposits of hard coal. There are 15 billion (?) tons of our prized brown coal. Thus far we have no experience in producing brown coal, because in the past we have only mined anthracite. Mining in Anju has already begun to yield this brown coal.

On the occasion of my visit to European socialist countries, I would also like to address cooperation with these nations and their assistance in exploiting our brown coal deposits. Our geographical position is a bit complicated because the region with the brown coal is immediately surrounded by the sea. We have already been able to set up a mining operation with a capacity of 7 million tons, but at least 30 to 40 million tons must be mined; this is within the realm of the possible. We are now in the process of acquiring the experience we need to mine this region. We are convinced that we can achieve the goals that we have set for ourselves if we obtain appropriate support from construction engineers from socialist countries.

In terms of the production of energy: we have good water resources since it rains a lot in our country. We will therefore build both hydroelectric plants and heating and

power stations. We have the potential to produce 70 billion kWh of current through hydroelectric power. We are building a hydroelectric plant with China on the Yalu River. Other mid-size and small hydroelectric plants will be built in the countryside, as well. We will have hydroelectric plants available to the degree that we resolve the coal-mining issue.

During my visit to the Soviet Union, I also made agreements with our Soviet comrades to build nuclear power plants. We are convinced that when we have accomplished this task, we will certainly be able to produce 100 billion kWh of energy. And once we have done this, developing agriculture is no longer a problem. Once we have solved the industry problem, nothing else will be an issue.

Naturally there are also problems in the area of the economy. This is foremost a lack of workers.

Because we are confronted with imperialism, many of our young people must go into the army. We must have 400,000 to 450,000 soldiers, because the South Korean army has 700,000 soldiers. Then there are also about 43,000 American soldiers stationed in South Korea. Although this is a great burden for us, we cannot reduce the strength of our army. We must resolve the labor problem using mechanization and automation, thus freeing up workers.

We ask for your support in resolving this problem, because we will resolve the labor issue if we automate at all in mechanical engineering and in industry. And if we have enough labor, we could create numerous mines and even strengthen the other industries. Other countries might have excess labor, but we don't. We are now considering how we can automate by trading with you and with your support, and we would also like to have cadre train with you in this field.

Now, these difficulties that are cropping up now are difficulties that can occur as development progresses.

Just as you are confronted with capitalism, we are also confronted with capitalism. We must therefore also show the South Koreans the superiority of socialism, just as you show the West Germans. It is also important to influence the entire South Korean population so that they want socialism and are in favor of unifying the country.

With respect to the cultural revolution, I told you about this, esteemed Comrade Erich Honecker, when you visited us. There are no major issues to clarify. We have introduced 11-year compulsory education. We have a total of 3.5 million children ranging in age from infants to high school age. Overall we have some 8.5 million being educated. Our current population is 17.7 million. That is, about half of the population is being educated at this time.

Naturally this is a great burden for us. But we have to take this upon ourselves in order to develop. All people must have a high degree of technical ability in order to build socialism and develop. If we accomplish these tasks, then we can train the people in the socialist sense. The issue is that each person strengthens his socialist lifestyle so that his neighbor can build socialism even better. People who are now less than 60 years of age have learned the lessons of middle school. We have set forth the solution that all people should reach

the level of high school graduate. Then we can completely resolve the issue of the national cadre.

We have not had less success in the area of the cultural revolution. When the country was liberated, we Koreans had only 12 high school graduates. Now there are some 1.2 million high school graduates. Training of the national cadre is the most important issue in Third World nations. We have resolved this issue.

As far as the economic situation is concerned, we must and we can achieve the perspective goals for the 80's in order to progress further. This is the situation. But we will have to work hard.

I would like to tell you briefly about the situation with South Korea. The situation with South Korea is very complicated and also very dangerous. Every year the American armies conduct a major military exercise. They conducted these exercises even prior to the Reagan era, but since Reagan took office this has grown. Last year 100,000 South Korean soldiers took part in this military exercise in addition to the American soldiers. We were a bit shocked that the Americans mobilized 100,000 South Koreans. We declared a state of emergency. This year the Americans mobilized more than 200,000 soldiers for this exercise. These exercises were "Team Spirit '83" and "Team Spirit '84".

The Americans stationed in Okinawa participated, as did those stationed in Hawaii. But many also came from the US. It was a major military exercise. But in contrast to last year, this year we did not declare a state of emergency. Our enemies threaten both us and the South Korean people with these exercises, and therefore there is this tension day in and day out on the demarcation line.

We have to take countermeasures every time the enemies conduct such military exercises, and this is a great hindrance for our production. Since the number of soldiers in our army is smaller than that of the South Korean army, we have to mobilize many workers in these cases. But when the workers are mobilized, one work shift is dropped for up to one and a half months per year. That is a great loss.

We proposed conducting tri-partite talks between us, the US, and South Korea this year in order to reduce tensions. The goal of these talks should be to replace the armistice with a peace treaty with the US. We proposed a non-aggression pact to South Korea. We hope that this will help to improve the tense situation, as well. And then the armies for both sides would be reduced and the Americans would withdraw from South Korea. Our opponent is using the pretext that we would attack South Korea, and says that this is why the Americans have to remain in South Korea. There is constant talk in the US House of Representatives that our military forces are stronger than those of South Korea—the purpose of this talk is to deceive the people of the world. In truth, it is not even possible for us to have more armed forces than our opponents. We have a population of 17 million, while South Korea has a population of 30 million. Just looking at these figures it is clear that it is impossible for us to be stronger militarily.

Just looking at the weapons potential, our opponent

gets all of its weapons from the US. And then there is the US army that is stationed in South Korea. And they even have nuclear weapons there. It is very plain that we are not militarily superior to them. But they use the pretext that we are stronger militarily in order to build up their weapons even more. And it would be impossible for us to attack them. This is all just a pretext for them to continue to occupy South Korea. South Korea is nothing more to the Americans than a colony and a military support point. The Americans never intend to leave South Korea. When Carter was in office, sometimes he said that there would be a partial withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. But Reagan has said that there should be even more American troops in South Korea. This is another reason we proposed tri-partite talks. We wanted to use the proposal to expose the American pretext. But this is precisely why the Americans have not agreed to our proposal yet. But their official statement is that they are against such tri-partite talks.

Their position has been that only two sides, that is, North and South Korea, should hold talks and negotiations. But in reality the South Korean authorities have no right to do so. In the past they opposed an armistice. They didn't want to sign it. In reality only we and the Americans are signatories. This is why it's completely clear that only the people who were signatories should hold the talks, but not those who opposed it. This means that when they say that both parts of Korea should hold talks, they will not replace the armistice with a peace treaty and they also oppose a statement of non-aggression. The commander of the South Korean Army is in reality an American. They are the unified military forces of the US and South Korea. This is why if talks are conducted with South Korea's president, it will never be possible for the armistice to be replaced with a peace treaty and for the soldiers on both sides to be reduced to a strength level of 100,000 to 200,000 troops. In reality our opponents want two Koreas and do not want to accept peaceful unification of the country.

The Americans now demand that if tri-partite talks are even to be conducted, the Chinese should also take part, so there would be four sides. The Chinese say they will not take part in such talks. The Chinese do not want to be drawn into the Korea issue. When Reagan was in China, he proposed conducting quadripartite negotiations, but China was opposed to this.

So the Korean situation looks like this. The struggle by the population of South Korea is currently intensifying. In the past the South Korean populace either feared the Americans or worshiped them. These two tendencies are in decline. The South Korean populace fought for democratization in the past. They did not fight for national sovereignty; they just demanded it. The demand for sovereignty would mean extricating itself from US domination. The young people and students of South Korea are currently waging an energetic battle for this. The Chun Doo Hwan regime is even worse than the Park Chung Hee regime. There are dogs that are somewhat belligerent and others that are downright vicious. This Chun Doo Hwan regime is like a vicious dog.

The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces in South Korea fought with Chun Doo Hwan against the Vietnamese during the Vietnam War. Chun Doo Hwan held major fundraisers for Reagan during the election when he was running for president.

When Reagan became president, he invited Chun Doo Hwan to further increase military forces in South Korea.

Once Chun Doo Hwan took power, the democratic parties in South Korea were dissolved under the pretext that they were our inventions. Some of the chairmen of the democratic parties were arrested, some were expelled. These representatives of democracy have thought about things since then and now say that there could be negotiations if they were still active as a party there. The entire population and even many Catholics in South Korea are unleashing a vigorous struggle against the Chun Doo Hwan regime. There is a rumor that the Americans are now considering replacing Chun Doo Hwan because the current trend in South Korea is to fight against Chun Doo Hwan.

In a word, there is little chance of reunification coming about as long as the Americans occupy South Korea. It is necessary to put forth proposals for peace over and over again in order to show the world that the US does not want this reunification. This is also necessary in order to encourage the South Korean people in their struggle. In the past we made a proposal for peaceful reunification, and, as I said, this year we proposed conducting tri-partite talks. So much for the situation in South Korea.

I would like to take this opportunity, esteemed Comrade Erich Honecker, to express to your Central Committee and your government our most sincere gratitude for your great understanding and active support for the fight to bring about the reunification of our country.

I would now like to turn to relations between our two Parties. Another reason we are visiting you is to consolidate friendly relations between the two Parties and to learn from the successes you have had in building a developed socialist society. At the same time, we have come to sign the Treaty of Friendship we spoke about in Pyongyang. Signing this treaty will be very encouraging, not only for socialist countries, non-aligned countries, and Third World nations, but also for all peace-loving peoples in the world. And this is very necessary in order to strengthen cooperation in the economic realm.

Our comrades have come at your invitation, at the invitation of the Central Committee and your government. It is both a great honor for us and a great joy that we are meeting here in Berlin. We have no differences of opinion with your Party and your government. It is necessary that we band together in order to reinforce the building of socialism and to assure peace in the entire world. I am in favor not only of signing the Treaty of Friendship, but also the long-term agreement on economic issues so that we can demonstrate socialism's superiority to capitalism.

The Central Committee and the government of our country actively support your people's struggle as the outposts

of socialism in the West. We actively support all of your proposals with regard to security in Europe and in the world. Our challenge is also that we obtain peace and strengthen the building of socialism. This is how we can assure peace in the entire world, because the only way we can continue to build socialism is under peaceful conditions.

With regard to relations between our two nations, I do not want to neglect mentioning that you also provided our people material and moral support during the three years of war in Korea. We are also very happy that you took in so many of our orphaned children and raised them as cadre. We are also grateful that you supported building up our country after the war ended, especially building up Hamhung. We are also grateful that you actively support us today on every issue.

I'd like once again to take this opportunity in the name of the Central Committee of our Party and in the name of all of the delegation members to express our sincere thanks for your active support for us in every area. I also believe that we will take the time on some other occasion to tell you about the issue of the movement of non-aligned nations and to speak with you about developments in countries in the region.

Erich Honecker: Thank you. If you permit, we will continue the talks after a short break and tell you about developments in the GDR and about problems we face in the further build-up of socialism, in realizing the resolutions of our X Party Congress.

In our country, the rent for one square meter of residential area is 0.80 to 1.20 M; in the Federal Republic of Germany it is 11.00 to 30.00 DM.

Comrade Kim Il Sung, I notice that we have exceeded the time we had allotted. I propose that we talk about the development of mutual relations at another time. We consider them positive, but think they can be expanded.

I have here the draft of an agreement between the governments of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic on economic and scientific cooperation during the period up to 1990. I propose that our comrades get together and work out the final text—this would be Comrades Reichelt and Müller on our side. Then the Prime Ministers will sign it.

We have fulfilled the goals of the last long-term agreement. We have achieved a great increase, and we accept your proposals, also those on specialization and cooperation, which we take as the foundation for completing our Treaty of Friendship in the economic arena.

If you will permit, I would like to close now. We can continue our discussion after the afternoon break.

Kim Il Sung: Thank you very much. I also thank you in the name of my delegation for the detailed report. We wholly and completely support the measures you have undertaken to maintain peace in Europe and in the world.

In addition, you spoke about relations between the two German nations. That was an important and very interesting issue. What you said was precisely correct.

Erich Honecker: We will meet again, then, and will also be together all day tomorrow.

¹ *Translator's note: German word used in source document can also mean lock or sluice.*



DOCUMENT No. 8
Memorandum of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 31 May 1984.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Memorandum
 [stamp:] Personal Classified Information
 Central Committee 02 310
 on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 31 May 1984

E. Honecker used the meeting to address some issues that could not be addressed in greater detail during the official talks on 30 May 1984 due to time constraints.

He stated that the GDR is currently preoccupied with its 35th anniversary. The Party, which has 2.2 million members, is making thorough preparations for the 35th anniversary. The centerpiece is the ideological work, which has led to intense talks with practically every citizen of the GDR.

He said that, as Kim Il Sung could see for himself, the Party is bound to the masses, and there is a good trusting relationship between the Party and the masses. The alliance policy is very important, that is, cooperation with allied Parties, the role of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, with 9 million members, the Free German Youth, with 2.3 million members, and the whole range of other organizations of the masses.

He said that the election results of 6 May 1984 could be considered the best in the history of the GDR, both in terms of the election itself and in terms of voter turnout, and attests to the successful policies of the Party and government in carrying out the resolutions of the X Party Congress.

He stated that the Socialist competition in honor of the 35th Anniversary of the GDR is very important. The workers have established as their goal for this to increase productivity by one percent above what is planned. Given the results thus far it can be expected that they will surpass this goal in the competition. Thus net industrial production in the first 5 months of 1984 increased by 7.9 percent. Productivity in the field of industrial ministries increased by 7 percent during the same period. This demonstrates the excellent initiative of the citizens of [line cut off].

He stated that the fact that 6 million citizens received new apartments between 1971 and 1983 alone was very positive for consolidating trust between the Party and the masses. Now the goal is to improve the residential conditions of an additional 4.3 million citizens between 1984 and 1990. Then the issue of apartments in the GDR as a social problem would be resolved in 1990. In addition, there are a number of other measures in the realm of social policy, e.g., the recent resolutions on improving material conditions for families with more than 3 children and the third increase in minimum pensions since 1971.

E. Honecker detailed the activities of organizations of the masses such as the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions, the Free German Youth, the Association of Gardeners and Animal Breeders, the reinvigorated Association for Mutual Farmers Assistance, the scientific institutes of the GDR, the academies and schools of higher education, the development of the general polytechnical school, the activities of artists unions, and much more.

All of this, he said, is going on in our country under conditions that are open to the world, as he had already expressed in 1977, that is, under the immediate observation of the Western adversary's electronic media. Naturally there are a few people who listen to these broadcasters and their daily lies, but it should not be overlooked that the vast majority of citizens of the GDR, one could even say, the people, stand fast and unalterably with the Party and government, with their republic.

E. Honecker then asked Kim Il Sung his assessment of the situation in China and of the current leadership of the Communist Party of China based on his own experience. For the USSR and also for the GDR and other socialist countries that do not have Party relations with China, China is a country about whose future course there are still many unresolved questions, for instance, as a result of the Reagan visit.

Kim Il Sung responded as follows. When Hu Yaobang visited our country in May, I also told him about my upcoming trip to the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. He welcomed it. I had not known Hu Yaobang before this. On the other hand, I have been friends with Deng Xiaoping for a long time. As you know, he was exiled three times during the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping paid me an unofficial visit for my 70th birthday in April 1982 to introduce Hu Yaobang to me as the new Secretary General of the Communist Party of China. He made a good impression on me from the beginning.

Hu Yaobang told me that he wants to improve governmental relations with the Soviet Union. He asked me to convey this to the leadership of the Soviet Union. Hu Yaobang assured me many times during our lengthy discussion that China is truly interested in improving relations with the Soviet Union. He confirmed this to me again this year. The leadership of the Communist Party of China is of one mind on this issue. He asked me to convey my thoughts on this to our Soviet comrades.

During his visit to the DPRK, he received news that Comrade Arkhipov's planned visit to the People's Republic

of China would be pushed back. Comrade Hu Yaobang told me that he had very much been looking forward to this visit. Our Chinese comrades also think highly of Comrade Arkhipov. He used to be an economic advisor in China. Comrade Hu Yaobang said that he very much regretted that Comrade Arkhipov's trip would be pushed back.



**Kim Il Sung and Erich Honecker,
29 May 1984**

Source: Bunesarchiv, Berlin

I told Comrade Chernenko about this during my meetings with him. I told our Soviet comrades my thoughts both in a personal meeting with Comrade Chernenko and in official negotiations—that the Chinese really want to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese do not want war. Overcoming the consequences of the Cultural Revolution in the economy and in the standard of living of the population requires a lot of time and effort. All resources must be devoted to this. The Chinese are not developing relations with the US and Japan with the goal of working against another country.

Given the complex world situation, I hope that the Soviet Union and China work things out. I believe that the development of relations with the US is not targeted against the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai already told me that when they established relations with the US. They told us every time they met with Japan and the US. The only objective of these relations is to obtain developed technology and credit from Japan and the US. Deng Xiaoping is said to have stated in the US that the arms build-up in the US is good for peace. I don't know if that's so. This is the first time I have heard of Deng Xiaoping expressing a sentiment like that.

It is a fact that the Chinese have improved governmental relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The number of delegations exchanged has grown, as well. All of this can help to reduce the mistrust between the Soviet Union and China. Naturally, I was not able to tell Comrade Chernenko that I think it is a mistake to push back Comrade Arkhipov's visit to China. I just told him that the Chinese regret it. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Com-

munist Party of China has 5 members. Two of them—Wu Xueqian and Li Xiannian—used to be friends with Comrade Arkhipov. Today they are both powerful. Comrade Arkhipov could build trust in meetings with these two men.

Hu Yaobang told me the following: We sent the Deputy Prime Minister to Comrade Andropov's funeral. During the welcoming meeting, his escort told him that he could meet with anyone he wanted. As is customary with East Asians, he said that he would accommodate himself to whatever his host had arranged. Our Soviet comrades did not understand this correctly. There were meetings with just anyone. Only the Foreign Minister attended Brezhnev's burial. They were sending a message to the Soviet Union by sending the deputy prime minister. But this was not understood.

Kim Il Sung said that he believed that all socialist nations should work toward creating trust between the Soviet Union and China. No new mistrust must be permitted to arise. I have told our Soviet comrades that I believe that the goal of our Chinese comrades is to put Socialism in China in order. They don't want a conflict. I think it is important that China wants to open the gate to socialist nations in the interest of socialist modernization. We should not oppose that. Why should we leave the important Chinese market to the capitalists?

The old generation of leadership in China is dying out. We should show the new generation an opening. If we leave China to the capitalists, there is the risk that China will become a quasi-colony again. We should not close the door in China's face.

Because of our position—the length of our border with China, confrontation with the US and Japan—what we are most afraid of is that China will not stick with socialism. There are 1 billion people in China. We have to make sure that they follow the socialist path rather than some other path. We have to focus on drawing them toward us. In the past there were major anti-Soviet campaigns in China. This is not the case anymore. During the Cultural Revolution there were major propaganda actions against us on the Yalu. There were provocations in North Korea at the time of the Chinese/Soviet conflicts on the Ussuri in 1969. While I was recuperating in the country, I received a call from our Minister of State Security that Chinese troops were crossing the Tumen [River] onto our territory. I gave the order not to shoot, but to let them come ahead so that we could take them on our territory, if necessary. We sent a group of soldiers there. Then the Chinese withdrew. The Chinese have castigated the Soviet Union and even us as revisionists. It lasted about 5 years in our case, and we had to keep our peace because of our situation. We had to be patient.

China has new leadership now. They don't want any conflict with the Soviet Union. They want peaceful co-existence with the US, Japan, India, and even the Soviet Union. There are still no Party relations between the Soviet Union and China. We should all try to use our governmental relations to create an atmosphere that promotes the restoration of Party relations, even between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China. I ask that

you, Comrade Honecker, recommend to our Soviet comrades that they send Comrade Arkhipov to China and furthermore that they begin exchanging delegations. I am convinced that China would never put herself on the side of the US against the Soviet Union. All socialist countries should develop economic ties to China, and should even invest in China. The Chinese wanted to speak to Comrade Arkhipov about opportunities to cooperate in modernizing the numerous plants built by the Soviet Union. I told Hu Yaobang that I would ask the Soviet Union about building a nuclear power plant. Hu Yaobang welcomed this, because it would be better than purchasing one from a capitalist country.

Regarding the incidents on the Chinese/Vietnamese border that you mentioned, which you do not approve of, which you regret, I have only the Chinese press accounts to go by. I know nothing of what actually happened. I consider it very regrettable, because these incidents help neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese. They do damage to our common tasks, above all bringing the Chinese closer to us. All socialist countries should urge the two great powers to hold out their hands to one another.

Hu Yaobang has gathered a lot of new people around him. Hu Qili, who in the past was with the World Federation of Democratic Youth—he knows many people from the past, including you, Comrade Honecker. The current Foreign Minister was also involved in the youth organization in the past. There are many other people around Hu Yaobang who used to work in the youth organization. Hu Yaobang himself is still very healthy; he is smart, his theoretical knowledge is good, and he has also made a thorough study of Marxism. Deng Xiaoping works more from behind the scene, but he also believes that they have to develop relations with the Soviet Union. He is the only one of the old functionaries who is still there. I am his friend. In the past the Chinese castigated the Soviet Union as social imperialists. They don't do that any more.

I met Comrade Chernenko for the first time [line cut off]

... I knew him well. He has been to Korea three times. He sent me a personal letter immediately after he was elected. I promised him that I would come to the Soviet Union quickly so that I could travel to the GDR immediately afterwards. But that had to be postponed due to Comrade Andropov's illness. Since I have just gotten to know Comrade Chernenko, I did not know how far I could go with him during our talks. I ask you, Comrade Honecker, to discuss all of these issues with him when you meet. How good it would be for all of us if the Soviet Union and China would reconcile. Japanese journalists have frequently asked my opinion on Sino-Soviet relations. I always said that they are both socialist countries and they therefore belong together. Both the Soviet Union and China are our comrades-in-arms.

To E. Honecker's inquiry about the nature of the group of Koreans living in Japan, Kim Il Sung stated that this was a group formed by the DPRK. We support relations between this group and socialist countries, including the GDR.

Hu Yaobang, Kim Il Sung continued, had me briefed in great detail on his trip to Japan. I support normalization of

relations between China and Japan. There are those in Japan who aspire to reviving militarism and the alliance with the US. But Japan in general can have no interest in re-militarization for economic reasons. All of Japan's mass organizations oppose militarization. Much depends on which people are in power. I asked Hu Yaobang about his talks with Nakasone. He told me that Nakasone said that Japan will not become cannon fodder for the Americans. It can't dissociate itself from the US, but does not want to become a lackey of the US. We should all think about that. For the future it could be important whether Nakasone remains prime minister or whether Abe becomes prime minister. In China the Chinese have been courting Abe because they think he would be the better choice. We have to work with the Japanese in a way that ensures that militarism does not recur. I sometimes make harsh statements against Japanese militarism, but we have to work with them anyway. Above all we oppose the US/Japan/South Korea trilateral military alliance. The Japanese have promised the Chinese \$2 billion in credit. This is good for the Chinese economy.

I would like to address the socialist market, but today we have no more time.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung, 1 June 1984

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

[stamp:] Personal classified material

Central Committee 02 311

Memorandum

on the meeting between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung on 1 June 1984

E. Honecker began by expressing his gratitude for the lively exchange of views that took place during Kim Il Sung's visit. You were able to become more familiar with the policies of our Party and government, E. Honecker said, during your stay in Berlin, Wolkow, Frankfurt (Oder) and Eisenhüttenstadt, and during discussions with members of your delegation in the semi-conductor plant and in the Buna plant. And it was evident that the masses support these policies.

E. Honecker stated: I am happy about how well our views on the most important issues coincide. I was already convinced of this in 1977, at the time we agreed to enter into the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. Today we will sign this treaty. At the same time, both heads of state will sign the Agreement on Economic and Scientific Cooperation between our two nations. Naturally, all of this is extremely impor-

tant—it is an inspiration for our people, as you noted.

As you know, the development of the GDR is occurring based on a major division of labor in the framework of COMECON, cooperation with the other socialist countries. Seventy percent of our foreign trade goes to the socialist world, thirty percent to the non-socialist world. The great majority of our trade is based on the dynamic development of our industry. We have obligations that we must honor, both with respect to socialist countries, in particular based on cooperation and specialization, and in trade with the capitalist world, as well. It must be stated that trade with the capitalist world has suffered for the last 4 years, given the freeze on credit that the Reagan administration implemented with its allies. The same applies to deliveries of what they call “strategic goods.” Regardless of the complex conditions that arose for our balance of payments, we rely on ourselves, on the Soviet Union, and on the socialist community. You could say that our confidence in our own abilities is justified.

In the past few years the GDR has developed into a powerful industrial complex, into an industrialized nation, as they say in the West. It is now among the ten strongest industrialized nations in the world. We have made great progress in the fields of microelectronics, in refining our own raw materials. Organizing our industries into collective combines that respect the complete independence of the operations has proved worthwhile. The collective combines can react to demand with flexibility and endeavor to maintain and influence peak positions in critical fields.

We devote great attention to upgrading coal. Brown coal is the basis for gas production in the GDR. It is significant that coal dust is used in operations that used heating oil in the past, such as the cement industry. We are now in the process of converting from “D” locomotives to “E” locomotives.

In terms of bilateral relations between the GDR and the DPRK, E. Honecker stated that they are developing well. It is satisfying to see that economic and scientific/technical cooperation has made steady and dynamic progress since 1977. This positive development is manifested above all in the fact that sales of goods continue to increase. Based on the long-term trade agreement, sales will grow approximately 160 percent in 1984.

I would like to highlight the cooperation in the building of the automation equipment plant in Pyongyang, which began operating in 1983, and in the new construction of an anilon textile plant and the reconstruction of an existing textile plant, E. Honecker said. The GDR provided the equipment in the framework of government credits. Measures for scientific/technical cooperation are being realized between the two nations, in particular in the fields of chemistry, mining, and metallurgy. We believe that it would be useful to both countries if in the future we were to link scientific/technical cooperation even more strongly to focal points of economic cooperation.

We now think the time has come to prepare and reach agreement on measures for developing mutually advantageous economic and scientific/technical cooperation for the

post-1985 years and thus to create a stable foundation for our cooperation for the period up to 1990. Talks between economic delegations from both countries in March of this year already provided a number of good incentives. Initial measures were established at the last meeting of the advisory committee.

It would be useful to enter into an agreement on economic and scientific/technical cooperation between the GDR and DPRK for the period up to 1990. We are assuming that the long-term agreement from 1977 was worthwhile and our further cooperation can be formulated even more goal-intensively if we proceed in accordance with a plan we both agree on. For this reason, over the past few days we prepared and made available for discussion the draft of an agreement for the period up to 1990.

The economic efficiency of our cooperation should be further increased by our concentrating even more on fundamental work for consolidating the economic potential of both countries. We believe conditions are good for strengthening cooperation in the fields of mining, processing, and the supplying of raw materials, basic materials, and energy carriers. We are prepared to support the expansion and modernization of capacities in the DPRK’s extractive industry by providing machines and equipment and want to increase the products we receive from these capacities. We completely understand that your country does not want to provide only raw materials at the first processing stage, but to a certain extent would like to provide refined exports. We would also consider such a possibility.

Also in the field of processing industries, especially mechanical engineering and electrotechnology/electronics, we consider the conditions for further cooperation to be very good. We welcome the fact that the responsible minister has established contacts with us and leading comrades from collective combines and operations in both countries are working out proposals about what, to our mutual advantage, is to happen with our cooperation in the next few years. We are also willing and in a position to provide certain equipment for the textile industry, for production of agar and also other items if, in exchange, we can take goods that the GDR’s national economy requires.

We would like to propose that the central planning organs of our countries hold detailed consultations on realizing the central tasks for economic cooperation based on the foundation of the agreement signed [for the period] to 1990. They should come to agreement on the specific basis of cooperation as a condition for preparing a long-term trade agreement.

Our comrades in foreign trade have agreed to extend by one year the long-term trade agreement that is in effect until 1984, and to prepare a new long-term trade agreement for the period up to 1990. We would sincerely welcome this because it fits the rhythm of our planning.

I would particularly like to stress our intent, through even closer cooperation between our countries, to contribute to eliminating imports from Capitalist countries and to including concrete agreements in the long-term trade agree-

ment. We consider this to be exceptionally important, given the economic war that the US and other imperialist countries are waging with all resources against the nations of the socialist community.

Our Party and our state in the future will also continue to develop our mutually beneficial economic cooperation, with high-reliability, as an effective growth factor.

Kim Il Sung expressed his thanks for the overview that E. Honecker gave on developments in the GDR since 1977, and addressed two issues: the results of the visit to a few additional operations in the GDR and the relationship to the non-aligned countries.

It is very encouraging that we were able to agree on the delivery of a semi-conductor plant by your side, he said. Soon we will send specialists to agree on all of the specific issues, including joint ordering of certain parts in third countries. We already purchased a semi-conductor plant from Japan through unofficial channels. But it is incomplete. We were not aware of electronics development in the GDR. It was only as I was preparing for this visit that I learned that you have such a plant of your own. Our Central Committee approved the means for purchasing a semi-conductor plant a long time ago. But it could not come to pass because, for one thing, we did not know about your electronics. When I was just in the embassy, I criticized our comrades because they did not provide us correct information about GDR industry. For instance, we also did not know that you produce good synthetic rubber and herbicides. In the past we purchased all of these things from capitalist countries. That has to change.

In our country we have rich deposits of heavy metals: lead, zinc, etc. We have enough sintered magnesite for you to rely on us in this regard for a long time. There are good prospects for the supply of other heavy metals over the long-term, as well. I criticized our comrades in the embassy because of the lack of information. But I must say that in terms of management we did not provide our cadre sufficient guidance on the issue of fully exploring options for cooperating with the GDR and other socialist countries.

The agreement on long-term economic cooperation that our specialists have come up with and that we will sign today—I would like you to understand that we can add to it in many areas. We are not adequately familiar with the options for cooperation. Many options should be examined in greater detail by specialists in order for us to be able to expand the agreement.

We had been members of the movement of non-aligned nations since 1975; most recently we no longer belong to the movement, said Kim Il Sung. The movement set forth good solutions but is not in a position to resolve the basic issues. Above all it is not in a position to realize the requirement for a new economic order. The states that belong to it are politically independent, but they do not have independent national economies. This is why the danger of expanding neo-colonialism is growing. The US and Japan are again reaching toward the countries of the third world. The problems of the developing countries cannot be solved simply by

cooperation among themselves. Naturally something has to be done. Certainly mutual cooperation can achieve a few successes for agriculture and health care. But the countries cannot be industrialized by cooperation within the non-aligned pact. The best solution for them would be close ties between the socialist market and the market of the developing lands. We must all think carefully about this. We also oppose the efforts of capitalism in the Third World.

I believe there are two options for economic cooperation: 1. Expand the socialist market by adding individual developing nations. 2. Individual socialist nations can establish bilateral economic relations to individual developing nations. We can offer them specialists and technical documentation at lower prices than the capitalist countries will. In return the socialist nations can obtain cheaper raw materials from them. If we help them to assure their political independence through economic independence, they will succeed in ridding themselves of the pressure of the former colonial powers.

Above all it is important to develop this cooperation with the African nations. Nearly all of the heads of state of Africa—with the exception of Kenya and Morocco—have already visited our country. We know that you, Comrade Honecker, have visited a number of African nations and ascribe great importance to Africa's development. We have agricultural specialists in nearly all African countries. Our experience in Sudan indicates that just sending a small number of specialists can help them to double or triple agricultural production and thus to solve their main problem, the issue of food. If all of the socialist countries together initiate more dynamic activities with respect to the nations of Africa, we will be able to tear all of Africa away from imperialism and set many countries on the path to socialism.

The political forces and resulting avant-garde parties in these countries are very different. Ethiopia has obviously achieved the highest level of consolidation of a Marxist party. Despite these differences, however, we can use economic cooperation to strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in all of these countries. I am very pleased that we are of the same mind on this issue, as well.

Kim Il Sung asked Erich Honecker for his impression of non-aligned nations, in particular those with a socialist orientation, based on his visits to the non-socialist world. He stressed that the DPRK maintains relations with them all in order to support the path to further decolonialization and to prevent re-colonialization. E. Honecker specifically mentioned the critical situation in Latin America, US interference in the domestic affairs of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and other countries, the continuing threats against socialist Cuba, and the situation in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

In conclusion, it was determined that it is necessary to continue to provide vigorous support to these countries in the struggle against imperialism, in particular US imperialism, but also imperialism of the FRG.

DOCUMENT No. 10
Report on conversation between Prof. Dr. Manfred Gerlach and Kim Il Sung, 26 May 1986

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

To the members and candidates of the Politburo, EH [Erich Honecker], 26 May 86
Berlin, 26 May 1986
To Comrade Erich Honecker

Dear Comrade Honecker,

As you know, Manfred Gerlach was received by Kim Il Sung during the former's trip to the DPRK. During this meeting, Kim Il Sung made some statements that were specifically intended for you. I am sending you this excerpt from the report in the enclosure.

Sincerely,
[s]
Enclosure
J. Herrmann

II The meeting with Kim Il Sung

1. The meeting with Kim Il Sung lasted over an hour and was very friendly and open. Kim Il Sung spoke frequently, interrupting remarks by Prof. Dr. Gerlach (on statements about the XI Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party, the GDR's peace and security policy, the USSR's peace program, the alliance policy of the Socialist Unity Party and issues of internal development in the GDR, the status of relations between the GDR and the DPRK, praising the policies and achievements of the DPRK) to express his thanks, to make assenting comments, or to make additional statements expressing his affirmation.

Kim Il Sung's comments can be categorized as follows:

- Emphatic, very sincere appreciation for his visit to the GDR in 1984. He said he will never forget the visit, the time he spent with Erich Honecker, "his best friend and comrade-in-arms", the extremely warm welcome the people of the GDR gave him. As soon as his train crossed the border and reached the first city, the entire population received him with jubilation, and his first impression was: This is truly a strong force that can withstand even its greatest foes.
- The expectation of a visit by Erich Honecker to the DPRK. After Erich Honecker's warm regards were conveyed to him, Kim Il Sung combined his thanks with a request that his own warm regards be conveyed. He said he was touched by these greetings and was very happy to re-

ceive them. He stated that he waited every day for news that Erich Honecker is coming to the DPRK. If he comes, he intends to receive him with extraordinary warmth and to personally show him the progress that has been made over the nearly 10 years since his last trip to the DPRK. He said he wants to discuss the international situation with him, the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Asia, and to talk about views on these topics.

He said he is very hopeful that Erich Honecker will visit and asks only that he not come in December during the cold season, as he did last time. He experienced such a warm reception in the GDR that if he wants to reciprocate the visit must take place in the warm season. He said Erich Honecker absolutely must come in order to encourage our people and the population of South Korea in their struggle. It is worthwhile to demonstrate before the entire world how both countries (even though they are divided) work together and diligently for socialism and peace. He has great personal respect for Erich Honecker, who has brought the entire population together in the GDR while Germany has been divided and who has built a developed socialist society. He greatly appreciates his accomplishments in achieving solidarity among Socialist countries, assuring world peace, the solidarity the people of the GDR have with the Korean people, and the material and moral support.

Relations between the GDR and DPRK

He said that since the Treaty of Friendship was signed in 1984, relations between our countries and peoples have grown much deeper. He stated that he is very happy that this is evident in all areas of politics, the economy, and culture. We are unanimous on all issues, there are no differences of opinion. Our task is to become even closer, as outposts of socialism in the east and west to fight against nuclear war, to assure world peace, and to continue to build socialism. Reagan is using every resource to prepare for nuclear war, but the peoples of the world oppose this and even his own allies waver. He said he is therefore convinced that we can assure peace and continue to build socialism even better if we wage this battle correctly. It is clear to us: this era of peace must be preserved. We must have better science and technology than the capitalist countries. The most important thing is to wage the battle so that socialism is completed.

He stated that in 1984 he became personally acquainted with the GDR's success in building socialism, and that after his visit in all the meetings of the Politburo and Central Committee he said in no uncertain terms that the people of the GDR—who are very disciplined, aggressive, and organized—will achieve victory. The outcome of the XI Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party, the peace initiatives, and the new tasks for social/economic progress in the GDR typify very successful development in the GDR—developments he is well informed of, developments that are just as gratifying to him as the re-election of Erich Honecker as Secretary General. He requested that Erich Honecker be told that everything is going well in the DPRK. The Korean Workers Party continues

to wage the battle and wants to speed up development. Work is still ongoing in terms of successfully realizing the resolutions of the VI Party Congress and the 3rd Seven-Year Plan. He said that realizing the Nampo Plan opens up great economic opportunities, including resolving transport issues and reclaiming land. 300,000 hectares of land are to be reclaimed by 1990, so that in a few years it will be possible to have an annual grain harvest of 15 million tons.

Appreciation of alliance policies.

He said he is very pleased to have met the Chairman of a Party such as the LDPD that, together with and under the leadership of the Party of the Worker Class, and with Erich Honecker at the top, fights on a united front, marching toward socialism. We have the SPK and a Christian party. We want to combine these resources and build socialism together. He said he believes the GDR will also wage the battle for socialism successfully and effectively in its political/moral unity in the future as well.

The situation in South Korea.

In South Korea the people are now waging a good battle against the puppet regime and the US occupiers. It is not just students who are fighting, but broad elements of society. A wide united front is forming, and although it is not yet able to drive the US out of South Korea, it is still very important for developing consciousness and increasing vigilance among South Korea's populace.

He said the dictator is trembling, and Schultz and Weinberger have had to stiffen the regime's spine. But there is no injection that can save a man who is already dying. So, the situation is good. We continue to build socialism, the populace of South Korea continues its battle to rid itself of its dependence on the US.

At the conclusion of the meeting, in the name of the Korean people, Kim Il Sung conveyed warm greetings to the people of the GDR. He was visibly pleased with the gift from the LDPD delegation (oil painting by a Dresden painter of the view from the bastion of the mountains along the Elbe).



DOCUMENT No. 11 **Report on the Visit by Erich Honecker to the DPRK,** **18-21 October 1986**

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Report

On the official friendship visit by Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, to

the People's Democratic Republic of Korea from 18 to 21 October 1986.

I.

The visit occurred at the invitation of Comrade Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and President of the DPRK. Resolution no. 02 347 12/86 of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Social Unity Party of 8 July 1986 was fulfilled.

The official talks (Attachment 1) took place in a very friendly, open, and constructive atmosphere. They offered an opportunity for a detailed exchange of information and views on the international situation and policies, social development in the GDR and DPRK, and on the structure of bilateral relations.

In Pyongyang there were meetings between Comrade Günter Mittag and Comrade Yi Chong-ok, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and Vice Premier of the DPRK; between the Foreign ministers, Comrades Oskar Fischer and Kim Yong-nam, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and Deputy Chairman of the Ministerial Council (Attachment 2); between Comrades Gerhard Beil and Choe Yong-gun, the Ministers of Foreign Trade; and between Comrades Günter Sieber and Hyon Chun-guk, member of the Central Committee and Director of the Department of International Relations of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (Attachment 3).

Comrade Erich Honecker was warmly welcomed by 100,000 residents of Pyongyang and Nampo. He saw for himself the proof of the success the DPRK has enjoyed in building socialism and visited sights in Pyongyang, Mangyongdae, the heavy machinery construction collective combine in Taan, and the West Sea barrage and locks complex. There was a major presentation in Pyongyang, with more than 150,000 participants. This was followed by a major athletic exhibition by 50,000 athletes, which took the form of a political manifestation of the close and friendly relations between the two Parties, nations, and peoples.

Comrade Erich Honecker placed a wreath at the memorial grove of revolutionaries in Pyongyang.

II.

Comrade Erich Honecker explained the tasks that are to be undertaken in the GDR in accordance with the resolutions of the XI Party Congress in the qualitatively new segment of further structuring the developed socialist society and the foreign policy of the GDR. The Socialist Unity Party has become involved, at the right time, with the requirements for further developing productivity and socialist production. He stressed that the economic strategy has made it possible to permit intensification to become the critical foundation for the increase in performance and to ensure the required continuous economic growth, in particular by mastering key technologies.

Comrade Erich Honecker stressed that the Socialist Unity

Party will hold steady in the future its course of unifying economic and social policy as the main battlefield for successful development of the GDR. The results of the national elections on 8 June have affirmed the will of the workers to continue this policy with new initiatives.

The focus of Comrade Erich Honecker's remarks on foreign policy was a detailed assessment of the international situation, which has become extremely critical due to the policies of the most aggressive circles of US imperialism and their allies in NATO, and an explanation of the initiatives of the SED and GDR, which are intended to maintain peace and assure security, in concert with the agreed peace strategy of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member countries. Comrade Erich Honecker said that it was not until now that it was worthwhile to take the opportunity and fight to decide the issue of war or peace, in favor of peace. This is why the GDR also supports the path Comrade Gorbachev laid out in Reykjavik to achieve that which was shown to be possible there. He made assurances, based on historical responsibility that war will never again issue from German soil, only peace, that the GDR will work with all forces of reason and realism and seek a constructive, results-oriented dialogue. In this context, he welcomed the foreign policy initiatives of the DPRK, especially efforts to create a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

III.

Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung praised the excellent state of fraternal relations between the two Parties, states, and peoples, which have reached a qualitatively new level since both leading representatives met and since the treaty on Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1984. The further deepening of relations between the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Korean Workers Party, as well as the active exchange of delegations and experience, had a particularly stimulating effect overall.

Comrade Erich Honecker invited Comrade Kim Il Sung to visit the GDR. The invitation was accepted with great joy and sincere thanks.

Comrade Erich Honecker stressed that the successful development of economic relations between the GDR and the DPRK was in complete accord with the political interests of the Party and government. It could therefore be established at the XI Party Congress that a qualitatively new level of relations of friendship and comradely cooperation had been achieved with the DPRK.

The positive results obtained in economic cooperation and in trade, and the further conditions created for dynamic development of economic, scientific/technical, and trade relations between the two countries, were appraised as the successful realization of the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation and the Agreement on the Development of Economic and Scientific/Technical Cooperation in the period up to 1990. Important industrial objectives in the DPRK, such as the automation equipment plant in Pyongyang, the textile plants in Kanggye, Hyesan, and Anju, were met with machines and equipment from the GDR and are important components of

the economy of the DPRK.

Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed with Comrade Erich Honecker's remarks on the link between strong socialism and peace. He stressed the need to draw more and more resources into the peace movement.

Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that the focus of the third seven-year-plan, which begins in 1987, is to resolve the food issue and to provide residential living space and adequate clothing.

This means expanding the amount of land cultivated for grain by 500,000 to 2 million hectares and guaranteeing comprehensive irrigation of the areas, creating 150,000 to 200,000 residential units annually, and, due to a lack of cotton, creating new production capacities for synthetic fibers from domestic raw materials (limestone, anthracite) from 50,000 tons to 150,000 tons annually as a foundation for a total of 1.5 billion meters of material.

It has turned out that only 8.5 to 9 million tons of steel are adequate for domestic demand, rather than the originally planned 15. Instead, the amount of aluminum produced from limestone and alumina must be increased. It is necessary to further raise the training level of the people to satisfy the new tasks.

Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned important resolutions by the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party that are meant to achieve the technical level of developed countries in a short period of time by accelerating the scientific/technical revolution.

In order to achieve the 10 planned development goals of the VI Party Congress, it will be necessary in particular to modernize available technology based on rapid development of mechanical engineering, electrotechnology, and automation technology, including in particular technology for finding and exploiting raw materials and fuels and other energy carriers, raising the technological level of production, scientific penetration into production methods and operational activities.

In this context, Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed the importance of cooperation with the GDR in implementing economic objectives and particularly providing scientific/technical know-how. This cooperation will become extremely important in the next few years. Comrade Kim Il Sung asked that the GDR review its ability to provide machines and equipment for the vinalon textile plant.

As to the situation in South Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that the anti-American mood has grown even more among the population, and in religious circles. But no rapid change in relations among the powers is to be expected.

The US rejected proposals made by the DPRK for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula because it [would] lose its reason for remaining in South Korea if the initiatives were realized.

Comrade Kim Il Sung affirmed that the DPRK does not intend to attack South Korea, nor could it. More than 1,000 US nuclear warheads are stored in South Korea, ostensibly for defense, and it would take only two of them to destroy the DPRK. The DPRK supports the proposals made by Comrade

Gorbachev in Vladivostok and Reykjavik. Many problems could not be resolved with South Korea. Progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the US would also help to resolve the Korea problem.

Comrade Kim Il Sung welcomed Erich Honecker's upcoming visit to the People's Republic of China. He characterized the trip as good for Socialism and told him about views expressed to him by high-level Chinese politicians, who praised Comrade Honecker's work and who had great expectations for his visit.

Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Kim Il Sung stressed their complete agreement on the issues they addressed and determined that there were no differences in views between the two Parties.

Comrade Erich Honecker welcomed the DPRK's foreign policy initiatives, especially the proposal to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone and the international conference held in Pyongyang on this, as important contributions by the country to ensuring peace and security in Asia. He considered the withdrawal of 150,000 DPRK army troops from the front line at the demilitarized zone to be a most important step for decreasing tensions on the Korean peninsula. Comrade Erich Honecker supported the DPRK's demand that US troops withdraw from South Korea and that Korea be peacefully reunited.

Comrade Kim Il Sung repeatedly stressed the DPRK's determined resolution to work more closely with the USSR, the GDR, the other states in COMECON, and with the Warsaw Pact.

During his visit, Comrade Kim Il Sung openly and repeatedly spoke in favor of the comprehensive initiatives Comrade Gorbachev proposed for preventing a nuclear war, in favor of transforming the Asia/Pacific region to a peace zone, in favor of cooperation, and in favor of the proposed halt to the nuclear arms race and averting the danger of a nuclear inferno. He characterized the Soviet proposals as responsible and evidence of a peace-loving foreign policy. In this context, he advocated comradely solidarity and development of friendship and cooperation between socialist nations as an important pledge in the war against imperialism and for socialism.

In his meeting with Comrade Günter Mittag, Comrade Yi Chong-ok, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and Vice Premier of the DPRK, expressed the conviction that the official friendship visit by the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Social Unity Party and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR would result in a broad impetus for deepening and expanding economic relations.

The economic policies of the Korean Workers Party, which are aimed at qualitative factors of economic development and intensification, offer favorable conditions for developing economic cooperation with a highly industrialized nation such as the GDR. Both sides agreed to examine further objectives of economic cooperation. A statement on this between the Ministers of Foreign Trade, Gerhard Beil and Choe Jong-gun, was signed on 21 October 1986.

The Annual Statement on Mutual Imports and Exports between Comrade Gerhard Beil and Comrade Choe Jong-gun was signed on 20 October 1986. It provides for a 37.5 percent increase in foreign trade over 1986. This created the foreign trade policy basis for export and import tasks for above-average and dynamic development of exports and imports. Including objectives for economic cooperation for the first time in the annual statement for 1987 assured the supply of work and professional clothing to the GDR in the amount of 32 million M/VGM.

IV.

Summary assessment:

1. The trip to the DPRK was an impressive and powerful demonstration of the friendship and fraternity between the two Parties, states, and peoples. It promoted closer cooperation between the Socialist states and will stimulate confident cooperation at all levels for a long time.

The official friendship visit and the meetings with leading comrades from the DPRK significantly improved the conditions for coordinating policies, for intensification, and for further improving the sharing of experiences on all sides. At the same time new conditions were created for quantitative and qualitative improvement of relations in all areas, especially in the economic and scientific/technical realms.

The broad exchange of information and experience on policies of both countries while building socialism, on raising the standard of living of the populace, on performing political/ideological work, and, last but not least, on the activities of the Party, represents an increase in knowledge for building and strengthening socialism.

2. The first meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung since his official 1984 friendship visit to the GDR pointed out additional opportunities to deliberately strengthen the process of rapprochement and of cooperation between the nations of the socialist community and the DPRK.

3. Comrade Erich Honecker's official friendship visit to the DPRK resonated strongly with the public in the DPRK and in the media.

Particularly stressed were:

- the trusting relationship of the two leading representatives;
- the great mutual understanding and constructive approach of both sides in managing relations;
- the effectiveness of past cooperation between the two Parties and nations.

V.

Conclusions:

1. Comrade Kim Il Sung will visit the GDR at some future time to be agreed upon.

For action: Comrade Oskar Fischer

Comrade Günter Sieber

2. Relations between the GDR's Chamber of Deputies and the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly shall be taken to a higher level by exchanging views and experience.

For action: Comrade Horst Sindermann

3. The existing consultation mechanism with the Korean Workers Party and the DPRK shall be qualified and employed in a deliberate manner for mutual procedures for reconciling and further coordinating foreign policy activities.

For action: Comrade Hermann Axen
Comrade Oskar Fischer

4. The official visit by the Foreign Minister of the GDR to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at a time to be agreed is approved.

For action: Comrade Oskar Fischer

5. Relations with the DPRK in the areas of economy, foreign trade, and science and technology shall be expanded and deepened based on the talks conducted and on existing agreements and treaties.

Foreign trade relations shall be expanded based on proposals made, the Governmental Agreement on the Exchange of Goods for 1986 - 1990, and the signed Annual Statement for 1987. The potential for supplying machines and equipment for a vinalon textile plant shall be examined.

For action: Comrade Günter Mittag
Comrade Gerhard Schörer
Comrade Gerhard Beil

6. The initiatives of the DPRK and its youth organization for conducting the XIII World Games of Youth and Students in Pyongyang are supported.

For action: Comrade Eberhard Aurich

7. Cultural/scientific relations to the DPRK shall be expanded. A cultural working plan shall be prepared for the years 1987 - 1990.

For action: Comrade Kurt Hager
Comrade Oskar Fischer
Comrade Hans-Joachim Hoffmann
Comrade Hans-Joachim Böhme

8. Concrete proposals for sending study delegations from the Party and appropriate ministries and high-ranking study delegations to the DPRK shall be presented to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party for further developing bilateral relations in the realization of determinations made during the Erich Honecker's official friendship visit.

For action: Comrade Günter Sieber
Comrade Oskar Fischer

DOCUMENT No. 12

Report on a Trip to the DPRK by a Delegation from the GDR, 16 May 1988

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2205. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

To the members and candidates of the Politburo, EH [Erich Honecker]
16 May 88

SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY

BERLIN DISTRICT
KURSTRASSE 36, BERLIN 1080
FIRST SECRETARY
To
Comrade Erich Honecker

Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party
and Chairman of the State Council
of the GDR
Berlin, 16 May 1988

Dear Comrade Erich Honecker,

I am reporting on the trip by a delegation from the Berlin District of the Socialist Unity Party to the capitols of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the People's Republic of Mongolia. The delegation was received with extraordinary warmth in Beijing, Pyongyang, and Ulan-Bator. We were afforded the greatest possible opportunities for work in each country.

The delegation leader and Comrade Erhard Krack, the lord mayor, were received by Secretaries General Zhao Ziyang, Kim Il Sung, and Jambyn Batmonh. Our comrades stressed their respect for the policies of the Socialist Unity Party, for the building work that has been accomplished in the GDR, and their great appreciation for the work of Comrade Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR. They expressed their personal and genuine solidarity with Comrade Honecker.

To augment my telegrams from the individual stations, I have enclosed the detailed records of remarks by Comrade Zhao Ziyang, Comrade Kim Il Sung, and Comrade Jambyn Batmonh.

In addition to the agreements with the Party leadership and municipalities on continuing to improve exchanges, agreements on city cooperation were reached with the capitols of Beijing and Ulan-Bator that the Secretaries General emphatically approved.

The most important of these framework agreements is the one with the city government of Beijing. I have enclosed it with proposals for a number of measures for fleshing out the framework agreement with respect to the 40th anniversary

sary of the People's Republic of China. I would be grateful for your ideas on this so that we can proceed with them in mind.

We will give Comrade Sieber the detailed reports about the delegation's work.

With Socialist greetings,

[s]

Enclosures

Günter Schabowski

Minutes

Of the meeting between Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Korean Workers Party, and Comrade Günter Schabowski in Pyongyang on 10 May 1988

At the beginning of the meeting Kim Il Sung asked specifically after Erich Honecker's health. He expressed his thanks for the Secretary General's regards as conveyed by Günter Schabowski and asked that his own warm regards be conveyed to his best friend and brother. He emphasized his deep friendship with Erich Honecker by saying that each of them was occupying a socialist outpost, one in the west, the other in the east. He said he still remembered the tremendous reception he experienced from the people of Berlin when he visited the GDR in 1984. The population thereby demonstrated its solid unity with the Party and also the force that grows out of the friendship of our two nations.

Comrade Kim Il Sung again gave his thanks for Erich Honecker's invitation for a delegation from the DPRK to attend the International Meeting for Nuclear Free Zones from 20 June to 22 June 1988 in Berlin. He characterized this initiative of Erich Honecker's as very important and said that the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party had decided to send a delegation that would be led by a member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the Central Committee.

Kim Il Sung stressed how completely the foreign policies of the GDR and the DPRK were in agreement and emphasized that our parties also had the same views on objectives for building socialism.

There can be no other objectives if one truly wants to blaze the trail of socialism.

He said he follows Erich Honecker's speeches with great interest, and that these speeches coincide completely with his views.

Comrade Kim Il Sung stated that he is very satisfied with the cooperation between the GDR and the DPRK. The GDR actively supports the Korean people's struggle in all areas. Indirectly referencing the information Günter Schabowski asked for at an earlier meeting with Kang Hui-won, candidate for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party, about the prospects for contractual delivery of certain raw materials from the DPRK, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he knew that the DPRK is not currently fulfilling its trade obligations as set forth in the agreements. He made

assurances that this will be made up and everything will proceed normally in the second half of 1988. Addressing the reasons for the backlogs – and according to him this was the first time he had discussed this with a foreign delegation— Kim Il Sung talked about major floods in 1986 and 1987, which the Koreans had not made publicly known internationally. All of the production facilities, railroad tracks, and roads were flooded in the valley where the sintered magnesite is found, production came to a standstill, and there was a great deal of destruction. A member of the Politburo and the Secretary of the Central Committee was dispatched to lead efforts on-site to repair the damage. A Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers has been working as the District Party Secretary for this period. The production workshops will begin full operations during the course of the first half of 1988 so that everything will be delivered that the DPRK has pledged to deliver.

The Party and the entire country is currently focusing great efforts on the construction plans for the 13th World Games of Youth and Students in Pyongyang in 1989. These are very difficult and also expensive preparations, because at the same time capital investments in operations must also continue. The build-up work in small cities has been suspended for the time being. It is primarily the army that is working at the construction sites in Pyongyang; it will accomplish much in the "200-day battle." Everything is being done to prepare well for the 13th world games and to make them a success.

Work is proceeding with the same initiative with which the service members of the army constructed the West Sea barrage. Now that the barrage has been operating for two years, the substantial efforts and costs invested have already been recouped.

Günter Schabowski thanked Kim Il Sung for the meeting, for the detailed description of the Korean Workers Party's current struggle to bring about the resolutions of the VI Party Congress, and the confident assurances that all of the obligations to the GDR with regard to deliveries would be fulfilled. He emphatically stressed that Comrade Erich Honecker had authorized him to provide assurances again that the GDR will observe all agreements that were made between him and Comrade Kim Il Sung. In this context, he described the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party to send a delegation of representatives of the GDR, to be led by Willi Stoph, to the 40th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

He said that the youth in the GDR are preparing for the 13th World Games in Pyongyang with the intent, alongside the side of the Korean youth, to make this occasion a great event for the youth of the world, a convincing demonstration of the strength of our socialist nations, and an active contribution to maintaining world peace. This was also reflected in the May demonstration by over 750,000 residents of Berlin, which was a powerful manifestation of the unity of Party and people.

Comrade Kim Il Sung again asked that his fraternal greetings be conveyed to Erich Honecker, and stressed that the

successes of the GDR, under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party, are also always considered as mutual successes and our Parties and our peoples will conduct increasingly close cooperation.



DOCUMENT No. 13
Report on visit of GDR military delegation to DPRK, July 1988.

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2508. Translated by Grace Leonard.]

Report

On the visit by an official military delegation from the GDR to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in July 1988.

An official military delegation from the GDR, led by General of the Army Heinz Kessler, Minister of National Defense and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from 19 July to 23 July 1988. This visit followed an invitation from Vice Marshall O Chin U, Minister of the People's Army and member of the Presidium of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. The delegation included Colonel General Horst Brünner, Deputy Minister, Lieutenant General Manfred Grätz, and six other generals and officers of the National People's Army.

In Pyongyang the delegation laid a wreath in the memorial grove of fallen Korean revolutionaries and toured the house in Mangyongdae where Kim Il Sung was born, visited the Tower of the Juche Idea, the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, the Pioneer Palace, construction sites for the athletic center, and Kwangbok Street, and in Nampo the delegation visited the West Sea barrage complex.

The military facilities the delegation visited were the "Kim Il Sung" military political academy, one base for the West Sea fleet (on an island off the coast), and a training center for special reconnaissance forces. The visit to the military forces in the Kaesong area, the building complex for armistice negotiations in Panmunjom, and to special forces, which had been planned for 22 July (originally planned for 20 July), could not take place due to poor helicopter flying conditions (violent rainstorms).

The high point of the GDR military delegation's stay was a meeting with Kim Il Sung, Secretary General of the Central Committee of Workers' Party of Korea and President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 21 July 1988.

At the beginning of the 70-minute visit, Kim Il Sung asked, "How is my brother and my best friend, Erich Honecker?" Heinz Kessler conveyed to him personal greetings from the Secretary General of the Central Committee of

the Socialist Unity Party, praised the manner in which relations between our two parties, nations, and peoples have developed since 1984 in accordance with the assessment of our Party and state leadership, and then had the opportunity to speak for about 40 minutes about the GDR's peace policy (Berlin Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones in June, Meeting of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact in July), progress of economic and social policy in the Socialist Unity Party (especially with regard to the increase in productivity and the use of key technologies), and security and military policy (including the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from GDR territory ahead of schedule and exercise monitoring in accordance with the Stockholm document).

Kim Il Sung expressed his sincere gratitude for the detailed and informative briefing on the policies of the Socialist Unity Party and on the situation in the GDR. His exact words were, "I greatly appreciate the policies of the Socialist Unity Party, with Erich Honecker at its top, and its efforts to assure peace in the world." He said that the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones was very important. He was also very grateful that the GDR's Party leadership and state leadership had determined that the delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had played such an important and vital role at this meeting in Berlin. He cited this as eloquent proof that their Party and our Party are fighting together for world peace.

He asserted that under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party, with Erich Honecker at the top, we are building Socialism well, that they have great appreciation for this and laud it as a success. The fact that we have made such good progress with residential construction and electrotechnology/electronics is a good indication that they can learn much from the GDR.

He said that our two countries welcome the signing of the medium-range missile pact between the Soviet Union and the US. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea welcomes the far-reaching disarmament negotiations between the two superpowers and has high hopes for a positive outcome. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is confronted with many nuclear weapons in South Korea that belong to the US. This is why the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also already made numerous proposals for the withdrawal of US troops and their nuclear weapons, for ending the arms race, and for reducing the armed forces on the Korean peninsula in stages in order to transform it into a nuclear-free zone of peace.

He stated that the situation in Korea is still tense. The declaration by the South Korean leadership on 7 July 1988 is meant to split the country permanently. Over the past six months the puppets over there have not responded at all to the proposals the President made in his New Year's speech to work intensively for peace and to undertake negotiations for reconciliation between North and South Korea on the broadest possible social basis, to alleviate tensions, and to work on relations between them at a conference of all parties and social classes of the North and South, with a view toward unification.

The stance of the puppets led to mass protests by the young people in South Korea, who demanded that they be able to go to the North and that the young people from the North be able to come to the South.

He said that the proposals made by the South Korean leadership were nothing new. Negotiations by the Red Cross, scientists, and other contacts were broken off precisely because "Team Spirit" and other major exercises were being conducted in the South. Peaceful negotiations were impossible to reconcile with the fact that they were aiming cannons at North Korea and sharpening their swords.

He stated that now new parliaments are being elected in the North and South — as a first step their representatives could get together and hold talks, sometimes in Pyongyang, sometimes in Seoul, on a declaration of non-aggression.

Today at 11:00 a.m. a new letter will be presented to the South Korean side in Panmunjom. If they decline to accept it, its contents will be broadcast by radio starting at 5 p.m. It remains to be seen what the response to this will be.

He said the South Koreans might want to, but the US will certainly oppose it and will prevent them because such an agreement on non-aggression would make it impossible to continue to justify to the world their presence in the South. But then the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be in a position to expose the statements made by the US and South Korea as mere empty words. Kim Il Sung requested that Erich Honecker be briefed about this situation and its implications.

During the second part of his remarks, the Secretary General addressed economic development in the country. He said that they are currently conducting a major campaign in the building of socialism. This has to do both with the construction of hydroelectric plants and many coal mines and with the building of major plants for vinalon, plastics, aluminum, and potassium fertilizers. "When we have completed this major campaign and have successfully satisfied the third Seven-Year Plan, then we will nearly have reached the level of developed nations."

In particular he praised the 200-day battle for the 40th anniversary of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in which the goals were consistently exceeded. He cited as an example that the daily goal of 4 million kilowatt hours of current was exceeded yesterday with 4.3 million.

Only 3.5 to 3.6 million kilowatt hours were produced in the past. Important accomplishments were achieved in transportation, as well; it was possible to increase the daily perfor-

mance of rail transport from 300,000 tons to 330 to 350,000 tons. And if energy production and transportation lead the way, the entire national economy will develop well.

Finally, Kim Il Sung expressed his gratitude for the assistance the GDR provided to the Korean People's Army. He considered the visit by the military delegation and also the subsequent short vacation by the Minister to be an expression of the close ties between our two Parties and of the profound confidence the Socialist Unity Party has in the Workers' Party of Korea. He asked that his most sincere regards be passed on to his brother and friend, Erich Honecker, and to the people of the GDR, when we returned. The President then personally awarded General of the Army Heinz Kessler with the Order of the State Banner First Class and the other members of the delegation with further orders and medals of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Subsequent to this visit, which took place in the President's residence at the foot of the Paektusan mountain, a center of the partisan battles against the Japanese, the delegation visited the highest mountain in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (2,744 meters), which is located immediately on the border with China. Minister O Chin U, who accompanied the delegation constantly except for two occasions, also made his way up the steep mountain paths despite problems stemming from a serious traffic accident in 1986.

A spirited meeting of the German/Korean Brotherhood in Arms with more than 6,000 members of the Korean armed forces took place on the afternoon of 22 July 1988 in the Cultural Palace of the Korean People's Army, one of the largest halls in the capitol (speeches by the two ministers enclosed as attachment).

At this point the completely open, comradely, even warm atmosphere that had characterized the entire visit by the military delegation was evident once again. The high esteem in which the GDR and National People's Army are held was apparent everywhere.

After the announcement, the document that we had prepared on the cooperation of the two Ministries of Defense in the coming years was signed.

In conclusion it can be stated that the goals of the Party and state leadership for the military delegation and the expectations linked to it were completely fulfilled.

The embassy of the GDR, the media, and its representatives abroad provided good support to the visit. Reporting in the Korean media was very detailed.

Inside North Korea: Selected Documents from Hungarian and Polish Archives

The following documents provided by Csaba Békés of the Cold War History Research Center in Budapest and Vojtech Mastny of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact supplement the analyses by Shen Zhi-hua, Bernd Schaefer and Balazs Szalontai. These records of Kim Il Sung's conversations and correspondence with his allies, and Hungarian diplomats' reports to Budapest from their embassy in Pyongyang, provide important insights into the evolution of North Korea's remarkable autonomy within the communist camp. The first three documents serve as a foil, illuminating by way of contrast just how sharply and rapidly relations between communist countries deteriorated following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. In this new environment, Kim Il Sung moved quickly to protect himself from the threat posed by de-Stalinization, while at the same time ensuring the continued flow of economic aid from his fraternal allies. As the Sino-Soviet split intensified the dangers facing the North Korean leadership, Kim Il Sung withdrew further into self-protective idiosyncrasy, pressing but never exceeding the limits of his allies' forbearance.

DOCUMENT No. 1 Report, Legation of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 4 March 1953

[Source: Hungarian National Archives [Hereafter MOL], XIX-J-1-j-Korea-11/f-00828/1953 8.d. Translated by József Litkei.]

The Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic.
Top Secret.

Pyongyang 4 March 1953.

Subject: Delivery of Comrade Rákosi's verbal greeting and gift to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

On 17 February, based on a previous appointment, I visited Comrade Kim Il Sung with the purpose of fulfilling the necessary visit upon my return from vacation and delivering Comrade Rákosi's verbal greeting, best wishes, and his previously-mentioned¹ gift to Comrade Kim Il Sung. Despite being occupied [with work], Comrade Kim Il Sung received me very quickly, on the third day after my request, at 12 p.m. at General Headquarters. He welcomed my arrival—as he usually does—with a cheerful and good-humored smile. Our conversation lasted for 108 minutes, and during this entire time he maintained his cheerfulness and good humor.

Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke in Korean, which was translated into Russian by Comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Tong-gon, and he talked for so long that I had difficulty remembering everything word-for-word. I apologized for disturbing him and immediately explained that the reason for my visit was to deliver to Comrade Kim Il Sung and the entire Korean people Comrade Rákosi's verbal greeting and best wishes, in which he wishes the earliest possible victory over

the enemy. Please allow me, Comrade Kim Il Sung, to deliver Comrade Rákosi's modest but cordial gift as well.² Comrade Kim Il Sung first [shook my hand] with his usual laughter, which expressed his fullest and honest delight, then repeated the handshake in a serious and strong way and thanked [me] for Comrade Rákosi's greeting and gift. He immediately offered me a seat and also offered biscuits and apples, which were served quickly.

Comrade Kim Il Sung briefly inquired after our well-being. Surely we must be having some difficulties, he said, to which I responded that we are having difficulties only in the sense that we would like to work more than we have managed to do so far. Other than this, we cannot speak of difficulties, since the Korean government—under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung—does everything possible to provide us with the appropriate and necessary undisturbed working conditions, with which we are fully satisfied.

Comrade Kim Il Sung then began [the conversation by] saying that the Eisenhower [government] is making a big noise which they think they can use to scare us, but we will not be scared by their noise, [since] our people have been forged and soldered together in this war. We are not alone. Chinese volunteers are fighting on our side, and, headed by the Soviet Union, all democratic countries—among them the Hungarian people—are giving us every support. Of course, he said, without this powerful assistance, we would be unable to continue successfully the fight against such an enemy as American imperialism. This is why we cannot give enough thanks for this help to the friendly countries, the Hungarian people, and Comrade Rákosi, who is so attentive and who took a position so resolutely to help the Korean people from the very first day of the war. We will never forget this, said Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Our hinterland is steady and we are stronger than ever before, and if the enemy dares to attack we will destroy them. Comrade Kim Il Sung repeated this with the following words:

“We will inflict a destructive blow upon the enemy.”

Following this, he listed some data concerning the assistance given by friendly China and Mongolia. They received 5,000,000 items of clothing and pairs of shoes from China. (One can see people everywhere wearing warm, blue Chinese clothes.) They also received a large amount of wheat from China.

From Mongolia, they [the Mongolians] intend to send 86,500 various animals again this year, among them 16,000 horses. This is extremely important, said Comrade Kim Il Sung, because until now the soldiers have been forced to carry various equipment on their backs and to haul military equipment [themselves], but this work can now be done by horses. With this, the situation of the soldiers is greatly improved. Comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Tong-gon told us that on one occasion, Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed himself on this topic in front of a Mongolian delegation visiting in January in the following way: they are a new kind of volunteer.

The assistance provided by friendly countries is ever increasing—just as Hungary increased its support for this year by 15 percent—so we are becoming ever stronger, said Comrade Kim Il Sung. Of course, we are receiving the most assistance from the Soviet Union, it helps us with everything, he said. In addition to this great support, we also do everything possible in order to strengthen the front and the country on our own. The mining industry is meeting the state plan, despite the fact that they had to work under very difficult conditions. Of the required 65 million meters of cloth, we are producing 40 million meters—primarily white linen—by ourselves. We have an underground textile factory equipped with 1,500 spools. (At this point, Comrade Kim Il Sung asked me whether I have seen this factory). No. They will show it [to us]. In addition to this, we have two smaller textile factories, he said. (We saw one of them in Pyongyang in a narrow [air raid] shelter.) In our meat production, we expect 60,000 tons this year, he said.

At this point, he turned to the subject of the importance of cadres, and referred to Comrade Stalin’s well-known thesis that [the quality] of cadres determines everything. In connection with this, he spoke again of the help given by the friendly countries. Today we still have great deficiencies [in this field] and difficulties that result from it, but in a few years time we will have many well-experienced cadres, who are now studying in friendly countries. This help is also of immeasurable value for us, said Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Here he mentioned that because of the difficulties caused by last year’s drought [in Hungary], they had not planned to send any new orphans to Hungary this year, but since they received our official request and approval concerning this, they will send them [after all]. They are very pleased to accept this help from us. In connection with this, he mentioned that the Korean children are being treated very well in Hungary, they have great opportunities to study, and in every respect they are being taken care of in the best manner. Comrade Kim Il Sung thanked us for this as well. This very serious help gives great strength to our people, he said.

Later, he inquired about the work of our hospital and the well-being of our medical staff. We are surely having difficulties, aren’t we? Our hospital has very good and safe underground working places. Our doctors can work undisturbed. I said that the frequent shortages of electricity are causing some difficulties in their work, but we can manage that. There were greater difficulties in terms of providing the labor force necessary for the construction. At the moment, our hospital is located in four villages. It was decentralized in this way due to the conditions of earlier times. Recently, however, as prescribed by order of the Military Medical Command, hospitals must be even more decentralized (outside of the villages), so we began with the construction of free-standing buildings and sickrooms that are located below ground level. The construction of the hospital was begun by our own forces, which is making it go very slowly. So far we have managed to build only four smaller buildings for 60 patients, and the groundwork for some more buildings is underway. The other patients in the villages are exposed to the greatest danger.

Comrade Kim Il Sung told us that certain military units are now under reorganization, but this will soon end, and then he will immediately send assistance to accelerate the construction [work], because it is very important that the patients get out of the villages as soon as possible. Concerning our hospital, Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned that our doctors are working very well and that our hospital has become very well known among the Korean people, and further added that [“]I have already promised to visit the Hungarian hospital named after Comrade Rákosi, but unfortunately I have not yet had time for it. From now on, however, the moment I have some [free] time, I will visit it.[”] I said that this would be our great pleasure, since Comrade Kim Il Sung’s visit will surely give a further impetus to the work of the hospital’s entire personnel.

Comrade Kim Il Sung then asked again whether we are having any further difficulties because of the bombing. With regard to the hospital we are not, I said. I see difficulties with respect to the work of the legation; we would like to work harder, but language problems on the one hand, and the war conditions on the other make our work more difficult. The staff of our legation has increased, [but] so have our tasks, I said. We find it very important to learn about the valuable experiences of the Korean people, who are bearing [the burdens of] a long war. Comrade Kim Il Sung reacted keenly to this, and listed several things, such as the fight of the heroic railroad workers and engine-drivers, the steadfast work of the peasantry to provide bread, and the heroic deeds of the partisans, etc. These are all providing [us with] important experiences, of which we have ample, he said. He also mentioned the story of the seventy heroic fishermen. While fishing, they were spotted by the crew of an enemy cruiser, which wanted to capture them. The fishermen did not surrender, and all of them jumped into the water and tried to swim to the seashore. Out of 70, only three drowned while the rest reached the shore.

I also mentioned that we are very interested in how the

different organs and organizations execute and organize their work under the difficult war conditions. I mentioned, for example, the work of the Peace Council, Trade Union, Democratic Women's Association, Youth Association, and, in the realm of culture, the work of the recently established Academy of Sciences. We would like to learn about their work, experiences, and the difficulties they face, in order to [know how we could] help them. We would like to provide the Academy of Sciences regularly with academic material, but we also would like to help in other fields. In order to do so, however, it is necessary to get in closer touch with them, in order to discuss with them from time to time what kinds of materials they need.

[Since] Comrade Kim Il Sung understands Russian quite well, he understood this, and said that this is a very good idea. Thereupon Comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Tong-gon reported to Comrade Kim Il Sung that I have already submitted a number of questions to which we would like to receive answers. He [then] listed the questions, to which Comrade Kim Il Sung responded that this is very natural and experiences must be shared. He requested that we reciprocate by sharing with them all of our people's experiences building socialism, ["because after the war we will also be building[?]", said Comrade Kim Il Sung. In this respect as well, I said, we will do our best to help as much and as well we can.

At this point Comrade Kim Il Sung emphasized that he will provide all possible assistance to this work, and that they will organize the meetings I requested in order to establish the necessary connections.

Concerning the bombing, I said that we already have a very appropriate air-raid shelter and we can work very undisturbed. I have, however, a very modest remark related to the population. I do not know the entire territory of the country from this respect, but for example from the bombing of two villages in our small working area, I perceived that they were located too close to the railroad's unloading platform, and this is why they were hit so badly that they were almost entirely destroyed.

Comrade Kim Il Sung said that this is indeed true and immediately added that ["we already gave strict orders to the population to move out from the cities, other dangerous locations, and their immediate vicinity (like railroad stations and unloading locations) to the mountains, and the peasants should build their houses on their land, 150 to 200 meters from each other. With the coming of the winter this work has become more difficult, so the population has not yet been able to move from many dangerous places. Now, in the spring, this problem will be entirely solved,[" said Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The entire conversation was very friendly, and as I could see, Comrade Kim Il Sung also enjoyed it. He did not mind devoting time to it. I was prepared to leave earlier, in order not to take up the time of Comrade Kim Il Sung for such a long while, but he kept on raising new questions, from which I concluded that I could not leave after all. He was glad to have this conversation, and I was just as glad to listen to him.

In the following [remarks], Comrade Kim Il Sung told me that they are receiving a great amount of meat from friendly countries, but now they are also taking the course of developing their stock of domestic animals, although they also have to consider the climate here. They are primarily thinking of raising pigs and sheep, he said, because they have difficulties with respect to the fat provision as well. Corn also grows here, and this provides a great opportunity for good pig breeding. Moreover, I said, you could introduce cows of good breed, which is necessary not only with respect to the meat provision but also with respect to the very important milk provision. To this, Comrade Kim Il Sung took out his notebook and showed me the names of the Caucasian breed cows they have requested from the Soviet Union. Friendly countries are helping us with everything, he said. We are now summoning our ambassador's home, and through them we will also express our special thanks for all the effective assistance the friendly countries have been providing us, said Comrade Kim Il Sung.

When standing up, Comrade Kim Il Sung turned to me and said the following: I ask you to forward my thanks, gratefulness, and love to Comrade Rákosi, the Hungarian government, and the entire friendly Hungarian people for the unselfish and honest assistance that they have provided us, which we will never forget. Then he continued: Moreover, I would like to thank you for your tireless work, which you have been doing in the last two long years in order to help our people under the greatest ordeals and difficulties. With these words, Comrade Kim Il Sung offered his hand, but I asked him to allow me one more minute, first apologizing that I kept him for such a long time, then requesting to respond to the last words of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

My assistance, I believe, can hardly be termed even modest, but in the future I will make every effort to contribute even better work to support the struggle of the heroic Korean people, and to deepen the friendship between our peoples. Concerning our difficulties here, I do not regard them as difficulties, because as I have already said, I see and I am convinced that the Korean government under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung is doing everything in order to provide the appropriate conditions necessary to our work. I could not feel better being here, I am proud that I can work together with this heroic people, and as far as I am concerned, I do not wish to leave the beloved Korean people until it finishes its victorious struggle against the enemy.

Concerning the gift, in Hungary the one who gives the gift usually says to wear and consume it in strength and health, and this is what I also wish now to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Kim Il Sung shook my hand again with great fervor and expressed his thanks for the gift several times.

[In the following paragraphs, the Hungarian minister reports that a flat tire made it difficult to arrive at the meeting on time.]

signature

Minister Károly Pásztor

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The document here uses the Hungarian expression "already known gift," but it is not clear what this refers to. It is most likely that the gift was either mentioned in a previous report or that the minister believes that those receiving this report already know about the gift.

² TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Here, as throughout the document, the text turns from indirect speech to quasi-quotation.



DOCUMENT No. 2
Report, Legation of the Hungarian People's
Republic in Beijing to the Foreign Ministry of
Hungary, 15 January 1954.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-11/f-00317/1954 9.d.
 Translated by József Litkei.]

The Legation of the Hungarian People's Republic.
 Beijing.

Top Secret.

4 copies prepared. 3 for FM, 1 for embassy.

Beijing, 15 January 1954.

Subject: Chinese opinion concerning the Korean question.

In the course of a conversation with Comrade Wu Xiuquan [Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs] on 2 January, he told me the following.

They think that it is very likely that the political conference can only be started after the beginning of the Berlin conference, but it is also possible that it can be started only after the Berlin conference is over. The beginning of the Berlin conference, its course, and [its] outcome will have a great impact on the entire international situation, and therefore on the Korean political conference as well.

The Chinese-Korean side is taking political advantage of the Americans' stonewalling tactics, revealing to the world what is the real meaning of [the Americans' policy], while they [the Chinese-Korean side] on the other hand are urging the resumption of the negotiations.

Another reason why the Americans are delaying the political conference is the question of prisoners of war, and [the Americans' attempts to] prevent a solution concerning the [ir] ideological education.¹ According to the Chinese government, the decisive factor in the question of prisoners of war is not the issue of the prisoners themselves, but the political aspect of the question. By preventing ideological education, the USA broke the armistice agreement.

In the eyes of international public opinion, this already

means a great defeat for [the US]. This further contributes to the violation of the agreement by the so-called UN Forces. If on 22 or 23 January, they execute the greatly-publicized liberation of the prisoners of war, which will entail penetrating into the neutral zone, they will again unmask themselves. At the same time, the Chinese-Korean side is strictly keeping the regulations of the armistice agreement.

It was interesting that although in December Indian General Thimayya, in the majority resolution (Indian, Czechoslovakian, Polish) concerning the prisoners' of war ideological education, condemned the UN's quibbling concerning ending the detention of the prisoners of war, on 23 January he represented the US position and took a stand for the release of the prisoners of war. The Chinese government, specifically Comrades Zhou Enlai and [Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs] Zhang Hanfu, informed the Indian government through Ambassador Raghavan that this declaration seemed to indicate that the Indian government would support the Americans' machinations which are trying to prevent resolution of the prisoners of war problem. According to the Chinese government, this does not correspond to India's neutral position. In this way, they exerted pressure on the Indian government, which a few days later resulted in Nehru making his well-known statement in which he declared that he supports prolonging the ideological education and ordered General Thimayya to withdraw his declaration and represent the position of the Indian government. In this way, it was achieved that despite all hesitations, India took a position concerning the prisoners of war issue that at least appeared to be neutral.

In my opinion, the reason for India's hesitation and contradictory statements is that it wants to take advantage of its neutral position vis-a-vis the US and to profit from publicly defending the Chinese-Korean position. It particularly needs this tactical advantage concerning the issues of Pakistan's armaments, the establishment of military bases, and the Kashmir question. At the moment, [India's] neutral statements favor the peace-camp.

signature

chargé d'affaires ad interim

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The literal translation of the term used here and elsewhere in the document would be "explanatory work." This, however, would not give the proper meaning.

DOCUMENT No. 3

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 28 June 1955.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/f-006944/1955 7.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.
Top Secret.

00135/Top secret-1955

Pyongyang, 28 June 1955.
Prepared in 4 copies, 3 for the FM,
1 copy for the Embassy
Typed by Mrs. Sóváradí

Subject: Visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

On 24 June, I went to the foreign ministry for a pre-arranged meeting at 4:45 p.m., where Comrade Foreign Minister Nam Il was already expecting me. After a few welcoming words, we drove with Comrade Nam Il in his car to [meet] Comrade Kim Il Sung, arriving a few minutes before five. I took Comrade Golub with me to act as interpreter for the conversation. Comrade Kim Il Sung received us very warmly. His speech was translated by Comrade Nam Il into Russian. The conversation lasted for forty minutes.

At the very beginning of the conversation, I thanked Comrade Kim Il Sung for receiving me so quickly, despite his amount of work. After this, I immediately presented the reason for my visit. I told him that [I came] on behalf of our party's Central Committee in order to hand over materials dealing with the March CC [Central Committee] session of our party. These materials consist of resolutions that were passed and documents dealing with the inner life of our party. I think that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the CC of the Workers' Party can make use of these materials, since there are certain problems that are common to both parties. Comrade Kim Il Sung received the material gratefully. He responded that he and the members of the CC will carefully study them.

Following this, Comrade Kim Il Sung inquired about our experts and the employees of our embassy. I answered that we live here in Korea just as if we were at home; I myself almost feel like an old Pyongyang resident, since I have been living in Korea already for a year. Comrade Kim Il Sung expressed his thanks for the good work of our engineers, who are helping to plan the rebuilding of Pyongyang and are also participating in the actual construction work. I answered that it is very pleasant for us to hear that Comrade Kim Il Sung values our experts and their work so highly. Our experts do everything in order to do as good a job as possible—while of course there are nonetheless some shortcomings in this respect. The rebuilding of Pyongyang has otherwise greatly advanced in the course of the last year. Last year it was difficult to notice its urban character, but

now we can say that Pyongyang really has become a city. Comrade Kim Il Sung responded that this is only the beginning of the city's development, and that the city will only be built up to a great extent in three or four years time. Otherwise, they are having difficulties with the construction, and especially in providing the necessary cement. They lack a sufficient amount of cement, and so they need to import it from abroad. Recently they have partially repaired a cement factory. Due to the urgent need for cement, they were forced to put it into operation. The factory was producing for a while, but now its operations have stopped again. It should not have been put into operation in a half-finished condition. Well, we are inexperienced in this respect. But we have drawn the necessary lessons in order to avoid such events in the future. I responded that we are familiar with cement shortages. One of our technical delegations was here recently, and he was intensively engaged with this very issue.

Following this, Comrade Kim Il Sung told us that the country's party leaders and experts are young, with little experience. During the more than 30 years of Japanese rule, there was no education of Korean experts. The majority of the present experts began to study after the liberation, and they had hardly graduated when we had to appoint them to responsible professional or party positions. It is no wonder that mistakes in the work still occur. It makes our situation even more difficult that our country is ruined, divided into two, and the fact that Southern slogans are emphasizing that they want to launch a "military campaign against the North" is forcing us to strengthen our defense capabilities. Hungary is in a much better situation in this respect. I responded that this is indeed the case; Hungary has been free for ten years, and during this time we did not have to wage a war. Of course, we also have difficulties. We also must intensify raising our country's defense capacity and developing our heavy industry, since there are imperialist states in our neighborhood. The road of our development is not paved with smooth asphalt either.

After all this, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that last autumn the party took the necessary measures to overcome the difficulties caused by last year's bad harvest. When I asked about the prospects for this year's harvest, he answered jokingly that the weather is good now, it rains a lot, and they make use of God's help. I answered, also jokingly, that we don't really care much about God's help, but sometimes it comes in handy.

I asked Comrade Kim Il Sung if he might have the time to answer a question of mine. Comrade Kim Il Sung courteously gave a positive answer. Then I asked him what were those fractional actions that were discussed during the last meeting of the party's Central Committee. Based on the material we received, we could not understand whether this refers to an old and ongoing question or merely to isolated phenomena. Comrade Kim Il Sung explained that the subversive elements uncovered last year exerted some influence on some party members, such as the Minister of Postal Affairs, and other members too. These elements were not in direct contact with the elements from last year. They did not have

a separate organization. They criticized the party's policy and were unsatisfied with it. The same thing happened in the army. The person who continued this policy in the army was a general who has already admitted his mistake and made honest [self-] criticism, so he was relieved of his post and appointed to another position. The CC is now dealing with the case of the minister of postal affairs. He is being cultivated and educated. Of course, the party does everything to avoid this or similar things from happening in the future. They have organized things so that if something like this happens again, it can be immediately prevented. It is absolutely important to be vigilant. And we will be vigilant for any such action. The activities of those members who pursued a clique-policy in the past are being observed as well. At the moment, they are not yet excluded from the party, but this could also happen in the future.

I thanked Comrade Kim Il Sung for his reply and told him that we are very interested in the situation of the fraternal parties. Unfortunately, not very long ago, similar problems also occurred in our party. The materials we brought deal with this issue, among other things. Our party had to engage in a hard struggle, from which it emerged victorious.

Comrade Kim Il Sung repeated that of course there is no guarantee against such things happening in the party in the future, but that they did everything they could to prevent such incidents from occurring again.

Following this, Comrade Kim Il Sung inquired about Comrade Rákosi. I told him that [Comrade Rákosi] has been sick lately, and for this reason he was not able actively to participate in the work done before March. He feels much better now, and the doctors have allowed him a six-hour work-day, but he works more than that because he has so much to do.

Finally, I expressed my thanks to Comrade Kim Il Sung for receiving me at such short notice and wished him good health and success in his work. Comrade Kim Il Sung replied that whenever I have any problem, I should turn to him. He is ready to receive me at any time. It is possible that he will have some questions concerning the materials I brought him.

The conversation took place in a very cordial atmosphere.

Remarks:

1. It was very friendly of Comrade Kim Il Sung to receive me immediately after learning the reason [for my request].
2. Praising our engineers and experts was more than a formal act of courtesy.
3. The information received concerning the issue of sectarianism is important for us because it explains the nature of the phenomenon discussed at the last plenum.
4. Comrade Kim Il Sung is in very good condition, in an extremely good mood, and he is very friendly.

signature

Ambassador Pál Szarvas



DOCUMENT No. 4

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 September 1956.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-1/c-007230-1956 2.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

96/7/Top Secret. 1956. I/3.

Presenter: Lajos Karsai

Top Secret.

Pyongyang, 10 September 1956.

Subject: Visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Since presenting my credentials (on 10 August), we have made five requests to the protocol department of the F[oreign] M[inistry] to be received by Comrade Kim Il Sung. Later I decided—and this decision was confirmed by the opinion of Soviet Ambassador Comrade Ivanov (See my report no. 96/8 top secret 1956)—not to make further requests.

I talked about this issue with the Comrade Soviet Ambassador on 20 August. After this, I indeed did not urge the above-mentioned visit, but on the evening of 2 August [sic.], at the reception organized at the Romanian embassy for the 12th anniversary of Romania's liberation—where Comrade Kim Il Sung was not present—Comrade Nam Il personally informed me that the next day, 24 August, Comrade Kim Il Sung would receive me at 12 p.m. At the same time, Comrade Nam Il asked me to be at his office at 11.50 a.m., because he would accompany me.

In my opinion, after the conversation with me, Comrade Ivanov raised the question to Comrade Nam Il whether Comrade Kim Il Sung had already received me, and if not, then why. That they can discuss such questions is the more likely since at every reception Comrade Ivanov talks only to Comrade Nam Il and vice-versa; moreover, their conversations can last a very long time. It happened several times that they arrived together in the same car to a reception. (For example, Comrade Nam Il and Ivanov arrived together in the same car to the reception we organized in honor of the "Járóka" ensemble. After the reception, they left separately in their own cars.)

But no matter how much the comrade Soviet ambassador did or did not help [us] (which is, of course, only an assumption), and moreover, no matter how definitely Comrade Nam Il stated the evening before that on the next day

Comrade Kim Il Sung would receive me, in reality he did not do so. On the appointed day, the morning of August 24, the FM [Foreign Ministry] protocol department informed me that due to his illness, Comrade Kim Il Sung was unable to receive me that day. I accepted this. In the evening, when I was at the dinner organized by Comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Yi Tong-gon, I expressed my regret that I had not yet been able to meet Comrade Kim Il Sung since presenting my credentials and [my sympathy] for his illness. I asked Comrade Yi Tong-gon to forward my best wishes to Comrade Kim Il Sung and to wish him a speedy recovery.

On 1 September, the FM protocol department informed me over the telephone that Comrade Kim Il Sung was ready to receive me at 12 p.m. that day. He asked me to be in front of the FM building at 11:50 a.m., but they could not yet tell me whether Comrade Nam Il or Comrade Yi Tong-gon would accompany me to the visit.

At the appointed time, I went first to the building of the FM accompanied by Comrade Karsai, where an official of the protocol department escorted me to Comrade Nam Il. Here Comrade Nam Il told me that the reason why Comrade Kim Il Sung has been unable to receive me was his illness and his being occupied with the work of preparing for the CC's August plenum. Comrade Nam Il also briefly mentioned that Comrade Kim Il Sung participated in the work of the CC Plenum despite his illness, and that unfortunately he is still sick, and he still does not feel entirely well. I immediately responded to this that if I had known this before, I would have suggested postponing the meeting to a later point of time when Comrade Kim Il Sung feels better, and I firmly requested not to disturb Comrade Kim Il Sung now. Comrade Nam Il responded that his illness was not so dangerous and in any event, this was a kind of official visit that did not need to last long—so there was nothing strange in my visiting him now, especially since he was waiting for me.

At 12 p.m. exactly, I appeared in Comrade Kim Il Sung's reception room in the Cabinet (Council) of Ministers building, where Comrade Kim Il Sung was indeed waiting for me.

Besides Comrade Kim Il Sung and myself, Comrade Nam Il and Comrade Karsai also participated in the conversation, the latter acting as interpreter on behalf of the embassy.

Comrade Kim Il Sung received me with apparent cordiality. He came up to the door that opened into the reception room to [greet] me, but the way he offered me a place to sit was interesting and for me somewhat unusual. The reception room, which was rather a hall, was a rectangular room. There were small tables along the two longer walls with comfortable leather armchairs behind them. The hall was approx. 5-6 meters wide, with an empty space in the middle covered with carpet. [Kim Il Sung] offered places to me, comrades Nam Il, and Karsai at one end of the hall, while Comrade Kim Il Sung took a seat alone at the other end of the hall. There was a distance of 2 to 3 meters between us, and this is how we conducted our conversation. It seems that this is the custom here.

[The following paragraphs deal with the conversation, which touched upon issues such as life in Pyongyang, the

problem of constructing a new building for the Hungarian embassy, and plans for developing Pyongyang. The conversation did not address political issues.]

When I left, Comrades Kim Il Sung and Nam Il escorted me to the door of the room.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth



DOCUMENT No. 5

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 19 November 1959.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/c-006836/1959 6.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

Pyongyang, 19 November 1959.

Subject. Conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yoo Ch'ang-sik on the Korean reaction to the CPSU Seventh Congress and some important questions concerning Korea's foreign and domestic policies.

Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik was recently appointed deputy foreign minister. He leads the work of the F[oreign] M[inistry]'s No. 1. Political Department, the Protocol Department, and the DCSO.¹ He is a young man aged approximately 35 to 38. During the Korean war, he fought on the front as a political officer. He was sent from the front to study in the Soviet Union. He graduated from the College for International Relations in Kiev. As a former war veteran and college student, he spent one month in Hungary in 1952 and participated for approx. one week in the building of Sztálinváros. Before his appointment as deputy foreign minister, he worked as the deputy head of the Party's CC International Department. He speaks Russian well. He gives the impression of being a talented, pleasant, and serious man.

[Translator's Note: In the following two paragraphs, the ambassador reports on the first part of their meeting, which dealt with the composition of the Korean delegation to be sent to the forthcoming Seventh Congress of the HSWP.]

Upon my inquiry, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik briefly informed me about some important questions of Korean foreign and domestic political life.

The Sixth session of the DPRK's Second Supreme People's Assembly was convened upon the personal initiative of Comrade Kim Il Sung. It was Comrade Kim Il Sung's

initiative as well which placed the question of Korea's peaceful unification on the agenda. They are convinced that they did so at the most appropriate time. Today, tension is abating in the international situation. Peoples of the world everywhere honestly wish for peace. They [the Koreans] think that the socialist countries and all the peace-loving people of the world reacted positively to the Korean parliament's appeal. Their aim with their appeal to the parliaments of the world was to direct the world's attention to the Korean question during a favorable period of international relations like this, so that they could achieve the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea as soon as possible, start negotiations and economic and cultural relations between North and South Korea, and realize the peaceful unification of the country as soon as possible. In the name of his government, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik expressed his thanks for the support that the Hungarian People's Republic offered so far in this issue and emphasized that they are counting on this support also in the future.

Talking about the domestic situation, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik informed me that they will convene the Korean Workers' Party CC Plenum in the near future, which will be similar to the December 1956 plenum in its significance. In Korea, the December Plenum is considered to be a plenum of historic importance. In the words of Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik, this plenum gave the push to the emergence of the "Chollima" movement. It was the 1956 December plenum at which they again debated and closed the Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik and Pak Ch'ang-ok faction group affair. While at the August plenum of that year they uncovered this faction and excluded its leaders and several members from the party, they were on the other hand re-admitted to the party at the September plenum, where Comrade Mikoyan also participated. At the December plenum, these faction leaders were finally excluded from the leading organs of the party and government and were allegedly sent for the time being to factories in the countryside. Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik did not say anything concerning the latter. The main questions that the forthcoming party plenum will discuss are the question of the economic plan for the year 1960 and of developing the planting of trees into a popular movement.

One of the most important national economic tasks of the year 1960 is the mechanization of agriculture and bringing the technical revolution of agriculture to victory. In January of this year, at the first congress of producer cooperatives, Comrade Kim Il Sung set the task of accomplishing the mechanization of agriculture within one to two years. Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik emphasized that the DPRK will be able to achieve this, since it already has a developed industry that is able to produce tractors and other agricultural machines. In order to increase the production of agriculture, modernize animal husbandry, and deliver more and a greater variety of food products to the workers' table—all issues which were discussed by this year's February and June party plenums—they need more work and, first of all, more working hands. The DPRK's national economy, and especially agriculture, suffers from a great labor shortage. This shortage of labor

will be compensated for by [the use of] machines, which will be able to accomplish work of both greater quantity and a more perfect, higher quality than human hands. The mechanization of agriculture will concern primarily the provinces of South Hwanghae and South Pyongan. These provinces provide more than the half of the country's agricultural gross yield. If they manage to mechanize agriculture in these two provinces, then it can be said that the mechanization was basically completed in the whole country. It is not by accident that Comrade Kim Il Sung recently visited several cities, villages, agricultural machine factories, and machine [and tractor] stations in South Hwanghae province on 12, 13, and 14 November. Others with him were Pak Chong-ae vice chairman of the CC, the head of the Planning Office, the Minister of the Engineering Industry, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Agriculture, and the Minister of Trade.

According to the press, the total sowing area of grain in South Hwanghae province is 286 thousand chongbo. On 58 percent of this, work (plowing, sowing and threshing) is already done with machines. The province has 16 machine [and tractor] stations.

In the seat of the province, the city of Haeju, a new agricultural machine factory was put into operation this July. Besides this, there is already another engineering factory in Haeju. Comrade Kim Il Sung visited both factories on 12 November, and had conversations with the workers. Here, in the engineering factory in Haeju, he announced that the building of a factory of machine parts necessary for irrigation plants will be terminated and a food industrial plant will be built instead. The parts necessary for irrigation plants will be produced in the machine factory in Haeju. The province has at the present 900 tractors. Next year they will give one thousand tractors and more trucks to the province. In this way, they will be able to cultivate 80 to 85 percent of the province's sowing area with machines. Parallel with the progress of motorization, the total crop of grain in the province will be raised to 1 million tons within the next few years. The 17 November issue of the "Minju Choson" wrote that during his November visit to the countryside, Comrade Kim Il Sung criticized the work of the ministry of agriculture, since the latter does not devote enough care to promoting the cause of mechanizing agriculture.

Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik emphasized that the reason why the question of mechanizing agriculture became such a central issue is that the problem of irrigation has been basically solved. The extension of the system of irrigation plants was put on the agenda of the September 1958 plenum. Then, Comrade Kim Il Sung set the task of making 1 million chongbo of arable land irrigable in the next 3 to 4 years. By the end of the sixth month after the September plenum, they already achieved making 80 percent of the planned arable land—that is, 800 thousand chongbo—irrigable. This year, they completed all irrigation system constructions. Next year's plan does not schedule the building of further irrigation plants. Since in this way 1 million of arable land [sic.] will potentially become irrigated next year, they will increase the sowing area of wheat and corn as well.

Following this, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik spoke on the issue of forestation. At the present, there are orchards in the DPRK on a territory of 70 thousand chongbo. The overwhelming majority of this consists of apple gardens. [During their occupation,] the Japanese destroyed a vast number of trees in Korea. The mountainsides were almost entirely devastated. The party plenum to be convened in the near future will make planting trees into a movement that embraces the entire population. They plan primarily to plant apple, sweet chestnut, and poplar trees, which can be well utilized in the national economy in a relatively short time, that is, within a maximum of ten years. Fruit-trees will provide fruits that can be utilized both in natural form and as canned food, thus increasing the foodstuff stocks. Poplar grows quickly and constitutes an important raw material in producing both paper and artificial textiles. These trees will be planted primarily on the slopes of mountains, hillsides, and along roads. Besides providing important raw materials for light industry within the next ten years, the propagation of these tree species will decorate the Korean soil and the Korean landscape.

Finally, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik mentioned that since the enlarged session of the Party CC Presidium in August, the issue of widening the local people's committee's sphere of authority and the network of local small scale industry is very much in the forefront for the DPRK. At the same time, the issue of increasing the quality of production came even more to the forefront as well. Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik emphasized several times that all changes that occurred or are planned in every field of the national economy originate from the personal initiative of Comrade Kim Il Sung.

The Yugoslav question was also mentioned in the sense that I remarked that while the national economies of socialist countries develop and rise year by year, the economic development in the capitalist countries, and characteristically in Yugoslavia, has become stuck or is even falling back. In Yugoslavia, animal husbandry and consumption of meat is on the level of the year 1931. Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik's apt response was that here is the result of revisionism, which is a lesson for all communist parties and all people building socialism. Deviation from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism leads to the deterioration of the standard of living of the working masses.

In my opinion, Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik made special preparations for this meeting, since at the dinner given in honor of Comrade Yi Tong-gon I informed him that parallel to the party congress we will have a ministerial conference in Hungary.

After thanking him for the information he gave me, I asked him to have more such useful conversations in the future.

The above conversation lasted for almost two hours.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Diplomatic Corps Supply Office

DOCUMENT No. 6

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 20 May 1960.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/b-004817/1960 4.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

Pyongyang, 20 May 1960.

Subject. Conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yoo Ch'ang-sik on some questions concerning Korea's foreign and domestic policies.

Upon my request, on the nineteenth of this month I was received by Comrade Yoo Ch'ang-sik, Deputy Foreign Minister, whom I asked for information concerning the DPRK's relations with Africa¹. In his answer, Comrade Yoo told me that on the occasion of the Republic of Guinea's declaration of independence, an exchange of telegrams occurred between the two countries by which they mutually recognized each other, but did not realize any further relations in the fields of diplomacy and the economy. Except for this, they have no connection to Black Africa; in the recent past, there was only one military delegation visiting Conakry. Of course, they support to the utmost the struggle of the African peoples against imperialism and colonialism and are making efforts to unmask American imperialism and its Syngman Rhee-like satellites—especially in the Afro-Asian countries—in front of the greatest possible public and to isolate them. Concerning the Afro-Asian countries, the comrade deputy foreign minister mentioned that they have a trade representation in Cairo, and based on an agreement last year, they will open a trade representation endowed with the rights of a consulate in Baghdad. As is known, they have trade representations in India, Indonesia and Burma.

In answer to my question, Comrade Yoo briefly described the visit of the Algerian government delegation to Korea. The delegation, headed by Krim Belkassem, arrived for a friendly visit and showed great interest concerning military questions. They spent a lot of time in the Museum of the Patriotic War, where they asked for detailed information, and then they also visited the Military Academy. Members of the delegation stated that the Korean people's fight against American imperialism inspires them too, and they gained a lot of experience during their visit. Concerning the latter, Comrade Yoo mentioned that this opinion is shared by the Koreans as well. He told me that the Algerians declared that "after driving out the French colonizers, the people of Algeria will act the same way the Koreans did."

Moving on to South Korea, the comrade deputy foreign minister expressed his view that the situation is unfolding, and this is setting new tasks for the DPRK. The possibility of unification is getting nearer; at the moment, their aim is to

establish correspondence and transportation connections. There are several parties being formed in South Korea, which is progress compared to the past situation and offers a possibility for uniting the progressive forces. The South Korean movement is deepening and intensifying, and it is increasingly acquiring the character of a class struggle. The task of the DPRK is to accelerate the building of socialism, so the Party is now devoting great attention to further developing the national economy. The most important task now is the intensification of mechanization, especially in agriculture (they need approx. 20,000 tractors), and to raise the workers' living standards. In the DPRK, for example, the average production is 17 meters of textile per person per year, but the army and industry use a significant share of this amount. They want to raise the average amount to 30 meters per person. Therefore, the government has recently passed a resolution concerning the development of the vinalon production. At the moment, they are having difficulties concerning machines.

At the end, the comrade deputy foreign minister expressed his thanks for the technical support provided by the Hungarian foreign ministry (cde. Bozi and Balogh), which he highly appreciated. Then he mentioned that recently the Hungarian periodical "Ország-Világ," in one of its Korean reports, evaluated the "Chollima" movement in a different way than the Korean position. "We do not have any objection to this, our embassy raised the issue. It is possible that a foreign visitor might not understand this [movement] a hundred percent as a Korean might," said the comrade foreign minister. In my response, I promised to look into the issue.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The literal translation of the term used here would be "Black Africa," which refers to the non-Arab part of the continent, that is, Africa south of the Sahara.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 1 March 1961.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/e-0027/1961 13.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.
Top Secret.

6/1961

Pyongyang, 1 March 1961.

Subject: Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Puzanov on the position of the Korean Workers' Party concerning the Moscow conference.

In the course of my conversation with Comrade Puzanov on the first of March (see my top-secret report No. 5), the position of the Korean comrades concerning the debate between the CPSU and CCP also arose. Comrade Puzanov told me that the issue was raised during the consultation between Comrade Khrushchev and Kim Il Sung in Moscow in June 1960, during which Comrade Kim Il Sung agreed entirely with the position of the CPSU. A few days later, at the Bucharest conference, Comrade Kim Ch'ang-man took a similar position. During the June consultations, Comrade Khrushchev did not engage in detail with the question, and only referred to several documents issued by the Chinese comrades, among them the well-known article "Long live Leninism!" by "Hongzhi" (By the way, Comrade Puzanov remarked that he is not sure whether Comrade Khrushchev was aware that Korean newspapers also published this article). Without being asked, Comrade Kim Il Sung mentioned that Korean newspapers had published this article on his personal advice, because the article sharply criticized revisionism. Comrade Puzanov assumed that on account of this latter factor [revisionism], the Korean comrades might possibly not have entirely comprehended the other messages of the article, or that they did not pay enough attention to them.

Over the course of time, the position of the Korean comrades has changed somewhat. In October, the November conference's Editorial Committee was working in Moscow. A Korean delegation, headed by Comrade Yi Hyo-sun, also participated [in this work]. Here, the Korean delegation, together with some other delegations (Vietnamese, etc.), sought to find a mediating solution or a compromise that could be accepted by both parties. Due to his illness (kidney stone), Comrade Kim Il Sung could not take part in the November conference; the speech of the Korean delegation [that would have been] headed by Comrade Kim Il was originally scheduled to come after the Chinese delegation, but the Korean comrades requested to give it earlier. So they actually did not address the questions under dispute, but [later], together with other delegations, [they] visited Comrade Khrushchev in order to convince him to make a compromise. He, however, held onto the only correct position and said that they should rather try to persuade the Chinese delegation. The delegation indeed visited the Chinese comrades. In Comrade Puzanov's view, the Korean editorials published after the Moscow "declaration" and "appeal," as well as the later December resolution of the Korean Workers' Party CC, correspond to the spirit of the Moscow declaration, although they omitted—for understandable reasons, remarked Comrade Puzanov—the issue of the cult of personality. He mentioned that contrary to other friendly states, the Korean comrades did not deal with the Moscow conference in detail. Before traveling to the January plenum in Moscow, Comrade Puzanov met Comrade Kim Il Sung. Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke very positively about the November conference and especially

about the steadfast and faithful behavior of the CPSU delegation headed by Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Kim Il Sung remarked that continuing the debate between the CPSU and CCP would have caused commotion among the members of the Workers' Party. One has to understand, he said, that China is Korea's great neighbor, and that the Chinese people sacrificed their blood for the freedom of the Korean people. According to Comrade Puzanov, the Korean comrades are apparently happy that the issue is closed, and would not like to engage with it [further].

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth



DOCUMENT No. 8
Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's
Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Hungary, 16 March 1961.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/ca-003645/1961 5.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.
 Top Secret.

90/1961

Pyongyang, 16 March 1961.

Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the Korean question and the forthcoming visit of Comrade Khrushchev to Korea.

During my conversation with Soviet ambassador Comrade Puzanov on 15 March, I asked his opinion concerning Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea, and whether he thinks that such a visit would be timely now. At the same time, I mentioned that a visit by Comrade Khrushchev would place Korea and the Korean question into the focus of international relations, and the Korean comrades, who are inclined to push their cause excessively into the foreground, could misunderstand this and perceive it as the justification of their position.

In his answer, Comrade Puzanov told me that the visit of Comrade Khrushchev was already timely in 1959, but at that time, during his [Khrushchev's] negotiation with Comrade Kim Il Sung in Beijing, they both came to the conclusion that due to the international situation of that time (immediately after Comrade Khrushchev's visit to the USA), this would not be advisable. Comrade Khrushchev would have visited Korea last October, but this was canceled solely due to the

lack of time: according to original plans, Comrade Khrushchev was scheduled to arrive back from New York at the end of September, but his trip to the US lasted longer, and after his return he was absorbed with preparing for the Moscow conference. The CPSU CC sent the KWP CC a very warm, comradely letter concerning the postponement of the visit to Korea, and upon receiving it, Comrade Kim Il Sung immediately told him (Puzanov) that he understood perfectly and also agreed with it from party-minded point of view.

During their visit to Moscow (in November 1960), the Korean party delegation visited Comrade Khrushchev, and Comrade Kim Il Sung inquired when [Khrushchev's] Korean visit could take place. In his answer, Comrade Khrushchev stated his great wish to come to Korea, but asked at the same time to examine this question at a later point in time, since due to the preparation for the Twenty-second Congress, he could not give a concrete answer at that moment.

According to Comrade Puzanov, there is no danger that the Korean comrades would present the Korean question as the central question of the international situation. He told me that during his Moscow visit in June 1960, Comrade Kim Il Sung gave Comrade Khrushchev an account of their policy towards South Korea. Comrade Khrushchev agreed with this [policy], and asked whether they [the Koreans] would want to elaborate a proposal of confederation as the Germans had done. Kim Il Sung answered positively, and the Korean comrades did the further work, and did it well in his [Puzanov's] opinion. It is apparent that the Korean comrades are now seeking to win public opinion in South Korea, and they have achieved some results in this respect. An increasing number of people support the proposals of the DPRK, and the anti-American mood is increasing as well. According to the opinion of Comrade Puzanov, the policy of the DPRK corresponds to the common policy of our camp regarding peaceful coexistence. Of course, the unification of the country requires a lot of further work, and this will not happen in the near future. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have offered, and continue to offer, serious assistance to the DPRK in making its position known and accepted. The Korean comrades well know that without this assistance they cannot achieve results; international power relations have changed so much in our favor that the governments of capitalist countries cannot dismiss the opinion of the socialist camp. Comrade Puzanov mentioned that the Soviet foreign ministry recently instructed ambassadors working in neutral countries to inform the leaders of their host country of the position of the DPRK during their conversations with them [the host country]. This has achieved positive results in many places. The content of the DPRK government's "Memorandum," which was issued on the Korean question prior to the opening of the second half of the UN General Assembly's 15th session, was also delivered through the above-mentioned Soviet ambassadors to the governments of neutral states.

Comrade Puzanov did not rule out the possibility that, depending on how the South Korean situation evolves in the future, the DPRK might take a new position and make new

proposals, which we all will support.

I informed Comrade Puzanov of my conversation with Comrade Deputy Prime Minister Kim Tae-hui during which he told me that they will not protest against the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and South Korea into the Interparliamentary Union. Comrade Puzanov said that the DPRK had already practically acknowledged South Korea at the 1954 Geneva conference, even if this fact was later somewhat withheld by the DPRK, or rather, one could observe irresolution [in this regard]. So, for example, when publishing an earlier speech Comrade Zorin gave at the UN, Korean newspapers omitted that part which concerned the two states formed on the Korean peninsula. On another occasion, upon receiving in advance a Soviet government communique supporting the proposals of the DPRK, they requested replacing the expression “two states” by “two governments.”

The conversation lasted for approximately three hours, with Comrade Fendler present as interpreter.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth



DOCUMENT No. 9
Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's
Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Hungary, 16 March 1961

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-5/bc-0030/1961 5.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

Subject: Chinese policy toward the DPRK and behavior of the Chinese ambassador in Pyongyang.

Pyongyang, 16 March 1961.

During my visit to Comrade Kohousek on 15 March, I informed him of my conversation with the Chinese ambassador (see my top secret report no. 95). The Comrade Czechoslovakian ambassador fully agreed with me, and he found it highly incorrect that the Korean comrades organized a separate presentation for the government and another for the ambassadors.

In the course of the conversation, we both remarked upon the fact that Chinese ambassador doyen Qiao Xiaoguang has recently not been attending the programs organized for the D[iplomatic] C[orps] by the Korean comrades, under the excuse of being busy. In addition to other

[examples], he did not participate in the visit to the steel complex in Kaesong, nor did he attend the performance of the Cuban ballet ensemble or the cultural presentation of Comrade Han Sol-ya, etc. According to Comrade Kohousek, the Chinese ambassador might be dissatisfied because in the course of last year he failed to convince the Korean comrades to support the Chinese position. Comrade Kohousek stated that earlier (last summer) he was of the opinion that the Korean comrades are under Chinese influence; however, recently he had to change his position. It is true that earlier there were attempts by the Korean side to adopt Chinese methods: for example, according to his information, they planned to establish two people's communes, etc., but they soon realized the negative [effects] of this, and gave it up. The so-called “Chongsan-ri method” radically opposes the earlier Chinese position, and, at least recently, the Korean comrades are devoting great attention to maintaining the principle of material interest and socialist distribution.

The Chinese comrades exerted pressure in order to bring the KWP to their side in the debate between the CPSU and CCP last year. The invitation of Comrade Kim Il Sung to China last year (before his incognito visit to Moscow) also proves this. Comrade Kim Il Sung, however, informed Comrade Khrushchev of this [invitation].

Last October, on the occasion of the 10th year anniversary of the Chinese volunteers entering the war, a Chinese delegation headed by General He Long [vice-premier of the State Council] visited Korea and tried again to win Korea over to the Chinese side. Despite this, the Korean delegation did not support China at the November conference, although, together with other delegations, [they] sought to find a compromise solution. To sum up, the Chinese did not reach their goal, despite a further credit of 420 million rubles offered to the DPRK last autumn, so it is not impossible that this is the reason that the Chinese ambassador is so displeased.

In confirming this, Comrade Kohousek told me that although the Chinese side enjoys a position of equality with the Korean side in the armistice committee in Panmunjon, the speeches are always given by the head of the Korean delegation. A recent event, when the new heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations paid an introductory visit to the heads of the Korean and Chinese delegations, was characteristic of this. The head of the Chinese delegation wanted to return these formal calls, but the Korean comrades did not consent to this, saying that they were not going to return them either. Similarly, a Chinese general came recently to Panmunjon to pay his usual yearly visit and was received by the heads of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations. Contrary to previous custom, however, the head of the Korean delegation did not show up, nor did he meet the Chinese general later. The latter left pretty soon without any notice.

The same afternoon, I also talked to Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, and informed him as well of my conversation with the Chinese ambassador. Comrade Puzanov agreed with me, the more so since I was the one to inform him that the performance in question was organized for the DC (he was not present due to the Women's Day celebration at the Soviet

embassy). He agreed that, under the pretense of discussing various protocol questions, I visit the Chinese ambassador, who following this will have to summon the [other] ambassadors. Concerning the statement of the Chinese ambassador, according to which “some criticize the people’s communes, yet they have already been proven to work” (see my above-mentioned report), Comrade Puzanov briefly outlined the questions concerning the Chinese people’s communes, and told us that according to his personal opinion, the Chinese comrades have also already learned from the experiences of the past years, and there are signs that they put an end to the communes’ “egalitarianist” system of distribution and are giving more space to individual farms, etc. That the last plenum of the Chinese fraternal party put the blame for the condition of agriculture entirely on weather and natural disasters is the business of the Chinese, said Comrade Puzanov, although the way we communists become even stronger is exactly by openly admitting our mistakes. He told us that on the way back from the CPSU January Plenum, he came to Pyongyang via Beijing, and also informed Comrade Kim Il Sung about the work of the plenum. On this occasion, the issue of the grave economic situation in China was also raised. Comrade Kim Il Sung declared that they (the Koreans) can also feel the Chinese difficulties, since there are delays in the delivery of coking coal, etc., and foodstuffs are not being delivered to Korea either. According to Kim Il Sung, taking the Chinese situation into consideration, they do not want to hurry the Chinese deliveries. Concerning the people’s communes, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he also follows the recent measures related to this with great attention, and he knows the articles published in the Chinese press, as well. In his opinion, “it is not the name, nor the form that is important, but the content,” and Comrade Puzanov, too, sees the essence of the issue in this.

Concerning this question, Comrade Puzanov made the final comment that Chinese Ambassador Qiao [Xiaoguang] “offended against his own party-consciousness” when he put the blame for their difficulties on the weather alone.

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

DOCUMENT No. 10

Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic in the DPRK to the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, 17 May 1961.

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j-Korea-27/a-0042/1961 13.d.
Translated by József Litkei.]

The Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic.

Top Secret.

9/1961

Pyongyang, 17 May 1961.

Subject: Conversation with Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the cult of personality and the policy of the DPRK.

On 15 May, I made a farewell visit to Comrade Puzanov, the Soviet ambassador. During the friendly conversation, the topic of the May Day parade also came up. I mentioned to Comrade Puzanov that in my opinion the Korean comrades organized the parade well, the small number of Kim Il Sung portraits was striking, etc. (See my report No. __)

Comrade Puzanov agreed and pointed out that the slogans were chosen carefully as well; they did a good job of symbolizing the achievements and tasks of the DPRK, but he found the Kim Il Sung statue to be superfluous.

Concerning the above issue, the question of the “cult of personality” was also raised. Comrade Puzanov expressed his view that the question cannot be decided merely based on the number of portraits, etc. What one has to look at, he said, is how the Leninist norms of inner party life prevail. In his opinion, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party holds regular meetings, and in its work often involves experts and functionaries from different fields.

During the last months, there were a number of nationwide¹ Korean professional meetings, in which leading comrades also took part. Comrade Puzanov also mentioned that Comrade Kim Il Sung and other leading comrades spend a lot of time in the countryside visiting factories and collectives, etc. The so-called Chongsan-ri method proved to be a good one.

Following this, when talking about the policy of the Workers' Party, Comrade Puzanov told me that the party leadership is mature, and that it has learned from past mistakes and is correcting them itself. He did not experience mistakes being “hushed up” by the party leadership. As an example, he mentioned the “great leap.” It is known that in 1958, Korean comrades adopted this slogan from the Chinese, and they wanted to double the plan target in 1959. The consequences were very negative, and a number of difficulties were caused in agriculture. The Korean party realized this, corrected the mistakes, and emphasized the necessity of the proportionate development of the national economy.

I request that this report be sent to leading comrades.

[To comrade foreign minister
Budapest]

signature

Ambassador Károly Práth

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: That is, with participation from both North and South Korea.



DOCUMENT No. 11
Letter to Wladyslaw Gomulka from Kim Il Sung, 3 February 1966

[Source: *Modern Records Archives, Warsaw, KC PZPR 2263/175-233, pp. 209-233. Translated by Vojtech Mastny.*]

To Comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka
First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Polish Workers' Party

Dear Comrade,

I have received your letter of 31 December 1965, in which you asked me to support the proposal by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party for the earliest possible convocation of a conference of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty as well as the socialist countries of Asia, with the goal of discussing the coordination of assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its war against US aggression.

In the present situation of an expanding war by American imperialists against the Vietnamese people, we consider it appropriate to convene a conference of the parties of the socialist countries and discuss there the ways of providing assistance and support for the fighting Vietnamese people as well as the coordination of common action. Because of the serious disagreements that exist within the communist movement, however, it would be difficult at this time to convene such a conference without a consensus among the interested fraternal parties and careful advance preparation.

If the conference were to be convened without adequate advance preparation it would not bring benefit to the struggle of the Vietnamese people nor would it enhance the cohesion of the socialist camp; on the contrary, it would cause further damage to the unity of the international communist movement.

The fraternal parties therefore must, above all, undertake sincere efforts to reconcile conflicting views and create conditions for convening the conference.

At the same time, with regard to assisting the Vietnamese people in its struggle, all parties of the socialist countries

and each one of them must first act in practice without waiting for the conference. The socialist countries must support even more actively the Vietnamese people in its heroic struggle against American imperialism and render it maximum assistance and moral support. At the same time, all socialist countries must develop their struggle against US imperialism from the position of principle.

It is necessary to use all possible opportunities to unmask the aggressive policy of American imperialism and gradually isolate it, not allowing any compromise with it.

At a time when the US imperialists are escalating their attacks on a socialist country—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—and expanding the war, the socialist countries should not even hesitate to break all relations with American imperialism.

If all socialist countries indeed take such common steps, they would deal a powerful blow to American imperialism, thus giving real help to the Vietnamese people.

In the course of such action, the existing divergences among the fraternal parties could be gradually overcome and the conditions for convening the conference of the parties of socialist countries that you propose could be created.

We believe that under the present circumstances this is the right way of both demonstrating support for the struggle of the Vietnamese people and defending the unity of the socialist camp.

Our party will also in the future make every effort to strengthen the unity of our camp and the cohesion of the international communist movement.

Kim Il Sung
Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party

Pyongyang, 3 February 1966

Mongolia and the Cold War

CWHP and its Mongolian and international partners held a workshop on “Mongolia and the Cold War” in Ulaanbaatar in March 2004. The workshop, the first of its kind, meant to explore and promote access to the Mongolian archives, to provide a forum for discussion of Mongolia’s role in the Cold War based on newly available archival evidence, and to allow for the establishment of closer links between Mongolian and foreign scholars and archival experts. Discussion touched on Mongolian foreign policy during the Cold War; declassification issues and practices in Mongolia, US, and elsewhere; and consideration of future cooperation, activities, collaborative research, and publications.

The meeting was hosted by a group of Mongolian Cold War scholars established in partnership with CWHP in early 2003 and follows a spate of recent revelations from the Mongolian archives. (See March 2003 news announcement and CWHP Working Paper No 42, by Sergey Radchenko, accessible on the CWHP website (<http://cwhp.si.edu>); and the conference website (<http://serrad.by.ru/mongoliaworkshop.shtml>))

**Program:
Mongolia and the Cold War
International Workshop, Ulaanbaatar, March 19-20, 2004**

*Co-sponsored by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP),
The George Washington Cold War Group (GWU),
The National Security Archive,
and the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP)*

Thursday, March 18. Foreign participants arrive.

**Friday, March 19. Chinggis Khaan Hotel (Ulaanbaatar),
Meeting Hall.**

9:30 - 10:00 Welcome and introduction.

10:00 - 12:00 Panel 1: **Mongolia and its Neighbors I**

Chair: Munkh-Ochir K. Khirghis.

Ts. Batbayar, “Chinese-Mongolian Relations in the Cold War Context”

Sergey Radchenko, “Lin Biao Affair: Mongolian Evidence”

K. Demberel, “Looking East: Mongolia’s Special Relationship with North Korea”

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch. Chinggis Khaan Hotel.

13:45 - 15:45 Panel 2: **Mongolia’s and its Neighbors II**

Chair: Odd Arne Westad.

Yvette Chin, “Mongol-American Relations”

Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis, “Defying the Soviet Line on Iran: Mongolian-Iranian Rapprochement in the 1970s”

Badamdash D. Marhy, “Chinese Workers and Mongolia’s Economic Difficulties”

16:00 - 18:00 Panel 3: **Mongolia’s internal politics and the Cold War**

Chair: D. Ulzibaatar

J. Boldbaatar, “Mongolian Party Politics: An Insider’s View”

Ts. Lookhuuz, “Our Moves Against Tsedenbal: 1956-1964”

Christopher Kaplonski, “Democratic Revolution in Mongolia: How It Happened”

J. Tugsjargal, “Soviet-Mongolian Relations during the Cold War: Materials from High-level Meetings”

Saturday, March 20. Chinggis Khaan Hotel, Meeting Hall.

10:00 - 12:00 Panel 1: **International Co-operation on Cold War Research**

Chair: Ts. Batbayar.

Malcolm Byrne

Jim Hershberg

Vojtech Mastny

Christian Ostermann

Odd Arne Westad

12:30 - 13:30 Lunch. Chinggis Khaan Hotel.

13:45 - 15:45 Panel 2: **Declassification and Archives**

Chair: Jim Hershberg

D. Ulzibaatar, “Mongolian archives: how declassification is coming along”

T. Nergui, “Foreign Ministry Archives of Mongolia: problems and opportunities”

Malcolm Byrne, “Cold War Research Using the U.S. Freedom of Information Act”

16:00 - 18:00 Panel 3: **Roundtable Discussion**

Chair: David Wolff

Monday, March 22. Foreign participants depart.

“You Have No Political Line of Your Own” Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964

By Balázs Szalontai

Recent publication of Russian and Chinese documents by Evgenii Bajanov, Chen Jian, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Kathryn Weathersby, and other scholars has finally thrown light on many aspects of the North Korean/Soviet/Chinese alliance during the Korean War.¹ Less attention has been paid, however, to the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Andrei N. Lankov has uncovered numerous Russian documents related to the important events of 1955-1956, but without access to a broader base of documents from Russia, the Khrushchev era of the DPRK/USSR alliance has remained largely obscure.² The documents presented below from the Hungarian National Archives help fill that gap. In general, Hungarian diplomats had more limited access to highly confidential information on North Korea than did their Soviet counterparts, receiving most of their information on Soviet-North Korean relations from the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. Nevertheless, thanks to the assistance of North Koreans who had been trained in Hungary and maintained contacts with the Hungarian Embassy after their return to the DPRK, Hungarian diplomats often matched the Soviets in acquiring information about North Korean domestic policies.

Peculiarities of the North Korean Regime and the Roots of Isolationism

As emphasized by Bruce Cumings, Brian Myers, and others, North Korea was by no means a typical “people’s democracy,” and its peculiarities influenced the character of Soviet-North Korean relations from 1945 on.³ For one thing, the relative backwardness of the North Korean economy either retarded the adoption of certain Soviet institutions or necessitated an inordinate dependency on Soviet expertise. For example, the limited financial resources of the North Korean state led it to establish unpaid security organs, whose members were present in every village.⁴ In 1953-1954 work cards and Stakhanovism were still unknown to most North Korean workers.⁵ The DPRK’s agricultural tax system seemed far less complex than its Hungarian counterpart, and the circulation of newspapers remained a fraction of that of their East European equivalents.⁶ Because of the deficiencies of the country’s motion picture industry, as late as 1957 some 60 per cent of the films shown in the cinemas were of Soviet origin, whereas the proportion of North Korean films did not exceed 10 per cent.⁷ Due to the paucity of North Korean authors, translated Soviet works constituted the largest share of the books published in 1955. By contrast, most of the plays staged in 1955 were classical Korean works like the *Tale of Ch’unhyang*.⁸ In 1956 North Korean higher education still lacked adequate textbooks, a problem the authorities proposed to solve by placing greater emphasis on teaching Rus-

sian so that students could use Soviet textbooks until Korean ones could be published.⁹ In primary and secondary education, on the other hand, Soviet and Communist influence gained ground at a much slower pace. In the mid-1950s the majority of teachers continued using the pedagogical methods of the pre-liberation era. The history of the Three Kingdoms was taught in a rather “romantic” style, and the teaching of Russian was less emphasized than in Hungary.¹⁰ The similarities and differences between Soviet and North Korean institutions did not, therefore, necessarily indicate political sympathy or aversion; in a number of cases they simply reflected the specific realities of North Korea.

From the very beginning, Hungarian diplomats were aware of the “special relationship” between Moscow and Pyongyang. On 30 April 1950 Hungarian Envoy Sándor Simics flatly told Kim Il Sung that Hungary could not afford to sell goods to the DPRK below world market prices. He also noted in his report that “they took a liking to the fact that the Soviet Union had given them long-term credit ... this is the generosity of the Soviet Union that overlooks everything they do. We cannot do it yet, for we are small and poor.”¹¹ This emphasis on Soviet generosity may have been an overstatement, but in the mid-1950s the character of Soviet-North Korean economic relations certainly differed from the common East European pattern. Like Albania, the DPRK received aid from the other Communist countries, whereas its export capacity remained quite negligible until the end of its Three-year Plan (1954-1956).¹² That Moscow assumed an obligation to such a small developing country greatly boosted the self-confidence of the North Korean leaders, who felt that the DPRK was entitled to preferential treatment.

Pyongyang took little interest in establishing contacts with Communist countries not capable of rendering concrete assistance. In 1954 its relations with Bulgaria and Albania were still at the ministerial, instead of ambassadorial level.¹³ Neither these two countries nor Romania carried on substantial trade with the DPRK in the mid-1950s.¹⁴ Pyongyang set up a Ministry of Foreign Trade as late as the last months of 1952, which demonstrated North Korea’s isolation within the “Soviet bloc.” Until that time, the DPRK had exchanged goods only with the USSR and China.¹⁵ To be sure, the disinterest often proved mutual, since the DPRK had little to offer the East European “people’s democracies.” Moreover, many North Korean leaders knew little about Europe or the “ways of the world” (see Document No. 1), which also inhibited the improvement of relations.

In the spring of 1950, as the DPRK prepared for its military campaign against the South, diplomats at the recently established Hungarian Legation found the North Korean Foreign Ministry anything but cooperative. “They received ev-

ery request completely uncomprehendingly, and whenever possible they dragged out its fulfillment until the requests became out of date,” Simics complained. On 21 August 1950 the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing frankly told his Hungarian counterpart that soldiers of the Korean People’s Army [KPA], infuriated by the US air raids that killed many civilians, often killed American POWs in defiance of repeated orders of the high command. The DPRK authorities prevented the Hungarians from acquiring photos of war-related events, even though the very same pictures were widely displayed in Pyongyang. Simics also stressed that the relationship between the North Koreans and the Soviet Embassy was “of a wholly different nature.”¹⁶

Throughout the 1950s the leaders of the Korean Workers’ Party [KWP], compelled to provide Soviet and Chinese diplomats with confidential information, apparently compensated by curtailing as much as possible the freedom of action of the East European embassies. China pursued a similar policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites. In 1951 Beijing forced the recall of Czechoslovak Ambassador Weisskopf and expelled a Polish diplomat, Lewandowski. In the mid-1950s the PRC did its best to increase its trade with the USSR and the Asian non-Communist countries, but cut back its exports to East Europe in order to retain more agricultural products for domestic consumption.¹⁷

Kim Il Sung’s tight control over North Korean society was one of the factors that enabled him to keep the “fraternal” Communist states at arm’s length. DPRK authorities, like their counterparts in China, limited their citizens’ contacts with foreign embassies to prevent the latter from recruiting clients, confidants, and informants. They also attempted to keep their intra-party affairs secret. As the purge of Communists of South Korean origin gathered momentum in November 1952, the Foreign Ministry emphatically told Hungarian diplomats not to visit anyone without prior approval from the ministry.¹⁸ (By and large, the North Vietnamese authorities did not resort to such measures until July 1963.¹⁹) Domestic despotism thus became a diplomatic tool.

In fact, North Korean despotism had few equals in Eastern Europe.²⁰ With the possible exception of Tito’s Yugoslavia, nowhere else did a leadership cult emerge as quickly as in North Korea. In 1946 the regime named the country’s sole university for Kim Il Sung, and in 1947 it established schools for the orphans of revolutionary martyrs in Man’gyongdae, Kim’s home village.²¹ By contrast, the Hungarian dictator Mátyás Rákosi, hardly an opponent of a personality cult, never took comparable measures. In Romania, the cult of Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej bloomed only in 1952. In January 1946 the North Korean authorities merged the various youth leagues into a single organization, whereas similar events would take place in Hungary only three years later. The membership of the new organization was proportionally far greater than that of the Soviet Komsomol, and it had a unitary structure, while China and North Vietnam created two youth leagues, one for devout Communists and another for sympathizers.²² In 1946 only party members gained admission to Kim Il Sung University, and even the janitors employed there

had to possess a party card.²³

While these distinctive characteristics—dependence on foreign assistance, a particularly despotic political system, and an inclination for isolationism—all played a central role in the clashes between Kim Il Sung and the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, the unresolved issue of Korean unification complicated the situation even more. Unification plans had influenced North Korean domestic policies from the very beginning. For example, in contrast with its East European allies, the DPRK did not collectivize agriculture during Stalin’s lifetime. In 1952 Minister of Foreign Trade Chang Si-u plainly told the Hungarians that the government had decided to postpone collectivization until unification in order not to alienate potential South Korean supporters.²⁴ Also, unlike the pattern in most East European countries, the 1948 purge of O Ki-sop and other party leaders did not lead to show trials that might have produced a negative effect on South Korean public opinion. The policies of the East German and North Vietnamese regimes also included the temporary postponement of certain unpopular domestic measures in order to facilitate national unification.

Pyongyang Seeks to Control the Diplomatic Corps

While the North Korean regime apparently welcomed the eagerness of Stalin’s successors to put an end to the Korean War, the Kremlin’s decision to call off the campaign accusing the US of germ warfare may have angered Kim Il Sung.²⁵ The first signs of political liberalization in East Europe were certainly greeted warily in Pyongyang. The replacement of Rákosi in June 1953 shocked the North Korean leadership, as it quickly understood that Hungary was moving away from the Stalinist path.²⁶ In the last months of 1953 the Foreign Ministry systematically obstructed attempts by Hungarian diplomats to communicate with the DPRK’s Academy of Sciences (see Document No. 2). These measures may have been designed to isolate North Korean intellectuals, who were eager to establish contacts with European colleagues, from the new political ideas that had gained ground in Hungary under Communist Party leader Imre Nagy. Such restrictions may also have been aimed at keeping secret the details of the purges that continued throughout 1953. As one Hungarian diplomat put it, “the masses did not understand” why Yi Sung-yop and the other SKWP leaders had been arrested. In June the regime thought it necessary to launch a 40-day campaign in order to convince the population of the guilt of the accused.²⁷

The purges were discontinued in 1954, but the relationship between the regime and Hungarian diplomats failed to improve. On the contrary, the restrictions now affected every foreign legation, including the Soviet and Chinese Embassies. Hungarian Ambassador Pál Szarvas suspected that the policies were motivated by Pyongyang’s antipathy to de-Stalinization (see Documents No. 4 and 5). “They would like to curtail the operation and activity of the whole diplomatic corps,” Szarvas warned. In essence, Pyongyang downplayed the inter-party aspects of its relationship with other Communist regimes and instead placed great emphasis on state sov-

ereignty. "It is customary in Korea that they speak little about the party in the presence of foreigners," Szarvas noted in December 1954.²⁸ In contrast, on 25 November 1955 the North Vietnamese Deputy Premier Nguyn Duy Trinh willingly provided Hungarian diplomats with highly confidential information about the number of recently expelled party members and the social composition of the membership.²⁹

After the armistice was signed in July 1953, North Korean security organs gained the right to subject Chinese soldiers to identity checks.³⁰ Moreover, in the fall of 1954 the Foreign Ministry began to replace the embassies' Korean employees very frequently in order to prevent the latter from becoming loyal to their foreign employers. On 21 October 1954 Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev told Szarvas "one may raise the issue of ... the Korean employees in the Foreign M[inistry], but in any case they will reply that the replacement of the employees occurred for political reasons."³¹ The North Korean authorities knew that the diplomats were neither willing nor able to verify the unspecified charges the Foreign Ministry's Cadre Department brought against the dismissed employees. Little by little, the North Korean Lilliputians enmeshed the foreign Gullivers.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Embassy proved a hard nut to crack. So-called "Soviet Koreans" who disagreed with Kim Il Sung's policies frequently met Soviet diplomats without officials of the Foreign Ministry being present, and they provided the Soviets with precious information about the North Korean situation.³² Kim's subsequent campaign against the Soviet faction thus constituted, among other things, an attempt to deprive the Soviets of their allies and informants.

Discord over Unification Tactics

As early as 1954 Hungarian diplomats noted that their Soviet colleagues criticized certain North Korean actions related to unification. To be sure, Moscow agreed with Pyongyang that a general election under UN supervision would only benefit the Syngman Rhee in Seoul, regime, since the population of the ROK was twice that of the DPRK (see Document No. 3). Neither Kim Il Sung nor Rhee wished to dismantle his political system for the sake of national unification, and the Chinese also made it clear that a UN-supervised referendum would "give up North Korea to the Americans."³³ On 3 July 1954 DPRK Foreign Minister Nam Il told Szarvas that a South Korean attack on the DPRK was unlikely at that time—a view shared by Moscow and Beijing.³⁴ However, the North Koreans seem to have had higher hopes for the Geneva conference than did the Soviets and the Chinese. Whereas Suzdalev was pessimistic about the conference, Nam Il told Hungarian Envoy Extraordinary Károly Pásztor on 23 March that while the Americans helped Seoul to expand the ROK Army, they might withdraw their own troops from South Korea by 1956.³⁵ This conclusion was based on knowledge of the American intention to replace a part of its ground troops with South Korean divisions in order to reduce military expenditures. The reality, however, was that a complete troop withdrawal remained out of the question.³⁶

In the summer of 1954, war-torn North Korea offered

economic aid to the ROK, a proposal Suzdalev rightly described as irresponsible.³⁷ Pyongyang then concluded that it was pointless to make any approach to South Korea, and kept silent for months. While Suzdalev admitted that Rhee's inflexibility and hostility constituted a formidable obstacle, he disapproved of the passive attitude of the KWP leadership.³⁸ On 9 September Soviet diplomats told Szarvas that the Soviet Embassy considered the data Pyongyang published on the South Korean situation to be unreliable. Since the Soviets subscribed to several South Korean newspapers, they were able to verify the information provided by the North Koreans.³⁹ GDR Ambassador Richard Fischer also complained of the uncooperative attitude of the North Korean Foreign Ministry regarding unification matters. While he provided P'yongyang with many documents related to the issue of German unification, the North Koreans did not give him anything about South Korea and Japan in return.⁴⁰

Conflict over Economic Policies

North Korean economic policies were another source of tension between Pyongyang and Moscow. As early as November 1954 the Romanian Ambassador to Pyongyang questioned the advisability of rapid collectivization, which might alienate the South Korean peasantry and middle classes from the DPRK.⁴¹ "The [North and South Korean] populations are equally familiar with the South and North Korean economic situation, since the borders are not hermetically sealed," the new Soviet Ambassador Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov stated in July 1955. He also criticized North Korean propaganda that depicted the ROK as a living hell (see Document No. 8). Informal relations indeed existed between the two Koreas at that time. The North Koreans succeeded in establishing some contacts with the ROK through Japan. They also carried on a contraband trade with the South across the DMZ in order to obtain wolfram and other goods indispensable for the DPRK's electrical industry.⁴² Under the circumstances, the Soviets thought, Pyongyang should not have ignored the negative effect its domestic policies might produce on South Korean public opinion. Actually, Kim Il Sung's economic strategy did not overlook the question of unification. However, he wanted to overtake the South instead of adjusting to it, which led to further disagreements with the DPRK's patrons (see Document No. 10).

A major objective of post-1953 industrialization was the replacement of the regional specialization that had characterized economic development in Japanese-ruled Korea (the textile industry, for instance, was concentrated in the southern part of the country) with a self-sufficient industrial structure. Mining thus received less emphasis than machine-building, even though the Soviets understandably wanted to import raw materials such as non-ferrous metals rather than poor quality North Korean industrial products. The bulk of Soviet aid went to the chemical industry, non-ferrous metallurgical works, iron smelting, and power generation. It was the more developed East European countries that assisted Pyongyang in the construction of a few machine works.⁴³ (By contrast, the Soviets had favored the development of an engineering

industry in China from 1951 on.⁴⁴) When Poland undertook to construct a plant for repairing freight cars, the North Koreans asked Warsaw to build a factory large enough to meet the demands of a united Korea. Finally the Poles persuaded them to abandon the idea.⁴⁵ The Rhee regime also linked its economic policies with the goal of unification, albeit in a rather different way. Power production, for instance, got little emphasis on the grounds that there would eventually be supplies from the North.⁴⁶

Committee plenum, when the leadership finally admitted the gravity of the food crisis, Kim called upon party members not to copy mechanically the policies of other Communist countries, and purged Pak Il-u and two other party leaders.⁴⁹ He apparently played upon Korean nationalism to conceal the fact that he had to beat a temporary retreat. Since Kim's agricultural policies proved less successful than contemporary Soviet or Chinese ones, his domestic and foreign critics made comparisons unfavorable to the DPRK, proposing that

**While the Kremlin did not hesitate to unseat the local
“little Stalins” in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1956,
it acted otherwise in North Korea.**

Soviet-North Korean disagreements over economic issues culminated in an open conflict in mid-1955. Pyongyang responded to the poor rice harvest of 1954, which had been caused by adverse weather, by squeezing an even larger percentage of the crop from the peasants. The leadership also resolved to speed up collectivization and prohibited private trade in grain. North Korean authorities, as Soviet Counselor A. M. Petrov reported, often “took as much as 50 per cent of the poor crop [...] from the peasantry by brute force.” As a consequence, the DPRK faced a serious food crisis in the first half of 1955. The system of non-rationed food-supply ceased to function, and in certain regions there were deaths from starvation. Comparable CCP policies, by contrast, did not affect urban consumers to the same extent, since Chinese agriculture was in better condition at the outset of collectivization than was that of war-torn North Korea, which proved simply unable to bear the burden the government placed on it.⁴⁷ Soviet diplomats harshly criticized the regime's disastrous policies (see Documents No. 6 and 7).

Pyongyang had no option but to appeal to the USSR and China for emergency aid. In April and May, Moscow and Beijing sent 24,000 metric tons of flour and 130,000 metric tons of agricultural products respectively. In May and June, Kim Il Sung and Nam Il spent substantial time in Moscow, where they must have had some difficult moments during the negotiations with Soviet leaders. Kim finally had to bite the bullet and cancel some of the measures the Soviets held responsible for the economic crisis. During the summer the government increased investments in agriculture, cut the retail prices of certain goods, reduced workers' personal taxes, and, above all, rescinded the decrees that effectively prohibited private commerce (see Document No. 8). In December Pyongyang increased agricultural investments once more, and reduced the personal taxes of private merchants.⁴⁸

In contrast with the USSR and certain East European countries, these changes were not accompanied by political liberalization. On the contrary, Kim Il Sung offset the economic concessions he had to make to the Soviets by cracking down on his intra-party critics, who may have played an active role in the Soviet intervention. At the April Central

Pyongyang adopt more flexible methods on the basis of the experiences of these countries. Kim was determined to prevent any such development.

At a CC plenum held in December, Kim Il Sung launched an attack on the Soviet faction. The economic measures taken in December were probably intended to emphasize Kim's commitment to the “New Course” in order to prevent Soviet criticism of this purge. Since the economic crisis had provided a good opportunity for the Soviets to meddle in the internal affairs of the DPRK, Kim did not want to repeat that error. The Soviets, for their part, turned a blind eye to the purges, perhaps because they considered the Soviet Koreans useful informants and allies whenever Soviet and North Korean interests clashed, but did not want to rely on them in periods when Kim appeared cooperative.

Throughout the Soviet bloc, de-Stalinization in the long run favored “domestic Communists.” As early as 1957 every East European country except the GDR was ruled by a “domestic Communist” leader. The influence Soviet Koreans, therefore, went against the tide. During the 1955 confrontation Moscow was much more interested in economic issues than in political ones and therefore did not attempt to force on Kim Il Sung unwanted political reforms, whether it would have been able to do so or not. As a consequence, rehabilitation of the unjustly persecuted remained out of the question in the DPRK, while all East European regimes except the Albanians began to release at least some of their political prisoners in 1954-55. Ironically, Moscow's attitude contributed to the decline of Soviet influence in the DPRK, since fewer and fewer North Koreans were willing to take sides with such an unreliable patron against a dictator as formidable as Kim Il Sung. On the other hand, it was quite understandable that the new Soviet leaders preferred Kim to the Soviet Koreans, since continued favoring of “Muscovites” might breed nationalist resentment that could destabilize their satellites.

Thus, in 1955 both North Korea and the Soviet Union made certain concessions. Pyongyang re-examined its economic policies and made some tentative approaches to Yugoslavia, while Moscow equipped the North Korean Air Force with turbo-prop bombers and gave the Soviet-North Korean

airline to the DPRK.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in contrast to Beijing and Hanoi, Pyongyang failed to establish any contact with Belgrade in the Khrushchev era.⁵¹ Moreover, the reconciliation between Moscow and Pyongyang was soon disrupted by the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

The August Plenum and its Consequences

Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 certainly worried Kim Il Sung. Though some aspects of Kim's cult of personality were toned down in the following months, the North Korean press did not directly criticize the phenomenon as such.⁵² To the chagrin of Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, at the 3rd KWP Congress the leadership stuck to the policy of rapid industrialization and economic autarky, and barely laid any emphasis on the improvement of living standards.⁵³ The spirit of the 20th Party Congress had no substantial effect on North Korean domestic policies. By contrast, CCP leaders were much less reluctant to follow Khrushchev's example. By May 1956, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had become more willing to provide the Communist embassies with information. In June the PRC adopted a conciliatory policy toward Taiwan.⁵⁴ Security precautions aimed at protecting high-ranking officials were greatly relaxed.⁵⁵ Mao's 10-point program placed a substantial emphasis on improving peasants' living standards. The party encouraged the children of "bourgeois" families to apply for admission to the universities.⁵⁶ Whereas in December 1955 the CCP had characterized Confucius' teachings as thoroughly reactionary, four months later the Deputy Foreign Minister called him "a great thinker, politician, and philosopher."⁵⁷ From 1954-1956 those Soviet and East European diplomats who harshly criticized North Korean policies often praised the correctness of Chinese measures, indicating that in this period the Soviets considered the North Koreans less cooperative than the Chinese (see Documents No. 9 and 10).⁵⁸

By the end of 1955 the North Koreans had used up most of the bulk of Soviet and they had received Chinese aid.⁵⁹ In the summer of 1956 the KWP leadership concluded that the country would need aid at least until 1958, and consequently dispatched a delegation led by Kim Il Sung to the USSR and Eastern Europe. The North Koreans seem to have been aware that the Kremlin's disapproved of their economic policies, since Nam Il informed the Romanian Ambassador before the delegation departed that they would ask for consumer goods instead of technical assistance. The visit proved quite successful. The Soviets granted a further 300 million rubles in aid to the DPRK, and cancelled a debt of 570 million rubles.⁶⁰ Though the CPSU leaders may have criticized Kim's policies during the negotiations, in the end they decided to fulfill his request. While the Kremlin did not hesitate to unseat the local "little Stalins" in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1956, it acted otherwise in North Korea. The Soviets supported Kim Il Sung quite reluctantly, and repeatedly interfered in his policies, but they did not attempt to replace him. This crucial difference between Eastern Europe and the DPRK effectively sealed the fate of those KWP leaders who dared to criticize Kim at the famous August CC plenum.

The "conspiracy" of Pak Ch'ang-ok, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, and others, which culminated in their open attack on the dictator's policies on 30-31 August 1956, was a desperate attempt to turn the tide rather than a serious challenge to Kim's rule. As early as mid-1955 most ministerial posts of crucial importance were held by Kim loyalists like Pang Hak-se (Interior), Ch'oe Yong-gon (Defense), Nam Il (Foreign Affairs), Yi Chu-yon (Finance), Chong Il-yong (Metallurgical Industry), Chong Chun-t'aek (Chemical Industry), Yi Chong-ok (Light Industry), and Kim Il (Agriculture). Thus, Kim Il Sung's critics, despite their high party ranks, had already become marginalized to a considerable extent.⁶¹

The unprecedented cooperation between the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans may have been due to their realization of the gravity of the situation. Outnumbered in the Standing Committee and the CC, they had little chance to prevail over the dictator. They may also have made some tactical mistakes. Pak Ch'ang-ok allegedly wanted to read an 80-page speech describing the errors the leadership had committed. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik characterized Japanese-trained intellectuals such as Chong Il-yong and the new intelligentsia created by the Communist regime as reactionaries and boors, respectively.⁶² Since Kim Il Sung had cultivated contacts with both groups in order to offset the expertise of the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans, Ch'oe had good reason to criticize them. By doing so, however, he became even more isolated. Kim's critics also pointed out that the government should have devoted greater care to the improvement of living standards. Kim skillfully countered this charge by enumerating the achievements of his recent visit to the Communist countries, and promising economic reforms. Already before the CC plenum, the regime had resolved to cut the price of some consumer goods, raise wages, and reduce agricultural taxes.⁶³ On 20 August Ivanov told Hungarian Ambassador Károly Práth that the cult of Kim Il Sung had recently decreased significantly.⁶⁴ Thus, the action of Pak Ch'ang-ok and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik proved rather ill-timed.

Kim Il Sung promptly purged his challengers, but his repressive measures provoked a joint Soviet-Chinese intervention. Most probably, Moscow and Beijing interpreted the purge as a manifestation of North Korean nationalism and willfulness. According to the memoirs of Albanian Enver Hoxha, at that time Boris Ponomarev Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, told him "things are not going very well with the Koreans. They have become very stuck-up and ought to be brought down a peg or two."⁶⁵ In 1955 Kim had skillfully exploited the rivalry between the Soviet and Yan'an Koreans, and his purges did not affect the two groups simultaneously. By contrast, in August 1956 he clamped down on both factions, and this act of repression, which ran counter to the new trend in Soviet and Chinese policies, could not pass unnoticed. Following a visit by Anastas Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai, on 23 September the purged leaders were readmitted to the CC. The Soviets and the Chinese were content with restoring the status quo ante;⁶⁶ it was the purge, rather than Kim Il Sung's rule as such, that they disapproved of.

Beijing seems to have played a crucial role in the success of the diplomatic intervention. In April 1956 a group of Albanian party leaders criticized Hoxha in the same way Pak Ch'ang-ok and Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik would condemn Kim Il Sung's policies in August. Although Khrushchev sympathized with the dissidents, he proved unable to protect them from the wrath of Hoxha. When Khrushchev sent Mikhail Suslov and Petr Pospelov to Tirana to persuade Hoxha to rehabilitate Koci Xoxe, the most prominent victim of the Albanian show trials, the dictator flatly refused to do so.⁶⁷ Had Moscow not joined forces with Beijing, Kim similarly might have gotten away with the purge. Judging from the support the CCP leadership gave to the Kremlin, in the summer and early fall of 1956 Mao did not yet consider Soviet de-Stalinization a threat. In fact, Hoxha stresses in his memoirs that Mao attempted to convince him in September that Stalin had made mistakes towards both the CCP and Yugoslavia.⁶⁸

On 3 October Ivanov told Práth that the North Korean leaders had finally begun to re-examine their economic policies, but it was not easy to eliminate the various deficiencies. For instance, the leadership had insisted on producing bicycles, watches, and sewing machines, even though the DPRK could have imported such products as part of the aid it received. Korean-made consumer goods were of poor quality, yet their prices were unaffordably high.⁶⁹ Contrary to widely held assumptions, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, Pak Ch'ang-ok and the Soviets had proposed the importation, rather than the local production, of consumer goods. Kim Il Sung seems to have opposed this proposal partly on the grounds that the DPRK's serious foreign trade deficit necessitated the rapid resuscitation of the country's industrial capacity.⁷⁰

Pyongyang Regains the Initiative

The Hungarian revolution of October 1956 stunned the KWP leaders, who were at a loss to understand the causes of the uprising. South Korean reactions to the Hungarian events also contributed to Pyongyang's anxiety. Certain high-ranking officials of the ROK Ministry of Defense allegedly made preparations for a military intervention in case a similar revolt took place in the DPRK.⁷¹ Kim did not regard this potential threat lightly. Factory-building came to an abrupt halt as the regime reassigned workers to the construction of underground plants.⁷² Of the North Koreans studying in Hungary, at least one took the opportunity to emigrate to the West, whereupon the regime hurriedly summoned most of the students home. On the other hand, Kim also took advantage of the Hungarian crisis. He demonstrated his dependability—and thus countered Soviet criticism of his policies—by offering economic aid such as 10,000 metric tons of cement to the newly-installed regime of Janos Kádár as early as 12 November.⁷³

Since the Hungarian crisis temporarily discredited de-Stalinization, Mikoyan's intervention in September did not put North Korean intra-party conflicts to rest. On 14 February 1957 Kim Tu-bong, a venerable leader of the Yan'an faction who had sympathized with the conspirators in August 1956, made a speech that condemned Pak Ch'ang-ok and

Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik.⁷⁴ This event revealed that Kim Il Sung was again in control of North Korean domestic politics. In February, Moscow summoned most of its technical experts home, and handed over the equipment of a joint-stock company called Sovexportfilm to the North Koreans. The Soviets also renamed the advisers remaining in the DPRK as consultants to demonstrate that their proposals were not binding on the North Koreans, as well as to prevent the North Koreans from blaming every setback on the Soviet advisers.⁷⁵

However, Soviet-North Korean friction continued. In the summer of 1957 Pyongyang invited foreign teacher deputations to spend their holidays in the DPRK. Seven smaller Communist countries did send deputations, but the Soviets and the Chinese were conspicuously absent.⁷⁶ One may thus conclude that Pyongyang's conflict with Moscow and Beijing did not necessarily affect its relations with the other Communist regimes. While the Soviets did not call upon their satellites to condemn the KWP leadership, the North Koreans seem to have attempted to win the friendship of the smaller Communist countries. In 1957, Práth emphasized, that P'yongyang appeared much more cooperative than it had been in 1956. The ambassador had several long and amicable conversations with Kim Il Sung, the latter repeatedly asking Práth what he thought of North Korean domestic politics.⁷⁷

In the fall of 1957 Pyongyang and Moscow apparently reached a *modus vivendi*.⁷⁸ Kim Il Sung took advantage of the events that had taken place in the USSR in June 1957. Since Khrushchev had also resorted to a purge in order to get rid of his opponents, he could no longer accuse Kim of violating the principle of "collective leadership." The KWP leadership publicly approved of the replacement of the Molotov group, drawing a parallel between the activity of the latter and that of the North Korean 'factionalists.' A CC plenum held in October expelled Yi Sang-cho, a dissident Yan'an Korean, from the party. Having been DPRK Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1956, he decided not to return home after the August plenum. Since he continued to criticize Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang demanded his extradition. The Soviets refused the demand, but they reportedly told Yi Sang-cho to keep silent. So Hui, another dissident Yan'an Korean, sought refuge in China, and Beijing similarly refused to hand him over to the North Korean authorities.⁷⁹ Later Lee joined So Hui in the PRC, and their case troubled Chinese-North Korean relations as late as the fall of 1958. When a Chinese delegation headed by Guo Moruo arrived in the DPRK on 30 September 1958, it was given a cold reception.⁸⁰ The CCP leadership seems to have made every effort to conciliate Kim Il Sung. When the North Korean leader visited the PRC at the end of 1958, the Chinese told him that the assistance the CCP had received from Kim's guerrillas in the 1930s was far greater than the help Beijing gave to the DPRK during the Korean War.⁸¹

Problems of Industrialization

In July 1957 the KWP leadership initiated a two-year-long party purge that broke the influence of the Soviet and Yan'an factions once and for all.⁸² Since it coincided with the

Ch'ollima movement, a campaign the regime launched in order to speed up economic development, repressive measures were often motivated by the leadership's desire to find scapegoats to blame for the economic problems. The foreign advisers working in the DPRK could not persuade the leadership to set reasonable production targets, and if they complained of any mismanagement or deficiency, the authorities clamped down on some hapless Korean engineer or official in order to demonstrate their willingness to listen to Soviet advice. In mid-1958 the Soviets pointed out that a number of machines sent by the "fraternal" countries stood idle, whereupon the leadership promptly replaced two deputy ministers in the Ministry of Engineering Industry.⁸³ At the same time, the slow pace of the construction of a machine-tool factory led to debates between the Hungarian specialists and the North Koreans. The Hungarians failed to deliver certain facilities in time, but they managed to put the blame for the delay on the Koreans by emphasizing that the Korean technicians had not received further vocational training in Hungary. In turn, the DPRK authorities launched an investigation, suspecting the Korean engineers of sabotage.⁸⁴

To be sure, the conflicts between North Koreans and foreign advisers were not provoked exclusively by the former. In December 1950 the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing reported that two members of the Hungarian medical team in Korea were notorious drunkards, while two others treated Koreans rudely and contemptuously.⁸⁵ The Hungarian technicians often failed to take the inexperience of the North Korean engineers and directors into consideration. The embassy repeatedly castigated them for their intolerant and arrogant attitude. In 1957 the DPRK authorities told a Hungarian specialist not to prolong his stay, for his Korean colleagues were not satisfied with him.⁸⁶

Hungarian professors highlighted the extraordinary diligence of their North Korean students.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, at the end of 1956 the DPRK recalled most of its students from the "fraternal" countries, even though they had not yet completed their studies. (By contrast, neither Beijing nor Hanoi resorted to similar measures at that time.⁸⁸) Since their experiences abroad made several students critical of North Korean conditions, in 1957-1958 many former students were neither allowed to correspond with foreigners nor appointed to positions worthy of their qualifications.⁸⁹ Those who could participate in production often lacked practical experience. Although the leadership did its best to prolong the stay of the foreign specialists, the shortage of skilled labor proved an insuperable obstacle. As Foreign Minister Chong Il-yong pointed out in 1958, nearly every iron-casting till that had been produced was faulty. However, the leadership, fully aware of the difficulties but preferring quantity to quality, pressed on with mass production.⁹⁰

The *Ch'ollima* campaign required enormous efforts of the hard-pressed population. North Korea already faced a labor shortage as early as 1946,⁹¹ and the war of 1950-53 diminished the population by a substantial percentage.⁹² Since men were mobilized for urban reconstruction, in the mid-1950s some 70 to 80 percent of the agricultural workforce was com-

posed of women and children.⁹³ "It is a common scene that a young girl of twelve to thirteen is operating sophisticated machines," a Hungarian diplomat noted.⁹⁴ The regime's solution to the labor shortage was the massive use of "voluntary work." In addition to the 8-hour workday, people had to do 4 to 5 hours of unpaid work every day, not counting political meetings. At the end of 1958 foreign advisers noted that workers and officials did their best to wriggle out of "voluntary work," though they did not dare to criticize it openly. Political meetings met with near-complete indifference.⁹⁵

On the other hand, cadres were extremely proud of the DPRK's economic achievements. Although in 1958 Kim Il Sung personally asked the diplomatic corps for economic assistance, party propaganda systematically downplayed the role the "fraternal" countries played in the modernization of the DPRK. Some high-ranking party officials boasted that North Korea would catch up with Czechoslovakia by 1960. Information about the achievements of the other "people's democracies" was withheld from the population, and whenever officials made comparisons, these proved quite unfavorable to Central and Eastern Europe.⁹⁶ Nationalism also influenced cultural policies. To the chagrin of the diplomatic corps, in 1957 hardly any foreign plays, operas, or musical compositions were performed in the DPRK. In 1958 Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, An Mak, a critic of narrow-minded nationalism, temporarily revitalized cultural life and established good contacts with the foreign diplomats. However, the Polish Ambassador heard with regret that he had been purged in January 1959.⁹⁷ Since North Korean referees blatantly favored Korean players, every visiting team left the DPRK discontented.⁹⁸

Khrushchev Affronts Kim Il Sung

In December 1959 a Soviet diplomat in Pyongyang, Yulin told a Hungarian colleague that "most of the mistakes noticeable in the DPRK are attributable to ... the exaggerated national pride of *the Korean people* [emphasis added]." This attitude, which reflected the arrogance of a superpower vis-a-vis a small country, served the Soviets poorly. Moreover, Soviet criticism of North Korean economic policies was often motivated by self-interest. In February 1959, during a conversation with Kim Il Sung, Khrushchev rightly pointed out that the targets of the DPRK's Five Year Plan were hardly realistic, but his emphasis on international economic cooperation also revealed that the Soviets intended to shape the course of North Korean economic development. Moscow wanted to supply Siberia with canned food, fruit, and vegetables imported from the DPRK (see Document No. 14). Indeed, the value of North Korean food exports increased sixteen-fold between 1956 and 1959, while that of imported food only tripled. Since the USSR and the East European countries had to import non-ferrous metals from the DPRK in order to meet the demand of their industries, the Soviets repeatedly told Pyongyang not to develop engineering at the expense of the mining industry. On the other hand, the critical comments the Soviets made about North Korean industrialization proved well-founded. For instance, the Seven Year

Plan Pyongyang launched in 1961 set the production of electric locomotives and steam turbines as an aim. North Korean technological standards hardly rendered that possible, since even the steel and firebrick the DPRK produced for export was of inferior quality. However uneconomical the non-series production of sophisticated machines was, the regime made import substitution a matter of principle.⁹⁹

Kim's concern about Pyongyang's international prestige explained both his eagerness to invite Khrushchev to

had been exhausting for the workers.¹⁰³ Following the June CC plenum, the North Korean media admitted that "the relationship between the government organs and the masses has worsened" in the recent period.¹⁰⁴ On 10 December Yi Chong-ok told the diplomatic corps that the regime's over-emphasis on industrialization and urban construction had deprived agriculture of labor, while the authorities proved incapable of providing the swollen urban population with food and flats. As a consequence, a "tense atmosphere" had

As early as August 1959 Hungarian diplomats noted that the North Korean leaders "may harbor an idea that the division of Korea was caused by the Soviet Union, and thus its unification also depends solely on it."

the DPRK and his anger about the cancellation of the visit. In February 1959 Khrushchev allegedly promised Kim that he would visit North Korea that fall. The North Koreans took it for granted that the promise would be fulfilled. Although Soviet Ambassador Puzanov repeatedly stated that he did not know when the visit would take place, the North Koreans busily prepared for it from June on. In October Khrushchev told Kim that he would not visit the DPRK after all. This left the KWP leaders with the awkward task of turning the celebration into a non-event. The Soviets did not make it easier for them. "They have only themselves to blame if they were offended by that, as they make their bed so they must lie on it, they must realize that in the present international situation Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea would further increase, rather than ease, the tension," Soviet diplomats told their Hungarian colleagues.¹⁰⁰

The cancellation of Khrushchev's visit occurred immediately after his visit to the United States. At first Pyongyang attempted to pass over the latter event in silence, but the Soviet Embassy forced the North Korean media to deal "appropriately" with the visit (see Document No. 14). On 12 September, three days before the Soviet leader left for the US, Pyongyang had sided with China with regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute. This may have been a veiled expression of Kim's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's foreign policy, since as late as 31 August the DPRK Ambassador to Budapest emphasized that North Korea's relations with India were improving. He also stated that Pyongyang intended to carry on with this policy.¹⁰¹

Breezes of Reform in North Korea

In May 1959 the KWP leaders asked the Kremlin to postpone the repayment of the credit the DPRK had received from the USSR, declaring that they intended to improve the living standards of the population. The Soviets consented to a four-year postponement.¹⁰² On 8 May, Kim Il Sung informed a Hungarian party delegation that the leadership wanted to designate 1960 as a "buffer year," because the last three years

developed. The December CC plenum had resolved to re-examine the regime's economic policies. While in January the Hungarian diplomats had thought it likely that the government would eliminate the household plots of the peasantry by the end of 1959, now the leadership decided not to resort to such measures.¹⁰⁵

The Soviets welcomed these changes, but the DPRK's new economic course also included measures that did not please the "fraternal" countries. In 1959 the export of certain agricultural products was halted in order to retain them for domestic consumption, causing a foreign trade deficit. Pyongyang then drastically cut back its imports in order to restore the balance of trade. At the end of 1959 several East European trade delegations arrived in the DPRK. Though the North Koreans had originally intended to halve the volume of their foreign trade, they finally yielded to the East Europeans' pressure. While imports fell to a large extent in 1960, the overall reduction proved quite insignificant. The volume of agricultural exports decreased, while the importation of agricultural products and food increased.¹⁰⁶

Since the DPRK leadership considered the shortage of skilled labor very grave, it felt compelled to relax certain discriminatory rules. In April 1959 Kim Il Sung declared that the country should involve "useful elements" of the pre-1945 intelligentsia in the modernization of the country, rather than slight and alienate them.¹⁰⁷ From mid-1959 on, the authorities permitted Hungarian-trained North Koreans to contact the Hungarian Embassy, and many of them were given jobs worthy of their qualifications.¹⁰⁸ "Communist universities" were set up in order to teach technical skills to persons of South Korean origin, who had hitherto been discriminated against. The repatriation of Koreans from Japan in 1959-1960 was also motivated, among other things, by Kim's desire to recruit skilled labor (see Documents No. 15, 18, and 19).

Preparations for Unification

On 8 May 1959 Kim Il Sung told a Hungarian party delegation that by 1958 the DPRK had become "strong enough"

to receive the Koreans willing to leave Japan.¹⁰⁹ The rapid development of North Korean industry also made the KWP leaders think that Pyongyang would soon overtake Seoul in every respect. Indeed, in 1958 the South Korean economy entered a period of stagnation. US aid flows began to decline in 1958, and it looked as if the ROK would be unable to survive without the American economic life-belt.¹¹⁰ Moreover, Pyongyang had good reason to believe that the Rhee regime would soon crumble. In 1959 the leaders of the Democratic Party [DP], the main opposition party in the South, also felt that “power was lying just around the corner, waiting for them to pick it up.”¹¹¹

In October 1959 the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s South Korean desk stated that the party leadership “considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country.” On 10 December a high-ranking KPA officer told a Hungarian diplomat that Pyongyang would unite Korea in 1960, supposedly by military means (see Documents No. 12 and 13). On 4 February 1960 the North Korean diplomat Paek Chong-won told the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that the KWP CC was of the opinion that due to various factors, it was possible to unite Korea in the immediate future. Among other things, he called the Hungarians’ attention to the increasing tension between South Korea and Japan.¹¹² The establishment of “Communist universities” for southern-born cadres therefore did not serve solely educational and economic purposes; they were also an effective tool of Pyongyang’s *Südpolitik*. Apart from nationalist motives, the North Korean leadership’s interest in unification may also have been for economic reasons. In November 1959 Romanian Ambassador to Pyongyang Dimitru Olteanu told Práth that national unification was crucial for both North and South Korea. Northern industrial products, because of their inferior quality, were not suitable for export; thus the North badly needed the industrially underdeveloped South as a captive market.¹¹³

Pyongyang’s unification plans became another source of conflict between the DPRK and the USSR in 1959-1960. As early as August 1959 Hungarian diplomats noted that the North Korean leaders “may harbor an idea that the division of Korea was caused by the Soviet Union, and thus its unification also depends solely on it.” “When will North and South Korea unite?” Yi Chu-yon asked Soviet Chargé d’Affaires Pelishenko on 20 August. Caught off guard, Pelishenko gave an evasive answer (see Document No. 11). Pyongyang, in all probability, felt that the Soviets were not concerned about Korean unification. The post-Stalin CPSU leadership indeed preferred maintaining the status quo in Korea to a risky confrontation. Competition with the US induced the Kremlin to give North Korea economic and military support, but the Soviets were content to protect the “socialist achievements” of the DPRK (see Document No. 3). Washington, similarly did its best to prevent Rhee from provoking a new war between North and South.¹¹⁴

Khrushchev’s preoccupation with the German question implied a comparatively neglectful approach to Far Eastern problems.¹¹⁵ In essence, he required North Korea to support

his policies with regard to Germany, but he refused to commit himself to the cause of Korean unification (see Document No. 17). The declarations of the international Communist conferences held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 highlighted the “special situation” of the GDR. The East German leadership, like that of the DPRK, considered itself entitled to preferential treatment in terms of economic relations and other issues.¹¹⁶ This led to a conflict of interests between Berlin and Pyongyang. On 14 January 1960 GDR Ambassador Kurt Schneidewind told Práth that an East German government delegation headed by Heinrich Rau would soon arrive in the DPRK in order to “make the leading Korean comrades understand that today the main threat to peace is not in the Far East but ... in West Germany.” That is, the DPRK should not press for a quick solution of the Korean problem.¹¹⁷ (In the fall of 1959 Pyongyang had declared that the Korean question was the most important issue in the world.¹¹⁸) Since Khrushchev did not hesitate to resort to ultimatums and threats in order to solve the German question, one may conclude that in 1959-1960 the different priorities of Soviet and North Korean foreign policy played a more important role in Soviet-DPRK friction than the conflict between Soviet “peaceful co-existence” and North Korean belligerence.

Pyongyang and the South Korean Revolution

The South Korean April Revolution that toppled the Rhee regime had a profound effect on North Korean policies. On 21 April 1960, two days after the so-called “4/19 Revolt,” the DPRK diplomat Kim T’ae-hwa told the Hungarian Foreign Ministry that the KWP leadership did not consider South Korea to be ripe for an armed uprising, since neither the army nor the police supported the demonstrators. Nonetheless, the protests might lead to the downfall of Rhee, for “even the Americans are displeased with his brutal rule.” Kim also anticipated Chang Myon’s rise to prominence.¹¹⁹ Pyongyang’s analysis of the South Korean situation proved remarkably objective and accurate, if somewhat tarnished by ideological views. Certain officials of the Foreign Ministry seem to have formed an accurate view of the southern media. Describing the participants in the April Revolution, Paek Chong-won frankly stated that both workers and peasants had kept aloof from the demonstrations (see Documents No. 16 and 28). On 5 July Paek predicted that the DP would win the coming South Korean elections, though he did not expect far-reaching political changes from it.¹²⁰

KWP leaders adopted a cautious policy with regard to the South Korean events. Although they sympathized with certain “progressive” southern parties, they did not provide public support to any of them in order not to compromise the favored party.¹²¹ In June Kim Il Sung paid a visit to Khrushchev and on the latter’s advice proposed a confederation of the DPRK and the ROK. Although Chang Myon’s government proved unresponsive, Kim did not give up. In November he reiterated his proposal. The northern leaders spoke about the South in a very moderate tone, calling it by its official name. They seem to have been ready for a temporary “peaceful co-existence” with Seoul in case unification

was delayed. On 26 August the DPRK Ambassador to Budapest declared that if a third state proposed the simultaneous admission of the DPRK and the ROK to the UN, Pyongyang would not object (see Documents No. 20, 22, and 23). On 5 April 1961, Paek Chong-won stated that the DPRK would agree to the admission of both Koreas to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and as late as 15 June he still stressed that North Korea would eventually become a member of the UN.¹²²

Pyongyang's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to international organizations shows that the aforesaid proposals were not merely propaganda exercises. Since Beijing and Hanoi consistently rejected any similar suggestions concerning Taipei and Saigon, respectively, the idea of simultaneous admission should not be taken lightly. Moreover, North Korean domestic policies also seem to have been influenced by the prospect of cooperation with Seoul. Pyongyang took various steps to reassure southern public opinion. In March 1961 the DPRK Ambassador to Prague stated that it was high time to improve the quality of North Korean consumer goods, for if the South Koreans visited the North, these products would hardly make a good impression on them.¹²³ Following the April Revolution, the leadership repeatedly called upon cadres not to resort to oppressive measures. Forced resettlement from the capital came to a temporary halt. Still, real de-Stalinization remained out of the question, since Kim Il Sung regarded the overwhelming majority of the population as potential suspects (see Documents No. 21 and 25). The accelerated recruitment of southern-born cadres, whose future task was to deal with local administration in the South, indicated that Pyongyang's ultimate aim was the establishment of a Communist regime in South Korea.

The DPRK and the Sino-Soviet Rift

The April Revolution coincided with the first open Sino-Soviet clashes, and influenced the DPRK's reaction to the latter. Since the new leaders in Seoul repudiated Rhee's commitment to military unification, the prospect of a rapprochement between North and South temporarily convinced Kim Il Sung of the usefulness of Soviet diplomatic methods, and he eagerly adopted Khrushchev's confederation plan. On the other hand, Beijing probably considered Kim's acceptance of the admission of both Koreas to the UN a dangerous precedent. On 1 July 1960 the Czechoslovak Ambassador told Práth that Pyongyang had recently moved a bit closer to the Soviet standpoint, while Chinese influence in the DPRK was decreasing (see Document No. 17). Nonetheless, Kim's attempts to make a good impression on South Korean public opinion were not always welcomed in Moscow. Aware of being regarded in the ROK as Soviet puppets, the KWP leaders reinforced nationalist propaganda. Following the April Revolution, North Korean music broadcasts seldom included foreign compositions.¹²⁴ Pyongyang did its best to hide the fact that it had received aid from the "fraternal" countries. Nationalist propaganda and the condemnation of "flunkeyism" also served as a means to isolate the North

Korean population from the effects of the Sino-Soviet rift. Following the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from the PRC, the regime took measures to prevent its citizens from visiting the foreign embassies (see Document No. 23).¹²⁵

Although Kim Il Sung was hardly fond of Khrushchev, he had good reason not to give Beijing his full support. In October 1960 a Chinese delegation headed by He Long tried to win Pyongyang over to China's cause, but the attempt ended in failure. In fact, in early 1961 a certain tension appeared in Sino-North Korean relations. The KWP leaders were clearly aware of the PRC's economic difficulties (see Document No. 24). In 1960 Pyongyang purchased 300,000 metric tons of grain from the USSR, whereas China proved incapable of exporting grain to the DPRK.¹²⁶ Due to the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward, by September 1961 some 30,000 Koreans had fled Manchuria, seeking refuge in the DPRK.¹²⁷ On 5 February 1961 a section head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry told a Hungarian diplomat that while in North Korea the correct policies of the KWP had more or less solved the problems of agriculture, this was not the case in South Korea and China.¹²⁸

In fact, Kim Il Sung had little inclination to look up to the CCP leaders. "These Chinese are too sluggish. If I had only one division, I could destroy the Central [Nationalist] Army right now," Kim had commented regarding the CCP's efforts in 1946.¹²⁹ In August 1957 Kim told Práth that the DPRK's rice crop was 300 kilograms per capita, while in the PRC it never exceeded 200 kilograms per capita.¹³⁰ From 1958 on, Pyongyang began to downplay the military and economic assistance it had received from China since 1950.¹³¹ Although the North Korean and Chinese regimes had much in common, their policies were often nonetheless dissimilar. In 1954-1955 KWP cadres emphasized that there was no need to launch an anti-"kulak" campaign. By contrast, in 1955 Beijing declared that the struggle against "kulaks" was of great importance.¹³² Moreover, Kim's actions sometimes preceded, rather than imitated, comparable measures by the CCP. In labor-short North Korea the peacetime mobilization of officials for physical work began in 1953-1954. Beijing introduced a similar policy as late as 1957.¹³³ Early in 1955, as the regime's control over artists loosened a bit, many North Korean painters returned to the traditional Korean style of painting. In the PRC the similarly temporary "rehabilitation" of traditional Chinese painting took place only in mid-1956.¹³⁴ Although the Great Leap Forward had certainly influenced the *Ch'ollima* movement, Kim began to re-examine his economic policies in 1959, while Mao pressed on until December 1960.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, the CCP leaders proved more tolerant of North Korean nationalism than did their Soviet counterparts. In the wake of Park Chung-hee's coup, Pyongyang signed treaties of mutual friendship and cooperation with both Moscow and Beijing. In June 1961 Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited the DPRK. He assured Kim Il Sung of the full support of the USSR, but criticized certain North Korean economic policies. Having inspected several factories, Kosygin, ever the technocrat, told Kim that the North Koreans should not have wasted time trying to invent everything themselves,

since in some cases the adoption of foreign patents would have been more economical.¹³⁶ By contrast, at the 4th KWP Congress in September, Deng Xiaoping explicitly appealed to Korean nationalism. “The Chinese leaders must learn from the Korean leaders,” he declared, calling Koreans a “mighty people of 30 million.” This certainly pleased Pyongyang. Deng’s words were often quoted in intra-party propaganda.¹³⁷

Confrontation with Seoul and Moscow

Much to the Soviets’ surprise, on 16 May 1961 Deputy Foreign Minister Kim T’ae-hui told the foreign ambassadors

assumed an interstate character. On 3 December all Soviet diplomats were recalled from Tirana. Henceforth Kim took the Soviet attack on Stalinism personally. As he put it at a CC plenum held in March 1962, “we must prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union will cast us aside in the same way as it did Albania.” (see Documents No. 27 and 30).¹⁴⁶

On 10 December Radio Pyongyang ceased to broadcast the Korean language programs of Radio Moscow. The post office withheld those copies of *Pravda* and *Kommunist* that dealt with the issue of Stalinism.¹⁴⁷ The diplomatic corps was told that from 1 January 1962 on, foreigners were forbidden

Since Khrushchev did not hesitate to resort to ultimatums and threats in order to solve the German question, one may conclude that in 1959-60 the different priorities of Soviet and North Korean foreign policy played a more important role in Soviet-DPRK friction than the conflict between Soviet “peaceful co-existence and North Korean belligerence.

that Park’s coup was a favorable development.¹³⁸ As did certain US observers, some KWP leaders considered Park, who had been arrested by the Rhee regime for his role in a 1948 rebellion, to be a leftist. Park’s initial policies apparently confirmed this view.¹³⁹ P’yongyang, prepared for all emergencies, put the KPA on alert, but considered the South Korean situation rather unstable. On 15 June Paek Chong-won highlighted Park’s conflict with Chang Do-young, calling it a clash of pro-Japanese and pro-US officers.¹⁴⁰ In September P’yongyang asked the Hungarian press not to criticize the southern leaders too harshly.¹⁴¹ As recently disclosed South Korean sources attest, at that time secret talks took place between the two regimes. Since these meetings proved fruitless, Kim Il Sung lost his patience. On October 2 Yu Chang-sik stated that because Park had cracked down on the southern proponents of unification, Kim dropped the matter of DPRK-ROK cooperation.¹⁴² Following Park’s visit to the US, the northern media began to attack him by name.¹⁴³

Having failed to establish contacts with Seoul, Kim lost his interest in the “peaceful co-existence” proposed by Khrushchev. The 22nd CPSU Congress, with its renewed emphasis on de-Stalinization, also alarmed him. Still, at first Pyongyang seems to have tried to avoid an open confrontation with Moscow. During the Soviet-DPRK “month of friendship” (15 October-15 November), both sides stressed the importance of cooperation, and the North Koreans spoke about their economic problems with remarkable frankness.¹⁴⁴ Although at the end of October a few Albanian students arrived in the DPRK, North Korean students were told not to put questions to them about the Soviet-Albanian dispute.¹⁴⁵ On 27 November Kim Il Sung forbade party members to discuss Stalinism and the “Albanian question.” However, the inter-party conflict between Khrushchev and Hoxha soon

to visit the three southernmost provinces without special permission.¹⁴⁸ In January Pyongyang flatly refused to sell copper and salt to the GDR, though the latter badly needed these materials.¹⁴⁹ From February on, intra-party lectures criticized Soviet policies and the COMECON. A wave of repression swept the party and state apparatus, and the half-hearted “thaw” of 1960-1961 came to an end. In fact, Kim Il Sung had good reason to worry about the effect Soviet de-Stalinization might produce on North Korean public opinion, for in the early 1960s dissenting voices were by no means non-existent among the intelligentsia and the masses (see Documents No. 27, 30, and 36). By contrast, the CCP leadership did not halt the process of political and economic “corrections,” including the rehabilitation of “rightists,” after the 22nd Congress.¹⁵⁰ While Soviet-Chinese relations began to improve in February, Soviet-DPRK friction continued until May.¹⁵¹

Kim Il Sung did not adopt a defensive posture vis-a-vis Seoul following his conflict with Moscow. On the contrary, he behaved as if he had finally been given a free hand. In March a high-ranking DPRK official told a GDR diplomat that Pyongyang would liberate the South by military means, for “we cannot wait until the population of South Korea starves to death!” (see Document No. 26). The belligerent statements of Kim Il and other KWP leaders startled certain East European diplomats, who had their doubts about the allegedly aggressive intentions of the US.¹⁵² In April the slogan *chonmin mujanghwa* (arming the entire population) appeared in many places.¹⁵³ In mid-1962 the employment of soldiers on construction projects more or less came to an end, indicating that the KPA was permanently put on alert.¹⁵⁴ At a secret meeting held on 19 June the leadership resolved to develop the defense industry. Kim seems to have tried not to place too heavy a burden on the population, since the other focal

point of the 1963 plan was agriculture, rather than heavy industry (see Document No. 30). While these steps gave the lie to the peaceful proposals the DPRK made in June 1962, it should be pointed out that in 1960-61 Kim's approaches to Seoul had not been accompanied by similar measures.¹⁵⁵

Early in 1962, Sino-North Korean cooperation intensified remarkably, as Beijing supported Pyongyang's militancy towards Seoul.¹⁵⁶ In April a Chinese delegation led by Peng Zhen arrived in the DPRK.¹⁵⁷ Since Sino-Soviet relations were improving at that time, Peng may have asked Pyongyang to be less hostile to Moscow. In August Khrushchev made an attempt to conciliate Kim, who welcomed the initiative (see Documents No. 29 and 30). On 17 October Kim told Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky that he did not intend to take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict. He also emphasized that the KPA needed modern Soviet arms. Of the 500,000 troops, 300,000 were constantly in the trenches. The DPRK's defense expenditures, Kim said, were proportionately the highest in the whole Communist camp.¹⁵⁸

From the Cuban Missile Crisis to Khrushchev's fall, Soviet-DPRK relations steadily worsened, while Sino-North Korean contacts grew stronger. On 23 October, one day after the outbreak of the Caribbean crisis, Kim declared that no Communist country had the right to impose its will on others. He probably meant that the Kremlin had subordinated Havana's interests to its own, exposing Cuba to a potential nuclear attack.¹⁵⁹ In November Khrushchev was depicted as an appeaser at a meeting in the DPRK Foreign Ministry.¹⁶⁰ Military buildup accelerated, while industrialization slowed down. In December a CC plenum designated 1963 as another "buffer year."¹⁶¹ By contrast, in 1965-1970 Pyongyang, in an attempt to compete with South Korea's rapid economic growth, tried to develop the military and civilian sectors of the economy simultaneously. The KWP leaders seem to have underestimated the danger of nuclear war, which worried Moscow, particularly when Pak Kum-ch'ol stated that a South Korean attack was unlikely for the time being (see Documents No. 31 and 37).

In 1963-1964 Soviet-North Korean relations reached their lowest point. Harsh debates took place between the Soviet diplomats and the KWP leaders. The latter's actions often amounted to outright provocations (see Documents No. 35, 39, and 40). The authorities systematically harassed the Soviet and East European embassies, tapping their telephones and delaying their mail. While the Chinese diplomats were provided with vegetables and meat, their Soviet or Hungarian counterparts were not.¹⁶² In Moskovsky's view, the KWP's intra-party propaganda outdid even the Chinese in reviling Khrushchev.¹⁶³ In turn, a Soviet diplomat called Kim Il Sung's "brain trust," which included Hwang Chang-yop, a "political Gestapo."¹⁶⁴ Pyongyang launched a campaign against mixed marriages, compelling Koreans to divorce their European spouses (see Document No. 33). The GDR Ambassador described the speech of a party cadre, who had called such marriages a "crime against the Korean race," as "Goebbelsian."¹⁶⁵ Ordinary citizens, with the exception of some children, seem not to have shared the cadres' hostility

to Europeans, but they were prevented from contacting the latter.¹⁶⁶ Although several North Koreans asked the Soviet Embassy for political asylum, the Soviets, who were rightly afraid of Pyongyang's agent provocateur tactics, refused to help.¹⁶⁷

Searching for scapegoats, Khrushchev and Moskovsky declared that Puzanov, Counsellor Kryukov, and other diplomats had not noticed Kim's hostility in time. This accusation was not completely justified, for Kryukov had become *persona non grata* in the DPRK because of his critical remarks. Khrushchev also seems to have misinterpreted Kim's motives. "You have no political line of your own, it is the Chinese policy that the leaders of the KWP imitate and carry out," Moskovsky told Yi Chu-yon in June 1964. Ironically, it was Puzanov, a person known for his Stalinist views, who understood that the KWP leaders, though they temporarily sided with the PRC against Moscow, did not trust Beijing either. Kim Il Sung may have preferred the smaller, nationalist, and usually hard-line Communist states, such as Romania, Albania, Cuba, and the DRV, to the Asian colossus, for the former posed no threat to the DPRK (see Documents No. 32, 35, and 39).¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, cooperation with these countries yielded rather meager results to both sides. Apart from chrome ore, Albania had little to offer the DPRK, while the latter could not extend credit to Tirana.¹⁶⁹ Of the 4,000 metric tons of steel North Korea exported to the DRV in 1963, Hanoi took merely 700 metric tons, since its quality was very poor.¹⁷⁰ During the Cuban crisis, Pyongyang organized meetings in order to condemn the US. Much to the surprise of the Cuban Ambassador, the speeches dealt mainly with the DPRK's economic achievements. Kim Ch'ang-man, however, told the ambassador, "the Cuban people do not know how intensely we are supporting Cuba."¹⁷¹

Conclusions

From the new sources discussed here, we may conclude that in the 1953-1959 period Soviet-DPRK relations were based on a certain mutuality, rather than subordination. The Kremlin was still capable of intervening in North Korean domestic policies, but Kim Il Sung skillfully countered these steps by appearing to play along while gradually depriving the Soviets of their Korean allies and informants. Pro-Soviet gestures, such as Kim's approval of the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary, and of the 1957 purges, often served as justification of Kim's own policies. Moreover, Kim usually tried to conceal the anti-Soviet nature of his actions. Whenever the DPRK authorities prevented people from visiting the embassies or dismissed the latter's Korean employees, they referred to "security reasons," i.e. the American threat. In 1959 Kim Il Sung replaced Foreign Minister Nam Il, one of the few Soviet Korean leaders who had survived the purges of 1955-1958, but he was careful enough to tell Andrei Kirilenko CPSU Central Committee Secretary that Nam Il might be promoted to Premier a bit later.¹⁷²

From 1959 on, however, the nature of the Soviet-DPRK relationship began to change. By that time Kim had broken the influence of the Soviet and Yan'an factions, thus pre-

venting the Kremlin from playing off his fellow Politburo members against him. In addition, the Soviet aid program had come to an end. Kim continued to press Moscow for economic and military assistance, but he was less and less willing to offer anything in return. In 1961 Pyongyang failed to meet its foreign trade obligations to Moscow, whereupon the North Koreans asked the Soviets to cancel their debt. As they put it, "Your country is rich, you can afford that."¹⁷³ This attitude was combined with a feeling of superiority. As early as 1960 some KWP cadres made statements such as "It won't be long before the Europeans come here to learn from us."¹⁷⁴ While in the pre-1959 period the DPRK took little interest in establishing contacts with developing countries, from the 1960s on it strove for a dominant role in the Third World. When the authorities showed factories built with foreign assistance to African or Latin American guests, they described them as achievements of North Korea's self-reliant development.¹⁷⁵

Despite the regime's extreme despotism and "national solipsism," Kim's policies did not lack an element of pragmatism.¹⁷⁶ In 1963-1964 the DPRK, while condemning "flunkeyism" and "modern revisionism," laid increasing stress on economic cooperation with Japan.¹⁷⁷ Kim also consented to the systematic translation of articles published in Soviet, Japanese, and US scientific journals.¹⁷⁸ In certain cases the KWP leaders even proved more rational than Khrushchev. Pak Song-ch'ol's frank analysis of the problems of North Korean agriculture stood in sharp contrast to the utopian educational scheme concocted by the Soviet leader (see Document No. 34). Due to this underlying pragmatism, Kim proved able to let bygones be bygones, and in 1965 readily accepted Moscow's offer of reconciliation. The Soviets also tried to avoid a complete rupture with the DPRK. In November 1964 Kosygin told Kim Il that the Soviet media had consistently refrained from criticizing the KWP by name.¹⁷⁹ In essence, the Soviets were compelled to put a good face on Kim's domestic and foreign policies in order not to push North Korea toward China. While Khrushchev eventually declined to make that sacrifice, his successors did not.

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NOTES

¹ See, among others, K. Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995); Evgeni Bajonov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949-51;" Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation*; Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives;" Kathryn Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996); Milton Leitenberg, "New Russian Evidence on the Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background and Analysis;" Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea," *CWIHP Bulletin* 11 (Winter 1998).

² Andrei N. Lankov, "Kim Il Sung's Campaign against the Soviet Faction in Late 1955 and the Birth of *Chuch'e*," *Korean Studies* 23 (1999), pp. 43-67.; A.N. Lankov, "The Demise of Non-Communist Parties in North Korea (1945-1960)," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3:1 (2001), pp. 103-125.

³ Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 291-376.; Brian Myers, *Han Sorya and North Korean Literature. The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 49., 53-66., 78., 99-107., 138-141.; Sung Chul Yang, *The North and South Korean Political Systems. A Comparative Analysis* (Boulder-Seoul: Westview Press, Inc.-Seoul Press, 1994), pp. 367-368. On the other hand, a number of other scholars consider the North Korean regime, at least in the 1945-1956 period, a Soviet satellite not different from the East European dictatorships, and describe it as an imitation of Soviet Stalinism. See, among others, Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea I-II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Okonogi Masao, "North Korean Communism: In Search of Its Prototype," in *Korean Studies: New Pacific Currents*. Ed. by Dae-Sook Suh (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 177-206; Adrian Buzo, *The Guerrilla Dynasty. Politics and Leadership in North Korea* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999).

⁴ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1953, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents] Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth KA], 4. doboz, 5/cg, 04629/1/1953.

⁵ Hungarian Legation Documents] Korea 1945-1964 [henceforth KTS], 10. doboz, 24/b, 001132/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 14 September 1953, KA, 11. doboz, 24/b, 011219/1953.

⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 April 1956, KA, 8. doboz, 15/b, 025/25/11-6/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 November 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 22/a, 010968/1954.

⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 May 1957, KA, 9. doboz, 18/f, 002756/1957.

⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 1 March 1956, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 003133/1956.

⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, 14 April 1956, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 025/25/4-5/1956.

¹⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 December 1954, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 001140/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 June 1955, 025/25/3-28/1955, June 28, 1955.

¹¹ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 5 May 1950, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 00895/1950.

¹² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December

1955, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 August 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 25/b, 09479/1954.

¹³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 13 September 1954, KA, 6. doboz, 11/h, 09481/1954.

¹⁴ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1956, KTS, 10. doboz, 24/b, 00608/1956; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 April 1956, KTS, 11. doboz, 25/b, 004441/1956.

¹⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 August 1954, KA, 11. doboz, 25/b, 09479/1954.

¹⁶ Hungarian Legation to the PRC, Report, 23 August 1950, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Kina 1945-1964 [henceforth CTS], 10. doboz, 5/f, 001503/1950; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 December 1950, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 01075/1951.

¹⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 29 January 1951, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 028286/1951; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 18 March 1955, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 003989/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 21 January 1955, CTS, 10. doboz, 5/f, 003995/1955.

¹⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 25 November 1952, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 013952/1952.

¹⁹ Hungarian Legation to the DRV, Report, 16 August 1963, XIX-J-1-j [Top Secret Documents] Vietnam 1945-1964 [henceforth VTS], 3. doboz, 5/a, 006368/1963.

²⁰ On the other hand, the North Korean land reform of 1945-1946 proved less violent than the ones carried out by the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist regimes. See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 414-417.

²¹ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 27 October 1951, KA, 9. doboz, 18/g, 01939/1952.

²² Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1953, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 011216/1953; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 November 1956, KA, 6. doboz, 12/a, 1/25-5/1957; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 April 1952, CTS, 5. doboz, 5/a, 00875/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 21 July 1955, VTS, 4. doboz, 5/c, 007961/1955.

²³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 June 1953, KA, 10. doboz, 18/i, 001404/1953. On the 1945-1950 period, see Charles K. Armstrong, "Surveillance and Punishment in Postliberation North Korea," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* Vol. 3 (Winter 1995), No. 3, pp. 695-722; Jeon Hyun Soo, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie preobrazovaniia v Severnoi Koree v usloviakh sovetskoi voennoi administratsii 1945-1948* (Moscow: Drevo Zhizni, 1997); Erik van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone. Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989).

²⁴ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 19 July 1952, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/bc, 001024/2/1952.

²⁵ Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the Deceivers," p. 180.

²⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 August 1953, KA, 1. doboz, 1/b, 02199/2/1953.

²⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 April 1954, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 00866/1954.

²⁸ Hungarian Legation to the DPRK, Report, 6 December 1954, KTS, 12. doboz, 27/a, 001131/1955.

²⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DRV, Report, 28 November 1955, VTS, 9. doboz, 27/d, 00426/1956.

³⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 December 1953, KA, 5. doboz, 5/f, 01202/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the

DPRK, Report, 16 July 1954, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/cb, 001201/1954.

³¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 September 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 010941/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 October 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 010929/1954; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 October 1954, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001567/1954.

³² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 13 April 1955, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006054/1955. The term 'Soviet Korean' refers to Soviet citizens of Korean background who were dispatched to North Korea in 1945-1947 to help Kim Il Sung in the establishment of a Communist regime. The most influential members of the so-called 'Soviet faction' were Ho Ka-i, Pak Ch'ang-ok, Nam Il, Pak Chong-ae, and Pang Hak-se. While some of them opposed Kim's policies in the mid-1950s, others took sides with him against Moscow. Those Korean Communists who had fought against the Japanese under CCP leadership in Yan'an constituted the 'Yan'an faction,' and its leaders were Mu Chong, Kim Tu-bong, Ch'oe Chang-ik, Pak Il-u, and Kim Ch'ang-man. This group was also divided between Kim Il Sung's supporters and opponents.

³³ Hungarian Legation to the PRC, Report, 18 May 1954, CTS, 9. doboz, 5/e, 00731/5/1954.

³⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 12 July 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/e, 08071/1954.

³⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 24 March 1954, KTS, 6. doboz, 5/e, 00738/1/1954.

³⁶ On post-1953 US military policies in Korea, see Taik-young Hamm, *Arming the Two Koreas. State, Capital and Military Power* (London-New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 67-69.

³⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 November 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/ba, 09427/1/1954.

³⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 4 November 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/ca, 010976/1954.

³⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 11 September 1954, KA, 5. doboz, 5/f, 09446/1954.

⁴⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 November 1954, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001117/1955.

⁴¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 2 December 1954, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001117/1/1955.

⁴² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 September 1954, KA, 4. doboz, 5/ba, 09427/1954.

⁴³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 10 June 1956, KTS, 12. doboz, 25/j, 005594/1956; Hungarian Board of Trade, Study, October 1959, KA, 3. doboz, 5/a, 001/114/2/1959. On the aid programs of the Communist countries, see Károly Fendler, "Economic Assistance and Loans from Socialist Countries to North Korea in the Postwar Years 1953-1963," *Asien* No. 42 (January 1992), pp. 39-51.

⁴⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 30 November 1951, CTS, 10. doboz, 5/f, 00313/1952; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 8 June 1953, 001275/1953.

⁴⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 October 1958, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006456/1958.

⁴⁶ Anne O. Krueger, *The Developmental Role of the Foreign Sector and Aid* (Cambridge [Mass.]-London: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 79.

⁴⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 2 November 1954, XIX-J-1-k [Administrative Documents] Kina 1945-1964 [henceforth CA], 6. doboz, 5/c, 05236/1/1954. See also Dali L. Yang, *Calamity and Reform in China. State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 23-29.

⁴⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, August 1955, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 006044/3/1955; Hungarian Embassy to the

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⁷⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Annual Report, 7 March 1958, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 002247/1/1958.

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- ⁹² Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, *The Population of North Korea* (Berkeley: University of California, 1992), p. 32.
- ⁹³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 10 May 1955, KA, 11. doboz, 22/a, 006049/1955.
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- ¹¹¹ Quee-Young Kim, *The Fall of Syngman Rhee* (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), p. 24.
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- ¹²² Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 5 April 1961, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/af, 003159/2/1961; Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, 17 June 1961, KTS, 3. doboz, 4/af, 003159/6/1961.
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- ¹²⁹ Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners. Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 132-134. On Sino-North Korean relations, see Chae-Jin Lee, *China and Korea. Dynamic Relations* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1996).
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¹³⁹ On Park's coup and its reception in the U.S., see Mark L. Clifford, *Troubled Tiger. Businessmen, Bureaucrats, and Generals in South Korea* (Armonk-London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 36-39.

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¹⁴³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 November 1961, KA, 8. doboz, 15/b, 3/25/3-1/1962.

¹⁴⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 21 November 1961, KA, 11. doboz, 21/c, 1127/1961.

¹⁴⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 November 1961, KTS, 10. doboz, 17/d, 008662/1961.

¹⁴⁶ The slogan 'Arms in the one hand and a hammer and sickle in the other!', which cropped up in December 1962, was adopted from the Albanians. Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, January 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 00380/1963.

¹⁴⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 February 1962, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 002307/1962.

¹⁴⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 20 January 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 002299/1962.

¹⁴⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 5 February 1962, KTS, 11. doboz, 25/b, 002290/1962.

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¹⁵¹ Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 30 May 1962, CTS, 6. doboz, 5/b, 002053/1/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the PRC, Report, 9 April 1962, CA, 18. doboz, 22/a, 004123/1962.

¹⁵² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 6 April 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/b, 004106/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 April 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/b, 004105/1962.

¹⁵³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 April 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 004855/1/1962.

¹⁵⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 January 1963, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 00385/1963.

¹⁵⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 June 1962, KTS, 9. doboz, 11/f, 006076/1962.

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¹⁵⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 27 October

1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0081/RT/1962.

¹⁵⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 2 November 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004105/1/1/1962.

¹⁶⁰ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Memorandum, November 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0085/RT/1962.

¹⁶¹ Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Report, 25 January 1964, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001400/1/1964.

¹⁶² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 11 May 1963, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 004161/1/1963; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 September 1963, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/g, 006728/1963.

¹⁶³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 1 February 1963, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0012/RT/1963.

¹⁶⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 7 January 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 27/a, 00398/1963.

¹⁶⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 22 June 1963, KTS, 13. doboz, 30/b, 005273/1963.

¹⁶⁶ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 May 1959, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 004528/1959; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 18 October 1964, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004087/1/1964.

¹⁶⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 15 May 1964, KTS, 7. doboz, 5/f, 004090/1964.

¹⁶⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 June 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 006081/1962; Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 May 1963, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 0022/RT/1963.

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¹⁷⁰ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Study, June 1964, KTS, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001400/3/1964.

¹⁷¹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 10 November 1962, KTS, 8. doboz, 5/f, 008695/1962.

¹⁷² Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 29 October 1959, KTS, 4. doboz, 5/a, 006840/1959.

¹⁷³ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 19 January 1962, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 002255/1962.

¹⁷⁴ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 9 June 1960, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 004823/1960.

¹⁷⁵ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 23 May 1964, KTS, 10. doboz, 17/d, 004091/1964.

¹⁷⁶ The term 'national solipsism' was coined by Bruce Cumings. See *Origins of the Korean War II*, pp. 305-316.

¹⁷⁷ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 17 January 1964, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 001770/1964.

¹⁷⁸ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 28 July 1964, KA, 10. doboz, 18/g, 004878/1964.

¹⁷⁹ Hungarian Embassy to the DPRK, Report, 8 December 1964, KTS, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 006558/1964.

DOCUMENT No. 1
Report, Hungarian Foreign Ministry to the
Embassy of Hungary in North Korea, 6 May 1950

[Source: Hungarian National Archives (Hereafter MOL), XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/bc, 00529/1950. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

For the information of the Ambassador I should like to relate our experiences with the members of the Korean government delegation that was in Budapest on the occasion of the celebrations of 4 April.

Yi Pong-nam [emphasis in the original], Minister of Health, the head of the delegation [...]

Pak Tong-ch'o [emphasis in the original], Deputy Foreign Minister, the deputy head of the delegation, alternate member of the Korean Workers' Party Political Bureau [...]

At first, the Korean delegation was very reticent [...]. The fact that most of them had never been abroad, and only a few of them spoke any foreign languages, contributed to that. In contrast with the other Far Eastern delegation, the Chinese, one could not find out which program they liked and which program they liked less. One never could judge their mood by their behavior.

In addition, they made approaches to other delegations very rarely. For the most part, they just introduced themselves to each arriving delegation, but they did not attempt to get in touch with them later. Relatively speaking, it was the Chinese delegation that they met most frequently. As their visit was drawing to its end, they began to relax a bit, and in the course of some programs they were already in a quite good mood.

Nevertheless, their behavior differed from the behavior of the other Far Eastern delegation till the very last, for they kept a certain detachment and reticence all the time.

[...]

By order of the Minister
 Irén Rózsa
 Deputy Assistant Under-Secretary



DOCUMENT No. 2
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 22 December 1953

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 9. doboz, 18/g, 00303/1954. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 21 December 1953 I visited the secretariat of the Academy of Sciences. I asked for this meeting long ago, but the

[DPRK] Foreign Ministry of this place did not give its permission. Now and then I met the members of the Academy in passing. They always invited me, and on occasion they even asked me for a meeting over the phone. Thus, the Foreign Ministry has created an impossible situation [...]. It should have ascertained long ago whether the delegation from the Academy, which was to visit the Soviet Union, intended to visit us [Hungary] or not. By order of the Center, we invited this delegation as recently as half a year ago, completely in conformity with the rules, through a verbal note. The invitation had been a great pleasure for the scientists, but because the delegation did not leave [for the Soviet Union], we had to wait. Due to the absence of contacts, we were not able to learn when this delegation would leave; it left in the middle of December. In giving reasons for not permitting the meeting, the Foreign Ministry came up with the argument that at present the scientific cadres were working in the countryside. During a conversation I remarked that I had seen these cadres in Pyongyang, whereupon they replied that these cadres may have been at home, but the secretary of the Academy had left for the Soviet Union [...]

On 21 December [...] I was suddenly invited to the Academy through the F[oreign] M[inistry]. I met the Deputy Secretary-General, *Comrade Yi Chu-won* [emphasis in the original]. This meeting came in handy, for the exchange of agricultural experience should have been discussed with the Academy here long ago. On the grounds of a conversation in September, the Academy here has already sent samples of seed grain and silkworm. While at home [in Hungary], I reached an agreement with Comrade Osztrovszki about how we would give fruit stocks [...] in return. We will be too late to help before long, which [...] will endanger the excellent relationship we had established with the Academy of Sciences here during the war.

The meeting took place in the following manner [...] the head of the chemical branch [...] spoke of *the difficulties they had in the chemical field* [emphasis in the original]. True, by now they receive scientific journals from the Soviet Union and from us, but they have not gotten any Western scientific journals since 1945. During the war, they were isolated even from Soviet scientific literature [...] He asked me to send them copies of the following journals, or similar chemical journals, should there be the slightest chance of it [...]

- 1) *Chemical Abstracts* (USA)
- 2) *Industrial and Engineering Chemistry* [...]
- 3) *Journal of [the] American Chemical Society*
- 4) *Polymer Science*
- 5) *Modern Plastics*.

- 1) *Berichte [der] deutschen chemischen Gesellschaft* (West German)
- 2) *Angewandte Chemie*
- 3) *Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie* [...]
- 4) *Kunststoffe*.

[...]

As for the silkworm samples: they handed them over to the Foreign Ministry here three months ago. Eggs were also attached (they have spoiled due to the storage). In my view, the Foreign Ministry here has kept them in storage for more than 2 months, although it could have handed them over to us almost any day [...] the Korean comrades need our help badly [...] This is why *the policy pursued by the Foreign Ministry here is so incomprehensible* [emphasis in the original]. I dare say that the isolation of the Embassy is greater than in the West, those who would like to visit us are subjected to an identity check and taken to task. If we ask for an appointment, they refuse it. For instance, I was repeatedly invited to the Academy [...] In return, we wanted to ask them to dinner. The F[oreign] M[inistry] turned down our proposal, coming up with the ridiculous argument that they [the scientists] did not reside here. This is ridiculous, for at present the Academy is in our vicinity, so to say, and if they were thinking about it, they would surely know that we can easily check that, even unintentionally. Around 1st December they asked me whether I wanted to meet the painters and the artists this year [...] *They have created an impossible situation* [emphasis in the original]. I think the Center should lodge a protest with the [North Korean] *Embassy here* [emphasis in the original], or authorize the head of the Embassy here *to have talks in order to put an end to this impossible situation* [emphasis in the original]. Thus, the situation would improve, at least temporarily, as it improved after Comrade Pásztor paid a visit to Kim Il Sung and raised the issue of these difficulties.

Zsigmond Csuka
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 3
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 12 March 1954

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 00741/1954. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 March [...] I paid a visit to Comrade Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev. [...] I asked him what we could expect with respect to solving the Korean question. Comrade Suzdalev then immediately asked me what my opinion was. As was also well-known from the statements of Comrade Molotov, I said, in principle our position on this issue—and we were wholly in favor of it—was that if both sides sincerely wished to achieve unity, it would be possible to find a way. One indeed can, and should, carry out the unification of both Germany and Korea, but the Berlin conference—although it yielded some very considerable results in other respects—

indicated that as regards the Korean question, we cannot expect considerable results from the Geneva conference either, as Berlin failed to yield a result with respect to the German question. We cannot expect [a result], because the leaders of both sides, both here and in Germany, are diametrically opposed to each other, the enemy is terrified of the consequences of rapprochement, and for the time being, is unwilling to make any compromise [...] Comrade Suzdalev [...] embarked on the following long and interesting exposition: Germany and Korea are two separate questions. Practically, though, both countries are divided in the same way. Still, concerning the conditions of their unification, one must take into consideration, apart from the aforesaid difficulties (the attitude of the enemy), some additional problems with regard to solving the Korean question, [i.e.] factors that are not to our advantage, and we must thoroughly prepare for them. Namely, the distribution of Korea's population is too uneven. Some 8 million people live in the North, whereas there are 20 million people in the South. One must also take into account, to an even greater extent, the results we can expect from a possible referendum. On this point he again asked me what my opinion was of it. We might expect results concerning the masses' efforts to unite their country, I said, but otherwise I was not convinced of [the positive results of the referendum]. Quite so, [Suzdalev said]. While in Berlin the enemy rejected our fair proposals which set that as an aim, in the Korean question it is they who can safely propose that, say, a general referendum should be held. Of course, this is not likely to take place. As a result of the elections, a National Assembly of such a composition might be established where all the proposals of our minority deputies would be rejected. Moreover, they might even be expelled from the National Assembly. On the other hand, if no elections were held, they [the South Koreans] would surely refer to the distribution of the population in establishing a unified government. If the central organ that would be fully entrusted with the guidance of the foreign and domestic policies of united Korea was created in accordance with this principle, this would also raise various difficulties for us. Namely, we obviously cannot sacrifice anything of the socialist achievements we have hitherto gained in the course of development, as the enemy is also unwilling to make concessions. [...] The Geneva conference does not look promising as regards the Korean question. One must prepare for it by thorough and very careful work. I could imagine a solution, Comrade Suzdalev said, that would include the unification of Korea and the establishment of a unified government to be fully entrusted with the guidance of Korea's foreign and domestic policies, but North Korea would exist as a dominion within united Korea, her socialist achievements [...] guaranteed by the Great Powers. He did not dwell on the issue of the dominion.

In my view, Comrade Suzdalev's exposition is extremely interesting. Namely, if it could be achieved that the present conditions—and for North Korea, even the possibility of further development—would be guaranteed in some form on both sides, then the leaders of the two opposing parts of the country may move toward rapprochement more

easily. It is doubtful, however, whether one could speak of a united Korea in such a case, and whether the unified Korean government could pursue coherent foreign and domestic policies, for, apart from the difficulties arising from the reconciliation of principles and interests, the opinion of the government of the dominion would be also a factor to be reckoned with.

[...]

Károly Pásztor
Envoy Extraordinary



DOCUMENT No. 4
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 18 December 1954

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 2. doboz, 2/b, 001118/1/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] the F[oreign] M[inistry] here quite mechanically turns a deaf ear to [the Hungarian proposal to] maintain a direct relationship with the [North Korean] party [...] the Korean comrades—I mean the comrades in the party—are a bit afraid of maintaining relations with the members of the foreign diplomatic corps. They are afraid and reserved. This is also noticeable on the occasion of receptions. [...] the leaders of the Korean Workers' Party show a certain reluctance to adopt the experiences of the parties of the fraternal countries. I think these problems would arise in the course of such a conversation. In my view, they would like to avoid responding to the problems, and for this reason they prefer not to maintain relations, although in my judgement, the time has already come to adopt a different point of view on a few questions, particularly on the issue of the methods of the party leadership. What I have in mind is primarily the issue of personality cult and [...] the methods of agitation and education. In my opinion, by now, one year after the armistice, the situation has become ripe for making changes at least on these issues, similarly to the other fraternal countries. In any case, the coming events will prove the necessity of the aforementioned.

Pál Szarvas
Ambassador

DOCUMENT No. 5
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 February 1955

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 4. doboz, 5/a, 004076/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] Our Embassy has not managed to extend its contacts during 1954. [...] recently the Korean organs and the [North Korean] F[oreign] M[inistry] do not give us the assistance that is necessary for the normal pursuance of our activities here. As indicated in earlier reports as well, they are unwilling to establish contact between us and the party. Recently the F[oreign] M[inistry] sends its representative to each meeting, who participates in the conversation from beginning to end. These [measures] make the issue more difficult. They frequently keep delaying meetings and certain programs for weeks instead of organizing them. The ones that are more important for us are arranged only after a long time, while the less important ones are organized rather quickly. As a rule [the North Korean Foreign Ministry] wants to ensure that we do not maintain any personal contacts with the state organs of greater importance but [...] submit questions, to which they reply in weeks, not infrequently in months, in writing and, of course, in Korean. For our part we dared to raise these measures with the Korean Foreign Ministry only very cautiously, because we can see that they would like to curtail the operation and activity of the whole diplomatic corps and keep its operation under rather strict control. We discussed this issue with the Embassies of the other fraternal countries, and we have come to that conclusion. A change in this issue can be accomplished only through rather persistent efforts going into small details. One must also add to the whole question the fact that in the highest Korean state organs, there is a certain incomprehensible secret-mongering aimed at covering up mistakes and difficulties, not just toward the diplomatic corps but toward the Korean people too. Of course, this manifests itself much more sharply toward the diplomatic corps. This cannot be changed solely through the Foreign Ministry, as it is connected with the development of the Korean party and its ideological level, and, last but not least, with the issue of frankness. The latter, though it has improved tremendously since liberation, has not yet managed to completely overcome the effects of the Japanese oppression that lasted for several decades.

[...]

Pál Szarvas
Ambassador

DOCUMENT No. 6**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 13 April 1955**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006054/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 12 April [...] I paid a visit to Soviet Counsellor A.M. Petrov. [...] I told him that I dealt with issues of internal politics, and since there were some issues I did not see clearly, I asked for his advice. These issues were the following: the absence of criticism and self-criticism in Korea, the unchanged personality cult, and secret-mongering. [...] In his view—he emphasized that this was his personal opinion—*criticism was directed primarily downwards, there was barely any criticism directed upwards* [emphasis in the original]. They speak about it, but they do not practice it, or rather it seems that it is only Comrade Kim Il-sung who practices it. The criticism that is heard is not public but exclusive. [...] In his view, it is a serious error that *Comrade Kim Il Sung is surrounded by bootlickers and careerists* [emphasis in the original]. They exploit, and rely on, the successes of reconstruction, which undoubtedly exist. Whatever is said by the leader, they accept without any dispute. Thus, the mistakes are not revealed openly, only in private and belatedly. No one has ever been held responsible for them.

The personality cult has not changed at all, and it is a primary and decisive factor in every mistake [emphasis in the original]. They do not even speak about this question.

In many respects their plans are not realistic but exaggerated [emphasis in the original]. For instance, the grain crop target for 1955 was 4 million metric tons, which was almost double as much as the 1954 crop had been. They wanted to achieve it without any particular investment. When they were reminded of that, they gradually lowered the plan target, and now it is 2.7 million, which is more or less realistic.

An even greater mistake was made in the appraisal of the 1954 crop. On the basis of embellished and false reports, the crop was estimated at 3 million metric tons. [...] In effect, as they recently admitted, the crop had been just 2.3 million metric tons. Nevertheless, it is possible that this figure is not correct either. As a consequence, in many places they took as much as 50 percent of the poor crop, instead of the 23 to 27 percent tax in kind enacted by law, from the peasantry by brute force. Thus, the peasantry was left with barely any grain reserve. Moreover, plan targets for compulsory deliveries, set on the basis of the high estimates, were also exaggerated. Private grain trade came to an end, only state organs took over grain at very low state prices. As a consequence of all this, public feeling rapidly deteriorated. In the countryside, *one could already hear strongly dissenting voices* [emphasis in the original] among the peasantry. Hostile elements took advantage of the public feeling, and intrigued. In addition, a number of suicides occurred. Following this, the situation was discussed in private in February, and a number of measures were taken. Grain was purchased from China and

the Soviet Union. (As far as we know, they purchased 200 thousand metric tons [of grain].) Compulsory deliveries were halted at once. A part of the delivered grain was given back to the peasantry as a loan. A decision was taken about the establishment of new machine-tractor stations. These measures eased the problem, but they have not fundamentally changed the situation.

The pace of cooperativization is also far too rapid [emphasis in the original]. In just one year, 30 percent of the peasantry joined [cooperatives]. [...] In a few cases they admitted that force had been used in the organization [of cooperatives] (probably there were many more such cases).

The plenum of 1-4 April was also held in private, the reports and debates were not published.[...]

Then Comrade Petrov spoke about the undeniable success of reconstruction. The unfavorable side of the latter is *the extremely low standard of living* [emphasis in the original]. The average monthly wage of a factory worker of undistinguished performance is 1500 won, whereas a meter of linen costs 300 won, and a necktie 3 to 500 won. *They [the workers] get nothing else on ration but rice* [emphasis in the original], only a very narrow stratum gets anything else. *They expect foreign countries to give them everything* [emphasis in the original]. In place of a part of the equipment to be sent within the framework of the one billion ruble aid program, the Soviet Union offered to *give them consumer goods. The government of the DPRK rejected that, and insisted on sending equipment* [emphasis in the original]. Nor do they utilize the local sources of raw materials and the secondary products of heavy industry to produce consumer goods.

[...]

There is also a very great shortage of leading cadres and technical experts. Nevertheless, a new generation is certainly emerging [emphasis in the original].

[...]

Dr. László Keresztes

Chargé d' Affaires ad interim

**DOCUMENT No. 7****Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 May 1955**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/c, 006048/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

The food-supply situation got worse in April. Though [...] the government has taken certain measures, [...] it could not fundamentally change the situation.

Due to the excessive forced deliveries, stocks of provisions were rapidly running out in the villages. At the same time, rice has completely disappeared from the free market. It

is only the employees of the state sector and state offices, and the members of their families, who are given rice. It is impossible to get rice in the villages. In the north-eastern province [North Hamgyong], where the situation is the gravest, the government has distributed some 100 thousand tons of rice, but this is not enough. A lot of people go to the towns to work, but many of the aged and the women head for the south where the situation is somewhat better. In the course of wandering, several of the latter become weakened to such an extent that they literally starve to death. For instance, some 20 dying or dead individuals of this kind have been taken to the Hungarian hospital in Sariwon since early April, of whom the autopsy diagnosed death from starvation as the cause of death. Most of these were such wanderers, but 1 or 2 Sariwon residents were also to be found among them, mainly among the dependents and the aged.

While the urban working population receives the minimal ration, those working in the non-state sector (e.g. street vendors) and large families (the rice rations of the relatives barely meet their daily needs) are also in a difficult situation. As a consequence, the number of beggars, particularly of children, has increased rapidly. [...] At the same time, the number of robberies and criminal acts also increased substantially, and public security got worse.

[...] the rural population tries to supplement its food by gathering various kinds of grass, onions and wild plants. The situation of the rural population is particularly grave in the north-eastern provinces.

In addition to the rice shortage, an increasing shortage of other foodstuffs is observable. Due to difficulties in foddering, the arrival of meat in the cities is decreasing more and more. [...] Of the smaller restaurants, many have closed down, because they could not supply their customers with food. Vodka has disappeared from the shops almost completely.

The authorities do not reveal the situation, and this spoils the atmosphere even further, serving as a basis for exaggerated rumors which can be heard. The 26th April copy of *Nodong* [*Sinmun*], which had written about the difficulties, was withdrawn.

At present, in early May, a certain improvement is to be expected. The Soviet Union and China are increasing their grain shipments, and by the middle of May, they had transported some 60,000 tons of grain. This enables the government to ensure that the urban population gets the basic food-supply. At the same time, the ripening of various vegetables and onions alleviates the situation in the villages. In the middle of June, barley and certain cereal crops are harvested here too, which will also alleviate the situation. However, a fundamental change in the situation can be made only after the October rice harvest.

[...]

Dr. László Keresztes
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

DOCUMENT No. 8

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 17 August 1955

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 10. doboz, 24/b, 008020/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 29 July 1955, at 4:30 p.m., I returned the visit of Soviet Ambassador Vasily Ivanovich Ivanov, with whom I had made an appointment. I took Comrade Golub with me as a translator. During the conversation we discussed the following main subjects:

...] Comrade Ivanov mentioned that on 30th July, the inaugural ceremony to mark the opening of the Soviet Red Cross Hospital would take place in the eastern part of Pyongyang, and he invited me to it. I expressed my thanks for his thoughtfulness, and told him I had already received an invitation. Comrade Ambassador said that the hospital in question had been built with Soviet assistance, and its facilities had also been sent to the Korean comrades in the framework of Soviet aid. The hospital has 400 beds and a clinic, the latter also being suitable for the treatment of patients. I told him we had expected the new Hungarian medical team to arrive today, but the plane had not arrived because of the bad weather. Comrade Soviet Ambassador asked for information about the Hungarian hospital. I told him that our hospital was in Sariwon. I invited Comrade Ivanov to take a later trip to Sariwon to inspect the Hungarian hospital. He was glad to accept the invitation.

We then had a conversation about the changes that had taken place in the international situation. I told him that the recent four-power conference in Geneva had been of great importance. If the Soviet Union's proposal for disarmament were accepted, it would lead to an improvement in the workers' material and cultural conditions in every country. Hungary also spends a substantial part of its budget expenditures for defense purposes. Comrade Ivanov confirmed what I had said.

In connection with this, he asked me about my opinion of the economic situation in South Korea, with special regard to the material conditions of the South Korean population. I told him that according to the information available to us, the conditions of the population of South Korea were bad. This is based on the fact that in South Korea, the number of unemployed exceeds two million. A number of people are starving. Various kinds of taxes are imposed on the population, particularly on the peasants who have to deliver a large part of their produce to meet their delivery obligation. The state purchases their crops at a cheap rate. Comrade Ivanov immediately asked me from where we had got these pieces of information. I told him that [we had received them] partly from local [North Korean] sources of information and the South Korean press reports, and partly from the neutral commission overseeing the armistice. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get information from the latter. Comrade Ivanov then said that South Korea received large quantities of artificial

fertilizer and many consumer goods from the USA, which improved the conditions of the population to a certain extent. In addition, they harvest twice a year, and this also improves the economic situation. Of course, the material conditions are not improving for the entire population, but the situation of certain strata, particularly of the urban population, is bearable. In reply to this I told him that the USA sends a lot of raw materials and agricultural products from South Korea to Japan so as to support Japan, a country deficient in raw materials. The USA purchases these goods from South Korea at very cheap prices.

Comrade Ivanov asked me whether I was of the opinion that the Korean comrades did not devote great care to the improvement of the population's material conditions. I said that in the last half year, the situation had somewhat improved in this respect, but not sufficiently. Comrade Ambassador then told me that the Korean comrades had made serious mistakes. He asked me *how it had been possible that the diplomatic corps did not discuss these issues with the Korean comrades. Had they kept an eye on these issues, the Korean comrades would not have made a series of mistakes* [emphasis in the original], e.g. the abolition of free market, the grain procurement, and so on. He visited the city's shops and markets in recent days, and saw that as a result of the correct resolution recently passed, which allowed private capital to take some initiative, conditions in commerce and the supply of goods improved, and, consequently, the price of certain products decreased. In reply to this I told him that the members of the diplomatic corps had discussed these issues with each other, but they failed to raise the subject collectively in the presence of the competent Korean authorities, because the Korean comrades were very sensitive due to the mistakes they had made, and they would not have interpreted the comments in the most appropriate way.

Comrade Ivanov said that the DPRK should have devoted very great care to the improvement of the population's material conditions. The [North and South Korean] populations are equally familiar with the South and North Korean economic situation, since the borders are not hermetically sealed. North Korea should have an attraction to South Koreans in order to demonstrate the superiority of the people's democratic system over the capitalist one. Otherwise, the Korean comrades devote all their energies to the development of heavy industry, although the Soviet Union could provide assistance to Korea by supplying consumer goods as well.

In my reply I also confirmed Comrade Ivanov's opinion. I told him that the Korean comrades had asked for equipment for heavy industry and factories from us too, although we also could have given them equipment for light industry and other products which would have enabled them to improve the population's material conditions in the near future. I mentioned that the Korean comrades had asked us for, among other things, a scale-making factory. Jokingly, I said that they should have had something to be weighed first, and scales only after that. On the other hand, we have already seen examples of this question. I reminded Comrade Ivanov of the

events that had taken place in the years past in the German Democratic Republic, where the population's unsatisfactory material conditions also played a role in the outbreak of various provocations.

Comrade Ivanov confirmed what I had said, then apologized for raising such serious issues on the occasion of my visit, but, he went on to say that he had had to do so because he had not yet gotten to know adequately the situation here. On the other hand, I was the only person he intended to tell about the questions raised and about his opinion. He will not discuss these with the other Comrade Ambassadors in such a way; he emphasized he intended to discuss them with the doyen of the diplomatic corps. In his opinion, the mistakes made by the Korean comrades should be raised in the presence of the top leaders, and in certain issues, the opinion of the whole diplomatic corps should be made known so as to ensure that the [Korean] comrades do not consider these comments as lecturing and ordering but notice the sincere helpfulness that inspired them. Our attitude will facilitate their [the Soviets'] situation if they take sides or give advice to the Korean comrades. The conversation, which lasted for some 75 minutes, took place in a sincere, friendly atmosphere.

Comment:

1.) As I have already reported by telegram, the raising of the questions was surprising and unusual. Hitherto, we have not experienced similarly sharp statements on the part of the Soviet comrades, at least not in this way. I am convinced that they have already criticized these issues very intensely, but they have not expressed their views in the presence of the diplomats of the fraternal countries. Still, this also had its antecedents, because Counsellor Petrov had already criticized issues of domestic politics quite sharply, and, in fact, that time we were of the opinion that his criticism was a bit too sharp.

On the basis of all this, one can conclude that the Soviet comrades consider the situation rather difficult, they anticipate the events [i.e. the problems that may result from the policies of the North Korean leadership], and they are doing their best to persuade the Korean comrades of the mistakes they have made, and it seems that they want to make use of the assistance of the diplomatic corps to achieve this purpose, in expectation that the Korean comrades may recognize their errors more easily if they are reminded of the latter by several [embassies]. I would like to make an additional remark about the whole question, namely, that the issue is quite delicate. One can touch it only very cautiously. One must think twice before raising questions like this so as to find the appropriate way. I must remind the comrades that I discussed these issues with Nam Il. Speaking with him, I raised economic issues as if I had asked for information, having not been to Korea for a long time. He stated that the situation was rather good, and although there had been some difficulties, "no one has starved to death yet in Korea," which, unfortunately, was not true. It was true, though, that when he made the statement mentioned above, the worst was already over and some improvement had set in. He did not speak about the errors committed, just about how they wanted to

establish a grain basis in 2 to 3 years. In my view, the last plenum of the [Korean] Workers' Party dealt with these issues quite sharply. It specified the mistakes, and it also took steps along the state line in order to correct these excessive measures. There are difficulties in carrying out [the new instructions]. The composition of the state apparatus, the executive organs and the provincial party and state organs is extremely weak, they cannot cope with the tasks. The executive organs are quite bureaucratic and inflexible. Lately, a rather intense struggle goes on in order to change that, in the press and other fields. Hitherto, this has not yielded yet any visible results. Comrade Kim Il Sung spoke to me too about the cadres' lack of professional and political skills when he mentioned that "they are young and inexperienced". For our part, we have already stated several times that the Korean comrades wanted to solve the agricultural problem too quickly. Otherwise, this is confirmed by the experiences of the past winter when there were rather serious difficulties, and the latter were undoubtedly related to the quick pace of the reorganization of agriculture (it was too quick, 25 percent of the peasant farms joined cooperatives in a year). It is only now that they begin to intensely organize Machine-Tractor Stations. The cooperatives hitherto organized are still just slightly more productive than individual peasant farms. They do not exactly give more to the state [than the individual peasant farms]. Their work is easier. For the time being, the state cannot give them anything but a minor support. Therefore, it would be appropriate to strengthen the existent cooperatives for a time, and expand their network only later. In my judgment, this issue is one of the most pressing problems of agriculture. It coincides with the difficulties of [food] supply and deliveries, and, last but not least, the living standards of the population.

2.) The issues raised by Comrade Ivanov are clear and comprehensible. It was unusual that he asked us to make occasional attempts at convincing the Korean comrades of the mistakes in certain issues, and, if possible, to prevent them [the mistakes]. Of course, this is a very difficult and delicate problem.

It must be emphasized again that the Korean comrades deal with their own issues in an extremely reserved way. There are few opportunities for a completely sincere discussion of domestic issues. In my view, Comrade Ivanov also sees it, and this is why he thinks that it may be possible to discuss the individual questions appropriately if we approach them collectively and from several different directions.

On the basis of all this one can conclude that the internal problems are somewhat greater than what we have hitherto seen or thought. I am clear about the fact that the Soviet comrades consider the issue serious and they actively deal with it.

I also draw another conclusion from the conversation, namely, that the reason for Comrade Suzdalev's dismissal was probably that his activity in this field was considered insufficient. It must be noted, though, that he was sick a number of times and he spent a long time out of Korea. This also contributed to the situation.

3.) I want to state that for the time being, I do not intend to take any initiative toward the diplomatic corps or the Korean comrades along the line described above. In my judgment, it is the Soviet comrades who have the say in this matter. I intend to take sides only if this is explicitly requested by the Korean comrades. I think this is sensible.

Pál Szarvas
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 9
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1955

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 009565/4/1955. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 October [...] I paid a visit to Comrade German Ambassador Richard Fischer [...]. Comrade Fischer spoke about the situation here, he told me that the situation here was completely different from that in China. When he arrived in Pyongyang last year and paid an introductory visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung, Comrade Kim Il Sung told him that he [Kim Il Sung] viewed him not as an ambassador but as a friend who came to help. Unfortunately, he has not experienced that everywhere, because the Korean comrades, whatever comes up, say yes to everything, including tasks which they certainly know they cannot carry out. In his opinion, friends could safely speak among themselves about the difficulties and shortcomings which naturally exist after such a destructive war. In his view, China is much ahead [of North Korea] also in this respect, people are much more frank and open there. Although there were backward conditions and a long dual oppression [in China] too, the Chinese leaders are wonderful, and the people follow them with complete confidence and enthusiasm. [...]

József Fűredi
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 10
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 28 December 1956

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001016/2/1957. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 27th December this year, [...] Comrade Fűredi invited Macuch, the Counsellor of the Czechoslovak Embassy, to

coffee. [...] Comrade Macuch dwelt upon the Korean situation, and described all the main shortcomings that had been noticeable in the development of the DPRK's economy and that still existed in many places. [...] for instance, he related how senselessly industry had been developed in the DPRK; in his view, what was most characteristic of this was that the Hungarians and the Czechoslovaks were building plants of completely similar type and capacity in Kaesong and Huich'on respectively, even though the DPRK's demand for the machines produced there could be abundantly met by just one such factory. In his view, the Korean leaders are thinking of long-range plans for exporting machines to the South-east Asian countries. In his view, this plan will continue to lack any real basis for a long time. They have built many factories where they cannot provide the workforce, the skilled workers, the engineers, etc. There are also frequent disruptions in the supply of raw materials because they have neglected the development of the mining industry [...]. Although the 3rd Congress of the Korean Workers' Party had already dealt with these mistakes, they set such guidelines for industrial development that they could not prevent [the repetition of] the earlier mistakes. Later, the CC plenums held in August and December finally modified the earlier plans, and instead of new industrial projects, they resolved to enlarge already existing ones and improve their technical standards. In addition, they are laying more and more emphasis on improvement of living standards, for there are still serious problems in this field.

As far as he knew, Comrade Macuch said that in South Korea the population's living standards were higher, which was made possible by the fact that the substantial aid given by the USA provided employment for the industrial workers in certain branches of light industry, and by the fact that they did not invest as much in industry as was the case in the war-torn DPRK. In his view, peasants also live better in South Korea, for there is more and better land at their disposal, and they use much more artificial fertilizer—800,000 metric tons in 1955, as opposed to the DPRK's 125, 000 metric tons—of course, this does not mean that the South Korean population lives well, it merely lives relatively better than the population of the DPRK.

[...] Comrade Macuch said that the Americans were doing their best to curtail the influence and authority of the N[eutral] C[ontrol] C[ommission]. Various disturbances and provocations are constantly occurring in the border zone; for instance, recently Rheeist provocateurs came over to a border village, killed the chairman of the cooperative, and kidnapped several youths. In Comrade Macuch's view, it is not right that the press of the DPRK does not deal concretely and publicly with these and similar cases but always writes merely about the "Syngman Rhee clique," the "gang," the "traitors" etc. (To our knowledge, the press did write about that border incident; Comrade Macuch was misinformed in this case.) In his opinion, this formulation is not right, for the South Korean population also keeps an eye on it, and the latest elections also showed that more than half the popula-

tion supported Syngman Rhee. It would be more sensible if the attitude of the government of the People's Republic of China toward Jiang Jieshi and other leaders active on the island of Taiwan became a lesson for the DPRK. Recently, the following policy is being pursued there: they [the GMD leaders] are called upon to return home [...]. In our opinion, the DPRK cannot completely follow the Chinese example in this field, for the greater part of the population [lives] in South Korea, and conditions are entirely different.[...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 11
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 September 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 006029/1959. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] at the cocktail party I gave on 20 August this year, the highest ranking Korean guest was Comrade Deputy Premier Yi Chu-yon. [...] As we were having a friendly conversation about generalities, Comrade Yi Chu-yon suddenly put the following question to Comrade [Soviet Chargé d'Affaires] Pelishenko: "In Comrade Pelishenko's opinion, when will North and South Korea unite?"

[...]

The question obviously also took Comrade Pelishenko by surprise. Nonetheless, he briefly gave the following answer: He is convinced that the peaceful unification of Korea will take place in a historically short time. He repeatedly emphasized in a historically short time, and by that he meant that it would not unite today, tomorrow, next year or in a few years but rather in the course of the worldwide triumph of the socialist idea. The existence of the socialist world system led by the Soviet Union, the rapid expansion of popular movements of [national] liberation in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Latin American states, and the unprecedented anti-war mood and desire for peace of the world's peoples were all facts which made possible the worldwide triumph of the socialist idea in a historically short time, Comrade Pelishenko stressed.

In our opinion, the Korean leaders may harbor the idea that the division of Korea was caused by the Soviet Union, and, thus, its unification also depends solely on it. Comrade Pelishenko certainly became aware of that. This is why he emphasized that Korea would unite in a historically short time—thus, he practically referred to the fact that the history of the division of Korea had been related to the objective historical events that happened in the last stage of World War II.

The dialogue described above consisted of just one question and one reply. Comrade Yi Chu-yon tacitly acknowledged what had been said by Comrade Pelishenko.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 12
Information Report Sent by Károly Fendler to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, “Conversation with Comrade Kim, Interpreter of the Korean Embassy”, 30 October 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 006373/1959. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík, D. Min. Károly Szarka.

On the evening of the 28th [...] I met Comrade Kim, the interpreter of the Korean Embassy with whom I have long had friendly relations. During the conversation, Comrade Kim mentioned the following:

[...] The head of the IVth Political Department [of the North Korean Foreign Ministry] told them that the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party “considered the situation as ripe for the unification of the country.” [emphasis in the original] In reply to my question Comrade Kim said that they “are considering accomplishing it in the ‘60s”, then called my attention to the increasing discontent in South Korea, which had been further aggravated recently by extremely great damage from a typhoon. In what follows he said that this very assessment had induced the Korean comrades to convoke the Supreme People’s Assembly, the latter having passed the resolution and letter already known to us. For the time being the Embassy is fully occupied in working up the documents of the session, their Center [the Foreign Ministry] charged them with making it known as widely and actively as possible [...], to such an extent that even the staff of the commercial branch agency is carrying out tasks related to it. [...]

Károly Fendler
official in charge of Korea

DOCUMENT No. 13
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 7. doboz, 5/f, 001711/1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 December the [East] German Ambassador had a dinner party on the occasion of his departure. [...] I had a conversation with the Korean head of the Korean-Chinese Armistice Commission. I asked him whether the international détente was perceptible in Panmunjom too. He told me that it was not, because the Americans dropped perhaps an even larger number of agents behind North Korean lines than they had done before. The general expounded that they would soon put an end to the provocations of the Americans, because they “would unite Korea next year.” Then he spoke of the unity and correct policies of the Korean Workers’ Party as if it were the guarantee of the unification of the country. The general was obviously in a state of intoxication. Interestingly, the Polish member of the Neutral [Nations Supervisory] Commission was of the opinion that at present, the Americans were “silent” in Panmunjom.

[...]

Gábor Dobozi
Chargé d’ Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 14
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 December 1959

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001660/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] on 16 December I paid a visit to [Soviet] Comrade Yulin. During the conversation, several issues came up, on which I give the following information:

Comrade Yulin told me that the December plenum of the [Korean] Workers’ Party had placed very healthy proposals on the agenda, and it also appeared to the Soviet Ambassador that this plenum had actually begun to correct the errors committed in the last years. He agreed with me that the most important resolution had been one that dealt with the rapid development of mining. In his opinion, mining should have been developed earlier, because that would have largely solved the problems which have cropped up in the supply of raw materials and in foreign trade. With regard to that, the issue of North Korea’s foreign trade problems came up. Comrade Yulin mentioned that it caused very great difficulties in Soviet-Korean relations that the Korean comrades could not

send goods in return for [the goods they got from the Soviet Union], although the Soviet Union asked Korea for goods which every country gladly exported (e.g. vegetables, fruits, canned food). He made mention of the fact that supplying Siberia with vegetables presented a very great problem to them [the Soviets], and they wished to import a large part of the needed goods from Korea. He told me that as regards the trade agreement for 1959, the Soviets had already met their obligations one hundred percent, whereas the Koreans had only met 56 percent of their obligations.

In the opinion of Yulin, most of the mistakes noticeable in the DPRK are attributable to one thing, namely, the exaggerated national pride of the Korean people. The mistakes made in the economic field also derive from that, for the Korean comrades are loath to adopt the experiences of other countries. They do not ask for advice, and they go their own way. He told me that after the 21st Congress [of the CPSU], Khrushchev had had a long discussion with Kim Il Sung in Moscow. Kim Il Sung set forth the data of their first Five-Year Plan and the targets of the coming years. Comrade Khrushchev did not agree with this plan, and made clear that these plans were not realistic, because they lacked an economic base. One could not base such a huge plan solely on the dynamism and enthusiasm of the workers, Comrade Khrushchev said. He censured the Korean comrades for taking no account of the possibility of cooperation with the other fraternal countries, and for wanting to produce everything by themselves. It was particularly inappropriate, Comrade Khrushchev said, that the DPRK wanted to make preparations for the large-scale production of tractors and trucks. At that time, Comrade Khrushchev's opinion was disregarded and Kim Il Sung maintained that they were able to fulfill the plan. Khrushchev told him that they [the Soviets] also wished to fulfill their Seven-Year Plan in five years, but if that was not possible, one had to acknowledge it. Kim Il Sung explained the production of tractors and trucks by saying that their agriculture was badly off, it was urgent to equip it with tractors and trucks, but, due to their very limited export potential, they were not able to import the latter.

Comrade Yulin told me that they had noticed several times that if the Korean comrades borrowed some experience from the fraternal countries, they were loath to speak about it. He cited as an example that the resolution on the reorganization of local industries had been patterned after a Chinese one, and when the Soviet comrades made mention of that, they [the North Koreans] declared that "this is not a Chinese experience, we carry it out on the basis of our own ideas."

On 1 October this year, Khrushchev again met Kim Il Sung on the occasion of the Chinese national holiday. Following the December plenum, it appears to them [the Soviets] that the talks were not unsuccessful, and certain changes are indeed noticeable. On this point Comrade Yulin mentioned that the Soviet government, though it had been aware of the inappropriate economic policy [of the North Korean leadership], decided to help the DPRK with everything. They follow the principle that if they [the North Koreans] want to solve the problems by themselves, they should realize the

mistakes on the basis of their own experiences. In what follows he told me that the Korean comrades did not inform them either about the measures they intended to take. [Similarly to the Hungarians,] they [the Soviets] also learn of their resolutions and plans only after these have become accomplished facts. Recently, all they could do was subsequently warn the Korean comrades that the elimination of boards in the ministries had not been appropriate. They still regard it as inappropriate, and they do not consider the explanation given by the Korean comrades acceptable, for the work of the boards was taken over by the ministries' party committees. The Korean comrades argue that the party committees include the ministers, deputy ministers, assistant under-secretaries and departmental heads, and, thus, they do not need to discuss the same task in two places [...].

Comrade Yulin regarded the extension of the powers of the provincial, city, and district party committees as the curtailment of professional one-man management. [...]

Comrade Yulin informed me that at the December plenum, Comrade Kim Il Sung had also dealt with the work of the Korean press and the self-conceit of party members. Comrade Kim Il Sung sharply criticized the press for often attaching great importance to issues of lesser importance, writing articles [about such issues] for days on end, and thus misleading public opinion. He also subjected the self-conceit of party members to sharp criticism. He emphasized that it was a very important task to accustom party members to modesty.

With regard to the press, Comrade Yulin also told me that they had a lot of difficulties, because the Korean press did not deal much with Soviet issues. They often prefer "their own little events" to great international events. For instance, while the world's press devoted whole pages to the reports that dealt with Comrade Khrushchev's visit to America, the Korean press published nothing, or just very short news [...], about it. It was only the intervention of the Embassy that ensured that subsequently the Korean press dealt appropriately with the visit. [...] I told him that we had also experienced similar phenomena; for instance, the Korean press hardly wrote anything about the 8th Congress [of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] in the first days.

We also spoke about the Koreans returning from Japan. Yulin told me that until now, the Korean Red Cross and the Soviet shipping company had made agreements for three ships. They will bring home approx. 3,000 Koreans [...] the South Korean government did its best to prevent their repatriation. [...] from 13 December on, a state of emergency was declared in South Korea, and the navy was put on alert in case there would not be any other way to prevent the arrival of the repatriates' ships in North Korea. The captain of the first ship declared before sailing that if the ship were attacked, they would regard that as an attack on the flag of the Red Cross and also as an attack on the Soviet flag. According to the *Seoul T'ongyang* news agency, on 14 December the American commander of the UN troops stationed in South Korea gave an order that prohibited the UN soldiers stationed in South Korea from participating in any action directed against the repatriates. He also instructed the South Korean Minister

of Defence to take similar measures with regard to the South Korean army.

[...]

Gábor Dobozi
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 15
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 May 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 004238/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

The large-scale return of Korean citizens from Japan goes on. [...]

Of the repatriates, those fit for work found jobs without exception. A large number of young people enrolled at colleges and universities. [...]

The technical experts who have returned from Japan are held in high esteem. Their wage-level substantially exceeds that of the other skilled workers and engineers, and in several plants they earn wages that are higher than those of the factory manager. It is beyond doubt that in many cases, the standard of their craftsmanship is higher than that of the skilled workers trained in Korea [...]. It is questionable, however, whether this difference is proportionate to the difference between the wages.

Those who have returned from Japan usually enjoy great privileges over other Koreans. Almost every repatriate was given a comfortable flat in a new building. They do not pay for the flat or the electricity. In the first months they get food and heating for free. In order to improve their food-supply, the competent authorities adopted a resolution about the establishment of special goods departments, where only repatriates can shop, in several stores in Pyongyang [...]. These departments are better supplied with goods than the other departments of the stores. To the knowledge of the Czech and Romanian comrades, prices are also lower in these departments. The privileges described above also include the fact that in the cities, the repatriates do not pay fares on public transportation.

When we discussed the aforementioned with the Soviet, Czech, Romanian, and Mongolian comrades, they unanimously declared that they refused to believe that the privileged status [of the repatriates] made a good impression on the Korean workers. Sooner or later, they will raise the question whether it is justified to favor the repatriates in terms of supply and wages to such a large extent. [...] such voices are already heard.

The Korean workers particularly often say that if so many people return home, they also include a number of people

who are not motivated by patriotism and the wish to work but by "other aims." [...] The Workers' Party stated over and over that it was possible that some subversive elements sneaked in, but "one must not look askance at every repatriate" because of a few people. [...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 16
Information Report Sent by Lajos Karsai to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, "Visit of Korean Provisional Chargé d'Affaires Paek Chong-won," 27 June 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 005061/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Endre Sík,
1st D. Minister János Péter,
D. Minister Károly Szarka,
Assistant Under-Secretary Márta Kolozs,
Departmental Head János Radványi,
Departmental Head Péter Várkonyi.

On 23 June of this year [...] I sent for Comrade Paek Chong-won, the DPRK's Provisional Chargé d'Affaires in Budapest.

[...]

With regard to the *South Korean* [emphasis in the original] situation, Com. Paik Chong-won made the following evaluation:

The leading elements of the South Korean mass demonstration of April were composed of students and the urban petty bourgeoisie. In essence, the workers and peasants did not voice their opinion. The slogans were just political ones. The main thrust of popular wrath was directed against Syngman Rhee, and Syngman Rhee indeed fled from it.

The reasons for the non-appearance of the workers and peasants in April were the following:

- 1.) There is no Marxist-Leninist party in South Korea. The working class lacks a vanguard, either in a legal or an illegal form. The revolutionary guiding force is missing.
- 2.) The South Korean working class does not constitute an organized force, partly because of the absence of the party, and partly because of its divided character. In South Korea, industrial enterprises employing no more than 20-30 workers make up 95 percent of all... industrial enterprises.
- 3.) The peasantry is also divided. At present there are 2.2

million peasant families registered in South Korea, and 70.5 per cent of them own no more than 1.5 chongbo (approx. 1 Hungarian acre) per family. In South Korea, the oppression of the peasantry takes place primarily in an indirect way, that is, through the landlords. Therefore, the main thrust of peasant discontent is directed against the landlords instead of the government. [...]

Since 1 May, a qualitative change has taken place in the South Korean mass protests. According to the news, workers' strikes have become increasingly frequent. Their main demands are the observance of the eight-hour workday and rising wages. All kinds of parties are mushrooming, and they are demanding new parliamentary elections in addition to the new presidential election. The masses (now even the workers and the peasants) are pressing for punitive measures against Rheeist officials. A mass movement to take the Rheeist murderers to task is in the making in South Korea. Its initiators are the relatives of the slaughtered. [...] The movement started in Koch'ang district.

So far the Korean Workers' Party and the government of the DPRK have not supported any of the South Korean parties, they are just following their activity with close attention. [...] The transitional government, though it is barely different from that of Syngman Rhee in its composition and aims, no longer emphasizes the military unification of the country; it prefers unification through so-called "free elections" under UN supervision. "As is well-known, the government of the DPRK cannot agree with the idea of [holding] all-Korean elections under the aegis of the UN while it is in essence at war with the UN," Com. Paek Chong-won emphasized. Then he went on to say the following:

Now more and more people in South Korea are pressing for the establishment of postal, travel, economic, and cultural contacts between the South and the North. This mainly results from the fact that since the April events, more and more people in South Korea are listening to the North Korean broadcasts directed toward South Korea.

South Korean parliamentary elections are due to be held this July. Of the 233 seats in parliament, Syngman Rhee's Liberal Party has hitherto occupied 150 seats. In April, 110 Liberal deputies resigned their seats in the wake of the events.

The recently formed South Korean Renovation Party has begun to voice remarkable slogans:

- 1.) Free parliamentary elections!
- 2.) Rheeists—individuals who occupied important central or provincial posts under Syngman Rhee, i.e. police and military officers, officials, etc.—must not stand for election!
- 3.) Exchange of mail must be established between South and North Korea without delay!
- 4.) Negotiations must be started on the peaceful unification of the country!
- 5.) A joint South-North commission entrusted with entering into negotiations must be established!

6.) All Rheeist hirelings must be relieved of their posts!
[...]

Lajos Karsai



DOCUMENT No. 17
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 2 July 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. doboz, 5/f, 0029/RT/1960. Translated by József Litkei.]

On the morning of 1 July, Czechoslovak Ambassador Kohousek invited me for a friendly conversation during which we exchanged views on several issues concerning the DPRK's foreign and domestic policies and the general line of policy of the fraternal countries in the Far East.

On my part, I informed the Comrade Ambassador of the DPRK's Seven-year Plan and certain economic issues related to the June visit of Comrade Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my other related reports). Concerning the latter issue, the Ambassador confidentially told me that according to the information received from Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, Comrade Khrushchev is going to visit Korea around 8-10 September. Concerning the Seven-year Plan, he referred to Comrade Kim Il Sung and informed me that the objectives of that plan will naturally be higher than that of the five year plan in order to achieve greater effect among the South Korean masses.

During the informal and friendly conversation that lasted for several hours, the Ambassador expressed the following:

Lately, there has been a certain palpable hidden difference between the views of the Chinese and the Soviet comrades, especially concerning the interpretation of the slogan of peaceful coexistence and the issue of people's communes. To his knowledge, in the past the CC of the Chinese Communist Party had already pointed out some excesses and deficiencies in relation to the organization of communes. Despite this—according to the information he received—



Kim Il Sung

Source: National Archives

there has been no change in the question of the communes and, for example, the principle of egalitarianism still prevails in the system of distribution practiced in the communes. According to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the idea of peaceful coexistence is somewhat unpopular among the people's democracies of the Far East, and this idea indeed has a real basis. After all, this principle means peaceful coexistence with US imperialism, which for any Chinese, Korean or Vietnamese is at least difficult to understand, given that for them the US represents their fiercest national enemy, which they are not willing to tolerate in either Taiwan or South Korea, etc. (I would like to mention that to our knowledge, when the Korean party education comes to dealing with the material of the 20th and 21st [CPSU] Congress, the question of the two systems' peaceful coexistence is, so to say, hardly dealt with.) In addition to this, both China and Korea are so much occupied with their "own" international issues (Taiwan and South Korea, respectively), that it is difficult and awkward for them to accept the German question as the central problem of international life. In order to demonstrate this, Comrade Kohousek referred to the behavior of the Chinese at the June session of the Supreme Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Beijing and to the articles published in China for the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth. He [Kohousek] also mentioned that in the speech of the Chinese Ambassador doyen in P'yongyang, given on the occasion of the New Year's reception, he did not even mention the slogan of peaceful coexistence and—contrary to custom—did not send his draft speech in advance to the ambassadors.

This [attitude] in the DPRK was evident at several occasions during the last year, most strikingly in the appeal of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly last autumn and in the letter addressing the parliaments of the world, in which they presented the Korean question as the most burning international problem. In the last months, according to the opinion of Comrade Kohousek, the Korean comrades became more reserved concerning this issue.

According to his observations, China's influence in the DPRK has increased significantly during the last year—especially after Comrade Khrushchev's visit to Korea was again canceled. (In the course of the conversation, Comrade Kohousek disapprovingly alluded several times to the Chinese Ambassador to P'yongyang, who uses his position as doyen to his own benefit in a very skillful way, and tries his best to please the Korean comrades.)

Comrade Kohousek nevertheless emphasized that in spite of China's great influence in Korea, the Korean comrades have never tried to copy the Chinese experiences. He referred to the example of communes, which, according to his knowledge, were the subjects of experiments but in the end the idea of their introduction to Korea was firmly rejected. Moreover, recently the Korean comrades have emphatically urged that the income distribution in agriculture be based on the quantity and quality of the work performed.

Concerning other political issues, it is undeniable that the Korean comrades are committing some mistakes along the way. We both agreed, for example, that the evaluations

made during the South Korean events had some weak sides (see my report No. 77). Despite this, the practical steps taken by the Workers' Party and the government were correct. The pursuit of autarky is still strong. Comrade Kohousek pointed out that in his view the Chinese influence is decreasing (understanding by this the above-mentioned political issues), and the Korean comrades stress more often and with more emphasis the *peaceful* [emphasis in the original] unification of the country, and there are signs that they no longer seek to place the Korean question at the forefront of international relations.

I informed Comrade Kohousek of my conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chang-sik concerning the visit of Kim Il Sung in Moscow (see my report No. 90). In the opinion of the Comrade Ambassador, it was not without reason for Comrade Yu Chang-sik to emphasize the complete agreement of views between the Soviet and Korean parties, since in his [Kohousek's] opinion the main focus of the negotiations was after all not so much on economic but political questions, and the deputy foreign minister presumably alluded to this. According to the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, it cannot be ruled out that Kim Il Sung also visited China prior to his visit to Moscow, but he does not have any data concerning this. He stressed, however, that in his views the Moscow talks meant a turning point in the political and party life of the DPRK. The agreement of views emphasized by the Foreign Minister¹ means that in domestic and foreign political questions, the DPRK completely shares the position of the Soviet Union.

Károly Práth
Ambassador

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: [sic.] probably Deputy Foreign Minister.



DOCUMENT No. 18
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 21 July 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 11. doboz, 27/a, 1/25/34-1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

Under a resolution that the [Korean] Workers' Party CC passed more than a year ago, a few "Communist universities" were established experimentally in the 1959/60 academic year. According to the CC resolution, the main purpose of the Communist universities is the further education of the workers in general and the accomplishment of the further theoretical education of the cadres of South Korean origin in particular. Students who have graduated from Communist universities have the same rights as students who have graduated

from other universities. In the last resort, it is the provincial party committees and the provincial People's Committees that propose university applicants for admission. In addition to party members, non-members worthy of it are also admitted. Classes are attended in the evenings after working hours. The four-week holiday is due to these students in the same way as to the other evening students.

In the last few weeks the party CC discussed the experiences gained in the previous academic year, and it found that the Communist universities established experimentally last year had done good work, and it became possible to increase the number of such universities. The CC decided to establish 20 such universities in the 1960/61 academic year in provincial centers and larger industrial centers.

[...]

In addition to raising technological standards, the main purpose of the universities is to gather together people of South Korean origin, and to select those cadres who will be suitable for leading the party and the democratic organs in South Korea after unification. The primary aim [of the leadership] is that from each South Korean settlement, there should be one or two students who have long been living in the North, at the universities. [...] Following the graduation of the present class, it will be ensured that after the unification of the country, in all the centers, cities and larger villages of South Korea the party committees and People's Committees will be headed by cadres born there.

These cadres will be politically firm and loyal to the Korean Workers' Party. They will be more or less familiar with industry and the planned economy as well, because at the university they study such subjects too. At the same time they, having been born there, will also know local conditions, which will be of invaluable importance in the first period after unification. [...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 19
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 August 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 004238/1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

In recent days, the 30th group of repatriates has arrived from Japan, and with them, a total of as many as 31,000 Koreans have already returned home. The repatriates—as I already related in my previous report—get jobs and can work right after they have settled down. Nevertheless, their adaptation to life here is not smooth. For one thing, their circumstances of life were better in Japan [than in the DPRK], and

they are not completely satisfied with the conditions here. According to what the repatriates say, there were more opportunities for entertainment in Japan. Initially, the [North Korean] way of life, which is fundamentally different from what they got accustomed to under capitalism, is certainly foreign to them. They have not heard about concepts like voluntary work, meetings, and pledges up to now. As a consequence, they are loath to participate in them. When the official working time is over, they try to go home immediately in order to change their clothes and seek opportunities for entertainment.

They also have difficulty complying with work discipline. [...] The government and the party ensure them a privileged position. [...] a substantial part of the repatriates have considerable professional skills. In addition to industrial experts, I primarily mean those professional skills which have existed only in a very rudimentary stage in the DPRK, e.g. ladies' hairdressing, gentlemen's and ladies' tailors, shoemakers, and so on.

Apart from formalities, the Korean workers do not like the repatriates very much. They have several reasons for that: 1) A great number of people have been removed from their flats so as to provide adequate flats for the repatriates; 2) In the factories, they get strikingly high wages; 3) They occupy a privileged position in food-supply; 4) Work discipline is less binding on them (at least they are not taken to task in the same way as others); 5) In respect of clothing and way of life, they are different from the local people.

[...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 20
Information Report Sent by Frigyes Puja to Minister of Foreign Affairs Endre Sík, "Visit of Korean Ambassador Yi Tong-gon," 30 August 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 3. doboz, 4/af, 0032/4/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

To Minister Sík, First Deputy Min. Péter, Deputy Minister Szarka, Acting
Departmental Head Széphelyi, Assistant Under-Secretary Kolozs, Chef de
Protocol Radványi, Departmental Head P. Várkonyi.

On 26 August, the Korean Ambassador in Budapest paid me a visit. The purpose of his visit was to inform me about the speech of Comrade Kim Il Sung and tell us their wishes concerning the UN session [...].

Concerning the UN session: the Korean comrades would

like one of the people's democracies to propose a draft resolution during the discussion of the Korean question, laying stress upon the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea.

In the draft resolution, it would be appropriate also to demand the dissolution of the so-called "Korean Development Commission" of the UN.

The Ambassador said the Korean comrades did not press for their admission to the UN, but if a third state proposed the admission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea together with South Korea, they would have no objections to it.

[...]

Frigyes Puja



DOCUMENT No. 21
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 11 October 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/a, 007686/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] this spring, the Korean Workers' Party CC passed a resolution on the more intense implementation of the principle of the "policy of the mass line" in party work. The party organs also discussed the resolution.

The party resolution in question makes it clear that the party should not become isolated but must take into consideration the interests of the vast working masses to the highest degree, maintain a permanently close relationship with them, etc. [...]

According to the information we received, the resolution analyzes the internal political situation of the country, qualifying it as complicated. The complicated nature of the situation is rooted in the 40-year Japanese rule, the subsequent division of the country, and the war of 1950-53.

In this [...] complicated internal situation, political work is impeded by further factors, namely:

- 1.) Almost all North Korean families have relatives living in the South, and in a number of cases, relatives who fled to the South;
- 2.) under the temporary American-South Korean occupation, many people—albeit under coercion—collaborated with the occupiers in various ways;
- 3.) a partial part of the former prisoners of war also constitutes a problem;
- 4.) there are still some petty bourgeois remnants in the DPRK, although not in a significant number.

Taking the aforementioned into consideration, in political work one must give evidence of great patience and caution, the method of re-education must be applied. In order to improve public feeling, the earlier policy of relocating people from P'yongyang came to an end. In cadre work, workers must be judged on the basis of the work they perform instead of on the basis of their origin. In accordance with the latter principle, in recent months—as far as we know—several non-party men or persons of class-alien origin (members of former noble and landowner families) were given leading professional positions, and increased attention is turned to the appreciation of those representatives of the old bourgeois intelligentsia who are excellent in their profession.

With regard to the implementation of the policy of the "mass line" in party work, in September a theoretical conference for party education leaders of various ranks was held at the Korean party college.

Károly Fendler
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim



DOCUMENT No. 22
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 30 November 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 005476/1/1960. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 30 November Comrade Deputy Foreign Minister Kim T'ae-hui gave the Ambassadors accredited in P'yongyang the proposals the 8th session of the DPRK's Supreme National Assembly had made with regard to the unification of Korea (the report of Comrade Ch'oe Yong-gon, the letter addressed to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, etc.). With regard to that, the Comrade Deputy Minister pointed out that these proposals meant the further concretization of the ones Comrade Kim Il Sung had mentioned in his speech of 15 August, and at the same time they specified the North Korean people's tasks concerning unification. [...] They intend to carry out unification by their own efforts, through general elections. Since the UN lent its flag to US aggression, it is at war with the DPRK, and thus it cannot be an "observer" of the Korean elections, etc.

In what follows, Comrade Kim T'ae-hui briefly outlined the proposals concerning the confederation and the establishment of a committee for economic cooperation, and with regard to the program aimed at assisting South Korea he pointed out the primary importance of the peasant question and land reform, for 70 percent of the South Korean population was composed of peasants. The DPRK's proposal concerning carrying out the South Korean land reform (purchase by the state, distribution for free) is different from the land

reform carried out in the DPRK, but, if one takes the circumstances into consideration, it is a Marxist-Leninist answer to the question. [...] The ruling circles of the USA have not adopted an official policy yet, they try to deal with the South Korean situation somehow indirectly. In these circles, a certain anxiety is noticeable, they do not completely trust the Chang Myon government, and, among others, the USA openly declared that if the South Korean authorities wished to negotiate with the representatives of the North in Panmunjom, this would require the previous consent of the “UN High Command.” In South Korea, the proposals [of the DPRK] are already widely known and discussed among the intelligentsia, the students, and the youth. Characteristically, a great number of South Korean correspondents came to the 29 November session of the Panmunjom Armistice Commission, and 50 percent of them made statements in favor of the DPRK’s proposals, while the others represented the official standpoint [...]. The South Korean National Assembly was also obliged to discuss the issue of economic and cultural contacts, then the Cabinet also dealt with it. While Chang Myon called [the proposals] “propaganda” in his statement, Foreign Minister Chong Il-hyong supported the idea of [accepting] electric power [from the DPRK] as long as no political strings were attached, though later he took back his word.

[...]

The tone of the [Supreme] National Assembly’s session is typical of [the present attitude of] the DPRK. Both the reporter [Ch’oe Yong-gon] and the speakers spoke about the South Korean leaders in a very moderate tone, the various attributes they had hitherto used were largely absent, and they began to speak officially about the “Republic of Korea” instead of “South Korea” (it even appeared in newspapers). Of course, as the Korean comrades correctly pointed out, the primary obstacle in the way of the peaceful unification of the country is the presence of the US troops. [...] it is not likely, however, that one can achieve their withdrawal solely through domestic (Korean) channels; the given international situation, and its development, will play an important role in it.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 23

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 December 1960

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/ca, 001/RT/1961. Translation by József Litkei.]

On 7 December, Czechoslovak Ambassador Comrade Kohousek invited me for dinner, together with Comrade Soviet Ambassador Puzanov. In the course of the friendly

conversation, I mentioned that the conduct of the Korean DCSO¹ is somewhat strange and incomprehensible to me, since they have been systematically taking away my best Korean employees on various pretexts. The behavior of the guards charged with guarding the embassies is also very strange, since—despite the emphatic statements of the Foreign Ministry—they constantly stop the Korean comrades visiting the Embassy, and check their identities. We do not take similar measures at the Korean embassy in Budapest; moreover, we do our best to offer them an ever-increasing space for movement and [possibilities to maintain] connections.

Concerning this question, Comrade Kohousek told us that his embassy is experiencing similar [behavior] from the Korean side, and remarked that according to his impression, some of the Korean employees working at the embassy are security people, who follow with great attention the work of the embassies and the Koreans visiting the embassy, and at the same time keep an eye on the other Korean employees as well. When Korean authorities have the impression that one or another of the Korean employees is working well, and that his work is promoting the work of the embassy, then he is removed from the embassy, usually on the baseless pretext of “political unreliability.” At this point, Comrade Puzanov interjected that why then do they send “politically unreliable [people]”?!—Comrade Kohousek also pointed out that the Korean side—both official authorities and some of the embassy employees—is trying to restrict the connections between the individual embassies and the Korean comrades who studied in their countries, out of the fear that they [the embassies] can receive some kind of “information” from them [the Korean comrades]. The situation, however, is that these comrades cannot subscribe to foreign specialist literature, and this is why they are always inquiring at the embassies.

In my response, I emphasized that I have no need for the Hungarian-trained Korean comrades to act as “informants” since I have been in the DPRK long enough to be able to form my own opinion on its individual issues and its situation. Comrade Puzanov agreed with this and then said that so far he had no problems with the Koreans working at the Soviet Embassy, and when it comes to signing the collective contract, he determines in advance each employee’s sphere of work. Concerning the problems related to free entry at the embassies, since he has also already heard similar complaints from the Bulgarian Ambassador, he had the issue investigated in relation to the Soviet Embassy, and they did not experience similar phenomena (I would like to remark that there is a permanent Soviet janitor service at the gate, so it is not possible for the [Korean] guard to stop visitors). According to Comrade Puzanov, Korean leading comrades do not assume that the embassies would use visitors for the purpose of getting information, such a [notion] can only possibly originate from some kind of lower subordinate. If he [Comrade Puzanov] wants to know about something, then he turns to the Central Committee or to the Foreign M[inistry], and it happened more than once that Comrade Kim Il Sung himself offered materials that were possibly necessary for

the work of the embassy. Concerning the conduct of the Korean DCSO and the guards, he strongly stressed that one has to call individual cases to the attention of the competent Korean authorities immediately [after such incidents happen], warning them “what, do you want brotherly reciprocity?!” If something similar would happen to me here, said Comrade Puzanov, then I would ensure that it be reciprocated in Moscow. I interjected that in our work we should not look for what possibly separates us but what unites us, and we must endeavor to strengthen cooperation and friendship. Comrade Puzanov also agreed with this by saying that these are after all minor issues, but they can also express the mutual relationship between two countries. No one in Moscow hinders entry to the Korean or [other] friendly embassies. After this, he firmly stated that concerning his own embassy, he has no information to which certain Korean employees are engaged in “intelligence” activity. If he would experience anything like this, then he would immediately protest to the Korean authorities, noting that he would be obliged to report this to his government and party. He works as the ambassador of a socialist country in another socialist country, and the Soviet Union does not conduct such activity toward friendly states.

Following this, the conversation turned to the November session of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly (due to his Moscow visit, Comrade Puzanov was not present [at this session]). Together with Comrade Kohousek, we found it to be inadequate that when the speakers of the People’s Assembly [discussed] such an important event as the completion of the Five-year Plan, they only devoted a brief half-sentence to the huge assistance provided by the socialist camp, and, above all, the Soviet Union, without which the execution of this plan would have been impossible. I reminded Comrade Puzanov that approx. two years ago, Comrade Kim Il Sung personally requested of the ambassadors that the socialist countries assist in the realization of the Five-year Plan. Comrade Kohousek expressed his opinion that Korean comrades would have had a really good opportunity, on the basis of proletarian internationalism, to point out what the support of the Soviet Union, and more generally the socialist camp, can mean for the development of a previously backward and colonial country, especially from the point of view of the recently liberated Afro-Asian countries. It would have been especially important and appropriate to contrast this assistance and the [resulting] achievements with the American aid provided to South Korea. Comrade Puzanov said that the Soviet Union does not need constant expressions of gratitude for its help, but the Korean comrades are displaying too “modest” behavior concerning the assistance, and they try to hush it up. According to him, the core of the issue is not whether or not they speak of the assistance received from socialist countries, but *how they educate the people* [emphasis in the original]! This is the most important factor, he said. He emphasized that they do not know what the Korean comrades think concerning this issue, he had not yet raised the question with them. It could be that they wish to emphasize to South Korea the independence of the DPRK

in all respects, or that they have some other ideas. Comrade Kohousek remarked that any bourgeois economist can easily calculate that the DPRK was unable to reach its achievements on its own, and it is similarly unable to provide the economic aid it recently offered to South Korea from its own resources. In his opinion, the Korean comrades will achieve just the opposite with this, and their proposals can be more easily labeled “Communist propaganda.”

Comrade Puzanov declared that due to his absence, he does not yet know in detail the numbers related to the questions discussed by the [Supreme] People’s Assembly. He spoke with great appreciation concerning the Korean proposals for the unification of the country. He told us that during Comrade Kim Il Sung’s incognito visit to Moscow this June, Comrade Khrushchev briefly asked Comrade Kim Il Sung his opinion concerning a confederation proposal similar to the one on Germany. Comrade Kim Il Sung immediately agreed with the idea, but the Soviet side did not push the issue any further, and the Korean comrades elaborated proposals, that were, in his opinion, very concretely and flexibly aimed at creating state federation entirely independently: free elections, [unification through] either state federation or, for the time being, only a Committee of Economic Cooperation, etc. For his part, he regards the proposals as very thorough and correct. Concerning how realistic the offered economic aid is, he declared that he will examine the material, but he believes that South Korea will reject it anyway. Concerning South Korea, Comrade Kohousek stated that although a popular movement overthrew Syngman Rhee, it [the movement] is basically unable to advance further; moreover, anti-Communist attitudes are also manifesting themselves, especially among the so-called progressive forces of South Korea. In Comrade Puzanov’s view, time will decide the question; in any event, the movement seems to be developing anti-Americanism. This, however, has its limits, since the intellectual and other circles see clearly that there are only American products in South Korea, and a potential anti-American movement could lead to the termination of American supplies, while the South Korean economy is unable to fulfill the country’s needs from its own resources. For this reason, they are unwilling to risk ending American assistance. It is unquestionable, however, that the DPRK proposals are putting the leading circles of the US and South Korea in a difficult situation.

Concerning the South Korean response to the DPRK’s proposals, Comrade Kohousek told us that in accordance with the information received from the head of the Czechoslovak observer committee in Panmunjom, there is some visible change on the Western side. As is known, American authorities already previously made the free movement of the Czechoslovak and Polish observers in South Korea impossible. Now opinions are being voiced that this should be made possible again. Some suggest that in addition to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and Sweden, the neutral observation committee should be enlarged by two new states, possibly with India and Argentina. At the same time, the committee could contribute to developing relations between the two parts of the country. According to the

Czechoslovak Ambassador, the first impression is that the enlargement of the committee is not advantageous for us, since at the moment the voting ratio is 2 to 2, while [after the enlargement] this would be 2 to 4, to our disadvantage. In Comrade Puzanov's view, this also does not make any sense, since the activity of the committee is anyway reduced. Promoting relations between the two parts of the country would mean a change in the function of the neutral committee; this, however, would first of all require the consent of the Koreans themselves. Comrade Kohousek further mentioned that the head of the Swiss delegation invited the Czechoslovak general to visit Seoul, which the latter accepted only under the condition that he can go in an official status. The Swiss agreed to this, but the visit has been suspended for various reasons.

We evaluated the above-mentioned diverse Western initiatives as attempts by the USA to find a way to counterbalance the effects of the DPRK's very effective proposals.

Károly Práth
Ambassador

¹ TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Diplomatic Corps Supply Office



DOCUMENT No. 24

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 16 March 1961

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0030/RT/1961. Translation by József Litkei.]

During my visit to Comrade Kohousek on 15 March, I informed him of my conversation with the Chinese Ambassador (see my top secret report no. 95). The Comrade Czechoslovak Ambassador fully agreed with me, and he found it highly incorrect that the Korean comrades organized a separate presentation for the government and another for the ambassadors.

In the course of the conversation, we both remarked upon the fact that Chinese Ambassador doyen Qiao Xiaoguang has recently not been attending the programs organized for the D[iplomatic] C[orps] by the Korean comrades, under the pretext of being busy. In addition to other [examples], he did not participate in the visit to the steel complex in Kaesong, nor did he attend the performance of the Cuban ballet ensemble or the cultural presentation of Comrade Han Sol-ya, etc. According to Comrade Kohousek, the Chinese Ambassador might be dissatisfied because in the course of last year he failed to convince the Korean comrades to support the Chinese position. Comrade Kohousek stated that earlier (last summer) he was of the opinion that the Korean comrades were under Chinese influence; how-

ever, recently he had to change his position. It is true that earlier there were attempts by the Korean side to adopt Chinese methods: for example, according to his information, they planned to establish two people's communes, etc., but they soon realized the negative [effects] of this, and gave it up. The so-called "Chongsan-ri method" radically opposes the earlier Chinese position, and, at least recently, the Korean comrades have been devoting much attention to maintaining the principle of material interest and socialist distribution.

The Chinese comrades exerted pressure in order to bring the KWP to their side in the debate between the CPSU and CCP last year. The invitation of Comrade Kim Il Sung to China last year (before his incognito visit to Moscow) also proves this. Comrade Kim Il Sung, however, informed Comrade Khrushchev of this [invitation].

Last October, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese volunteers entering the war, a Chinese delegation headed by Marshal He Long visited Korea and tried again to win Korea over to the Chinese side. Despite this, the Korean delegation did not support China at the November conference, although, together with other delegations, it sought to find a compromise solution. To sum up, the Chinese did not reach their goal, despite a further credit of 420 million rubles offered to the DPRK last autumn, so it is not impossible that this is the reason the Chinese Ambassador is so displeased.

In confirming this, Comrade Kohousek told me that although the Chinese side enjoys a position of equality with the Korean side in the armistice committee in Panmunjom, the speeches are always given by the head of the Korean delegation. A recent event, when the new heads of the Swedish and Swiss delegations paid an introductory visit to the heads of the Korean and Chinese delegations, was characteristic of this. The head of the Chinese delegation wanted to return these formal calls, but the Korean comrades did not consent to this, saying that they were not going to return either of them. Similarly, a Chinese general came recently to Panmunjom to pay his usual yearly visit and was received by the heads of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegations. Contrary to previous custom, however, the head of the Korean delegation did not show up, nor did he meet the Chinese general later. The latter left pretty soon without any notice.

The same afternoon, I also talked to Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, and informed him as well of my conversation with the Chinese Ambassador. Comrade Puzanov agreed with me, the more so since I was the one to inform him that the performance in question was organized for the DC (he was not present due to the Women's Day celebration at the Soviet Embassy). He agreed that, under the pretense of discussing various protocol questions, I would visit the Chinese Ambassador, who following this will have to summon the [other] ambassadors. Concerning the statement of the Chinese Ambassador, according to which "some criticize the people's communes, yet they have already been proven to work" (see my above-mentioned report), Comrade Puzanov briefly outlined the questions concerning the Chinese people's communes, and told us that according to his personal opinion,

the Chinese comrades have also already learned from the experiences of the past years, and there are signs that they put an end to the communes' "egalitarianist" system of distribution and are giving more space to individual farms, etc. That the last plenum of the Chinese fraternal party put the blame for the condition of agriculture entirely on weather and natural disasters is the business of the Chinese, said Comrade Puzanov, although the way we communists become even stronger is exactly by openly admitting our mistakes. He told us that on the way back from the January CPSU Plenum, he came to Pyongyang via Beijing, and also informed Comrade Kim Il Sung about the work of the plenum. On this occasion, the issue of the grave economic situation in China was also raised. Comrade Kim Il Sung declared that they (the Koreans) can also feel the Chinese difficulties, since there are delays in the delivery of coking coal, etc., and foodstuffs are not being delivered to Korea either. According to Kim Il Sung, taking the Chinese situation into consideration, they do not want to hurry the Chinese deliveries. Concerning the people's communes, Comrade Kim Il Sung said that he also follows the recent measures related to this with great attention, and he knows the articles published in the Chinese press, as well. In his opinion, "it is not the name, nor the form that is important, but the content," and Comrade Puzanov, too, sees the essence of the issue in this.

Concerning this question, Comrade Puzanov made the final comment that Chinese Ambassador Qiao committed an "offense against his own party-consciousness" when he put the blame for their difficulties on the weather alone.

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 25
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 June 1961

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/e, 003643/1/1961. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

According to information we received from an acquaintance of ours who is a party member working in a ministry, on 27 March Comrade Kim Il Sung delivered a lecture at the party center on some issues regarding proletarian dictatorship in Korea. His speech was recorded, and it is studied together with the Red Letter and collectively listened to by party and state cadres down to the middle level.

Kim Il Sung called attention to the country's complicated situation in cadre policy. Only about 0.5 percent (!) of the population has no relatives who live in the South, were collaborators of the Japanese or the Americans, or are elements of class-alien origin, etc. Nonetheless, the party lead-

ership is firm and experienced [...]. He condemned dictatorial methods in party and mass work, citing Ho Ka-i as an example of someone who was unmasked during the liquidation of factions and who, as the secretary of the CC, had disciplined 500 thousand party members out of 700 thousand in the course of the [1950-1951] retreat (later he committed suicide). He emphasized that the primary task of the Communists was to provide well-being for the popular masses, and they had to do their work primarily through re-education. In spite of its complicated composition, the 99.5 percent of the population cannot be considered as enemies, for in this case the Ch'ollima movement, etc. would be out of the question. The enemy wishes that the Communists make mistakes, that there are dissensions in their ranks, and that the relationship between Communists and non-members becomes tense. For instance, during the short period of occupation the Americans did their best to establish as many [anti-Communist] organizations as possible so as to provoke the Communists into forming suspicions about as many people as possible and [creating] sharp tensions within the population [...] after their [the Americans'] retreat. One must see that, and we must not bring grist to the enemy's mill through our actions.

In what follows Com. Kim Il Sung pointed out that in the DPRK, the [sharp] edge of proletarian dictatorship was directed against the former collaborators of the Japanese and the Americans, the former landlords, capitalists, and kulaks, then he proceeded to analyze these categories.

Those who occupied various minor administrative posts, were members of the civil defense, etc., before liberation cannot be reckoned among the collaborators of the Japanese.

It must be taken into consideration that almost every Korean over 30 was compelled to work [under the Japanese] so as to make a living, and neither they nor their children can be qualified as "bad people" for that. It is the former high-ranking officials, provincial etc. functionaries, confidential clerks, factory owners, police leaders, etc. who are considered friends of the Japanese.

Nor is the dictatorship directed against all religious people, only against the priests who collaborated with the USA. Religion is essentially a superstition, and the same holds true of Christianity, but the latter, due to its foreign origin, always remained foreign to the Korean people.

Superstitions of Korean origin must be weeded out through education. Comrade Kim Il Sung cited as an example that his grandmother had also prayed for him while he was still fighting with the partisans. Kang Ryong-uk (Kim Il-Sung's uncle, now the chairman of the Democratic Party and the vice-chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly) also was a good priest, he prayed a lot, but his children protest against being called "priest's children".

After liberation, the landlords opposed land reform, and the kulaks stood up against collectivization; therefore, proletarian dictatorship is directed against them as well. However, Kim Il Sung declared emphatically that proletarian dictatorship had never been directed against the middle strata of peasantry, then advised the leaders not to underestimate the masses, no matter how complicated the cadre situation was.

He dealt separately with the issue of those who had been collaborators under the temporary occupation. The great majority of them were forced to do some service for the occupying troops, for the most part they did it unintentionally. He remarked that they wished Koreans had not served in the South Korean puppet army either, but one had to reckon with these circumstances as well. Several former collaborators later held their own bravely in the [Korean] People's Army and in peacetime work. One must also take into consideration that the landlords, etc. often did not participate in person in the various actions but forced others to carry them out, and they themselves attempted to remain in the background. Similarly, one must draw a distinction between those who fled to the South and the members of their families who remained here.

The aforesaid could not mean the weakening of class struggle, Kim Il Sung said, the latter went on, but it was directed only against the objects of proletarian dictatorship.

With regard to intra-party re-education, he pointed out that one had to look after those who had made mistakes, they had to be judged, or rehabilitated later, on the basis of their work. Within the party, the struggle may take two shapes: purge or re-education. Comrade Kim Il Sung considers the latter as the more appropriate and progressive, even in those cases when some people kept their class background, etc., secret from the party but held their own in work. In conclusion, he emphasized that "if we were incapable of carrying out re-education work within the party, how could we re-educate and transform the masses?", and "if we do not complete this work in the North, we will not be able to obtain results in the South either".

According to our informant, the aforementioned issues are studied primarily in the party organs of the offices, in enterprise and factory party organizations they constitute a lesser problem. [...]

Károly Práth
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 26
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 29 March 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 8. doboz, 5/f, 004108/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 29 March, Com. Reuter, the press attaché of the German Embassy, paid a visit to Com. Fendler, and informed him about the conversation that had recently taken place between Com. Provisional Chargé d'Affaires Stark and Com. Pak, head of the F[oreign] M[inistry]'s First Department.

For the latter's information, Com. Stark handed the copy of the memorandum written by the GDR government on the German question to Com. Pak. In the course of the conversa-

tion, Com. Pak dwelt at length upon the fact that the Korean situation greatly differed from that of Germany, [because] *in Korea, as opposed to Germany, there did not exist two states but only one, and the armistice demarcation line could not be considered a border* [emphasis in the original]. (Com. Reuter emphasized that the conversation had been initiated by the departmental head.)

Concerning the *peaceful coexistence* [emphasis in the original] of the two Germanys, Com. Pak remarked that in Korea, other methods were needed, "we cannot wait until the population of South Korea starves to death!" With regard to that, he also mentioned that economic competition was not the best method, and "class struggle is inseparable from war."

In the course of the conversation, the quotations from Lenin that had been published in *Nodong Sinmun* several times, and the issue of revisionism cropped up. Com. Pak stated that due to the great distance [between the two countries], Yugoslav revisionism had not affected Korea, and that time they (Korea) were occupied in fighting dogmatism. Now the situation has changed, because "the revisionist danger is close to us, the wind of revisionism is blowing toward us from all the four cardinal points, from South Korea, Japan, and another direction".

[...]

József Kovács
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 27
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 5 April 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/a, 0025/RT/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...]

The Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party discussed the 22nd Congress of the CPSU on 27 November, and on the evidence of Kim Il Sung's speech, which was also published in the newspapers (probably in an abridged version), they considered the issue (the cult of personality, the Albanian question, and so on) as practically closed, although, in our view, public opinion was greatly interested in it. The so-called "Tae-an instructions" of Kim Il-sung, and the reorganization of industrial management (which has not yet been completed), occurred after the November plenum, then the members of the Political Committee visited the most important industrial plants in order to guide the reorganization. According to very confidential information we received at the end of December (from a party worker in Hamhung), Com. Kim Ch'ang-man—a member of the Political Committee and the vice-chairman of the CC, who otherwise deals primarily

with ideological work—visited the Hamhung artificial fertilizer factory in connection with the “Taeon reorganization”. Before an invited audience of Hamhung city and provincial party leaders, Kim Ch’ang-man declared that the leaders of the CPSU had adopted a revisionist point of view regarding peaceful co-existence, proletarian dictatorship, and so on. According to our informant, he did not approve the openly anti-Soviet outbursts of the Albanian leaders, but emphasized that in the debate, “the CPSU is not right in every respect either.” [...]

To our knowledge, in February and March similar lectures were delivered in the party organizations of the capital and of the more important provincial centers. In some places they spoke about the revisionist threat just in general, whereas in other places they made concrete references to the leaders of the CPSU. At the end of February, the issue of the revisionist threat suddenly appeared in the press as well [...].

With regard to the food shortage, statements like “we have no apple, because we must export everything” are made, although they failed to ship even the minimal quantity the USSR had contracted in 1961, and the USSR canceled the arrears.

Although at the plenum held at the end of November Kim Il Sung declared that the cult of personality and the Albanian question must not be discussed in the Korean Workers’ Party and in Korea, the relevant statements of the 22nd Congress, albeit not always in their entirety, became quite widely known. It was obvious that the aforesaid objections were essentially attributable to the issue of the personality cult. From the end of January on, a certain tension was already noticeable; in the last two months, quite substantial (and, in a number of cases, sudden) replacements took place in the ranks of the middle-level (party and state) functionaries, which affected low-level employees as well. [...] a number of people have been transferred to the countryside, or simply sent to the mines. Surveillance of foreigners has been greatly tightened up, they are often shadowed, and those Koreans who have contacts with the Embassies here are particularly watched. [...] in early February, everywhere in the capital meetings were held in the institutions, enterprises, etc., in order to warn workers against having contacts with foreigners; they were told that no one was permitted to visit any Embassy without the previous consent of higher organs, and such a visitor would be obliged to give an account of his visit. At several universities and colleges, students were warned against corresponding with foreign (fraternal) countries. Korean subscribers, even in institutions, receive *Pravda* and other Soviet publications very incompletely, and in several places the local party organs got them to cancel their subscription “voluntarily.” Several of our acquaintances were also “exiled” for their contacts with foreigners [...].

At the very beginning of March, Com. Kulaevsky [*Pravda’s* correspondent in North Korea] and Com. Fendler had interesting talks with [...] a Soviet Korean who repatriated in 1946, and on the basis of his chance remarks, [we learned that] he will travel to Tashkent on the way back from his holiday in order to “visit his relatives”, and he may not

even return home. These circumstances presumably “loosened his tongue” to a certain extent.) Com. Kim depicted the internal situation of the DPRK in the following manner:

In the wake of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, a rather tense situation has developed in Korea. The objections to the line of the CPSU are rooted in the personality cult. [...] He remarked that the slogan *charyok kaengsaeng*—“regeneration through one’s own efforts”—is also of Chinese origin, and—in his personal opinion—the *juche* slogan has little to do with “the application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the Korean reality,” it is in essence a manifestation of subjectivism. There is also an intense distrust of Koreans of Soviet origin. (This is also confirmed by other sources.) Finally, Com. Kim stated that the Korean internal situation was rather delicate (*shchekotlivy*), a great number of people were thinking about the effects of the 22nd Congress [...], but “they have shut everybody (including the F[oreign] M[inistry]) up,” and this is why people kept silent.

According to the informant of ours who is employed at the party committee of Hamhung, “political control” has been tightened up with an iron hand in the last months. Local party organizations must regularly prepare reports about the mood of the population, and in these reports they must constantly watch what the masses know about the aforesaid problematic issues (the Albanian question, etc.). Of those Koreans who had visited foreign countries or lived in the Soviet Union, the names of the “more suspicious” ones were recorded. Simultaneously with the political tension, he said, there were also difficulties in the economy, particularly in industry and the supply of goods. The so-called “Taeon reorganization” is going on, but it is dubious whether it facilitates solving the basic economic issues [...]. Living standards have declined, the prices of several textile products were raised, and [...] maize, barley, etc. is substituted for 30 to 50 percent of the rice ration. With reference to that, anonymous letters were sent to the Central Committee, and the issue was also discussed at the exclusive meetings of the party action committees. Women are complaining more and more often that there is nothing to buy. There is a general weariness among the people due to the rapid pace and rush which has been going on for years and which now became even more intense because of the introduction of compulsory physical work (one day per week). In March, the institutions and offices in Pyongyang switched over to a 5 day work week; employees perform physical work on the sixth day of the week, and, in addition to the daily political programs which last for two hours, there is compulsory collective political study on Sunday mornings. For instance, the F[oreign] M[inistry] does not operate on Saturdays.

[...]

József Kovács
Ambassador

DOCUMENT No. 28**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 28 May 1962**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-k Korea, 8. doboz, 15/b, 005805/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

At the Czechoslovak reception on 9 May, Comrade Fendler, while having a conversation with Comrade Cho Byong-hui, the Deputy Head of the Press Department, asked him for information about the character of the major South Korean newspapers and news agencies [...]. Comrade Chong, an employee of the Press Department, received Comrade Fendler on 24 May, and informed him in detail (enclosed please find the evaluation of each newspaper).

[...] At the reception on 9 May, Comrade Cho Byong-hui referred to the fact that certain South Korean newspapers, while beginning their articles with appreciation of the policies and [...] efforts of the government, cautiously pointed out that “there are still some shortcomings.” The tone of the provincial newspapers is more dissenting than that of the metropolitan press, because in the countryside, particularly in the southernmost provinces, economic conditions are worse (the uprising of April 1960 also started in Masan), and the national feeling of the intelligentsia is also stronger in the countryside. Nonetheless, articles containing veiled criticism pass the censor time after time, considering the isolation of Park Chung-hee, which is substantial enough in any case, and international public opinion.

The conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere, and finally Comrade Chong, on his own initiative, stressed that they would be ready to inform the Embassy at any time, and referred appreciatively to the relationship between the Korean Embassy in Budapest and the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

[...]

József Kovács
Ambassador

*Appendix 1**Characterization of major South Korean newspapers:*1) *Han'guk Ilbo* [...]

The newspaper is owned by a stock company representing capitalist commercial interests, and it is solidly funded. It frequently publishes reviews, summaries, and long editorials. This newspaper was of an oppositional character as early as under Syngman Rhee, and at present it also criticizes the military government and the USA, though not consistently. Its circulation once exceeded one hundred thousand, but it has somewhat decreased since the coup.[...]

2) *Kukje Sinmun* [...]

It is published in Pusan, one of the largest seaports in

South Korea, owned by a stock company, and firmly funded; in terms of size and influence, it is equivalent to the metropolitan newspapers, and its circulation is one of the widest. [...]

Its editorial staff is very talented [...]. Under Chang Myon's government, this newspaper was the one that demanded the unification of the country most actively, and at present it is also the strongest critic of the “military government,” it published several anti-US articles. It set forth, by and large, Comrade Kim Il Sung's proposals of 15 August 1960 (confederation), and valued them highly.

3) *Ryongnam Ilbo* [...]

A newspaper of oppositional attitude, it was founded in October 1946 in the city of Taegu. It published news, which revealed the policies of the “military government” and the present South Korean situation, and it recently called upon the other newspapers not to humble themselves before the government. It happened several times that it rated the guerrilla struggles of the 1930s highly, and demanded the peaceful unification [of the country] on the basis of revolutionary traditions. Its negative side is that it disseminates “Yankee culture” in the same way as the other newspapers do.

4) *Pusan Ilbo* [...]

A Japanese newspaper before liberation, it was refashioned in 1946. Originally a mouthpiece of the Pusan commercial circles, it has gradually turned to politics. It is a many-sided and interesting newspaper, and in recent times it has published oppositional news more than once. Its finances are low.

5) *Tonga Ilbo* [...]

One of the oldest newspapers in Seoul, its first issue appeared on 1 April 1920. Under Japanese rule, then under Syngman Rhee, it was repressed several times; it was banned during World War II. Owned by a stock company, it is firmly funded, and its circulation is around 150 thousand.

It was a mouthpiece of the former Democratic Party and the landowners, and as such, it attacked the former Liberal Party of Syngman Rhee, it was a competitor of *Seoul Sinmun*. Its critical tone has become faint since the military coup, it expresses the interests of the landowners, and it deals with the inflow of foreign capital from this angle.

6) *Kyonghyang Sinmun*

A Catholic newspaper in Seoul, it was founded in the autumn of 1946 with moderate funds. It criticized Syngman Rhee, for which it was once suppressed. Under Chang Myon, it was a mouthpiece of the government, at present it has an anti-Communist disposition. Park Chung-hee aspires to make it, together with *Seoul Sinmun*, a government newspaper.

7) *Choson Ilbo* [...]

Founded in 1920, it is a newspaper with meager funds and a narrow circulation. Under Syngman Rhee, it had been neutral as a rule, in recent times it has cautiously criticized

the “military government” time after time.

It had been the official newspaper of the Japanese Government-General, then of the regime of Syngman Rhee, and for this reason its editorial office was set on fire by the people in April 1960. The newspaper of Park Chung-hee in recent times, it is firmly funded, but its influence is insignificant. It is a reactionary newspaper, but it is afraid of public feeling. [...] It appears in 100 thousand copies. [...]



DOCUMENT No. 29

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 27 August 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0066/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

Comrade V.P. Moskovsky, the new Soviet Ambassador, paid me an introductory visit on 22 August, which I returned 2 days later. The subject of our two conversations was, above all, the development of Soviet-Korean relations [...].

Before his departure for Korea, he was received by Comrade Khrushchev who gave him important guidelines concerning [Soviet] policies toward the KWP and the DPRK.

Comrade Khrushchev explained that, in his view, they had made a mistake when they applied *mechanically* [emphasis in the original] the criticism of Stalin’s personality cult to the Korean Workers’ Party. It was a well-known characteristic of Stalin’s working method that he did not travel to the provinces, he visited neither factories nor co-ops, he ran the country locking himself up in the center, so he had no contact with the masses. For instance, at the time of the [Great] Patriotic War, he never visited the front to inquire into the situation on the spot, he always directed the military operations exclusively from the center.

This cannot be said of Kim Il Sung. The person in question regularly tours the country, inquires into the work of the factories and co-ops, and, thus, he has quite extensive contacts with the workers and the peasantry. Kim Il Sung has certain new conceptions, and these may be illuminating for us as well. For instance, he holds a CC meeting on the spot in the countryside if that facilitates better understanding of the question of the day. (Such a case was the CC session dealing with the development of fruit production held on 7 April 1961 in the district of Pukch’ong.) For instance, said Comrade Khrushchev, one can approve of the resolution passed by the CC last November on the reorganization of industrial management, disregarding a few errors. The district directorates established for agricultural management also must be considered as positive.

It is also known, said Comrade Khrushchev, that in the policy of the KWP and the DPRK, one can usually observe a vacillation between the Soviet Union and China. If we do not

strive to improve Soviet-Korean relations, these will obviously become weaker, and at the same time the Chinese connection will get stronger, we will make that possible for them, we will even push them directly toward China. Comrade Khrushchev instructed Comrade Moskovsky to do his best to improve relations between the CPSU CC and the KWP CC, and between the two governments.

At the same time, Comrade Khrushchev sent a message to Kim Il Sung through the Ambassador, in which he wanted to communicate that the CPSU CC and the Soviet government considered that Soviet-Korean relations were making good progress, they [the Soviets] were satisfied with it, and they saw no obstacle to the further improvement of relations, indeed they strove for it.

When Comrade Moskovsky delivered Comrade Khrushchev’s message to Kim Il Sung, the latter cheered up and likewise stated that they were also satisfied with the development of relations between their respective countries, and he agreed with Comrade Khrushchev that they had to intensify their relations even further.

[...] Comrade Moskovsky told me the story of the proposal for a Korean visit by a Soviet party and government delegation headed by Comrade Khrushchev. [...] When they [the Soviets] made this proposal, Kim Il Sung had not yet fully recovered from his nephrotomy. But it had been more than probable, said the Soviet Ambassador, that it was not because of his illness that they [the Koreans] kept delaying the answer, but because Comrade Khrushchev’s visit to the Far East would have put China in an awkward position. Therefore, he went on, the reply was presumably delayed because they asked the Chinese about the issue. After 10 days of waiting, the Soviet comrades withdrew their proposal with the explanation that Comrade Khrushchev was about to make a tour in order to observe the defense system in the northern part of the country, and, thus, he would not have time to visit Korea this year. When the Ambassador paid Kim Il Sung an introductory visit, the latter apologized to him, saying that he had been ill that time and the Central Committee could not come to a decision quickly on this issue. At the same time he assured Comrade Moskovsky that since the physicians had already given him permission to work 4 hours per day and he did work, he would receive the visit of Comrade Khrushchev with pleasure this year or any time next year, whenever the Soviet government considered that appropriate.

In Comrade Moskovsky’s view, Comrade Khrushchev’s visit to Korea will take place in all probability in the coming year.

In the opinion of the new Ambassador, recently a certain improvement has become noticeable in Soviet-Korean relations. The staff of the Embassy and the military attaché are received by the Korean functionaries more promptly than before, and they are even allowed to inspect certain issues concerning the M[inistry] of D[efense] and the M[inistry] of I[nternal Affairs]. As mentioned above, Kim Il Sung received the message of Comrade Khrushchev with pleasure, he agreed with the idea of improving relations between the two countries. The Korean leaders also favorably received the Soviet

supplies intended to serve the DPRK's defense needs, including submarines and facilities strengthening the defense of P'yongyang. Since his arrival (on 9th August) he has already met Kim Il Sung two times, the latter is very friendly to him, and he hopes he will also succeed in establishing a good personal relationship with him.

Of his predecessor, Comrade Puzanov, he said that during his five-year stay here, he [Puzanov] had had a very good relationship with Kim Il Sung for more than 3 years. However, for approximately 9 months before his departure no opportunity to meet the Prime Minister had been given to him, and Comrade Puzanov's farewell visit to Kim Il Sung lasted merely 10 minutes. They [the Soviets] themselves do not know it either, but presumably something was not right between his predecessor and Kim Il Sung. It was the impression of the organs at home that the good relationship established earlier between them had deteriorated, particularly in the last year.

József Kovács
Ambassador



DOCUMENT No. 30
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, August 1962

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 002304/1/RT/1962. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

At the end of July I had a long heart-to-heart talk with a close Korean friend of mine [...].

The Korean comrade told me that in his opinion, the primary reason for the current economic problems of Korea was bad economic planning [...]. In the course of drawing up national plans for each branch of industry, they naturally take the capacity of the individual enterprises and factories as their starting-point. Preparation of the plans takes place, by and large, in the following manner: the competent employees of the central organs visit the enterprise or factory in question, and the latter's director informs them about its capacity and potentialities. The comrades coming "from above" usually find that insufficient, and they generally turn to the workers in the matter of the next year's plan. With an adequate political arrangement, one can always find some so-called "hurray" men, who assume production obligations that are well over what can be fulfilled [...]. The plan for the factory is made on the basis of these pledges, and the director, if he happens to protest, will be branded a "backward-looking" man, which often leads to his qualification as politically unreliable and to his dismissal. Of course, a plan drawn up in this way cannot be fulfilled either by the enterprise or the branch of industry, and this also affects the other branches, since the same unrealistic plan targets are given as index numbers

for the related industries as well.

The phenomenon described above is observable not only on lower levels but also on the highest level. My informant told me that recently, Comrade Deputy Premier Chong Chun-t'aek, the chairman of the National Planning Office, and several of his high-ranking subordinates, paid a visit to Comrade Kim Il Sung, and they frankly revealed the situation of the vynalon factory.

In accordance with the 1962 plan, the factory should produce 10 thousand tons of vynalon, but due to various technological and other difficulties, so far it has produced a mere 5 or 6 tons per day. According to my informant, Comrade Kim Il Sung received this information with exasperation, he literally chased Chong Chun-t'aek and the others out from his office. Several high-ranking employees of the National Planning Office were soon dismissed and expelled from the party.

The Korean comrade told me that although Comrade Kim Il Sung had good organizational skills, his general theoretical and economic learning was very scanty, he usually liked to do his work in a "military" way. My informant explained this as follows: Kim Il Sung compares every issue to a front-line battle, that is, we always face some enemy to be defeated (in the case of production, nature is the enemy). For this reason, Comrade Kim Il Sung cannot study certain economic issues concretely and closely, he regards the embellished reports as true. He [the informant] cited as an example that whenever it was announced to him [Kim Il Sung] that they wished to overfulfill the plan targets of the given factory or branch by so many percentages in the following plan period, he always took this approvingly and contentedly. As I already mentioned, it is very frequent that the plans lack a real basis, but this comes to light only along the way, which again ends in the replacement of the professional leaders.

"Unfortunately," my informant said, "certain members of the Political Committee take advantage of this weakness of Kim Il Sung, and they regularly mislead him." The Korean comrade cited Comrade Deputy Premier Yi Chong-ok, the chairman of the Committee of Heavy Industry, as an example [...]. He also remarked that in the opinion of Kim Il Sung and the Party Center, the issue of political guidance was of single and exclusive importance in solving any problem, that is, this slogan resulted in a disregard of professional considerations, and often in a disdain for the latter. Of course, this does not promote solving the issue of technical cadres, which is difficult in any case. The rise of careerists and people of that ilk, and the thrusting of the few technical experts into the background and their designation as politically unreliable on fictitious charges, is a common occurrence. At the same time, the Party Center and the central organs constantly send various teams of inspectors to each area or factory; there are often 5 or 6 different control teams in a place, who disturb the work there with their activity, undermine the authority of the local leaders, and so on.

The various and constant political campaigns do not promote work in all cases.

In what follows, the Korean comrade told me that on 19th June, a secret meeting had been held at the Party Center, and its subject was the preparation of the 1963 economic plan. Comrade Kim Il Sung also attended the meeting and made a speech. To the knowledge of my informant, the two focal points of the next year's plan are the development of agriculture and the development of the defense industry. The Korean comrades pay increased attention to the development of defense capabilities, they will begin the construction of a very large defense factory in the city of Kanggye, near the Korean-Chinese border, in the immediate future. In higher circles, the extension of the 7 Year Plan (1961-67) by one year, through the omission of the year of 1963 from the period of the 7-year plan [...], is taken into consideration. A decision has not yet been made, but according to my informant, the issue is not likely to be published at all. In his opinion, the omission of the coming year would lead to a "transition" year comparable to the year of 1960 [...].

According to my Korean friend, the six months' report that was recently published by the Office of Statistics reflects not just an embellished situation but a falsified one, since [...] the six main targets of this year's plan are unreal, and there is no guarantee at all of their fulfillment.

At the end of June, Comrade Kulaevsky, TASS's correspondent in Pyongyang, also informed me of what he had heard of the background of the slogan *charyok kaengsaeng*, i.e. thriving unaided. As is well-known, this slogan, which covers a highly autarkic and nationalist tendency, was set by Comrade Kim Il Sung at the plenum of the Korean Workers' Party CC last December, and since then it has become the cornerstone of Korean domestic and economic policies and ideological work. According to the information Comrade Kulaevsky got from a Korean party worker, the slogan is in fact nothing else but the reaction of the Korean party leadership to the XXIIInd Congress, the self-defense of the regime of personality cult. According to what we have heard, at the March CC plenum Comrade Kim Il Sung, while explaining the slogan, allegedly declared that "we must prepare for the contingency that the Soviet Union will cast us aside in the same way as happened to Albania."

This information is confirmed by other sources and by the fact that the Korean press published only a short piece of news about the last COMECON session that had been held in Moscow, and it did not publish the document on the basic principles of international division of labor. Otherwise, the press and party education do not study the issues of international division of labor; according to certain pieces of information we received, this issue is often branded a "revisionist" one.

Comment: Autarkic tendencies had been felt in the economy of the DPRK even earlier, but in 1960—presumably due to the "transition year"—some subsidence in this field and a more or less realistic attitude were observable. The Korean comrades distanced themselves from the various mistakes the Chinese comrades had made in economic policy, and they even gave their opinion of them [the mistakes] within the party, [informing functionaries] to middle-level cadres

inclusive. In the second half of last year, particularly since the December plenum, autarkic tendencies have again been felt to a great extent.

Regarding the relationship [of the DPRK] with China, one cannot say that their standpoint is identical in every respect, although Korean-Chinese relations have greatly intensified in the last year and a half. According to the Korean friend of mine whom I mentioned in the early parts of my memorandum, there is an undeniable identity of Korean and Chinese views in the line of foreign policy, which manifests itself primarily in that both regard the anti-imperialist struggle and the colonial-national [*sic*] liberation movement as the most important task of our time. At the same time, my friend also remarked that in the field of economic policy, the Koreans still did not adopt, for instance, Chinese agricultural policy, etc., and they had other reservations as well. Another Korean acquaintance of mine [...] recently [...] suddenly remarked: "Do not think that we follow the Chinese line in every respect."

For the time being, the Korean comrades—approx. since May—outwardly intensely emphasize the unity of the socialist camp and the friendship of its peoples, on the surface they make an effort to maintain a balance between the USSR and China (see the first anniversaries of the Treaties of Cooperation), and the F[oreign] M[inistry] behaves in a friendly manner towards the D[iplomatic] C[orps] in Pyongyang; as opposed to the past, programs are frequently organized; etc. It's just possible that it is the result of the visit of Peng Zhen (in April and May), who may have warned the Korean comrades for "tactical" reasons.

Károly Fendler



DOCUMENT No. 31

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 February 1963

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 6. doboz, 5/d, 0011/RT/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

The December session of the KWP Central Committee passed a resolution to reinforce the defense of the country. According to the resolution, a strong defense system must be established in the whole country, the population must be armed, and the country must be kept in a state of mobilization.

From what I hear, at present large-scale work is going on throughout the country, in the mountains not only entrenchments but also air-raid shelters for the population are being built. As the Soviet Ambassador informed me, in a conversation between him and Kim Il Sung the latter explained that the geographical conditions of the country (mountainous terrain) gave a certain advantage to them in case of an atomic

war, for the mountains warded off the explosions to a substantial extent, and to wreak large-scale destruction in the country, many such bombs would be needed. The construction of these air-raid shelters is presumably related to this theory.

The Czechoslovak Ambassador informed me that the Koreans propagated a theory that cited the South Vietnamese events as an example. In that country, there is essentially a war against the Diemist authority and the American imperialist troops, and, as is well-known, the partisan units have succeeded in winning over more and more territory from the influence of the Diemist puppet government. In spite of this, the Americans make no attempt to use atomic bombs. Does anything support the assumption that the Americans would act otherwise in case of a South Korean war, then? It is obvious that there is nothing to support it.

Comrade Czechoslovak Ambassador Moravec also told me that at the dinner party Deputy Foreign Minister Kim T'ae-hui had had [...], Major General Ch'ang Chong-hwan, the Korean representative of the Panmunjom Armistice Commission, approached in him after dinner, and put the following question to him: "What would you do if some day the enemy took one of the two rooms of your flat?" "Whatever happens, I would resort to methods which did not run the risk of destroying the whole building or the whole city [...]," Comrade Moravec replied. Thereupon [Major] General Ch'ang threw a cigarette-box, which he had held in his hand, on the table, and left him standing. It was also Comrade Moravec who informed me that recently, the percentage of rice in the rations of Pyongyang residents had been reduced (hitherto approx. 50 percent of the ration had been given in rice). It was supplemented by maize and potato (80 decagram of rice = 2.5 kg of potato). Presumably they kept back rice so as to reserve it, the Czechoslovak Ambassador remarked.

At the same time, several articles were published in *Nodong Sinmun* and other Korean newspapers about the American imperialist theory of "local" and "special" wars, and the role of Asia in the strategic plans of the US military. [...]

I had a conversation with Comrade Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky about these issues. He told me the following: Recently he paid a visit to CC Vice-Chairman Pak Kum-ch'ol, to whom he forwarded a telegram from the competent Soviet authorities that invited several persons for a vacation in the Soviet Union. During his visit he asked Pak Kum-ch'ol what his opinion was of [...] the fact that Park Chung-hee and the South Korean military leaders recently had a talk with Meloy, the commander of the "UN troops," about the defense of South Korea. In the view of the CC Vice-Chairman, for the time being no adventurist military preparations were to be expected because of the following two reasons: 1) The transfer of power to civilian authorities was going on, that is, they were putting other clothes on the Fascist dictatorship, and they were busy with that. 2) The South Korean economic situation was difficult, and it was inconceivable under the circumstances that they would make serious preparations in order to pursue adventurist aims.

The CC Vice-Chairman also expounded their viewpoint concerning South Korea. After Syngman Rhee had been driven away, when Chang Myon was in power, but even as late as the beginning of last year, their view on the South Korean situation was that a successful opposition to the Fascist dictatorship, led by the students and the intelligentsia, was possible. By now it has become obvious that there is no chance of it, and Park Chung-hee has even succeeded in improving the country's economic situation to a certain extent. In these circumstances one cannot negotiate with the Fascist dictatorship on peaceful unification, and the process of the country's unification drags on.[...]

As regards the resolution of the CC, Comrade Moskovsky also thinks that arming the population and keeping it in a state of mobilization is a rather unusual measure in peacetime. The economic situation of both North Korea and China is quite difficult, they have a lot of problems. Under the circumstances a military action is hardly to be expected from them. Or on the contrary? "Would their economic difficulties possibly plunge them into some adventure?," Comrade Moskovsky asked. It is not easy to say yes or no to such questions. The first sentence of the resolution of the December plenum begins as follows: The development of the international situation is favorable to the Korean revolution. However, the remaining part of the resolution tries to refute that, while Pak Kum-ch'ol said they were not threatened by any southern adventurist provocation. If they look upon the situation in that light, [...] why are these unusual defense measures needed?

As is well-known, last year the Korean leaders had specially asked the Soviet government to have the issue of the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea put on the agenda of the 17th UN session, the Soviet Ambassador went on. But when the session opened, the government of the DPRK declared that the UN was not competent to deal with the Korean question. Unfortunately, the fact was that we often heard contradictory opinions here, Comrade Moskovsky said.

I agree with Comrade Moskovsky that the policy of the Korean leaders is not an unvarying and consistent one. Otherwise, these contradictory statements serve the aim that they [the North Koreans] can justify [their actions] in any event.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)

DOCUMENT No. 32**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 26 August 1963**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0034/RT/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

During the visit I paid to the Soviet Ambassador on 24 August, I was informed of the following:

A few days after Comrade Moskovsky returned from holiday, Romanian Ambassador M. Bodnăra° called on him and informed him about the following issues, which are of some interest.

To begin with, the Romanian Ambassador emphasized how impatiently he had been waiting for his [Moskovsky's] return, because he wanted to inform Comrade Moskovsky of the events that had taken place in his absence before he [Bodnăra°] would go on holiday (he will leave for Bucharest on 28th August). For in the last one and a half months, Bodnăras was received twice by Kim Il Sung, and they discussed the widening of Romanian-Korean relations and issues of party politics.

At the first meeting Kim Il Sung, giving [Bodnăra°] a very warm welcome, asked the Ambassador to ensure that the Korean government delegation, which had left for Romania in order to discuss economic issues, be received at an appropriately high level. Among the members of the delegation there were two high-ranking party functionaries, Kim Il Sung said; thus, it would be possible even for leading Romanian party functionaries to negotiate with the delegation. Bodnăras promised to convey all this to the higher organs.

The second meeting took place at Kim Il Sung's invitation, and it lasted for not less than four hours. Among others, Kim Il Sung told Bodnăra° that the relations between their countries were developing in a pleasing way, and they [the North Koreans] were seriously determined to widen these relations even further, in a multilateral form. They intended to increase the volume of trade between the two countries approx. *ten times* [emphasis in the original] as early as next year or the year after that. Romania has a developed manufacturing industry, and they (the Koreans) have also developed that branch of industry. In Kim Il Sung's view, a close cooperation should be established between the engineering industries of the two countries. It would be necessary for them primarily for two reasons: First, with Romanian assistance they could get new machines produced in the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries. Second, it is to be expected that as a consequence of the disagreements between the CPSU and the CCP, the Soviet Union will reduce the amount of machinery exported to the DPRK. In case of such cooperation, the Romanian comrades would make good the losses they may suffer as a result of these reductions.

Kim Il Sung also said that Soviet geologists had been searching for oil in the DPRK for a rather long time, but, unfortunately, they did not find oil. They [the North Koreans] are of the opinion that the Soviet geologists intention-

ally searched for oil in places where indeed no oil was to be found, and, thus, it was not accidental that the large-scale search for oil ended unsuccessfully. Now they ask for Romanian geologists for this purpose, and he assures the Romanian Ambassador that the Romanian geologists arriving here will get every possible assistance from the Korean authorities. Hopefully, their efforts will be more successful than those of the Soviet geologists.

In Kim Il Sung's view, at present Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej is the sole party and state leader in Europe that he (Kim Il Sung) can negotiate with as an equal partner. Therefore, he holds him and the other leaders of the Romanian party in great esteem.

Ambassador Bodnăra° told Comrade Moskovsky that in the course of their conversation, Kim Il Sung had criticized the Chinese leaders for the extremist tone they used in attacking the CPSU. As noted by the Romanian Ambassador, Kim Il Sung did not agree with the line of the CPSU either. The worsening of relations between the KWP and the CPSU began as early as 1956, with Mikoyan's visit to Korea. Mikoyan's role in the intra-party factional struggles had a negative impact on their relations with the Soviet leaders. Nevertheless, they had the factionalist Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik sentenced and executed; they may have acted otherwise if they had had the present perspective, Kim Il Sung said. In the opinion of Romanian Ambassador Bodnăras, Kim Il Sung is a clever man, he pursues a sensible foreign and domestic policy, and he personally agrees with this policy.

Then the Romanian Ambassador explained to Comrade Moskovsky the standpoint of their party. They disapprove of the policies of the Chinese leaders, but they do not follow the CPSU as closely as the Czechoslovaks do. Under the guidance of the Romanian Workers' Party, they also build socialism in Romania, for there is no other way and it cannot be otherwise, but they want to do it in their own special way. Making use of the advantages of their country, in a certain sense they want to reach socialism according to their own ideas.

Finally, Bodnăra° emphasized to Comrade Moskovsky that he still had a lot to say, but because of the lack of time, he could not go on now. He came to an agreement with Comrade Moskovsky to meet with him again on 27 August, when he would speak more about his negotiations with Kim Il Sung.

In the opinion of Comrade Moskovsky, it is perfectly plain that Bodnăra° never participated in the party movement, his familiarity with Marxist-Leninist theoretical issues is extremely weak, [the following part of the sentence crossed out in the original document] but he is a good hunter and angler. Comrade Moskovsky is of the opinion that one should look after the Romanian Ambassador. We must attempt to speak with him several times so as to steer him in the right direction.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)

DOCUMENT No. 33**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 2 October 1963**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 30/b, 005273/1/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

As I already reported, the Korean organs frequently adopt an incomprehensible position on the question of so-called mixed marriages (expulsion of Korean husbands from the capital, restrictions on the movement of their wives, who are citizens of the Soviet Union or other fraternal countries, and so on). Recently the Soviet comrades experienced an even more offensive attitude on the part of the Koreans, about which Comrade Moskovsky told me the following:

Before the holiday of 9 September, one of the Soviet women, accompanied by two children, presented herself at the Soviet Embassy, her clothes torn and her body covered with bruises. The following had happened to her: two months earlier she had asked for permission to travel to Pyongyang from the countryside, for she wanted to leave for the Soviet Union for good. The provincial organs refused to fulfill her request. At first they refused her request without offering an explanation, then, before the holiday, they let the Soviet woman know that at the moment any travel to the capital was prohibited, neither Koreans nor foreigners were allowed to enter the capital during the preparations for the holiday of 9 September. However, the Soviet woman, a mother of two, was compelled to travel [to Pyongyang] due to her financial situation; therefore, she took a train to the centre [Pyongyang] in defiance of the prohibition. Following that, the provincial police took her to task on the train, and after a short argument, they began to beat her. The woman lost consciousness because of the strong blows, to the extent that she had to be brought round with water. After she had regained consciousness, the persons assaulting her left, and the people travelling on the train took care of her two children. She arrived in Pyongyang under such circumstances. The Soviet Embassy took her statements down, and a medical report was written about the woman's injuries.

Another case: recently two Soviet women applying for repatriation came to them. These two women had been prevented from travelling to Pyongyang for four months, while they [the North Korean authorities] made countless attempts to talk them into renouncing their Soviet citizenship and not returning to the Soviet Union, [alleging that] there was starvation in that country, the situation was extremely bleak and it was going from bad to worse, and now there was a relapse into capitalism in the Soviet Union; they cast such aspersions on the Soviet Union. "You should understand," the police explained to them, "that the situation will soon get much better here, Korea will unite in a short time, it will become a united and rich country, and the rapid improvement of living standards is to be expected." "Do not forget," the competent authorities went on, "that Korea is defended by [...] China, which is at present the strongest state in the world."

In recent months it happened four times, Comrade Moskovsky said, that Korean students asking for political asylum presented themselves at the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet comrades regularly order these "asylum-seekers" out of the Embassy, and in one case they even had to ask for the help of the police to this end. [...] the police later informed the Embassy that the student in question was insane and a mental hospital kept a record of him. In order to avoid the repetition of the cases described above, Comrade Moskovsky lodged an official protest with the competent Korean authorities. He emphasized that these [cases] were nothing a but provocations committed against the Embassy [...]. To this very day, he has not received a reply to his protest.

József Kovács
Ambassador

**DOCUMENT No. 34****Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 30 December 1963**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 10. doboz, 22/d, 0014/1963. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 29 December I met Comrade Moskovsky, who informed me of the following facts concerning his conversation with Pak Song-ch'ol.

The Korean government requested approval of its new ambassador to Moscow. Intentionally, they did not react to the request for two weeks, which made the Korean leaders rather nervous. Recently they finally replied [to the Koreans], and he met the Foreign Minister on this occasion. At the same time, Comrade Moskovsky took the opportunity to inform the minister about the December plenum of the CPSU CC. At first the minister made an attempt to evade this, but he failed.

The Soviet ambassador gave a short summary of Comrade Khrushchev's speech, and spoke about the great enthusiasm the report had elicited from the six thousand participants of the plenum. Pak Song-ch'ol then asked whether the Soviet government planned a raise in salaries or a cut in prices. Comrade Moskovsky informed him about what had been said by Comrade Khrushchev, who expounded in his closing speech that the leading comrades and CC members had discussed how to increase the living standards of the Soviet workers. Three alternatives cropped up. First, to raise the salaries. Second, to cut the prices. There is also a third solution, and although it is still just a plan, more and more CC members are favorably inclined towards it. For the point is that instead of the above two measures, the state would provide board and lodging for all children. In accordance with this plan, all urban and rural children up to the 8th grade of primary school would live in day nurseries, kindergartens

and day-care centres, and all related expenses, clothing included, would be met by the state. Of course, the parents, if they wished, would be allowed to take their children home every evening or on Sundays. This great action of the state would have several advantages; among others, the parents would be freed from all financial burden and partly from the responsibility for the rearing of their children. Another advantage would be that the education of children in state institutions and by trained pedagogues would rear a new generation, the man of Communism. All this took the Foreign Minister by surprise, he was obviously astonished and practically did not know what to reply.

Comrade Moskovsky then put a question to him about the achievements of 1963 and their plans concerning the next year. The minister informed Comrade Moskovsky that agricultural production was approximately on the same level as it had been last year. Industry generally fulfilled its plan, but they have a lot of problems. The backwardness of the Korean villages is a particularly burning question for the time being. While the urban workers get inexpensive flats, heating, lighting and clothing from the state, and enjoy what is provided by the theatres, cinemas, and other cultural institutions, all this is absent in the villages. The Korean peasants work from daybreak until nightfall, they have to pay for everything given to the cooperatives. In addition, the villages pay taxes for the work done by the machine-tractor stations. They pay for the equipment necessary for the cooperatives, they pay taxes for the water needed for irrigation, and they also have a number of other financial obligations to the state. The Korean villages are underdeveloped, there are no community centers or any similar institutions at their disposal. *At that time they adopted foreign experiences in the socialist development of Korean agriculture. They have come to the conclusion that this policy did not work in their country, it must be changed* [emphasis in the original]. A substantial part of the cooperatives, particularly the cooperatives in the highlands, got into debt to the state. As a consequence of such a great difference between cities and villages, the peasants flee the villages, everybody wants to go to the cities, which is, of course, an intolerable situation, because, for one thing, they do not intend to swell the urban population, and secondly, the food for the country's population must be produced, one cannot feed the people on coal and iron. Practice also proved that resettlement from the cities does not work either. The more disciplined part of the people, the party members maybe remain [in the villages], but the resettled non-members return clandestinely to the cities. As a consequence of all these facts, the party and government leaders came to the conclusion that the villages had to be fundamentally reorganized and the rural policies hitherto pursued had to be changed. They are considering that the same system which exists in the cities must be established in the villages too. Cultural institutions and state-owned houses have to be built, in other words, all the advantages enjoyed by the urban workers must be extended to the villages too. According to their conceptions, in the new villages, whose establishment is planned, a system of house-rents and all the

advantages provided by the state will be introduced for the peasantry too, similarly to the urban workers. They are aware that such a transformation of the villages requires huge investments. The issue of reducing industrial investments was brought up. The question was raised whether it was necessary for them to achieve the planned production of 2.5 million tons of steel and 500 million metres of textiles per year. Instead, it would be more sensible to limit steel production to 1 million tons and textile production to 300 million metres, and to invest the full amount of money saved this way in the villages. They will not set a limit to the exploitation of raw materials, they intend to develop it further, because these raw materials are exported too. Of course, the realization of all this is not just a financial problem. They know from experience that the Korean peasants are accustomed to their small, primitive houses. They were reared and raised there, and they do not want to move into new, modern houses. Of course, this is a subjective factor, but they have to take it into consideration in the plan aimed at the transformation of the villages, the minister said.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 35

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 11 January 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 0015/RT/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 January 1964 I invited Comrades Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky and Romanian Ambassador Bodnăra°, and their wives, to dinner. During the conversation that followed dinner, Comrade Moskovsky told me the following facts about Soviet problems which had arisen in years past in connection with the interpretation of the Korean political situation and perspectives.

The development of the Korean situation, and the fact that the Korean Workers' Party took sides with the Chinese party, took the Soviet comrades to some extent by surprise, because, among others, their former Ambassador, Puzanov (he was in Pyongyang between 1957 and 1962), failed to indicate, or underestimated, the tendencies and phenomena of Korean-Chinese rapprochement, which undoubtedly developed more and more as early as that time. Puzanov also took a negative view of the anxieties that were aroused by this development.

Comrade Moskovsky told me that after his arrival (in August 1962), on the basis of his conversations with the various Korean leaders, and his other impressions, etc., he had been obliged to form an idea [of the North Korean situation] that was entirely different from what he had been pre-

pared for, or what several high-ranking diplomats of the Soviet Embassy wanted to ram down his throat. With regard to that, Comrade Moskovsky blamed several employees of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Embassy (he mentioned former Counsellor Kryukov and current First Secretary Titarenko by name), who were assigned to Korea as many as two or three times, “got accustomed” to the 1954–1956 situation, and were incapable of comprehending the change that had taken place in the political situation [...]. Comrade Moskovsky emphasized that, as a consequence, a struggle had been waged at the Embassy with regard to the interpretation of the Korean situation. During the introductory and other visits he paid to the Korean leaders, here and there—in spite of the apparently friendly tone—various allusions, etc., were made by the Koreans. However, when he (Comrade Moskovsky) expressed concern about this at the Embassy, Kryukov and others did not attach importance to it, they attempted to jump down his throat (“Kim Il Sung is our man, I am on very good terms with him, we were hunting together,” “the minister was lying in a state of drunkenness under my billiard-table,” etc.). True enough, some of the diplomats in question have modified their standpoint in the meantime, among others Comrade Puzanov [...] signed a document, in which he had “enumerated but not proved and interpreted” a few phenomena. However, he was forced to do so by the party secretary and some other diplomats of the Embassy, who threatened him with taking him to task along the party line, and declared that if he did not sign it, they themselves would send it to Moscow!

Nonetheless, no substantial change took place after Comrade Moskovsky had sized up the situation. Moreover, when he, in his quarterly political report, was obliged to describe the problems related to the Korean political situation, it was the same employees, who had returned home but continued to deal with Korea, who evaluated his reports at the Foreign Ministry. They forwarded his reports with comments like “the Ambassador overstates the matter,” etc. This situation had developed so far that in the summer of 1963, on the occasion of his vacation, “I was compelled to appeal to the top man [Khrushchev]. I told him that either the Foreign [Ministry] should be sorted out, or I should be recalled and reinstated in my former position!,” Comrade Moskovsky said (previously he, as Deputy Premier of the RSFSR, had dealt with cultural and ideological issues). That settled matters, and the December 1963 plenum of the CPSU CC also proved him right.

In addition to the development of the chemical industry, the December plenum also dealt with questions of the inter-party debate, and it was Comrades Ponomarev, Ilyichev, and Andropov who gave an account of the latter. In his concluding remarks, Comrade Khrushchev also referred to these issues in more detail. The standpoint of the Korean Workers’ Party was also made known in these speeches, and Com. Puzanov’s responsibility [for misinterpreting it] became obvious. In the intermissions of the plenum, Comrade Moskovsky said, several CC members, particularly the Ambassadors, had surrounded Puzanov (at present he is

Ambassador in Belgrade), besieging him with their questions (“you [tj] always reported that you hunted, were on vacation, and drank with Kim Il Sung, and that everything was fine!”, etc.), and finally Puzanov did his best to spend the intermissions in the toilet!

Comrade Moskovsky told me that the six thousand participants of the plenum had reacted with deep indignation and a loud outburst to a piece of information given in the concluding remarks of Comrade Khrushchev: at that time, the Soviet government managed to [...] get Eisenhower to eliminate the humiliating fingerprinting that had been applied to Soviet citizens who entered [the United States], then recently Kim Il Sung introduced it with regard to the Soviet specialists! The Korean organs demanded fingerprints from the Soviet technical experts who worked at the construction of the radio station, the experimental nuclear reactor, and the weaving mill (!) which were built with Soviet assistance and co-operation, and they made them fill out a form of 72 questions, in which they had to describe their circle of relatives and friends in detail, with addresses! A Korean “colleague” told one of the technical experts that “if we cannot get you for some reason, we will get your relatives; this is why it [the questionnaire] is needed!”

[...]

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 36
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 11 January 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 11. doboz, 24/b, 001767/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 10 January I invited Comrades Soviet Ambassador Moskovsky and Romanian Ambassador Bodnăra^o to dinner. Comrade Moskovsky told me the following about the problems of the thermal station being built with Soviet assistance in Pyongyang.

On the basis of the reports of the Soviet technical experts involved in the construction [of the power station], last summer he [Moskovsky] was compelled to visit Comrade Kim Il and call his attention to the absence of safety equipment and the neglect of safety regulations at the construction of the thermal power station. Serious accidents were a common occurrence at the construction site, and all the warnings of the Soviet experts were in vain. On the Koreans’ part these issues were dealt with in an irresponsible and thoughtless way.

Kim Il received the information with thanks, and promised that he would submit the issue to the Council of Minis

ters. To Comrade Moskovsky's knowledge, this actually took place, but it has yielded very little practical results. Last December, 11 fatal accidents occurred at the site. Among others, five Korean workers fell down simultaneously from a height of 27 metres. Of them, three died instantly, while one got caught on a hook by the rib and, having not been taken off for a long time, bled to death. The fifth one got caught on a hook by the clothes, and he had been hanging there for hours until they took him off, but he became mentally unbalanced in his alarm.

In late December, Deputy Premier Nam Il, accompanied by the chairman of the city party committee, the ministers concerned, etc., visited the construction site. He informed the construction's Korean management about the personal instruction of Kim Il Sung: they were to put into operation the first section of the thermal power station by March 1964! Comrade Moskovsky told me that approx. 20 percent of the construction of this first section had been completed in one and a half years, and now they [the leadership] wanted to have the remaining part of the work completed in three months! No one dared to oppose the instruction, both the local and the ministerial leaders promised everything to Nam Il. After the meeting [...] [a North Korean engineer] went up to one of the Soviet comrades and stated: "Have you seen this comedy? Everybody knows it cannot be done, but no one dared to tell the truth!"—Comrade Moskovsky said that 1500 soldiers dressed in pufaika and 1500 workers dressed in linen suits (!) were working at the construction site. In the morning a 40-minute open-air political meeting is held, but during this time they are frozen so much that following the meeting, everybody runs to warm himself, and they begin working as late as around 11 o'clock.

Otherwise, the Korean press investigated issues of industrial safety several times in the last few months.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 37
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 10 March 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc,
003819/RT/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

As was also disclosed in the Soviet press, in early February Comrade Khrushchev received the Korean Ambassador, who was about to leave Moscow. Comrade Moskovsky said the following about the meeting:

Comrade Khrushchev asked the Ambassador about last year's harvest in Korea and their achievements in the field of

raising rice yields. Without thinking, the Ambassador stated that last year they had harvested on average 50 quintals of rice per hectare (whereas it is known that at the 1963 CC plenum, Kim Il Sung spoke about a rice harvest of 3.6 metric tons [per hectare]). Thereupon Comrade Khrushchev noted that in Kazakhstan, they [the Soviets] also had a kolkhoz where 55 quintals of rice per hectare had been harvested, and they achieved 45 quintals in the Ukraine. Otherwise, in the Soviet Union there was a law that stipulated that if a kolkhoz overfulfilled its plan in rice production, it could dispose freely of the grain produced in excess of the planned amount, it could make use of it as it wished.

The Soviet people followed with great attention the South Vietnamese people, who fought for their freedom and waged a war against the American troops and the army of the US-satellite South Vietnamese government, Comrade Khrushchev said. Why is there such a great silence in South Korea at the same time? Do the South Korean people perhaps expect democratic steps from the government, or have they already gotten tired of the struggle? Is the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee perhaps so severe that the masses are incapable of putting up any resistance?

The Ambassador told Comrade Khrushchev that at present, there were 6 million unemployed peasants in South Korea. Nonetheless, the organization of a resistance movement meets with difficulties, because there is no revolutionary party, or any leaders capable of organizing such a party, in the country.

Comrade Khrushchev: But Kim Il Sung told us there was a strong resistance movement in South Korea. Otherwise, it is precisely the difficult economic situation that makes the organization of such a movement possible.

Ambassador: The American imperialists station large troop contingents in South Korea, and these are equipped with modern armaments, they even possess atomic weapons. Evidently they frighten the people in this way.

Comrade Khrushchev: To begin with, there are no atomic weapons in South Korea. At that time, the Americans took atomic weapons to West Germany. Secondly, let us suppose that there were such weapons in the country [South Korea], this still would not account for why there is not any resistance movement. Atomic weapons are unusable in direct fighting, because the explosions and the subsequent radioactive pollution would cause damage to one's own troops as well. For that very reason, both the Soviet Union and America have phased out atomic weapons as a service. As you can see, you are misinformed about the equipment of the American troops stationed in South Korea. Now it is the missiles installed outside of the enemy countries that are the most suitable for carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs, these are developed by the Americans and the Soviet Union too. I can assure you, Comrade Khrushchev went on, that if the North attacked South Korea again, it is more than probable that the Americans would put into action nuclear weapons too. The Ambassador did not object to the term "attacked again".

Concerning the rest of the conversation, Comrade

Moskovsky said just that the Soviet Prime Minister had commented on the fact that it has recently happened frequently that anti-Soviet writings and articles were published in the Korean press, and the Soviet people rightly found that injurious. He asked the Ambassador about the reason for that. In the Soviet Union, no anti-Korean material is published in the newspapers and magazines. Of course, the Ambassador could not give any concrete answer to that.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 38
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 June 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 13. doboz, 27/a, 004092/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

[...] A particularly conspicuous characteristic of the country's internal situation [emphasis in the original] is a general mistrust and suspicion, and an increasing "tension." As I already indicated, the February plenum of the KWP CC discussed—on the basis of a report prepared by its Vice-Chairman, Pak Kum-ch'ol—the question of "working with various strata of the population." The press did not set forth the report or the resolution, but recently we chanced upon a secret party publication that outlined the issue discussed at the plenum. To our surprise (and to the amazement of the Soviet comrades), by the term "various strata of the population" they essentially mean the "untrustworthy" strata and elements. It is clear from the brochure that the plenum pointed out the following: in the DPRK, "the composition of the population is rather complicated," and, therefore, "the work to be done with the various strata of the population is an important factor in the *organizational policy* [emphasis in the original] of our party." (Pak Kum-ch'ol deals with organizational issues.) Although the report emphasizes the importance of educational and re-educational work, and of the method of persuasion, there is no doubt that it is, after all, a task of an organizational, rather than of a canvassing, nature. (According to unsubstantiated information, organized relocation on a large scale—carried out under the pretext of "reducing the population of the capital"—is to be expected.) It has come to light that in the 20th year of people's power, 10-12 years after the war, a substantial part of the population is categorized according to the following guidelines:

- 1) The remaining family members of those who fled to the South in the course of the war;
- 2) the former members of the counter-revolutionary detachments organized during the temporary occupation [of

the DPRK], and their families;

- 3) former [North Korean] prisoners-of-war, small and medium merchants, former clergymen, and their family members;
- 4) those who moved from South Korea to the North, old intellectuals and their family members, and those who returned home from Japan.

The divided character of the country indeed justifies certain measures. Nevertheless, the suspicion toward the former prisoners-of-war and those who had voluntarily joined the People's Army during the temporary liberation of South Korea [...] is incomprehensible. Although the report emphasizes that all these strata must be involved in the construction of socialism, it also points out that "they must be kept under surveillance in everyday life," "one must keep an eye ... particularly on their children," [...].

József Kovács
(Ambassador)



DOCUMENT No. 39
Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 29 June 1964

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 004558/RT/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 26 June of this year Yi Chu-yon, an alternate member of the KWP PC and Deputy Prime Minister, received Comrade Moskovsky, and the Soviet Ambassador briefly informed us about the following issues that were brought up in the course of the conversation, which are of some interest.

"We are in the middle of the year," Yi Chu-yon began to speak, "and it appears to me that it would be appropriate to discuss next year's exchange of goods. For one thing, the Soviet foreign trade organ has not given 2000 metric tons of cotton to Korea in the current year, and instead of 200 thousand tons of magnesite clinker, they were willing to take a mere 60 thousand tons. Of the offered 80 thousand tons of barite, only 20 thousand tons were recorded in the minutes. They had considerably reduced the purchase of Korean chinaware, then they did not buy machine-tools either from the DPRK. Such measures mean that the Soviet Union has extended the interparty disagreements to the state line."

"Up to the present," the Soviet Ambassador replied, "the Soviet party and state leaders have not mentioned anywhere that there were any disagreements between the CPSU and the KWP; thus, nothing was to be extended to the state line. You are the first to inform me about the existence of such a disagreement, you [the North Koreans] are speaking of it; thus, it is also you who extend it to the state line."

The Korean government, Yi Chu-yon went on, had de-

veloped the production of magnesite clinker essentially at the disposal of the Soviet Union, and now the Soviets caused great difficulties for them [the North Koreans] by not purchasing it; they had been compelled to halt production in several mines.

Comrade Moskovsky reacted to that in the following manner: the Soviet Union never asked the government of the DPRK to develop the production of magnesite clinker; otherwise, he (the Soviet Ambassador) knew very well that production had not been halted in any of the magnesite mines [...] it was rather obvious that she [the Soviet Union] purchased goods they could really make use of. The Soviet organs would not take over magnesite sand in the future either.

As was well-known, they did not purchase Korean machine-tools, because the latter's quality was inferior to that of the Soviet machines, and the Soviet Union had no need of museum pieces.

As Ambassador to Pyongyang, Yi Chu-yon went on, he [Moskovsky] could see with his own eyes that they [the North Koreans] did not live well, food was scarce, clothes were in short supply, they worked hard, they made strenuous efforts, they even sacrificed their free time to develop the country and increase the living standards of the people. They wanted to become civilized people, they wanted to reach communism together with the socialist countries.

Unfortunately, Comrade Moskovsky replied, he did not know the situation of this place, for the Korean organs did not allow him to contact the people, they kept him away from the population. Nor had he, the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, any contact with the members of the Korean government; for instance, Kim Il Sung received even Japanese prostitutes, but he had not been willing to meet him [Moskovsky] for more than a year. They [the North Koreans] indeed worked hard, he could see that; the people were subjected to the torment of spending 8 hours at work and 4 hours at meetings every day. They [the Soviet diplomats] got information about the host country almost exclusively from the press. He also saw that *Nodong Sinmun*, the party's central newspaper, had been hurling abuse at the Soviet Union for a year under such terms as "certain people" and "certain countries".

Yi Chu-yon then presented the affair in such a way as though the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries (he listed them by name) had not been willing to purchase anything but non-ferrous metals from Korea; thus, they wanted to force the DPRK to remain a producer of raw materials and agricultural goods. Certain people lined their pockets through the trade with Korea.

Comrade Moskovsky repudiated this statement by saying that it was solely the inferior quality of Korean manufactured goods and other industrial products that prevented them from being purchased in larger quantities. Exchange of goods with Korea amounted to a mere 1.8 percent of the Soviet Union's foreign trade. "Do you not think," Comrade Moskovsky asked, "that the statement [accusing] the Soviet Union of lining her pockets through this trade sounds ridiculous in the light of such an insignificant percentage?"

The Deputy Premier brought up the issue of the payment by installments of the loans the Soviets had granted [to the DPRK]. (This amount would run to approx. 12 million rubles next year, then it would rise by 5-10 million in the coming years.) The Korean government could provide the payment of the next installments only through the export of magnesite clinker and milled barite. If the Soviet Union did not accept these materials, it would deal a heavy blow to the economy of the DPRK. This would obviously prove that the Soviet leaders extended the disagreements to the state line. The Korean Workers' Party had its own political line, and it intended to proceed along this line. (Comrade Moskovsky asked Yi Chu-yon to send the Koreans present out of the room, and when the latter fulfilled the request, Comrade Moskovsky also sent out the employee of the commercial branch agency who had accompanied him.) They continued the conversation with two interpreters present.

"Now let's talk with each other as Communists," Comrade Moskovsky began to speak. "First of all, you have no political line of your own, it is the Chinese policy that the leaders of the KWP imitate and carry out. We have been observing speeches about the alleged [...] attempts at the exploitation of Korea for approximately a year. Would it not be more appropriate if the high-ranking economic leaders, say, Deputy Premiers, of the Soviet Union and the DPRK came together to discuss and clarify the alleged grievances and the problems you perceive in our economic relations?"

Thereupon, Yi Chu-yon declared that the time had not yet come for such a negotiation.

"It seems that you are afraid of such a discussion, and at present the Chinese would not allow you to meet the representative of the Soviet Union," the Soviet Ambassador replied. Comrade Moskovsky then handed over the copy of the letter the Soviet government had sent to China with regard to the 1965 meeting of African and Asian Premiers. He asked Yi Chu-yon whether the latter wanted him to set forth orally the content of the letter. The person in question declined, then added that it must have been full of aspersions.

The leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government, Comrade Moskovsky remarked, did not cast aspersions on anyone but substantiated their message by realistic arguments based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Casting aspersions was solely a habit of the weak who could not bring up convincing arguments.

With this, the three-hour debate came to an end.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)

DOCUMENT No. 40**Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 1 October 1964**

[Source: MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 5. doboz, 5/bc, 005971/1964. Translated by Balazs Szalontai.]

On 24 August, the Provisional Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Pimenov, told Comrade Fendler that recently problems had recently arisen in Soviet-Korean cooperation for lumber. In accordance with the five-year agreement signed in 1957, the DPRK lumbers free of charge, with its own workforce, in the Amur region. In 1961, during Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow, the agreement was extended, at the request of the Korean side, for another 10 years. The DPRK has hitherto lumbered approx. 2 million cubic meters of wood, and at present there are still approx. five thousand Koreans working in the forests around Khabarovsk. In the last months the Korean workers and their leaders have been behaving more and more provocatively, they are violating the rules aimed at the protection of forests, and the articles of the intergovernmental agreement, etc. The competent Korean authority is intentionally raising difficulties in the work with the local Soviet organs, and finally the head of the Korean enterprise made an ultimatumlike statement, according to which they would cancel the agreement unless the Soviet side fulfilled a good many demands of theirs. At the same time, they are taking advantage of the relaxed rules of border crossing to ship large quantities of vodka, apple, salt, Japanese goods, transistor appliances, etc., from the DPRK for the workers, and the Korean workers are carrying on a speculative trade with the local population by selling these goods. This had assumed such proportions that the local organs were obliged to report it to Moscow. On 17 August the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister sent for the Ambassador of the DPRK, and gave him a verbal warning; at the same time, he reminded him that since it was an intergovernmental agree-

ment they were talking about, the government of the DPRK should officially confirm the statement of the aforementioned managing director, and in this case, if the DPRK wanted to cancel the agreement, the Soviet side would not make difficulties over that. Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam also sent for Comrade Pimenov about the issue, and he blamed the Soviet organs for the difficulties.

On 8 September Comrade Pimenov also informed Comrade Fendler about the fact that three days ago Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam had again sent for the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, and handed him the letter of the Korean government, in which they proposed the cancellation of the agreement, laying the blame on the Soviet side.

Following that, Comrade Moskovsky told me that recently he had met Deputy Minister Kim Yong-nam. The Deputy Minister raised the issue of the cancellation of the Khabarovsk lumbering agreement [...].

Thereupon the Soviet Ambassador replied the following: [...] Unfortunately, the competent Korean authorities took unfair advantage of the helpfulness of the Soviet Union.

For one thing, recently the Korean lumberers have been exploiting the forests really ruinously, they are cutting down even the saplings, and, as a consequence, it will take a long time to reforest the area.

Secondly, the Korean organs took advantage of the relaxed rules of border crossing [...] to smuggle in Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda material, and they also involved the employees of the Korean Consulate in Nakhodka in that. [...]

Finally, Comrade Moskovsky emphasized to the Deputy Minister that if this activity continued, the Soviet organs would be obliged to close the Korean Consulate in Nakhodka and arrest certain persons so as to put an end to these unfriendly, destructive activities against the Soviet people.

József Kovács
(Ambassador)

Disclosure of True History after Fifty Years: The First Collection of Russian Archival Materials on the Korean War (Chinese Edition) Published

26 July 2003 was to be the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Korean War armistice agreement. The war impacted the whole world, and, consequently, for a half-century since its conclusion politicians, military experts, diplomats, and historians in many countries have published memoirs and monographs to remember, to comment on, to chronicle, and to debate the event. This has resulted in abundant achievements of scholarly research. Nevertheless the most valuable and revealing histories of the war have been written only since the 1990s. The obvious reason is that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, two key participants of the war, long kept their relevant historical records behind the "iron curtain." Not until more than a decade ago did the Russian and Chinese archives begin to declassify some of these records, which allowed the hitherto well-kept secrets to enter the public domain.

To mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice agreement, the Modern History Institute of Academia Sinica in Taiwan published a documentary collection, *Chaoxian Zhanzheng: Eguo Dang'anguan de Jiemi Wenjian* (The Korean War: Declassified Documents from the Russian Archives). These archival materials are principally from the Presidential Archives and the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History, Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, and the Central Archives of the Russian Defense Ministry. The collection includes correspondences and meeting minutes between Soviet, PRC, and North Korean leaders and government branches, meeting minutes, resolutions, reports and briefings of the Soviet Communist Party and government apparatuses, and telegrams and letters between the Soviet embassies in the PRC and North Korea and relevant government agencies at home. In total the collection publishes more than seven hundred documents, including 554 principal pieces plus appendixes. In addition, the publication is enhanced with biographies, a chronology, and an introductory essay, "The Soviet Union and the Korea War." The two-volume set consists of more than eight hundred thousand Chinese characters.

The compiler of the documentary collection is Shen Zhihua, an independent scholar based in the PRC. Since the early 1990s when Mr. Shen switched from the arena of business to the field of scholarship, he has undertaken study of Soviet Union history and Cold War history with tremendous enthusiasm. In the past decade, he organized and sponsored researchers to travel to Russia and the United States, and collected some 15,000 pieces of Russian archival materials. Under the aegis of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Mr. Shen led a project group that translated and compiled more than 8,000 Russian documents. In August 2002 these documents were published by Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Beijing) in thirty-four volumes, under the title, *Sulian Lishi Dang'an Xuanbian* (Selected Compilation of Soviet Historical Archives). But, because the Korean War has remained an extremely sensitive topic in the PRC, this 2002 publication, even in the form of "internal publication," could not include any document on the subject. Some of the Russian documents on the Korean War have been released in various publications in Russian, English, and Korean languages, but not in Chinese. To give Chinese researchers access to these valuable historical records, the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica decided to publish all these in one collection.

As of today, only a small number of Russian documents on the Korean War have been published in their entirety through scholarly articles in Russia. South Korean press released some two hundred Russian documents on the Korea War, which were a gift from Russian president Boris Yeltsin to Korean president Kim Young-sam. But these were edited and were not the originals. In the United States altogether about two hundred documents were translated and published in professional journals at different times. These have been widely used by English-speaking scholars. The Chinese version of Russian archives to be published in Taipei therefore is the first documentary collection devoted to the subject of the Korean War. Its content is more focused and complete than any other previous publications in any language. It is hoped that its publication will help advance the study of the Korean War and the Cold War in Asia in the Chinese-speaking world.

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NEW EVIDENCE ON THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

By Christian Friedrich Ostermann

What was behind the Soviet decision in December 1979 to invade Afghanistan? And when and why did Mikhail Gorbachev decide to pull out Soviet troops nearly ten years later? What was the role of the US covert assistance program, in particular the Stinger missiles? What role did CIA intelligence play? How did the Afghan War's history, a key step in the rise of militant Islam, intersect with the history of the final decade of the Cold War? These were among the questions addressed at a major international conference, "Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan," organized in April 2002 by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program and Kennan Institute, George Washington University's Cold War Group, and the National Security Archive.² Designed as a "critical oral history" conference, the discussions between policy veterans—former Soviet officials and former National Security Council (NSC), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials from the Carter, Bush, and Reagan administrations—and scholarly experts centered on newly released and translated US, Russian, Bulgarian, German, Czech, and Hungarian documents on the war, a selection of which are printed below.³ In addition to those mentioned below, conference participants included former RAND analyst *Alexander Alexiev*, former CIA officials *George Cave* and *Charles Cogan*, Ambassador *Raymond L. Garthoff*, former Kabul University professor *M. Hassan Kakar*, Ambassador *Dennis Kux*, Ambassador *William Green Miller*, former Carter NSC staffer *Jerrold Schecter*, President George H. W. Bush's Special Afghanistan Envoy *Peter Tomsen*, and former Reagan administration Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs *Nicholas A. Veliotis*.

The available Russian documents—including a set of materials provided to CWIHP by Russian military expert *A. A. Lyakhovskiy*—revealed how one-sided official reporting from Afghanistan severely limited Soviet policy options between March 1979, when an uprising in Herat and calls for Soviet intervention first surfaced during discussions in Moscow, and the final decision-making process on intervention that fall.⁴ Russian scholar *Svetlana Savranskaya* argued that the Soviet leaders' almost exclusive reliance on alarmist KGB assessments of a quickly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan in the fall of 1979—at the expense of more cautious military intelligence and diplomatic channels—constituted a critical factor in the decision to intervene. That year, Soviet concerns mounted over the possibility of a potential US intervention in Iran following the ouster of the pro-Western Shah. Moscow, moreover, feared that the United States sought

a substitute foothold in Afghanistan and worried about maintaining its credibility with communist world allies. Soviet leaders were genuinely concerned that Afghan strongman Hafizullah Amin was either a US agent or prepared to sell out to the United States. At the CWIHP conference, former US Charge d'Affaires *J. Bruce Amstutz* as well as other participants forcefully refuted allegations of Agency links to Amin. In his five conversations with Amin in the fall of 1979, Amstutz remembered, the Afghan leader did not in any way suggest that he was interested in allying himself with the United States.

US relations with successive communist regimes in Afghanistan had been volatile since the April 1978 communist coup, the "Saur Revolution." The accessible KGB record remains garbled on a key event in the downward spiral of the US-Afghan relationship prior to the Soviet invasion of 1979: the still-mysterious February 1979 abduction and subsequent killing of US Ambassador Adolph Dubs. The materials, provided to CWIHP by defected KGB archivist *Vasily Mitrokhin* (published as "The KGB in Afghanistan," CWIHP *Working Paper No. 40*, available at <http://cwihip.si.edu>), suggest that the Amin regime, against the advice of the US embassy in Kabul, had authorized the storming of the hotel where the ambassador was held by three terrorists associated with a radical Islamic group. It remains unclear why the KGB recommended the execution of the only terrorist who survived the hotel storming of the hotel before US embassy personnel could interrogate him. Dubs had in fact advocated a wait-and-see policy toward Kabul and had favored the resumption of Afghan officer training in the United States, which had been suspended after the communist take-over in 1978, eager as other State Department officials to avoid forcing Kabul to rely solely on the USSR.

But by early 1979 relations between the two countries were rapidly declining. Following a meeting with Amin, Carter Administration NSC official *Thomas P. Thornton* recounted providing a negative assessment of the regime that influenced the US to suspend its assistance program to Afghanistan, a decision reinforced by the "Dubs Affair." In mid-1979, the Carter administration began to provide non-lethal aid to the Afghan resistance movement. The Reagan administration would indeed inherit an active program of covert military aid to the Mujahaddin that had begun in December 1979 (though some conference participants suggested that a US-funded arms pipeline was in place as early as August 1979—an assertion repudiated by some of the CIA officials present). In the early 1980s, under the leadership of CIA Director William Casey, this aid program expanded into a sophisticated coalition effort to train the mujahadin resistance fighters, pro-

vide them with arms, and fund the whole operation. In 1980, the government of Saudi Arabia decided to share the costs of this operation equally with the United States. In its full range of activities, the coalition included the intelligence services of the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and China. According to the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, Milton Bearden, at the height of the covert assistance program in 1986-1987 the coalition was injecting some 60,000 tons of weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment per year into the Afghan war.

Nevertheless, *Elie D. Krakowski*, former special assistant to US assistant secretary of defense for international security policy during the Reagan administration, argued that US aid and in fact overall American strategy toward Afghanistan remained half-hearted and inconsistent, mostly due to the fact that Afghanistan policy derived largely from the United States' relationships with Pakistan and Iran. This, in turn, meant allowing the Pakistani ally broad leeway, with the result that US assistance was channeled largely to radical Islamic resistance groups. Confronted with allegations that one third of the Stinger missiles alone were kept by the Pakistani intelligence service for its own purposes, the former CIA officials at the conference asserted that oversight over the aid program was tighter and more discriminate than publicly perceived.

London-based Norwegian scholar *Odd Arne Westad* pointed out that Russian documents reveal how quickly the Soviet leadership grew disenchanted with the intervention in Afghanistan. A narrow circle of leaders had made the decision to intervene, with KGB chief Andropov and Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov playing critical roles. According to *Anatoly S. Chernyaev*, a former member of the Central Committee's International Department and later a key foreign policy adviser to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, many Soviet officials like him learned of the invasion from the radio. Even at the time, criticism of the decision within the Soviet elite was more widespread than often assumed. Not surprisingly, internal discussion of settlement proposals began as early as spring 1980. These proposals bore remarkable similarities to those introduced by the United Nations in 1986.

By the time Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the war in Afghanistan had developed into a stalemate. The Soviet forces were mainly tied up in cities and in defending airfields and bases, leaving only roughly 15 percent of their troops for operations. According to *Lester Grau*, a US Army specialist on the war, the Afghan conflict had become "a war of logistics." *Grau* also emphasized the heavy toll disease took on the Soviet troops; almost 60 percent of them were hospitalized at some point during the war. Some advocates of the US covert aid program, such as *Congressman Charles Wilson* (D-TX), contended that the aid program drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan and credited the decision to introduce the shoulder-held Stinger missiles in 1986 as the basic turning point of the war. This missile proved highly effective against Soviet helicopters.

In a further effort to build military pressure against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, *James G. Hershberg*

(George Washington University) presented evidence from declassified US documents that in 1986 the Reagan Administration's National Security Council staff tried to funnel aid to the mujaheddin through Iran as part of its covert arms dealings with Tehran—a previously undisclosed aspect of the Iran-Contra affair whose ultimate impact remains unclear.⁵⁷ Former CIA Iran expert *George Cave*, a participant in the clandestine US-Iran contacts spearheaded by then-NSC aide Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, confirmed that the US sought to collaborate with the Iranians against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Based on his notes of CPSU Politburo meetings and conversations between Gorbachev and foreign leaders, *Anatoly Chernyaev* argued that Gorbachev had decided to withdraw from Afghanistan within months of taking power. The Reagan administration's active program of aid and assistance, in coordination with its coalition partners, played an important role in shaping Moscow's decision to end the war and withdraw. But *Chernyaev* pointed to the loss of public support within the Soviet Union—as reflected in demonstrations by the mothers of soldiers, negative press reports on the campaign, and the high number of desertions—as the paramount impetus for the Gorbachev's decision to withdraw. Gorbachev could not pursue his campaign for perestroika unless he ended the war in Afghanistan and sharply reduced the arms race. But the decision was highly controversial. Now a withdrawal would raise questions about Soviet credibility ("they think this would be a blow to the authority of the Soviet Union in the national liberation movement")⁶ and might cause a domestic backlash ("they will say: they have forgotten about the sacrifices and the authority of the country").⁷ Thus it took the new Soviet leader considerable time to gain approval from the other members of the Politburo and the leadership of the army and the KGB.

The new evidence illustrates the dilemmas that confronted the Soviet leadership. Sensitive to potential fallout from images similar to those of the US pullout from Vietnam a decade earlier, fearful of turning the Afghanistan into a "bloody slaughterhouse" (General Varennikov), and determined to preserve a "neutral" and friendly regime in Afghanistan, Moscow leaders, particularly Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, favored an exit strategy of "Afghanization" without "losing the war." But as with perestroika in general, the transformation Gorbachev urgently pursued in Afghanistan proved both far more difficult than anticipated. Propping up the (last) communist regime of Najibullah through additional aid while Soviet troops were still in the country gave ever more leverage to a ruling Communist elite largely content to leave the fighting to the USSR "while they live quietly in palaces."⁸ Turning the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) into the "leading force" of "national reconciliation" stalled as party officials resisted the almost certain loss of the party's leading role. "Karmalism"—ideological rigidity combined with inaction—gripped much of Moscow's chosen instrument of change. Najibullah himself seemed to many in Moscow a questionable "No.1" for a "new Afghanistan," yet Gorbachev felt

stuck with the Afghan leader: “who can we work there if not with Najib?”⁹

Washington’s (and Islamabad’s) unwillingness to cease military assistance to the mujaheddin as part of a Afghanistan settlement added to the frustrations of the Soviet leader, as Chernyaev’s notes of Gorbachev’s conversations demonstrate. Najibullah’s far-flung proposals for joint operations against Pakistan, and Gorbachev’s references to fall-back options notwithstanding, the Kremlin chief remained committed to withdrawal from Afghanistan “without fail.” Though massive economic and military aid from the USSR continued through 1991 (as Gorbachev promised Najibullah as late as 1989), the last Soviet military units departed Afghanistan in February 1989.

The documents printed below illuminate Soviet policy not just toward Afghanistan but offer fascinating insight into Moscow’s dealings with the subcontinent as a whole, particularly the dynamic of relations among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Particularly striking in this regard is Gorbachev’s 20 July 1987 conversation with Najibullah about joint retaliatory actions by India and Afghanistan against Pakistan. To cover the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and relieve pressure on the Kabul regime Najibullah suggested the “risky” idea of provoking serious “disturbances” in the border regions of Pakistan in case India launched “a preventive attack, as a sort of demonstration, on Pakistan. Not to occupy its territory but as a show of force.” According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev “unceremoniously ridiculed” such suggestions, yet at the time, according to the transcript, Gorbachev’s response was far more equivocal.¹⁰ The release of additional documentation from the Gorbachev Foundation and other archives will help to further clarify the broader regional context of Moscow’s policy in Afghanistan.

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NOTES

¹ I owe thanks to Samuel F. Wells Jr., James G. Hershberg, Svetlana Savranskaya, and Gary Goldberg for contributing to this introduction and document edition.

² The conference—one in a series of “critical oral history” conferences being organized by CWIHP and its partners on key Cold War flashpoints—followed an earlier meeting on the Soviet invasion and the fall of detente in the context of the multi-conference “Carter-Brezhnev Project,” sponsored by the Norwegian Nobel Institute and Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies in October 1995. For further information and documentation see *CWIHP Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 133-184.

³ The full conference document reader, “Toward an International History of the War in Afghanistan,” is available at the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the original Russian and other archival documents are accessible at the CWIHP/National Security Archive collection (Russian and Eastern European Documents Database (READD)) at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. (Contact Svetlana Savranskaya at the Archive by phone: 202-994-7000, fax: 202-994-7005, email: Svetlana@gwu.edu).

⁴ For prior CWIHP publication of documents on the Afghan War, see Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A:’ New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 128-132; for further documentation, see *ibid.*, pp. 133-184.

⁵ See James G. Hershberg, “The War in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra Affair: Missing Links?” *Cold War History*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 2003), pp. 23-48.

⁶ Gorbachev, quoted in Chernyaev’s notes of CPSU Politburo meeting of 23 February 1987, printed below.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Gorbachev, quote in Chernyaev’s notes of Gorbachev’s meeting with Najibullah, 20 July 1987, printed below.

⁹ Gorbachev, quoted in Chernyaev’s notes of CPSU Politburo meeting of 21-22 May 1987, printed below.

¹⁰ Chernyaev, *My Six Years*, pp. 161-162.

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Gorbachev and Afghanistan

Edited and Annotated by Christian F. Ostermann

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 29 May 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. *Concerning Afghanistan.* We've replaced [Afghan President Babrak] Karmal with Najib[ullah]. But this is not a "fait accompli," but a justified action on our part. How are we behaving? [USSR] Ambassador [Fikryat A.] Tabeyev told Najib point blank: "I made you the [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan's (PDPA)] General Secretary." It's time to recall him since he's acting like a governor-general. Tabeyev is, of course, a serious, important person, but it's time for a change together with a change of policy.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 June 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. We've reached a new stage of relations. There's a new leadership now. Where is it going? We should handle things so that they take more on their own shoulders.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 24 July 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. *About Najib.* It's hard to build a new building from old material... Weapons deliveries are not to be increased... Forty percent of Afghanistan's border is not covered, and it's impossible to do it.

God forbid we've made a mistake with Najib.

A coalition government, including those who are outside the country but not "in the enemy's camp". (not yet)

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 25 September 1986 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Have a secret exchange of opinions with the Pakistanis about expanding the Kabul government with exiles.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 13 November 1986¹ (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. Intuition advises [me]—something is threatening [us]. I'm afraid *we've lost time!* We've become accustomed [to the situation]. Why?—"a war is going on, it's business as usual, life goes on." "A strange war!"—they'll soon stick this term on us.

Comrades, once you adopt a policy you need to follow it. After all, this is war! We've been fighting six years already! Some people say: if you act this way it can go on 20 or 30 years. And it will be so!

People ask: what are we doing there—will we be there endlessly? Or should we end this war? Otherwise we'll disgrace ourselves in all our relations.

The strategic objective is to conclude the war in one, maximum two, years and withdraw the troops.

[President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Andrei] GROMYKO. Admits that there was an underestimation of the social conditions and all the other circumstances when "they agreed to military support" of Karmal. He proposes turning to the King (who is in exile in Italy)² and persuade the Americans to [make] joint efforts, go to London, and get in touch with Pakistan.

The main thing is to halt the war and withdraw the troops. This will be necessary—we will conclude a treaty, etc.

[KGB Chairman Viktor M.] CHEBRIKOV. There won't be a resolution by military means; it's necessary to step up a search for political solutions. *Najib has never been in Moscow* but we met Karmal five times at a high level. This circumstance is in Karmal's favor among the opposition. We need to invite Najib and decide everything with him.

[Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] SHEVARDNADZE. We need to end the war. And we need to have talks everywhere to do this. We should designate a time for the withdrawal. If we do not, the talks will fall apart.

Our comrades, both here and there in Afghanistan, can't get used to the idea that we are dealing with a sovereign country at all. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Ministry of Defense nor other agencies have gotten used to this. Therefore things haven't worked out according to our design: let Najib himself decide everything.

We need to give him full freedom of action.

GORBACHEV. We have set a clear goal: help speed up the process so we have a friendly neutral country and get out of there.

[Fmr. Soviet Ambassador to the US and head of CPSU CC's International Dept. Anatoly] DOBRYNIN. We need to have an "Afghan Reykjavik." Give Najib freedom of action (...)

GORBACHEV. Why is this issue on the table again? Why are you all not doing this? Why? In what office have they made decisions which contradict Politburo decisions?!

But we have a concept. We approved it at the Politburo. There is no implementation of the concept.

Seemingly turns to [Chief of Soviet General Staff, Marshal Sergei] Akhromeyev: they climbed in – they didn't calculate, they embarrassed themselves in all directions. And they could not use military force in a real way. And now it is necessary to climb out (...) We need to climb out!

AKHROMEYEV. (Makes a brilliant report.) In 7 years in Afghanistan there is not one square kilometer where a Soviet soldier has not trod. But he ought to go, as the enemy is coming, and he will restore everything as it was.

We have lost the battle. The majority of the Afghan people right now are with the counter-revolution.

We overlooked the peasantry; they got nothing from the Revolution. Eighty percent of the country is in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries. And the situation of the peasants there is better than in government-controlled territory.

GORBACHEV. In accordance with the policy adopted in October 1985 a clear goal has been set—to speed up the process in order to have a friendly country and leave. But all our actions in all avenues—political, diplomatic, economic—have not given us any forward movement. And Karmal's policy was simple: sit and rule and leave the fighting to us.

They panicked in Kabul when they found out we intended to leave.

We replaced Tabeyev in order to let them know that we are oriented toward Afghan independence. But what happened? Again we are doing everything ourselves. Our people are only trained for this. They tie Najib's hands and feet.

In a word, the implementation of the concept is going badly, but we need to get out of there.

But two points need to be clearly kept in mind:

- 1) Leave there over a period of two years; 50% of the troops per year.
- 2) Expand the social base of the regime; a real distribution of political forces in the leadership is necessary to do this. And have them stew in their own pot with all their eastern pluralism.

Deal with their entire Politburo. Approach Karmal and even those who consider one another bandits, although 80% of them are.

Put the issue of our withdrawal to them sharply and name the procedure for the withdrawal: 50% the first year, 50% the second.

Engage in direct talks with Pakistan since there are 3 million Afghans there who fled the country. It could be a mess.

(...) We don't want socialism there. And the US will not climb right in with military force if we leave.

If there are no American airfields, military bases, etc. in Afghanistan, then what? Let the Afghans themselves deal with the rest.

AKHROMEYEV confirms that the US will not go into Afghanistan with troops.

GORBACHEV. Therefore we need courageous decisions and to involve the Americans in our policy.

Invite Najib in December.

We're creating a Politburo group on Afghanistan for two years, headed by Shevardnadze [and] including Chebrikov, [Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai V.] Talyzin, [Chairman of the State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex Vsevolod S.] Murakhovsky, [Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei] Sokolov, and [former Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan Fikryat A.] Tabeyev.

He turns to [Deputy Chairman of the KGB Vladimir] Kryuchkov: Is it an ordinary matter to withdraw troops once you have deployed them? Yes! But since no one objects. So do you see? We have agreed.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 21-22 January 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

SHEVARDNADZE. Najib makes a very good impression, but not everyone supports him, even in the leadership. Some comrades are vacillating. But he speaks correctly when he says he has no other people. He has taken the initiative into his own hands. I think that the mujaheddin³ chiefs have mis-

calculated in refusing to talk. The country's economy is in ruins.

Little remains of the friendly feelings toward the Soviet people which existed for decades. A great many people have died and not all of them were bandits. Not one problem has been solved to the peasantry's advantage. The government bureaucracy is functioning poorly. Our advisers' aid is ineffective. Najib complains of the narrow-minded tutelage of our advisers.

I won't discuss right now whether we did the right thing by going in there. But we did go in there absolutely without knowing the psychology of the people and the real state of affairs in the country. That's a fact. And everything that we've done and are doing in Afghanistan is incompatible with the moral character of our country.

GROMYKO. It's incompatible that we went in?

SHEVARDNADZE. And this, too. The attitude toward us is more negative than it seemed to us.

And we're spending a billion rubles a year for all this. An enormous sum, and responsibility needs to be taken for it. And count up again in every detail how much Afghanistan costs us at the present time. [Soviet Premier] Nikolai Ivanovich [Ryzhkov] doesn't have such data right now. But in the United States they think we'll need 2 billion a year and the Japanese think 3 billion. I'm not talking about the lives of people.

GORBACHEV. We won't talk right now about how this revolution came into being, how we reacted, and how we vacillated about whether or not to deploy troops.

GROMYKO. Yes, yes.

GORBACHEV. Right now we need to proceed from what we have at the present time and what steps need to be taken.

GROMYKO. I agree with the description of Najib...

Probably with Najib's consent some kind of coalition government agreeable to us needs to be created... It would not be suitable to the pursuit of our new policy to recall our advisers.

RYZHKOV. The report by Eduard Amvrosiyevich [Shevardnadze] gives a realistic picture. Previous information was not objective. The situation forces us again to approach the problem in a serious way. Nothing needs to be simplified. Najib's personality is important, of course... But...

GORBACHEV. Each village there is full of such personalities.

RYZHKOV. It's an illiterate society. The Revolution led to a worsening of the people's situation. We need to pursue a firm policy of getting out of there in two years. It's better to pay with money and kerosene, not with men. Our people don't understand what we're doing there. Why we have been there seven years.

It is easy to leave, [but] we can't just throw everything to the whims of fate. Many countries would forsake us. We need to take steps so that, when we leave, affairs proceed toward the creation of a neutral, friendly Afghanistan.

What steps should be taken? An army. Why not a paid army? What will prevent it from deserting? – Good money. They don't believe in slogans (...) Generally speaking, I would not reject the idea of a mercenary army out of hand.

It is better for us to hand out weapons and ammunition. And have them fight themselves if they want to. Actively guide a parallel political settlement. Everything needs to be used: contacts with Pakistan and with the US.

[Yegor] LIGACHEV. We cannot bring them freedom by military means. We have suffered a defeat in this cause. And the information of Eduard Amvrosiyevich is the first objective [information], although it is grave. We didn't consider the consequences and set our hopes on the military way. I think the policy of national reconciliation is correct.

If the question is put before the people: is it better to let our people, our soldiers die, or to give every kind of aid? I think that every person to the last man will favor the second path.

And to work on the Pakistani avenue, with India, with China, and with America. But to leave like the Americans did from Vietnam—no, we still have not come to this, as they say.

[Marshal Sergei L.] SOKOLOV. The military situation has recently become worse. The shelling of our garrisons has doubled. They are fighting mainly in villages, counting on our not retaliating against population centers.

It is impossible to win such a war by military means.

The first task is to force the Afghan leadership to actively bring the program of national reconciliation to the population. If this does not happen, the army will be of no use.

The Afghan army has cost us 3.5 billion rubles. And another 1.5 billion [rubles] are planned for this year. They have everything they need to fight.

In 1986 the 40th Army lost 1,280 men.

To analyze economic aid: they are asking for three times more than they need. Yes, we ought to help. But there must be a benefit. In 1981 we gave them 100 million [rubles] in free aid. And it all stayed with the elite. In the villages there is no kerosene, [there are] no matches, nothing.

CHEBRIKOV. We discuss the Afghan issue more than any other. The comrades have analyzed it well. It's as if we've received much new material. But if we lift the documents, all of this has already been described.

There are no [new] findings about the situation. Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachev], you've been telling this to Karmal.

GORBACHEV. Thus, we confirm our firm policy. We will not retreat once we have started.

Act in all avenues. Seriously analyze where and how to use our aid, and start up foreign policy mechanisms through [UN Special Envoy Diego] Cordovez and Pakistan. Try to do

business with the Chinese and, of course, with the Americans.

When we went into Afghanistan we were wrapped up [*zakol'tsovany*] in the ideological aspects and calculated that we could jump over three stages right away: from feudalism to socialism. Now we can look at the situation openly and follow a realistic policy. For we accepted everything in Poland—the Church, the individual peasant farms, the ideology, and political pluralism. Reality is reality. The comrades speak correctly: it is better to pay with money than with the lives of our people.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 23 February 1987 (Excerpt)⁴

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. The situation is not simple. Now we're in, but how to get out racks one's brains. We could leave quickly, not thinking about anything and making reference to everything which the previous leadership started. But we can't act that way. India would be concerned, and they would be concerned in Africa. They think this would be a blow to the authority of the Soviet Union in the national liberation movement. And they tell us that imperialism will go on the offensive if you flee from Afghanistan.

But the domestic aspect is important, too. A million of our soldiers have been to Afghanistan. And all in vain, it turns out. The matter has not been brought to an end. We're not answering to our own people. They will say: they've forgotten about the sacrifices and the authority of the country. It provokes a bitter taste—for what did you lay down [the lives of] people?

...Don't exclude America from an agreement, even as far as making a deal with the Americans. And we need to rub Pakistan's nose in it, letting them know that the Soviet Union isn't going anywhere. Could [President of Pakistan] Zia ul-Haq possibly be invited to Tashkent to meet with me and even "pay" him in some way? We need flexibility and resourcefulness, for otherwise there will be a slaughter and Najib will fall right away. Continue talks, don't let them be broken off. And possibly we'll have to make concessions about the withdrawal periods.

Are there doubts about what I have said right now (voices: No! No!)? Then let's act accordingly.

Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 February 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

GORBACHEV. Material aid. The expenses are enormous, and they are justified if they solve the Afghan problem.

SHEVARDNADZE. We will have made a mistake again if we haven't foreseen what awaits us. To withdraw troops now is the only correct solution.

GORBACHEV. And we won't let the discussion get diverted on the topic of who was at fault. Right now, about material aid.

GROMYKO. But they asked us to deploy troops 11 times. We turned them down. There was, of course, the simplistic idea that the presence of our troops would put Afghanistan on the correct path. But I do not now believe for a second that Afghanistan could have created its own army no matter how many resources we invested there. Nevertheless, we have no alternative—nothing is left [but] how to supply it.

GORBACHEV. There is an "alternative"! For example, if we deploy another 200,000 [troops] but then that is the collapse of our whole cause. So the withdrawal of troops is the only correct decision. But other decisions might be required at a given moment. Take something from what [Najib's Chief Soviet Advisor] Polyanichko suggested. And don't be hasty with the withdrawal of advisers: everyone will see that we're running away.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti, 27 February 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

[G. ANDREOTTI] The issue of Afghanistan. Obviously, you know that in recent years resolutions regarding the Afghan issue have been adopted in various forums of the European Community [EC]. We noted that recently the Soviet Union made a series of new announcements. I particularly have in mind a message to the Islamic Conference which I personally value highly. This was a very skillful political move. It is

therefore not surprising that the countries of the European Community have gained the impression that a solution of the Afghan problem is coming which everyone has always advocated and considered it necessary to confirm their opinion and to call upon the Soviet Union to continue moving along this correct path.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I want to make one comment. We have information from very reliable sources which I think we can consider reliable. The US has set itself the goal of obstructing a settlement in Afghanistan by any means, for if America is not successful it will be deprived of an opportunity to present the Soviet Union in a bad light in the eyes of world public opinion. If this is so, and, I repeat, we are almost convinced that our information is reliable, the matter takes on a difficult nature.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Even the Pakistanis are telling us of the pressure that the Americans are putting on them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, the Pakistanis are complaining that the Americans are putting pressure on them to obstruct a settlement. I earnestly request that you not let the Pakistanis down, for then the Americans will finally crush them.

G. ANDREOTTI. (Laughs) Thank you for the confidential information. I know about this. The Pakistani minister of foreign affairs is my personal friend. He was a prisoner in Italy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This means that our information agrees with yours.

G. ANDREOTTI. But it's impossible to forget that there are various forces in America. Other and, I think, the most influential American circles are undertaking other steps, for example, to cancel the sanctions against Poland. I also know about the trip which [Undersecretary of State John C.] Whitehead made through the Warsaw Pact countries not long ago. And he had very open conversations with the Poles. I think that it would be in both our and your interest that America have ever increasing influence in determining the political course of the country.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We also see this. We follow US policy very closely and respond to signals which come from reasonable, realistic circles. Naturally, we understand that these circles also represent and defend US interests. We do not preclude rivalry and competition with America, but on a realistic basis. Generally speaking, we have a positive frame of mind but not everything depends on us.

G. ANDREOTTI. Some words about an international conference on the Middle East. I am personally advocating serious preparations for a conference. During meetings in the US I even used the expression "preparations for preparations."

For if there are no serious preparations for an international conference then it will be doomed to failure from the beginning. Such carelessness is impermissible.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We are of this same opinion.

G. ANDREOTTI. You obviously know about the differences with the Israeli leadership, including those which are public. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs often come out with not simply contradictory but even diametrically opposed statements.

I would like to clarify that in a document approved by the EC there is nothing written about the need to renew diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel. We requested that this desire be sent to the Soviet leadership confidentially, so to speak, "in their ears." This was my suggestion. I stated frankly that this issue is very delicate, and it is not necessary to make public statements.

On the other hand, Israel is probably right in some regard when it questions how a country that does not have [diplomatic] relations with it can participate in an international conference on the Middle East. Possibly you could reexamine this issue since you maintain diplomatic relations with dozens of countries which have the most diverse economic, social, and political systems. I well understand your difficulties connected in particular with the psychology of the Arabs. But right now several Arab countries are beginning to move in the direction of recognizing Israel. If the fate of the conference possibly depends on the issue of restoring diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel, would it not be worth doing this?

I also know about the difficulties with the Palestinians. We ourselves also suffer from them. Who should represent the Palestinians, [Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser] Arafat or not? We support Arafat inasmuch as we do not see anyone else who could be the representative of the Palestinians in present circumstances. Mr. Gromyko once said to me that Arafat is the "black cat" in your relations with Syria. But where is another representative right now who could represent the Palestinians instead of and better than Arafat?

M. S. GORBACHEV. We see both of these problems. If one talks about our relations with Israel then possibly at some stage of a movement toward a conference in the course of this process we could return to this issue. But not right now. It does not seem possible to pull this question out from the general context of the present situation.

As regards the PLO, we also are of the opinion that this is a reality which needs to be considered. If the interests of the Palestinians—and the PLO represents them—are cast aside then nothing will be achieved by any conference. There are things from which it is impossible to escape. The Soviet Union favors the PLO being a constructive participant of the Middle East process. We maintain relations with many Arab regimes in the course of which the PLO situation is also dis-

cussed. We call upon them to preserve the PLO as an organization representing the interests of the Palestinian people. But you know it is easier for all of us to fly off together to another galaxy than for the Arabs to agree among themselves.

G. ANDREOTTI. This is correct. Many people, when they talk about an international conference, mention as a difficulty the issue of whether the Soviet Union should participate in it or whether the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. I think that the main issue which should be decided is where should the country be located which is granted to the Palestinian people. They have suffered so much. The question now is not of your recognition of Israel. Possibly in the course of preparations for the conference we would be able to use the argument about restoring diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel to exert pressure on Shamir. But resolve the issue at the conference itself.



Notes from Politburo Meeting, 21-22 May 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

SHEVARDNADZE reports: expressing serious worry and alarm at the state of affairs: the policy of national reconciliation is producing a certain result, but very modest.

GORBACHEV. (After [General Valentin I.] Varennikov's report) Thus we won't go into a new Afghanistan with the present regime. The regime should be transformed. But how are we to act? You say that the Afghan army is not able to perform its role independently, but what then about a withdrawal of our troops?

VARENNIKOV. The policy of national reconciliation is dying out.

GORBACHEV. But we have already told Najib to do everything himself and not run to us for advice. He sees that a national reconciliation will not be reached, yet he does nothing. This is a typical Karmalism.

You're right: it will turn out like the soldier thinks there, that they're forcing him to fight for us and not for his homeland.

VARENNIKOV. There's generally no sense of a homeland there. There's kin, the tribe, and the clan; a soldier fights for [his] family because a large part of the territory is under the rule of the mujaheddin.

GORBACHEV. The mujaheddin, too, proceed from what you're saying.

VARENNIKOV. They are an illiterate people, but we are agitating for socialism and imposing the idea of a national democratic revolution. But they don't understand any of this there in Afghanistan.

There are tendencies toward stagnation. More could have been done in five months.

KRYUCHKOV. It's impossible to withdraw, flee, and throw everything away. I understand the Politburo policy this way: shift everything onto Afghanistan and have them learn to manage to act independently. Otherwise [it will be] a bloody slaughterhouse. The problem is not just that the word "democratic" in the name of the Party (PDPA) is not suitable. The Party can be renamed. But it needs to be kept in mind that the very concept of "Party" is strange to an Afghan. But Najib is first of all the leader of the entire Party. But without the government he is nothing to Afghans. And "Islamization" needs to be added to the Party's appearance.

GORBACHEV. Yes, this is a realistic approach. We are obliged to conduct a realistic policy. And this needs to be remembered: there can be no Afghanistan without Islam. There's nothing to replace it with now. But if the name of the Party is kept then the word "Islamic" needs to be included in it. Afghanistan needs to be returned to a condition which is natural for it. The mujaheddin need to be more aggressively invited to [share] power at the grass roots. No one is stopping this from being done. But Najib should speak as President and Chairman of the State Council. The personal factor has great importance there.

If Najib is nominated for the post of President then have him right away proclaim another program and not [one] around the PDPA.

Who can we work with there if not with Najib? But [if] we turn away completely, though, everything will slip away [and] they'll say to us: the Soviet Union betrayed us.

It's clear that the Afghans will not rally around the PDPA. They will not accept it. And [we] need to talk now not about a second wind in Afghanistan but a last. If we exclude a prospect connected with Najib then we have lost everything. It'll turn out as with Karmal. And then what—we'll withdraw troops and bug out? We'll leave bruises all the same. But it's necessary so that there will be fewer of them and that it not be painful. We need to think about ties with the King. We need to avoid the formula that a coalition government is only to be based on the present government. And not to make Najib "No.1."

AKHROMEYEV. A leading role for the PDPA will never happen. And if we take that point of view there will be an endless war which we will never win. A coalition government is possible but not with the PDPA having a leading role, only with its participation, where it does not have decisive influence. Let there be a "bourgeois government" there for about a year

supported by our bayonets.

GORBACHEV. If we tell them this right now, they will simply flee.

GORBACHEV. It would be a mistake if we simply cleared out of there. We will not explain to our people why. But in Afghanistan, whoever is on the side of the mujaheddin will long remember how we were killing them and those who are with Najib, that we put everyone on the level of their enemies with one stroke. And we will not get a friendly Afghanistan. At the same time it is impossible to continue this war endlessly.

Accordingly, we need to find a political solution which will not exclude any military operations. To put it another way, the policy of national reconciliation is the correct one. But how to flesh it out? Specific steps are needed. In this form it comes to nothing. A broader spectrum of diverse forces needs to be contacted.

Right now the positions of the United States and Pakistan are hardening. This is in order to frustrate the policy of national reconciliation. We cannot disregard even one avenue.

1) Cordovez. Think hard how to do business with him and not break off contact.

2) We have not approached the United States of America in a real way. They need to be associated with the political solution, to be invited. This is the correct policy. There's an opportunity here.

3) Diplomatic steps in regard to the leadership of Afghanistan itself. There are chances of influencing them. They are afraid that we will simply bug out like the United States did from Vietnam.

4) Military operations. The tactics of territorial pressure need to be improved. Give weapons to local authorities. The Afghans are able to keep their word [if] they have their morale. It is important to try that our aid reaches them in the sense of supplying the soldiers with everything they need. Get the officers interested. Detachments exist in the field and more will spring up. But they will then act only in our favor when the whole process operates in the necessary direction.

5) What is preventing the opposition being brought into the government or local bodies of power at the grassroots? Invite them and make an announcement to this effect; get the word to the people that they are ready to do this.

6) The PDPA needs to be left a defined role and not pushed out. And let other parties be created, let's say, an "Islamic Party of Afghanistan." Let them combine all the forces capable of national leader-

ship. In any case an Islamic element needs to be inserted in the Party name. And also have the PDPA change its form and nature.

I do not want to say right now what place will be left for Najibullah. But by nature he is most probably leader of the government, since the president should be a neutral figure. And there should be something like a parliament with an influential post of chairman.

7) It is clear it will be impossible to get by with 2-3% in the government for the opposition. Realistically, if we want to achieve something, no less than 50%.

8) We should be finished with the Afghan issue in a year and a half. A firm deadline. And Najib needs to be told about this deadline. Warn him again: do as you yourself think and ask us less often. But tell our advisers: stop commanding there. And condition Najib so that he acts as he considers necessary and not send 20 questions a day to Moscow.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Cde. Najib, 20 July 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. In the name of the Soviet leadership we welcome you to Moscow, Cde. Najib. Your visit to Moscow to talk and to exchange opinions here is well-timed.

NAJIB. I would like to express my deep gratitude for the opportunity afforded me to meet with you, Mikhail Sergeevich, and with members of the Soviet leadership. The constant attention which is devoted to the problems of Afghanistan is displayed in this.

Our meetings and conversations have become a good tradition and have great importance for the work of the DRA Party and government leadership. We view today's meeting as a manifestation of your constant attention toward Afghan affairs and the Afghan Revolution. And this is why I view today's meeting as a great honor for myself. I express appreciation for the organization of my brief visit which will allow me to share ideas about the trends of the military and political situation in Afghanistan and the plans for our future work directed at its normalization.

If you will allow me, then, following established tradition I could first inform you about the state of affairs in Afghani-

stan. In doing so I would like to give you prepared material on this issue but in today's conversation I would like to dwell on key topics of principle. (hands over the material).

M. S. GORBACHEV. Thank you. As always, we study your material closely. As you know, our comrades in Kabul regularly inform Moscow [*tseñtr*] of your ideas and assessments. However this material, it seems, allows us to realistically determine how accurately they are passing on your ideas and what they add from themselves (commotion).

NAJIB. They do not add, rather they enrich them.

First, I would like to dwell on an analysis of the initial results of implementing the policy of national reconciliation and problems we are encountering at the present time in carrying out this policy; to talk about the immediate tasks of the Party in promoting this policy, including in the area of military policy and economic work; and to touch on several problems of the international activity of the PDPA and the DRA government.

At the present time what is the focus of attention of the Party and governmental leadership are the issues of the unswerving implementation of the steps for national reconciliation developed in all areas—political, economic, military, and ideological. As the accumulated, although as yet insignificant, experience shows, as regards the fight against the counterrevolution, the defense of the gains of the Revolution and normalization of the situation, there is no alternative to the policy of reconciliation. It is nevertheless important that the period past has convincingly demonstrated the impossibility of resolving the problems facing Afghanistan by military means alone.

I'll dwell on several specific topics.

A mechanism has been created for implementing the policy of national reconciliation, the main links of which are appropriate commissions. At the present time more than 10,000 reconciliation commissions are operating in the country, joining together tens of thousands of patriotically-minded representatives of the population, including former rebels. These commissions can be viewed as temporary operating bodies of local authority with a specifically marked coalition structure.

In the period after the proclamation of the policy of reconciliation, of a total of around 164,000 [rebels], fifteen thousand armed rebels openly came over to the side of the government. More than 600 groups with a total strength of 53,000 men are holding talks with the government. Part of the counterrevolutionary formations, about 50,000 men, are taking a wait-and-see position. However, as before, there is an active nucleus of the irreconcilable opposition numbering 46,000 men. The groups in it continue serious resistance to the measures which people's power is implementing.

The process of returning refugees to the DRA has been stepped up. More than 60,000 people have already returned to various regions of the country. Their numbers could be even greater if obstacles were not placed in their way by Pakistani and Iranian authorities.

The policy of national reconciliation, the proclamation of which was a surprise to the opposition, is deepening the split in the ranks of the irreconcilable counter-revolutionary organizations operating within the framework of the "Alliance of Seven." In particular this has been displayed by the failure of the plans to create a "provisional government," a "government in exile" by uniting the leading counter-revolutionary organizations. A tendency toward a division between the second echelon of the counter-revolution—the middle link of the leadership of counterrevolutionary groups and organizations in Afghanistan—and the highest echelon located in Pakistan is also increasingly perceptible.

In a word, interest in participating in the policy of national reconciliation is growing in the opposition camp. The attitude of the counter-revolutionary organizations toward former King Zahir Shah, who is inclined to look for a compromise, is indicative in this sense. It can be said that the attitude toward the former King is a unique "litmus test" through which the real positions of one or the other counterrevolutionary group are revealed. But, in any case, there are a considerable number of serious opponents of the former King in the opposition, chiefly representatives of right-wing, reactionary forces, who think that the appearance of Zahir Shah on the political stage could strike a serious blow to the plans of the counter-revolution in Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. These forces are striving in every way to diminish the importance of this figure and the possible role of the former King in achieving reconciliation. And he himself is displaying great caution.

NAJIB. The main thing is that the policy of national reconciliation become a unique catalyst for the sentiments of the population to strengthen their support for the measures of the PDPA and government. It can be stated with confidence that the policy promoted by the PDPA enjoys the support of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people and meets the national interests of the country. But, on the other hand, in the process of implementing the policy of reconciliation all the more often reserves are being identified and not used by the Party, including those for a further increase of its authority.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Have you thought about the question of what the basis will be for national reconciliation considering the great diversity of attitudes, interests, and trends existing in society?

NAJIB. Yes, of course. In our view, in these conditions the objective possibilities for a larger role for the PDPA increases by expanding its social base. But, nevertheless, it would be premature and incorrect to say that the policy of national reconciliation has brought such tangible results and acquired an irreversible nature. The enemy is not only not stopping fighting but is intensifying resistance to the policy of the PDPA and government. Washington and its allies in the region are continuing to whip up tension in and around Af-

ghanistan and are escalating combat operations. Our country has become one of the main links of a policy of state terrorism being pursued by the US. In implementing the designs of their patrons, the main blow of the counter-revolution is being directed at the PDPA.

As is well known, since May of this year the counter-revolution has begun at the orders of the White House to implement a plan to create a "national council of mujaheddin" with the functions of a provisional or transitional government. However the reactionaries are making efforts to discredit the PDPA and the policy of national reconciliation, seemingly separating the Party from the policy of national reconciliation. In the opinion of these forces such an approach could give them an opportunity to gradually nullify reconciliation itself.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In other words, they are, so to speak, "for councils, but without communists." For a neutral, independent Afghanistan, but without the PDPA.

NAJIB. There are also subjective reasons for the current difficulties. It is necessary to admit openly and self-critically that up to now the PDPA has not made a sharp turn toward an active implementation of the policy it advanced and is insufficiently purposeful and diligent in solving the problem of creating [the appropriate] conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Moreover, even at the highest level of the Party and government there still remains a narrow-mindedness of views, a lack of initiative, a disinclination to free themselves from the burden of past mistakes, and conservatism. The fact that in local Party organizations and among the population in the districts work has still not been properly organized to explain and propagandize the results of the June CC PDPA Plenum could serve as an example of this.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Is it not the case that some comrades in the PDPA leadership will identify the interests of the people and the country with their own welfare and their own egoistic interests?

NAJIB. Yes, this is actually so.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The question also arises: do not individual comrades view the policy of creating a coalition government and expanding the social base as a threat to their positions and status? A real revolutionary thinks about his own country first. This is his fate, too. If there then are such sentiments, will they interfere with the process of national reconciliation? In this connection there is the question of the historic responsibility of the PDPA leadership to their own people, especially considering the policy of reconciliation and the solution of the problems of a political settlement under the conditions of the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops.

NAJIB. I completely agree with you. It ought to be openly admitted that as before there is a feeling of routine in our

work and a substitution of words and slogans for specific deeds. Control of the expeditious solution of pressing problems and the implementation of planned measures has been poorly organized. Executive discipline is still at a low level. The Party and government bureaucracy often displays a lack of initiative. This could be illustrated, for example, by how things are going with the solution of the critical problems of helping the peasants, providing medical services, and the other first-priority needs of the population. It is completely understandable that all this negatively reflects on the authority of the PDPA.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It could be said that there exist two levels of problem solving. The highest level is the adoption of decisions which would consider the interests of all groups and sectors of the population to the maximum possible degree and would determine the way to support these interests under Afghan conditions. If this can be achieved then the population itself will actively participate in the implementation of such measures, not waiting for steps from various government bodies. The second level is translating these decisions into practice. Those responsible for carrying out government policy are the local party and government bodies who are called upon to work to support the very interests of the population. What interest is this to us in this regard? Perhaps something is interfering with the adoption of the necessary decisions at the highest level. Perhaps the decisions which are being made are not being realized at the grassroots. We would like to understand this.

NAJIB. Specific and correct decisions are being made. Moreover, they are encountering ever greater understanding and support from the people, who are displaying a readiness to actively assist in their implementation. Government bodies at the local level are taking specific steps for their realization. But when specific work from higher levels of the government and party bureaucracy is required to implement decisions which have been made, the process slows down. We encounter inaction, laziness, an inability to work, a love of routine, and a lack of understanding of the problems being faced by several members of supervisory bodies. Executive discipline is weak. It would seem in present conditions that the leadership itself would be an example of dedication and purposefulness. Unfortunately, however, this does not yet happen, mostly due to surviving group thinking and factionalism.

M. S. GORBACHEV. If the decisions being made do not affect the interests of the population, for example, the peasantry, then no bureaucrats will be able to do anything. And on the contrary, if they do affect [the population] then things will move. I will cite an example from history in this connection. Why was Lenin's Decree on Land effective? After its proclamation Soviet power was still far from being established. But the peasants, to whose interests the Decree responded, took the land themselves and translated the Decree into practice.

I would like to stress this: if a particular decision affects [someone's] interests, then the mechanisms for their [the decrees] implementation will be found. But it will not work out if something is not fully thought out in decisions and decrees made by the PDPA and government and the interests of one or another group of the population are overlooked.

NAJIB. I can say in this regard that the policy of national reconciliation has evoked a warmer reaction from the Afghan people than in the ranks of the PDPA. Regrettably I have to say that the activity of the Party is lagging behind the situation and the reaction of the population.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Probably the reaction in the Party is varied. Those who represent the working levels are trying to do everything necessary to satisfy their aspirations. However, obviously there is the leadership level, which is afraid of losing its privileges if the PDPA withdraws to the background under the conditions of reconciliation. They are concerned not for the fate of the Party but about some interests of their own.

NAJIB. I agree with your statement.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And everything turns on this.

NAJIB. What do we consider the main tasks of the PDPA and the government to implement the policy of national reconciliation considering the current situation? First of all, we have to concentrate our efforts on actively translating into practice steps to defend revolutionary achievements, especially considering that we are entering a new stage of the policy of national reconciliation. Today new complex and critical tasks are on the agenda which the Party should resolve in the shortest possible time. In this regard, in our opinion, the main directions of the work should be the following.

We think that it is necessary to increase pressure on the enemy with emphasis on stepping up contacts with various sectors of the opposition—monarchists, “moderates,” representatives of the big and middle bourgeoisie, clergy, and tribal leaders and elders.

We have to develop and carry out such specific measures which would facilitate the imparting of an irreversible character to the process of reconciliation, which the enemy especially fears.

One of the main areas of work is the expansion of coalition forms of power at all levels.

The task of creating a bloc of leftist democratic forces on a platform of support for the policy of national reconciliation, involving all patriotically-minded forces in cooperation under the slogan of defense of the independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, and the strengthening of friendship with the Soviet Union is being promoted to the forefront. In so doing we do not exclude that other forces acting in the conditions of reconciliation will receive access to political activity, of course, on the basis of their principles.

The PDPA has also announced and has stressed with

specific steps its readiness to create a multi-party system in the country. Political parties are receiving the right to [perform] appropriate activity on condition that they will act in support of peace and security in the country. Moreover, they will be afforded the opportunity to realize their goals and tasks in the framework of the National Front.

However, I would like to openly admit in this regard that the National Front has not yet become an influential and notable force in society. The scope of its activity is limited to large cities but even in this situation its organizations function poorly. One of the main reasons for such a state of affairs is that until now we have viewed the National Front as a part of the Party and have restricted its activity to the limits of Party requirements. The time has come for it to become a genuine union of all patriotically-minded forces on a voluntary, not compulsory, basis.

It happened that in the draft constitution of the DRA which we submitted at a national conference the obligatory collective membership of particular parties, public, and political organizations in a National Front was stipulated. It appears that this is an incorrect formulation of the problem. Therefore we have in mind introducing a corresponding amendment to the final draft of the Basic Law, for it is important that the Front facilitate the attainment of national reconciliation.

There is yet one more problem which is of concern. As before, there are people in the PDPA who favor not the creation of a bloc of leftist forces but are for the fusion of leftist democratic organizations with the PDPA. However, as experience has shown, the artificial union of four such organizations with the PDPA did not produce a political effect. Actually, in these four organizations in the PDPA only 885 people joined. At the same time they continue to maintain their organizational structure and act in accordance with their programmatic and regulatory requirements.

On the other hand, as is well known, there are leftist groupings of the so-called “radical type” in Afghanistan, in particular the Revolutionary Organization of Workers of Afghanistan. They place the leading role of the PDPA in doubt and damage the unity of leftist forces. Therefore it would be more correct and advisable for the PDPA to work in cooperation with leftist democratic organizations in a common bloc, at the same time actively implementing measures to restructure intra-Party activity. In our view, a recently adopted law about parties creates good preconditions in these terms.

M. S. GORBACHEV. That is why it is very important to correctly determine what the “face” of the PDPA should be at this stage.

NAJIB. Absolutely. I would like the PDPA to remain the leading mobilizing force. But, unfortunately, a wish is one thing and life and practice are another. At the present stage we do not have the strength to compete for such a role.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that at this stage of implementing the policy of national reconciliation, in the conditions of form-

ing a broad coalition the PDPA could play a leading organizational role. And at the same time it would actually be unrealistic to count on the Party maintaining its present position after achieving national reconciliation. It's necessary to accurately forecast the situation which will develop in the background of the processes now already underway, put this policy into effect, and [forecast] the situation after achieving reconciliation.

In other words, the step-by-step principle should be at the foundation of the determination of the near-term and long-term tasks of the PDPA. At the present time the PDPA is operating in conditions of a struggle for implementation of the policy of national reconciliation. A correct evaluation of the tasks of each stage, a precise and realistic analysis of the situation at each of them, will help correctly determine the role and place of the PDPA in the first and second stage.

At the present stage the PDPA is the leading force of national reconciliation. It fulfills its role, relying on a scientific analysis of the situation in Afghan society, the processes taking place in it, and a correct evaluation of the historic stage of this society. Preserving its revolutionary character, at the same time the Party understands that right now it needs to work on translating a minimal program into practice, that is, the realization of national democratic reforms. And here it should act with a consideration for the entire spectrum of political and social forces of Afghan society. And now at the stage of realizing a policy of national reconciliation and after achieving its goals and turning to democratic reforms, the PDPA should consider the real situation in Afghanistan. Otherwise this will be adventurism.

Of course, right now the PDPA can do much in order to play an important role in succeeding stages. It is important not to lose time now and that the PDPA be the initiator of the policy of national reconciliation and that it be ready to share real power—all this will substantially facilitate the strengthening of the authority of the PDPA, and create a good foundation and opportunities for the future. But if it is more expedient for the Party now to place its cadres in all institutions of government authority then it could create favorable conditions to preserve and strengthen its positions. Of course, the task is very difficult and the process of its resolution will be difficult, but you and I have come to the conclusion that there is no other way.

There can be mistakes and losses on this path. You won't avoid them. Of course, it is easier to shout, proclaim revolutionary slogans, and fight for the purity of the revolutionary banner. This is the spirit of "Karmalism." Those who uphold it would like for the Soviet Union to fight while they live quietly in palaces. But such an approach and such a situation can in no way suit the Afghan people, let alone the Soviet Union. The Afghan public is tired of the war. We need to be realists and politically responsible people.

Now, when you are moving to the next stage in realizing the policy of national reconciliation it is very important to show the danger of reasoning in the spirit of "Karmalism." Tell Party members bluntly that inactivity and an unwillingness to realistically analyze the current situation are being

hidden behind pseudo-revolutionary leftist phraseology. People need to be united in an understanding of what needs to be done at the present stage.

Information is reaching Moscow that there are such sentiments: the policy of national reconciliation "is coming to an impasse, which means the loss of revolutionary achievements and a retreat from goals which had been reached." This is all nonsense, irresponsible chatter. The Party needs to be told bluntly about this and those who are mistaken need to be set straight.

It is very important at this stage not to allow a split in the PDPA.

The future of Afghanistan can only be secured through national reconciliation. It is impossible to jump to socialism without a stage of national democratic reforms. We and the Chinese had "great leaps." We know how they end.

The fate of the PDPA after achieving national reconciliation will depend on how the Party acts now, at the present time. It is impossible to retain authority on [the force of] Soviet troops. But while our troops are in Afghanistan, all capabilities need to be used. Propose such a policy that the people see the PDPA as a national force. The authority of the leadership and those who implement the policy depend on this. And it cannot be otherwise. I got so actively involved in your information because this is the central point of the political situation.

NAJIB. In the first PDPA platform adopted in 1966 one of the main tasks that was established was the joining of various classes and sectors of Afghan society together on a national patriotic basis. But after the Revolution we forgot this principle and monopolized power. Instead of isolating the enemy we isolated ourselves and lost touch with the people. Now we are trying to convince our own people that we have not repudiated these principles once and for all. Therefore we are forced to take one or two steps back in order to correct errors of dogma. We are doing this on a principled basis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The Party should be ahead of the people. One cannot lose touch with [one's own] base. A fondness for leftist slogans leads to sectarian politics. This is why the situation has become difficult when all of society is undergoing a certain historical stage of its development and the Party has withdrawn into its own circle and its own ideas. Whether one or two steps need to be taken is more evident to you. But [they] need to be together with the public.

NAJIB. I will note that some people interpret our actions as a retreat. But in reality this is a movement forward in all directions—inside the country and in the international arena. We are at that stage of our development when to advance we need first of all to correct the mistakes which have been made. There have been and [still] are mistakes. We are correcting them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I completely agree with your analysis and assessments, with one reservation. All this needs to be

done without losing time. Because Afghanistan is a country at war. You cannot ponder for years.

NAJIB. I want to note that our efforts to create a leftist democratic bloc are being implemented quite successfully. Moreover, we intend to develop contacts with the so-called social democratic party “*Afgan mellyat*.” This organization operates both inside and outside Afghanistan. Specifically, such a meeting took place not long ago in Delhi. On the whole we hope to complete work to form a bloc of leftist democratic forces by fall.

Work is also being done to create political organizations which would express the interests of categories and sectors of the population. I have in mind joining the representatives of the Afghan clergy together into an Islamic Party. We are acting cautiously in this direction since we don’t want such a party to be imposed from above. This would be a mistake and could be used by the enemy in their interests. Additionally, in order to intensify work with the clergy we plan to introduce structural changes in the Ministry for Islamic and Waqf Affairs.⁵ The implementation of the planned measures would allow the opposition to recommend their representatives for this Ministry through Islamic committees operating in the country. Thus yet one more channel of communication with various groups of counter-revolutionary forces could arise.

NAJIB. The creation of a peasant party could be an effective step in attracting the peasantry to participate in political life.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Was there such a party in Afghanistan earlier? Through whom, in your view, could such a party be formed?

NAJIB. There was no such party in the past. As regards the members of the peasants party then they could be landowners, peasants who receive land in the process of reforms, and members of agricultural cooperatives. I think it is a realistic matter, considering a certain interest which is being shown by the population itself.

We are also encouraging representatives of the ethnic bourgeoisie to create their own democratic party. We are confident that the successful implementation of these plans will permit the PDPA to find a way out of the situation in which it has to confront the counter-revolution alone. The union of all democratic, ethnic forces on a common platform would facilitate the creation of political pluralism and be in accord with ethnic interests.

Of course, all this is directed at strengthening cooperation with patriotic forces who have moderate positions on the whole. But we continue to swing [our] work around to strengthen our contacts with the so-called “rightist” forces.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Probably a moment will come before the elections when the PDPA will have to share posts in the government bureaucracy with other parties. Otherwise a situation could develop where, in accordance with the law

adopted in Afghanistan, different parties could be created and operate but all the positions remain in the hands of the PDPA.

NAJIB. I agree with you completely, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Actually they can gain access to real power in the government bureaucracy themselves as a result of elections. It is tactically more advantageous for this to be done ahead of time by the PDPA. Such a step could produce a positive effect both inside the country and abroad.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In addition, this would intensify the split there, outside the country.

NAJIB. We have also established contacts with several leaders of counter-revolutionary organizations in the “Alliance of Seven.” Without question, former King Zahir Shah would be a realistic and suitable candidate to be used in a high government post under the conditions of national reconciliation.

Moreover, while searching out and expanding contacts with the highest level of the counterrevolution, we are concentrating our attention on work with its middle echelon. In our view one could go so far as recognizing a certain autonomy and independence of mid-level rebel chieftains on the territory which they control on the condition of their recognizing the central government, albeit only partially. As regards the opposition outside the country then here the main target is its moderate part. Expansion of ties with representatives of “moderates” would allow us to create a greater split and dissension within the “Alliance of Seven.”

In this context I would like to consult with you on this issue. In our view it would be advisable to turn to the opposition, first and foremost the moderates, with a proposal: open your own missions in Kabul to have constant contact and talks within the framework of national reconciliation.

Now about military issues. At the present time our measures in the political, economic, and ideological spheres are directed at solving military problems. In doing so, the main attention in the military area is devoted to fighting the irreconcilable part of the counter-revolutionaries whose strength is 46,000 men, as I have already noted above.

We understand that the problems of strengthening the armed forces are quite important from the point of view of implementing the policy of national reconciliation; however it has to be said that a great many, good well-founded decisions directed at strengthening the armed forces, primarily the army, have not yet been carried out.

As an analysis of the current state of affairs shows, we have made several mistakes in determining priorities in military policy. For example, at one time a decision was made to bring the armed forces up to 500,000 men. However, right now we have a ten-fold advantage in manpower over the nucleus of the irreconcilable opposition. Such a task is therefore incorrect, even if there was not a high level of desertion, which has reached thirty thousand, or a need to discharge men into the reserves who have served their terms.

The main thing is to concentrate efforts at increasing the combat readiness of personnel already on hand, and solving the problems of providing necessary discipline and coordination between various branches of the armed forces, and units and subunits. To put it another way, it's necessary to achieve a qualitative, not [just] quantitative improvement of the DRA armed forces. The problems of staffing combat units and subunits, the [manning] level of which at the present time is only 40% of authorized strength, can be solved only by transferring servicemen into them from logistical subunits, administrative echelons, and [other] staff.

What has great importance for stepping up the fight against the counter-revolution is a directive of the HQ [Headquarters] of the Supreme High Command providing for the creation of military districts and subordinating all armed formations to a single command within the zones of responsibility of the corresponding army corps. Such a measure will facilitate, in particular, more active participation by border troops deployed in border areas in combat operations to neutralize rebel groups. In this connection we are requesting you examine the issue of transferring the advisory functions in the border troops to the staff of the Chief Soviet Military Adviser.

In solving the problem of creating special purpose units of the "commandos" type by a call-up of volunteers, we intend to subordinate them directly to the HQ of the Supreme Commander. In addition, in present conditions we have to increase the level of coordination of the Ministries of Defense, State Security, and Internal Affairs under the command of the Supreme Commander within the framework of the Supreme High Command. Such a coordination of operations already exists, without doubt, but it is of a predominantly military nature, and it needs to be given a more political direction.

Taking this opportunity I would like to express appreciation to you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, for agreeing to send to Afghanistan such an eminent military leader as General of the Army V. I. Varennikov. Moreover I would like to ask that you consider these following ideas of ours.

At the present time all plans for combat operations which are developed by the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Operations Group headed by, V. I. Varennikov, are submitted to Moscow for coordination. This leads to a loss of time. Obviously it would be more suitable to give General of the Army V. I. Varennikov the authority to make operational decisions in the field. Moreover, he could also be given the functions of coordinator of the activity of all Soviet military organizations in Afghanistan in waging combat operations.

A new department has been created in the PDPA CC in order to strengthen political work in the armed forces and expand the military-political education of the population. Considering the importance of this task we would like to ask you to consider the possibility of a temporary assignment to the DRA of a special adviser to help in the work of this department. Of course, we have arranged for the gradual reduction of the strength of the advisory staff, but nevertheless we are proceeding only from the interests of the matter in this

request.

Regarding the problems of party work to implement the policy of national reconciliation. I completely agree with your assessment of the nature of the new stage of implementing the policy of national reconciliation and the PDPA's growing responsibility in it. From this point of view, in our opinion, the June plenum of our Party's CC was an important step in understanding the future tasks of the PDPA. It demonstrated that by an overwhelming majority the members of the PDPA are supporting the policy which has been advocated. The plenum seemingly marked the conclusion of a certain period in developing and implementing this policy and showed that the Party has outlined a specific framework for the policy of reconciliation.

The readiness for compromise, the introduction of a multiparty system in our country, the creation of coalition governing bodies, the formation of a bloc of left democratic forces including the PDPA, etc. lies at the base of our future activity. In developing the concept of reconciliation, we submitted the draft constitution for public discussion and we are examining the possibility of changing the name of the country and even the Party. By the way, in connection with the following question – I intend to change the name of the PDPA—I need to consult with you about the following. Considering the law about parties, the Karmalists could take steps to create their own political organization. One can already observe such a tendency. Therefore if we rename the Party then they could name their organization "PDPA" as a counterbalance and act against us.

The main task of the present stage of development of the PDPA's activity is preparation for an all-Party conference. Considering the magnitude of the issues which have to be decided at the present time we are devoting special attention to work in this direction.

M. S. GORBACHEV. When do you think it possible and necessary to hold the conference?

NAJIB. In about two or two-and-a-half months. This is why we need to sharply step up work to explain the decisions of the last plenum.

Taking into consideration that, regarding the questions being submitted for its consideration, the conference could be equal to a congress, it is obvious that organizational measures have to be put on the agenda. The time has come to cleanse the Party of people who speak against the policy of national reconciliation, factionalists, and saboteurs.

The most important task, the task of overriding importance, is to strengthen the authority of the Party. That fact that even under the conditions of a coalition the post of president should belong to the PDPA can be viewed as a favorable precondition to take the necessary steps directed at preserving the Party's positions under new conditions. Of course, even now one ought to think about the correct placement of people. And in this connection the question arises about forming a united monolithic nucleus in the PDPA leadership by drawing on capable young party activists.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But are there such possibilities? Are there are trained young cadres?

NAJIB. Yes. But they need to be used and advanced more boldly. In doing so one can in no way forget about trustworthy party veterans. Everything ought to be done so that their rich experience is used with maximum effectiveness. This will be especially important when the PDPA has to confront opposition forces under completely new conditions in a future situation.

I would like to consult with you on such a serious topic as the ethnic problem. We understand that the Party needs to solve the ethnic issue. And we need to take specific steps in this direction. Individual comrades even speak of granting autonomy to various ethnic groups of the population.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is actually a very serious issue and it is impossible to ignore it. But the main thing is that such decisions not be artificially imposed and not conflict with existing realities. A mechanism has been worked out in Afghanistan over the ages which to a particular degree has supported mutual relations between the ethnic groups, sectors, and population groups in the country. Therefore it's important to look for such ways to solve the problem which would dialectically consider their interests and organically integrate the ethnic groups in the process of consolidating society. If you propose something new to the people which they do not understand, this can complicate the process of national reconciliation. In any case, it is more apparent to you, and only you, how to proceed. The main thing is respectful and impartial relations with everyone.

I'll cite an example of solving the ethnic problem in our country. At one time I worked in Stavropol' Kray, which includes the Karachay-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast.' Ninety thousand Karachay, 35,000 Circassians, 14,000 Abazi, 11,000 Nogay, etc. live here; Russians comprise 53% of the population. Nevertheless there are newspapers and radio and television broadcasts; literature is developed; and instruction in the schools is done in all the national languages. The ethnic factor is also considered when assigning party and government personnel.

It is understood that the ethnic problem is very delicate and tricky. But it is impossible to solve other problems without solving it.

NAJIB. I share your point of view. Right now we are working on creating a Ministry of Nationalities proceeding from such an understanding of the problem. We are taking steps to develop the culture and preserve the customs, traditions, and the national characteristics of various ethnic groups. The draft constitution provides an option to create ethnic entities. But nevertheless I think there is no need for haste here. We ought not be eager to solve this problem by purely administrative methods.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Right. A normalization of the situation needs to be achieved. Live in peaceful conditions, and then it

will be more evident what ought to be done. Then everything will become clear.

NAJIB. Haste in solving such complex problems is extraordinarily dangerous. We already have the bitter experience of carrying out land and water reform. The mistakes made in this area were palpable, but all the same they did not lead to especially negative consequences. However if a mistake is made in carrying out ethnic policy, then it will be a powerful "delayed-action bomb."

Right now we are working on a well thought-out, considered, and scientifically-based PDPA concept on the ethnic issue. And we would like to send it to you after preparation of the corresponding document.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will study it carefully without fail. But again I repeat: the main thing is to take steps yourselves. It is more evident to you [what to do]. In Marxism the main thing is recognition of dialectics and their employment in specific historical conditions.

NAJIB. Briefly about economic issues.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Is our aid reaching you as intended?

NAJIB. On behalf of the PDPA CC and the government I would like to express deep gratitude for the enormous unselfish aid which is being given our country. We see in this firm guarantees of a successful solution of revolutionary problems. Along with the large-scale free aid of the Soviet Union which is being sent for the needs of strengthening the armed forces and increasing the standard of living of the population, border trade and direct ties between the various Soviet republics and oblasts and Afghan provinces have great importance. These are no longer simply inter-governmental relations but invariably strengthening ties between our peoples. Without question, the development of such ties will

M.S. GORBACHEV. Not long ago in the CPSU CC a conference was held with the leadership of a number of republics and oblasts which were charged with implementing direct ties with Afghanistan, giving direct aid to the population of Afghan provinces, and developing human contact. This ought not to be forgotten in order that the free Soviet aid reaches those for whom it is intended, ordinary Afghans.

NAJIB. Eh. A. Shevardnadze told me about the results of this conference. We know well how seriously the Soviet comrades approach the question of developing direct ties. Recognizing the full measure of their responsibility for the successful implementation and the correct and effective use of the free aid being granted us, the Party and government leadership of Afghanistan is also trying to devote constant attention to improving the operation of Afghan agencies in these areas. At the same time it has to be said that shortcomings and oversights still exist in the activity of the Afghan side. We will try to remove them.

Taking this opportunity, on instructions of the PDPA CC, I would like to state several additional requests.

First of all, we would be appreciative of favorable consideration of our proposal for the command of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops and the staff of the Chief Military Adviser to give us assistance as before in the organization of work to distribute free Soviet aid among the population. This would have great political importance in terms of propagandizing the idea of friendship with the Soviet Union among the population.

In the interest of strengthening long-term cooperation between our countries in the economic sphere, we request you consider the question of building an approximately 200 km Kushka-Herat railroad branch line and return to the issue of developing the Aynak copper deposit. We understand that the realization of such projects is fraught with considerable expense in the initial stage, but all this would be repaid a hundredfold.

In terms of involving the population in supporting the government and strengthening the political position of the Soviet Union, the further improvement of trade, economic, cultural, and other ties between the northern provinces of the DRA and the Central Asian republics of the USSR can have great importance, but so also does the solution of the problem of expanding the practice of building "Soviet border to DRA province" electric power transmission lines.

We think that the opportunities for cooperation with COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation] member countries are still being insufficiently used in solving the economic problems of Afghanistan. The conditions for expanding ties with socialist countries are good, including the creation of joint enterprises.

Now I want to touch on issues of the international activity of the PDPA and government. First of all, let me state a request to help us establish and expand Afghanistan's ties with progressive countries through CC CPSU channels, especially with those where the parties or governments in power could be viewed as leftist. In addition, we would be appreciative for help from Soviet diplomatic missions in various countries in establishing contact with the Afghan opposition.

In light of the announced policy of national reconciliation, the foreign policy activity of the Party and government is at the present time being implemented sufficiently actively. In spite of the fact that India has not yet given its consent to hold a conference on reconciliation on its territory, our foreign policy is exerting an ever-growing influence on the moderate, wavering part of the opposition.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In conversations with [Indian Prime Minister Rajiv] Gandhi we discussed in detail issues connected with Afghanistan and around it. It is very important that Afghanistan not fall under US and Pakistani influence. This would be absolutely unacceptable to them. This is a good basis for cooperation with the Indians.

But there's one difference. The Indians are afraid that normalization of the situation in Afghanistan will lead to Pakistan directing subversive activities against India. One can

feel, although they do not talk of this, that the Indians are interested in the USSR not hastening to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. But in this position India is considering the interests of India alone 100%, but the interests of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union maybe 20%.

Since Afghanistan and the Afghan people having lived for so many years in a state of war they could hardly agree with such a formulation of the question. The desire of the Afghan people for peace is the main reason why the policy of national reconciliation is encountering growing understanding and support.

NAJIB. Considering my possible future meeting with Gandhi I would like to consult with you about the following issue. At the present time we are on the threshold of renewing talks in Geneva. We are trying to put constant pressure on Pakistan to act so that they neutralize those circles in the Pakistani administration who favor positions sharply hostile to Afghanistan. Of course, in the present circumstances even the policy of national reconciliation itself has become an effective factor in influencing the mood of the Pakistani population. But besides this we have traditional possibilities of influence. I have in mind the Pushtun and Baluchi tribes and also the opposition movements. There is an opportunity, for example, to work in Sind Province.

Not long ago we sent S. Layek to Delhi. The thing is, the famous leader of the Pushtun tribes of Pakistan there, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, is hospitalized in serious condition. He began his political activity even before the time of Mahatma Gandhi [the leader of the Indian nationalist movement]. They even call him "the Gandhi of the border tribes." Right now he is over 100 years old, of which he has spent 40 years in prison. In his will he expressed the wish that he be buried not in Pakistan, which, he said, is a "prison for peoples," but in Afghanistan. Unquestionably, we will try to get a suitable propaganda effect from this fact.

In the course his visit to Delhi, Layek met with Gandhi and delivered my message to him. In the conversation the Indian leader noted that the US had turned Pakistan into a bridgehead for a fight against India and Afghanistan, using the Sikhs and the Afghan counter-revolution, accordingly, for their own interests. In this regard he proposed thinking about joint retaliatory actions by India and Afghanistan against Pakistan. What do you think, would it not be worth it if Pakistan and the US try for a political settlement and develop a coordinated plan for such actions together with India? I even have an idea, a risky one, you could say. In this matter I am proceeding from the Indian leaders seriously thinking from time to time about the problem of launching a preventive attack, as a sort of demonstration, on Pakistan. Not to occupy its territory but as a show of force.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Gandhi even told me that they have plans to dismember Pakistan.

NAJIB. If the Indians do this, we for our part could, without being directly involved, provoke serious disturbances in the

border regions of Pakistan where Pushtun and Baluchi tribes live. However, the danger of a US military presence arises. But could the Americans decide to act against India? I think not. Even the simple fact of an American presence in the region would create problems for them far more difficult than in Vietnam. There is still one serious factor, however, the presence of the Soviet limited contingent. This issue could obviously be studied as an alternative.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that the special measures you are taking justify themselves. Moreover, the other side is resorting to similar actions.

NAJIB. You are right. The effectiveness of our measures has a particularly notable effect on the political situation in such provinces as Sind and Punjab.

M. S. GORBACHEV. [We] need to constantly go in the main direction which we have jointly decided on: to achieve a political settlement. If we encounter direct sabotage of the efforts for a political settlement on the part of the US and Pakistan [or] some kind of harsh measures to undermine the developing process, then obviously we will discuss with you how to act.

But today the two main issues on the agenda are: the implementation of a policy of national reconciliation and the achievement of a political settlement. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of carrying out special measures, including ones coordinated with India. However [we] need to act so that they do not lead to a direct confrontation, not to open a path to the Americans in this region.

Not long ago a group of retired Pakistani generals came to our military attaché in Pakistan, who requested that assurances be given to the Soviet leadership that they would not permit Pakistan to be turned into a bridgehead for an American military presence. We are determining right now whether this was an initiative of the generals themselves or a move instigated by Zia ul-Haq. In any case, in Pakistan they understand they ought not to play dangerous games with the Soviet Union. They see the limits.

In discussing long-range issues with Gandhi, we have proceeded from [the assumption] that there is the Soviet Union and there is India in this region and an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan would be a stabilizing element in the region. We intend to collaborate with India in the long run. Especially with Gandhi. It is very difficult for him right now. But we support him in that difficult situation which has evolved in India.

We think that the basic interests of the USSR, India, and Afghanistan coincide as regards the international issues and the situation in the region.

NAJIB. There are several more issues connected with our foreign policy activity.

We are on the eve of the convening of the 42nd UN General Assembly session. Considering the work that we are doing, opportunities have arisen to try to introduce changes

to the General Assembly resolution on Afghanistan which are favorable to us. Together with this we have developed a plan of specific actions to strengthen Afghanistan's positions in the Non-Aligned Movement, to work with the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and in other directions. In particular, we plan to send 67 delegations to various countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to conduct explanatory work there. [We] intend to enlist the aid of socialist countries in implementing the foreign policy measures of the DRA government. [We] plan to distribute special material on the subject of refugees as an official UN document in order to deprive Pakistan of an opportunity to use this problem against us.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But have you estimated how many refugees could really return to Afghanistan, even if [only] approximately?

NAJIB. We think that the return of the overwhelming majority of the refugees can be expected if the barriers from Pakistani and Iranian authorities are removed. We have information that many of those who left Afghanistan as our enemies are now actively speaking out [*vystupayut*, which can also mean "acting"] against the counter-revolutionary chieftains. But, of course, we need to work more actively to involve the various specialized UN agencies in solving the problem of the refugees.

What are our immediate plans to implement the policy of national reconciliation? In the first place in determining these problems we rely on the positive momentum created in the course of implementing this policy. We have held meetings in party organizations with a single agenda dedicated to the problems of translating Party policy into practice. They have shown that the steps being taken by the PDPA are exerting the proper influence both on party members and the population as a whole. At the same time, in the process of the work the need arises to improve the planned measures, the approaches, all the work. For example, one of the important areas is the development and consolidation of the legal basis for the policy of national reconciliation in the course of the implementation of which various questions arise, even as far as the granting of the opportunity to all public and political organizations to openly express their opinion.

In accordance with a decree of the DRA Revolutionary Council, the Party has been granted the right to draw up proposals to reorganize the political structure of the country. In this connection a group has been created within the framework of the PDPA CC Secretariat which includes representatives of both our Party and other political organizations. It has been given the task of drawing up proposals to create a bloc of leftist forces.

We understand the importance of organizing reconciliation work this way in order that the role of public organizations and the population itself be more broadly displayed in these processes. For example, the decision to extend our call for a cease-fire for six more months was adopted at the initiative of the National Front, the Higher Extraordinary Recon-

ciliation Council, and the Higher Council of Ulemas and the Clergy. In the immediate future we plan to prepare and send messages to fraternal parties and the Socialist International in which, along with an explanation of the substance of the policy being followed, we will state requests to give appropriate aid in its implementation.

In the military field we will solve the problems of neutralizing the irreconcilable rebel groups and destroying caravans with weapons, fortified regions, and bases. At the same time the implementation of measures to cover the border with Pakistan and Iran will be continued. Our goal is not to let the counterrevolution consolidate their positions, especially in the border zone, which should become a bulwark of people's power.

All these measures have been recorded in the composite plan of the PDPA CC Politburo. We will try to actively implement them in practice, relying on the aid of all the Soviet comrades working in Afghanistan. Taking this opportunity, I would like to express appreciation for the support which has been given us by the Soviet Embassy, Cde. Ambassador P. P. Mozhayev, the CPSU CC group of advisers to the PDPA CC, the Manager of Affairs of the CPSU CC Cde. Kruchina, and other comrades.

Considering the large and important measures which we plan to carry out—I have in mind the all-party conference and the PDPA Congress planned for the coming year—I would like to request the tenure of the CPSU CC adviser to the PDPA CC Politburo, Cde. V. P. Polyanichko, be extended.

Dear Mikhail Sergeevich, we constantly feel your attention and concern, your exacting attitude. In spite of your great workload you find time to deal with Afghan affairs. Among us in our country we know you as a genuine friend of the Afghan people, a firm fighter for peace, a stout internationalist. The efforts, which the CPSU and Soviet government are undertaking at your initiative in the name of the progress and prosperity of the Soviet people, find a keen response in our hearts. We seek to learn from you how one needs to love one's native land and fight for common human ideals.

Two hundred and twenty days have passed since our December meeting. During this time the policy of national reconciliation has become a reality and your ideas played a role in its development. The results of the January and June CPSU CC plenums have evoked a broad response in Afghanistan, and I would like to congratulate you on their success. By decision of the PDPA CC Politburo, the texts of your reports at these plenums were translated into Dari and Pashto and printed in large numbers. Party members study these documents. Highly esteeming the constructive, peace-loving initiatives you have advanced in the name of the CPSU and Soviet state directed at stopping the arms race and ensuring peace and security, as internationalists we see our duty in the creation of conditions for the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent within the agreed timeframe.

We are deeply appreciative of the unfailing aid and support which the CPSU CC Politburo and the entire Soviet leadership give us. The meetings and conversations with Cdes.

Eh. A. Shevardnadze, A. F. Dobrynin, and other Soviet comrades and the visits of various Soviet delegations have special importance for us. We are constantly aware of the aid of the CPSU CC Politburo Commission on Afghanistan. All this strengthens in us a confidence that with our joint efforts we will build an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan without fail which will forever remain in a position of friendship with the Soviet Union.

M. S. GORBACHEV. For my part I would like to describe briefly the situation as we see it.

Your information has again confirmed the coincidence of the points of view about what is happening in Afghanistan and those measures which the PDPA needs to implement within the framework of a new stage of the policy of national reconciliation.

Comrade Najib, you should know that, with the great responsibility which rests with the CPSU CC in the areas of domestic and foreign policy problems facing our country the problems associated with Afghanistan are always at the forefront of our attention. We usually don't report them, but these issues are very often discussed in the Politburo.

Inasmuch as we and you have opened a new stage in the development of the situation in Afghanistan, the Politburo Commission headed by Eh. A. Shevardnadze has resumed its work. Besides the Politburo, the Soviet government, the CC Secretariat, and our other organizations and departments devote the most serious attention to Afghan problems. We proceed from the position that the root interests of the USSR and the DRA coincide. First and foremost this determines our policy with regard to Afghanistan for today and the future. We have always treated Afghanistan with respect, as early as Lenin's time.

But there are also factors of no little importance such as the civil war in Afghanistan and the presence of our troops. This gives our relations a special character and forces us to constantly deal with questions of relations with Afghanistan.

We have carefully listened to your information. We draw a general conclusion from it: the policy of national reconciliation which you and we have worked out together is the correct one, and it should be continued. The problems cannot be solved by military means. In the person of Comrade Najib we see a political leader who understands the depth and importance of the processes which are occurring and the correctness of the chosen policy of national reconciliation for the destiny of Afghanistan.

It can be said that the policy of national reconciliation enjoys the support of the Afghan people. It is supported by progressive forces in the world, realistic circles, and all those who are actually interested in a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. It can also be said that national reconciliation is proceeding with difficulty and is encountering resistance from the counterrevolution and also from those forces of inertia in the PDPA itself which do not want to live and work in a new manner. There is nothing unexpected here. This should shock neither you nor us. On the whole, we and

you foresaw this. No one inside or outside Afghanistan has suggested an alternative to the policy of national reconciliation put forth by the PDPA. This is a fact. Employing our terminology, it can be said that Afghan society has learned this through suffering. The people are tired, they want peace. This is the main thing. But whom does it not suit? The rebels and, excuse me for the harsh words, those who think only about their own hides.

The main part of the Party leadership is concentrating around the policy of national reconciliation. And Afghanistan needs these people right now. They will also be needed tomorrow. I would say this: the main criteria for assessing the political and professional characteristics of workers of different levels is their attitude toward the policy of national reconciliation. I am dwelling on this issue in detail because it is the main one. There should be no doubt or wavering in the correctness of Afghanistan's current choice. We are deeply convinced of this.

Now about the role of the PDPA in the policy of national reconciliation. Without question, the PDPA is the leading force in the implementation of this policy. And the more authority this program gains, the more authority the Party will have. A contradictory but dialectically clear situation is developing. On one hand, the PDPA, in expanding its social base and adopting a policy of creating a coalition government, is seemingly undermining its own authority. But this is not so. This is just an appearance. The true authority of the PDPA is being formed right now. It is necessary that there be no defeatist sentiments so that those in the leadership understand this correctly. While our troops are in Afghanistan, the process of national reconciliation needs to move forward as the PDPA views it and not as the rebels want. The potential of national reconciliation is still far from exhausted. It needs to be used to the maximum. It is impossible to replace it with anything. Right now despairing, defeatist sentiments and any doubts or wavering are simply impermissible. New impetus is needed to move the policy of national reconciliation forward. Please convey this opinion of the CPSU CC to the entire Afghan leadership, the PDPA Central Committee, and the government.

It is necessary to act decisively right now and systematically turn the policy of national reconciliation around. Create reserves for the future now. Create opportunities for a real presence of the PDPA in all areas of Afghan society now. This is lacking now.

We have carefully listened to your ideas about what needs to be done in the near future, and we support you. But information is reaching us that decisions made in Kabul reach the grass roots very much watered down.

When we talk about the second stage of the policy of national reconciliation, then we mean that it began on 14 July, that is, on the day when the Afghan government declared its readiness to extend the cease-fire and respond only to military operations of the other side. It is evident that in the second stage of the reconciliation the question arises at the practical level of forming a coalition government, and the creation of other parties and a bloc of left-democratic forces.

You cannot refuse to cooperate with those who do not share your point of view. On the contrary, you have to create real pluralism in society and in government structures. Probably it would be tactically correct to put the stress on joining these forces together and the policy of national reconciliation and the cessation of military operations would be such a unifying factor.

You've talked about the principles of volunteerism. These need to be encouraged in every way. And they need to be followed especially consistently in the creation of structures of political power.

Possibly it is not necessary to require that other, newly-created parties loudly advocate friendship with the Soviet Union. For them, it would be equivalent to recognizing the presence of Soviet troops. Let them come to this themselves. But when the organizational structures of these parties are registered, our Embassy will get in touch with you in order to establish dialogue with these parties.

Now some words about the specific tasks of this new stage of reconciliation. It seems to us that it is necessary to decide the issue of the president more quickly. As far as we understand the situation, there is no other candidate for the post other than Cde. Najib. Yes, and comrades from your entourage maintain the same opinion. In spite of the fact that the process of understanding is proceeding with difficulty, the main representatives of the leadership, including Cde [Prime Minister Sultan Ali] Keshmand, support this idea. It is very important to correctly place party cadre in government and party posts ahead of time. All this needs to be done in order to adopt a constitution in the near future and thus create the legal basis for the second stage.

I agree that the discussion of creating a transitional government needs to be translated into practical terms. And very well thought-out, considered steps are needed here. It is very important to draw the opposition into a dialogue about the creation of a coalition government. There need to be several options for its makeup. There are options which would suit both you and us. A coalition government should include figures who enjoy real authority and influence and who will work in favor of national reconciliation, and not the first people who come along.

I think that the tactic of public appeals to the opposition has justified itself. Moreover it will become effective if it is combined with a designation of specific posts in the governmental structure. This would also facilitate the process of dividing the opposition. The leaders will undoubtedly reject this proposal but the ordinary members will be drawn to it. But work needs to be done in this direction. It is also necessary to think carefully about the possibility of granting specific posts in the government to two or three rebel leaders. But these should be real proposals and not political games. We completely support your plans to continue contact with foreign opposition centers. We will help you in this where there is an opportunity.

You are right, Comrade Najib, when you say that the present stage of national reconciliation requires new approaches and an abandonment of stereotypes and methods

which have outlived themselves. And it is correct that you want to hold a party conference in order to consolidate the Party and all healthy forces. Hence we support all your plans in this regard.

Some specific issues in terms of military policy. Those issues which you have raised require deep analysis. They go in the right direction. We will think them over and decide together.

I would like to stress one more thing here: the military policy, as it is being pursued today, suits neither you nor us. But when is it going to be dealt with if not today, when our troops are [still] in Afghanistan? I agree with you that we need to improve the quality of military training. The special forces subunits of the “commandos” type are justifying themselves. Great attention needs to be devoted to them.

NAJIB. Excuse me for interrupting you, Mikhail Sergeyevich. I am surprised how we have been fighting for eight years. When Karmal was the supreme commander he did nothing. We actually lost these eight years.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is especially important not to permit debates between the former “Khalq” and “Parcham” wings. Send this to the comrades from us: if this happens it will be a stab in the back. This would be the same as treason and suicide.

We are very impressed with how you are conducting ethnic policy. You are conducting it in a considered fashion. This has great importance.

As regards international issues then, as before, we will help here, considering our common goals and those changes which are taking place in Afghanistan. We will lay bricks in the building of good relations between our countries and peoples.

And lastly. I want again to draw your attention to the necessity of the maximum use of the temporary presence of Soviet troops so that the policy of national reconciliation produces the results that you are counting on. And we are counting from 1 January of this year.

NAJIB. Seven months have already passed.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Time is flying and we need to use it to the maximum. The Soviet leadership, as before, is giving Afghanistan the highest priority attention.

Please send greetings to your comrades from the Soviet leadership.

We invite you, Comrade Najib, to the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution as the head of an Afghan delegation.

How would you view the possibility of carrying out a joint flight of Soviet and Afghan cosmonauts? The information about this could be included in a report about our meeting today.

NAJIB. You, Mikhail Sergeyevich, have seized the initiative from me. I also wanted to propose this idea to you. The prob-

lem is that the use of surface-to-air missiles by the counter-revolutionaries, especially Stingers, have not failed to affect the morale of our pilots. But the prospect of space flight will lift them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It would be necessary to show Pakistan that Stingers can hit their territory, too.

NAJIB. We will do this without fail.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We have one path—only forward. I am glad to meet you. I am glad that you are not only in good physical shape but deeply understand the problems which lie before you. Act confidently. Unite the Afghan leadership and Afghan society around you.

You will have an opportunity to rest a bit. If you want to see something or meet with Soviet comrades then we will organize this.

NAJIB. Thank you very much. Today’s meeting is a great honor for me. Its results will be used by us in the course of preparing for the all-party conference of the PDPA. I will say openly: such meetings with you, our senior comrades, are always exceptionally useful and instructive for me. I assure you that I have always been and will remain a faithful student of the Leninist school.

I want to express thanks for the invitation to the Great October celebration. I accept it with appreciation.

Please accept my wishes for the health, success, and welfare for you and your family.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan Najibullah, 3 November 1987

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. First I want to thank you for the warm feelings you expressed in today’s speech. Your sincere words will find a path to the hearts of all the Soviet people, especially our women and mothers.

I am glad for the opportunity to meet with you and exchange opinions, although briefly. Of course, we will hardly be able to talk about much. Nevertheless there are questions which ought to be discussed.

I greet you on our holiday. We are glad that in the persons of the DRA delegation we greet representatives of a neighboring country with whom we have established a long

friendship. At the same time we welcome our new friends from Afghanistan, keeping in mind the new spirit of our mutual relations. It can be said that the old and the new Afghanistan are embodied in this.

You heard the report. We worked on the report a great deal. Very serious effort, thought, and significant analysis was required. Its preparation required several months. If you paid attention, all three sections of the report were connected by the single thought of our past and the present day, our present concerns. Of course, we could have deferred an analysis and assessment of the historical events of past years and done them separately. But we needed to do them for the present day. Therefore we had to deal with them.

Much of what has to be decided today in the process of *perestroika* traces its roots back there in history. Therefore it's necessary to look into history, into one or another event, and construct our policy accordingly.

As regards the third section of the report, "Great October and the Contemporary World," everything is also explained in it inasmuch as our domestic interests are compatible with common human interests. We need a normal international situation.

Strictly speaking, the report is therefore called "October and *Perestroika*: the Revolution Continues." It reveals the essence of the task which we have seen before us: the cause of October needs to be continued, drawing lessons from the past. And to create good foreign policy preconditions for deep changes in society. This is what we wanted when going to this festive meeting. It is possible that someone expected something else. But this is just what we needed. We still have to enhance the ideas described in the report very seriously.

But how are things in Afghanistan? I congratulate you on your election to the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. It is good that this was done.

I would like to find out, how the measures are being implemented which you developed for placing people to augment the leadership echelon? I congratulate you on the successful completion of the all-party conference of the PDPA. At one time the information which came from Afghanistan concerned me. The conference placed critical tasks before the country.

It is very important right now not to permit discord in the leadership and in the Party itself in the face of such tasks. It is necessary to take people into the headquarter's apparatus who could be sent to the provinces so that they could work there.

How did Lenin act in his time? He sent [Grigory Konstantinovich] Ordzhonikidze here, [Sergey M.] Kirov there, and [Josef] Stalin and [Mikhail] Frunze over there. I have named only several of the important figures of our Party and government. But so it was with officials of lesser rank. All of them headed key sectors, which was dictated by the demands of a crucial stage in the development of the Revolution and the conditions of the Civil War. Such revolutionaries were needed, not those who occupied "warm chairs" and received profits.

It is necessary to send energetic people invested with

authority to work in newly-liberated regions of Afghanistan and, yes, to the provinces which have long been under the control of people's authority, giving them help there from local party and government personnel, elders, and other representatives of the population, regardless of their party affiliation and political coloration—everyone who favors national reconciliation. And then such a representative will be surrounded by local people and local authorities. Here ties between local authorities and Kabul, and coalition forms of government will be created.

NAJIBULLAH. First of all, on behalf of the members of our delegation permit me to express to you, dear Mikhail Sergeyevich, and all the Soviet leadership, our heartfelt thanks and appreciation for the invitation to take part in the festivities on the occasion of a glorious date, the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. All of us are under a deep impression from your report, which could rightfully be called an action program for the international communist and workers' movement and all peace-loving people of the planet.

Turning to the works of Lenin again and again, we find answers to the burning issues which life presents us with.

Your report, which we will continually and comprehensively study, is such a source of creative inspiration and a school of Leninist thought for all revolutionaries.

Speaking of our work, I would like to note that, as a whole, the all-party conference went successfully. But serious shortcomings in our political, organizational, and ideological work were clearly identified in the process of its preparation. As before, the conservative forces remaining in the Party, relying on old methods and forms of work, are trying in every way to prevent the new from sprouting and do not want to cooperate in the process of reconciliation. These shortcomings have deep roots caused by the existence of a gap between word and deed in the PDPA. We understand that it is impossible to achieve the implementation of planned ideas with declarative statements and slogans alone. The consciousness of party members needs to be changed in a decisive manner. From this point of view the importance of the all-party conference is quite great. We are again convinced of the need to get seriously busy with educating the party cadre and all its members.

We well understand your recommendations expressed in December of last year and during the meeting this June about the need to consolidate the Party and its unity, and we will strive to implement them in practice. However it ought to be recognized that the situation still existing in the PDPA is the reason for the stagnation of the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation. But the main and hopeful result of the all-party conference was that it gave a mandate and instructions to the party leadership to intensify work to step up the reconciliation process.

Some words about the progress of implementing this policy. I think there is no need to give numbers and other statistical data. The main conclusion is that this policy enjoys growing support from our people. Today only the farthest-right wing of the counterrevolution does not respond

to our peace-loving proposals.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But the groups in Iran and Pakistan have managed to join their forces together. By the way, who is the head of this union, what party does its leader represent?

NAJIBULLAH. Actually, as a result of direct pressure from the Americans and the Pakistani administration, the counter-revolutionary organizations have announced they have united and elected a single leader, [Muhammad] Yu[nus]. Khalis. He heads the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and at one time split from [radical Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i Islami) leader] G[ulbuddin Hekmatyar's]⁶. However, we know that, in spite of formal unification, the counterrevolutionaries still have not managed to overcome serious existing differences.⁷

I would like to inform you, Mikhail Sergeevich, of several of our short-term plans. In a month we plan to hold a Loya Jirga at which we will adopt a constitution for the country and elect a president. Afterwards it is intended to hold elections to a National Council, which will form a government. In this connection I would like to consult with you regarding the following issue.

In the course of conversations with Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze, we discussed in general terms the question of the content of the first address of the president after his election by the Loya Jirga. It seems to us that this speech ought to first of all reflect the thought that the president is the exponent of the interests of all the people and all the social sectors of the population, and not narrow party interests.

In addition, it ought to be noted that our Revolution is national democratic in nature, but not socialist. Therefore in the present and succeeding stages the constructive participation of all political forces and all sectors of the population—the clergy, ethnic entrepreneurs, the intelligentsia—is urgently required in the solution of nationwide problems, firstly ensuring peace, which is what the PDPA is calling for.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Correct.

NAJIBULLAH. One more important point connected with the role of the PDPA. I intend the PDPA representative to be elected to the post of president, and it will be stressed in the address that the president embodies and defends the interests of the entire people, and all groups and sectors of the population, and not [just] the Party.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This needs to be done. The candidacy itself of the president is the result of compromise and therefore it should reflect all interests. In other words, the president is the national leader.

NAJIBULLAH. The necessary attention will also be devoted to stating a position about such issues which are traditional for our society as “Jirga” democracy and the customs of the

people.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is correct, for the Jirga joins together real authorities on whose opinion the support of the government depends to a large degree.

NAJIBULLAH. The issue of creating conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops occupies a special place. It will be stressed that, in calling upon the Afghan people to create coalition forms of government, the leadership of the country is trying to ensure the necessary preconditions to turn to the Soviet government on a whole range of issues connected with the times and schedule of such a withdrawal.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Right.

NAJIBULLAH. It is evident that the thought also ought to be expressed that the armed forces of the country firmly watch over the revolutionary achievements, express the interests of all the people, and defend the independence sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. They are subordinate to the president as supreme commander.

In addition, the address is to note that in conditions where a new constitution is in effect in Afghanistan various political parties receive the right to be established and function on condition that their paramount goals will be the attainment of peace, a cessation of bloodshed, and the progress of the country along the path of social and economic development.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But is this principle contained in the present draft of the constitution?

NAJIBULLAH. Yes, we have stipulated the introduction of a multiparty system.

One more point. Considering that the ethnic issue is an acute one in Afghanistan we plan to stress in the address the readiness of the country's leadership to do everything necessary to solve it. It will be announced that at the present stage the most important task is the achievement of national reconciliation. Therefore we are appealing to all ethnic minorities to help translate this policy into practice. If the policy of national reconciliation is successful conditions will arise to ensure the genuine equality of all ethnic groups and tribes of the country, even as far as giving them national autonomy and the right to self-determination.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that such an announcement would be appropriate for your problems.

In Lenin's time, 5,000 soviets [councils] were formed in rural areas populated by ethnic minorities. There's the flexibility of Lenin's ethnic policy for you!

Will the president be elected at the Loya Jirga?

NAJIBULLAH. Yes.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This means the Loya Jirga elects the

president. But what then?

NAJIBULLAH. The Loya Jirga will first of all adopt the new constitution and then elect the president.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Will the Loya Jirga also remain after this? But how is it proposed for the president to be elected subsequently?

NAJIBULLAH. The upcoming Loya Jirga will be convened only to fulfill the above tasks. After the president's term expires in five years, a Loya Jirga will be convened again.

M. S. GORBACHEV. One more question. How will the representation from all the provinces of Afghanistan in the Loya Jirga be ensured? Or [will it be] partially, only from those which are in the government's sphere of influence and then it will not be fully legitimate [*nepolnotsennaya*]? Can you estimate how many representatives there will be in the Loya Jirga?

NAJIBULLAH. On the eve of the departure of our delegation to the Soviet Union, a meeting of Commission to Prepare a Draft Constitution was held. Individual members of the Commission proposed holding elections of representatives to the Loya Jirga via mass public organizations.

M. S. GORBACHEV. What is meant by this? Will elections of representatives from all provinces of the country be held, or will regions where the bandits are spreading terror not name their representatives?

NAJIBULLAH. Although it was stipulated that the elections are to be held throughout the entire country, the principle of election of representatives to the Loya Jirga which was proposed does not agree with the traditions of democracy which exist in our society. Therefore I proposed – and it was adopted – to grant the right to the population of each province to elect 10 representatives apiece as they see fit. We don't want to impose our will on the population.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I support your point of view. It is very important to ensure genuine popular representation in the Loya Jirga. But you're going to the Jirga by a difficult route. The counter-revolution will oppose its success. To what extent have you thought out the problem of ensuring the necessary support of Jirga representatives? For example, on the issue of the president?

Other issues also arise: who will open the Loya Jirga? Where will the candidacies be discussed? Evidently this means the creation of a sort of Council of Elders which could nominate three or four candidates?

NAJIBULLAH. Yes, exactly.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This means one or two candidates from the PDPA, let's say, Najib or Gorbachev. But what about the

Council of Elders? Will it have the right to discuss with the opposition the possibility of its nominating its own candidate?

NAJIBULLAH. The irreconcilable opposition will obviously not do this. As regards those who are ready to support national reconciliation then without question they will get this right.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is important. Possibly some liberally-minded figure can be prepared and even choose a candidate from among the most inveterate enemies. But soundings should have already been necessary to do this. It is impossible to permit the counter-revolution to then have an opportunity to say that it was left out of participating in the election of a president, which was all cooked up by the PDPA, and accuse you of fraud.

But how will the government be formed?

NAJIBULLAH. The president appoints a prime minister, who is charged with forming a cabinet of ministers. The government will be approved by the National Council, which should give it a vote of confidence.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This means an approach is needed here which is appropriate to the problems of creating a coalition government. You need to know beforehand who is to be given the post of prime minister. If the post of president remains with the PDPA, the prime minister should be a representative of an opposition party. If the chieftains of the counter-revolution and Zahir Shah refuse to accept this proposal, then select a suitable candidate from among prominent authorities who have recently entered into cooperation. Have him be a figure with competence [*malokompetentnyy deyatel'*]. But it's necessary to show such courage here.

Generally speaking, Cde. Najib, an exceptionally important and critical stage is beginning. Unfortunately, we don't have the opportunity to discuss all the problems before us in detail since I have a meeting scheduled with Cde. János Kádár.

I want to suggest to you: think about all these suggestions. We will also think [about them], consult with the Soviet embassy, and with the commission headed by Eh. A. Shevardnadze.

All possible alternatives associated with the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation ought to be considered—both the election of the president of the country, the appointment of the prime minister, and the formation of a coalition government, which needs to be done so that the Loya Jirga actually reflects the entire spectrum of political forces of present-day Afghanistan.

Describe your thoughts, views, and ideas and send them to us. And we, for our part, will be ready accordingly. In a word, everything needs to be discussed again. But in general, from what you are saying, everything is going in the right direction.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with your suggestion. But now I would

like to briefly touch on two more topics. Of course, the address ought to reflect a position regarding the issues of the further economic development of the country and Afghanistan's foreign policy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is advisable to describe the approach to economic problems so that the desire of the leadership to do everything necessary in the interests of the broadest sectors of the population, and in the interests of the peasantry, clergy, and ethnic entrepreneurs is obvious to everyone.

NAJIBULLAH. Agreed. Regarding foreign policy issues, I would like to say the following. The personal representative of the UN Secretary General, Cordovez, recently sent us his scenario for future talks about a political settlement. Obviously Cde. Shevardnadze ought to be consulted about this question.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But what do you think of Cordovez' proposal?

NAJIBULLAH. There are unacceptable aspects in it for us but there is a grain of reason, a positive momentum [*pozitiv*], which ought to be used. I think that we could send you our ideas on this account in writing.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Good, write them. We'll think about them and consult. It's possible that Eh. A. Shevardnadze will come to you.

The time is such right now that it's necessary to think very well and act. And the iron needs to be struck while the fire is hot. The people need to be drawn to your side so that the dynamism of national reconciliation is not lost. The counterrevolution has not yet really united. So this does not turn out like a train which starts moving and gains speed, and suddenly brakes and is stopped.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And think about one other thing. We could have told this to Reagan. The Americans seemingly want to take part in the political settlement of the Afghan problem. I do not believe in their sincerity. But everything is possible. In the twilight of its term, the Reagan administration wants to show that—together with the Soviet Union—it is contributing to a settlement of the situation in such a hot spot as Afghanistan. But, of course, they would like a settlement to be achieved in which the PDPA is shunted into the background, although it is already clear today that peace in Afghanistan can be achieved only by considering that the PDPA is an equal among other political forces. Nothing else will work.

We are telling the Americans that we are ready to support their participation in the settlement process. But in doing so they must proceed from current realities, that is, recognize that a government, an armed forces, a security service, a Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. exist in Afghanistan. We are stressing that this is reality, as real as the existence of the opposing force. So let's find ways to solve the problem.

But you need to look not at the Americans, but promote the process, widely opening the door to the creation of a coalition inside the country.

On the whole, you've held a good party conference. Now your task is to urgently implement the decisions made and go forward. As regards those in the PDPA who do not believe in national reconciliation, these skeptics need to be given a good pension or sent abroad.

Not everyone is grasping the challenges [*zadachi*] raised at the party conference. But it became clear after the discussions what this is—national reconciliation.

NAJIBULLAH. Two requests in conclusion, if you'll permit me. First, as you know, we decided to create a zone free of rebel bands in the north of Afghanistan. A need arises in this regard to conduct a "cleansing" in this region using USSR KGB Border Troops. At the same time we have also requested consideration of the question of granting aid in solving the economic problems of this region.

Second. On the way to Moscow I visited Volgograd, a city which was raised from the ruins after the Great Patriotic War. Not long before this I had the occasion to visit Kandahar which we also have to rebuild anew. Therefore I turn to you with a request to help us build one more housing construction complex.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will consider these requests without fail.

But I have in turn a request of you—inform us of how matters are going with the use of the free supplementary Soviet aid. Are we being hasty with the allotment of 2 billion rubles? Information is coming to us that the aid is not reaching the people for some reason.

NAJIBULLAH. We are not yet using the goods which are coming into the current year free aid account. We are still using the remainder of the 7,000,000 rubles aid previously given us. The losses here were 2%. We are trying to tighten up control. We have been able to reduce losses to some degree although this is still insufficient.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It's necessary to closely follow how it is being used so that there is no misuse. And the people should feel this. This should actually be your fund. It should be in your hands. It's good that you went to Kandahar and promised to help rebuild the city. You could have given an order to give the necessary aid to the population from this fund.

But if the fund is administered by a bureaucrat then it'll all trickle into the hands of his relatives, through clan and family ties. In a word, it'll end up with those who handle its distribution.

Whoever is abusing authority needs to be punished and imprisoned. And let everyone see that he is a thief, although possibly it is not considered a sin according to the Koran to embezzle aid received from an atheist.

NAJIBULLAH. Permit me to express gratitude to you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and all the entire Soviet leadership for the constant aid and support.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Send our greetings to your comrades and wishes to firmly go along the chosen path.



Conversations between M. S. Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan regarding Afghanistan, 9 December 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

R. REAGAN. The regional issues relate primarily to other issues, first among them—Afghanistan. This is, first of all, about the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. We know one another's point of view, and I would welcome it if you would announce a withdrawal of Soviet troops. I think such an announcement should have been made long ago. Without doubt, the situation in Afghanistan is difficult, primarily for you, and we could help you, guaranteeing that no other governments in this region would threaten you in Afghanistan. We will do everything in our power to guarantee that Afghanistan will be an independent, neutral country, and we hope that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from it by the end of 1988...

M. S. GORBACHEV. Our order of priorities coincides with yours. Therefore I will begin with Afghanistan (...).

Regarding Afghanistan, within the framework of the Cordovez mission, there exists an agreement of principles about non-interference and guarantees from the US, the USSR, and Pakistan, and it would be good if Iran were on the list. There exists a plan for the return of the refugees, and guarantees are being given to the mujaheddin in Pakistan and Iran. All this will help. The issue of the timing of the troop withdrawal remains open. President Najibullah has suggested—and consulted with the Soviet Union about this, although this is his own suggestion—that Soviet troops leave over the course of 12 months with the understanding that this timeframe could be reduced by 2-3 months if everything goes smoothly, but from the very start the process should be tied to national reconciliation and the creation of a coalition government. But only the Afghans themselves should decide the issue of the nature and composition of such a government. I share your idea about an independent, neutral, multi-party Afghanistan. It is in this very framework that a society is now being formed in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not a socialist country. It is a semi-feudal pluralistic society. How they are to live and develop is for they themselves to decide. But you under-

stand that the issue of Afghanistan is not a simple issue. We have a more than 2,000 km border with them and therefore we need a friendly neighbor. But I can assure you that the Soviet Union is not hatching plans to create bases in Afghanistan. We have not been thinking about this. We think that it is necessary to conclude the process begun there on the basis of national reconciliation. And the Afghans have even said they are ready to give half of the posts in a government of national reconciliation to the opposition, including the post of prime minister. We support this but the decision is to be made by the Afghans themselves. Neither you nor we can decide how to divide up these posts. I think that if we advised our friends to act in the direction of national reconciliation, and you also conscientiously [*akkuratno*] advised this to those with whom you maintain relations—we know you have such capabilities since not long ago you received some opposition leaders—this would not be bad.

Speaking of the withdrawal of our troops, I will say that we are interested in this and have already begun to withdraw our troops. But you ought to cease financial support and weapons aid to the opposition. I can say that on the same day as the withdrawal of Soviet troops is announced they will not participate in military operations except for self-defense purposes. You yourself understand that the situation can be most unpredictable. It would be good if you and we agreed about cooperation and demonstrated this to the world. We favor an indigenous [*narodivshiy*] neutral regime in Afghanistan, a regime that would not be unacceptable to either of us, nor to the Afghans. Therefore let us agree about this and we will inform Najibullah and you, the opposition, about this.

R. REAGAN. We will try to exert influence on them. However, the president of Afghanistan has an army, and the opposition does not. Therefore it is impossible to ask one side to put down its weapons at the same time as the other keeps theirs. It seems to me that they need to meet together to find a political solution.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that there are real preconditions to solving this problem. Let our experts think about it...

By the way, Iran is also taking aim at Afghanistan. If we put too much pressure on Iran, then they could respond somehow in Afghanistan.



Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan, 10 December 1987 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated by Gary Goldberg for CWIHP.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yesterday I touched on the Afghan issue. I will say frankly: I have noticed from your side a certain restraint and unwillingness to get involved in discussing the ideas I expressed about solving the Afghan problem. Therefore I would like to stress that we are ready to talk seriously with you on this topic; moreover, to agree on several principal aspects.

If you want, then we will not make this agreement public. The Soviet Union would name a specific date for the withdrawal of its troops, and the United States would obligate itself to halt aid to known Afghan forces. That is, we would act synchronously. On such-and-such a day we would begin the withdrawal and on the same day you would cease aid to the forces in the opposition. When we name a day then it would simultaneously signify that from that date our forces would not participate in combat operations except in cases of self-defense. I again stress that we don't want Afghanistan to be pro-Soviet or pro-American. We think that it should be a neutral country.

It seems to me that such a suggestion provides a basis for our cooperation in resolving the Afghan issue. But I have developed the impression that the US takes the following position on this issue: the Soviet Union is "tied down" in Afghanistan, and let them get out of there however they want, and the United States will criticize all the time and then impede the withdrawal of our troops.

If you actually take such a position then it will be hard for us to find a common language. All the same, let's think together about some businesslike approach and joint practical steps. In our summary document we could write down in a general way that we discussed the issue about Afghanistan. (...)

R. REAGAN. In reply to the ideas you expressed I'll try to explain to you what difficulties we have in regard to, let's say, Afghanistan or Nicaragua. The present Afghan government has its own armed forces. If we agree with you that the Soviet Union withdraws its troops and we halt aid to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, then they would end up disarmed before Afghan government troops and would be deprived of any opportunity to defend their right to participate in a future government. Therefore we think that within the framework of our decision with you the Afghan government troops should also be disbanded. This would allow both sides to take part in a discussion of the settlement process on an equal basis...

G. SHULTZ. Regarding the Afghan issue, we think the working group has made a step forward. The Soviet side let us know that the issue of troop withdrawal is not tied to the conclusion of the process of national reconciliation. This process will take quite a lot of time and the Afghan people themselves will determine through what stages it must pass. It means that one element that has been lacking until now can be included on the agenda at the next stage of the Geneva talks, namely the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁸

M. S. GORBACHEV. On condition that it is tied to the issue of American aid to opposition forces; that is, the day of the start of the troop withdrawal should be the same day that American military aid stops. If such an agreement is reached, then Soviet troops will cease participation in military operations and observe a cease-fire from the start of the withdrawal. The rest (creation of a coalition government, etc.) the sides will do and implement, whether by themselves or using the mediatory mission of Cordovez.

I can repeat what I said this morning – we want the new Afghanistan to be neither pro-American nor pro-Soviet, but a non-aligned, independent country. If we agree to withdraw our troops and the US does not stop financial and military aid to the opposition forces then the situation would only deteriorate further, which would make it impossible for us to withdraw troops. Therefore we tie troop withdrawal to the cessation of aid to opposition forces and outside interference.

I think that our discussion of this issue was good. I propose that henceforth we put this discussion on a more practical basis and begin a specific discussion about it.

G. SHULTZ. Yesterday in the working group the Soviet side welcomed US support of the Accords already reached in the Geneva talks. We said that one important agreement is lacking between us at present, namely the time of Soviet troop withdrawal.

M. S. GORBACHEV. [Translator's note: possible a word missed due to a spurious character at the beginning of the sentence] [More] about cessation of American aid to Afghan opposition forces. Let's agree on the time and announce it. But if you need additional time to think, please, think. But right now we are inviting you to make a specific joint step.

It would allow [us] to verify how sincerely the US administration is trying to ease the situation in Afghanistan. For us this verification would have great importance inasmuch as it would allow us to correctly assess US actions in other situations also.

G. SHULTZ. At the Geneva talks a proposal was made that the United States could halt deliveries of lethal weapons to Afghan freedom fighters 60 days after the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal.

One more issue remains unresolved, namely how the process of national reconciliation will proceed, in parallel with the Soviet troop withdrawal or whether the Soviet side agrees to include in the summary document a point that both sides support the Accords on Afghanistan which were reached at Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. We are not tying the issue of the timing of the Soviet troop withdrawal to the process of national reconciliation, which naturally will be a long process. We confirmed this again yesterday.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It can be said in the concluding document that after conclusion of a summit meeting the USSR and the US will begin specific work on this issue through diplomatic channels with the participation of interested parties.

G. SHULTZ. We do not object.



**Conversation with US Vice President
George H.W. Bush, 10 December 1987
(Excerpt)**

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(...)

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yesterday, when we met with you, I did not see optimism from your side about how the Afghan problem could be unknotted, for a suitable solution could be found in Afghanistan, Central America, Cambodia, and the Persian Gulf right now. However, I felt that the United States had no special desire to solve these problems.

G. BUSH. When I was talking with Dobrynin he said that in his view Pakistan did not want to halt aid to the Afghan rebels and was very much afraid of losing aid from the US.

With regards to Afghanistan, we frankly do not know what contribution we could make to help the Soviet side get out of the current situation...

M. S. GORBACHEV. Regarding the Afghan problem, I think your administration could contribute to a search for its solution. If you would say that you are halting aid to the opposition, the rebels, with the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal, we would name a specific time. If this does not happen, if the US acts according to the principle “you got yourself in, you can get yourself out,” then the entire problem will be deferred. If we were to begin to withdraw troops while American aid continued then this would lead to a bloody war in the country. I don’t know what we would do then. The Soviet Union does not intend at all to tie Afghanistan to a particular political system. Let it be independent.

G. BUSH. And we are not in favor of installing an exclusively pro-American regime in Afghanistan. This is not US policy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And we are not in favor of a pro-Soviet regime. Let Afghanistan be independent. However, the American side should not continue deliveries of weapons and the financing of aid to the rebels. We ought to take this up seriously in order to ensure the establishment of a coalition gov-

ernment in this country which would suit both you and us, and all domestic political forces in Afghanistan. Right now there is a chance for practical results.

(...)



**Record of a Conversation of M. S.
Gorbachev with Indian Minister of
Defense Krishna Chandra Pant,
11 February 1988**

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. Please pass to Rajiv [Gandhi] that I very much value our cooperation and our exchanges of information through various channels about the situation in the region where both we and you have very important interests.

I would also like to ask you and the Ambassador to send to Prime Minister Gandhi one observation having perhaps a global character, an observation which is not superficial but born as a result of serious analysis. We see that the reactionary circles in the West—as distinct from realistic circles—are very worried about that the pioneering [*initsiativnaya*] policy which the Soviet Union, India, the Non-Aligned Movement, and progressive forces are now following. These forces are trying to consolidate right now and are looking for ways to seize [*perekhvatit*] the initiative and disrupt movement along the path which leads to strengthening security and improving international relations. This is not to the militarists’ tastes.

Therefore they have begun to literally attack the Soviet embassy and the General Secretary personally and are doing everything in order to denigrate his policy both in domestic affairs and in foreign policy. We see that Rajiv Gandhi and other progressive figures have not been ignored. This is a very serious fact which needs to be considered. Right now the periods of euphoria and panic have passed for them, and they are consolidating. For example, the Soviet Union, India, and other progressive regimes for them are like a bone in their throats.

At the same time it is impossible not to see anything else. Our joint efforts and our peace initiatives are enjoying ever greater support in the world and are drawing all realistically-minded people to our side. This is a very important factor whose significance is growing. Therefore there is every reason to look at the future optimistically.

K. Ch. PANT. Thank you, Mr. General Secretary. I recall with great pleasure your visit to Delhi, the time we spent together, and the thorough conversations with you.

I recall not only your official statements but your numer-

ous statements in personal conversations with me. A great impression was made on me by the fact that your words correspond so harmoniously with your actions both in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Probably many of the thoughts you then expressed came hard. But you have not retreated from your chosen path and follow it firmly.

It should be said that I share your optimism in connection with the positive processes in the world which are the result of your efforts. A new generation is recognizing the imperatives of the nuclear age and it understands the need for changes in the world which would be in accord with the turbulent changes in science and technology. I think that you gave this new generation a charter of values, a charter of concepts which could touch chords in the souls of people.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Thank you for this important thought and this assessment.

K. Ch. PANT. The desire for peace was very strong earlier; however it was quite amorphous. But you have managed to put it on a clear path.

The [the December 1987] signing of the agreement on intermediate and shorter-range missiles [INF Treaty] was an important step forward. Now we await with impatience the next step you have been talking about—the achievement of an agreement on strategic weapons.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You know the impression is being created that neither Congress—both the Democrats and especially the Republicans—nor even the closest circle of the President will allow him to reach this agreement.

K. Ch. PANT. Yes, this is also possible.

M. S. GORBACHEV. They evidently have already distributed roles among themselves. Nevertheless, we favor the achievement of such an agreement as soon as possible. We will drag them along the road of disarmament.

K. Ch. PANT. If they don't come to an agreement then they will have to defend their position, and this will not be easy.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, this is so. And the election campaign will leave an imprint on the entire situation.

K. Ch. PANT. Of course. But at the same time the number of supporters of peace in the US is growing, especially among ordinary Americans.

We are maintaining close contact with you about Afghanistan. I cannot say anything new right now. I can state that we consider the initiative you have taken to be a bold step which will in the final account facilitate the elimination of this dangerous hotbed of tension.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Right now a group of our comrades is there with special authority from the Politburo. They report

that, after the latest steps we took, Najib is looking at the situation more optimistically. I think this man has great potential, and he will show himself in a new situation.

I think that we and you need to maintain contact, exchange opinions, and see to it that the situation does not get out of control and develop in an undesirable direction.

When I was in Washington I informed the Americans that we are ready to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan and discuss practical steps in this regard; the Americans avoided discussing the substance of the issue. They would like to maintain the present situation in Afghanistan, for it allows them to maintain their presence in the region and strengthen their position, in particular in Pakistan.

But it ought to be noted that Reagan's team [*komanda*] took into consideration and welcomed the fact that the Soviet Union is not tying the issue of creating a coalition government with the issue of the presence of our troops in Afghanistan. It seemed to them that the presence of Soviet troops allows us to influence the situation in Najib's favor. But the Pakistanis are already saying now that they will not sign an agreement until a coalition government is created.

Earlier they thought that our announcement of our readiness to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan was only a propaganda slogan. However, now when we and Najib announced the troop withdrawal and when India supported this step they are openly interfering. They see that the Soviet Union, Najib, and India are acting confidently and think that they "have agreed on how to act." Therefore they have now begun to maneuver.

[Indian Diplomat] T[riloki]. N[ath]. KAUL. But you've taken the wind out of their sails with your step.

K. Ch. PANT. At the same time there are also grounds for concern. Earlier the Americans gave them, and now, first and foremost, Pakistan. In insisting on the interconnection of these two issues it is pursuing matters toward the creation of a government of fundamentalists.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Absolutely right.

K. Ch. PANT. And this is in no one's interests but Pakistan's.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, we and you need to think about this seriously. And not only think, but do something.

K. Ch. PANT. And so we think that you have come forward with a good initiative and now need to follow the situation attentively.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We have created a special group which is dealing with this. The Minister of Defense and other comrades are its members.

K. Ch. PANT. One more aspect of the situation: there are many weapons there now. The Americans have created large reserves in Pakistan of which the Afghans could avail them-

selves. Is it impossible to arrange that these weapons be destroyed within the framework of the agreements? For if the “Stingers” fall into the hands of terrorists and are used against civilian aircraft there will be chaos.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, this is actually a difficult issue. But if we raise it then they can say—and what about Soviet weapons in Afghanistan? And then the process could be dragged down since we don’t want to leave Najib naked.

Pass to Rajiv that we understand in the most serious way his idea about the need to strengthen the Kabul government in a military sense and consolidate its positions in Afghanistan. Everything possible is being done for this.

Of course, it is difficult to foresee everything. The Americans, and not only they, can also aggravate [the situation]. Why, we will think, how [are we] to behave in this case. Then they will completely unmask themselves.

K. Ch. PANT. Some words about the situation on the Indo-Pakistani border. Clashes occurred in September and October in the region of the Siachen Glacier. We repelled the attacks of the Pakistani forces; however there were casualties. Right now the situation is relatively quiet. But we have information that possibly they are preparing for new attacks.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I think that Prime Minister Gandhi expressed a very correct thought when he said that our countries should act so that Zia and the Pakistani regime have as little freedom of maneuver as possible.

K. Ch. PANT. There is one aspect causing very serious alarm which you know about. This is the problem of the creation of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.

Pakistan is getting enormous aid from the US. Of \$4 billion, \$1.8 billion is military aid. Right now the Pakistanis are on the threshold of obtaining nuclear weapons. This is our assessment and yours, too. This creates a very serious problem. We have acted honestly and done everything in order to avoid a further aggravation of this issue. However, a situation is being created right now where blackmail is possible.

Of course, we don’t want the resources needed for socioeconomic progress to have to be used for such ends. However our security is paramount. Therefore we have a dilemma before us. Our public is reacting to this very sharply. I could not fail to mention this in a conversation with you.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is the continuation of a conversation which we had in Delhi. I think that it is very important to firmly hold a principled position. This will prevent the adventurers in Pakistan from realizing their plans. I think that the assessment of the situation which we gave in Delhi remains the same. But the situation needs to be watched all the time.

Record of Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with US Secretary of State George Shultz, 22 February 1988

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

G. SHULTZ. In any case we have discussed all the issues in detail as never before. We have not come to any special conclusions. But we have worked to advantage. Our discussions are becoming ever more sophisticated.

Regarding the problems of Angola and Cambodia we have agreed that there are opportunities for cooperation. We discussed the problem of the Iran-Iraq conflict. I would be interested to hear your ideas on this account. This also relates to Afghanistan

We welcome your announcement regarding Afghanistan. We think that the situation is quite promising right now. We want the upcoming round of Geneva talks to be the last. We see that there is movement in this process. We want this difficult process to finally be concluded.

At the same time it is completely natural that our side wants to obtain certain assurances regarding the substance of this process. Yesterday I tried to explain what this is about. Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail and I would be interested to hear your ideas.

I’d like to talk about the Middle East, the region where I will be going soon.

M. S. GORBACHEV. First an idea of a general nature about the role of our countries—the USSR and US—in efforts to settle regional conflicts. I think that we should show the world an example of cooperation in these issues. If we establish such cooperation then it’s possible to hope that conflicts will be resolved considering the interests of all involved countries.

G. SHULTZ. I can agree with this.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will not loose the acutely painful knots which have accumulated in the world with other approaches.

I am saying this because I feel that you have maintained a negative attitude toward our genuine desire to work with you in solving these acute problems. Possibly the problem is that you developed this attitude long ago. But possibly the problem is the channel which, as we understand it, comes from the National Security Council. As before, there they think that the Soviet Union both today and tomorrow will remain a power with which the United States will collide everywhere in the world and is “guilty” of everything everywhere. If such an attitude remains then it is hard to count on progress and collaboration.

But a completely different conclusion can be drawn from that fact and [the fact] that both you and we are everywhere.

And I've said this to you more than once and have said it publicly. If we and you are everywhere we are simply connected in searches for a balance of interests. Such an approach will stimulate searches and the finding of outcomes and solutions. That's our philosophy. It is important for an understanding of regional situations.

How is it specifically being interpreted, particularly in the issue of Afghanistan?

We came to Washington—and informed you first—of our plan of actions and invited you to work with us in a search for a solution to this acute, difficult problem. We received and considered your ideas regarding the fact that the accords at the Geneva talks should be achieved as soon as possible and our departure ought not to be tied to the formation of a coalition government in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the discussion in Washington on this theme did not work out.

Nevertheless we think that our countries could collaborate in the situation around Afghanistan and could give an example of how to approach regional conflicts. We made our recent announcement in order to push you in this direction. After this you began to move.

But what is happening? Now you're rejecting the advice which you yourselves gave us. If we want to have a neutral, non-aligned, independent Afghanistan, then let the Afghans themselves discuss and decide what kind of government they should have. What is unacceptable here? Wasn't it you who were speaking about this all the time?

We've said that both your and our capabilities of influencing the situation will be limited after the signing of an agreement. And we see this already now. It's already more difficult to do business with our friends. Each of them thinks first of all about themselves, about their future, and the future of their country. And this is completely natural.

But it seems to me that we can play a role in settling this conflict. You wanted us to make an announcement about the withdrawal of our troops and set a date and timeframe for our withdrawal. We have done this. The path is open.

I welcome what you have said: the upcoming round should be the last. This is the only correct approach. When all is said and done we cannot dance to the moods and emotions of one or another side in this conflict. This issue is too important to the Soviet Union to please someone with silly dancing [*pol'ka-babochka*]. And all the same it is impossible not to see who has had enough of whose impudence—and I am not afraid of this word—to say that the Soviet Union's statement about the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is all just propaganda.

G. SHULTZ. We are not saying that. We welcome your statement. We accept it as it is. I believed the seriousness of your intentions even a year and a half ago when Eh. A. Shevardnadze first announced them to me.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I want to again assure you that we have no intentions of establishing a springboard in Afghanistan to rush toward warm waters, etc. This is nonsense. We have

never had such intentions and do not [now].

We want you to facilitate the quickest possible signing of the Geneva Accords so that Afghanistan is an independent, non-aligned, neutral country with the government that the Afghans themselves desire. And let's push matters from both sides in the direction of such a settlement so that it is bloodless.

G. SHULTZ. I agree with this.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You asked me to talk about the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq conflict.

G. SHULTZ. Permit me to say a few words to begin.

I won't repeat everything that I said yesterday to Eh. A. Shevardnadze. I was talking about what constitutes the essence of our concerns in the context of which we are following the Geneva Process. We want this process to work well. I have not changed my point of view in comparison with what I said in Washington about the difficulties of forming a coalition government.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It will not be formed either in Moscow or in Washington.

G. SHULTZ. Nor in Pakistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Especially not in Pakistan.

There are contacts taking place between Afghans now which we did not know about earlier. Things are happening there which neither you nor we know about. We need not imagine ourselves as unique masters of the destiny of Afghanistan.

G. SHULTZ. Good. I am ready to limit myself to what I have said.

Let's switch to the Iran-Iraq conflict.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Please pass to the President that we hope to work with the American side in the issue of an Afghan settlement.

The Iran-Iraq conflict. We think that in the course of searches for ways to settle the problem certain new elements of collaboration between our countries have appeared both at the bilateral level and within the framework of the Security Council. We value this. This is important in itself and from the point of view of future prospects in the UN Security Council. It is important that such cooperation continue and not dwindle.

We are ready to work with you in the next stage. But centrifugal tendencies have now appeared in the Security Council, and you are now the chairman of the Security Council. Hence [your] efforts are needed. We have not wasted our term as chairman of the Council. So don't waste yours.

G. SHULTZ. We want to achieve a success.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will help you in this.

G. SHULTZ. Yesterday we discussed a somewhat new approach to this problem. First, a mandatory embargo of arms deliveries to a country which does not observe the previous resolution. Plus two more ideas for this. Determine an exact date at which the arms embargo would go into effect. However, there would be an interval between this date and the vote in the Security Council, let's say, 30 days. In addition, it would be proposed that the Secretary General create a special negotiations group or appoint a special representative who would deal with this issue exclusively.

In reality, as Eh. A. Shevardnadze told me yesterday, the UN Secretary General has many other responsibilities. Therefore it would be desirable to fill in the overall picture with this new element in order to step up the talks. Such a representative would work within a set timeframe. In doing so he could turn to the Security Council at any time and announce that in his view the effective date of the resolution could be postponed since progress has been noted in his efforts. Thus the representative would have a certain instrument of influence in his hands.

That's the new idea which appeared in the course of our discussion.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will discuss your suggestions. In this context such an idea is new to us. We are ready to make a constructive contribution to the solution of this problem. I want to ask you to pass the following to the President. In our view it is exceptionally important not to permit this conflict to spread or grow or let a dramatic situation arise which could end up involving many countries.

Such a prospect worries us very much, and therefore it is necessary to carefully check all the steps. Of course, it's necessary to act firmly and consistently. But at the same time to be concerned that the result not end up being directly opposite of what we're trying for.

G. SHULTZ. Yes, we understand this.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Tell me, have you been thinking about the possibility of reducing your military presence in the Persian Gulf? Or do you think that such a step would be taken as a sign of weakness? You can solve the missions which you put before yourselves there with fewer ships.

G. SHULTZ. The mission which we are performing there is a continuing one. We are performing it successfully. Not long ago we reduced our military presence in the Persian Gulf and withdrew two large ships. As a result the configuration and size of our presence changed. The mission remains as before. However, we calculated that we can perform it with fewer resources.

We have no desire to maintain large numbers of ships there. When the size of the problem lessens our presence will too.

[US National Security Adviser] C. POWELL. When Eh. A. Shevardnadze raised this issue yesterday I pointed out that the buildup of our presence in the Persian Gulf during the last 6-6 [sic] months led to the appearance of only two additional combat ships. The buildup occurred mainly through mine-sweepers, helicopter carriers, and other ships which do not present a threat and are needed only for trawling operations.

We adjust the size of our presence as we understand the situation better. Therefore it became possible to withdraw two large ships. As the threat decreases and as we understand the situation better, we will be able to make further adjustments.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Good. As I understand, we can conclude the discussion of the Iran-Iraq conflict with this.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. We have agreed that we will continue consultations on this issue.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The Iranian element is also present in the Afghan situation. And we need to consider this.

G. SHULTZ. We understand this. This element is also present in the Middle East equation. I talked about this yesterday.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Absolutely right.

As regards Afghanistan, Iran is trying to have a fundamentalist government formed there.

Eh. A. Shevardnadze. And not only there.

G. SHULTZ. In my opinion, the Iranians would not object to fundamentalist governments in the Kremlin and Washington (laughter).

M. S. GORBACHEV. All the same, they can scarcely hope for this. Possibly it is true they pray for it.

Now about the Middle East. We familiarized ourselves with your proposals sent via Ambassador [Jack F.] Matlock. In addition, all the Arabs to whom you turned with these proposals have actually turned to us.

I welcome the process of collaboration which is beginning, although it is still quite weak, in searches for a solution to this chronic problem. We waited for you to be convinced that it would be hard to solve this problem without the participation of the Soviet Union. I think there could be common ground there between us.

We favor a just, comprehensive settlement considering the interests of the Arabs, including the Palestinians, and Israel on the basis of the return of the occupied territories and the solution of other problems. No other approach has a chance of success here. It is impossible to ignore anyone's interests. We are considering your proposals from this point of view. Of course, there are also certain differences between us. But both of us understand that it is impossible to impose some solution and it is impermissible to ignore the interests of any of the parties or groups.

In this light a critical understanding of your proposals regarding the Middle East is occurring. Many think that in spite of elements of flexibility in your proposals they are nevertheless based on an old approach and that that same policy of separate deals with a limited number of participants is being pursued under the cover of talks about a conference on the Middle East. The fact that your proposal reflects a negative position with regard to a Palestinian settlement and, in particular, the UN serves as an example of this.

They reason this way: on the one hand, your proposals are sort of directed at trying to provide an armistice and to removing the bitterness in Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River. If this were done in connection with an overall settlement this would be understandable. If not, this is a completely different matter.

As you know, we have proposed to begin the work of the preparatory committee with the participation of the permanent representatives of the Security Council which would comprehensively discuss both the multilateral and the bilateral aspects of a settlement. We think that this is a clear, natural approach.

(...)



Record of Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party [PCI] Alessandro Natta, 29 March 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. Regarding Afghanistan. The signing of the agreements in Geneva is grinding to a halt through the fault of the US and Pakistan. However, we will continue. Our representatives have said to the Pakistani delegation that the Soviet Union can act alone in this role. We firmly intend to settle the situation which has developed around Afghanistan politically.

[Italian Communist Party leader] A[ntonio] RUBBI. Will the Afghan issue be raised at Shevardnadze's meeting with Shultz in April⁹ and what are the prospects of discussing this issue at the summit meeting in May of this year?

M. S. GORBACHEV. The issue of Afghanistan has been repeatedly discussed with the Americans, including during my visit to Washington. They wanted us to name a time for the withdrawal of our troops. We did this, and Washington agreed

that the US for its part would stop helping the rebels. The American side has long insisted that it is impossible to talk about forming a transitional government while Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. In this event it "would be formed on 'Soviet bayonets.'" We accepted this point of view. But the Americans suddenly began to say that such a government needed to be created before the troop withdrawal. It's true that they then had to return to the previous position. We had already agreed at the first stage to withdraw a considerable part of the troops. That is, we accommodated them here. And the Americans thought up yet one more obstacle—"symmetry" in halting aid. Then we said to them: we will aid Afghanistan on the basis of long-concluded treaties. To demand of us that we stop these actions is the same as our side demanding the US cease US military aid to Pakistan. This is how they're maneuvering. But we have firmly decided to work actively in favor of a political settlement and bring the matter to an end.

A. NATTA. There are forces in America which are absolutely and definitely interested in the USSR remaining in Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We know this. But in other countries for various, often contradictory, reasons there are forces which also do not desire the withdrawal of Soviet troops. There are even such forces in Africa. The substance of their reasoning boils down to the following: "you're abandoning Afghanistan; it means you're also abandoning us."

A. NATTA. There are substantial forces which are worried about what will happen in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It is very important that there be no big trouble there.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We don't want a pro-Communist regime in Afghanistan. We want to preserve good-neighborly relations with this country with whom we've had decades of collaboration and a border totaling 2,500 km. Right now the Afghans themselves need to make a very serious analysis of Afghan society. It is obvious that those groups who came to power in 1978 made a mistake in evaluating the situation and thought it possible to leapfrog several stages in the development of the country. The question right now is of involving all the ethnic forces in running the country and taking economic and political pluralism into consideration. In other words, we now see that the theoretical mistakes of the Afghan comrades in 1978 led to political mistakes, to a "superrevolutionary character" [*sverkhrevolyutsionnost*].

A. NATTA. I don't want to return to polemics. And I didn't want to raise this question. But you know our point of view. The PCI is convinced that the deployment of troops to Afghanistan in 1979 was a mistake. But this is not a mistake of the current leadership. We are now convinced that the Soviet Union has made a completely correct decision directed at national reconciliation in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of

the troops.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In concluding the conversation I would like to express deep satisfaction at its substance and the atmosphere of our meeting. I hope that in the future our meetings will take place in the same spirit of trust and respect. Please pass cordial greetings to the Italian Communists and the workers of Italy. As before, my promise to visit Italy remains in force.

A. NATTA. Genuine thanks for the conversation. I wish you, Cde. Gorbachev, and all the CPSU leadership great success in your work and in implementing the policy of *perestroika*.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with President of Afghanistan, General Secretary of the CC PDPA Najibullah, Tashkent, 7 April 1988

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyayev and translated by Gary Goldberg for CWIHP.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. I welcome you, Cde. Najibullah, in a fraternal way as President of a friendly Afghanistan, our neighbor, and as General Secretary of a party close to us. Considering the occasion and the intention we have come a long way for this meeting. We now stand at a threshold beyond which lies the signing of the Geneva documents and where a new, difficult, and, I would say, unique stage is opening up, requiring a very well-considered policy, creative [*neordinarnyye*] steps, and very flexible tactics from both of us.

I see the political meaning of our meeting today at this critical moment as again demonstrating the collaboration of the USSR and Afghanistan and the leadership of our two countries to the peoples of our countries and the entire world.

Second. We can already foresee that regardless of how the situation develops after the signing of the Geneva documents – acutely or relatively quietly – great responsibility will rest on the Afghan leadership and first of all on the President of Afghanistan. We think it our duty to welcome the President at this moment and give him every political, moral, and practical friendly support, proceeding from the principles and traditions of collaboration we have developed with the Afghan people in these difficult years for Afghanistan.

We proposed holding a meeting trying at this moment to even further back up the President and support him before the entire world. Naturally, this requires not only moral and political support but also aid in other categories.

And I see even one more task for today's meeting in examining specific aspects arising before the signing of the

Geneva documents and the practical issues of preparing Afghanistan for a new situation. And we don't have to begin from zero here. All the members of the Politburo have received information from Eh. A. Shevardnadze and V. A. Kryuchkov about the conversations during these days with you in Kabul. The Soviet leadership also knows about the conversation held here in Tashkent. Hence we will act right away, as we say "taking the bull by the horns," finish deciding, and clarify everything that remains.

After such an introduction I want to again greet you here and give you the floor.

NAJIBULLAH. Deeply respected, dear Mikhail Sergeyevich! Dear comrades! For me, the representative of the Afghan people and the party and government leadership, expressing the interests of the country it is a great honor to meet with you and discuss the fate of Afghanistan which now has drawn the gaze of all humanity.

We can rightfully say that our relations rest on a firm foundation laid back in V. I. Lenin's time. The fine, beautiful edifice of our friendship has risen on this foundation. The new floors of this building of traditional friendship are rising today by your hands, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and these floors are being built from even stronger material. I share your point of view that our meeting in Tashkent opens a new page in the history of the friendship and collaboration between our countries and fills them with new substance. This is instructive for everyone.

You know that in the meetings with Eh. A. Shevardnadze in Kabul, we carefully examined all issues affecting the domestic and foreign aspects of the Afghan problem. I want to express great gratitude for the valuable advice given by Eh. A. Shevardnadze. I and my comrades have comprehensively examined the results of these talks and unanimously approved them. Afghan-Soviet relations are now at a qualitatively new stage.

I would like to state some ideas in development of the conversations in Kabul. We have a need to consult with you regarding the issues of the further organization of presidential authority, the structure of presidential government, and the Geneva process. But first of all let me briefly tell you about the situation in and around Afghanistan.

I note with satisfaction that, thanks to the constant efforts of our government, several hopeful factors are appearing in the progress of the situation in the country. Many features of the policy of national reconciliation are acquiring an irreversible character and are being realized in practice. Generally speaking, the policy of national reconciliation has become comprehensive. The fact that it has received recognition in Cambodia and Nicaragua also confirms that at its base it is correct and objectively reflects reality.

The main feature of the situation in Afghanistan is the desire for peace. Figuratively speaking, the people see the light at the end of the tunnel. The policy of national reconciliation has permitted [us] to fuse the interests of people's power, that is, the establishment of peace, with the interests of the peasantry, which comprises the opposition's base.

The initiative in carrying out the policy of national reconciliation and its propaganda are in our hands, and the path to victory passes through this policy. But, naturally, we are backing our steps in the political area with steps in the military and economic areas. If we want to defend our system, then it is necessary to raise the people's standard of living, and this is impossible without comprehensive aid from the USSR.

It ought, however, to be admitted that we are required to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet aid and reorganize the entire mechanism of its use. This is a high-priority area, together with the Geneva Process. We can get specific tangible advantages in it.

Speaking of foreign policy, I stress that the constructive position taken by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan has forced the enemy to go on the defensive, which has created additional opportunities. A letter received from Shultz, which Eh. A. Shevardnadze showed me, is evidence that the US and Pakistan are concerned that they do not lag behind the settlement process.

There are broad opportunities to develop our initiative, although naturally in order to get concessions we will have to give some ourselves. We are doing that. Concessions have to be made for the successful conclusion of the Geneva Process. At the same time new opportunities will be created for bilateral collaboration between us.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In the Politburo we asked ourselves the question: what alternative would be more advantageous – have the Americans sign the Geneva Accords where both we and they take on certain obligations, or [they] refuse to sign them when we are implementing the withdrawal of troops under a scenario most favorable to us [?] All the same, we've come to the conclusion that it is desirable to sign the Accords.

The signing of the Accords could create a framework so that events do not take on extremely acute forms. When there are obligations of parties there are opportunities to put pressure on those who shirk them. And we still intend that it would be very disadvantageous for both the US and Pakistan to refuse to sign the Accords. They have unmasked themselves in the eyes of the entire world. And that being the case we have a situation where we can make accommodations and compromises.

Thus, we have chosen the first alternative as the main one. But we should also have our approaches in reserve in case the signing of the Accords breaks down. This will be a more difficult option, but it also has its strong points.

In any case one thing is clear – and we are convinced that we have an understanding in this – the real situation in and around Afghanistan needs to be used in order to move the policy of national reconciliation along to the end. You have now said that in Afghan society, in all its sectors, including the opposition, the trend toward peace and a normalization of the situation is gaining strength. But this means that the people are tired of war. This is the trend.

There is a strong trend which has formed in Soviet society – a desire to finish with the Afghan problem by means of

a political settlement. And this desire is being transformed into an appropriate policy. Right now there is a real chance of achieving a settlement in and around Afghanistan and opening the road to progress and a peaceful life to the Afghan people.

We do not exclude that the succeeding stages of the process will develop in acute forms. But we think that if we act wisely and judiciously we can avoid such acute forms. The time has come today when arrangements for broad pluralism in politics and ethnic and religious relations will have decisive importance for the country.

When you and we together formulated the policy of national reconciliation we were already talking then about expanding the social base of the regime. You will remember what discussions this provoked in the PDPA and Afghan society. Some simply turned out to be incapable of understanding the policy of national reconciliation and acting in this situation. But this was a stage of policy formation and now there will be a more difficult step when the "mujaheddin" appear next to the PDPA as a major component of the realization of the policy of national reconciliation and those who stood on the other side of the barricades appear in government and public life. Representatives of other parties which were seen as enemies for many years will appear next [to the PDPA]. Now it will be necessary to share posts with them and organize a new power structure.

This again calls for discussion. Again the policy of national reconciliation will undergo a serious test. And here again it is important not to become bewildered. You have said correctly that it is especially important to reinforce this policy with corresponding socioeconomic measures. Proposals in this regard are being formulated in the Soviet-Afghan Commission on Economic Cooperation, the Soviet part of which is headed by V. S. Murakhovskiy. We will help you without fail and help you thoroughly. But the President and his colleagues need to think about where all our aid needs to go.

But there are many other problems. For example, comrades have been telling me that 11,000 hectares of irrigated land are not being worked, that the peasants do not use them. Why are these lands not put to use or leased? We're doing much in this regard right now in our own country. This factor can also be used in Afghanistan. In generally, it's important to use the capabilities you have more fully. Afghanistan is fully capable of building an economy based on its own resources, using our aid.

We are ready to give practical aid, especially to move quickly in accommodating refugees. But all the impediments in Afghan society need to be removed and the road opened to private enterprise, primarily small property owners and tradesmen. In five years China increased their grain harvest by 100 million tons only thanks to giving land to the peasants there.

But I have interrupted you. Please continue.

NAJIBULLAH. With the signing of the Geneva Accords we will gain additional opportunities to expand the policy of national reconciliation both in domestic and foreign areas.

The American side, as Shultz said in his letter, will not halt their attempts to give the counterrevolution weapons aid. But under conditions in which we have expanded and are continuing to expand the social and political base in the country, the counterrevolutionary movement will increasingly lose the nature of political terrorism and become simply criminal.

In order to maintain the initiative we intend to carry out a number of political measures which we are preparing considering the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops. We talked about this in detail with Eh. A. Shevardnadze in Kabul. This point was reflected also in the draft of our joint statement about the results of today's talks. For example, I am thinking, considering the upcoming Soviet-American summit in Moscow, whether it is possible to examine the question of some part of the Soviet military contingent be withdrawn from Afghanistan as a goodwill gesture. This would be perceived positively both in our country and in the whole world.

Such a withdrawal could be implemented before Reagan arrives, regardless of whether the Geneva Accords are signed or not.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Do you have in mind beginning on 15 May, as it was agreed?

NAJIBULLAH. Yes. In other words, it's not necessary to wait the 60 days between the signing of the Accords and its entry into force.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I understand this, hence in maintaining the 15 May date we keep our word and don't present a gift to Reagan.

NAJIBULLAH. It's necessary there not be the impression that Reagan arrived and exerted some pressure regarding the troop withdrawal.

M. S. GORBACHEV. As a gesture the withdrawal could begin before his arrival, that is, 15 May. Let's think about it. But I'm in favor of this in order to adhere to our statements of 8 February¹⁰ with the understanding that we are acting according to our own program and not to please Reagan.

NAJIBULLAH. One principal difficulty arises with the signing of the Geneva Accords—the formulation about the border.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I know what you're talking about. This is a consequence of the colonial policy of the English who in particular created border disputes. But now this all needs to be looked into.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. The English deliberately left this problem so that disputes would arise.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We are trying to do a good deed but they're trying to use this issue against us and you. But we'll act so that everything is normal.

NAJIBULLAH. I am sure that it will be so. The issue of the "Durand Line" is, of course, complex. The English drew this line, dividing the Pushtun tribes and creating a situation which is a source of tension. Amir Abdur Rahman himself, who at the end of the last century signed the agreement with the English, did not recognize this line. He signed the agreement to get a monthly allowance of 12,000 rupees from the English.¹¹

M. S. GORBACHEV. It would not be bad to use this method on occasion even now (everyone laughs).

NAJIBULLAH. Not one government in Afghanistan has yet recognized this "Durand Line" as the border. And if we do this now, an explosive situation would arise in society. Therefore we have tried to select a formula such that an Afghan-Pakistani agreement about non-interference would not signify official recognition of the "Durand Line" by us or cause any concern among the Pushtuns. We found such a formulation in the end.

There was a tough battle for a day with Zia ul-Haq but he was forced to agree to it. We had already started to congratulate one another on this success. But then something unforeseen happened – the "rose" in our garden bloomed (I have in mind [Afghan foreign minister Abdul] Wakil's conduct in Geneva). Nevertheless, we are resolving all the difficulties all the same, since at one time we were close to recognizing the "Durand Line," generally speaking.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I understand this well since you were in the Afghan delegation that arrived in Moscow in October 1985. I said back then that one could not hurry. Now the situation is such that some outcome needs to be found according to a formulation. You, as a Pushtun president, have found it. What does Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil think?

NAJIBULLAH. He is against it.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It turns out that he is more Catholic than the Pope himself.

NAJIBULLAH. Absolutely correct. In this regard, he is a proverb – the kasha is hotter than the cauldron.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It seems to us that Wakil is an honest man. Perhaps it turned out that he has been at the talks in Geneva for a long time and ended up removed from what was going on in Kabul? Perhaps – and this is completely natural – he is not always and is not completely informed about everything?

NAJIBULLAH. No, we regularly inform him about everything. But he is somewhat of a hothead. Of course, they often think that wisdom and composure come to a man with age. But in our situation we have to be as wise in 40 years as those who have reached 80. This is no time for emotions right now.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I know that the opinion in the Afghan leadership on this issue was unanimous.

NAJIBULLAH. We held a special meeting of the Politburo yesterday. I openly informed all the members of the Politburo about doubts that had been raised about Wakil. The comrades asked only one or two clarifying questions and expressed the opinion that the formulation which had been found is to our advantage. By the way, this is the formulation of Wakil himself. He only wanted that it not be in the second article of the Accords about non-interference but in its preamble.

On the whole I want to again stress that with the signing of the Geneva Accords we will be able to come closer to a quieter version of the development of the situation.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Did you also prefer this version?

NAJIBULLAH. If the Geneva Accords are signed, then we will get strong additional opportunities to strengthen the policy of national reconciliation. We will try for an easier, quiet version.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This would be very desirable. But it's necessary to prepare for the worst. But if we talk about this version, then what are main, most key problems? How can final success be ensured, even in such conditions?

NAJIBULLAH. First of all, in the difficult version the issue of a withdrawal of troops on a bilateral basis ought to be considered. We have also prepared a number of other proposals which we told to the Soviet comrades in Kabul.

M. S. GORBACHEV. First, do I understand, is this the creation of a security force and the redeployment of Afghan troops around primary facilities in order to ensure their manageability [*upravlyayemost'*]?

NAJIBULLAH. Absolutely right. We need to create a security force, redeploy forces, and create a concentration of them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will help solve the problems of financing and weapons supply issues. Even in the most difficult and severe conditions, even under conditions of strict monitoring [*kontrol'*], we will completely supply you with weapons in any situation. We are using every mountain in Afghanistan for this.

NAJIBULLAH. We have a saying: even the highest mountains have their roads.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Further. In order not to lose time, consolidate the structure of presidential power along the lines: President, governors, other bodies. But do you have people suitable for appointment as governors?

NAJIBULLAH. There are such people and we are already

working in this direction.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is very important. I understand that candidates to the positions of governor-general need not be PDPA but can be representatives of other parties or opposition groups.

NAJIBULLAH. That is what we are proceeding from. We will try to include more people who are neutral.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is a very important issue. If you appoint PDPA representatives to all 25-30 governor's posts, then everyone will say: there's your pluralism for you, there's your policy of national reconciliation. Your prestige will suffer and so will we, since it will seem that all this was encouraged by the Soviet Union. The president should be above the interests of the PDPA. He should represent the national interests. They are watching you in the entire world. And you need to be very precise.

NAJIBULLAH. We are trying to act in such a tone. We have prepared appropriate steps but did not want to hurry because of elections to the National Council which began on 5 April. We did not want to somehow complicate the holding of elections. Of the 30 candidates for governor only three represent the PDPA and the rest are from the most diverse sectors and political forces. We are appointing these three comrades to those provinces where there are very strong party organizations.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This is good.

NAJIBULLAH. We plan to introduce this structure in the provinces: a governor and his three deputies, one of which is a PDPA member and two are local authorities.

M. S. GORBACHEV. But you need to leave [some] leeway [*rezerv*] of positions for the opposition for the possibility of additional steps, considering the policy of national reconciliation.

NAJIBULLAH. We intend to do this including at the level of deputy governor.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. And in the National Council.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The problem of refugees especially needs to be worked on. It requires more specific solutions. A good welcome of refugees in Afghanistan and providing them with everything necessary will shrink the base in which the opposition operates. As I have said to you, we are ready to help in this. But you should take a position with regard to land and [with regard to] supplying them with construction materials.

NAJIBULLAH. Last week we had an expanded meeting on the issue of refugees. We are preparing to receive 1.2 million refugees, counting, of course, on your financial and material

aid. We are approaching this issue not simply from an organizational point of view but are examining it as an important political problem, especially considering that the refugees are speaking out against the leaders of the counterrevolution more actively.

There is one more important field in our activity—contacts with the opposition, which have now become more active. We are trying to draw the broadest possible sectors of the opposition into the process of peace talks and are especially intensifying work with the counterrevolutionaries inside the country. Almost a third of the counterrevolutionaries maintain illegal contact with us. In the process, not only detachments associated with the moderate groups of the “Alliance of Seven” but also of the groups of Hekmatyar and Rabbani are entering into contact with us. This process will obviously intensify with the signing of the Geneva Accords. Only 50,000 active counterrevolutionaries oppose us. And when the enemy tries to present the “Alliance of Seven” as a united force, this is not so.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The strength of counterrevolutionary detachments is sometimes set at more than 200,000.

NAJIBULLAH. Yes, altogether the counterrevolutionaries number 270,000 men. A third of them are talking with us; 50,000 are irreconcilable; and the rest are taking a wait-and-see position. Relying on the results of Geneva, we can attract the passive part of the counterrevolutionaries to our side.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Evidently this option needs to be played out: how to act if a parallel government is created in Afghanistan, or in some part of it. And it will try to seize one province after another and displace the legal government of the country.

NAJIBULLAH. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops the situation in a number of regions will without doubt become difficult. Our comprehensive plan envisions that we will conduct work among the population which has fallen under opposition control together with a concentration of the armed forces. We will send in the armed forces in certain cases. In a number of provinces, besides redeployment, we envision the creation of powerful organizational nuclei, including in those regions which border Pakistan.

If we are to speak openly, we have not heretofore enjoyed special influence in many regions and have sent organizational nuclei there, but they were weak and could not act. Actually, these organizational nuclei dropped in from Kabul were not working bodies but controllers [*kontrolery*]. It turned out that we tried to attract the population by using force. If we act considering the specifics of our society, then we will create organizational nuclei on a new basis so that they actively help us or at least serve as a sort of buffer. Now I would like to talk about Zahir Shah.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Has he begun to distance himself?

NAJIBULLAH. By nature Zahir Shah is conservative. However, he is interested in getting his place in the process of reconciliation.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is good that your attitude toward him is better than the “Alliance of Seven,” which has written him off. You can score some points in this matter.

NAJIBULLAH. We will do just that. The factor itself of Zahir Shah should work to split the “Alliance,” especially considering that the extremists do not agree to his candidacy. However, some extremists are trying to establish contacts with us while rejecting the candidacy of Zahir Shah.

Analyzing the situation further, I want to note that the enemy continues to strengthen his forces, bring in caravans with weapons, and create his reserves in various regions. We are preparing to launch strikes on bases and depots and intercept caravans. But we associate the larger scale of operations with the results of the talks in Geneva. We are also considering the possibility which you have been talking about: the enemy could create a government in one of the regions of Afghanistan in order to turn to the Americans with a request for recognition.

M. S. GORBACHEV. At one time in one of our previous conversations we were talking about how Lenin acted in emergency situations. I was talking then about the Leninist policy with regard to the mid-level peasantry which ensured that it switched to the side of Soviet power and, essentially, ensured the defeat of Kolchak and the counterrevolution.

Being so busy with military and structural problems and searching for contact with the opposition, I think it’s necessary not to forget the religious aspect. When the ethnic groups see that you show concern for them, they will respond with reciprocal steps, for in the final account they too are in favor of peace so that their people can quietly till their land. This is a decisive factor which also does not contradict the Koran.

In our country the Orthodox Church has seen much in *perestroika* which is compatible with its views, since we are cleansing society of distortions, fighting against drunkenness, calling for respectfulness and industriousness, and acting for peace. The Church openly says that it supports the Party’s policy. There will evidently be a meeting with [Patriarch] Pimen and other members of the Synod in connection with the millennium of Christianity in Russia.

All this needs to be considered, for a policy built outside realities is not viable, is doomed to vacillations, and leads to disappointments.

NAJIBULLAH. Not long ago we had a closed meeting with representatives of Hekmatyar at which we had a very free conversation. They told me that in Islamic issues I had gone so far forward that they could give me a membership card in their party, that is, the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. But how did they react to your

election as president?

NAJIBULLAH. They said that I needed to agree to two things –to accept a membership card of their party and give up the post of president. They said in this respect that while in Moscow I were to declare publicly that I am ready to sacrifice my life and the post of president for the sake of peace. I replied to them that I could think about the first. But they were too late about the second. I told them, you say that 80% of the territory of the country is under your control. Why then did you not take part in the Loya Jirga which elected the president since you could have voted in the Loya Jirga for another person and he could have been elected president. When I said that I was ready to give up anything, I was General Secretary of the Party, but not president. Now when I have become president I cannot betray the trust of the people.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Probably they have also begun to display greater realism.

NAJIBULLAH. The policy of national reconciliation is also influencing their positions.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The people will not support the fundamentalists.

NAJIBULLAH. We have our own “fundamentalists;” one of them is in Geneva right now (he has Wakil in mind).

Permit me to touch on the situation in the PDPA CC Politburo and Secretariat. Briefly put, the membership of these bodies has been confirmed, and there are no grounds for concern. We are trying to work actively on a collective basis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In any event. You and your comrades should have clearly in mind that both the president and the others are always in the people’s sight. The alignment of forces can be different but if an emergency situation arises, we will come to the rescue and do everything necessary. Let them know about this.

NAJIBULLAH. I am very grateful.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I am saying this just in case. We are not immune. But our Afghan friends should act confidently.

NAJIBULLAH. Fortunately, I can again say that the situation in the leading bodies of the Party is improving.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is important in order that efforts not be wasted on clarifying relationships at this difficult stage.

NAJIBULLAH. By the way, Hekmatyar’s representatives both directly and indirectly tried to find out how matters are with unity in the leadership.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You see that this issue is of interest to

both them and us but from another point of view. Each is pursuing their own goals.

They asked me in the West how matters are with unity in the Politburo. Generally speaking this is constantly tossed up by imperialist centers in order to inflame our population. They say that there are two, three, four groups in the Politburo, and some say that there are even five. They reason this way: if discussions are going on, it means that there are enemies of *perestroika*.

Another topic which is tossed up are relations between ethnic groups. They splashed out so many fabrications in connection with the events in Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹² They declare that the first person responsible for spilling blood is Gorbachev. But they are silent about the fact that Gorbachev’s address facilitated the normalization of the situation. This is not to their advantage. Returning to the theme of Islamic fundamentalism I will say that they are trying to toss this topic up on us here, in Uzbekistan.

NAJIBULLAH. Our old acquaintance Karmal is also busy with this matter; he states that M. S. Gorbachev remained isolated.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The policy of *perestroika* in the USSR is a realistic policy, expressing real needs. The people understand it. A parallel can be drawn here with the policy of national reconciliation being followed by the Afghan leadership. Of course, a strong political will and decisiveness are required. But what your comrades were telling me before the meeting with you shows that the process is going in the right direction.

Please pass on that we welcome the solid work by the PDPA CC Politburo and Secretariat under the leadership of Cde. Najibullah. Whoever acts in this manner is a real revolutionary. Those who are worried about their own income, who wallowed in mercantile ideas, have left this path. You need to be free of them. Right now when Afghanistan is at a turning point it is impermissible to think about income, payment, and portfolios. A revolution requires total commitment [*samootdacha*]. And at such times one need not fear strong, loud words.

NAJIBULLAH. The problem of forming a presidential form of government is very important but we do not have experience here. But considering the peculiarities of our society, the factor of the president has greater significance for us than the factor of general secretary. It seems to me that it’s necessary to create a small, but very active presidential staff which would ensure communications with the people. There is a basis for this staff but the work has not been completed. We cannot decide how presidential and executive power are to relate to one another. During the conversations in Kabul we asked you for help in forming a presidential form of government. As Eduard Amvrosiyevich noted, this issue is of course within our own competence.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In fact, we cannot dictate what you have.

There is no analogy here; moreover, we ourselves have been very thoroughly occupied with improving the structure of the leadership. We can, of course, send comrades who could help organize the purely technical work of the presidential office.

The boundaries of functions need to be determined, including [those] at the provincial level. Inasmuch as all the remaining bodies will be formed on the basis of elections but the governor, as a person appointed by the president, is a representative of the highest central authority, he should look after how presidential decisions are being implemented in practice. You need to look for the correct forms and you need to look for them yourselves.

NAJIBULLAH. Our mistake in the past was that we created a structure of five bodies in the provinces instead of centralization. Proceeding from the recommendations of Soviet comrades we will create a system of undivided authority under the leadership of the governor.

One more issue should be under the constant attention of the president – the strengthening the armed forces on the basis on the policy of national reconciliation. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that Soviet troops are being withdrawn the Afghan army does not yet have the capability to wage independent operations and defeat the enemy. The level of material and technical supply of the army is high, thanks to your aid. However, there is an acute shortage of personnel, especially junior officers. Although a mechanism has been created for raising the standard of living of personnel, there has not yet been a complete turnaround [*otdacha*]. True, we are taking additional steps and are studying all possibilities to solve the personnel problem. There is just no way the army can bring its strength up to 200,000 men.

As I have already said, a redeployment of military units is being planned and a headquarters of the Supreme High Command will operate. Military councils have been created in corps and border brigades. We are constantly improving the structure of the armed forces, are creating “commandos” subunits, and are actively working on the formation of a special security force. This security force will be formed based on special MGB [most likely: WAD (*Wizarat-i Amaniyyat –i Dawlati, Ministry of State Security*)] units. Then we will bring the strength up to 33,000 men from the best MGB [WAD] and army units. The entire security force will undergo special training and have distinctive markings.

M. S. GORBACHEV. They will be based on brigades?

NAJIBULLAH. Yes. The security brigades will be deployed on four axes in Kabul. The main mission of the guard is to protect people’s power and the primary centers, primarily Kabul, and ensure the security of the leadership. Generally speaking, the plans have been drawn up and work is proceeding but there are problems, mainly regarding material and technical supply.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We will consider all this in the Politburo.

I think the economic and military issues will have to be considered separately.

NAJIBULLAH. It is important that the nucleus of our revolutionary army be composed of a special purpose security force which would prevent any coup attempts.

There is one more issue in the military area connected with military policy. The problem is that we have formed several units from bands which have crossed to our side. But they are worried right now that extremists will take revenge on them after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. They are asking us to help them with weapons and ammunition. We request the Soviet comrades consider this possibility.

Economics has special importance for solving domestic and foreign problems. Unfortunately, in spite of comprehensive Soviet aid, we are not able to carry out our plans completely. The growth of the revenue portion of the government budget rose 15% in recent years, while expenses rose 60%, especially for military needs. The national income rose only 6% total, instead of the planned 40%. Inflationary processes are developing, and the value of the Afghani is falling. Prices are rising 15-20%. An additional 9-10 billion Afghanis are issued annually. The state debt quintupled and is now 100 billion Afghanis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. And at the same time we’re trading in bicycles, the output of a restored private enterprise, hence it is ruined.

NAJIBULLAH. I have been dealing with this problem in real earnest. I invited the owner of this enterprise to my office, which in itself is without precedent, and talked with him in detail. I asked him if he had any complaints or difficulties. He gave the same reply all the time, that he has no complaints or difficulties. Of course, I know that this is not so: he was simply afraid of the officials of the bureaucracy. Only at the very end of the conversation did he say that he had no telephone and that this was hampering his work. I promised to help him.

We are feeling a shortage of petroleum products, but the construction of a refinery in Shebergan [in northern Afghanistan] with a capacity of 500,000 tons a year has not yet started. The implementation of plans to increase the production of glass, paper, and various essential goods has also not begun. About 700,000 children are studying in schools, but only 30% of them have the necessary conditions for normal study. An additional 20 billion Afghani are needed for repair and restoration of the road network. I would like to ask you to help us in solving all these problems.

The development of bilateral Soviet-Afghan relations will have decisive importance for strengthening democratic rule and increasing the resources to oppose the counter-revolution. The question arises of how to replace our cooperation in military terms under conditions of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and afterwards. But we need to replace it with economic cooperation. We need to pay serious attention in these terms to the development of trade between the

Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

We understand that we are asking for a lot of aid in the most diverse fields – from the delivery of consumer goods to direct financing. If you agree, we will send our proposals to the Soviet leadership.

Now one more issue, again in the military area, about whether it is possible to consider leaving part of the Soviet servicemen, for example, ten to fifteen thousand, to protect economic facilities and in training centers as well.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Considering that the Soviet military advisers are not among the troops it is possible to consider your request.

NAJIBULLAH. I'm talking about training centers and special technical groups to support the operation of airfields and roads.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This needs to be looked into. But, of course, all the requirements about including advisers in the troops are in the framework of the Geneva Accords. And then, naturally, when military equipment is delivered help will be required to assimilate it. This is normal everywhere it is delivered.

NAJIBULLAH. Possibly the principal aspects of this issue could probably be formulated in a new friendship treaty.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, it's possible.

NAJIBULLAH. We are trying to solve problems connected with the training of military personnel and are doing it with our own resources but would like to expand collaboration and at a base in the Soviet Union.

In the worst case scenario we are providing for the creation of a reserve strongpoint in the north. Individual steps have already been taken, and we have informed the Soviet comrades of them. Much can be done here, from joint provision of security to still greater development of direct communications and giving new stimulus to border trade.

These are the main ideas which I would like to describe today and which were described in greater detail to the Soviet comrades in Kabul. I want to stress that in your person, Mikhail Sergeevich, and in your colleagues, we see the true friends of Afghanistan. It is very important that the entire world considers the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as a single whole and sees that how successfully the friendship between our peoples is developing and deepening. We feel your support and solidarity deeply. We thank you from the bottom of our hearts. But we ourselves are not sparing efforts to carry out the tasks which lie before us.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Two days ago I talked with F[idel] Castro by telephone and told him of our upcoming meeting in Tashkent. Castro displayed great interest and expressed complete support for our steps and requested that I send you greetings. Castro said that he considers you simpatico and

hopes that you like him. He added that, of course, that Cde. Najibullah cannot travel right now but let him remember that they are waiting for him in Cuba. Generally speaking, I felt like F. Castro was confident that Cde. Najibullah will lead the new Afghanistan.

Two days ago I talked with the Indian Ambassador in Moscow who sent me a message from R. Gandhi. We talked with him about issues of Soviet-Indian relations. I said that I would be meeting with you in Tashkent and that we would send corresponding information to the Indian side after I return to Moscow.

The Ambassador stressed that India and Rajiv Gandhi personally were interested in strengthening Afghanistan in its non-alignment position in order that Afghanistan be a country maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union and India. He noted that the Indian side is actively facilitating this process. It is good that India and we are ready to help strengthen the positions of the Afghan leadership.

You and I met at a good time. We need to formulate our common position before the signing of the Geneva Accords, ensure they are signed, and the main thing – agree on joint steps at a new stage of development of the Afghan situation.

We will consider all the issues you touched on in the Politburo and try to solve them as much as the situation permits.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with President of Afghanistan, General Secretary of the CC PDPA Najibullah, 13 June 1988

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. I welcome you to Moscow, Cde. Najibullah. I congratulate you on the successful conclusion of your strenuous journey. I know that you have been working well and productively.

At the present time I am sort of staying in the “underground.” It seems that periods of “underground” work are needed in the Soviet Union. Two weeks remain until the start of the XIX All-Union Party Conference.¹³ The concluding stage of preparations for it is underway – work is concluding on the report of the CPSU CC General Secretary and other documents of a Conference which doubtless will be an important political event.

I think that it was interesting for you to familiarize yourself with the main points of the CPSU CC for the XIX All-Union Party Conference. This document describes the platform for discussion about the problems of the development of socialism in our country and an attempt has been made to

analyze what is acceptable and necessary to further strengthen it and what is not.

A key issue at this conference of landmark importance will be reform of the political system. Of course I have in mind not the breakup of the government machinery as Lenin described in his work *Gosudarstvo i Revolyutsiya* [The State and Revolution] but its restructuring.

We have to think deeply and comprehensively about the role of the Party at the stage of *perestroika*, considering that much in this area has been messed up [*podnaputali*] and the Party has been overburdened with functions not inherent to it. As a result the Party is not always on top of the situation as the political vanguard. But inasmuch as no one can replace the Party in such a capacity serious oversights and blunders have been committed and here and there even mistakes in domestic and foreign policy. *Perestroika* has brought to the fore the imperative to sharply increase the leading and organizational role of the CPSU, which is especially important in the conditions of a single-party system when there is no other force capable of replacing the Party. The Party has been called on to work out a theory and strategy to develop our society, domestic, and foreign policy. It has been entrusted with the tasks of ideological support, education, and personnel placement.

In this context we must solve the problem of creating political mechanisms which would guarantee the well-founded, reliable fulfillment of the functions of direct management of the country and economic activity by other bodies. Therefore we are again, for the fourth time, advancing the slogan "All power to the councils [*soviets*]!" intending in this regard a considerable increase in the role and authority of these fully-empowered [*polnovlastnyye*] bodies of popular representation. We ought to analyze their functions and missions specifically and secure all this legally and economically. This is the second link of the reform of the political system.

And naturally the problems associated with assuring the constitutional rights of Soviet citizens, the activity of labor unions, the [Communist youth organization] Komsomol, and other public organizations are being deeply thought through, proceeding from the realities of a one-party system. The creation of a socialist law-governed state founded on the supremacy of law needs to be concluded. The linchpin of the entire reconstruction of the political system is opening the road to a real inclusion of the people in managing the government. Of course, these provisions are written in basic party documents. But at the present stage the participation of the people needs to be turned into an inseparable part of the political system.

We have to carry out legal reform and make changes in the electoral system. The CPSU Charter needs to be changed and additions made to the USSR Constitution.

There are great expectations in connection with the Party Conference in our society. That is why it can be said that the Conference is "doomed" to success.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Israeli Prime Minister [Yitzhak]

Shamir, too, talked about this in particular in a conversation with me in New York.

A. F. DOBRYNIN. Reagan has also repeatedly stressed his interest in the upcoming Party Conference.

M. S. GORBACHEV. American editors have been giving this advertisement for my book about *perestroika*: "Reagan read this book from cover to cover." Obviously this is having an effect on Americans who know that Reagan generally doesn't read books.

All in all, we are passing through a critical stage in Soviet history. And we can not lose it.

I have described to you, Cde. Najibullah, the chief provisions of the main points with which CC of our Party is going to the Conference. A settlement of the situation in Afghanistan is a very important part of *perestroika* and an important part of our policy and yours. And we need to be successful in what we decided together. With this point of view I welcome your present visit.

Your speech at the UN General Assembly session and other steps taken in New York have aroused great interest.¹⁴ There is positive reaction, the theme of which is the thought that President Najibullah is a leader with whom we ought to do business. All this is important for molding world public opinion in the right direction. Now the public will not very much accept hostile inventions about what is going on in Afghanistan on faith and will try to know the truth.

We know from the Cuban comrades that they are quite satisfied with the results of your visit. The Cubans also give high marks to the decision of the Soviet leadership to withdraw troops from Afghanistan... Before this they were constantly sounding out the issue, referring to the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan tying the hands of the Cubans as regards the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

NAJIBULLAH. They talked in these terms in the course of the plenary discussions.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Everyone sees what is happening as a result of the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. As regards us, Cde. Najibullah, the Soviet Union will henceforth do everything necessary to support you. There are no problems here and there cannot be. But however we help you, no matter how much we support you, the troops will be withdrawn. This needs to be kept in mind.

Therefore it is especially important that there be no panic among the Afghan comrades. And there needs to be unity. Otherwise you will end up as a sect of political figures divorced from reality and life. It is still a long way until the ideals proclaimed by the PDPA are realized. A long path will need to be traveled for this [to happen]. Ideals are not established by simple mechanical means. You need time and a corresponding level of development of a society.

If you do not understand, if you are frightened by reality, then everything can be lost. You need to reach higher levels of a political outlook and think about the fate of the

country, and not about incomes, portfolios, and selfish interests. The time has come to look at the situation in Afghanistan realistically. It is time to share power in practice and form management mechanisms on the basis of the realities of Afghanistan with the participation of all political and social forces. Otherwise, this is not Marxism.

Remember how Lenin acted in such conditions. That's why everyone refers to Lenin and finds answers from him left and right. Because Lenin promoted political and ideological goals, relying on specific, real life, not taking any dogmas into consideration. He understood deeply when it was necessary to compromise and maneuver. A classic example was the conclusion of the [1918] Brest [-Litovsk] Peace [Treaty]. But what efforts this cost him! But at the same time when it was necessary he was a decisive revolutionary.

Now it is necessary, considering all the aspects of the situation in Afghanistan, to act consistently in all fields, including [the] diplomatic [one]. But the main thing is work in the country itself. I am getting the impression that the focus of events is shifting to Afghanistan. The domestic armed opposition is appreciably gaining strength. Therefore it is necessary to concentrate efforts in this direction and involve the commanders of armed formations, both in the upper echelons of power and in local bodies. There is no other way. If this is not done there can be a catastrophe.

We can regulate the tempo and intensity of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, no matter that the mujaheddin "are rubbing their hands." Moreover, the continuing violations of the Geneva Accords by Pakistan permit us to do this. We will react to this. Right in Kandahar the withdrawal had barely stopped and right away they reacted. We will act in a similar matter in all cases when there are attacks on our troops. If necessary powerful strikes need to be launched on the rebel bands. I told [USSR Minister of Defense] D. T. Yazov about this. Let them know that it is not permitted to play with us. In a word, both the carrot and the stick need to be employed.

It seems that Hekmatyar is leaving his post. [National Islamic Front leader Pir Sayyid Ahmad] Gilani is replacing him.¹⁵ This figure is evidently different from Hekmatyar. He follows a wait-and-see policy in order to begin larger operations after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. This ought to be closely followed. But it's important not to lose time while our troops are still in Afghanistan. And we still have time – two months remain until withdrawal of 50% of the contingent of Soviet troops and even more until complete [withdrawal].

The main problems ought to be solved during this period. Don't lose time on "agitation" of our comrades in Kabul. Don't be shy about raising questions directly with Moscow. We'll examine them. The help of the Soviet ambassador and our other representatives is always at your disposal. But when doubts arise in conversations with them ask them directly whose opinion they are expressing – their own personal [opinion] or that of the Soviet leadership. In addition, if the opinion of the Soviet leadership reaches you and you, Cde. Najibullah, as a man, as the leader of a country, have other ideas, inform us. We will study them here carefully and report our point of view.

[Some] friendly advice to all Afghan comrades and first of all to you as President, who has the necessary political experience, intellect, and knowledge: you need to act independently.

There are specific issues which we need to discuss with you. As has already been noted the timetable of the troop withdrawal can be adjusted considering the actual situation. But in this regard you need to proceed from the fact that we will withdraw the troops without fail. In this context the most important task is to speed up measures to strengthen the army and special security force. I know about your requests, especially about the security force.

It is important to strengthen political work in the armed forces with material incentive measures and take steps to build up material resources. Eh. A. Shevardnadze, V. M. Chebrikov, D. T. Yazov, and the heads of other ministries and agencies are examining all the problems you raise. Part of them have already been decided. Eh. A. Shevardnadze will inform you of them.

Some of the problems, for example about foodstuffs, will remain for the time being since we do not have the capability to satisfy these requests. As soon as such a capability appears we will examine it again and make a decision. I note in this regard: it is necessary to use the available resources with maximum effectiveness and do everything so that the aid being offered is not squandered.

An important avenue of work should be stepping up contacts with realistic, sober-minded forces of the opposition and everyone who is ready to enter into talks. I have the impression that you personally have enormous capabilities for creative [*nestandartnyye*] steps in this area. Your opposition has half as many relatives (laughter).

You could argue in favor of your position that in present conditions an opportunity has been opened to the Afghans themselves to solve their own problems. Appeal to the need to understand the groundlessness for Afghanistan of a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union, with which there is a common border of 2,500 km.

And have the opposition not entertain any illusions regarding Zia ul-Haq and the present rulers of Iran, who are not abandoning plans to dismember Afghanistan. They [offer] no guarantees of the independence, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of Afghanistan but the Soviet Union does, regardless of whether our troops are there or not. If you cast aside ideological differences then the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, one can say, are destined to collaborate. Our bilateral relations have deep roots and are completely in accord with the national interests of our countries. The Soviet Union is genuinely interested in a good neighbor living and working on its southern borders. And how can Pakistan and Iran help Afghanistan? Not at all. They will only try to chop off a piece of the Afghan pie.

In connection with the Geneva settlement, at the present time the Western countries are trying to construct something like a "Marshall Plan" through the UN. In other words, to create a base to penetrate Afghanistan on the rails of economic aid. Don't stray from cooperation in the implementation of such a program. It is possible there are positive as-

pects from the point of view of expanding contacts with the West and the UN. But maximum caution ought to be displayed here and be on your guard so you are not “swaddled” as happened in Angola and Mozambique. Progressive revolutions have long been underway in these countries but they cannot yet get out of the powerful embraces of the West. As soon as [Angolan President] Dos Santos tries to do this, they will practically seize him by the throat.

NAJIBULLAH. Dear Mikhail Sergeyeovich, first of all I want to express genuine gratitude for the opportunity that has been afforded to discuss our problems and tasks with you and consult with you regarding issues which the Afghan leadership has to decide at this critical historical stage of the development of Afghanistan. I thank you for the explanation of the main points of the CPSU CC for the All-Union Party Conference. I am convinced the Conference will be equal to a Congress in its importance.

Briefly about the trip to New York and Cuba. In our view, the work done was quite useful both from the political and propaganda points of view. Of course, it would be premature to expect immediate political dividends since time is required for quantity to become quality.

I am happy to fulfill a request of Fidel Castro and pass on his warm comradely greetings to you, Mikhail Sergeyeovich. I think that he has a feeling of genuine respect for you. For example, Fidel Castro told me that the policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan developed jointly with Soviet comrades has so impressed him that he would even like to revive [Cuban dictator Fulgencio] Batista in order to engage in national reconciliation with him.

M. S. GORBACHEV. (Laughs) I get the allusion. Generally speaking, Fidel Castro is different than [Cuban revolutionary and guerilla leader Ernesto] Che Guevara. Without question, the people love him and he enjoys enormous authority. In a word – he is a legendary personality, but legends should be constantly nourished somehow.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with your statement. Now some words about trends in the development of the situation in Afghanistan. The beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops has complicated the military and political situation in the country. The situation has worsened in a number of border provinces; an increase in the infiltration of caravans from Pakistan with weapons is being observed, and depots and bases are being created on our territory.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The recent destruction of two depots is a good thing. This is how you need to act henceforth.

NAJIBULLAH. The main goal which the irreconcilable opposition is trying to realize is the seizure of a provincial capital which has an airfield. If this is done the main axis will be the seizure of Jalalabad or Kandahar where combat operations have been especially active recently, and also the creation of an airlift to receive American military aid, bypassing Paki-

stan. At the same time the enemy has intensified psychological warfare which is producing its own results and influencing the population of Kabul and other regions.

In the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command we have developed measures to launch strikes on counterrevolutionary groups in the regions of Jalalabad and Kandahar and are preparing operational subunits with a strength of from five to seven thousand men.

It needs to be noted that negative processes are being aggravated by the latest outbreak of disputes in the PDPA CC Politburo and in the leadership as a whole. Many of our comrades voted in support of the policy of national reconciliation at party conferences and plenums. But right now when the matter has reached practical work and really sharing power with the opposition, they are evasive or openly resist. The passivity of members of the Party leadership is having a negative influence on the mood of ordinary PDPA members, especially in the army.

As a result, desertion has recently increased, including absconding with weapons. In these difficult conditions the natural and normal process of self-purification of the PDPA has begun – casual and vacillating people who joined the Party only to realize their own egoistic ambitions are leaving it. We intend to maintain this trend because, in our view, such a purification will be only to the PDPA’s advantage.

I want to stress the timeliness and the importance of your address to the PDPA leadership. Your message was deeply and comprehensively discussed at the Politburo. The comrades entrusted me with passing our message of reply to you. (Passes the message of reply from the Afghan leadership to M. S. Gorbachev.)

M. S. GORBACHEV. Since you left this message with our comrades before your departure for New York I have familiarized myself with it. You acted correctly in suggesting that all your colleagues in the leadership sign it.

If the notion of dividing the PDPA into independent “Khalq” and “Parcham” parties, which individual comrades are expressing, takes over, this will be doomed to catastrophe. This would be a blow to the position of the President and would make your work more difficult. You would have to leave the Party. In the final account all this would turn into a catastrophe. It’s necessary to remember the folk wisdom which says that a fish rots from the head.

NAJIBULLAH. I completely agree with your opinion. I would like to touch on international issues further. At the present time we are proceeding from the position that Pakistan is not fulfilling and indeed is not demonstrating readiness to fulfill the Geneva Accords. As regards Iran, it is occupied with the problems of the Persian Gulf and the attention of Iranian leaders is being deflected from Afghanistan by the Iran-Iraq War, in spite of all the hostility of their positions.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Some days ago Zia ul-Haq sent me a message in which he virtually disclosed embraces of friendship, lying with the tears of tender emotion. He officially

invited me to visit Pakistan. In his step there is obviously a tactical stratagem and a recognition of reality. He needs to consider the possibility of what will happen to Pakistan if the Soviet Union, India, and Afghanistan pressure him from three sides.

NAJIBULLAH. When did the message arrive, before the recent events in Pakistan?

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yes, literally days before.

NAJIBULLAH. It seems to me that your visit could be exceptionally useful in terms of [putting] appropriate pressure on Pakistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I am not going there. But if there is some positive movement in the position of the Pakistani administration then it's possible to consult and propose to Zia ul-Haq that we meet somewhere.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with you that if there are constructive elements displayed in Zia ul-Haq's policy a meeting between him and the Soviet leadership could be useful.

M. S. GORBACHEV. We have repeatedly said to the Americans that the Geneva Accords concerning Afghanistan are a touchstone of the US readiness to actually improve relations with the Soviet Union. The latest information indicates that the US Administration is displaying increasing realism in the analysis of the situation in Afghanistan which is based on data of American representatives in Kabul, understanding the staying power of the present regime, and that it cannot simply be removed. Yet not at all long ago they had different assessments. But the smallest allusion to differences in the Afghan leadership and disputes which occur will immediately become known to the Americans. Therefore I advise you to warn your comrades that they be more careful and chatter a little less.

NAJIBULLAH. Thank you for the friendly advice.

Returning again to foreign policy problems, I want to note that, unfortunately, the Geneva Accords have not yet brought the expected cessation of outside interference. I raised these issues in conversations with UN Secretary General J. Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez. They promised to take the necessary steps to activate a monitoring mechanism and assured me that Pakistan had reportedly expressed readiness to take all measures in their power.

In a word, the first 15-20 days after the start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops were quite difficult: a certain tension arose in the Party and we displayed an unnecessary haste in our steps. But right now work is getting down to normal and we see our miscalculations and also our capabilities more clearly. A unique breathing spell has come when each of the sides is organizing. In my view, we need scarcely expect large-scale combat operations from the armed opposition in the near future. Fearing the Soviet troops, the armed formations

will try to amass their forces and at the same time step up propaganda work, sabotage, and terrorist activity. Moreover, the disputes between the foreign and domestic forces of the counterrevolution are growing stronger.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The armed formations which are operating inside Afghanistan are less extremist. They need to consider that they are in plain view of the people.

NAJIBULLAH. Exactly so. Of all the [rebel] groups the most active are those of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, which G. Hekmatyar heads. They are concentrating their main efforts on the Kabul axis, trying to sow panic among the capital's population with shelling and terrorist acts.

It should be noted that at the present time the population of Afghanistan as a whole is displaying a notable caution and a desire to get their bearings on the situation. It is waiting to see if the present government holds out or not. This also refers to armed formations created of rebels who crossed over to the government side.

We are acutely faced with the problem of achieving a decisive turning point in the psychological mood of the population. But this can be done only by launching decisive strikes on irreconcilable groups. This is the psychology of the Afghan people. If they see that we could teach the rebels an exemplary lesson then the balance will swing in our favor. In this regard I would like to ask you to approve several large-scale military operations. The armed forces of Afghanistan would take a direct part in waging these combat operations. Soviet troops would be in the second and third echelons. This would boost the morale of the personnel. And victory in such operations would give them confidence in their ability to defeat the enemy by themselves.

M. S. GORBACHEV. This can be done only if an attack is made on our troops. In this case our retaliatory actions would be confirmation of the statement we made that we will react to violations of existing agreements by the other side in an appropriate manner.

NAJIBULLAH. We will diligently put the policy of national reconciliation, which is gaining increasing popular support, into practice. The recent changes in the upper echelons of government, the appointment of authoritative representatives of the population by governors, and the creation of a coalition government have evoked a favorable response.

At the same time we intend to continue working with Afghan emigrants, in particular former King Zahir Shah, although considering the situation main reliance will all the same be placed on establishing contact with the domestic opposition.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Now you need not only to have intentions but to already be working.

NAJIBULLAH. We also will resolutely overcome intra-Party differences and attempts by individual comrades to abandon

and avoid supporting the leadership.

M. S. GORBACHEV. There is already a circle of people around the President who can be relied on. But it needs to be considerably expanded, contact made with representatives of various forces, and rally them around yourself. You need to work more actively with the new Prime Minister [Muhammad Hassan Sharq],¹⁶ with Layek, other comrades, and also with representatives of the patriotic clergy.

Eh. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Individual Soviet comrades have expressed ideas about the advisability of dividing the functions of the President and the General Secretary of the Party CC. This was not the opinion of the Soviet leadership and we have disavowed them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I want to repeat what I have been saying: in such cases you could ask whose opinion the Soviet representatives are stating.

NAJIBULLAH. As Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, I will strive to keep all military matters under personal control. We are faced with big problems and we will need your assistance. I described my proposals in this connection to Eh. A. Shevardnadze and A. F. Dobrynin earlier.

M. S. GORBACHEV. I repeat: we will henceforth do everything to help you. But again I insistently call to your attention that you not squander our aid.

NAJIBULLAH. I would like to consult with you about this issue. In present circumstances the policy of exerting appropriate pressure on Pakistan seems important. In these terms the sending of Eh. A. Shevardnadze's letter to the UN Secretary General was opportune. The USSR MID Statement of 29 May 1988 was very important. Moreover, in my view, appropriate steps could be taken through the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow and also through third countries.

It is important to get the UN to have the groups of observers work directly in the border regions, in the zone through which the so-called "Durand Line" passes. As regards propaganda work, then it ought to be given a purposeful, active character, and to specifically expose Pakistan from the facts of [its] violations of the Accords. The main thing for us is to ensure the fulfillment of the Geneva Accords.

In conclusion I want to assure you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that we will do everything necessary in spite of current difficulties in order to preserve the gains of the Revolution, consolidate, and increase them.

M. S. GORBACHEV. You can always be confident that the broadest support will be given for your efforts on our part.

NAJIBULLAH. We consider the policy of national reconciliation to be part of the policy of *perestroika* of which you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, are the initiator. The ideas of *perestroika* have international importance and go far beyond national

boundaries. They have become exceptionally popular among the Afghan people and have been turned into a factor capable of strengthening their national pride. Therefore we fully understand the responsibility which rests on us at the present stage and will work persistently to translate the policy of national reconciliation and *perestroika* in Afghan society into practice.

M. S. GORBACHEV. It is important that everyone with whom you work and whom you involve in cooperation are imbued with the understanding that we have no secret, selfish designs regarding Afghanistan. Our policy has been and will be based on respect for the Afghan people, their values and traditions, and full recognition of the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union will continue to help you solve the problems of developing the country, move Afghan society along the path of progress, and restore general international recognition of Afghanistan. We are genuinely interested that there be a loyal neighbor at the southern borders of the Soviet Union with whom our country has a longstanding friendship.



Record of a Conversation of M. S. Gorbachev with President of Afghanistan Najibullah, 23 August 1990

[Source: Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow. Provided by Anatoly Chernyaev and translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

M. S. GORBACHEV. Cde. Najibullah, I welcome you to Moscow. I hope that your rest in our country has gone well.

NAJIBULLAH. I am genuinely thankful to our Soviet friends for the attention shown me and my family.

I took it with special appreciation that you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, found an opportunity to receive me for a conversation in spite of your enormous workload. I know at what a strenuous pace you have to work at the present time and therefore I highly appreciate your agreement to this meeting.

M. S. GORBACHEV. In fact, today our country is undergoing an exceptionally critical period of its development when it has to make such big decisions and when the future of Soviet society has to be determined. All this requires an enormous mobilization of forces and total commitment. In a word, the load is great. Possibly in some respects it is now quieter in Afghanistan than here.

Evidently those problems which we are deciding can justly be called problems of growth. If you consider them from today's positions then they, of course, cannot fail to

cause serious concern. However, from the point of view of the future and ultimate objectives it could hardly be expected that in such an enormous country as the Soviet Union deep revolutionary changes and the reconstruction of all facets of life could occur smoothly and painlessly.

I will say openly: the first-priority issue today is to stop the further development of crisis phenomena and keep the state of affairs in its present form. Otherwise the situation will deteriorate further. The Soviet people and the leadership of the country understand this well and are experiencing it. It is clear that the only way out of the present situation is to move the cause of *perestroika* forward. But everything here is not so simple.

As is well known the practical implementation of *perestroika* was preceded by discussions around this idea and development of the theory and practice of *perestroika*. When *perestroika* was discussed at the level of theory then everyone greeted it as an important and urgent step on the path to the renewal of society. But the realization of the policy of *perestroika* has touched all spheres of public life – the government, the Party, the army, personnel, etc. and has exposed socioeconomic problems and problems of inter-ethnic relations which had accumulated over the years.

The task before us at the present time is to do everything necessary to stabilize the socioeconomic situation. This would permit us to remove tension and create conditions to gradually come to a solution of other problems through corresponding phases. Right now two central questions are on the agenda – acceleration of economic reform and transition to a market [economy], and preparation of a union treaty. In concentrating on these fundamental political problems we of course are in no way forgetting about the need to satisfy the needs of the people in food, housing, restoring [*navedeniye*] proper order, and ensuring discipline in the area of material production.

It needs to be noted that the political situation in the country is quite acute. Opposition forces speculate much about current difficulties although they propose nothing new. Some of them advocate “capitalization”, which our people would never do. The Soviet people support the idea of a transition to a regulated market, that is to a market which would open the way to efficient labor, enterprise, and initiative, while preserving social justice.

In my speech in the Odessa Military District I touched especially on those problems which worry our entire country today.¹⁷

NAJIBULLAH. I have carefully familiarized myself with your speech.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Now attempts by certain forces are being noted at using the discussion about means for fundamental reforms of the economic system to cancel everything that has been done up to this time. However it is clear that reliance on leftist radicalism and war communism has not stood the test of time and history. At the same time this does not quite mean that a conclusion follows from this about a

crisis of socialism. Our own rich, accumulated experience allows us to see the goals and continue moving with conviction toward a revolutionary renewal of society within the framework of the socialist choice we have made considering the achievements of world civilization, the Twentieth Century first and foremost.

The coming months will clarify much. Questions of the type “will the current leadership hold onto power?” are now already being tossed about, even in the newspapers. We are convinced power needs to be retained at whatever cost. If others came to power it would put the country through serious trials. For in this case a possible alternative is that matters would lead to a dictatorship.

I am confident that the choice we have made is the correct one. But we need to remove socioeconomic tension and bitterness as quickly as possible. That is why I have considered it necessary to cut short my rest in order to deal with all matters in real earnest.

Yesterday we discussed issues associated with economic reform, the transition to a market, and preparations for a union treaty with a group of comrades for six hours. Today, at the request of N. I. Ryzhkov, I have to meet with members of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. Right now approaches to solving the most immediate, medium-term, and long-term problems are being worked on.

As you see, our meeting takes place at a very difficult time. I want to note that we are churning our relations with Afghanistan quite a bit. With all our own difficulties we hold Afghanistan and the solution of the Afghan problem in our field of vision constantly for we view the fate of Afghanistan as a part, an important part, of *perestroika*.

As the development of events shows, in spite of all its efforts the Afghan opposition is not managing to secure the realization of its planned goals. Differences and internecine conflict in the enemy camp are intensifying. All attempts to unite its uncoordinated forces have ended unsuccessfully.

As far as I know the situation in your country as a whole is quiet and all primary transportation arteries are functioning. The leadership headed by the President and the government and Party bodies are working actively. In our view the holding of a Party congress and the adoption of decisions important for the fate of the country was a timely step. The renaming of the Party to “The Fatherland Party” symbolizes, it seems, its readiness both in policy and in practice to collaborate with all national forces.

All this confirms the analysis which we made together back in the fall of 1985 when *perestroika* was proclaimed. I want to especially note your personal service and great role in this context. It is also important to travel further on the planned path and not lose one’s bearings and give way to defeatist sentiments. I include both you and myself in this completely.

I know that you have already been informed of the results of Eh. A. Shevardnadze’s conversation with US Secretary of State J. Baker in Irkutsk.¹⁸ We have formed the opinion that the Americans are beginning to better understand the realities of present-day Afghanistan. Such a conclusion can

be drawn in particular from the fact that long ago they advanced a demand that President Najibullah renounce power as a preliminary condition for beginning an all-Afghan dialogue and starting the process of forming new bodies of power and holding elections. Now, such conditions are not raised, although President Najibullah himself has declared his readiness to renounce power for the sake of Afghanistan if, of course, the people want this.

The impression is being created that the Americans are actually concerned with the danger of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. They think, and they frankly say this, that the establishment today of fundamentalism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran would mean that tomorrow this phenomenon would encompass the entire Islamic world. And there are already symptoms of this, if you take Algeria for example.

But the Americans were and will remain Americans. And it would be naïve if one permitted the thought that we see only this side of their policy and do not notice other aspects. It is clear that the US is not opposed to fundamentalism becoming the banner of 40 million Soviet Muslims and creating difficulties for the Soviet Union. They object only to it affecting their own interests. The US also approaches East European issues in a similar fashion, trying to tie them to the West. Of course, they would also like to see the Soviet Union weakened.

As regards the process of a political settlement of the Afghan problem I note that the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] government is operating from active positions here both inside the country and in the international arena and trying to make the negotiations process more active.

In spite of our own difficulties and problems and all the changes inside the country we, of course, considering all of these circumstances, will continue the policy of supporting the Afghan leadership and developing cooperation with Afghanistan. I think that today we are right to talk about collaboration, keeping in mind existing opportunities you have for this.

Another position with regard to Afghanistan—if, let's say, the present Soviet government were to leave Afghanistan to its own fate—it would not be understood in our society, although, of course there are people who think otherwise. These are assorted populists, etc.

NAJIBULLAH. Chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin publicly came out for halting aid to Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Yeltsin speaks like “an old, broken record” always and everywhere. He has two themes in all: first, “the bad Center is guilty of everything” and second, “take everything in your own hands and do it yourselves”. In a word, a latter-day anarchist who, it is true, cannot be compared with [Russian revolutionary agitator and political writer Mikhail Aleksandrovich] Bakunin, an eminent figure of our history.

I will try to include Yeltsin in the real process of *perestroika* but I do not know whether this can be done.

Nevertheless, efforts in this direction continue because in the present conditions of our society the unresolved status of various problems, even such ones, also ricochets on the President. I think that either this phenomenon itself will go up in smoke or Yeltsin will be restructured and join the work. There should not and cannot be a place in politics for personal resentments and ambitions, especially when the fate of a country is being decided, although it needs to be admitted that affection and goodwill between its members have a certain importance for the effective workings of any leadership.

NAJIBULLAH. Before beginning an analysis of the military and political situation in Afghanistan permit me to cordially congratulate you, Mikhail Sergeevich, on your re-election as CC CPSU General Secretary. The Afghan people know you as their true friend, a consistent fighter for peace and security in the entire world, including in Afghanistan, and as an eminent political figure of modern times who enjoys the deserved respect both in the Soviet Union and among the world community.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Thank you for your congratulations.

I would like you in the course of the analysis of the military and political situation to also give your assessment of the changes in Pakistan's position after [Pakistani Prime Minister B[enazir] Bhutto was removed from power.¹⁹

NAJIBULLAH. As is well known, the Geneva Accords regarding Afghanistan are a good basis for achieving a political settlement and establishing peace in our country. But if Afghanistan and the USSR honestly observed the agreements which were reached, the other parties to the agreements have traveled another road. As a result the scale of aggression and interference in the affairs of Afghanistan has not decreased but has begun to increase.

In the process of facing armed pressure from the Afghan opposition independently the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] government has managed not only to frustrate their plans to seize power in the country but to demonstrate convincingly its vigor and vitality. Having suffered defeat in combat operations at the front the enemy made an attempt to undermine the Party and government from within and attain their goal by organizing a military coup. The failed plot of former Minister of Defense Sh[ahnawaz] Tanay was a link in a chain of military confrontation between the government and the extremist part of the opposition.²⁰

As a whole, the situation around the country is entirely satisfactory. Combat operations are being mainly waged in provinces bordering Pakistan and several other regions. However, as before, the enemy is subjecting Kabul and administrative centers to missile bombardment and artillery shelling. Nevertheless, the process of normalization of the situation is gaining strength. Particular evidence of this is that almost 2/3 of the field commanders have ceased armed combat.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Are they simply maintaining neutrality or are they participating in social, political, and economic

activity?

NAJIBULLAH. In crossing to the side of the government they join various armed formations or take part in peaceful activity.

Thanks to the aid of the Soviet Union we are managing to completely solve the problems of supplying the population with essentials at a satisfactory level and to maintain economic activity. Only recently as a result of the delay of Soviet deliveries have there arisen difficulties in the supply of fuel and grain. I am confident that these are temporary difficulties which will be soon eliminated with the aid of Soviet friends.

As regards the state of affairs among the Afghan opposition, it is characterized by a continuing exacerbation of differences among them, and a deepening of the split between the Alliance of Seven in Peshawar and the Shiite organizations based in Iran. We are trying to use this situation to expand our contacts with various opposition forces, in particular with Afghan emigrants in Europe and first of all with the circle of former King Zahir Shah.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The extremist part of the opposition, as far as is known, has a quite negative attitude toward Zahir Shah.

NAJIBULLAH. We think that in any case the extremists will not participate in a political settlement. Indecisiveness in combat operations against the government of Afghanistan and internal differences among the various groups of the opposition have led to even Pakistan becoming disappointed in their creation – the so-called “transitional government of Afghan mujaheddin”. All this is also increasingly influencing the mood of the Afghan refugees, who are beginning to more insistently demand their return home.

M. S. GORBACHEV. How many refugees are outside Afghanistan?

NAJIBULLAH. The total number of refugees is 5-5.5 million, including about 3 million in Pakistan, up to 1.5 million in Iran, and 1 million in other countries.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Part of the refugees will obviously not return to the country.

NAJIBULLAH. Of course, it's mainly the Afghan emigrants in Western countries who will not return. However the overwhelming majority of refugees live in exceptionally difficult conditions and therefore they will return home.

In a word, the situation is gradually developing in our favor. The RA government holds the political and military initiative in its hands which permits it in the final analysis to confidently count on the opposition entering into talks. We have traveled a considerable portion of the road. A small sector lies ahead, but it is the most difficult part.

It seems that the Americans understand the present-day

realities of Afghanistan well. As has become known, for example, a report by the Special US Representative to the Afghan Mujaheddin P[eter] Tomsen talks frankly about the inability of the opposition to achieve the goals it has set and about the stability of the government of Afghanistan. Moreover he proposed the US Congress hold off on refusing to support the mujaheddin, motivated by the fact that the Soviet Union, under pressure of their own domestic problems, will “be forced to cease aid to the Afghan government”.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The US would like to attain much else [by] exploiting our difficulties.

NAJIBULLAH. It is completely obvious today that we were forced to wage armed combat since the war was imposed on us by enemies. However, for all this, we remain adherents of the policy of national reconciliation and are taking diligent practical steps to implement it. It is sufficient in this connection to list those measures which have been implemented by the government in recent months, namely: the cancellation of the state of emergency; the formation of a new government headed by a figure unaffiliated with a party, F. Khalek'yar; the changes made to the country's Constitution; and a number of decisions directed at developing private enterprise, attracting foreign capital to the country, etc.

The second congress of the Party, held after a 26-year interval, renamed the PDPA the “Fatherland Party” and adopted a new party Program and Charter. The congress was held in an atmosphere of unity, glasnost, and democracy and confirmed that the overwhelming majority of Party members favor deepening the policy of reconciliation, and dialogue and collaboration with other political forces of society. But it needs to be admitted there are also others who are opponents of national accord. True, there are few of them, and they have no importance.

At the present time we are working actively on implementing decisions adopted by the Loya Jirga and the Party congress. Preparations are underway for a national referendum and elections will be organized in accordance with the results.

After Sh. Tanay's unsuccessful coup the state of affairs in the armed forces of Afghanistan improved notably. The morale and fighting spirit of the personnel are strengthening and coordination of activity between the three branches of the armed forces is increasing. In spite of all negative predictions in the spring and summer period Afghan troops carried out a number of successful operations in Jalalabad, in the Paghman District of Kabul Province, and in other regions. In the last four months the Towraghondi-Kandahar, Kabul-Gardez, and Kunduz-Takhar roads were again opened for transport traffic.

The government of the country, the capabilities of which are limited for well-known reasons, has begun to work actively.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Events have confirmed the correctness of the joint conclusion we reached about the need for such a

government in which prominent people unaffiliated with a party will work.

NAJIBULLAH. Of the membership of the current government 17 were educated in Western countries, two in Egypt, one in Turkey, and six in the Soviet Union. I think that even US President George H.W. Bush could not suggest a better government make-up for Afghanistan.

M. S. GORBACHEV. A good argument which Eh. A. Shevardnadze will be able to use in subsequent conversations with the Americans. Actually, whom could they suggest? Hekmatyar?

By the way, how is the institution [*institut*] of governors working?

NAJIBULLAH. Quite effectively. Moreover, we have started to expand their authority. In a number of cases the administrative and territorial division was reexamined and new administrative units were created in order that the governor be first of all acceptable to the population which lives in this territory.

Returning to the theme of the work of the government I will note that without the aid of the Soviet Union it would scarcely have been able to deal with the problems facing the country. I will say openly that voices are heard ever more frequently in Afghanistan that supposedly President Najibullah and the Party say they are in favor of a coalition but in fact are not interested in one. In this regard a reason is advanced as an argument that when the government was formed by the Party its activity was provided every manner of support. However as soon as the government was headed by an unaffiliated person it encountered enormous difficulties in its work.

If we glance at the history of relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union then we will again be convinced that they are based on the firm foundation laid by V. I. Lenin and Emir Amanullah and have deep roots. Even in the difficult years of the Civil War Soviet Russia gave Afghanistan aid after they restored their independence. In turn, Afghanistan helped the Soviet Union in the '20s and '30s in the fight against basmachestvo²¹ and in the Second World War they did not permit their territory to be turned into a springboard for fascist aggression against the Soviet people.

From the middle of the '50s Soviet-Afghan collaboration actively developed in an increasing direction. Many in Afghanistan really saw and felt that the preservation and deepening of good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union had great importance for the future of our country. From that time they tied themselves to the Soviet people forever with bonds of friendship and sympathy.

After the 1978 April [Saur] Revolution and especially in the years that Soviet troops were in Afghanistan our countries reached an exceptionally high level of cooperation and collaboration. And although the leaders of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan have courageously recognized the errors of the decision to deploy Soviet troops, a considerable part of

the Afghan public nevertheless remains devoted to the ideals of friendship with the USSR and, as before, associates their aspirations with your country. In the conditions of a difficult military and political situation in Afghanistan when there is no longer support from Soviet troops, they closely follow how the attitude in the Soviet Union is developing at the present time toward events occurring in Afghanistan.

Obviously these people represent a considerable force in present-day Afghanistan and are right to think that the Soviet Union bears a certain moral responsibility that its loyal friends be secured a fitting place in the future structures of state power in Afghanistan. Naturally, certain biased assessments of Afghan events recently appearing in the Soviet Union cannot fail to concern your friends, against whom similar statements are being used.

I am convinced that past mistakes should in no account overshadow the reality and the actual state of affairs, which is more and more developing in favor of the RA government. The government of Afghanistan is acting aggressively and in solidarity and holds the political and military initiative against a background of various collapsing opposition alliances. We think that in the next two-three years we will be able to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the cause of complete normalization of the situation in the country. The Afghan government firmly intends to go forward along the path of political settlement and national reconciliation but it will be practically impossible to realize these goals without the support and aid of the Soviet Union.

As it seems, our enemies - the Afghan opposition, Pakistan, and the US - have still not shown their cards to the end. I agree with you that they are interested in strengthening the positions of Islamic fundamentalism not only among the peoples of Soviet Central Asia but among all Soviet Muslims. Equivalent retaliatory actions will be required to disrupt similar plans and here, in our view, the interests of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan closely overlap.

I have prepared several ideas regarding the further development of bilateral economic collaboration and a number of specific requests for aid for the remainder of 1990 and in 1991. If you agree I could discuss these issues in detail with N. I. Ryzhkov or [USSR Minister of Shipbuilding] I[gor] S. Belousov.

In recent years the Soviet Union has invested many men and much material in Afghanistan and made considerable sacrifices for the Afghan people. Therefore to refuse Afghanistan aid right now, as some figures in the Soviet Union propose, would be a betrayal of those who fought in Afghanistan who have done so much in the name of our friendship, including warriors who are still captives of the Afghan armed opposition.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Neither the past, nor the future of Afghanistan gives anyone the right to approach such issues superficially, on impulse, and deprive the Afghan people of the opportunity to fight for a new Afghanistan. It is also impossible to disregard the common border of almost 2,500 km. between our countries.

NAJIBULLAH. I repeat the idea I told you, that the present economic difficulties of the Soviet Union are the problems of a transitional period and problems of growth. I am confident that the efforts of the Soviet leadership in the very near future will turn the development of the situation around in the direction of an improvement.

As regards Afghanistan, then we are already prepared for mutually beneficial collaboration with the Soviet Union, although in insignificant amounts for the time being. In no way are we interested in the Afghan people being perceived simply as a consumer and nothing more. And, all the same, for the next two-three years the development of the situation in Afghanistan will as before depend to a large degree on your policy.

Some words about Pakistan. As is well known, Pakistan is an artificially created country within whose boundaries they have tried to create a single nation on a common religious basis.

M. S. GORBACHEV. R. Gandhi, too, gave such an assessment.

NAJIBULLAH. Pakistan can be compared to a boiling kettle which is full of various contradictions and antagonisms – religious, national, and ethnic. In order to keep this “kettle” from exploding Pakistani leaders are trying to let off the “steam” of public dissatisfaction, diverting the attention of their people to problems of an external nature. At one time it seized upon the Afghan problem eagerly and actively heated it up. At the present time the Kashmir issue has become a safety valve.

For decades the military has decided and dictated the policy of Pakistan. And even after B. Bhutto came to power the policy of the Pakistani administration regarding Afghanistan remained unchanged: it was only sort of dressed “in civilian clothes.” Nevertheless, right now when Pakistan is allied [*zaangazhirovan*] with Saudi Arabia in connection with the conflict in the Persian Gulf and when Pakistani-Indian relations have sharply heated up, it’s evidently possible to expect some slackening of attention by Pakistan toward the Afghan problem.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you, Mikhail Sergeevich, for the constant attention to Afghanistan and the support and aid which the Soviet leadership and all the Soviet people are giving us in our efforts to achieve peace and stop the war in Afghanistan.

Everything that I said about the importance of Soviet assistance to those Afghan forces which have tied their fate to Afghan-Soviet friendship in no way means that I am concerned about my personal well-being. I assure you that I am ready to sacrifice not only my post but even my life in the interests of Afghanistan and the interests of our friendship.

M. S. GORBACHEV. The truth is that neither President Najibullah nor Gorbachev need much. The main thing are the interests of our peoples and governments.

I thank you for the interesting and well-reasoned analy-

sis of the military and political situation in Afghanistan. I follow the development of events in Afghanistan closely but I consider it quite useful to supplement and deepen my impressions with the view of the Afghan leadership.

I completely share your ideas about the interests of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union coinciding in strategic terms. I add to this that during the ten years of close collaboration our countries have experienced a drama together and sealed the bonds connecting the peoples of the two countries with blood. The duty of the Afghan and Soviet leaderships is to protect and develop the good traditions of relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan based on the coinciding interests and existing foundations of friendship. These should determine the specific content of our policy and its application.

Indeed, in present conditions the aid of the Soviet Union to your country can and should have another nature and be implemented in a different scale. In this context we note your statements about the possibilities of giving bilateral collaboration a mutually beneficial character. Obviously we need to move forward in this direction. In a word, there are all the prerequisites for continuing collaboration between our countries, helping Afghanistan finish the great cause it has begun there and preserve the long-standing friendship between the Soviet and Afghan peoples in the future. I stress again – we are not in favor of a discontinuance but in a normal development of relations.

In this connection I welcome your desire to meet with I. S. Belousov with whom you can discuss specific issues of Soviet-Afghan collaboration.

We will also continue our support in terms of advancing a peaceful settlement of the situation in and around Afghanistan. This is urgently needed so that the cause to which we have given so much is successfully concluded in the interests of our countries.

EH. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Cde. Najibullah, we would like to suggest to you that you speak on national television or meet with representatives of the Soviet press. I think that such a speech of yours would be useful, considering the great interest in Afghanistan in our country.

NAJIBULLAH. I will use this opportunity with pleasure.

EH. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Cde. Najibullah, in connection with your upcoming visit to India we think it important that you try to bring the Indians to some specific agreements, for example, in the area of economics.

NAJIBULLAH. I agree with your ideas, although to be sure, I think that it will be difficult to do this. The Indian side, proceeding from their own interests in connection with Kashmir, is stubbornly trying to involve Afghanistan in opposing Pakistan but it is not trying very eagerly to give specific support to settling the Afghan problem.

M. S. GORBACHEV. Concluding our conversation I would

like to note that the exchange of opinions was exceptionally useful, in my view. The main thing is that we wound our political clocks, figuratively speaking.

I wish you success in your work for the good of the Afghan people.

NOTES

¹ *Editor's note:* Excerpts from this meeting have been previously published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 178-181; and Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), pp. 89-90.

² King Mohammad Zahir Shah abdicated in August 1973 and had since lived in Italy.

³ Also spelled mujahedin, mujahedeen, or mujahidin.

⁴ *Editor's note:* A slightly different version of these notes have appeared in *Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev*, translated and edited by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), pp. 89-90.

⁵ *Editor's note:* a waqf is a religious endowment

⁶ Also spelled Hikmatyar.

⁷ On 18 October 1987, Yunus Khalis [Khaless] was elected spokesman of the seven-party mujaheddin alliance.

⁸ Several rounds of UN-sponsored talks on Afghanistan between Pakistani and Afghan officials had taken place in Geneva since June 1982. The tenth round of the negotiations opened in Geneva on 26 February 1987.

⁹ George P. Shultz visited Moscow (as well as Kiev, and Tbilisi) on 21-24 April 1988 to discuss preparations for the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting in May.

¹⁰ On 8 February 1988, in a statement that was read by a broadcaster over national television interrupting regular broadcasting, Gorbachev announced that Soviet troops would begin pulling out of Afghanistan on 15 May if a settlement could be reached two

months before that date, and that a withdrawal would be complete no more than ten months after it started. See Philip Taubman, "Soviet Sets May 15 as Goal to Start Afghanistan Exit," *New York Times*, 9 February 1988, pg. A1. For the full text of Gorbachev's statement, see *ibid.*, pg. A14.

¹¹ On 12 November 1893 Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary to the government of India, and Amir Abdur (Abdul) Rahman signed an agreement in Kabul that defined the borderline between Afghanistan and then British India. In 1979 the Afghan parliament repudiated the Durand Agreement.

¹² In early 1988, ethnic disturbances and unrest occurred in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

¹³ The Nineteenth Party Congress took place in Moscow from 28 June to 1 July 1988. On the importance of the Congress, see Archive Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chapter 6.

¹⁴ Najibullah addressed the UN General Assembly on 7 June 1988. Najibullah warned that continued violations by Pakistan of the Geneva accord on Afghanistan could force a delay in the agreed timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal. See *The Washington Post*, 8 June 1988, p. A22.

¹⁵ Gilani [Gailani] became spokesman for the seven-member mujaheddin alliance on 15 June 1988.

¹⁶ Muhammad Hassan Sharq was appointed Prime Minister on 26 May 1988, replacing Sultan Ali Keshtmand, who became secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. See Ludwig A. Adamec, *Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions and Insurgencies* (London: the Scarecrow Press, 1996), p. 305.

¹⁷ Gorbachev gave a speech in the Odessa military district on 17 August 1990.

¹⁸ The meeting between Shevardnadze and Baker took place from 31 July – 2 August 1990 in Irkutsk.

¹⁹ Benazir Bhutto was forced to resign in August 1990.

²⁰ In 6 March 1990 Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Shahnawaz Tanay, with the alleged support of the air force and some divisions of the army, leads an unsuccessful coup attempt against Najibullah's government.

²¹ "Basmachestvo" is the term for the anti-Soviet nationalist movement against Soviet rule in Central Asia during this period.

New Documents Released: "China and the Warsaw Pact in the 1970-1980s" Document Reader for the International Seminar 24-26 March 2004, Beijing/China

Documents have been obtained by Parallel History Project (PHP) associates Oldrich Tuma from former Czechoslovak archives, and Mihail Ionescu from Romanian archives, and Senior CWIHP Scholar Bernd Schäfer from former East German archives, in preparation for the International Seminar on "China and the Warsaw Pact in the 1970-1980s," to be hosted on 24-26 March 2004 in Beijing.

The seminar will be co-sponsored by the Modern History Research Center and Archives and the School of International Relations, both at Peking University, and the Center for Archival Studies of the Institute for the Study of the History of the Communist Party of China.

The documents are available in facsimile on the Parallel History Project website, (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php>) and the Cold War International History Project website (<http://cwihip.si.edu>). English translations of some of the documents have been provided by Karen Riechert, through the CWIHP, and by Viorel Nicolae Buta through the PHP.

KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82

By Vasilii Mitrokhin

*[Editor's Note: The following materials were presented by former KGB archivist Vasilii Mitrokhin to the participants of the April 2002 CWIHP conference "Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989." (See Section introduction above.) Mitrokhin, who became known in the West in 1999 when he co-authored with Christopher Andrew *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB*,¹ brought with him six cases of notes when he defected to Britain in 1992. In these cases were the details of the operations of the KGB and other Soviet intelligence gathering organizations going back to 1918. The 1999 volume provided an overview of some of these materials regarding operations in the United States and Western Europe. In early 2002, CWIHP published Mitrokhin's *The KGB in Afghanistan* (edited by Christian Ostermann and Odd Arne Westad) as Working Paper No. 40, written after he retired from the KGB in 1984.² (Mitrokhin revised and rewrote the Afghanistan manuscript in 1986-87; then destroyed the original notes.) Mitrokhin's compilation on Soviet "active measures" in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for the Afghanistan conference.*

Most of the materials Mitrokhin brought to the West consist of notes which he had carefully assembled over several years while working in the archives of the KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) in Yasenovo outside Moscow. Mitrokhin had moved from the operational side of the FCD to its archives in late 1956, where it was his job to respond to requests by other departments. Influenced by the harsh suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 and the dissident movement—all of which he could follow through the files he administered as well as Western records—Mitrokhin became increasingly disaffected with the KGB. By the early seventies he had decided to compile his own account of the KGB's foreign operations, a project that became feasible when he was put in charge in 1972 of the movement of the FCD archives from the KGB's headquarters at Lubyanka in central Moscow to Yasenevo southwest of the capital Moscow.³ In charge of checking, compiling, and indexing the records in the process of the transfer, which began in 1974, Mitrokhin soon conceived of the idea to create his own archive. Starting in 1977, he used every opportunity to take notes of the documents he saw. Proceeding in complete secrecy, he first took these notes in longhand while working in the archives and later, once safely in his dacha, sorted and transcribed them.⁴

Vasilii Mitrokhin, who passed away in January 2004, would be the first to point out that his notes captured only a small part of the totality of documents; his decade-long work in the archive was a "massive filtering exercise," with a flood of documents coming through his hands on a daily basis. The documents he saw were mostly informational cables from the First Directorate to the Politburo and Foreign Ministry, a copy of which went to the archives after a month. By no means is this manuscript therefore a complete record. Though the materials provided earlier by Mitrokhin seem to fit with available documents from other archives,⁵ historians and others will continue to assess the significance and authenticity of these materials until the original notes become fully accessible. Mitrokhin's notes on the original documents are clearly not the same as original documents (or copies thereof), but, short of full access to the the archives of the former KGB and other Soviet intelligence agencies, they will remain one of our most intriguing and valuable sources on Soviet intelligence operations.—Christian F. Ostermann]

A

The intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked sharp protests from the world community. The KGB took various measures, including some involving disinformation, to neutralize the negative response and distract attention from the activities of the USSR and its forces in Afghanistan.

The KGB devised a doctrine according to which the choice of means to combat the adversary did not depend on the KGB but was dictated by necessity, by the adversary's conduct; therefore any KGB activities were supposedly legitimate and justified.

[“]Disinformation is regarded as one of the instruments

of CPSU policy; it is an integral, indispensable, and secret element of intelligence work. It not only serves the interests of our own people but also those of working people throughout the world; it represents one of the forms of international assistance to progressive mankind and is radically different in essence from the disinformation to which Western agencies resort in order to deceive public opinion. KGB disinformation operations are progressive; they are designed to mislead, not the working people but their enemies - the ruling circles of capitalism, in order to induce them to act in a certain way, or abstain from actions contrary to the interests of the USSR; they promote peace and social progress; they serve international détente; they are humane, creating the conditions for the noble struggle for humanity's bright fu-

ture.[”]

[“]The main value of all Active Measures lies in the fact that it is difficult to check the veracity of the information conveyed and to identify the real source. Their effectiveness is expressed as a coefficient of utility, when minimum expenditure and effort achieves maximum end results. Forms of disinformation basically fall into three groups—documentary (written); non-documentary (oral); demonstrative.[”]

[“]In KGB Residencies, the Residents are personally responsible for work relating to Active Measures. In large residencies, Active Measures constitute an autonomous direction of intelligence work; specialists in this kind of work are assigned to it. The KGB Chairman’s Order No 0066 of 12 April 1982 required all FCD [First Chief Directorate] departments and personnel to participate in devising and carrying out Active Measures; young officers were to be given a taste for such work; Active Measures were to be regarded as one of the basic forms of intelligence activity. Officers of Service A were to display initiative and ability to act independently when solving both simple and complex questions. Anyone who had to be told day by day what he was to do was unsuitable for this kind of work.[”]

B

In February 1980, Andropov approved a KGB plan of action relating to Pakistan which specified the following:

1. Through KGB SCD [Second Chief Directorate] assets, a warning is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission in Moscow to the effect that if a sensible line does not prevail in [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul Haq’s political course, and Pakistan agrees under pressure from the US and China to turn its territory into a base for permanent armed struggle against Afghanistan, the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences will be instructed to study ways of exploiting the Baluchi⁶ and Pushtun⁷ movements in Pakistan, as well as internal opposition to the country’s military regime, in the interests of the security of the frontiers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
2. Using operational-technical means, 500 copies of leaflets produced at the Center are to be disseminated in Islamabad and Karachi; some of these, issued in the name of a group of Pakistani Army officers, sharply criticize the government’s internal and external policy, which is leading to a constant deterioration of the country’s material situation.
3. Three hundred leaflets codenamed ‘SARDAR’ are to be produced, demonstrating to the administration that there is extreme dissatisfaction with its policy in public and military circles.
4. Information is to be planted in the local press in Pakistan to the effect that the ruling regime is artificially whipping up the atmosphere relating to events in Afghanistan with the object of building up the Pakistani Army,

further increasing its influence in the country, and maintaining the ban on the activities of political parties and organisation for an indefinite period.

5. In Bangkok, information is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission to the effect that within the Carter Administration there are doubts about the utility of further increases in military assistance to Pakistan, given the Zia-ul Haq regime’s unpopularity in the country. [US] Secretary of State [Cyrus] Vance and his assistants consider that, in order to avert another major failure of US foreign policy, it is imperative to seek to replace the dictatorship with another regime which would guarantee stability in Pakistan.

6. In India, information is to be conveyed to Prime Minister Gandhi to the effect that Pakistan is not satisfied with the insignificant scope of American military assistance and the condition imposed on it to abstain from exploding a nuclear device while the American assistance program is in force. The leaders of Pakistan intend to continue to whip up hysteria over the events in Afghanistan in order to obtain a significant increase in military assistance from the US and the lifting of restrictions on the development of the nuclear program.

7. Through the UN leadership, information is to be conveyed to representatives of Iran to the effect that, in return for growing military assistance to Pakistan, the US is seeking to be granted military bases on Pakistani territory, including in Baluchistan, in close proximity to the Iranian frontier. The leaders of Pakistan are inclined to make concessions to the Americans on this issue.

8. In various circles in member countries of the Non-aligned Movement steps are to be taken to discredit Pakistan’s foreign policy, emphasizing that it has breached the basic principles of the Non-aligned Movement, as the leaders of Pakistan have allowed the US and China, two of the great powers, to turn the country into an instrument of their policy in Asia.

9. In India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, Jordan, Italy and France, there is to be continued publication of materials about the direct involvement of the Pakistani special services and military servicemen in organizing armed interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.[”]

On 2 September 1980, [KGB chief Vladimir] Kryuchkov approved an extension of the above plan. A Working Group was set up under the Deputy Head of the KGB FCD, V.A. Chukhrov, with representatives from Directorates K and RT, Service 1 and Service A, and Departments 8, 17 and 20. The Group was tasked to devise complex agent measures, coordinate the joint actions of all FCD Sections, and monitor implementation. The Head of the Third Department of Service A, Colonel Yu. V Rykhlov, coordinated and concerted the implementation of Active Measures, as a member of the Chukhrov Working Group.

In February 1981, the Working Group devised a wide-ranging operational plan code-named ‘TORKHAM.’ This was

to be carried out in various countries, in accordance with individual plans which included the following elements: compromise the Zia-ul Haq regime; weaken the positions of the US and China in Pakistan; exacerbate relations with Iran; intensify and deepen disagreements between India and Pakistan on existing disputed issues; inspire new irritants in Indo-Pakistan relations; reinforce the antipathy and suspicion felt by Indira Gandhi and other Indian leaders towards Zia-ul Haq personally; compromise him in the eyes of the Muslims of India and other countries in the world; induce the government of India to seek to secure the end of Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels; step up the activities of Pakistani émigrés and of the nationalist movement, particularly in Baluchistan; disrupt Afghan émigré organizations; intensify the local population's hostility towards Afghan refugees.

Information was to be conveyed to India and Iran to the effect that by building up its military potential Pakistan was in fact preparing for aggression not only against Afghanistan, but also against India and Iran. India was to be told that Zia-ul Haq was giving Afghan refugees an anti-Indian outlook and using Afghan emissaries to conduct activities favorable to Pakistan in India. The plan also provided for intensified anti-Pakistan propaganda directed at India and other countries abroad, and the setting up of a Committee for the return to India of the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir. Disinformation was to be conveyed to Gandhi on joint operations by the US, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China to destabilize the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

In Bangladesh, the aim was to impede actions by the Zia-ur Rakhman regime in support of the Afghan counter-revolution, and to intensify disagreements between Bangladesh and Pakistan on such disputed issues as the repatriation of Pakistani citizens, the division of banking assets and so on, and the responsibility of Pakistan's ruling circles for the economic backwardness of Bangladesh.

The aim was to impede the activities of the US, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China relating to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In 1981-82, the following Active Measures were envisaged within the framework of the 'TORKHAM' operation:

[“]I

- Produce a leaflet in Urdu sharply criticizing the Pakistan regime and its cooperation with the US, from the standpoint of local religious (Shiite) circles. Implicate the Iranian authorities in the production of the leaflet by including in the text appropriate comments by Khomeini about Zia-ul Haq. Implementation: posting the leaflet to various establishments, newspapers and foreign missions in Islamabad, and scattering copies in Karachi.
- In the name of a fictitious grouping in the Pakistani armed forces, disseminate leaflets (in English, as part of the 'SARDAR' series) from which it could be concluded that there is growing dissatisfaction among the military about Zia-ul Haq's policy of redirecting Pakistan towards conflict with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

and India, and subordinating the country to foreign interests—those of the US and China. These leaflets to be disseminated in Islamabad and Karachi.

- Using available models, produce a 'personal letter' from Pakistan's Home Affairs Minister, Mahmud Harun, who represents the Shiite minority in the government, to the Iranian leader, Imam Khomeini. Indicate in the letter that Zia-ul Haq intends to take severe new measures to restrict the activity of Shiites in Pakistan, and that they [the Shiites] appeal to their Iranian brethren for help to avert this threat. Send a photocopy of the letter, with a covering note from 'a well wisher' to one of the leaders of Pakistan's military special service.
- Complete the elaboration of proposals for exploiting the separatist movement of Pakistani Baluchis and Pakistani opposition forces located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
- Place compromising material in the press of various countries.[“]

[“]II

- Promote by all means an intensification of the Pakistani population's hostility towards Afghan refugees and the disruption of the Afghan emigration in Pakistan.
- Disseminate disinformation in the Pakistani community to the effect that in reality the Zia-ul Haq regime is not seeking to solve the Afghan refugee problem and would like to turn it into a permanent feature. The presence of refugees from the DRA gives the government the possibility of obtaining substantial material assistance, isolating the Baluchi and Pushtun nationalist movement and increasing the severity of the central authorities' control in districts where they mainly located.
- Convey information to Pakistani government and journalistic circles to the effect that some leaders of the Afghan emigration, such as [radical Islamist mujaheddin (Hizb-i Islami) leader] G[ulbuddin] Hekmatyar and N. Mohammad, who seek to keep Pushtun tribes under their influence, are promising to help them to set up an independent Pushtunistan on the territory of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Convey information to the Pakistani special services to the effect that a significant portion of the weapons reaching the Afghan refugees is sold on to activists and officials of opposition political parties who have established permanent undeclared contact with leading personalities within the Afghan counter-revolutionary emigration in Pakistan.
- Through the country's press, disseminate information about growing disagreements among the leaders of Afghan emigration in Pakistan, their dissatisfaction with the Zia-ul Haq administration, and their attempts to develop cooperation with the special services of the US, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, out of the Pakistani authorities' control.

- To disrupt the Afghan emigration, make use of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]’s special services, with the help of the Afghans themselves. [”]

[“] III

- Carry out Active Measures to expose cooperation between Washington, Peking, and the Zia-ul Haq regime in connection with the development of Pakistan’s own atomic weapon.
- Convey information to India, Bangladesh, and other countries with the object of inducing them to take actions favorable to the USSR. Some measures [are] to be carried out jointly with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
- Convey information to the press of Asian countries, in Dhaka, Delhi, Colombo, and to Pakistani missions in these places, to the effect that the expansion of military cooperation between Pakistan and the US will inevitably entail the establishment of US military bases on Pakistan territory, the influx of military advisers, and the arrival of American ships in Pakistan harbors, all of which can undermine Pakistan’s relations with Islamic and non-aligned countries and further incline the USSR, India, and Iraq against Pakistan, and these can give active support to forces opposed to the Zia-ul Haq regime.
- Through the possibilities of India and of the UN Secretary [General], convey information to the US to the effect that the Reagan administration’s plans to expand military and other assistance to Pakistan will provoke an extremely negative reaction within the democratic opposition to the Zia-ul Haq regime. If the precarious Zia-ul Haq dictatorship is overthrown, the US would be faced with rising anti-American feelings in that country on the same scale as in Iran.
- Through the Hungarians, convey information to NATO weakness of the Zia-ul Haq regime, the growing strength of the opposition, including in the Pakistan Army, and the instability of the situation in the country.
- In Dhaka, inspire parliamentary questions and speeches, declarations by public and political personalities and leaders of the main opposition parties, urging the government to display caution when solving the problem of ‘Bihari’ repatriation and to facilitate the dispatch of a UN mediation commission to Bangladesh with the object persuading Pakistan to repatriate Pakistani citizens most urgently and getting the Zia-ul Haq administration to use the funds provided by Saudi Arabia for the proper purpose, and not for backing the Afghan counter-revolution.
- In Delhi, convey information to the effect that the US and NATO have plans to set up an anti-Indian alliance in South Asia in which Pakistan would plan a key role. Western countries are not only strengthening Pakistan’s military might but also encouraging its subversive activity against India and inciting it to inflame disputes be-

tween Hindus and Muslims, as well as the Sikh aspiration to set up an independent Khalsalistan.

- In Dhaka, convey slanted information to Indian diplomats about the Pakistani leadership’s aggressive intentions against India, the junta’s strategic plans, aroused by the practical actions of the US and the People’s Republic of China which aim to weaken India’s positions in the subcontinent in every way and rapidly build up Pakistan’s military potential.
- In Tehran, regularly supply the Iranian leadership with disinformation about Pakistan’s use of Afghan émigrés to pass arms to Baluchistan and Arab separatists in Iran and to instigate mass disorders and anti-government incidents in the provinces of Khuzestan [in Southwestern Iran], Sistan [in Eastern Iran] and Baluchistan.[”]
- In March 1981, in addition to the above ‘TORKHAM’ plan of action, a plan code-named ‘GVADAR’ [Gwadar] was devised with the object of exploiting the Baluchi problem to influence the policy of Pakistan. The Deputy Head of Service A of the FCD, Colonel M. A. Krapivin, was responsible for carrying out this plan.

‘GVADAR’ specified the following:

- [“] Through the KGB Residencies in Islamabad and Karachi and the Afghan special services, supply slanted information to Baluchi leaders about the Pakistani authorities’ intention to legalize the presence of Afghan refugees on the territory of Baluchistan, giving them the right to erect permanent dwellings and to use the pasture lands to put out their animals to graze.
- Prompt some Baluchi groups to engage in armed clashes with Afghan armed detachments.
- Examine the expediency of making and maintaining contacts with representatives of the Baluchi emigration to Europe, in order to ascertain the situation within the Baluchi movement, exerting influence on it, and giving the impression that the USSR intends to give broad assistance to this movement.
- Consider the expediency and technical possibility of setting up a radio station in Afghanistan which, in the name of the Baluchis, would call on the population of Baluchistan to fight for the establishment of an autonomous state.
- Through the Afghans, carry out a series of leaflet operations designed to exacerbate relations between the population of Baluchistan and the Afghan refugees.
- Convey slanted information to Pakistani leaders about the US’s intentions and specific actions to exploit the Baluchi problem to put pressure on the Zia-ul Haq government in order to secure the further use of Pakistan as a stronghold for organizing the undeclared war against Afghanistan.

- Carry out disinformation operations about the CIA's contacts with individual Baluchi leaders, including some who had emigrated, either directly or through political figures such as [probably Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur] Bakhtiar and [Former Iranian General Gholam Ali] Oveisi [Oveissi]. For the sake of credibility, compile and send out letters ostensibly from Baluchis to the Pakistan Embassy in the US and some countries in Asia, containing threats against Zia-ul Haq and other military and state personalities in Pakistan. It would be clear from this that the Baluchi leaders are receiving support and financial assistance from the American authorities and special services in pursuit of the idea of establishing an independent Baluchistan.
- Convey slanted information to the Iranian leadership on the Americans' intentions and specific actions, including those of agents recruited by the Americans through SAVAK [the Iranian Intelligence Agency], designed to detach Iranian Baluchistan from Iran and, by arrangement with the Pakistani authorities, set up an autonomous united Baluchistan within Pakistan.
- Convey information to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo, citing the Libyan leadership, to the effect that the leaders of the Pakistani Baluchis have asked Libya for assistance in the struggle to set up an autonomous state, and that senior Libyan officials are studying the request. A Baluchi armed action against the central government of Pakistan can only be averted by democratization of the country's life and repatriation of the Afghan refugees in Baluchistan.
- Consider jointly with the Afghans how to incite the Baluchis to engage in antigovernment actions, and what assistance should be given.
- Convey information to [Palestinian Liberation Organization leader] Yasser Arafat and to the press of various countries to the effect that the US uses Pakistan to deflect the Muslim countries' anger at Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and to undermine their unity on this issue. If an emergency Conference of Islamic States were convened, the Americans have given Pakistan the task of again drawing the Conference's attention to the Afghan question, thereby wrecking the adoption of resolutions on Jerusalem that are unwelcome to the US and Israel.[?]

The Chukhrov Working Group also considered the question of creating a new irritant—the problem of setting up an Azad-Kashmir independent of Pakistan and India, and the notional formation of a Free Baluchistan government-in-exile in Afghanistan. But in view of the extreme complexity and uncertainty of many aspects of the situation, this question was postponed indefinitely.

Many other measures of this kind were devised and the conditions were created for strengthening and consolidating Pakistan's democratic forces. Work was in hand with representatives of the People's Party of Pakistan, of the Tekhrik-i-Istikhlal Party, of all factions of the Muslim League, of the

Mussavat Party, the National Democracy Party, the Pakistan National Party and other national-patriotic forces in the country.

The possibilities of all KGB elements and Residencies, and of the KGBs of Kirgizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Azerbaijan were mobilized to conduct Active Measures.

C

Many Active Measure pieces on various themes were placed in the periodical 'NIVA,' published in Islamabad, which was controlled by the KGB Residency.

In 1980, 239 articles based on Service A themes were placed; in the first half of 1981, the total was 216 articles. When commenting on the situation in Afghanistan and on Pakistani-Afghan relations, the periodical occasionally slipped into anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan criticism. Issue No 10, quoting the press of the US, included Zia-ul Haq's statement that the USSR was seeking to break through to the Persian Gulf and to twist Pakistan's arm. Issue No. 46 reprinted a 'Novai Vakt' article which criticized people who regard the Soviet Army as a friend and liberator, and scared them and all left-wingers with the idea that the Soviet Army would spare neither them nor their families.

In 1981, much of the material in the periodical dealt with the Conference of the Non-aligned Countries and the UN on Afghanistan.

In 1980, the KR line in Pakistan carried out 12 Active Measures, including some to compromise 'LEO' and some involving the distribution of posters about the CIA. Use was made of a journey to Baluchistan by a US State Department official, the Consul in Karachi, and 'LEO,' where they supposedly had meetings with pro-separatist political leaders of that province. It was from there that the Americans organized the struggle against revolutionary reforms in neighboring Iran, promising in return to help that province to achieve autonomy.

A brief item in a local newspaper reporting that a policeman had stopped the motorcar of a member of the American Embassy was transformed by Chekist scribes into an incident of smuggling by the Americans and confirmation of their link with Pushtunist separatists.

At that time also, a scheme was devised to carry out an Active Measure through the 'loss' of a wallet belonging to a Secretary in the Political Section of the American Embassy. The wallet contained 'documents' of an anti-Pakistan nature. It was supposedly 'found' by a Pakistani in a public place and handed to a policeman. On 5 April 1980, the KGB-controlled 'Patriot' newspaper in Delhi published an article under the heading: 'The American cloak and dagger agency's war against Zia-ul Haq.' This mentioned the CIA's involvement in an anti-government officers plot.

On 4 April 1981, the same newspaper published an item headed 'Mutiny in Pakistani units: 7 executed'. This described disorders in regular Pakistani forces stationed in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Karachi barracks. Contrary to the expectations of Service A of the KGB FCD, no news agency apart from

TASS reacted to this disinformation.

On 6 July 1981, a Soviet scholar and orientalist who was a KGB agent had a meeting with the Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR. In a confidential conversation, he passed on the views of the competent agencies about the reaction of ruling and academic circles to the visit of Aga Shah, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to the US. Particular emphasis was given to the theme that the US assisted the Afghan rebels with arms sent through Pakistan; these arms were used not only to kill Afghans but also to kill Soviet citizens; the USSR would be forced, not to reduce, but instead to increase the scale of its military assistance. If Pakistan continued to act as an accomplice of American plans, particularly relating to the situation in Asia, the Soviet side would be unable to stand by idly in the face of such developments. The Charge defended the actions of his government, citing the impossibility of controlling the situation and activities in the Pushtun tribal areas.

"What are we to do?" asked the Chargé.

"I am not authorized and I cannot take decisions for the government of Pakistan, but I should like to draw attention to the matter so that you might give serious thought to the substance of our talk" the agent replied.

"But this is escalation of tensions!" the Chargé exclaimed.

"But is handing over American weapons to the bandits in order to kill Soviet citizens not escalation? Pakistan is being turned into the main base of bandit formations and the channel for the supply of arms! And the Soviet Union is to stand by quietly and watch this happen?" the agent objected.

The chargé concluded: "This information is important. Although I am reluctant to do so, I am compelled to report it to Islamabad."

When giving false information about Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan to the Iranian leadership, the Cheka⁸ sought to convince the latter that if elements closely linked to the Americans came to power in Afghanistan, the Americans, in the course of their struggle with Khomeini, would actively use his own weapon - Islam - against him. He should therefore pay attention to the subversive activities of the real enemies of the new regime, namely the West and neighboring Arab countries.

In order to exacerbate Iranian-Pakistani relations and develop the Iranians' negative attitude towards Afghan emigration, use was made of information that, with the support and agreement of the local authorities, the CIA had set up special bases in Oman and in Pakistan to train armed formations and to send them into Iran to carry out counter-revolutionary and sabotage operations against the new regime. The training was conducted by CIA officers, former SAVAK agents and officers, and Afghan émigré organizations in Pakistan.

On 10 November 1980, an Iranian Parliamentary Deputy from the town of Zahedan [in southeastern Iran], made a speech in Parliament exposing the hostile activities of Pakistan, Oman and 'other puppet states in the region' against the Islamic Republic of Iran. He referred to facts in his pos-

session relating to 'the secret involvement of statesmen from so-called friendly Pakistan' in subversive actions against the Islamic regime. The deputy used KGB briefing for his speech and emphasized the part played by Afghan emigration in subversive activities from the territory of He urged the Iranian government to take steps to put a stop to such activities and to define the status of the Afghans on Iranian soil, as they are used for political purposes by forces hostile to Iran.

An Active Measure, code-named 'TOKSIK' [TOXIC], was designed to compromise Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. It put forward the idea that the Afghan partisans' main problem was lack of funds. Therefore to balance their budget the refugees were extensively engaged in selling narcotics in the West.

In Bangladesh, in January-February 1980 alone, 56 items were planted on the Afghan theme; 12 editorials tending to justify the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan were published. They pointed out that it was only in response to the undeclared war of imperialism against the 1979 Afghan Revolution that the USSR, bound by a friendship treaty with Afghanistan and responding to a request from its legitimate government, was compelled to take this step.

As these articles did not have the desired effect on public opinion and the majority condemned Soviet aggression, the Residency tried, through agents of influence in the parties, to turn the public's attention away from condemnation of the occupation of Afghanistan and towards exposure of the reactionary nature of US and Bangladesh policy, and the US interference in the affairs of Bangladesh. If this also had no effect, then in the light of the situation and of the public mood, the idea was put forward that condemnation of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan had to be balanced with simultaneous criticism of the schemes of American imperialism.

Through agents, covert action was taken in the Central Committee of the RKB, the SARKER wing of the CPB [Communist Party of Bangladesh] and the MOHI wing of the CPB to dampen anti-Soviet attitudes among party members and to turn their attention towards the activities of the US and the People's Republic of China in the northeastern states of India and China's intention to create a buffer state between India and China out of the Chittagong Hill District, Tripura, Mizoram and Manipur.

Another argument was deployed: the Americans seek to get young people to focus on the events in Afghanistan in order to distract them and student organizations from their dangerous schemes in Iran which are designed to crush the Iranian Revolution. Leaflets and appeals on this theme were sent out to public organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan. Articles were printed in 'Gonokongh,' 'Jonpod,' 'Sansbad,' 'Notun Bangla,' 'Democrat.'

The following is one of the FCD Service A articles designed to be placed in the Bangladesh press:

[“]Despite their evident anti-Russian attitude, recently arrived refugees from Afghanistan say that the majority of the Afghan population is surprised by the correct behavior of the Soviet units, which in no way fits the conception of

how the occupation forces of a foreign power must behave. The impression is that the Russians are determined to make use in Afghanistan of the experience which they gained in the 1920s, when the Soviet regime was being established in the Muslim republics of Central Asia.

The situation in Soviet Central Asia at that time reminds one of the situation which developed in Afghanistan after the April 1978 Revolution: trouble among the frontier tribes, fierce opposition from the large feudal landowners, strong clerical influence over the illiterate peasant masses, active support for the opposition forces from abroad (Iran, PRC) with the active involvement by Britain.

The Russians at times displayed extraordinary flexibility and the ability to combine military and political methods, indeed giving priority to the latter. The presence of Russian military units in Afghanistan has had little effect on daily life. As a rule, they are located in positions far from large centers of population and they do everything possible not to attract the attention of local inhabitants. Evidently, officers and soldiers are forbidden to take leave or go out of their deployment area, or to have any contacts with the Afghan population.

From the Afghan refugees, it has become known that, before being sent to Afghanistan, the Russians were specially instructed not to do anything which might offend the religious feelings of the Muslims or anything contrary to the traditions of various national groups living in the country. Notably, every Soviet serviceman has a special guidance note on the rules of behavior which are to be observed in Afghanistan. It is categorically forbidden to engage in any discussion about religion with the believers; it is recommended to recognize the rule observed by all Afghans on the performance of five daily prayers and not to disturb those at prayer. In the presence of Muslims, it is strictly not allowed to consume substances forbidden in the Koran, and so on. The refugees state that the commanders of Soviet units have been warned that they would be severely punished if the conduct of their subordinates gives rise to justified discontent among the local population or undesirable complications in relations with local inhabitants. On occasions when the Afghans are in contact with the Russians or have an opportunity to observe the life of Soviet troops in military garrisons, they are struck by the modest and undemanding mode of life, not only of the soldiers but also of the officers, their unruffled calm and their discipline.[7]

In the framework of the 'TORKHAM' operation in 1981-1982, disinformation was regularly passed to the Iranian leadership about Pakistan's use of Afghan émigrés to pass arms to Baluchi and Arab separatists and to stir up mass disorders and anti-government incidents in the provinces of Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan.

A leaflet in support of Afghanistan was disseminated, notionally by the organization of Iranian People's Wrestlers, calling for an end to Iran's and Pakistan's provocations against Afghanistan.

In the second half of May 1982, the 'ZAKHAR' leaflet

operation calling for the overthrow of Zia-ul Haq, was carried out in Pakistani Baluchistan. Through agents of the Afghan special agency SGI 990 leaflets were distributed. An SGI agent among the leaders of one of the Baluchi tribes got some of his trusted people to throw out the leaflets along the railway line to Zahedan, in the area between Quetta and the Iranian frontier, paying them in Iranian rials. The agent told those who were carrying out the task that he had been given the leaflets and the money by a 'friend' of his who was the leader of one of the Baluchi tribes in Iranian Sistan, warning them not to say anything of this to their Afghan friends. Another SGI agent, the leader of a small Feda group codenamed 'Mohammad Khano,' sent two of his trusted people to throw out leaflets in the Quetta-Sukkurt area. He gave Iranian rials for expenses and explained that he had taken this on 'at the request of an Iranian, in the clear expectation of earning further reward.' In this way, the cover story for the operation was watertight, even if the executants were detained, as they in fact could not add anything to the fictitious information which they had been given.

In 1980, the following numbers of KGB agents were involved in work against the Afghan emigration: in Pakistan - 8; in Bangladesh -6; in India -12; in Afghanistan -12.

In Britain the KGB was engaged in tracking down one of the leaders of the Pakistani emigration, and in France it was looking for a leader of the Baluchi emigration, with a view to making operational contact with him.

KGB Active Measures designed to impede the improvement of Pakistan- Indian relations contributed to the failure of the Pakistani leadership's attempts to improve relations with India and to reduce tension on the borders with India.

If this had been achieved, it would have enabled Pakistan to participate more freely in Afghan affairs and to carry out anti-Soviet actions on the international stage with regard to the USSR intervention in Afghan affairs. [Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad] Dost's visit to Delhi in February 1981 [for the 9- 13 February Conference of the Non- Aligned Movement] ended in failure; [Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Nara Simha] Rao's visit to Islamabad in June of the same year did not yield any results. It was important to convince Indian politicians that Pakistan's desire to improve relations with India was only a tactical maneuver, an attempt to gain time in order to rearm and exploit the expected destabilization process in India, and solve the Kashmir issue.

A document notionally entitled 'The Haig Memorandum' was produced. Its main elements were as follows:

- [“] The US considers that Pakistan must be a bastion of the free world on the borders of Iran, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, in order to block India's ambitious claims to the leading role in the Indian Ocean.
- The US is ready to help Pakistan to build its Navy (lending it 1 or 2 aircraft carriers), naval bases at Gwadar, and extend anchorages in Karachi harbor.
- The Reagan administration welcomes Zia-ul Haq's at-

tempts to create the appearance of good will towards India, but there can be no illusion about the fact that while Indira Gandhi remains in power, Delhi is bound to follow the Soviet political line.

- Consequently, there must be no let-up in joint efforts in the Washington-Peking-Islamabad triangle to destabilize the Indian government.
- The US is prepared to consider Pakistan's request for the supply of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft for use along the border with India, subject to the subsequent equitable sharing of the data acquired between the US, China and Pakistan.[“]

The KGB Residency in Delhi noted that, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned Movement in Delhi on 9-13 February 1981, the right wing of the Movement attempted to give the Conference an anti-Soviet slant, artificially whipping up the Afghan and Kampuchean issues. [“]An attempt was made to discredit the thesis that the countries of socialism are the natural allies of the Non-aligned Movement; a slogan proclaimed that the Non-aligned countries have no natural allies, but there are natural enemies – neo-colonization, racism, imperialism and hegemonism. Yugoslavia and North Korea sided with the right wing. The only truly combative progressive forces in the Non-aligned Movement were Cuba and Vietnam. The right wing managed to drag into the text of the Declaration a statement on the need to withdraw foreign forces from Afghanistan (admittedly, without referring to ‘Soviet’ forces). Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen were ill-prepared and did not display a combative spirit.[”]

The KGB Resident in Delhi, Prokhorov,⁹ put forward proposals for Active Measures on his own initiative (in his telegram No 1669 of 5 May 1981). These led to the following sinister conclusion: in order to keep the Babrak Karmal regime in power in Afghanistan, a war between India and Pakistan would be advantageous for the Soviet Union, and they must be steered in that direction. The Department not only failed to rebuke its Resident for his levity, but instead asked Service A, Service 1, and the geographical departments of the KGB FCD and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their views on the Resident’s proposals.

Any initiative by an operational officer relating to Active Measures was encouraged. The Resident’s approach to the subject was later reflected in requests sent out by the Center to its Residencies in Tehran and Islamabad. Service A asked for their views on the exacerbation of Iran-Pakistan relations. A telegram addressed to Shabrov in Tehran asked him to ‘state his views on existing irritants in Iran-Pakistan relations which could be worked on to lead to an acute worsening of relation between Iran and Pakistan, even to the extent of causing open hostilities against each other.’ The telegram was signed by the Head of Department, Major-General M. K. Polonik. On 12 January 1982, a similar request addressed to Islamabad was signed by the Head of the 17th Department,

Major-General Nikishchov (workname: Mishin). This invited suggestions ‘on sensitive points in relations between Pakistan and Iran which could be worked on to lead to an acute worsening of relations between them, even to the extent of causing open hostilities against each other, and which would contribute to achieving the aims of our Service in this region.’

Both telegrams were drafted by Aleksin, a Service A officer.

Through their agents, the KGB Residencies in Delhi and Colombo established channels for conveying FCD Service A information directly to highly-placed officials in India. In Delhi, a reliable agent (codenamed ‘VANO’), who was a journalist, passed information to the Prime Minister, I. Gandhi.

In September 1981, he was sent to Pakistan. Service A prepared themes on the Afghan issue for him, which he was to convey to representatives of the Pakistan administration, and, on his return, convey to the Indian leadership and publish in the Indian press. The Center allowed for the fact that the information might be amended and include some corrections in the light of the results of the agent’s visit, but in any case it had to look like personal impressions and take account of the Indian leadership’s loathing of the Pakistani administration, and of Zia-ul Haq in particular. In his published work, the agent was to stick to more careful and balanced formulations, in order not to rule out the possibility of visiting Pakistan again in the future.

On his return from Pakistan in October, the agent had a meeting with Gandhi and expounded to her the KGB themes on Afghanistan:

[“] From what the Pakistani leadership says, one can see that the presence of the so-called Afghan refugees is useful to the Zia-ul Haq administration, as it enables it to seek additional material and military assistance from the US, China, Saudi Arabia and certain other countries. However, the Afghan refugees are also a source of additional tension for Islamabad, as the indigenous inhabitants of Pakistan are certainly not indifferent to who uses their pasture lands, their water and their grain. In the view of some of the military, there will be continuing tension on the Pakistan-Afghan frontier until such time as Pakistan finally achieves the reorganization of its army and its complete rearmament. There are indications that as early as January 1982 the US will hand over to Islamabad the first batch of F-16 aircraft and patrol boats equipped with M-113 ‘Hawk’ missiles. Thus one can suppose that the tempo and nature of rearmament are designed to speed up the militarization of the country and its conversion into an aggressive state, serving the interests of the US, China and reactionary Islamic regimes...[”]

In Colombo, an agent of the Residency among Sri Lankan journalists had access to the Indian High Commissioner in

Sri Lanka, T. Sri Abraham. He passed on to Abraham information supplied by Service A of the FCD, and the latter expressed unflinching interest in this. Thus, at a regular meeting on 10 January 1981, the agent passed on information on a US plan covering a 20-year period to establish its domination in the Indian Ocean to the detriment of India's interests. Abraham said that he would discuss this information with E. Gonsalvez, the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was due to visit Sri Lanka on 12 January.

Conveying information in this manner is termed 'the method of special positive influence.' It involves passing slanted information of various kinds and content, and disinformation, in conversations designed to influence governments, parties, individual political, public and state personalities, through agents, foreign confidential contacts, intelligence officers, and agents or cooptees of Soviet nationality. 'Special positive influence' presupposes continuous work for the purpose, constant study of its results and of the reaction to the measures which are taken.

The KGB carried out Active Measures jointly with the Hungarians, who were in operational contact with a prominent Indian journalist in Vienna; they supplied him with KGB disinformation materials, which he published in the press under his own name.

Another agent of the Hungarians, codenamed 'OTTO PALMA,' was used to convey slanted information to government circles of Western countries. Service A themes were sent to the Head of the Disinformation Department of Hungarian Intelligence, Josan, for action.

KGB Residencies in Pakistan, India, and Iran were instructed to react to any press reports of gastric diseases and to inform the Center with a view to discrediting the US as part of a complex Active Measure codenamed 'TARAKANY' [Cockroaches]. This was designed to discredit the American bacteriological laboratory attached to the Lahore medical centre and its personnel, and was a continuation of the operation to compromise the US and NATO over chemical and bacteriological weapons. In 1980-82, items appeared from time to time in the press of India, Iran, Bangladesh, and Lebanon, alleging that preparations were in hand in Pakistan for bacteriological warfare and subversion against Afghanistan, Iran and India, with the involvement of American specialists. ["Cases of intestinal diseases in humans in the area of Pishin, Surkhab, Muslimbagh and adjacent districts of Afghanistan, and of cattle plague and infectious diseases in Western districts of India (in the states of Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan) were caused by the migration from Pakistan of people and animals infected by American specialists. Through the seasonal- and often encouraged - migration of cattle-raising tribes from Pakistan to Afghanistan, Iran, and India, carriers of new types of mass infection could be infiltrated into these territories; this, according to the schemes of the Americans and Pakistanis, would promote anxiety, chaos and disorders in these countries.["]

["] In Iran, a rumor was spread that in Pakistan the Americans were using fellow Shiites as guinea pigs to study

the effects of new chemical and bacteriological products on humans, as a result of which many either died or were crippled. The Pakistani regime's decision to allow the Americans to conduct such experiments on human subjects was evidence that the Pakistani leadership was conscious of the danger which the local Shiites represented, and therefore decided to rid itself of a potential internal enemy.["]

["] In these same countries, steps were taken to inspire applications to the World Health Organization, urging it to set up a commission to investigate the activities of American specialists who had turned Pakistan into a testing ground for experiments on human subjects and animals, using products which were part of the chemical and bacteriological arsenal.["]

["] In Kabul, there were press, radio and television references to the exploitation of Pakistan's territory to conduct dangerous experiments to develop methods of bacteriological warfare against Afghanistan, Iran, and India.["]

["] In Dakha, a number of newspaper articles demanded an investigation into the true nature of experiments conducted by American specialists in the country, under the aegis of the International Center for the Study of Intestinal Diseases and in cholera hospitals in Dakha and other cities. ["]

The KGB succeeded to mold public opinion against the American bacteriological services in these countries. The head of the bacteriological laboratory was expelled from Pakistan. The Indian government cancelled a joint Indo-American commission on healthcare and an Asian conference on intestinal diseases which were to take place in India.

The Karachi 'Daily News' of 11 February 1982 printed a report from its Washington correspondent about the Pakistani authorities' expulsion of an American, Dr. David Nelin, the leader of a group of scientists from Maryland University attached to the Lahore medical center. Nelin stated that his expulsion was the result of intrigues by his Pakistani colleagues. The American said that his ill-wishers included Professor Aslam Khan and Brigadier M A Choudri. The KGB instigated the dispatch of protest letters to World Health Organization headquarters ostensibly from Pakistani medical scholars, and anti-American articles with fierce condemnations were planted in many countries.

In February 1982, the Soviet 'Literary Gazette' published an article by I. Andropov under the heading: 'An incubator of death.' This replayed KGB disinformation materials about the Lahore research center.

'Pravda' of 27 February 1982 reported that the Indian authorities had cancelled a meeting of the joint Indo-American commission on health care and the Asian conference on intestinal diseases. It linked this with facts about the activities of American specialists in Pakistan and Bangladesh who were studying the effects of new products and conducting experiments related to the development of biological weapons. According to the 'Patriot' newspaper, the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs intended to hold an investigation into the activities of American scientists and doctors in India. The Bangladesh authorities were also thinking of examining what the so-called international research institutes, such as the

one headed by Dr. Nelin in Lahore, were up to in the country. (Note: 'Patriot', a weekly journal, was controlled by the KGB Residency in Delhi.)

The Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn' of 23 February 1982 reported a meeting between representatives of the US's National Health Institute, Paul Ahmed and Douglas William, and Pakistan's Minister of Health, Dr. Nasiruddin Jomezai.

This led to the production of the following press release:

[“]In connection with the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr D. Nelin for conducting dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American medical delegation has gone urgently to Islamabad in order to hush up the scandal which has blown up unexpectedly over the Lahore medical research center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to disclose what researches are carried out by the Center. The American delegation is headed by Paul Ahmed and Douglas William. The sudden appearance in Pakistan of a group of American medical specialists provides confirmation that Washington fears that their dangerous experiments with new biological components of weapons of mass destruction will be exposed, and it confirms the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue their dangerous experiments, in view of the probable use of the new weapons against India, Iran and Afghanistan.[”]

In May 1982 reports date-lined Islamabad appeared in the Indian press about the deployment of American chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.

“According to information obtained from local military sources, chemical reagents have recently been brought to Pakistan from American chemical weapon arsenals located on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and in Japan; these are to be stored in areas close to Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. As for the characteristics of these reagents, according to the sources they are similar to those used previously by the Americans during the Vietnam war. According to the same sources, the build-up of US chemical and bacteriological stocks in Pakistan is designed for potential use by American rapid deployment forces in the broad region of South and South-west Asia.

An understanding between Washington and Islamabad on the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the territory of Pakistan was reached as far back as August 1980, when the agreement on the activities of the American bacteriological service in Pakistan was officially extended. Item 2 of Article 5 of that agreement in particular gives the Americans the right, through the US's International Development Agency (USAID), to review the results of the work periodically and to put forward proposals for its modification. In practice, this means that the Americans exercise complete control over all aspects of research in Pakistan on the development of new types of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons. This formulation gives the US the possi-

bility of determining unilaterally that it is essential to stock up and use chemical reagents on Pakistan territory. Clear confirmation of this can be found in the widely known facts relating to the activities of the Lahore Medical Centre, where American specialists were engaged in developing new forms of bacteriological and chemical weapons.”

Published items of this kind were picked up by TASS and reprinted in the Soviet press; the press cuttings were filed with the original disinformation material. To some extent they eclipsed reports in the Western press about the Soviet Army's use of chemical weapons against the Afghan people. The Soviet propaganda services denied such reports, attributed their publication to American pressure on the Western press, and blamed the Americans for the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

The KGB Resident in Pakistan, Akim, was awarded a testimonial by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov for the 'TARAKANY' Active Measure.

The Active Measures work of the KGB Colombo Residency in 1977-81, and that of the Resident, Grinevich, himself won a positive assessment: the Resident made skillful use of intelligence means and methods, the whole operational staff of the Residency was involved, and the output of agents was substantial. The 'Lanka Guardian' and 'Tribune,' periodicals controlled by the Residency, won high praise.

In 1980, the KGB leadership was told of 13 Active Measures carried out by the Residency. A complex operation to strengthen the international standing of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and to develop a positive attitude to the work of Karmal within the Sri Lankan government and public won approval. The operations helped to moderate criticism of the USSR by Sri Lankan representatives and by the press with regard to the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In 1980, 5,000 leaflets were disseminated in Colombo in the name of a fictitious organization, the 'Union of Muslim Youth,' in support of the Karmal government and condemning the actions of the US and the PRC against the DRA. The same aim was pursued through meetings, seminars, resolutions and conversations of influence.

Through the possibilities of the 'Sutra' Agency, a session of the Sri Lankan National Center of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress (ABPC) was arranged to condemn the policy of China and Pakistan, and to press for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Arrangements were made for sending letters of protest to the PRC Embassy, for an operation codenamed 'OMICRON' against the Chinese in Sri Lanka, for leaflets exacerbating the schism between Albania and China, for anti-American posters, and appeals in favor of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

With the help of agents, a Sri Lanka-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee was set up: this was used to organize mass meetings in towns to condemn interference by the US, the PRC and Pakistan in the affairs of the DRA, and to support the revolutionary reforms in that country. It also organized

letters of protest to President Zia-ul Haq and to the Pakistan government's daily newspaper 'Dawn.' The letters condemned the CIA's activities in Pakistan and interference by the US and China in the affairs of Afghanistan.

[“]In Colombo and Kandy, seminars were held to criticize interference by imperialist forces in Afghanistan; many slanted conversations were held in the entourage of President J.R. Jayewardene and Prime Minister Ranasinha Premadasa, in leading circles of the ruling Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the criminal activities of mercenary groups sent into Afghanistan from neighboring countries. Conversations of influence were held among political, state and public figures in Sri Lanka with the aim of influencing the position of Jayewardene towards Afghanistan and the surrounding area. Through agents, influence was exerted on trade union and religious organisations to induce them to adopt resolutions and declarations expressing support for the USSR's policy in Afghanistan. Favourable articles on the Afghan issue, based on briefing from Service A of the KGB FCD, were printed in the 'Tribune', the 'Lanka Guardian' and the bulletin of the Sri Lankan Centre of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress.[”]

In June 1980, the following disinformation was conveyed to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo:

[“]In the view of French diplomats, Zia-ul Haq's policy towards Afghanistan amounts to laying dangerously with fire. Further delay in establishing direct contacts with the new regime in Kabul will have tragic consequences in Islamabad. India views Zia-ul Haq's policy of playing a leading role in the Muslim world with suspicion, and will not put obstacles to a change of regime in Pakistan. The US no longer believes in the durability of the government and seeks to establish undeclared contacts with the opposition.[”]

[“]At the same time, it was suggested to Pakistanis in Delhi that there was a real possibility of normalizing relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the so-called Durand line frontier, and that by delaying normalization Pakistan was

missing a favorable opportunity.[”]

[“]Taken together, this all moderated the negative attitude of Sri Lankan representatives and the press towards the actions of the USSR and of its forces in Afghanistan; it helped to raise the interest of government and political circles in the country towards Soviet proposals for settling the situation in Afghanistan and the South-west region of Asia.[”]

NOTES

¹ New York: Basic Books, 1999. See the report by the British Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee, *The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report* (London, June 2000).

² Available at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.

³ *The Sword and the Shield*, pp. 6-8.

⁴ Letter from Vasilii Mitrokhin to editor, July 2000.

⁵ For Soviet and other East-bloc documentation on the Soviet war in Afghanistan see CWIHP *e-Dossier No. 4: Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, <http://cwihip.si.edu/>; as well as: CWIHP *Bulletin 3* (Fall 1993), pp. 67-69; CWIHP *Bulletin 4* (Fall 1994), pp. 70-75; CWIHP *Bulletin 8/9* (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 124-127, 133-137, 145-184.

⁶ *Editor's Note*: Baluchi, also spelled Balochi or Beluchi, group of tribes speaking the Baluchi language and estimated at about 4,800,000 inhabitants in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and also neighboring areas of Iran, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Punjab (India). See "Balochi," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (2004), <http://www.britannica.com>.

⁷ Pushtun, or Pakhtun, Hindustani Pathan, Persian Afghan Pashto-speaking people of southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. See "Pushtun," *Encyclopædia Britannica* (2004), <http://www.britannica.com>.

⁸ Name of early Soviet secret police agency and a forerunner of the KGB.

⁹ Prokhorov was the work name of Gennadiy Afanasyevich Vaumin, the Resident in Delhi, later head of the 17th Department of the FCD, with the rank of Major-General.

Cold War Memory: Interpreting the Physical Legacy of the Cold War

On 8 and 9 September 2003, the Cold War International History Project hosted a pioneering international conference on Cold War commemorative efforts. The meeting was co-sponsored by the Association of Air Force Missileers, the Cold War Museum, the German Historical Institute (Washington, DC), the Harry S. Truman Library, the Kennan Institute; in cooperation with the Norwegian Aviation Museum, the Eisenhower Foundation and Eisenhower Presidential Library, and the National Coalition for History; and with generous financial support from the Boeing Company.

The principle objective of the conference was to foster a dialogue among scholars and those charged with interpreting the physical legacy of the Cold War in the United States and abroad. The conference brought together about one hundred cultural resource specialists, leading international scholars, Cold War veterans, media and foundation representatives, government officials, and other professionals from the U.S. and abroad. For additional information, visit the CWIHP website at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.

Why Was There No “Second Cold War” in Europe? Hungary and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: Documents from the Hungarian Archives

By Csaba Békés

“Our friends will naturally also understand that the development of events did not make a preliminary exchange of opinions possible for us.” This was the closing sentence of the highly confidential communication on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan forwarded to the Hungarian party leadership by Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Pavlov on 28 December 1979 (Document No.3). Although the Hungarian “friends” never made it public, they did not at all understand why they had to learn about an event of such importance from regular news broadcasts and papers instead of directly from their Soviet “friends.”

In fact, after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis the invasion of Afghanistan was the first and only case when the East European allies had been faced with a *fait accompli* by Moscow in which it had taken an unexpected step in a serious international crisis situation without either informing them or consulting with them first. Even back in 1962, the Hungarian leadership had been rather upset about that humiliating situation. János Kádár, first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HWSP), had not hidden his frustration when, during a meeting with Khrushchev in July 1963 he warned: “the point is that there should not occur such a situation when the Soviet government publishes various declarations and the other governments read them in the newspaper (...) I have thought of preliminary consultation (...) according to our experiences it is better to quarrel before than after the events.” In order to avoid similar situations and to compel Moscow to inform its allies regularly about its intentions Kádár suggested the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact.¹

Although the proposal was turned down on the spot, from early 1964 on, at Soviet initiative, the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states began to meet regularly, several times a year. Other fora of consultation developed gradually as well and eventually a more or less working mechanism emerged whereby Moscow regularly informed its East European allies at the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (after 1956), the Warsaw Pact Council of Defense Ministers (after 1969) and the Council of Foreign Ministers (after 1976) about important international issues. In addition, consultations among the ruling parties’ Central Committee secretaries for international relations regularly took place beginning in the late 1960s.

The history of crises inside the Soviet bloc had also shown to the Hungarian leaders that it was not impossible for Moscow to consult with its allies even at very short notice. Just before crushing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,

Khrushchev and his comrades had personally visited with the leaders of five countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia) in the course of only two days.² Additionally the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 had been preceded by six months of very intensive bilateral and multilateral consultations. That precedent was especially memorable for the Hungarian leadership since Kádár had personally played an important role in mediating between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders.³ During the Vietnam War, too, the Soviet Union regularly informed its East European allies about its current position. The CSCE process, starting in 1969 and culminating in the Helsinki Agreement in 1975, produced long and intense cooperation on and the harmonization of a joint position of the Soviet bloc. In the success of that process the East European countries had played a key role that was unprecedented in the bloc’s history.

In the case of Afghanistan, the Soviets regularly provided confidential information to their allies after the “Saur Revolution” in April 1978 (Documents No.1 and 2). To Hungarian leaders this as well suggested that they were taken seriously by Moscow and they had every reason to believe that no important step, such as an invasion of Afghanistan, would take place without Moscow holding preliminary consultations with the members of the alliance. We now know that the CPSU Politburo decision on the invasion was taken on 12 December, so in fact there was sufficient time for such consultations before military operations began.⁴

Since Hungary was a solid member of the group of “closely cooperating socialist countries” (the Warsaw Pact members minus Romania) there was nothing much Hungarian leaders could do other than accept the Soviet explanation and follow the general propaganda line of the bloc. Initially this did not seem to cause too much trouble for Hungary, as the country’s main concern was to maintain its good political and economic relations with the West, especially with Western Europe, relations which had been improving since the mid-seventies. Although the harsh American reaction against the invasion fostered concern about the future of East-West relations, for the Hungarian leaders it was reassuring that both the Soviet leadership (Brezhnev’s speech on 16 January 1980) and key politicians in Western Europe made it clear that there was a strong joint interest in maintaining the results of détente. Therefore it came as a real shock for the Hungarian leadership when the Soviets “requested” in late January 1980 that Hungary freeze its high-level contacts with the West. This unexpected Soviet move was motivated by Moscow’s new attitude towards the international crisis. Moscow had

expected a certain amount of initial criticism from the West but counted on the *fait accompli* being accepted by the world that after a short period of time. Brezhnev had hoped that the crucial matter of maintaining détente would override the problem of Afghanistan. However, after the surprisingly harsh US reaction was made public, Moscow took offense and decided to take counter-measures. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR were ordered to cancel imminent high-level talks with Western politicians.⁵

The Soviet request created a very serious clash of interest between the Soviet Union and the East European Communist countries since all of these countries were, albeit to different degrees, interested in further developing their relations with Western Europe. In the case of Hungary, the Soviets asked that the visit of the Hungarian foreign minister to Bonn, due to occur in less than a week, be cancelled and that, similarly, the trip by a delegation of the Hungarian parliament to the United States be put off. At the 29 January meeting of the HSWP Political Committee, one of the most dramatic ones in the history of this body, the Hungarian leadership came the closest ever to making a political decision to defy openly Soviet will. During a heated debate, several HSWP Politburo members proposed that the Soviet request should be disregarded due to the extremely short notice and the country's economic interests; there seemed to be a clear majority for this position.⁶ It was Kádár's dramatic intervention that prevented the Political Committee from making an "irresponsible" decision. In a rather confused speech he argued that they had to choose between two bad options and declared that the visits had to be cancelled. He also warned the Political Committee that Hungary would, in fact, not lose anything by obeying Moscow (except for that he, Kádár, "would be called a Soviet satellite" in the West). By contrast, there was much to lose by undermining the confidence of the Kremlin leaders. In order to enlighten those who might have had any illusions concerning the nature of the Soviet request, he added: "... what do you think, how long will they be polite to us? Why with us, (...) excuse me for the phrase, with our lousy life and country, (...) how long will they behave politely towards us?"

Eventually the visits were cancelled but, paradoxically, the humiliation that Kádár "suffered" had positive effects. At the same Political Committee session it was also decided that Moscow should be asked to urgently hold a multilateral consultative meeting regarding the impact of Afghanistan on East-West relations. A special envoy, Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs András Gyenes, was immediately sent to Moscow for personal consultation. Kádár himself sent a letter to Brezhnev,⁷ arguing that in the present situation the allies had to be consulted regularly on the joint Soviet bloc policy and that the results of détente had to be preserved. This was possible only by maintaining and strengthening the relations of the East European countries with Western Europe. Only in this way could US influence over those countries be warded off.

Moscow accepted the Hungarian proposal. A meeting of the Central Committee secretaries for international rela-

tions of the *closely cooperating socialist countries* took place on 26 February 1980 in Moscow (Document No. 5). At the conference Boris Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee secretary for international relations, adopted and put forward the Hungarian position *as the current CPSU line*, emphasizing that "the socialist countries should make maximum use of the possibilities contained in existing relations with the Western European countries to counter-balance the United States' foreign policy line" (Document No. 6).

The decision was a significant achievement for Hungarian diplomacy, not in the least because Hungary received the green light to its preserve and even enhance Western relations. Kádár's personal intervention had in fact helped the liberal forces to overcome the hardliners within the Soviet leadership (Document No. 6). This, in turn, contributed to avoiding any further deterioration of East-West relations similar to what happened following the invasion of Afghanistan. It is one possible reason why no "Second Cold War" developed in Europe.

For Hungary, in fact, the period between the invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of Gorbachev in 1985 was rather dynamic and fruitful in the foreign policy arena. Hungary was able to join the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1982. As early as 1981 exploratory talks were underway concerning a potential agreement with the European Economic Community. (These discussions eventually failed due to West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's concerns about the potential negative effect of such a step on the Federal Republic's relationship with the Soviet Union.)⁸ Moreover, high-level relations with Western countries had intensified during this period. Kádár paid visits to Bonn and Rome in 1977, to Paris in 1978, to Bonn again in 1982, and to London in 1985. Hungary, in turn, received French Prime Minister Raymond Barre in 1977, and was visited by Schmidt in 1979, French President Francois Mitterand in 1982, US Vice-President George Bush in 1983, and Schmidt's successor Helmut Kohl, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi in 1984. As Poland lost the goodwill of many in the West after the introduction of martial law in December 1981 and Romania fell out of favor over its increasingly repressive internal policies, Hungary took on the lead role in promoting East-West dialogue. Only after Gorbachev entered the scene did the situation change: Moscow itself seized the role as the principal proponent of improved East-West relations. Even with its moderating influence on East bloc policy, Hungary now fell back to playing second fiddle.⁹

Csaba Békés is director of the Cold War History Center in Budapest and a former CWIHP Fellow. His most recent publication includes The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A History in Documents, co-edited with Malcolm Byrne and János M. Rainer (2002).

DOCUMENT No. 1
Soviet Communication to the Hungarian
Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan,
17 October 1978

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 11/4377.õ.e Translated for
 CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

TOP SECRET!
 Budapest, 17 Oct. 1978

BULLETIN

On 16 October 1978, [Central Committee (CC) Secretary for International Relations] Comrade András Gyenes received Comrade Vladimir Pavlov, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary, at his request. Pavlov who gave the following oral information in the name of the CPSU Central Committee:

“On behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, between 25 and 27 September this year, B. N. Ponomarev, candidate member of the CPSU CC Political Committee and secretary of the CC, stayed in Kabul to carry on talks with the leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about some questions concerning the political situation of the country and Soviet-Afghan relations. He met Noor Mohammad Taraki, secretary-general of the PDPA, president of the Revolutionary Council and Hafizullah Amin, secretary of the PDPA, vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs.

The main purpose of the trip was to prevent [the continuation of] those tremendous mass reprisals that, after the Afghan revolution, were also aimed against the Parcham group¹⁰ who participated in overthrowing the despotic system.

During the talks we placed special emphasis on these unjustified reprisals. In connection with this, we pointed to the fact that we did so because we had brotherly concerns about the question of the Afghan revolution, even more so as since aspects of the development of events in Afghanistan might affect the Soviet Union and the CPSU as well.

After being the first to recognize the new system in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union expressed its solidarity with Afghanistan before the whole world. This point of view was newly confirmed at the highest level in [CPSU General Secretary] L. I. Brezhnev's speech given in Baku. It is widely known that we provide extensive support and aid to the new leadership. Under such circumstances, both within Afghanistan and over her borders, hostile propaganda is aimed at showing that any development of events within Afghanistan, especially their negative aspects, are directly or indirectly related to the Soviet Union.

We drew the Afghan leadership's attention to the fact that the reprisals had reached massive proportions in the past period, [that] they were carried out without complying with the law, and not only against the class enemies of the new system (“Muslim brothers,” the supporters of the mon-

archy, etc.) but also against people who could be used in the interest of the revolution. This caused dissatisfaction among the population, undermined the prestige of the revolutionary leadership and would lead to the weakening of the new system.

Our opinion was listened to with great attention but noticeable tension. Without questioning it directly, the Afghan leaders tried to justify their politics with the anti-governmental activity of Parchamists.

“We—said Taraki—had no confidence in Parcham even before the revolution, the union with them was only *pro forma*. In reality they did not participate in the armed uprising. But after the revolution, the leader of the Parchamists, B. Karmal demanded that the leading posts in ministries and other organizations should be divided equally. He strove to assume a leading role in party-building. He stated, ‘The army is in your hands, give us party matters.’ Besides, when we rejected his demands, he threatened us with the outbreak of an uprising. We had only one alternative in this situation: either them or us.”

Besides this, N. Taraki tried to prove that the measures taken against the “Parcham” leaders did not have a negative impact on the masses. The people of Afghanistan support the new system and the PDPA Khalq leadership. The leaders of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government of the Democratic Republic and of the Revolutionary Council—said Taraki—completely understand the worries of the CPSU CC, but they guarantee that the latest events in the country will not disturb the further development of the Afghan revolution and the consolidation of the people's democratic system.

We paid special attention to the questions of party-building, the work of the People's Democratic Party, the direction of the country and the masses. We emphasized the necessity of setting up and strengthening the party on the whole territory of the country, the normalization of the work of the higher and lower level party organizations without delay, setting up the power organs of the people and the need for greater attention to economic issues. The masses must experience in their own lives the real achievements of the revolution. Therefore the improvement of people's lives must be a first rank issue of the new power.

Consistently we moved to the fore the idea that the main tasks were strengthening the people's democratic system, a well-balanced and flexible policy which would isolate the counter-revolution from the people and deprive it of the opportunity to misuse the backwardness of the masses. For the short period of time following the creation of the new system, important measures had been taken to the benefit of the people. At the same time the immense creative possibilities of the Afghan revolution had to be discovered to a greater extent and should be put into practice.

During the meetings, the Afghan party mentioned briefly the question of the relations between Afghanistan and the imperialist countries. “Imperialism”—said Taraki—“puts many hurdles in our way, among others, ‘soft’ methods. The West and the Americans unequivocally strive to divert us

from the chosen path with economic help. At present we do not intend to [act so as to create a] deteriorat[ion] in our relations with the West, although we understand that their offers are not unselfish at all." From the Soviet side, we have underlined we must not allow the West to trap us.

With reference to the Chinese question, N. Taraki by all means disapproved of the Maoist leadership and their activity, remarking that the leaders of China allied themselves with the enemies of communism. The People's Democratic Party has cleared the army and the state apparatus of Maoist elements.

The meetings with Taraki and Amin made the impression that the persecution of Parchamists was mainly motivated by a fight for position and personal antipathy. At the same time, it was clear that the Afghan leadership did not fully understand the negative influence of reprisals on the general situation of the country and the mood of the army and the party.

The talks were carried on in a comradely atmosphere. The generally warm welcome, the attention devoted to the position of the CPSU CC, the readiness to discuss even the most delicate questions with us is witness to the fact that they considered friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to be of great importance. Taraki requested us to deliver to the CPSU Central Committee [the message]: Afghanistan will always be on the Soviet Union's side together with the socialist countries.

The CPSU Central Committee thinks that, during their further activities, the Afghans will consider our opinion, although—naturally—only the future will tell. Based on our information, repressive actions are being relaxed, and the process of partial rehabilitation of the leaders of the Parcham group has started."

Budapest, 17 October 1978



DOCUMENT No. 2
Soviet Communication to the Hungarian
Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan,
28 March 1979

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 11/4380.õ.e Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

Budapest, 28 March 1979

BULLETIN

On 27 March, [Head of the CC Department for International Affairs] Comrade János Berecz received Comrade Vladimir Pavlov, the Soviet Union's ambassador to Hungary at his request, who gave the following oral information on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee:

"In the past months in Afghanistan the internal political situation has become strained. Counter-revolutionary reactions, which have become stronger and are actively supported and helped by the special services of imperialist powers like China, Pakistan and Iran. The strained internal political situation has been caused by the increasing opposition of the exploiting classes and the reactionary circles [that are] of the Muslim religion. In their activity against the people's democratic government, the Afghan counter-revolutionaries make use of the conservative and reactionary traditions of Islam, the influence of tribal leaders, the deepening class conflicts coming to the surface because of the land reform, the economic difficulties, the lack of experience of party cadres and certain mistakes of the Afghan revolutionary power.

The program of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is aimed at wide social-economic changes in the interest of the working masses, at the same time, in practice, they are only in the beginning phase of realization. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has not yet become a mass party and it has also been weakened by internal conflicts for a long time.

The Afghan leadership has abused its position both in the solution of party and state questions, because it has not only taken repressive measures against the obvious enemies of the republic but also against those hesitating as well, especially the intelligentsia. According to all indications, dissatisfaction affects the army as well, which has always been the main supporter of the fight against the counter-revolutionary forces.

Recently the Afghan reactionary forces have organized armed actions with foreign support. They have managed to draw one part of the population and a unit of the army to their side in the town of Herat. Order was restored in the town on 20 March.

The most active counter-revolutionary force is the organization of "Muslim Brothers," headquartered on Pakistani territory and which has wide-ranging support within the Pakistani government. From Pakistan, Iran, and China an enraged propaganda campaign is aimed at democratic Afghanistan and its government. From Pakistani territory armed subversion units are infiltrated to Afghanistan, they call upon the people to start a "holy war," [carry out] acts of sabotage, and start an armed mass uprising against the government.

Reactionary groups of the Shiite Muslim religion participate in the anti-governmental movement as well. Also a Maoist clique participates in it, many of whose members have received special training in China, and have been deployed in Afghanistan to execute diversionary and terrorist actions with the support of the Chinese authorities.

The Soviet Union has provided wide-ranging political and financial support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, including [helping her to] consolidate her armed forces and does so even more in the present complicated situation. The Soviet press, the radio and the television reveal to a great extent the intrigues of internal and external reactionary forces [who are fighting] against the revolutionary government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and [the

Soviet Union] fight[s] for the consolidation of the new revolutionary system.

As far as we are concerned, we have drawn the attention of the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan several times—moreover at the highest level as well—to the mistakes of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government.

The CPSU Central Committee expresses its hope that friendly countries will also take the necessary steps to provide aid and support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in this hard period.”



DOCUMENT No. 3
Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Events in Afghanistan, 28 December 1979

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 5./ 790.ő.e Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS’ PARTY
 CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET!

Written in one copy
 Budapest, 28 Dec. 1979
 Seen by [First Secretary of the HSWP] Comrade János Kádár

BULLETIN

for Comrades János Kádár, [Central Committee Secretary for Party Organization] Károly Németh, [Central Committee Secretary for Ideology] Imre Győri, [Central Committee Secretary for Administrative Issues] Mihály Korom, János Berecz and [Prime Minister] György Lázár, [Deputy Prime Minister and longtime Central Committee Secretary for Cultural Affairs] György Aczél and [Hungarian Foreign Minister] Frigyes Pujá.

In the name of the CPSU CC Political Committee, Comrade Vladimir Pavlov, the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Hungary, informed Comrade Imre Győri—*giving highly confidential and exclusively private information*—about the following concerning the events in Afghanistan:

“We consider it necessary to inform the leaders of our friends with full frankness about actions we carried out in the face of the heavily strained situation in Afghanistan. Under present circumstances, the foundations of the April 1978 revolution, the democratic and progressive achievements of the Afghan people, are endangered. The rude interference of some powers in the matters of Afghanistan does not cease, moreover its extent is increasing; armed formations are directed to Afghan territory, weapons are sent to counter-revo-

lutionary elements and gangs, whose actions are governed from abroad. The purpose of this interference is quite obvious: to overthrow the democratic and progressive system created by the Afghan people as the result of the revolution.

The danger threatening the Afghan people is increasing, despite the fact that the people and armed forces of Afghanistan have been heroically beating off, for a long time, the military interventions of the imperialist and reactionary forces. All this is closely related to the fact that Amin and the small group supporting him have cruelly and treacherously done away with Cde. Taraki, the leader of the Afghan revolution and many other outstanding personalities; they have subjected hundreds and thousands of communists faithful to the ideas of the revolution, including the Parchamists and Khalqists, to mass repression.

By these means, the external intervention and the internal terror which developed under Amin threatens the destruction of everything given to Afghanistan by the April revolution. Considering all these circumstances, the Afghan forces that are faithful to the cause of the revolution, staying at present within the country or—for known reasons—abroad, are taking steps to get rid of the usurper, to defend the achievements of the April revolution and the independence of Afghanistan. Considering this and the new Afghan leadership, requests for [Soviet] support and aid to beat off the external aggression, the Soviet Union—governed by its internationalist obligations—took the decision to send a small contingent of forces to Afghanistan. These forces will be withdrawn after a solution to the causes which make the action necessary is found.

The Soviet Union would like to make understood to all the countries with which it maintains diplomatic relations, that in executing this inevitable, provisional measure it is obeying the request of the newly establish leadership of Afghanistan, [who has] turned to the Soviet Union for aid and support in the fight against external aggression. Concerning this, the Soviet Union begins with the fact that, in matters of security, the interests of Afghanistan and [the Soviet Union] are identical, [they are established by] what was laid down in the pact of friendship and cooperation of 1978, and the defense of the interests of peace in this area of the world.

The Soviet Union’s affirmative answer to the request of the Afghan leadership results also from the statement of Provision 51 of the UN Charter, which interprets collective and individual self-defense applied against aggression and toward restoration of peace as an inseparable right of states.

Just like our friends, we also count on the fact that both in the West and East there will be circles initiating a propaganda campaign against the support and aid given by the Soviet Union to the revolution in Afghanistan. But, as has happened before, the fault-finding of our class and ideological opponents cannot prevent us from doing our best to defend the global interests of our security and protect our allies’ and friends’ safety, which includes states like Afghanistan, whose people are firm in expressing their will to progress resolutely along the path of cooperation with socialist countries, of revolutionary social changes taking place on pro-

gressive and democratic grounds.

We are convinced that our friends will rightly interpret the reasons dictating the necessity of definite help to Afghanistan in the present situation and fully support this internationalist action of ours. Our friends will naturally also understand that the development of events did not make a preliminary exchange of opinions possible for us.”



DOCUMENT No. 4
Report on the Talks of Gyula Horn,¹¹ Representative of the HSWP CC Department of Foreign Affairs in the United States and Canada, 23 January 1980

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 5/ 791.ő.e Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
 TOP SECRET!
 CENTRAL COMMITTEE
 Written in 44 copies
 DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Seen by Comrade András Gyenes
 Inf/ 1363

BULLETIN/2/

for the members of the Political Committee and the Secretariat

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The meetings of the representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the United States and Canada

/The record of the Department of Foreign Affairs/

Organized by the HSWP Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Gyula Horn visited Washington, New York, and Ottawa as a courier between 7 and 20 January. In all three places he participated at the membership meeting of the foreign representation party organization concerning [party] congress guidelines and electing a leadership.

Our ambassadors to Washington and Ottawa informed the American State Department and the Canadian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs about this visit and announced his [Cde. G. Horn] readiness to participate in meetings. In Washington Gyula Horn was received separately by Deputy Secretary of State George West, [Deputy Assistant of State for European Affairs] Robert Barry, the head of the group of European Affairs, Marshall D. Shulman, the Minister Counselor (for Soviet Affairs), James E. Goodby, the head of the group dealing with European security and questions concerning NATO. He had a meeting with [F. Stephen] Larrabee, a leading member of the National Security Council, and the leaders of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

At the initiative of our ambassador to Washington, Rabbi Arthur Schneier, the president of several American foundations and a member of several institutions including the Council of Foreign Relations, organized a meeting in his flat with the leading representatives of [several] great financial and economic monopolies, and religious organizations. A meeting took place with Helen Winter, the international secretary of the United States' Communist Party.

In Ottawa Comrade Horn was received by Klaus Goldschlag, deputy foreign minister and his senior colleagues.

The recurring element of the conversations in the various meetings was that they welcomed the opportunity for an exchange of opinions, which was extremely important in such a strained situation. Without exception, the conversations were centered around the international context of the events in Afghanistan.

The Americans emphasized that the Soviet Union's direct interference in Afghanistan meant a change in the quality of international political relations and especially in East-West relations. The United States could not accept that the Soviet Union use its advantage in the sphere of conventional weapons outside the borders of the Eastern European alliance, especially in an area that was extremely important in providing for the United States' needs for raw material. The event might constitute a significant drawback in the process of détente, and considering the headway made by the Soviet Union in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and in the development of their armed forces and the increase in their military power, hopes for détente have become much weaker in the United States.

According to American evaluations, in 1972—that is at the beginning of détente—there was an approximate balance in the armed forces of the two great powers. According to 1979 surveys, the general balance in power changed to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Thus, in the [recent] past period, new conditions have appeared in international strategic relations. But what has caused the biggest problem for the United States has been that it could not assess Soviet intentions: to what extent did Soviet Union has want to increase its power and to what extent did it want to exploit the imbalance in power relations to advantage in the areas that were crucially important to the West [?] Therefore the United States was forced to react to the present situation by [attempting to] scare off the Soviet Union from taking such steps. The American leadership had already received much

criticism for its military inability in Iran and elsewhere while the Soviet Union put in practice those necessary measures that enabled it to protect its basic interests.

Concerning this, during the New York meeting, the leading representatives of the monopoly capitalist groups unanimously emphasized that the Soviet Union had to prepare for an extremely hard fight. Practically all conditions were given for the United States to step forward. In principle, the Soviet action carried out in Afghanistan meant that for the USA and her allies to increase their defensive power have been removed. They [the representatives] also laid out that this type of hardball politics required leaders who could meet the new requirements.

There were positions [taken by some at the meeting] that approached the situation and perspectives on Soviet-American relations from an analytical point of view. Several emphasized that the two great powers had not regulated to the extent necessary the competitive elements present in their relations. The melting pot-like international situation had brought about unexpected events and decisions that would have to be made by the Soviet Union and the United States. The coming decade would have been a hard phase even without the Afghan events. Nor were the two powers successful in regulating military competition either. Both parties blamed the other for their own increase in pace in armament.

The SALT-II [agreement] could not effectively put a stop to continuing the arms race either, but without the agreement the situation would certainly be worse. Besides, the ratification of the SALT-II agreement was expected by the White House by February 1980. According to the evaluations of the government and the senators playing a positive role in the procedure, despite the pressure against bringing the agreement into force, it seemed realistic [to assume that there would be] the two third majority needed to ensure ratification. But events in Iran and Afghanistan favored the opponents of SALT, and in this situation the government considered it better to delay the request for ratification. Restarting the procedure of putting the treaty into force greatly depended on the general international and internal American political situation.

According to Shulman, when looking for a way out of the situation resulting from the Afghan events, the following would be crucially important: the two great powers should define at the very beginning what is meant by the necessary self-restraint and in which spheres it should be applied; to what extent they would manage to reach the appropriate regulations concerning the competition between the two great powers, especially concerning the arms race.

The representatives of the foreign affairs apparatus expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that allies of the USA did not follow the United States in the Iran question and even less in repressive anti-Soviet measures. The Western European countries and Japan supported the United States less and less in the question of an economic boycott against Iran, and they emphasized more and more their position according to which additional diplomatic and political efforts were needed to solve the Iran crisis.

The allies of the USA agreed only not to fill in the gap caused by the economic measures taken by the US in Soviet-American relations, and did not join those American measures that would lead to the deterioration of their economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union.

The Americans were worried about the fact that the allies' behavior did not make it possible to exercise enough influence on the Soviet Union. They calculated that the Soviet Union needed to buy, apart from the 8 million tons of American corn already under contract, factually another 17 million tons of American corn, two thirds of which [would be used as] corn fodder. On the other hand, Brazil had undertaken a large-scale soy-export to the Soviet Union in the past days and similar steps might be taken by several Western-European and developing countries. They also reckoned with the fact that the socialist countries would increase their corn purchases in the capitalist world. It would be difficult for them to prevent this.

They said that the American government had elaborated plans and concepts to ease the military tension, to defend the process of European security and cooperation, to prepare for the Madrid conference, and to continue the Vienna talks. As a consequence of the Afghan events, however, the government was forced to re-evaluate its plans. The experts continued working on the elaboration of newer American positions and, although their preparation was not as intense at present as earlier, they were making new efforts to elaborate and execute a common Western position.

They still attribute great importance to the initiatives concerning European security and in their view, they will serve as a basis for talks in the future too. The 12 December NATO decision outlined the suggestion of the organization about talks concerning the reduction in European armament. In Brussels, NATO experts are presently working on giving a definite form to the suggestions and they trust that the technical problems will be solved by the end of spring. They consider it unfortunate that the Soviet Union has not so far reacted in effect to the suggestions about talks concerning European strategic missiles. They can reasonably count on the fact that progress will be extremely complicated in this matter, and every step depends on the European political situation and on Soviet-American relations.

The Americans studied the proposals of the Budapest session of the Warsaw Treaty concerning measures to increase confidence. They had some reservations concerning the "proclamation-like" proposals, but they did not exclude the possibility of progress.

They emphasized that the United States and its allies had also taken one-sided steps concerning the reduction in armament, such as the evacuation of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe; the USA's commitment not to increase the number of its nuclear armament above seven thousand in Europe; the declaration of the United States' and the NATO allies' readiness to hold a conference on European disarmament; the support of numerous confidence-building measures.

The American negotiating partners emphasized, without

exception, that the United States was ready to develop Hungarian-American relations. They underlined that the US wished to continue the subtle political discussions with the socialist countries in the same way as before. Several of them suggested that, in the present situation, the relations maintained with the individual socialist countries could ensure the continuity of the politics of peaceful coexistence.

At the same time, they stated that this readiness could not be one-sided, and such Hungarian statements as those concerning the Afghan question were of no help. They made it clear that in the United States there was a substantial number of people who tried to use the given situation to change the positive tendency in bilateral relations. The increase in their influence could result in difficulties concerning the official procedures for the further extension of the most-favored-nation-clause. A lot depended on how far official Hungarian circles would go in their statements criticizing United States foreign policy. They consider it also extremely important that the Hungarians should not make any backward steps in Hungarian-American relations. They underlined the importance of the Hungarian-American foreign political consultations, of further specific economic talks and of the realization of the talks to be carried out with the Hungarian parliamentary delegation visiting the United States headed by Comrade Antal Apró.

The following arguments were generally received with understanding:

The deterioration of the Soviet-American relations did not start with the Soviet support given to Afghanistan. The United States had taken earlier steps endangering the Soviet Union and more generally the East-West relationship both in the spheres of military and politics. The American efforts to upset the balance of strategic power increased the tension, decreasing the mutual confidence between the two world systems. It was the USA who made the change according to which it has tried to show the Soviet Union's behavior in Third World countries in the light of being the preliminary condition for the continuation of détente. This opens up new sources of tension in East-West relations. It was the United States leadership that took strict and direct measures to weaken Soviet-American relations.

Soviet support of the revolutionary forces in Afghanistan is not the concern of the Warsaw Treaty [members] but the internal affair of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; but all countries have sovereign rights to take a point of view according to their ideological-political convictions. The Hungarian government's official position was born in this spirit. During the talks carried on with the representatives of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the interlocutors' evaluation and statements coincided with the American position. At the same time, serious worries were voiced about the increasing international tension; the [Canadian officials] considered it very important to preserve or restore at least a minimal amount of mutual confidence which is indispensable in East-West relations.

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During the meeting with the foreign secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, Comrade Helen Winter expressed her worries about the latest international events, the ever increasing anti-Communist hysteria and hysteria against the socialist countries, which made the party's situation even more difficult in the United States.

Budapest, 23 January 1980

János Berecz



DOCUMENT No. 5

Report on the meeting of the foreign secretaries of the closely cooperating socialist countries in Moscow on 26 February 1980, 29 February 1980

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 11/4396.ő.e Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY

TOP SECRET!

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Written in two copies

DEPARTMENT OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Budapest, 29 February 1980.

INFORMATIONAL REPORT

to the Political Committee

The foreign secretaries of the central committees of the parties of the closely cooperating socialist countries—the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic—held a coordinating meeting in Moscow on 26 February concerning topical international questions.

Representing the CPSU Central Committee, [CPSU Central Committee Secretary for International Relations] Comrade Boris Ponomarev emphasized that in the present international situation it was extremely important to make detailed analyses and to draw correct conclusions. For this the contents of Comrade Leonid Brezhnev's declaration of 16 January and his pre-election speech of 22 February provided a good basis. The CPSU thinks that recently the process of détente has suffered serious losses. The basic causes can be defined as the aggressive endeavors of the USA, the arms race provoked by it and the intensification of attacks against socialism. In the foreign policy steps [taken by] the USA, a role is played by the fight concerning the presidential elections and the internal political and economic problems of the

United States. More and more obvious are the [US] intentions to make the NATO member states line up to support American policy and to increase the influence of the United States in the world.

The dangers threatening world peace are great, but we must see that Carter's "new" policy has not had the expected result. The United States could not turn Afghanistan into a base of operations for American imperialism, and it is of principle importance that the USA did not consider it possible to announce military confrontation. This is due to the substantial defensive force of the Soviet Union and the socialist community. It means that we should develop our economic and military ability in the future too and improve our armed forces within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty.

The Western European allies of the US, with few exceptions, are unwilling to follow Carter's policy unconditionally. The intentions to block the Soviet Union's economy were thwarted; in this the United States was not followed by Europe, moreover not by Latin America. Carter is aware that the formation of an anti-Soviet front is impossible without the active participation of Western Europe. The European capitalist countries are interested in distancing themselves from Carter. Some countries are definite, others are more moderate in demonstrating their faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance, and in reality the unity of NATO is much less than is seen in the propaganda.

France's opposition to the United States is becoming stronger and stronger. The behavior of the Federal Republic of Germany is of key importance. The FRG government played a decisive role in passing the NATO resolution concerning medium-range missiles, and they express their solidarity with the Carter administration. At the same time, the West German government declares its commitment to the policy of détente. This is strongly emphasized by Schmidt too, in his recent message to Comrade Brezhnev. It is also worth mentioning that, at the session of the leaders of the German Social Democratic Party held in chambers, Schmidt explained that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan served a defensive purpose. The Chancellor expressed his disapproval with the refusal to ratify the SALT II [agreement], and with the fact that Carter has subordinated US interests more and more to his own [personal] purposes. The Chancellor defined explicitly that his country would not participate in the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, it would not sacrifice its Eastern policy and endeavored to prevent the American president from making other mistakes. But the Americans exercise great influence on Schmidt, who shows less resistance than expected probably because he has to take into consideration [domestic] political requirements for the autumn elections.

The Soviet leadership pays great attention to the points of view of the communist, social-democratic parties and the non-aligned countries. The majority of the fraternal parties represents the right position even in the strained international situation, the evolutionary process started in the leadership of the French [Communist Party] is especially important. At the same time, we have to sum up the negative phenomena too. The wrong position of the Italian and Spanish

communist parties is especially worrying. The Vienna meeting of the parties of the Socialist International in February showed that social democracy does not intend to sacrifice détente on the altar of the adventurous US politics of the USA.

The US puts great emphasis on using the events in Afghanistan to increase her influence on the non-aligned movement and in the Muslim world. The political and economic interests of the developing countries and of existing socialism still coincide but a complicated situation has evolved. Cuba's position has become particularly complicated; the Cuban comrades should receive support to alleviate their situation. We must contribute to the neutralization of the resolutions of the Islamabad conference, and we should prevent the creation of the alliance of hostile Muslim states on the Southern borders on the Soviet Union.

Comrade Ponomarev gave a brief summary of the events in Afghanistan. He said Taraki and Amin had requested that the Soviet Union provide military help 14 times since March 1979. At the definite request of Amin the number of Soviet military experts and counselors was increased in the middle of December. Obeying the express demand by the members of the revolutionary council and the government, Amin himself requested four times in December the strengthening of the Soviet troops stationed there. On the basis of all this it is obvious that the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan are complying with the norms of international law. There is no question of occupying the country, the Afghan authorities act independently. The task of the Soviet troops in close cooperation with the Afghan authorities is to ensure the territorial sanctity. The contents of Comrade Brezhnev's pre-election speech confirm that the Soviet Union is ready to withdraw its troops as soon as the United States and Afghanistan's neighbors guarantee non-interference in the country's internal affairs.

In connection with practical problems and tasks, Comrade Ponomarev emphasized that the Soviet Union definitely disapproved of all American attempts aimed at breaking up the unity of the socialist community. At the same time, she endeavors to maintain relations with the USA according to the words and spirit of the agreements in effect. Reacting to the anti-Soviet steps of the American administration, the Soviet Union has suspended trips by cultural groups, the organization of exhibitions and has decreased tourism. At the same time, it maintains connections with some American firms in the sphere of publishing, the protection of copyright, radio and television. If the Americans sabotage the service provided to the planes of the Aeroflot in the future too, the Soviet Union will stop the transportation of supplies of American representations on the territory of the Soviet Union.

The economic and trade relations between the two countries have always taken place on the basis of mutual advantages. It seems reasonable to further maintain normal business relations, but on the other hand, to show that the socialist countries act on the basis of a harmonized policy.

The Soviet Union endeavors to constructively renew or continue the talks concerning disarmament. The Soviet party

is willing to start talks concerning medium-range missiles, independent of the ratification of SALT II and outside the framework of SALT III, demanding to modify or at least, suspend the NATO decision of 12 December and its execution.

In the present situation, the Warsaw Treaty's initiative to summon an all-European conference to deal with the questions of military détente and disarmament is particularly important. It is reasonable to continue the consultations preparing the Madrid meeting, but meanwhile we have to make clear the intentions of the capitalist countries, what character they want to give to the conference.

It was important and timely to cancel the planned political contacts at high level with the United States and the FRG. The Soviet Union's further behavior with the latter depends on whether the West German government will take concrete steps to contribute to détente. It is beyond doubt that the communist community cannot be interested in the defeat of the present coalition government. Taking this as a starting point, according to plan, Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Soviet Union will take place in spring.

It seems right and reasonable to develop political relations further with France and the other member states of NATO in order to prevent Carter's policy from prevailing. By boycotting the Moscow Olympics, Carter wants to diminish the prestige of socialism. His endeavors have been thwarted so far, but the situation is still very complicated. The Soviet Union will hold the Olympic Games and we must ensure that the sportsmen of as many countries as possible take part.

In the present international situation, it is of particular importance to consolidate economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the countries of the socialist community. We must make efforts to specialize production and develop cooperation to reduce our economic dependence on the capitalist world. The competent Soviet organs should study the possibilities of accelerating the process and of elaborating our coordinated activity in the capitalist world market.

We should increase the cooperation between the European communist parties. For this, a good opportunity is the joint French-Polish initiative to hold a conference of the representatives of the communist parties of the continent on the reduction of military tension and the promotion of the issue of disarmament in Paris in April. Although for example the Italian and Spanish parties categorically object to participating in the conference, it is reasonable to organize the event and look for other opportunities to convince those who disagree. The CPSU keeps up the conversation and relations with the socialist and social-democratic parties. It considers it necessary to make relations more active with the Finnish, West German, Belgian and other parties in order to solve tense international problems. To beat off the American government's cold war endeavors, all forces supporting peace and progressive international public opinion should be mobilized.

The representatives of the other sister parties contributing to the meeting unanimously underlined the necessity of more frequent harmonization of positions and ideas concern-

ing tasks between the closely cooperating socialist countries under the circumstances of the deterioration in the international situation. They also thoroughly analyzed the causes of international tensions and their position coincided with the Soviet evaluation.

In his speech, [Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary] Comrade *Dimitry Stanishev* put a great emphasis on the Bulgarian evaluation concerning the political situation in the countries of the Balkans. He sharply criticized Yugoslav foreign political endeavors. He underlined the importance of activating our existing relations in order to influence the Western European political circles in a favorable way.

During the presentation of the Polish point of view, [Polish United Workers Party Politburo member] Comrade *Andrzej Werblan* dealt with the behavior of the governments of France and the FRG emphatically. He stressed that we should approach the individual countries of Western Europe differentiated ways. We should treat flexibly the existing political, cultural and other relations and we should strive to make new contacts.

Comrade [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee Secretary] *Vasil Bilak* pointed at the extreme danger of American foreign and internal policy, the traditions of anti-imperialist endeavors of socialist countries and the fact that we should make use of the conflicts between the Western states. He stated that we should set up the conditions for the self-sufficiency of socialist countries concerning food and other products.

Comrade [East German Community Party Central Committee Secretary] *Hermann Axen* presented in detail the evaluation of the Party of Socialist Unity of Germany concerning the West-German situation and political endeavors. He underlined the danger of the hegemonic and revenge-seeking endeavors of the right wing in the FRG. This is why it is in our interest to support the present coalition government, we should contribute to preventing Strauss from coming to power.

Comrade *András Gyenes* analyzed the international situation and pointed to the importance of the offensive peace policy of the socialist countries. He presented the point of view of the HSWP concerning the capitalist countries, first of all, the maintenance of political, economic, cultural and technical-scientific relations with the West European countries. He underlined the importance of the consolidation of our relations with the communist parties of the capitalist countries and the social democratic parties.

After the meeting of secretaries, under the chairmanship of Comrade O. B. Rahmanyin, a meeting took place at the level of deputy heads of department. At this meeting, the Soviet side emphasized among other things that greater attention should be paid to influencing Yugoslav foreign policy in a positive direction. According to the CPSU, no "political earthquakes" are expected even after [Yugoslav leader Josip Broz] Tito's death]. Surely, the collective system of government, which has been created by now will prevail.

The Soviet side considers it necessary to make further efforts to hold the Paris communist conference successfully

in order to make our activity concerning the non-aligned countries more active. They also suggested that the closely cooperating socialist countries should start the elaboration and harmonization of their ideas and recommendations concerning the questions of the contents of the [14-15] May [1980] session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact [in Warsaw].

The report was prepared by Gyula Horn
Approved by András Gyenes



DOCUMENT No. 6

Memorandum of Conversation between Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee [CC] and Gyula Horn, Deputy Head of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party CC Department of Foreign Affairs, on Debates Within the Soviet Leadership on Issues of International Politics, 16 July 1980

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. 47/ 764.õ.e Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
TOP SECRET!
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Written in one copy
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Budapest, 16 July 1980

RECORD

On 16 July, Wednesday, a private interview took place with Comrade Vadim Zagladin, the first deputy of the head of the International Department of the CPSU CC. Comrade Zagladin said that for several months in the CPSU Politburo, there had been heated arguments about the Soviet Union's specific foreign policy steps, the general evaluation of the international situation and the situation of the communist movement. He emphasized that in this argument Comrade János Kádár's message to the Soviet leadership¹² played an important role, which created a stir and met with different reactions among the individual members of the Political Committee.

The leading personalities of the [Soviet Communist Party] Central Committee apparatus, including Comrades B. N. Ponomarev and K[onstantin] V[iktorovich] Rusakov were of the position that the HSWP's opinion contained many elements deserving attention and consideration, which should be implemented in individual international questions. Mainly

this was expressed in the evaluation of the situation and suggestions presented by Comrade B.N. Ponomarev at the February conference of the Central Committee secretaries of the fraternal parties of the closely cooperating socialist countries. Among these the most important could be considered the fact that the socialist countries should make maximum use of the possibilities contained in existing relations with the Western European countries to counter-balance the United States' foreign policy line.

During the February conference and afterwards the divergence of opinions and arguments increased between the Central Committee and the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Comrade [Georgy] Kornienko, the [Soviet] first deputy foreign minister accused the CC apparatus of opportunism, of lacking principle because of the concessions made to Western European countries. In the practical sphere this was also expressed by the fact that, following the instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet cultural organs, pushing aside all agreements in effect, cancelled the Soviet cultural events scheduled in France, the FRG and other capitalist countries. The determined action of the Central Committee was necessary to revoke this provision.

After Comrade Brezhnev's recovery and return to work, the power relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee changed significantly. Comrade [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko, against his own and his counselors' opinion, was forced to accept the proposal to meet [US] Secretary of State Muskie in Vienna. [The CC leadership] also managed to change with the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which [West German] Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt's visit to Moscow would have been organized so that it could become obvious to the West German government that the Soviet Union would be willing to strengthen partnership relations with the FRG only if certain conditions were fulfilled.

There is a remarkable divergence of opinions between the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] and the Central Committee in military questions too. The MFA leadership categorically objected to making any gesture, or having talks with NATO concerning medium-range missiles. Comrade Brezhnev's personal influence and his direct action were needed for the CPSU Politburo force them to approve the new suggestions regarding talks.

There are arguments concerning the solution of the Afghan problem too. The Central Committee thinks that efforts should be concentrated on the normalization of the internal Afghan situation that they must strive to achieve [normalization] so that the so-called Afghan question does not become a world political question. Several members of the leadership, first of all, Comrade Gromyko and others, still think that this question should be treated as one that shows the Soviet Union's resolution to defend her strategic interests.

Within the Soviet leadership there are debates going on also about what steps are necessary to solve the new problems arising in the international communist movement. Some think the reduction of financial aid, the narrowing of bilateral relations and strict criticism are needed to suppress oppor-

tunist trends. Such opinions are sometimes expressed in different statements, and publications. Comrade Zagladin thinks that there is a need for stating what one thinks, but that it would be a mistake to take steps that would seriously harm relations and thus minimize the possibility of our influencing events.

Gyula Horn



DOCUMENT No. 7

Soviet Briefing on the Correspondence between Yugoslav Leader Josef B. Tito and CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev [ca. 1980]

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f./11. Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

Top secret!

001/52

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The correspondence between Tito and Brezhnev

Maltsev, first deputy foreign minister, informed the leaders of the missions of closely co-operating socialist countries about the correspondence between Tito and Brezhnev:

In his letter written at the end of last month President Tito expressed to his worries concerning the unfavorable developments in the international situation. He thinks one should look for ways to improve the situation. With reference to this, he mentioned Soviet-American relations and that it would be reasonable to find solutions through talks that would make it possible to continue the policy of détente. He disapproved of NATO's decision about American medium-range missiles. He dealt with the march of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, which met with negative reactions both in international and Yugoslav public opinion. Tito thinks one should find a way to withdraw the Soviet troops as soon as possible. He approved of the changes in Iran, of its joining the list of non-aligned countries, and he criticized the American leadership for its interference in the internal affairs of Iran. As for the European situation, he thought it desirable that the Madrid Conference [on Cooperation and Security in Europe] should have positive results in November. Finally, he dealt with Soviet-Yugoslav relations and pointed out that Yugoslavia wished to consolidate them in the future as well.

In his reply, Comrade Brezhnev stated that the CPSU CC had studied the letter and interpreted it as an exchange of experience between the two parties and countries. This was very useful because it provided an opportunity to get to know each other's point of view and excluded the possibility of misunderstanding. We understand the worries that were

expressed by the letter because of the strained international situation. The letter says that we should put end to the practice that certain countries may interfere in other countries' internal affairs. It is unnecessary to prove that the Soviet Union wishes the same, but to realize this, we should, first of all, look for and do away with the origin of negative tendencies that made the international situation strained—wrote Comrade Brezhnev in his reply.

He stated that the present government of the United States does its best to suppress the national liberation movements, that it wants to prevent people from attaining their freedom. It can be understood that a person who loses his head because of his fear of popular revolution and who does not like détente cannot create his own people's right to self-determination and interferes in other countries' internal affairs. The Soviet side regularly informed international public opinion and its partners about the imperialist endeavors, and did its best to safeguard the achievements made in the seventies concerning the extension of relations between countries. The Soviet Union, in agreement with the member states of the Warsaw Pact, took a unilateral step too in the interest of détente, it withdrew one part of her troops from Europe and suggested talks to prevent the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. The US and NATO countries ignored this suggestion. The Soviet Union is ready to carry on talks even now if NATO changed its resolution or at least suspends its implementation. This is the way to achieve talks that should not be carried on from a position of power but should be based on the principle of equal rights.

All this shows that the Soviet Union has a constructive attitude toward the improvement of Soviet-American relations and it is not responsible for the deterioration of these relations. It is not the Soviet Union that delayed the ratification of [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] SALT II and it was not the Soviets who blocked economic relations between the two countries. Neither this, nor the boycott of the summer [1980] Olympic Games [in Moscow] disheartens the Soviet Union, but it is beyond doubt that these measures have a bad influence on [bilateral] relations, undermine confidence, [bring about a] deterioration in the atmosphere, make the solution of complicated international questions more difficult.

[The US] spreads all over the world [the idea] that the deterioration of international relations was due to the events in Afghanistan. In reality, it was Washington, who exported arms to the enemies of Afghanistan and counter-revolution to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had always maintained normal, neighborly relations with Afghanistan. It was like that during the reign of the monarchy as well and when Afghanistan stepped onto the path of socialist development. The Soviet side could not but hurry to help when the people of Afghanistan were threatened by outside danger from the US, Pakistan, and China. The Soviet Union also had to consider preventing the appearance of a new flashpoint on its Southern borders. The Soviet Union did so on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship, which corresponded also to the UN Charter. The Soviet side have never kept it a

secret that it sympathizes with nations fighting for their freedom and socialist development. At the same time, the Soviet Union has also declared publicly that it was ready to start the evacuation of its troops from Afghanistan if the United States and the countries neighboring Afghanistan undertake to guarantee ending their external interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union has no reason to station its troops in Afghanistan in its own interest, but it will not withdraw them until the causes making the support necessary cease completely.

Comrade Brezhnev mentioned in his letter that Yugoslavia had a great amount of prestige in the movement of the non-aligned countries and therefore it could do a lot concerning the Afghan issue. It could influence the Pakistani leadership by persuading it not to support the reactionary forces and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union approves of the fact that Iran's non-aligned character should be preserved. The Soviet side has supported this endeavor of the Iranian people from the beginning. At the same time, they oppose the idea of American control in the area of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union has not forgotten [Iranian political leader Mohammad] Mossadeq [who was overthrown in a CIA-sponsored coup in 1953] yet. The Non-aligned Movement, using all their power and prestige, could do a lot to stop the unlawful demands of the US.

Finally, Comrade Brezhnev's letter touched upon the fact that the present situation in the world was not simple, but the Soviet leadership was optimistic concerning the future because the forces of peace were great and there was no doubt that they would continue to grow in the future, that they would be able to overcome the imperialist endeavors. The favorable development of the world, however, will not take place by itself; to achieve this all countries have to be active. The Soviet Union is preparing for the Madrid conference in this spirit and desires to develop its cooperation with Yugoslavia in the different matters of international life and concerning the bilateral relations on this basis.

Some Western circles try to achieve the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The Soviet side does its best to develop these relations in a favorable direction. The Soviet Union does not disturb the development of the Yugoslav people, it wishes that Yugoslavia become stronger and the union of its peoples be consolidated.

Finally, Comrade Brezhnev expressed his gratitude for Tito's good wishes, wished him recovery to be able to work for a long time to the benefit of the Yugoslav people and for the flourishing of Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

DOCUMENT No. 8

Soviet Briefing on the Need to Counterbalance Yugoslav Efforts On the Afghan Question in the Non-aligned Countries [1980]

[Source: MOL M-KS 288 f. /11. Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

[1980]

Top secret!

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The meetings of our ambassadors in the non-aligned countries to counter-balance the Yugoslav endeavors concerning the Afghan question

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed some of our ambassadors working in important non-aligned countries to tell the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the receiving country that they had received news saying that some countries of the non-aligned movement have begun an initiative to summon a conference of foreign ministers or a session of the Coordination Bureau to discuss the Afghan question. Without interfering in the internal affairs of non-aligned countries, we would like to call attention to the fact that in the present situation such a conference would serve the interests of imperialism and most of all, of the United States. The countries of the Non-aligned Movement cannot have an interest in the US drawing the movement into an anti-Soviet confrontation and the US's general campaign against détente. We must see that the security of the Middle East is threatened most directly by the US's political plans and steps: its anti-Arab politics, its arms transportation, its preparations for intervention. The discussion of the Afghan question would distract the movement's attention from its real interests, it would break up its anti-imperialist unity and ability to act. In his electoral speech Leonid Brezhnev put forward a realistic and acceptable suggestion about doing away with the tension surrounding Afghanistan.

Our ambassadors, acting on the basis of the above instruction report the following about the reactions:

Our ambassador to *Algeria* was informed by the Cuban ambassador to Algeria about the fact that Yugoslavia had been the first to officially send a request to Cuba that the Coordination Bureau discuss and take up a position concerning the question of "non-interference in internal affairs." After Cuba's definite refusal, the Yugoslav side repeatedly urged Algeria to bring up the question. Algeria did so but Cuba again refused to discuss the question.

According to the report of our ambassador to Hanoi, the Vietnamese ministry of foreign affairs knows that, during his latest visits to *Bangladesh and India*, the Yugoslav foreign minister suggested a similar idea but it met with no support. The Indian side also informed the Vietnamese ministry of foreign affairs about the fact that the Indian government did

not approve of discussion of either the Afghan or the Cambodian situation at the conference commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Bandung [Non-alignment Movement founding] conference to be held at the same place and urged by Yugoslavia.

In the ministry of foreign affairs of *Ghana*, our ambassador received information that the Yugoslav side had not officially suggested the summoning of the conference of foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries or of the Coordination Bureau because of the strained international situation and because of the threats to the movement. Ghana did not approve of this idea even though it was, as far as it knew, approved of by several America-friendly non-aligned countries. Ghana thinks that in this question the Indian position should be followed. According to information received by our ambassador, the US ambassador to Accra attempting to influence the foreign minister of Ghana to make him change his stance and accept the Yugoslav position.

Our ambassador to *Jakarta* was given a definite statement in the Indonesian ministry of foreign affairs: Indonesia has not been approached with this idea and they do not have any information about the fact that any member of the non-aligned movement has dealt with the preparation of such action. Our ambassador to *Baghdad* received the same information from the Iraqi ministry of foreign affairs. Here they also underlined that Iraq in time understood the endeavors of the USA and of imperialism in the area and now the president mobilized the Arab countries by announcing a charter against the USA's Near East policy and the Egyptian-Israeli special agreement.

The acting foreign minister of *Kuwait* told our ambassador that at present there was no specific plan for summoning the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries or of the session of the Coordination Bureau. Kuwait agrees to take such a step only if the conference does not become an anti-Soviet forum and discusses exclusively the plan of development and what role the movement may play in it. Kuwait does not approve of mentioning "interference," for which "there are more serious examples in the world." They emphasize putting an end to the presence of foreign troops without naming the Soviet Union.

Kuwait carries on vivid consultations about the Afghan question with both the Western and the non-aligned countries. They think that their position coincides with that of India; therefore they encourage India to be active. As their latest step, they told the British undersecretary of state for foreign affairs that they did not approve of the English suggestion about the neutralization of Afghanistan. Together with India, they believe that the most realistic approach to solution is for a national democratic government embracing wide layers to be formed in Afghanistan. The present government having a narrow base cannot achieve national peace. The USA, Pakistan and others have to stop arming refugees and they should help all Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan without arms. Preparing for the event of the fulfillment of the above mentioned conditions, the Soviet Union should work out a realistic and detailed schedule for the withdrawal

of its troops. According to the foreign minister, in connection with Afghanistan, India will become active first of all in the non-aligned movement.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Soviet briefing on the talks between CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and President of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Babrak Karmal in Moscow, 29 October 1980

[Source: MOL M-KS 11/4391.õ.e. Translated for CWIHP by Attila Kolontári and Zsófia Zelnik.]

HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY
TOP SECRET!
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BULLETIN

On 28 October 1980, Comrade János Kádár received Comrade V. Pavlov—at his request—who informed him in the name of the CPSU Central Committee about the talks carried on with Babrak Karmal, the secretary-general of the Afghan People's Democratic Party CC, the president of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, prime minister.

The main political achievements of the talks are reflected in the document signed by L. I. Brezhnev and B. Karmal, 'The Declaration of the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,' which was published in the Soviet press on 20 October, and with which our friends are already probably familiar.

We would like to give our friends the following complementary confidential information:

B. Karmal and other Afghan leaders have expressed their frank appreciation for the support the Soviet Union is providing to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the fight against foreign intervention, in defense of the April revolution, in building a new life. B. Karmal emphasized that, without among others, the timely, military help of the Soviet Union, the revolution would have been put down and Afghanistan's existence as a sovereign and independent state would have ceased.

We have confirmed that the Soviet Union has stood up firmly and will do so in the future for the Afghan revolution and we consider it our internationalist obligation to provide support and aid to the Afghan people and government.

During the exchange of opinions about the central questions of the development of the Afghan revolutionary process, we pointed to the correctness of the internal policy

chosen by our Afghan friends, which started from the fact that the April revolution was of a national democratic character. Related to this, it is important not to rush forward, so that they would be able to elaborate from various aspects and ensure the success of the next step in the development of the revolution.

L. I. Brezhnev explained to B. Karmal that such an approach made possible greater deliberateness and flexibility in the solution of several questions of the development of the revolution than had been shown by the earlier leadership of the country for some reason. Here we think of questions like relations with religious circles, tribes and, of course, the execution of agrarian reform.

We also drew B. Karmal's attention to the fact that, besides the tasks of the mobilization of the party and the people to fight against intervention and counter-revolution, the questions of economic activity are being moved more and more to the fore. It is necessary to do everything to revive and develop the national economy, to raise the standard of living of the population and, foremost, of all workers and peasants as it is they who have to form the wide social base of the revolutionary power.

Concerning this, we told B. Karmal that the CPSU CC had made a resolution to provide additional aid to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan having as its aim the realization of comprehensive measures concerning the development of the people's economy and a raise in the standard of living.

Evaluating the military-political situation in the country, B. Karmal said that, on the whole, there were positive changes in the mood of the Afghan people; confidence in revolutionary power was growing. At the same time, it would always remain a task of first-rank importance to defend the security of Afghanistan's territory and to clear it of internal counter-revolution and gangs arriving from abroad, mainly from Pakistan.

In the interest of a more successful solution to the tasks of finally destroying the counter-revolution and to mobilizing across a wide range to fight against it, the Afghan leadership attributes great importance to the creation of a national front with a broad base, which would embrace representatives of all classes and layers of Afghan society, including the patriotic clergy and the tribes, among whom they are carrying on continuous work.

During the talks and the private meeting of B. Karmal and L.I. Brezhnev, special attention was paid to the need of putting an end to cliques among the members of the PDPA and of guaranteeing the unity of the party at each level. We told B. Karmal with full frankness that the still existing controversies within the party had a negative influence on the party's readiness to fight and consequently the situation of the army, the state apparatus and the whole country. We emphasized that the creation of an organic, not a mechanical unity of the party was a key problem. The fate of the revolution itself depended on solving this as soon as possible and on the party's readiness to rise above earlier conflicts. To

what extent the party would be able to carry out its revolutionary mission [depends on this]. We also emphasized that the PDPA bore responsibility for the fate of the revolution not only to its own people. Its responsibility was of an internationalist character just like the aid and support given to the Afghan revolution.

B. Karmal stated that the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee paid special attention to the question of unity and carried on continuous work aimed at improving it. According to his evaluation, the question of the organizational and ideological-political unity of the PDPA can be considered 70 to 75 percent solved.

We discussed questions concerning the political settlement of the Afghan situation based on the recommendations of 14 May this year of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA], well-known by our friends. In this respect, we emphasized that the consistent realization and support by other brotherly countries of the policy harmonized between the Soviet Union and the DRA would have its positive results. The plans to change the character of the Afghan revolutionary system would be thwarted and so would be attempts to question the legality of the revolutionary Afghan government and invent plots to prevent its recognition.

The internal and external counter-revolution has not surrendered yet, but time is on the side of the new, revolutionary Afghanistan becoming stronger and stronger with undiminished energy.

As for the evaluation of the international situation and the foreign political initiatives of the brotherly countries, our Afghan friends gave expression to their approval and full support.

During the discussion of the South-Asian situation, we pointed to the activation of the USA's and China's intrigues in this area. B. Karmal put special emphasis on the danger of the Zia-ul Hak regime [in Pakistan] playing the role of the unforgiving enemy of the Afghan April revolution after becoming the obedient means for the politics of American imperialism and the Chinese endeavor for hegemony.

B. Karmal approved of our opinion concerning the fact that the consolidation of relations between Afghanistan and India might contribute to a great extent to the prevention of American-Chinese intrigues in this area. Realizing the need for an improvement of the Near East situation, our Afghan friends also intend to continue work concerning the settlement of their relations with Iran, although this is not a simple task.

On the whole, we think that B. Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union was timely and useful. We hope that the talks carried on with B. Karmal and the other Afghan comrades who do not have enough experience in governing the country will be of help to them in acquiring such experience.

B. Karmal expressed his conviction that his visit to the Soviet Union would have a positive influence on the consolidation of the internal political situation and the strengthening of the system of the revolutionary power in Afghanistan,

just like on the stabilization of the foreign political positions of the DRA.”

Budapest, 29 October 1980.

NOTES

¹ János Kádár's account on his visit to Moscow at the 31 July 1963 meeting of the HSWP Political Committee, Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives, hereafter: MOL], M-KS-288.f.5/309.ő.e. Following Khrushchev's fall, at a meeting with the new Soviet leadership Kádár warned Brezhnev that whatever the Soviet leadership did, it had an important effect on the other socialist countries as well. *Magyar-szovjet csúcstalálkozók, 1957-1965*, [Hungarian-Soviet Summit Meetings. Documents] Évkönyv, 6. 1998 /szerk. Litván György. (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 1998): p. 171.

² *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A History in Documents*, ed. by Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer, (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002): pp. XLI-XLII.

³ Jaromír Navrátil, et al. Eds. *The Prague Spring 1968* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1998).

⁴ Odd Arne Westad. "Concerning the situation in 'A': New Russian evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan" *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997): p. 131.

⁵ Two visits of FRG politicians were cancelled: foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher was to visit Prague, while Chancellor

Helmut Schmidt was to have talks with Erich Honecker in Berlin.

⁶ MOL., M-KS-288.f. 5/791.ő.e.

⁷At the same time Kádár sent explanatory letters to SPD Chairman Willy Brandt and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

⁸ István Horváth and István Németh, *És a falak leomlanak. Magyarország és a német egység (1945-1990)* [And the Walls Come Down. Hungary and German Unity (1945-1990)] (Budapest: Magvető Kiadó, 1999) 173-176. Eventually, in 1988, the contract was made and diplomatic relations between Hungary and the EEC were established.


⁹Csaba Békés, "Back to Europe. The International Context of the Political Transition in Hungary, 1988-1990," in: Andras Bozoki, ed. *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), p. 237-272.

¹⁰The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was founded in 1965. Two years later the party split into two fractions: Khalq (people) and Parcham (banner). The Khalq group was lead by Taraki, while Babrak Karmal was the head of the Parcham group. The two groups were united at the party conference in July 1977.

¹¹ Gyula Horn, member of the CC Department of International Affairs (1969-1983); head of CC Department of International Affairs (1983-1985); state secretary for foreign affairs (1985-1989); foreign minister (1989-1990); prime minister of the Republic of Hungary (1994-1998).

¹² Following the unexpected Soviet request to freeze high-level consultations with Western politicians, Kádár had sent a letter to Brezhnev arguing that in the present situation the allies had to be consulted regularly on joint Soviet bloc policy and that the results of détente must be preserved.

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Czechoslovakia and the War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

By Oldrich Tůma

Sometimes a historian runs across documents that cast a revealing light on his research topic in just a few lines. Just so, the Czechoslovak Communist leadership's view of Afghanistan during the 1970's and 1980's is vividly illustrated in a few passages from two documents found in the archive of Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) Central Committee General Secretary Gustáv Husák.¹

The first document is a report dated 17 February 1970. Submitted by the Czechoslovak embassy in Kabul on the political situation in Afghanistan and the reactions provoked there by the events in Czechoslovakia from the spring of 1968 to the beginning of 1970. The report, detailed and very well informed, characterized the opinions of the country's various political groupings on the events in Czechoslovakia; in some places it was nearly prophetic. According to the report, some Afghans, on the center right of the political spectrum, reckoned that "Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), might under certain circumstances invite the Soviet Union to occupy Afghanistan." Even the center left (represented in the report by Muhammad Daud, a former premier who later became head of state after a coup in 1973), was "concerned that if they align themselves any more closely to the USSR, things could end up there like in the CSSR."

The second document was written ten years later almost to the day. During that decade Babrak Karmal lost his position as PDPA General Secretary, went into exile, and reemerged in late 1979 as party leader and head of government. On 27 February 1980, he wrote – now as leader of Afghanistan – "to my respected brother, Comrade Gustáv Husák: Scientifically speaking, history never repeats itself. But according to the laws of peace and socialism, and the law of the downfall of imperialism, and in view of the fact that international reaction is still capable in various areas of disrupting peace, freedom, and socialism, the crisis in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan is notably similar to the events of 1968 in heroic Czechoslovakia."

Babrak Karmal was certainly not the only one reminded of 1968 by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in 1979 national security advisor to President Carter, writes in his memoirs how he attached a short memorandum to a proposed American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, explaining how President Johnson had reacted to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He felt that the American reaction in 1968 represented the minimum of what the United States had to do in response to the new intervention.² As we now know the American reaction ended up being much more forceful—to the unpleasant surprise of the Soviets.

Comparison of the two invasions is almost obligatory in

the historical literature on the war in Afghanistan, which swarms with the phrase "just as in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968." Similarities cited are both military (use of airborne troops and occupation of key buildings in the capital) and political (use of pro-Soviet communists to help carry out and justify the invasion), as well as similar ideological and propaganda rationalization (the Brezhnev Doctrine).³ There is a noticeable similarity in terminology used—the infamous 1968 phrase "healthy forces" [i.e., orthodox Communists] to describe the corresponding faction in the PDPA that cooperated in the intervention,⁴ and some key individuals filling the same roles on the Soviet side (the commander of the invading forces was as in 1968 General Pavlovskij; General Yepishov's role was also similar to the one he played in Czechoslovakia).⁵ Some episodes are almost grotesquely similar. The famous scene in which Alexander Dubcek, when informed of the invasion, wept in disbelief that the Soviets could do such a thing, saw a repeat on 27 December 1979 in Kabul, only with a somewhat more passionate script: When KGB special forces began their attack on Tadj-bek palace in Kabul and shooting was heard within, PDPA General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin ordered that Soviet units be called in to assist. When he was told the Soviets were the ones doing the shooting, he threw an ashtray at his aide, shouting "You lie! That's impossible!"⁶

More importantly, however, the Soviet leadership itself drew analogies between 1968 and 1989. They assumed that the action in Afghanistan would go over relatively calmly on the international scene, with verbal protest from the West at most, and that the situation would be quickly stabilized. Although it had been a difficult decision for Brezhnev, in Moscow's view the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had strengthened both the position of Brezhnev himself, as well as that of the USSR as a world power.⁷

The historical analogy was reflected upon in Prague as well. The similarities, which were pointed out by Karmal, made the CPCz leadership particularly sensitive to the situation of the Afghan comrades. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan seemed to confirm once again the correctness of the orthodox view of 1968, adopted by the "normalization" leaders of the CPCz in 1970, which accepted the invasion of Czechoslovakia as necessary and justified. The Afghan communists were likewise eager to point out this similarity; in fact, Karmal went so far as to personally translate the CPCz's "Lessons of Crisis Developments in the Party and Society" into Farsi.⁸ In its search for support, the PDPA appealed to the Czechoslovak comrades on the basis of shared fate and experience.

Czechoslovakia had maintained relatively close ties with

Afghanistan during the monarchy, and later with the Daud regime, who took power after the coup and overthrow of the king in 1973. (Incidentally, Afghan King Zahir Shah had made a long visit to the Karlsbad spa, for reasons of health, in the early 1970s, inadvertently adding his name to the curious list of foreign statesmen who lost power at home soon after their stay in Czechoslovakia.) Czechoslovakia provided Afghanistan with economic assistance, loans, and weapon deliveries, including L-39 training jets.⁹ The relationship grew even closer after the April 1978 coup brought the Marxist PDPA to power. In the spring of 1979, after a visit to Afghanistan by CPCz chief ideologist Vasil Bilak, the Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee (CC) discussed a general plan for future cooperation and assistance for Afghanistan. Bilak had been in Afghanistan in March; where he observed, among other things, the bloody suppression of an anti-Communist uprising in Herat, the country's second largest city, during which several Soviet advisors lost their lives.¹⁰ Bilak submitted a report and extensive materials on the situation in Afghanistan, along with proposals for future Czechoslovak political, economic and cultural cooperation with the new Afghan regime; the report was approved by the CPCz CC Presidium in May.¹¹ The document concluded that "the fundamental changes in Afghanistan create new politico-economic and ideo-propagandistic conditions for participation by the community of Socialist countries. Therefore the policy of the CSSR will be to focus on further consolidation of the progressively-oriented regime in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and its foreign policy." This report suggested various types of assistance and cooperation, much of which was gradually carried out in the following years.

The close relations between the two governments and the two Communist parties were illustrated by a number of top-level visits. In addition to Bilak, Foreign Minister Bohumil Chnoupek (June 1980¹² and April 1987¹³), Chairman of the Slovak National Council Peter Colotka (May 1983¹⁴), and Federal Vice-premier Josef Kempný (April 1988¹⁵) visited Afghanistan. Equally frequent were trips by high-level Afghan officials to the CSSR; the reception of Karmal in June 1981 was especially opulent.¹⁶

Divisions within the ruling Afghan party, however, posed certain problems for the CPCz. In 1966 the party had split into two factions, the Parcham and the Khalq. After the April 1978 Revolution, the two factions worked together. The highest offices in the party and state were held by Nur Muhammed Taraki, leader of the Khalq. His deputy was Karmal from Parcham. Conflict soon broke out, however; officials of the Parcham were relieved of their posts, some were shipped off on diplomatic missions abroad.¹⁷ The most important of these, Karmal, took up the position of ambassador to Prague in August 1978. Thus the factional conflict within the PDPA affected the CPCz directly and more so as the struggle deepened. After being removed as ambassador by Kabul in September 1978, Karmal feared for his life and decided to remain in Czechoslovakia. The leadership of the CPCz waffled somewhat before, apparently at the recommendation from Mos-

cow, it permitted Karmal to remain in the country on the pretext that his health required long-term treatment.¹⁸ The decision, of course, was not well received in Kabul. After a meeting at which he informed Taraki of the decision to let Karmal stay in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak ambassador reported to Prague that his "send-off, unlike my reception, was notably brisk."¹⁹

There is no indication at all that the Soviets were at the time considering a future use for Karmal. On the contrary, at the time Karmal was traveling to Prague, Soviet ambassador to Kabul Puzanov informed Czechoslovak ambassador Karmelita that the poor relations between Khalq and Parcham within the PDPA were mainly the result of personal rivalries. Puzanov let it be known that the USSR supported Khalq and took a very reserved stance toward Parcham officials and Karmal in particular, recommending that Prague show great circumspection in dealing with him.²⁰

What Karmal did from September 1978, when he began his "treatment" in Czechoslovakia, until he appeared in December 1979 as head of state in Afghanistan calling for Soviet troops and "fraternal assistance," is not clear from the available Czechoslovak archival record. According to Col. Morozov, then head of the KGB in Afghanistan, the Kabul regime decided in May 1979 to send a hit squad to Czechoslovakia to kill Karmal. According to the source, the Czechoslovak Secret Police (StB) uncovered the plot and neutralized the group.²¹ However, none of the accessible Czechoslovak documents mention this episode. According to a Western intelligence source, Karmal was said to have stayed at a Party hotel in Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad) and was still in Czechoslovakia in September 1979.²² The official Soviet version claimed that Karmal had left Czechoslovakia in October 1979, two months before the invasion, and worked along with other Parcham exiles organizing underground resistance in Afghanistan against Amin, who had overthrown and murdered Taraki that September.²³ Karmal actually seems to have reentered Afghanistan only a few days before 27 December, under the protection of Soviet units that were moving into the country upon the request of Amin. Prior to his arrival in Kabul, Karmal had apparently spent some time in the USSR, probably somewhere in one of the Central Asian republics.²⁴ Precisely when he really left Czechoslovakia remains unclear.

Documents from the papers of Gustáv Husák chillingly illustrate the struggles and changing fortunes within the Afghan Communist Party. Found next to one another in the files are heartfelt greetings to Comrade Muhammed Nur Taraki on Afghanistan's national holiday, dated 19 August 1979; then heartfelt congratulations to Comrade Hafizullah Amin upon his election to the highest Party and state offices, dated 18 September of that same year (by then Taraki had already been murdered); and, again, equally heartfelt congratulations to Comrade Karmal upon the same, dated 28 December 1979 (by then Amin was dead, too).²⁵

The Czechoslovak regime gave its unequivocal support to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Its letter of congratulations to Karmal, drafted on 28 December, was released the

following day. The Bulgarian press agency issued a similar statement the very same day, followed two days later by East Germany. The positions of Hungary and Poland were much more reserved: they did not send their congratulations until almost two weeks later.²⁶ In January, *Rudé právo* published a long interview with Brezhnev in which the Soviet leader defended the Soviet position, and in the following days the paper printed the favorable responses of its readers.²⁷

From early 1980 on, the Czechoslovak involvement in Afghanistan increased. Documents show that Czechoslovakia was second only to the Soviet Union in providing extensive aid to Afghanistan (a fact for which the Soviets expressed appreciation, while not failing to call upon them to take a greater part).²⁸ During the period from 1980 to 1985, Czechoslovak grants and loans to Afghanistan were triple those of the GDR, and fifteen times those provided by Bulgaria.²⁹ Czechoslovakia signed a number of agreements with Afghanistan (including a treaty for cooperation between security services) and trained hundreds of Afghan students, technicians, soldiers, journalists, security personnel, and PDPA activists. Afghanistan was given a loan of USD 120 million and humanitarian aid, including equipment for entire hospitals. Economic support was extensive: for example, Czechoslovakia took part in building cement factories in Polichomri and Ghorī, a thermal/fossil fuel electric power plant in Herat, an irrigation system in Helmand, etc.³⁰ Large arms deliveries were a matter of course. The lists of materials delivered also contain some strange entries: in 1980 the Czechoslovak ministry of culture sent to Afghanistan books, films, and television serials (including the famous “Major Zeman of the StB”), and musical instruments worth 25,000 CZK. It would also be interesting to know how the Afghan comrades, in their struggle against counterrevolution, made use of the 133 wigs worth 15,000 CZK, also obtained from Czechoslovakia.³¹ The Presidium of the CPCz Central Committee approved its last assistance to Afghanistan in October 1989. They agreed then to the presence of a PDPA secretary in Prague, covering his office expenses for 1990 and 1991 from CPCz funds. The CPCz’s assistance was not overly generous: the Afghan embassy asked for 500,000 CZK, but only 325,000 CZK were approved.³² It is unlikely that the CPCz was able to deliver on its promise.

Strange was the fact that from early 1989, when both regimes were facing acute crises, Prague’s interest in Afghanistan actually seemed to increase. In prior years, the Presidium of the Central Committee had only irregularly received reports at long intervals on the situation in Afghanistan, usually in the context of important visits. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989, Prague began getting more frequent and extensive reports on the Afghan situation (two in February, then again in April, May, and in September).³³ The agony of a distant Communist regime, and the alarming fact of Soviet disassociation with it, perhaps drew an irresistible, foreboding fascination.

The documents from the Czechoslovak archives are interesting not only as sources on the history of relations be-

tween Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, but as a source on the situation in Afghanistan itself, and they broaden our understanding of Soviet policies. The situation in Afghanistan is covered in a large number of documents – records of conversation with Afghan officials, reports and letters from PDPA officials, or reports made by the Czechoslovak diplomats in Kabul. Their content is relatively mundane: much on the defeat of counterrevolution and the approaching final victory; requests for increased assistance, and the obligatory criticism, by whatever faction of the PDPA held power at the time, of its rivals in the other faction. Among the more interesting documents is a letter dating from March 1980, from the PDPA Central Committee to the Communist Party of China (CCP) CC, explaining the situation before and after the Soviet intervention.³⁴ Significant records include materials related to top-level meetings during Karmal’s visit to Prague in June 1981,³⁵ or minutes of an April 1987 meeting in Kabul between Chnoupek and PDPA General Secretary Nadjib, who replaced Karmal in 1986.³⁶

Documents casting light on the Soviet side of the issue are few. I have found four: the above-mentioned report of the Czechoslovak ambassador to Kabul about the opinions of Soviet ambassador Puzanov on the situation within the PDPA in August 1978;³⁷ a Soviet evaluation of the situation in spring, 1987;³⁸ a report by Soviet ambassador in Kabul Vorontsov for embassy officials of the other socialist countries in Afghanistan, (26 January 1989);³⁹ and the official position of the CPSU CC sent to the CPCz CC after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (17 February 1989).⁴⁰

The spring 1987 position paper signaled a change in Soviet policy. There was still talk of full support for the Kabul regime, and of the necessity for Czechoslovakia to provide increased support; yet, the emphasis was no longer on the unconditional defeat of counterrevolution but instead on a policy of national reconciliation and the necessity for a political, not military, solution. The two documents from early 1989 in particular show the efforts of the USSR to extricate itself from the problem of Afghanistan. The Soviet position paper stated explicitly: “...we withdrew our forces regardless of the fact that the other participants in the Geneva agreements broke the agreement arrived at. Under these circumstances Soviet troops could, and had the right to, remain in Afghanistan. Even so, the Soviet side, in the interests of Afghan reconciliation, and regional and international security, has fulfilled its commitments.” But under these circumstances the assurances, expressed by Kabul leadership, of complete understanding for the Soviet actions, as well as for the broad material and propaganda assistance that would allow the Kabul regime to survive militarily and eventually make peace, somehow lack conviction. The Soviet leadership put the CPCz on notice toward the end as well (the passage has a somewhat apologetic tone): “We would emphasize that we are not indifferent to what happens in Afghanistan. We will make broad efforts to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive settlement to the Afghan problem. We

trust that you understand our thoughts and feelings, our effort to achieve peace for the Afghan people, for them to live their lives as they see fit, with the right to determine their own fate.” The document also reported in detail on Soviet negotiations with Iran, Pakistan, and various groups of muhajadeen. But despite every assurance that Kabul was sufficiently capable of defending itself militarily, the concern kept reappearing that conflicts between individual opposition groups might break out in full force. One can hardly avoid the impression that this was the eventuality on which Soviet leaders placed their hopes, that might allow the Kabul regime to survive.⁴¹

The CPCz leadership gave its unreserved support to Soviet policy in Afghanistan. It involved itself in many ways in political and economic assistance to the Afghan communist regime, and made greater efforts and spent more money doing so than the other Soviet allies. The CPCz followed the same policy in other cases such as Cuba and Vietnam. It would seem that this consistent willingness on the part of Czechoslovakia, in the case of the war in Afghanistan, to involve itself on behalf of Soviet interests, may have reflected a certain feeling of mutual affiliation. This affiliation existed on other levels as well. After August 1968 in Czechoslovakia, the question was posed by many: who’s next? When the answer turned out in late 1979 to be Afghanistan, perhaps few guessed (least of all the “normalizers” of the CPCz) that that this time would be the last Soviet intervention, and that the episode in history that started on 27 December with an attack on the presidential palace in Kabul would, instead of creating the conditions for creating a socialist society, would become one of the decisive factors in the extinction of that society, and its political regime.

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DOCUMENTS

Editor’s Note: Four documents from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Archive are published below. They are located in the Central Archive in Prague. The documents depict the situation in Afghanistan during the last years of the Soviet intervention. The first document contains the minutes of the meeting between Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohumír Chnoupek and Najib, Secretary General of the Afghan People’s Democratic Party on the occasion of Chnoupek’s visit to Afghanistan between 26 and 30 April 1987.

The second document gives the Soviet account of the situation in Afghanistan; the memo was submitted to the members of CPCz Politburo with other materials on their

meeting on 6 May 1987.

The third document contains information for ambassadors of other Eastern bloc countries delivered by the Soviet Kabul envoy Yuri M. Vorontsov on 26 January 1989.

The last document presents the official CPSU CC position following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This memorandum was handed to Jozef Lenárt, CPC CC Secretary, by Deputy USSR Ambassador Marat Kuznetsov on 17 February 1989.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Report on Meeting between Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohumír Chnoupek with the General Secretary of the Afghan People’s Democratic Party Central Committee, Comrade Najib [1987]

[Source: State Central Archive Prague, File 02/1, CC CPCz Politburo 1980-1989, 35th Meeting, 6 May 1987, in Czech. Translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton.]

Najib warmly welcomed Comrade Chnoupek in Afghanistan in the name of the Afghan People’s Democratic Party. Najib then spoke of the main goals of the national reconciliation policy. First, he emphasized guaranteeing the peace and security of the country. Most importantly, it is important to mobilize political forces in the struggle for state sovereignty and to gain the support of wide segments of the population for the revolutionary process. The main goal is to lay the groundwork for the ongoing realization of the April National Democratic Revolution. He characterized the present situation as follows: 100 days had passed since the national reconciliation policy was declared. 80 days remain until the passing of the first phase, namely the validity of the declared ceasefire. Much has been accomplished over the past 100 days. However, even more work still awaits us. First of all, a great organization of labor is to take place. The Party is undertaking widespread massive propaganda activity in order to realize the new policy. At the present time, the Party is taking energetic strides in the economic sphere. The first year of the current Five-Year Plan represents the effective beginning of a national resolution of the country’s economic difficulties. A pan-Afghan conference of national private businessmen took place for the first time in Afghan history. The goal here is to develop cooperation with the private sector, which accounts for eighty percent of the national economy. Najib expressed his appreciation for the speech by the Czechoslovak ambassador at this conference, in which he stated basic Czechoslovak support for the reconciliation process. At issue is finding common ground with businessmen.

The Afghan leadership is also undertaking a new offensive on the international scene. It is defending the new policy more dynamically, which has yielded positive results, such as diplomatic relations with Cyprus and Zimbabwe. The Afghans are approaching the Geneva discussions with generous and courageous policies aimed at solving the Afghan situation. Relations with India are being consolidated. Unfortunately, Pakistan has completely disregarded the local interests of its population by not adopting a constructive approach at the Geneva discussions. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is an overall concurrence with all present aspects of Afghan policy.

The realization of national reconciliation policy is no easy task. Najib likened it to overcoming an unknown mountain where there is no smooth path, but where it is necessary to find an alternative way to overcome obstacles.

The Party is realizing national reconciliation policy with the burden of economic tasks that have gone unfulfilled over the past eight years. It is paying the price for past negligence and dilly-dallying in economic policy. The revolution brought with it many broken promises. It was like water dissipating in sand. The Party thus recognized the need for fundamental change. For this reason a special session of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee took place, resulting in the declaration of the national reconciliation policy. The idea of national reconciliation had existed previously. For example, the 16th Plenum of the People's Democratic Party Central Committee had presented a ten-point plan concerning this policy, but the concrete mechanisms and methods for realization were accepted later by the special session of the Afghan People's Democratic Party Central Committee. This policy does not represent some theoretical experiment, but rather it is a concrete reaction to a concrete situation, that is, a reaction to the needs of the people. This is a people's policy. Slogans expressed earlier had not gained the support of the wide masses.

Ever since the new policy was announced, certain pre-assumptions have been created according to which the Party must intensively work. At present, the Party has 180,000 members in 5,600 organizations. The task of the Party is to remedy past mistakes, formulate new plans, and to consider matters from a long-term perspective. Thus far, the Party has not achieved a qualitative change in the country. In spite of this, it is possible to point to some significant results over the past 100 days. A mechanism to realize the new policy has been created, namely national reconciliation commissions. About 1,300 of these commissions sprang up, which is not an insignificant number when considering the circumstances. The commissions are comprised of a large number of activists, including 3,000 former opponents of the Party.

Najib cited other tangible results. 25,000 counterrevolutionaries surrendered to government forces, in all 1,100 armed groups. An additional 100,000 members of the armed opposition are in contact with state organs. Another 30,000 have adopted a wait-and-see approach. Between 25,000 and 30,000 counterrevolutionaries continue to wage an armed struggle. However, their social base is dwindling, which is largely the

result of their irrational, mad policy of terror. This will only increase their isolation. There are great disagreements among the opposition inside the country.

On the international scene, the United States administration continues to hold a hard, uncompromising position towards Afghanistan. The same holds true for Iran. In addition, China has not changed its position and continues to provide assistance to the extremists.

Overall, it is fair to describe the international response to national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan as favorable. The fact that the empty seat at the Islamic Conference was not given to the extremists can be described as a success. On the contrary, the Conference resolution recognized the good will of both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. An appreciation of the new policy has also been expressed in two United Nations resolutions. Twelve out of fourteen opposition parties in Pakistan support national reconciliation policy. This leads the Party to believe that its new policy has not only local, but also international significance. The relationship to refugees has also been favorable. In the last six months, 44,000 refugees have returned compared with 35,000 over the past seven years. The number of repatriated refugees could be higher if obstacles were not placed in their way by the Pakistani and Iranian bureaucracies. 5,500 political prisoners have been released as a result of amnesty. 1,100 villages have been peacefully liberated. The second round of local elections is taking place. These results are greater than those over the course of seven years.

National reconciliation policy does not signify an end to the Party's struggle against extremists who still oppose the Party with arms in hand. This struggle continues with the difference that the Party no longer has to contend with 175,000 counterrevolutionaries, but rather a mere 35,000.

The national borders are being secured. Even the armed forces are being strengthened with 40,000 new fighters called up. In addition, the salaries of soldiers and officers have risen.

The backbone of support for national reconciliation policy remains the assistance provided by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Among the supporters is also Czechoslovakia. This year the Soviet Union provided especially significant assistance.

In other news, Najib expressed his heartfelt gratitude for assistance provided by Czechoslovakia and described in detail the quantitative nature of this support in individual economic sectors. Najib requested that Minister Chnoupek convey the Afghan leadership's sincere gratitude to Comrades G. Husák and V. Bilak.

There is a long tradition of relations between our countries, which precede the revolution and the founding of the Afghan People's Democratic Party. The diplomatic relations established in 1937 turned into brotherly relations after the revolution.

Najib recalled his conversation with the Czechoslovak ambassador two weeks before and just prior to the present gathering, in which he openly expressed the pressing need for Czechoslovak assistance to Afghanistan in the struggle

against international imperialism so that the burden of such assistance would not be solely on the Soviet Union. Difficult tasks await the Party in its attempts to implement the national reconciliation policy. A new initiative will need to be developed after the initial six-month period in a manner such that this policy will become irreversible and influence the masses both inside and outside Afghanistan and keep the opponents of the Afghan regime forever divided. The main organizer of this activity must be the Afghan People's Democratic Party. One of the main aspects of the new policy is the creation of a coalition Government of National Unity. The Afghan People's Democratic Party has decided that it must correct its past mistakes by relaxing its power monopoly. The Party must be a mobilizing, guiding force in society. The Party must get Afghanistan out of its present international isolation. Therefore, the Party's policy must be alive and realistic, conducted in new conditions and in cooperation with new forces. The Party can no longer rely solely on itself. Its policy must be open, patient, and enjoy the confidence of other social forces. The main aim is to achieve the unity, united character, and mobilization of the Party. At the same time, the Party must actively pursue social policy both in Kabul and in the countryside.

In order to achieve these goals, the Party is organizing a large gathering of all its members in Kabul as well as in the countryside. The accepted resolutions express full support for national reconciliation policy. In this, the Party sees a confirmation of its mandate to lead society and strengthen the Party through Leninist-style labor.

In his conclusion, Comrade Najib emphasized the need for close consultations with allies regarding the most effective implementation of national reconciliation policy on both a bilateral and multilateral basis where allied countries can provide significant assistance to those with whom they enjoy friendly relations.



DOCUMENT No. 2

Soviet Memorandum on the Present Situation in Afghanistan [6 May 1987]

[Source: State Central Archive Prague, File 02/1, CC CPCz Politburo 1980-1989, 35th Meeting, 6 May 1987, in Slovak. Translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton.]

The leadership of the Afghan Democratic Republic attaches special significance to expanding cooperation with socialist countries at a time when the situation there is complicated. For example, some days ago a working meeting between Comrade Najib and diplomatic representatives of socialist countries took place in Kabul. During this meeting,

Najib informed the others of Afghan domestic and foreign policy.

In these circumstances, the need for a common approach by socialist countries to aid Afghanistan is becoming more significant. This was discussed at a gathering of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Moscow. A new situation, however, has emerged in Afghanistan. A path to national reconciliation has been followed, bloodshed has been curtailed, and a political solution is being sought. The first tangible domestic and foreign policy results have been achieved. Some bands are laying down their arms, refugees are returning, and the international community is taking an active interest in Afghan events.

At the same time we realize that the basic struggle for national reconciliation in Afghanistan still awaits us. The imperialist and reactionary forces cannot reconcile themselves with the pacification of this tense flashpoint and are thus doing all they can to prevent a solution to the Afghan problem. It is sufficient to recall the new supplies of modern weapons to the counterrevolutionaries, the sending of hundreds of millions of dollars, and attempts to stifle discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva. The terror continues and the already weak Afghan economy is being further undermined. Naturally, without the overall support by socialist countries to our Afghan allies, it would be difficult to imagine victory in the struggle for a peaceful, non-aligned, and peaceful Afghanistan. It is obvious that the absence of a solution to the Afghan problem is being used to harm the interests of all socialist countries.

In this trying time for our Afghan comrades, it is crucial that they be firm in their pronouncements so that they can overcome their enemies' attempts to hinder national reconciliation.

Over the last months, the Soviet Union has decided to provide substantial, non-returnable aid to Afghanistan. In fact, Soviet assistance is increasing by several times. Out of humanitarian considerations, the Soviet Union has provided large quantities of basic needs for the poor in Afghanistan as well as for returning refugees. The Soviet side considers this to be important because many ordinary Afghans have lost their property and even the roof over their heads as a result of counterrevolutionary activities. Other significant assistance being prepared for the Afghan people includes education, health care, and the training of national cadres. When taking into account the issue of national reconciliation, great attention is devoted to the private sector and the creation of "mixed" enterprises. Also, significant aid is oriented towards the bolstering of the Afghan armed forces, whose role it will be to safeguard to stability of the national reconciliation process. The Soviet Union is strengthening its political and diplomatic support for Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union appreciates the benefits provided by the solidarity of socialist countries with the Afghan people. In the current situation, it is crucial once again to reconsider possibilities of expanding cooperation.

Concretely, it is important to activate political contacts with Afghanistan, particularly on a high level, and delega-

tions on various levels should be exchanged more frequently. It is quite clear that there exist serious reservations regarding a more active and involved approach to Afghanistan in the United Nations as well as other international gatherings between uninvolved countries. It is definitely worth considering looking into possible measures in the areas of propaganda and counterpropaganda with the aim of disseminating truthful information about the situation in Afghanistan. For the sake of brevity, we must do everything in our power so that nobody can doubt our support for the present policies of the Afghan leadership.

The Soviet Union is aware that its Czechoslovak friends, guided by an internationalist approach, are providing economic assistance to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it would be good for us to consider how to make this assistance more effective and how best to suit the needs of Afghanistan.

The Soviet side believes that its Czechoslovak friends will correctly interpret this call to action, which involves our common goals, and that the Czechoslovaks will do everything in their power to further the goal of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.



DOCUMENT No. 3

Report by the Soviet Ambassador Y. M. Vorontsov, Concerning the Current Political Situation Inside Afghanistan and the Possibilities of Solving the Afghan Question, sent to the Heads of the Embassies and Legations of the Countries of the Socialist Commonwealth in Kabul, [3 February 1989]

[Source: State Central Archive Prague, File 02/1, CC CPCz Politburo 1980-1989, 103rd Meeting, 3 February 1989, in Czech. Translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton.]

Y. M. Vorontsov reported on his talks with representatives of the Afghan opposition in Tehran and Istanbul. In Tehran he met with a representatives of the alliance of “Eight.” It was a very unusual group of people; only one person spoke on its behalf—[spokesman of the seven-party mujaheddin alliance Yunus] Khalis [Khales]—who talked mainly about the French Revolution. He said that once an Islamic state was created in Afghanistan there would be full equality and freedom in the country. Vorontsov replied that it was first necessary to bring about an end to the fighting in Afghanistan and establish a coalition government. Khalil did not reply to that.

According to Vorontsov the leading Iranian representatives took a pragmatic, matter-of-fact approach in talks with him. They had directly asked him what had to be done to solve the Afghan problem. Vorontsov replied that the war had to be stopped and all the representatives of all the forces

in Afghan society had to be brought to one table. They replied in a matter-of-fact way that they were looking into what could be done to that end. Unlike earlier talks, they avoided talk about the ideology of the Islamic revolution.

It was agreed that Vorontsov would meet again with representatives of the “Eight” (according to Vorontsov they are not at all independent, and are run by Iran).

In Pakistan, according to Vorontsov, [Pakistani Prime Minister] Ms. Benazir Bhutto is not in charge; power is in the hands of the generals. In Islamabad he had been told openly that the country supported the Mujahadeen on the basis of Islamic commonality and the fundamentalist principles established in the country by Zia-ul Haq. The generals had come out particularly hard: [Pakistani General Mirza Aslam] Baig and [Hamid] Gul, the Head of Military Intelligence (who runs the mujahaddin).

The meeting with Vorontsov was attended by [National Liberation Front of Afghanistan leader Sebgatullah] Mudjaddidi [Mojaddedi], [National Islamic Front leader Pir Sayyid Ahmad] Gilani and representatives of [radical Islamist mujaheddin (Hizb-i Islami) leader] Gulbuddin [Hekmatyar] and [“Islamic Society of Afghanistan” leader Burhanuddin] Rabbani. Rabbani himself was abroad. Also in attendance was the head of the pro-Iranian “Eight,” Khalis. During the talks there were clearly also sharp differences between participants, and mutual hatred. The talks took place in an extremely tense atmosphere; the partners stated that they did not want to hear anything about the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

At one point Mudjaddidi said that he wanted elections to be held in Afghanistan to make it appear that the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan had the support of the masses. Vorontsov agreed that there should be elections, but pointed out that this would be the first test of the position of members of the “Alliance of Seven,” which so far had never that appeared before the Afghan people. Gilani immediately declared that he did not want any elections.

Vorontsov demanded that the talks should focus on two main tasks: the ceasing of hostilities and the creation of a provisional organ. A sort of “consultative council” was discussed, which was to comprise between fifty and sixty members. Vorontsov expressed his agreement with the condition that the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan would also be suitably represented in it. The Pakistanis then proposed a council comprising between five hundred and six hundred persons; their reasoning was that all the leading armed groups operating in Afghanistan also wanted to be represented in it (because they did not believe the “Seven,” and wanted to be alone at all talks). Vorontsov pointed out that such a large assembly could not decide anything. He then, however, agreed again to the condition that the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan would be appropriately represented. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Jaqub Khan promised that they would try to see to that. Now, however, [Benon] Sevan ([UN envoy Diego] Cordovez’s political representative) said that he was considering providing the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan with twelve places (out of

five hundred to six hundred places); that, however, is unacceptable. The pro-Iranian opposition (the “Eight”) also refused to take part in this “council,” because it had been assigned only sixty places, though it had demanded twice as many. Vorontsov feels that it is necessary to return to the variant of a council with fifty to sixty members, in which the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan should hold twelve places and the other groups would also have twelve places each.

What was important, according to Vorontsov, was that everybody should be very interested in the creation of some sort of “consultative council” (including representatives of Iran and Pakistan; and there were also signals of interest from the USA). Ms. Bhutto asked Vorontsov when such a council should begin to operate; Vorontsov replied, that it should be as soon as possible.

Vorontsov said that everybody (from both the “Seven” and the “Eight”) wanted to negotiate, but only with him. At the same time, the most irreconcilable men, in his words, wanted to have highly private talks with him (so that none of their partners finds out).

The main problem, however, is what Vorontsov called the “Pakistan Game:” to turn these ideas about “councils” into a reality only after 15 February [the deadline for Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan]. On 15 February they want to test their strength, to see whether they can manage to overthrow the Kabul regime militarily; if they do not succeed, then they would negotiate about “councils” and compromises—that is Plan B. The politicians do not discuss that publicly. The generals speak more openly about this. They (Baig and Gul) told Vorontsov that their primary effort would be to find a military solution to the Afghan question; if they didn’t succeed, it would be the turn of the diplomats. This position is also taken by the US, and one cannot expect another approach even from the new [George H. W.] Bush administration.

Concerning former [Afghan] King Zahir Shah, Vorontsov said that in his talks with him, Zahir Shah complained at great length about his having been deposed. He expressed sorrow over the suffering of the people of Afghanistan as a result of the many years of war, and stated that he was prepared to do everything to end this war and bring peace back to Afghanistan. He did not support the condition that Nadjibullah and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan had to leave the political scene; yet he was aware that Nadjibullah could not stand at the head of a broad coalition based on all the political forces of Afghan society. At the same time he knew he could not return as king. But he did openly say to Vorontsov that his activity in this sense would be possible after the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Vorontsov’s personal view was that Zahir Shah himself was not particularly interested in this activity, but was being forced into it by those around him (his relatives). The Czechoslovak titular head reported on his talks with Minister Pazhvak and about the latter’s proposal that Czechoslovakia use its good name with Zahir Shah and send its emissary to him for talks (see my 010/89). Vorontsov very much welcomed the proposal and

recommended it be carried out, especially if we found somebody who had once talked to Zahir Shah in the past.

The Soviet representatives stated clearly to the leading actors of the Kabul regime that they had to withstand the initial assault from the side of its enemies. Vorontsov added that contacts would continue (with the “Seven” and the “Eight”) and other groups and actors (though only after 15 February; likewise, Najibullah and members of the Kabul leadership would also negotiate intensively with the opposition along their lines.)

The aim of the recent visit of E. A. Shevardnadze in Kabul was to negotiate with the Kabul leadership about what assistance they still required in order to withstand the assault from the side of the armed resistance after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. After Shevardnadze’s departure members of the delegation remained, and discussed details related to this assistance. Vorontsov reported that other Soviet actors (such as Defense Minister [Dmitri] Yazov) would soon be flying to Kabul with this end in mind.

Vorontsov reckons that the first assault from the side of the armed resistance against the Kabul regime would last about one month (that is to say, till about 15 March). The Kabul regime had to hold out, and had all the necessary conditions for that. The opposition was at a disadvantage, because it would be fighting both against the Kabul regime and amongst itself. Each part of the opposition wanted to be the first to enter Kabul; heavy fighting was already taking place among them. The strongest forces among them are those of Gulbuddin and Rabbani, but they hate each other more than they hate Najibullah and the Kabul politicians.

The Soviet Union is giving the Kabul leadership everything necessary—including powerful new weapons—so that they have enough of everything to fight for a year. In conversations with leading Kabul politicians, E. A. Shevardnadze emphasized that their unity was essential to drive back the enemy, and that was a life-and-death question for them.

To relieve the military situation of the governing forces, the Soviet Union would any day now also provide assistance in the form of heavy weapons and aircraft: places where enemy forces, ammunition dumps, etc. were concentrated had been destroyed. These strikes, carried out together with the Afghan government forces, were very effective and caused the enemy great losses. At present a lethal operation was underway against the strongest of the native leaders of the armed opposition, Ahmad Shah Masoud, whose divisions had occupied the Panshir Valley, a territory in the north-east provinces, and operated particularly in the region of the Solang pass, where they disrupted traffic on the Kabul-Hairaton highway.

Even though talks had been held with him for several years now (both from the side of the Kabul leadership and from the side of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan), he has turned out to be insincere and is the first to prepare an attack on Kabul after the departure of Soviet forces. According to Vorontsov the Americans have won him over to their side and have recently (not through Rabbani, as was the case in the past) provided him with money and arms, and sent their

emissaries to him. Masoud is Tajik and the [ILLEGIBLE–Tajiks?] want to make him the leader of the northern part of Afghanistan and thus, through him, complicate the situation between the Tajiks and other peoples in the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. Devastating strikes with rockets and air raids, followed by artillery fire, have caused heavy losses to Massoud in terms of men and material, decimating his units. Evidently units of other leaders of the armed opposition (particularly Gulbuddin) are taking part in this campaign against Masoud.

Vorontsov confirmed that the Soviet divisions would leave Afghanistan by 15 February. The most important situation will be on the Kabul-Hairaton highway, where Soviet and Kabul units are now conducting a mopping-up operation. That must then be assured by the government forces themselves. In the same way the government forces are taking over the protection of Kabul airport. Vorontsov emphasized several times that the Kabul leadership had everything needed to that end, but must demonstrate strong resolve.

According to Vorontsov, a large war over Kabul, a concentrated attack on the city, is not anticipated. He is convinced that the Soviet Union will thwart the attempt to blockade the city, and will ensure the necessary foodstuffs for the inhabitants of the city (an airlift has been made). It is necessary, however, to be prepared for terrorism within the city and rocket attacks on it. The Afghan security forces have discovered hundreds of rockets prepared for use against the town; Vorontsov noted that this means that the mujaheddin have moved thousands of rockets into the proximity of the city. The rockets should be of the same strength as those that were fired on the town; only their range may have been extended to 35-40 km. A basement shelter ought to provide sufficient protection.

It is also necessary to be prepared for bandit attacks, explosions and provocations in the city.

For employees of our offices in Kabul that means the following:

(1) A reduction in the number of employees to the bare minimum. In accordance with the latest decision, the Embassy of the USSR has sent all women home. There are now about three hundred persons on the Embassy grounds – Vorontsov was trying to reduce this number even more. Employees sent to the USSR shall continue to remain in the employ of the Embassy; they should take their vacations and possibly work for a short period in the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. He expects that they will return to Kabul within one and a half to two months.

(2) The preparation of basement shelters in case of rocket attacks.

(3) Expecting terrorist attacks in the city; one should therefore not leave the city unless it is absolutely necessary, and then only together with other vehicles. In the event that Embassy buildings are at-

tacked, one should not defend oneself (or return fire); one should try to hide and immediately request the assistance of the Afghan security organs (the Ministry of the Interior and the State Security). One should also immediately signal other embassies of the socialist countries by radio, informing them that they should also try and get the Afghan security forces to take action. To that end it has been agreed that the radio operators of all the fraternal embassies would meet to work out permanent contact and codes; the Embassy of the USSR will obtain the same kind of transmitters for everybody.

Vorontsov stressed that the socialist countries should not close their embassies in Kabul. At the present time it is very important to support the Afghan leadership politically and morally, to bolster its self-confidence. Vorontsov stated that the Soviet leadership is convinced that the leadership of the Afghan Republic would hold out, would resist the assault by the enemy forces, and would thus force the opposition to negotiate with them about the future organization of the country. The USSR was continuing to develop economic relations with the Afghan Republic. In his opinion, it was necessary to activate the relations between the socialist countries and the Afghan Republic, to develop contacts with private entrepreneurs and with intelligence, among others. In contacts with the leading Afghan figures (both with the representatives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the SAZA [Toilers of Afghanistan Party], as well as other political forces), to emphasize the necessity of their unity, so that they concentrate all their forces on repelling enemy assaults and only then should they work out their personal differences.

It will also be necessary, according to Vorontsov, to develop a big political and propaganda campaign after 15 February, in which the following should be emphasized: it is said that the main cause of the fighting in Afghanistan is the presence of Soviet troops in the country; and yet, though Soviet divisions are now leaving, fighting continues and is even intensifying. The cause of that is the personal ambition of representatives of the Peshawar alliance and their support and instigation on the part of the US and Pakistan. This campaign must therefore be focused on condemnation of the approach of the US, Pakistan and the Peshawar leaders. In developing this campaign the USSR will request the assistance of the socialist countries and their mass media, as well as other members of the progressive, peace-loving public throughout the world.

Prague, 3 February 1989

DOCUMENT No. 4**Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the Current Situation in Afghanistan, 17 February 1989**

[Source: State Central Archive Prague, File 02/1, CC CPCz Politburo 1980-1989, 106th Meeting, 22 February 1989, in Russian. Translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton.]

Report on the Current Situation in Afghanistan
(Comrade J. Lenart)

In connection with the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan we wish to share several views with you. First, we are grateful to you for the assistance and support you have provided both unilaterally and as part of the coordinated policy of the countries of the socialist commonwealth in solving a difficult problem we inherited in this difficult period of international relations, a period of growing tension and conflicts in the world arena.

Practical implementation of the line of a political settlement of the Afghan problem became possible only in the conditions of perestroika, new political thinking, the course of the fundamental recovery of the international situation, of unbiased, realistic approaches to the resolution of regional conflicts. We are firmly convinced that a solution by force to the situation that has arisen in Afghanistan is not only impracticable but also dangerous for the country and its people.

That is why the Soviet Union, in strict compliance with the Geneva Agreements, has completely withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan by the assumed date. Together with the Republic of Afghanistan the USSR has gone its share of the Geneva road with honor and dignity. We have withdrawn our troops regardless of the fact that the other participants in the Geneva Agreements broke the arrangements that had been reached. Under these circumstances the Soviet troops could have remained in Afghanistan, indeed even had the right to do so. Nevertheless, the Soviet side, in the interest of an Afghan settlement as well as of regional and international security, has met its obligations. At the same time, its principled positions and activities have been fully understood by the Afghan leadership.

The political line of the USSR is, as before, oriented towards achieving a general Afghan settlement, towards resolving the intra-Afghan conflicts by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. After the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union expects that the absence of foreign troops on Afghan territory will stimulate the peace process in Afghan society, and activate efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to problems. For our part we believe that the road to an internal Afghan settlement consists in the creation of a broad-based representative government, with the participation of all mutually belligerent Afghan groups. The Soviet Union fully supports the efforts of the Afghan Republic in this sense. Nevertheless, to form a government

that would truly reflect the will and interests of all strata of Afghan society is obviously possible only in a situation where fighting ceases in the territory of Afghanistan, thus ensuring the truly free expression of the will of the Afghan people. Concerning the future of this country, the Soviet Union, as we have stated on more than one occasion, supports the idea of an independent, neutral, non-aligned, demilitarized Afghanistan.

The situation in Afghanistan is at present very complicated; there is even a danger that military operations will intensify, at least in the initial period, as a result of the irreconcilable positions of individual extremist groups of the armed opposition. The future development of the situation, either along the path of national concord and the formation of a broad-based coalition government or along the path of an escalation of hostilities and tensions within the country and around it, will depend in many respects on how the other parties to the Geneva Agreement—the USA and Pakistan, who have direct access to, and influence on, the armed opposition, whom they support with supplies of arms and financial assistance—and on how actively the world community contribute to the implementation of the Resolution of the 43rd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the UN on Afghanistan.

The constructive line promoted by the Soviet Union and the Afghan Republic, which corresponds in spirit and letter to the Geneva Agreements, has created all the conditions for a cessation of the bloodshed in Afghanistan, so that the future course of events could extricate itself from a military solution and move to a solution along the path of peaceful negotiations and the search for mutually acceptable compromises.

The government of the Afghan Republic starts from the only correct assumption, that is, that attempts by anybody to take all power in the present conditions condemns *a priori* the Afghan nation to a long, bloody, civil war, to further victims, material losses, and the ruin of the country. It is precisely to ward off such a course of events that the proposals of the Afghan government—for the commencement of an intra-Afghan dialogue, the creation of transitional structures for the eventual formation of a broad-based representative government and a general, complete cease-fire—are to serve. It is characteristic that these proposals point the way to the free self-determination of the Afghan people, which has been so vehemently demanded by the opposition, and enables the solution of problems facing the Afghan talks, without force and the use of arms. The call for peace is not a sign of weakness of the leadership of the Afghan Republic; rather it is the voice of political reason, an admission of the priority of nation-wide interests over all others. It would be absurd, however, to assume that the Afghan leadership, which is giving up its monopoly on power, is prepared to capitulate, to leave the state structures and political life of the country voluntarily. If the extremist part of the opposition tries by force to gain advantage from the present situation, the Afghan Republic and its armed forces will have all they need, including the most effective modern weapons, to repel its forces, which

will be counting exclusively on a military solution.

The Soviet Union has provided, and will continue to provide, great assistance to the people of Afghanistan. The traditional friendly relations, good neighborliness, and co-operation between the USSR and Afghanistan has in recent years been supplemented with a whole series of treaties and agreements, whose aim has been the provision of continuous, long-term assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its national economy and in healing the wounds suffered in the long war.

Afghanistan now requires the general assistance and support of the world community. We are determined to do everything necessary to develop our bi-lateral collaboration even more effectively in the interest of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, both in the current phase, with efforts to restore peace on Afghan soil, and in future, after the achievement of national reconciliation and a political solution in the country.

We are prepared to share in the manifold assistance to Afghanistan, along the lines of the United Nations, and hope that everybody who cares about the future of the Afghan people will provide assistance and support in this difficult period for Afghanistan.

At present the Soviet Union is particularly disturbed by attempts of extremist parts of the armed opposition to stifle the Afghan people and starve out Kabul; that is why the USSR considers it its duty to do everything possible to ensure that humanitarian aid is delivered to the Afghan people on time and to the designated places.

We turn to you at a time when the USSR, in good will and after agreement with the Afghan leadership, is leaving Afghanistan, and we emphasize that we are not indifferent to what happens in Afghanistan. We shall make an all round effort to achieve a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the Afghan problem. We are convinced that you understand our thoughts and feelings, our efforts to attain peace for the Afghan people so that they can run their lives as they see fit and with the right to determine their own fate.

Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU, conveyed by Comrade Marat KUZNETSOV, Deputy to the Soviet Ambassador to the CSSR, 17 February 1989.

NOTES

¹ Both are on deposit at the State Central Archive (SÚA), fond Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle. Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York 1982), p. 430.

³ See e.g. J. Bruce Amstutz: *Afghanistan. The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation*. (Washington 1986), p. 42; Joseph J. Collins: *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Ma. – Toronto 1986), p. 77; Pierre Allan – Dieter Klay: *Zwischen Bürokratie und Ideologie. Entscheidungsprozesse in Moskaus Afghanistankonflikt* (Bern –

Stuttgart – Wien 1999), p. 30ff., 46ff., Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*. Durham 1985, p. 137f., 160f., 170f.

⁴ In official Soviet literature of the period such as Genrich A. Poljakov: *Afganistan revoljucionnyj*. (Moscow 1981), p. 42f.

⁵ See for example H. S. Bradsher, p. 100, 108.

⁶ Alexander A. Ljachovskij, *Tragedija i doblest Afgana*. (Moscow 1995), p. 149.

⁷ Besides the literature mentioned in footnote 3, see also Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*. (Oxford 1999), p. 75ff., N.I. Nikov et al., *Vojna v Afganistane*. Moskva 1991, p. 211ff., Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Decisionmaking on Afghanistan, 1979*. In: J. Valenta – W. C. Porter (ed.), *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security*, (London 1984), p. 165-184, and several reports in the collection Heinrich Vogel (ed.), *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan. Entstehung und intergrunde einer weltpolitischen krise*. Baden-Baden 1980 (Astrid von Borcke, pp. 119-180, Helmut Dahm, pp. 181-245, Gerhard Wettig, pp. 247-271).

⁸ This was the official pamphlet of the CPCz that laid out the party line to be adhered to in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of 1968.

⁹ See documents on deposit at the State Central Archive (SÚA), f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file. See also H. S. Bradsher, p. 27f.

¹⁰ See for example Jacques Lévesque – Gilbert Labelle, *La mémoire du siècle: l'USSR en Afghanistan de l'invasion au retrait*. Bruxelles 1990, p. 47f. or J. J. Collins, *Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (c.d. in note 3), p. 59ff.

¹¹ SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ [Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia], 1976-1979, 104th (30.3.1979.) and 108th meeting (16.5.1979).

¹² SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 144th meeting, 15.8.1980.

¹³ SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 35th meeting, 6.5.1987.

¹⁴ SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 70th meeting, 27.5.1983.

¹⁵ SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 69th meeting, 6.5.1988.

¹⁶ On preparations and course of visit, see SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 8th (29.5.1981), 12th (19.6.1981), and 14th (10.7.1981) meetings.

¹⁷ See e.g., Anthony Arnold – Rosanne Klass: "Afghanistan's Divided Communist Party". In: R. Klass (ed.), *Afghanistan. The Great Game Revisited*, (New York 1990), pp. 135-160, or Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, (New Haven-London 1995), p. 111.

¹⁸ See record of conversation of head of diplomatic protocol Tucek, on conversations with Karmal, 29.8.1978 and 11.9.1978; and record of conversation with deputy foreign minister Spácil with Novikov, Soviet embassy attaché in Prague, 11.9.1978; SÚA, f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

¹⁹ Telegram from ambassador Karmelita from Kábul, 4.10.1978, SÚA, f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

²⁰ Letter from ambassador Karmelita to minister Chnoupek, 16.8.1978, SÚA, f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

²¹ Alexander Morozov, "Our man in Kabul." In: *New Times* 1991, no. 38; pp. 36-39, no. 39, pp. 32-33; no. 40, pp. 38-39; and no. 41, pp. 32-35: history of a plan for murder no. 39, p. 33.

²² See Bradsher, p. 173f.

²³ See e.g. Rauf T. Rasidov: *Sovetsko-afganskije otnošenija i ich bur'uaznyje fal'sifikatory (1978-1983)*. (Taškent 1986), p. 77ff.,

or pro-Soviet Indian journalist D. R. Goyal: *Afghanistan. Behind the Smoke Screen*. (Delhi 1984), p. 277.

²⁴ See David Gaj – Vladimír Snegirev: *Vtor•eniye. Neizvestnyje stranicy neobjavljennoj vojny* (Moskva 1991), p. 98f., H.S. Bradsher, p. 77, or A – K, p. 189.

²⁵ SÚA, f. Gustáv Husák, unsorted materials, Afghanistan file.

²⁶ See. Christian Meier: “Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan und die Reaktion im Warschauer Pakt” In: H. Vogel ed., *Die sowjetische Intervention in Afghanistan* (see note 7), pp. 273-289.

²⁷ Bre•nev gave the interview on 12 January; *Pravda* published it on 13 Jan., Rudé právo a day later: *Sovetský svaz nic neodradí od mírové politiky*, p. 1 and 6.

²⁸ See e.g. [compilation report on the realization of resolutions by party and government organs on cooperation with developing countries], SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 94th meeting, 25.11.1988, or Soviet memorandum on the current situation in Afghanistan, SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 35th meeting, 6.5.1987 (see doc. no 2 below).

²⁹ See Bradsher, p. 293.

³⁰ There are dozens of documents about this in the papers of G. Husák, the Presidium and Secretariat of the CC CPCZ and the office of the government presidium on deposit at the State Central Archive. See for example a report from ambassador Karmelita of 10. 6. 1981 from Kabul on Afghan requirements before the visit by Babrak Karmal to the CSSR, SÚA, f. 02/1, Presidium CC CPCZ 1980-1989, 12th meeting 19.6.1981, or correspondence from Feb.

1984 between the foreign trade minister and premier Štrougal, SÚA, f. ÚPV, sv. 315, a.j. 69/1. On economic cooperation see also John F. Shroeder- Abdul Tarab A SSIFI: *Afghan Mineral Resources and Soviet Exploitation*. In: R. Klass (ed.), *Afghanistan*, pp. 97-134, or J.B. Amstutz, p. 254ff.

³¹ SÚA, f. ÚPV, sv. 402, a.j. 69/7.

³² SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 117th meeting 19.10.1989.

³³ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 103rd (3.2.1989), 106th (24.2.1989), 112th (14.4.1989), 116th (12.5.1989) and 130th (14.9.1989) meetings.

³⁴ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 137th meeting, 18.4.1980.

³⁵ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 14th meeting, 10.7.1981.

³⁶ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 35th meeting, 6.5.1987 (see Document No.1 below).

³⁷ See note 19.

³⁸ See note 27.

³⁹ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 103rd meeting 3.2.1989 (see doc. no 3 below).

⁴⁰ SÚA, f. 02/1 Presidium CC CPCz 1980-1989, 106th meeting 24.2.1989 (see doc. no 4 below).

⁴¹ On the history of the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan, see for example Diego Cordovez – Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan. The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal*. (New York-Oxford 1995).

The George Washington University Cold War (GWCW) Group

The George Washington University Cold War (GWCW) Group promotes research and scholarship on this critical period in international affairs and strives to elucidate the ways in which Cold War legacies (economic, political, psychological, military, and environmental) affect public policy in many parts of the world. GWCW encourages multi-lingual, multi-disciplinary, and multi-national explorations of the Cold War experience and serves as a meeting place for scholars and graduate students by hosting a seminar series to showcase recent books and ongoing research. A key focus of GWCW is to support graduate students working on dissertations concerning the Cold War. To that end, GWCW each spring co-organizes with U.C. Santa Barbara an annual graduate student conference designed to support the work of the next generation of Cold War scholars. And in June 2004, GWCW will host its second annual Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research (SICAR), designed to train graduate students in the use of American and non-American archival materials. With a three-year grant from the Luce Foundation, GWCW has built additional programs on the Cold War in Asia, including organizing an annual workshop, the most recent of which was held in Budapest, Hungary, and featured new documents from Central and Eastern European archives on such topics as the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the Vietnam War. With a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, GWCW has also worked with the CWHIP to train high school teachers on the Cold War and to develop an online resource for teachers and their students. GWCW resides in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) of the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University in Washington, D.C. More information is available at <http://ieres.org>.

More East-Bloc Sources on Afghanistan

Memorandum of Conversation between the Czechoslovak Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dusan Spacil and Soviet Ambassador Novikov (written by Spacil), 12 September 1978

[Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma and translated by Francis Raska.]

On 11 September 1978, I informed Comrade Novikov, who monitors problems among diplomats, at a gathering at the Chinese Embassy of the situation that resulted on account of the recalling of the Afghan ambassador [former People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) leader] Babrak Karmal. Comrade Novikov then had a long discussion with Karmal and his report is as follows:

Karmal had requested an audience with Comrade Mackevitch in order to resolve his personal situation. Comrade Novikov replied that Mackevitch was terribly busy and that he (Novikov) would be of assistance. Karmal said that he was at a loss as to what to do. The Afghan leadership had recalled him from the post of ambassador. He cannot return to Afghanistan because he would be arrested, perhaps even executed. He also does not wish to return to Afghanistan because his return as well as that of other [PDPA faction] Parcham comrades scattered throughout the world could result in great social disturbances and an eventual uprising against [PDPA Khalq faction leader and Afghan President and Prime Minister Nur Mohammad] Taraki, who is losing the support of the people. Under no circumstances does Karmal wish to leave Czechoslovakia for some capitalist country because that would be used by imperialist countries against the Revolution in Afghanistan. At the same time, he is aware that he cannot remain in Czechoslovakia. Not long ago, a relative, also a Parchamist and a leading Party member who had served as ambassador to Pakistan, contacted Karmal and informed him of his request for asylum in Yugoslavia. Karmal considers even this solution to be problematic. Therefore, he had sent forth his request for assistance to Novikov and he is waiting for a recommendation from his "older brother" as to what to do. Comrade Novikov informed me that he would immediately pass on this information to Moscow. I told Comrade Novikov that our Communist Party representative had already informed Moscow about the situation and looked forward to the disclosure of Moscow's position.

Comment:

The head of the diplomatic protocol, Comrade Tucek, spoke with Karmal that very day and stated that, according to Kabul, Karmal is no longer the ambassador. Despite this, Karmal showed up at a cocktail party hosted by the Chinese

ambassador. It remains unclear whether he came in order to meet someone or whether he is not considering departing for China.



Minutes from Conversation between Former Afghan Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Babrak Karmal, and the Head of the Diplomatic Protocol Tucek, 12 September 1978

[Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma and Translated by Francis Raska.]

Babrak Karmal visited the head of the diplomatic protocol on 11 September at 3 p.m. He introduced the discussion by stating that he had been informed that his diplomatic activities in Czechoslovakia were at an end. The head of the diplomatic protocol replied that the Foreign Ministry had learned news to this effect through the Czechoslovak Embassy in Kabul.

Karmal said that he realized that, officially, his function in Czechoslovakia was over, but that as a member of his Party's leadership, he would like to meet with [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia chief ideologist] Comrade Bilak and inform him of the situation in his country as well as his own situation. Karmal also declared that he would not return to his homeland under the present circumstances, but that he had no desire to move to any capitalist country. He stated his intention to ask for political asylum in Czechoslovakia.

When Karmal asked what his status in Czechoslovakia was after he ceased to be the ambassador, the head of the diplomatic protocol replied that as an Afghan citizen, he was under the care and protection of the Afghan Embassy.



Dispatch from the Head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) Central Committee's International Relations Department M. Stefanak to the Czechoslovak Embassy in Kabul, 28 September 1978

[Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma and Translated by Francis Raska.]

Comrade Kouba

Foreign Ministry-Kabul

Visit the Afghan representative and inform him that Babrak Karmal was accepted in Czechoslovakia as the ambassador of a friendly country. While in office, Karmal asked for permission to undergo treatment. This request was granted and treatment was administered. It became evident that Karmal suffers from heart problems, which require long-term treatment. After the Afghan government's decision to recall Karmal, he asked that his treatment be continued. In consideration of his poor health, we could not refuse Karmal's request. He stated later that he could not return to Afghanistan. He has not requested asylum. He is in Czechoslovakia for necessary treatment. We believe that a stay for treatment in a socialist country is more appropriate than in a Western or other country because his activities can be better controlled.

M. ŠTEFANAK



Telegram from the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Kabul, Karmelita, to Prague, 4 October 1978

[Source: Central State Archive, Archive of the CC CPCz, file Husak, unsorted materials, box Afghanistan. Provided by Oldrich Tuma and translated by Francis Raska.]

Telegram from Kabul
Arrived: 4.10.78 at 10AM
4.10.78 at 12:15PM

#059.236[...]

To your 072 516 [note from 28 September 1978]

I was received today, 4 October, by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party [PDPA], Nur Mohammad Taraki, whom I informed of the contents of the dispatch mentioned above. He listened to the information attentively and calmly. He said that Karmal's illness was fictitious and that he should be returned as a warrant had been issued for his arrest.

Taraki said in a somewhat unpleasant tone that Czechoslovakia is an independent country, which can act on the basis of its own judgment. He added that he had expected a different reply. Finally, Taraki requested that we convey the information in writing to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin.

In case you concur that we should indeed make this confirmation, send the text in English.

In contrast to previous times, the parting of ways was

rather terse. (Ka)

Karmelita 0354



Information About the Visit of the Afghan Party and State Delegation, Headed by the Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Board and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Nur Mohamed Taraki, to the USSR [December 1978]

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Opis 35, File 335. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova and Baev.]

On 4-7 December [1978], an Afghan Party and State delegation, headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki visited the Soviet Union.

The delegation included many of the members of the [PDPA] Politburo of the Central Committee—Hafizullah Amin, Shah Wali, and Comrade Suma, the ministers of industry, agriculture, energy and communications, deputy-ministers of commerce, culture and housing.

At the request of Nur Mohammad Taraki, the delegation visited only Moscow.

Top-level talks were held at two of the meetings. The Soviet Party was represented by comrades [CPSU General Secretary Leonid] Brezhnev, [Soviet Premier Aleksey N.] Kosygin, [Foreign Minister Andrei A.] Gromyko, [CC Secretary Boris] Ponomarev.

Twenty-four meetings took place between the Afghan delegation and the top-level Soviet party and state leaders.

Hafizullah Amin met the following comrades: Kosygin, Gromyko, [KGB Chief Yuri] Andropov, [Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal [Nikolai] Ogarkov and [Minister of Defense Marshal Sergei] Solokov.

[...]

The visit was initiated by the Afghan Party.

Its objectives were:

1. To make face-to-face contacts with the Soviet Union's party and state leaders;
2. To specify the major trends of the development of the cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union;
3. To share opinions on the most topical issues of international affairs.

This is Brezhnev's official statement on behalf of the

Soviet delegation:

“The coming to power of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, [...] is an event of historical importance for Afghanistan. We are sincerely happy that the Afghan people have succeeded in defending the revolution and the revolutionary achievements from all internal and international predators within such a short period.” Comrade Brezhnev pointed out that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were assuming a completely different nature. These relations are now based on class belonging; they are imbued with the spirit of friendship and revolutionary solidarity.

Comrade Brezhnev assured Taraki and all delegation members of the assistance and support they can firmly rely on; all activity towards the revolutionary transformation of the Afghan society will be backed up.

Cde. Taraki pointed out that the Afghan Party attached prime importance to their visit to the Soviet Union. All talks and meetings will contribute to the strengthening of the revolutionary regime in Afghanistan; they will enhance the support from within the country and abroad.

In its domestic policy PDPA has adopted a program of radical revolutionary socio-economic reforms to the benefit of the working class; these reforms will help abolish any remains of feudalism and semi-feudal social relations; they will provide for the non-capitalist development of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the building up of a society free from exploitation, based upon the progressive ideology of the working class and scientifically-grounded socialism.

Taraki emphasized the following about foreign policy: “The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been conducting a policy targeted at strengthening the brotherly relations with the socialist countries; this policy is also aimed at non-alignment as a form of struggle against imperialism and colonialism, protecting world peace, favoring détente and disarmament, and providing support for the national liberation movements.

A joint communiqué emphasizes the policies adopted by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; this policy was outlined in Taraki’s speech at the dinner given by the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU, the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Soviet government.

An important result of the visit of the Afghan Party and State delegation to the Soviet Union was signing the Treaty on the establishment of friendly relations and close cooperation between the two neighboring countries.

The latter was drawn up upon the Afghan Party’s initiative.

Both parties pointed out that this treaty was of considerable political significance in terms of strengthening the relations between the two countries, and supporting peace and security throughout the world. This treaty enhances

Afghanistan’s image and authority in international affairs; it guarantees its national independence, territorial integrity and security. This treaty will have an impact on all opponents of the revolutionary regime in Afghanistan and prevents their action towards undermining the revolutionary process. The documents agreed upon state the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’s initiative to join the movement of non-aligned countries at present, since the April Revolution the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has adopted the correct stance on many of the movement’s major issues. Together with the [Democratic People’s] Republic of Korea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and other progressive member-countries, the movement will contribute to the consolidation of the anti-imperialist positions.

Taraki informed the Soviet comrades of the actions against Afghanistan launched from the territory of Pakistan. He pointed out that the two countries had different attitudes towards the Pushtuns and the Baluchis.

Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin stressed that it was inappropriate to take any measures. Such measures would provoke anti-revolutionary action by both internal reactionary forces and external enemies; thus the situation in the region will be complicated. The Soviet party shares the concern about the future of the Pushtuns and the Beluchis; it is of the opinion that only negotiations with the participation of these two groups can contribute to reaching a solution of the problem.

[...]

The Soviet leaders laid down their opinion of the necessity that the party’s unity be strengthened and all progressive forces to take part in the revolutionary restructuring of Afghanistan.

They suggested that the USSR assume the responsibility to carry out many of the projects on Afghanistan’s development. The projects, talks about which have already been held, are to become part of an agreement in the field of economics, science and technology. All newly proposed projects are to be a matter of further negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan ministers; following preliminary consultations, these must become an integral part of the agreement on economic cooperation.

The following was agreed upon: an increase in the oil supplies to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; setting up a link between the Soviet energy network and that of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; refurbishment and reconstruction of the oil-processing plant.

The establishment of a joint commission for economic cooperation on the level of ministers was agreed upon.

All Afghani members of the delegation made a statement about the successful visit. Useful and fruitful talks were conducted. The Soviet leaders, and comrade Brezhnev in particular, expressed their interest towards Afghanistan, their warm and cordial attitudes. Comrade Brezhnev drank to the health of Taraki, Amin, and other members of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee.

The major conclusion finally arrived at was that the April Revolution is a crucial historical moment for Afghanistan. Under PDPA's leadership, Afghanistan was to abolish the centuries-long backwardness in its development; it was to carry out deep social and economic reforms to bring feudal social order to an end; it was to start establishing a society free from any exploitation. Most views of contemporary foreign affairs issues were shared.

Hence there are sufficient grounds to claim that all necessary conditions to develop relations with the socialist countries, and coordinate all efforts in the struggle for peace, co-operation, détente, disarmament between the peoples in Asia and throughout the world, are present.

Upon the delegation's return from the Soviet Union, the politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA considered all results of the visit.

Taraki pointed out the attentiveness and interest by both the CC of the CPSU, and comrade Brezhnev in particular.

The visit and its results were highly appreciated. All members of the delegation, the Afghan State and Party functionaries were satisfied with these results.



Diplomatic Note of Afghan Embassy in Sofia, 13 March 1979

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, opis 35, file 361, p. 58-60. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Albena Stefanova and Baev.]

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY
SOFIA

13 March 1979

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of People's Republic of Bulgaria

The Embassy of D[emocratic] R[epublic of] Afghanistan in Sofia has the honor to inform about persons who are not returning to their homeland. They are dismissed from diplomatic work and by the government decision their diplomatic passports have to be considered as invalid. We are requesting any application for a visa from their part to be rejected. Furthermore we are requesting this decision of the Afghan government to be forwarded to all Bulgarian diplomatic missions abroad.

Please find next the list of mentioned above persons, which citizenship is rejected:

1. Dr. Mahamad Rahim Sherazui – former Ambassador in Czechoslovakia;

2. Hamidula Enayat Serdajh – former Ambassador in India;
3. Eng. Bashir Ahmad Ludin – former Ambassador in Federal Republic of Germany;
4. Dr. Abdul Vahed Karim – former Ambassador in Washington;
5. Abdulla Maliqiar – former Ambassador in Iran;
6. Mohhammad Jussuf Meherdal – former Ambassador in Saudi Arabia;
7. Babrak Karmal – former Ambassador in Czechoslovakia;
8. Nur Mohammad Nur – former Ambassador in the USA;
9. Dr. Anahita Rotebzad – former Ambassador in Yugoslavia;
10. Abdul Wakil – former Ambassador in London;
11. Mahmud Barakyal – former Ambassador in Pakistan;
12. Dr. Nadjib – former Ambassador in Iran;
13. Halilula Halili – former Ambassador in Iraq;
14. Zalmay Mahmud Gazi – former Ambassador in Egypt;
15. Mohammad Hakim Sarboland – former Consul General in Karachi;
16. Golam Faruk Torabaz – former Counselor in Washington;
17. Dr. Sadulla Gausi – former Counselor in Japan;
18. Poyanda Mohammad Kushani – former Counselor in India;
19. Mohhammad Faruk Farhang – former Counselor in Iran;
20. Mohammad Ali Amir – former Counselor in Federal Republic of Germany;
21. Nazar Mohammad Azizi – former Counselor in Italy;
22. Valid Etemadi – former I Secretary in Paris;
23. Mohammad Atila Acefi – former I Secretary in Poland;
24. Mohammad Ali Suleyman - former II Secretary in the USA;
25. Mohhammad Omar Malequiar – former II Secretary in the USA;
26. Abdul Hadi Vaydi – former II Secretary in London;
27. Mohammad Akmal Rani – former II Secretary in Iran;
28. Ruhula Tarzi – former II Secretary in Pakistan;
29. Abdulla Bahar – former II Secretary in Czechoslovakia;
30. Abdulla Laamir – former III Secretary in Pakistan;
31. Mohammad Junus Farman – former attaché in Washington;
32. Homajunshah Acifi – former attaché in Federal Republic of Germany;
33. Enajatolla Madani – former attaché in India;
34. Dr. Nangjalay Tarzi – official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Afghan Embassy in Sofia

Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin and Afghan Premier Nur Mohammed Taraki, 18 March 1979² [Excerpt]

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichennyy Kontingent" ("Limited Contingent") *Progress, Moscow, 1994*, pp. 34-40. Translated by Gary Goldberg.]

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KOSYGIN. Tell Cde. Taraki that I would like to pass on to him warm greetings from Leonid Il'ich [Brezhnev] and from all members of the Politburo.

TARAKI. Thank you very much.

KOSYGIN. How is Cde. Taraki's health, is he very tired?

TARAKI. I'm not tired. There was a meeting of the Revolutionary Council today.³

KOSYGIN. This is good, I am very glad. Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

TARAKI: The situation is bad and getting worse. During the last month and a half about 4,000 servicemen in civilian dress have come from the Iranian side and infiltrated the city of Herat and military units. Right now the entire 17th Infantry Division is in their hands, including the artillery regiment and an air defense battalion, which is firing on our aircraft. Battles are continuing in the city.

KOSYGIN. How many people are in the division?

TARAKI. Up to 5,000. All the ammunition and depots are in their hands. We're carrying food products and ammunition by air from Kandahar to our comrades who are fighting with them now.

KOSYGIN. How many people do you have left there?

TARAKI. Five hundred men. They are at the Herat airfield headed by the division commander. We have sent an operations group there from Kabul by air as reinforcements. They've been at the Herat airfield since morning.

KOSYGIN. But have the division's officers or the part located with the division commander at the airfield also betrayed you?

TARAKI. A small part is on our side; the rest are with the enemy.

KOSYGIN. Do you have support among the workers, city petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there anyone still on your side?

TARAKI. There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans – follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by all this.

KOSYGIN. What is the population of Herat?

TARAKI. Two hundred to two hundred fifty thousand. They are behaving in accordance with the situation. They will go where they are led. Right now they're on the side of the enemy.

KOSYGIN. Are there many workers there?

TARAKI. Very few – between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

KOSYGIN. What is the outlook in Herat, in your opinion?

TARAKI. We think that Herat will fall this evening or tomorrow morning and be completely in enemy hands.

KOSYGIN. What are the prospects?

TARAKI. We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

KOSYGIN. Do you have the forces to rout them?

TARAKI. I wish it were the case.

KOSYGIN. What, then, are your proposals on this issue?

TARAKI. We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

KOSYGIN. It is a very complex matter.

TARAKI. Otherwise the enemy will go in the direction of Kandahar and on in the direction of Kabul. They will bring half of Iran into Afghanistan under the flag of the Herat division.

Afghans are returning who had fled to Pakistan. Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the Revolution.

KOSYGIN. The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

TARAKI. I ask that you extend assistance.

KOSYGIN. We must hold consultations on this issue.

TARAKI. While we consult Herat is falling, and there will be

even greater difficulties for both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Now, can you possibly tell me what forecast you can give about Pakistan and then about Iran, separately? Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda.

TARAKI. Today we made a statement to the Iranian government and transmitted it by radio, pointing out that Iran is interfering in [our] internal affairs in the area of Herat.

KOSYGIN. But do you not consider it necessary to make any announcement to Pakistan?

TARAKI. We will make such a statement about Pakistan tomorrow or the day after.

KOSYGIN. Do you have hopes for your army? What is its reliability? Can you not gather troops to make an attack on Herat?

TARAKI. We think that the army is reliable. But we can not take troops from other cities to send them to Herat, since this would weaken our positions in other cities.

KOSYGIN. But if we quickly gave you aircraft and weapons could you not form new units?

TARAKI. This would take some time and Herat is falling.

KOSYGIN. You think that if Herat falls then Pakistan would attempt the same actions from its border?

TARAKI. The probability of this is very high. Pakistani morale is rising after this. The Americans are giving them suitable aid. After the fall of Herat the Pakistanis will also send soldiers in civilian dress, who will begin to seize cities, and the Iranians will begin to actively intervene.

Success in Herat is the key to all the remaining issues connected with the fight.

KOSYGIN. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

TARAKI. Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kabul.

KOSYGIN. They still need to get to Kabul.

TARAKI. It's much closer from Kushk to Herat. But troops can be delivered to Kabul by air. If you send troops to Kabul and they go from Kabul to Herat then, in our view, no one will be the wiser. They will think these are government troops.

KOSYGIN. I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. Tell me, Cde. Taraki, if we deliver weapons to you by air to Kabul, including tanks, then will you find tank crews or not?

TARAKI. A very small number.

KOSYGIN. How many?

TARAKI. I do not have exact figures.

KOSYGIN. But if we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition, and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

TARAKI. I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

KOSYGIN. It means, to put it another way, that there are no well-trained military personnel or very few of them. Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

TARAKI. Most of them are Muslim reactionaries, Akhvanists [*akhvanisty*], or what else do they call themselves, the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴ We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

KOSYGIN. What's the population of Kabul?

TARAKI. About a million people.

KOSYGIN. Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

TARAKI. We can gather a certain number of people, primarily from among the youth, but it would require a lot of time to train them.

KOSYGIN. But is it impossible to recruit students?

TARAKI. One might talk about pupils and 11th and 12th grade secondary school students.

KOSYGIN. But is it impossible to recruit from the working class?

TARAKI. The working class in Afghanistan is very small.

KOSYGIN. But what about the poor peasants?

TARAKI. The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students, and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

KOSYGIN. We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to delivery to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.82.

TARAKI. That is very good, but let us talk about Herat.

KOSYGIN. Go ahead. Can you not form several divisions right now of progressive people on whom you can rely, not only in Kabul but in other places? We could give [them] suitable weapons.

TARAKI. There is no officer personnel. Iran is sending military men to Afghanistan in civilian dress. Pakistan is also sending their people and officers in civilian dress. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them.

KOSYGIN. What else can you say about Herat?

TARAKI. We want you to send us Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Turkmens. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

KOSYGIN. You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you. It seems to me that you need to try to create new units since it's impossible to count only on the strength of numbers that are coming from elsewhere. You see from the experience of the Iranian revolution how the people threw out all the Americans there and everyone else who tried to paint themselves as defenders of Iran.

We'll agree to this: we will talk it over and give you an answer. And you, for your part, consult with your military and our advisers. There are forces in Afghanistan who will support you at the risk of their lives and fight for you. These forces need to be armed now.

TARAKI. Send us infantry combat vehicles by air.

KOSYGIN. Do you have anyone to drive them?

TARAKI. We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

KOSYGIN. Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the same language.

TARAKI. Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language – Tajiks and Uzbeks.

KOSYGIN. I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

We will call you again and give you our opinion.

TARAKI. Give our respects and best wishes to Cde. Brezhnev and the members of the Politburo.

KOSYGIN. Thank you. Send greetings to all your comrades. And I wish you firmness in deciding questions, confidence, and prosperity. Goodbye.



Telegram from East German Embassy in Kabul to Socialist Unity Party (SED) General Secretary Erich Honecker, 17 September 1979

[Source: Bundesarchiv—Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen Berlin, DY30/J IV 2/20/175, n.p.. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

Nur Mohammad Taraki who until recently held both functions [General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and President of the Revolutionary Council] has "retired on age and health grounds." We know nothing about his present location. [...]

Yesterday's state funerals were orderly, with military honors and a relatively great participation for comrade Taraki's former military adjutant Taroom as well as four other high security officials, who were supporters of comrade Amin and were shot on Friday in connection with the Cabinet meeting.

In contrast to Friday, the situation on Saturday and Sunday was completely calm, although politically tense. There is no reliable information on the location of the deposed three ministers and security chief. Unconfirmed rumors say that the former post and telegraph minister was shot and the others arrested.

Maeser
17.9

Soviet Foreign Ministry Circular [27 December 1979]⁵

[Source: Published in Boris Gromov, Ogranichenny Kontingent (*Limited Contingent*), (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp.88-89.]

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TO ALL SOVIET AMBASSADORS

(except Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Havana, Ulan Bator, and Hanoi)

Immediately visit the head of government (or the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the person acting for him) and, referring to instructions of the Soviet government, announce the following:

As is well known everywhere in the world, including the government of (...) for a long time there has been outside interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, including the direct use of armed force. It is completely evident that the purpose of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic system established as a result of the victory of the April Revolution of 1978. The Afghan people and their armed forces are actively repelling these aggressive acts and giving a rebuff to assaults on the democratic achievements, sovereignty, and national dignity of the new Afghanistan. However the acts of external aggression continue in ever wider scale; armed formations and weapons are being sent from abroad to this day.

In these conditions the leaders of the government of Afghanistan have turned to the Soviet Union for aid and assistance in the struggle against foreign aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from a commonality of interests between Afghanistan and our country on security issues which has also been recorded in the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and in the interest of preserving of peace in the region, has responded to this request of the Afghan leadership with approval and has decided to send a limited military contingent to Afghanistan to carry out missions requested by the Afghan government. The Soviet Union thereby proceeds from the corresponding articles of the UN Charter, in particular Article 51, which stipulate the right of states to individual and collective self-defense to repel aggression and restore peace.

The Soviet government, in informing the government of (...) of all this, considers it necessary to also announce that when the reasons which prompted this action of the Soviet Union no longer exist it intends to withdraw its military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union again stresses that, as before, its sole wish is to see Afghanistan as an independent, sovereign state conducting a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and carrying out its international obligations, including those according to the UN Charter.

The text of this announcement can be left with the interlocutor.

Report by telegraph when these instructions have been carried out.

**Soviet Foreign Ministry Circular [27 December 1979]⁶**

[Source: Boris Gromov, Ogranichenny Kontingent (*Limited Contingent*), (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp. 91-95. Translated by Gary Goldberg.]

Top Secret
Special Folder
Flash [precedence]

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet with the representatives of the leadership of friends and inform them in the name of the CC CPSU of the following:

Dear Comrades!

Following the tradition which has developed in relations between our Parties, the CC CPSU would like to share with the leaders of your Party our views and an assessment of recent events in Afghanistan.

As you well know, a new progressive national [political] system was created in Afghanistan as a result of the April 1978 Revolution. Much work was done in the country to eliminate the despotic monarchy by enlisting the broad popular masses on the side of the Revolution; land reform has been carried out, and a large amount of land has been transferred to the working peasantry; the payment of *kalym* (compensation) for a bride has been abolished; and other reforms have been carried out in the interests of the people.

However the revolutionary events in Afghanistan have met with fierce opposition on the part of hostile foreign reactionary forces. Constant subversive activity from Pakistan, Iran, and China has been unleashed. In turn, the reactionary remnants of the old regime, landowners deprived of land, the former minions of the monarchy, and part of the Muslim clergy have unleashed a struggle against the revolutionary order.

To this was added the mistaken, it must be frankly said, dictatorial, despotic actions of H[afizullah]. Amin, violations of elementary norms of legality, widespread repression of everyone who did not agree with him, including those who for many years fought against the monarchy and actively participated in the April Revolution.

Having eliminated the former General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party and President of the Republic N[ur]. M[ohammad]. Taraki, H. Amin has recently hypocritically talked of humaneness and legality, given ultra-revolutionary speeches, etc., but in fact has carried out massive

repression and undermined the foundations of the revolutionary order.

Thus external intervention and terror against honest persons devoted to the cause of the Revolution and the interests of the people has created a threat of liquidation of what the April Revolution brought the Afghan people.

As a result of the harmful and impermissible acts of H. Amin and his closest associates enormous discontent and protests against the policy of H. Amin have arisen in the country and at the same time subversive activity of reactionaries has revived and attacks of armed formations sent from abroad have intensified.

All this has been exploited by foreign reactionary forces. They have intensified the infiltration of sizable armed groups (mainly from Pakistani territory), they have supplied various military formations with weapons and money, etc.; in a word, they have worked towards establishing the previous reactionary regime and subordinating Afghanistan to imperialism. American imperialism and the CIA, and also the Beijing leadership, have acted as the main force in carrying out this policy.

However in Afghanistan there have been found forces which have risen decisively against the regime of H. Amin, removed him from power, and created new governing bodies for the Party and the country. Those who for many years fought against the monarchy and brought about the April Revolution together with Taraki have been brought into them. Karmal Babrak has become the head of the Party and the government. His speeches and appeals to the people of Afghanistan are directed at ensuring the national independence of Afghanistan; rallying the people together; carrying out a progressive, democratic policy; observing legality; establishing firm law and order; and [having] a humane attitude toward people. The new leadership is setting as its task the assurance of civic peace in the country. All of this gives reason to say that such a leadership will facilitate the strengthening of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and a progressive republican system.

The new government and Party leadership has turned to the USSR with a request to give it political and material aid, including military support.

The Soviet Union has decided to give this support. In this matter the Soviet and Afghan governments have relied on an international treaty concluded between the USSR and Afghanistan on 5 December 1978. Chapter 4 of this treaty says: "The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and neighborliness and also the UN Charter, will consult and with the consent of both Parties undertake the appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of both countries. They will continue to collaborate in the military field in the interests of strengthening the defensive ability of the High Contracting Parties."

The Soviet Union has given consent to the Afghan government to the introduction of a small military contingent for a period of time. Its very presence in Afghanistan will serve as a guarantee (barrier) against sudden armed attacks of hos-

tile foreign forces (mainly from Pakistan) and from the actions of internal counterrevolutionary forces.

The Soviet armed formation will be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the situation there stabilizes and the reasons which prompted this action no longer exist.

In taking this decision, the CC CPSU considered the possible negative reaction of imperialist states and their mass media. But the political attacks of class and ideological enemies should not deter the CPSU and the Soviet Union from granting the request of the Afghan leadership.

The CC CPSU expresses confidence that your Party will well understand the motives which dictated the need to give this kind of aid to democratic Afghanistan and will support these measures.

With Communist greetings

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

LIST

of Communist and workers' parties
of non-socialist countries
who are being sent the CC CPSU letter

- The Communist Party of Austria
- The Party of the Socialist Avant Garde of Algeria
- The Communist Party of Argentina
- The Communist Party of Bangladesh
- The Communist Party of Belgium
- The Communist Party of Bolivia
- The Brazilian Communist Party
- The Communist Party of Venezuela
- The Communist Party of Great Britain
- The German Communist Party
- The Communist Party of Greece
- The Communist Party of Denmark
- The Communist Party of Israel
- The Communist Party of India
- The Iraqi Communist Party
- The People's Party of Iran
- The Communist Party of Ireland
- The Communist Party of Spain
- The Italian Communist Party
- The Communist Party of Canada
- The Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus – AKEhL
- The Communist Party of Colombia
- The Lebanese Communist Party
- The Communist Party of Luxembourg
- The Communist Party of Malta
- The Mexican Communist Party
- The Communist Party of the Netherlands
- The Communist Party of Norway
- The Peruvian Communist Party

The Portuguese Communist Party
 The Reunion Communist Party
 The San Marino Communist Party
 The Syrian Communist Party
 The Communist Party of the USA
 The Communist Party of Turkey
 The Communist Party of Uruguay
 The Communist Party of the Philippines
 The Communist Party of Finland
 The French Communist Party
 The Communist Party of Chile
 The Swiss Party of Labor
 The Workers' Party – Communists of Sweden
 The Leftist Party – Communists of Sweden
 The Communist Party of Sri Lanka
 The Communist Party of Ecuador
 The Communist Party of Japan



Record of the Main Content of a Conversation of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko with DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost, 4 January 1980⁷ (Excerpt)

[Source: Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy Kontingent (Limited Contingent), (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp. 99-104. Translate by Gary Goldberg.]

GROMYKO [...] It is good for us to hear that the present DRA leadership regards the advice and good wishes of the Soviet side with attention. Moreover I would like to stress that the final decision regarding one or another issue will be left to the Afghan side, to you, and only you.

Comrade Minister, I would like to share some thoughts regarding the situation which has now developed in the Security Council and also about the nature of your statements at the upcoming meeting.⁸

Of course, these thoughts are not anything conclusive, but they reflect the point of view of our country and the Soviet leadership about events occurring in and around Afghanistan.

First. The Western powers, chiefly the US, have unleashed a broad hostile propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and revolutionary Afghanistan, which has firmly embarked on the task of building a new society. Imperialism has decided to “let off steam.”

There is nothing surprising in this malicious propaganda. It would be surprising if imperialism took a benevolent position toward the revolutionary reforms being carried out in Afghanistan. Then you and we would have to think about what we had done wrong that the imperialists commended us for. Consequently there is nothing surprising in the propa-

ganda fuss raised by the West about the events in Afghanistan.

Second. Regarding the tone of the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation at the Security Council meeting.

Comrade Minister, you have every grounds to speak not as the accused, but as the accuser. It appears there are enough facts for this. Thus, it is quite important not to be defensive but to vigorously attack and vigorously expose the imperialist intrigues.

Third. It is necessary to especially stress that the introduction of the limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was done by the Soviet Union in response to the repeated appeals of the DRA government to the leadership of the USSR. These requests were made earlier by both N[ur]. M[ohammad]. Taraki, when he was in Moscow, and by H[afizullah]. Amin.

[US President Jimmy] Carter wants to create the impression that the Soviet Union received a request for the introduction our limited contingents into Afghanistan only from the new Afghan leadership. However it would decisively refute this idea and, possibly to show by reference to dates, that it was forced to turn repeatedly to the Soviet Union for aid, including military [aid], in connection with the incessant interference of external forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

In this part of the speech it would be appropriate to remind the participants of the Security Council meeting of Article 51 of the UN Charter, and also the provisions of the existing Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.

Fourth. It ought to be clearly stressed that the limited Soviet military contingent was introduced into Afghanistan only to aid it in repelling the incessant aggressive acts of external forces, in particular from Pakistani territory where camps of refugees, through the efforts of the US, other Western countries, and China, have been turned into a center for training and infiltration into Afghanistan of numerous armed groups.

Fifth. The change in the leadership of the DRA is a purely internal problem of Afghanistan and the business of the Afghans themselves. No one has the right to point out to the Afghan people what they ought to do or how to proceed.

Representatives of Western countries, particularly [British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher, are trying to draw a parallel between the change of the Afghan leadership and the introduction of the Soviet military contingent into Afghanistan, talking of a supposed inherent connection between these two events. However, it ought to be especially noted that there is no causal relationship here. This is simply a coincidence.

It would be desirable to direct attention to the fact that even in the time of N. M. Taraki and H. Amin the official representatives of the US and other Western powers shouted to the whole world about the introduction of our two combat battalions into Afghanistan. This means that they themselves contradict the words of “reliable information” that the introduction of the Soviet military contingent began before the

events of 27 December 1979, which led to the change of the Afghan leadership.

Sixth. It can be stated again that the limited Soviet military contingent will be completely withdrawn from the DRA after the need for their presence in Afghanistan ceases, as soon as armed incursions and aggressive provocations from without cease and the security of Afghanistan is accordingly assured.

Seventh. Voices ring out in the West about continuing mass repressions in Afghanistan involving prominent Muslims and that the Islamic religion is being scorned in this country. These "condolences" are expressed not in connection with the acts of Amin and the victims of his repression and despotism, but about the removal of this executioner of the Afghan people from power.

Considering this, the positive policy being followed by the new government of the DRA headed by Babrak Karmal regarding Islam and Muslim believers ought to be firmly and vigorously stated in the speech of the head of the Afghan delegation.

Eighth. It is obvious that the nature of H. Amin as a dictator possessed of the ideas of carrying out repression and mass terror against the population of the country in general ought to be revealed. Give examples and facts. There are many of them.

Ninth. It is useful and important to say that the new leadership of the DRA has announced its firm intention to establish normal good-neighborly relations with its neighbors Iran and Pakistan. This DRA government announcement is being made when interference from Pakistan into the internal affairs of the Afghan people is unceasing and when the infiltration of armed groups from Pakistan into Afghanistan is occurring, that is, aggression is occurring.

Tenth. In connection with the decision of the US to expand the quantity of weapons deliveries to Pakistan, it is necessary to state an opinion that some external forces, in particular the US, are interested not in establishing peace, but on the contrary, in aggravating the situation, in inflaming a conflict situation in this region. It ought to be firmly stated that the arming of Pakistan to the teeth by the Americans can not leave the government of the DRA indifferent inasmuch this could create a constant threat of an armed invasion of Afghanistan from Pakistan. The DRA would be forced to be concerned about its security in these conditions.

Eleventh. It is well known that attempts are being made to set Afghanistan against other Muslim countries. In this regard it ought to be stated that Afghanistan holds out the hand of friendship to all Muslim countries, even those who put their signatures to the letter demanding the convening of the Security Council. It is necessary to stress that the new DRA leadership in fact is ready to show respect toward Islam and constant solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement. It is advisable to say that not one clergyman will be punished if he does not oppose the legal government of Afghanistan with a weapon in his hands.

Comrade minister, I can confidentially inform you that we have information about Saudi Arabia's intention to con-

vince six countries bordering it to break off diplomatic relations with the DRA.

Twelfth. It is important to stress that the governments of the countries whose signatures are on the letter to the chairman of the Security Council have embarked on a path of hostile activities against the Afghan people. Afghanistan is firmly traveling along a path of revolutionary reforms and there is no power which can force it to turn from this path. At the same time it is necessary to state that the new DRA government sincerely wishes to cooperate with all countries, even with those who signed the letter. The DRA government will continue to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement.

DOST. It remains for me to cordially thank you, comrade minister, for the advice which is very useful and valuable to me regarding the nature of the speech in the Security Council.

I did not only listen to it closely but recorded it in detail. All the wishes you expressed to me will be the core of my speech in the Security Council. Again, my thanks for the open comradely conversation.

GROMYKO. For my part, there were expressed thoughts which, in my view, could be useful to you in preparing the speech. Of course, because of limited time it was done in condensed abstract form. However the comradely advice and wishes expressed give a clear idea of the Soviet point of view about the issued touched on.

As you have requested, we have prepared for you a number of materials, in particular concerning American military bases. These materials will be sent to New York with [Soviet diplomat and adviser to the DRA government] V[asily]. S. Safronchuk, who is going there to assist you as you have requested earlier.

When you are assaulted concerning the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, you can parry this by exposing the aggressive policy of the US. In Cuba, the US, despite the constant demands of the Cuban government and people, continues to maintain its military base in Guantanamo. This is an example of open and gross interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

On a comradely level I would like to wish you and the members of your delegation a cheerful spirit, confidence, and firmness in defending your positions. Meet more often with representatives of countries taking part in the meeting and fearlessly explain to them the essence of the events occurring in Afghanistan, since the truth is on your side and our side.

Concerning contacts with Safronchuk and your conversations with him, it is desirable to use discretion and certain caution during conversations in New York, especially inside premises. Meetings and exchanges of opinions can be realized in turn on the premises of the Soviet UN mission or in the buildings of the Soviet consulate general. It is desirable not to advertise that Safronchuk arrived in New York to render you assistance. Officially, he is going in the capacity of a member of the UN General Assembly, which, as is well known, is still carrying on its work.

4 January 1980



Telegram from GDR Embassy in Moscow to Socialist Unity Party (SED) Central Committee Secretary Hermann Axen et al., 10 January 1980

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen DY30 IV 2/2.035/70, p. 39. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

10 January 1980

Telegram from Moscow
Urgent Flash

To [SED Central Committee members] comrades Axen, [Joachim] Hermann, [Werner] Krolikowski, Mahlow and Ziebart

From conversations in the USSR Foreign Ministry

6. The Soviet comrades consider that in Afghanistan successful measures to stabilize the internal situation are being carried out. The creation of a new party and state apparatus is progressing. The distribution of information must be completely renewed, since progressive forces in the media were removed by the [Hafizullah] Amin regime.



Memorandum, "Some Ideas About Foreign Policy Results of the 1970s (Points)" of Academician O. Bogomolov (Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System) sent to the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB on 20 January 1980 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, Plamy Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran) (Moscow: Iskon, 1999) pp. 202-203. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

The introduction of Soviet troops did not lead to the abatement of armed struggle by the opposition against the government. The Islamic fundamentalists have sharply stepped up their propaganda activity among the population using a new slogan: fight against foreign troops. Attempts have been stepped up at joining all Islamic groups into a single anti-government and anti-Soviet front.

After the introduction of the Soviet troops the United States, their allies, some Arab and Muslim countries, and also China announced their support and aid to the opposi-

tion. This aid had been given earlier, but now it has grown considerably. Afghanistan ended up isolated at the international level and relies only on the socialist camp, mainly the Soviet Union.

With the introduction of troops into Afghanistan our policy [...] crossed the permissible bounds of confrontation in the "Third World". The advantages of this action turned out to be insignificant compared to the damage which was inflicted on our interests:

1. In addition to the confrontations on two fronts – in Europe against NATO and in East Asia against China – a third dangerous hotbed of military and political tension on the USSR's southern flank has arisen for us in unfavorable geographic and sociopolitical conditions [...]
2. A considerable expansion and consolidation of the anti-Soviet front of countries surrounding the USSR from west to east has taken place.
3. The influence of the USSR on the Non-Aligned Movement, has suffered considerably, especially in the Muslim world.
4. Détente has been blocked and the political prerequisites to limit the arms race have been destroyed.
5. Economic and technological pressure on the Soviet Union have risen sharply.
6. Western and Chinese propaganda have received strong trump cards to expand a campaign against the Soviet Union in order to undermine its prestige in Western public opinion, developing countries, and also the socialist countries.
7. The Afghan events have eliminated the preconditions for a possible normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations for a long time.
8. These events have served as a catalyst to overcome the crisis relations and for a reconciliation between the Iran and the US.
9. Mistrust toward Soviet policy has been intensified and Yugoslavia, Romania, and North Korea have distanced themselves from it. Even in the Hungarian and Polish press signs have been observed of a restraint in connection with Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Evidently they reflect the sentiments of the public and the fears of the leaders of these countries of being drawn into the global actions of the Soviet Union, for which our partners do not have sufficient resources to participate.
10. The nuanced policy of the Western powers has been intensified and it has switched to a new tactic of active intrusion into the sphere of relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, openly playing on the contradictions and incompatibility of interests between them.
11. The burden of economic aid to Afghanistan has rested on the Soviet Union [...]

Memorandum on Information Given by [Soviet Ambassador] Comrade Pyotr A. Abrassimov to Comrade Erich Honecker about a Conversation between USSR Foreign Minister Comrade Andrei Gromyko with US Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, 27 May 1980

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30 IV 2/2.035/70 pp.40-42. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

27 May 1980, Berlin, 3 Copies

Memorandum

On information given by comrade P. A. Abrassimov to Comrade E. Honecker about a Conversation between USSR Foreign Minister Comrade A. GROMYKO with the US Secretary of State, E. MUSKIE⁹

MUSKIE: President Carter is for an improvement in Soviet-American relations. He was always very balanced towards the Soviet Union. But the Afghanistan events have created hindrances.

GROMYKO: The American side scratched the agreement made with President [Gerald] Ford in Vladivostok [in 1974]. SALT II was signed in Vienna [in June 1979], but not ratified; that is breaking your word. Then there was the discovery of the Soviet rocket brigade on Cuba. After the US lost Iran, they tried to compensate for this loss through Afghanistan. The USSR's intervention prevented this. As is well known we hesitated for a long time before we agreed to the request to send troops. Since the danger became extremely great we couldn't just watch any more and sent a limited troop contingent at the express wish of the Afghan government and in accordance with the treaty.

MUSKIE: It's a matter of finding a way out. Maybe the USSR could help liberate the American hostages in Iran.

GROMYKO: We have expressly declared ourselves against the hostage taking at the UN. But we are against any foreign intervention in the affairs of Iran. The US has gathered a large fleet in the Persian Gulf that is not only aimed at Iran and the Arab countries. But we also have a large Soviet fleet [three illegible words].

MUSKIE: We must, however, solve the Afghanistan matter.

GROMYKO: You know our position. Once there is no longer any foreign interference from Pakistan or [infringements on] the sovereignty and independence of the government of Afghanistan, then we are ready, at the request of the Afghani government, to withdraw our troops.

MUSKIE: We want to go back to normal relations between the US and USSR. But public opinion in the US must be taken into account.

GROMYKO: We are ready to normalize relations. You must stop boycott politics.¹⁰ Maybe you can find a way so the American athletes can participate in the Olympic Games. Maybe they will find a solution that smoothes the way.

MUSKIE: President Carter has made his decision.

GROMYKO: The President decides sometimes this way and sometimes that way.

MUSKIE: Participation at the Olympic Games is impossible. I consider this meeting very useful. He [Muskie] is interested in further meetings with such an experienced diplomat as Gromyko. Gromyko has been in diplomacy for 20 years and Muskie only 20 days.

GROMYKO: We agree to continue contacts and talks between us.

MUSKIE: I would like to assure [you] that I took over my position on the condition that the Secretary of State must be absolutely independent to conduct foreign policy and not Carter's retinue.



Memorandum of Conversations between Socialist Unity Party General Secretary Erich Honecker and Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Member of the Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 23 October 1980

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Partei- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/2367, pp. 66-7. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

23 October 1980

Conversation of Erich HONECKER, General Secretary CC SED with Sultan Ali KISHTMAND, Politburo member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan¹

Comrade Keshtmand unfortunately provided only a short evaluation of the present situation in the DRA: since the extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the PDPA in August of this year at which wide-reaching decisions were taken on destroying the counter-revolution, good conditions for the fighting off of the counter-revolution have come about. The fighting spirit of the party, mass organizations, and the people has increased. Naturally, in this connection, it must be mentioned that the USSR provides help in every

area and in every matter. [...]

Comrade Erich Honecker responded to the greetings of Comrade Babrak Karmal in the most heart-felt manner. Comrade Babrak Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union is being followed very attentively in the GDR [German Democratic Republic].¹² The party and state leadership are happy with its positive outcome. They hope that Comrade Babrak Karmal will visit the GDR soon.

It is good that the internal situation in the DRA is stabilizing. Both from an international standpoint and keeping in view that a contingent of Soviet military forces are stationed in the DRA, a political settlement of the Afghanistan problem is necessary. Such a settlement requires appropriate guarantees. In view of the policies of Pakistan and Iran, reactionary Arab states and the Islamic Conference, this will not be an easy task. The party and state leadership of the GDR assume that the Soviet troop contingent will stay in the DRA as long as necessary.

The GDR understands Afghanistan's position well. The GDR had many enemies after 1945. Without the armed defense by the Soviet Union, she could not have existed. Only after twenty years did the GDR have her international breakthrough. Today she is recognized worldwide, a member of the UN and the Security Council, and many other international institutions. The inner stability of the DRA will be strengthened on the basis of the policy of the party and the government under the leadership of comrade Babrak Karmal. Imperialism will have to accept that Afghanistan is a sovereign and independent state. The DRA and the USSR were in the right when they invoked their international treaties. The Chinese can be indignant and make trouble, but no more. The strength of the USSR and the other states of the socialist community is great. The SED and the people of the GDR will support all measures for the reinstatement of the sovereignty of the Afghani people on a revolutionary basis.



Working Record of CPSU Central Committee Politburo Meeting of 30 July 1981

[Source: Published in Krasnaya Zvezda, 15 February 2000. Translated by Gary Goldberg for CWIHP.]

(Top Secret)
SPECIAL FOLDER
Only copy
(Working record)

CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 30 July 1981

Chaired by [Chief Soviet Ideologist] Cde. M[ikhail]. A. SUSLOV. Present were [KGB chief] Cdes. Yu[ri]. V. Andropov,

M[ikhail]. S. Gorbachev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. Ya. Pel'she, [Premier Nikolai] A. Tikhonov, V. V. Kuznetsov, [CPSU Central Committee International Relations Secretary] B[oris]. N. Ponomarev, M[ikhail]. S. Solomentsev, I. V. Kapitonov, V[ladimir]. I. Dolgikh, M. V. Zimyanin, [Party Secretary] K[onstantin]. V. Rusakov

SUSLOV has the agenda. I would like to consult about one issue. Cde. Tikhonov has submitted a note to the CC CPSU and a draft instruction regarding perpetuating the memory of the soldiers who have died in Afghanistan. It is proposed to allocate a thousand rubles to each family to put an epitaph on the headstone. The matter is not the money, of course, but whether if we perpetuate the memory of soldiers who died in Afghanistan, what will we write about this on the epitaph of the headstone; in some cemeteries there could be several such headstones, so from the political point of view this would not be entirely correct. What do you think, comrades?

ANDROPOV. Of course, I think we need to bury soldiers who died in Afghanistan with honors, but it seems to be that it is a bit early to perpetuate their memory right now.

KIRILENKO. I think that it would be inadvisable to erect epitaphs right now.

PONOMAREV. Many letters are coming to the CC CPSU and other organizations; parents of the dead especially complain that their children and relatives died in Afghanistan. We need to consider this.

TIKHONOV. Of course, they always need to be buried. It's another matter whether inscriptions ought to be made.

ANDROPOV. Two questions arise from this. First, the issue of burial with honors and, second, about perpetuating the memory. I think we ought to accept this proposal to bury dead soldiers with honors, but regarding perpetuating the memory, we need to wait a while.

TIKHONOV. It's good that together with the Ministry of Defense we will submit new proposals on the basis of an exchange of opinions.

SUSLOV. Comrades, we also ought to think about replies to the parents and relatives whose children and friends died in Afghanistan. We should not take liberties here. The replies should be brief and, moreover, standard. We could charge Cdes. Zimyanin, [General of the Army and Chief of the Main Political Directorate A. A.] Yepishev, [N. I., Chief of the CC CPSU Administrative Organs Department, which oversaw the military] Savinkin, and [possibly General of the Army and Chief of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops V. A.] Matrosov with thinking about this.

CPSU Memorandum, “The Position of the PRC on Afghanistan,” 12 May 1982

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/vorl. SED 31955, n.p. Obtained and translated from Russian by David Wolff.*]

12 May 1982
CPSU Material
Strictly Confidential
The position of the PRC on Afghanistan

[...]

The policy of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] towards Afghanistan proceeded, from the very beginning, from great-power, hegemonic ambitions and [Chinese leader] Mao Zedong’s and the Beijing leadership’s efforts. Already during the Chinese government delegation’s first official visit, headed by Zhou Enlai, [there was] direct pressure on Afghanistan regarding Pushtunistan in the disagreement with Pakistan.¹³ The Chinese also underlined more than once that the whole Pamir [area], so they say, is ancient Chinese territory. Current maps published in Beijing present the Wakhan area [corridor] as “lost” Chinese territory. [...]

As early as 1978 Chinese specialists left Kandahar (from the hospital construction) and Bagram (from the textile factory construction [site]). In 1979, the remaining Chinese specialists left the country. The construction of a secondary irrigation system in Parvan province was discontinued. [...] The diplomatic personnel at the PRC embassy was cut in half.

The Chinese leaders at various levels announce their support for the anti-governmental forces in Afghanistan, encourage their subversive activities. The PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang announced on 3 June 1981 in Islamabad that the government of China” will provide active support – political, moral and material – to all who fight the hegemonic policy of the USSR in Afghanistan.” [...]

Beijing’s subversive action takes place mainly from Pakistani territory, where a broad net of camps, bases and special schools with Chinese instructors (in Peshawar, Chitral, Badzhaur, Miramshakh, Quetta) are preparing bandit formations to be sent into the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. In Peshawar for example, a group of Chinese specialists is working on counterintelligence, helping to reorganize the counterintelligence apparatus of the northwest province of Pakistan, smoking out agents from among the Afghan refugees.

Analogous bases are active in the Xinjiang-Uighur autonomous area bordering the DRA and since 1981 also in the town of Linzhou (Tibetan autonomous area). The base at Linzhou has given special training to more than 3,000 diversionaries. Separate Chinese instructors act directly in Afghanistan.

[A list of weapons provided by China follows.]

The Chinese embassy maintains a conspiratorial contact with the Afghan counter-revolutionaries. [...] The Chinese embassy’s workers have several times exhorted Afghan citizens to counter-revolutionary attacks. [...]

The PRC embassy in Afghanistan coordinates its subversive actions against the DRA with the governments of the USA, England, West German, and Italy by attending weekly meetings in Kabul with the personnel of these embassies to trade information of a political intelligence nature.

Based on materials of the Scientific-Research Institute (NII) and foreign information.

**Memorandum of Conversations between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and Afghan Leader Babrak Karmal, 19 May 1982**

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/2420, pp.90-1, 93-94, 97-98. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.*]

19 May 1982 (15:00-17:50 hours)
(uncorrected version)

[...]

KARMAL: When I talk about imperialism, I mean US-Imperialism and its allies, reactionary Arab lands, the reaction in the region, reactionary forces in Pakistan, right-wing forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially SAVAK, the former secret service of the Shah of Persia, and the hegemonists. They got together three years ago to start an undeclared war against Afghanistan.

Before the newest phase of the April [1978] Revolution there were 80 bases in Pakistan, 10 to 12 in Iran, 8 in Xinjiang in China. Counterrevolutionaries are being trained by specialists from the PRC, the US, and Egypt. These countries I have named have publicly announced that they support the counterrevolutionary elements of Afghanistan.

[...] The imperialist and reactionary forces have plans not only to end the Afghan Revolution, but also to end Afghan territory as a free country. The second stage of the April Revolution of 27 December [1979] put an end to that.

These plans called for regions such as where the Pushtuns, one of Afghanistan’s largest minorities, live as well as the western part of the country to be given to Iran. The northeast would go to China and in the center of Afghanistan, they would create a government against socialism, obedient to American imperialism, directly linked to the CIA.

Since the existence of Afghanistan and its territorial integrity were in danger, the revolutionary government and the

People's [Democratic] Party of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union for help under our treaty of friendship. The Soviet Union gave this help at just the right moment. It was a matter of days.

The imperialists were even ready to let loose a regional war. But the timely help of the Soviet Union not only saved the Afghan Revolution and territorial integrity, but also blocked the imperialist powers' advance. The danger was that Amin, who had had the legal president of the Republic murdered, was in on the plans of American imperialism and that the forces against the party had won influence inside the party. [...]

In the last two years and some months, the national army, the security forces, and the People's militia have not doubled or tripled but quadrupled, and now with our own security forces we can eliminate large groups of counter-revolutionaries who are filtered into our country from Pakistan and Xinjiang, China. They can not make any frontal attack on us, rather they are organizing terror bands of 5 to 10 men to blow up schools, public buildings, hospitals, and other government institutions. They blackmail the farmers and other classes. This kind of counter-revolutionary battle creates problems for us.

We are in the position to remove counter-revolutionary forces in our country this or next year. But the main problem is that when we succeed in bringing over the counter-revolutionary elements through promises and offers, then new forces are slipped in from Pakistan...

HONECKER: In our view, it will be a very difficult process to go from a feudal society to a new democratic and socialist system, while there are open borders with Iran and Pakistan.

BABRAK KARMAL: 2,340 kilometers of border with Pakistan, 800 kilometers of border with Iran, and 96 kilometers of border with China. And they are all adversaries!

HONECKER: We understand it this way: the imperialists want the borders with Iran and Pakistan open, as well as with China, but the border with the Soviet Union should be closed. But not everything follows the will of the imperialists and the development of the world has its own law.

[...]



Memorandum of Conversations between Socialist Unity Party (SED) General Secretary Erich Honecker and Afghan President Babrak Karmal, 21 May 1982

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/2420, pp. 128-9, 133, 140-3, 147. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

21 MAY 1982 (10:00-12:20 HOURS)

[...]

HONECKER: ... I don't need to emphasize that we are most closely allied with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos. We have a friendship and mutual aid treaty with Vietnam and the same treaty with Kampuchea and now we are about to conclude one with Laos.

BABRAK KARMAL: And now with Afghanistan.

HONECKER: Yes. That takes place today. But I wanted to consider now the Indochinese countries which are threatened by the Chinese hegemonists. This is clearly our main thrust in this region; otherwise, we wouldn't conclude these treaties. We know how complicated the situation is in Southeast Asia. I had a chance to see it on the spot with [GDR premier] Comrade [Willi] Stoph and other comrades. We've supported Vietnam with over 2.5 billion marks. We've trained tens of thousands of specialists in our higher schools and even our manufacturers are organizing workshops for manufacturers...

As an expression of our alliance and solidarity I would like to present you, Comrade Babrak Karmal, as a complement to the print-shop already at work, with a photo laboratory as a present from the GDR communists. A photo laboratory can help to reflect reality and we know that image plays an important role in the fight for peace. We are deeply convinced that on the basis of the measures we have agreed on today, on the basis of our treaty of mutual aid and friendship, the cooperation between our countries in political, scientific-technical, economic and cultural areas will become closer.

In our view, we could also expand the education of your cadres in higher education and popular education as well as with experts in this area. Together with all these measures that we agreed on today, we will expand considerably the spectrum of our cooperation...

BABRAK KARMAL: [...] We put the emphasis on the fact that Afghanistan is confronted with Pakistan, Iran and the People's Republic of China. But our policy principles are based on peaceful coexistence and our foreign policy follows.

Naturally, one can add that after Pakistan, Iran, China, and several Arab lands, the Federal Republic [of Germany] is one of the most important centers of the counter-revolution against Afghanistan and here we have almost the same positions.

HONECKER: Do you still have a German Federal Republic school in Kabul?

BABRAK KARMAL: It is good, comrade Honecker, that you are bringing up this problem, since we were planning to talk with you about it. Aside from the [West] German school, we have... [Cut off]

HONECKER: They're all agents.

BABRAK KARMAL: [continuing] ... the Goethe Institute and both institutions are very conspiratorially active in Afghanistan.

HONECKER: They send all the bad reports to Bonn. That is why [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt said [to me that] he is better informed about Afghanistan than I.

BABRAK KARMAL: But the reports they send are not true.

HONECKER: That is clear [...]

BABRAK KARMAL: Regarding Pakistan, as you said, comrade Honecker, the US intends to use Pakistan as a gendarme. This is naturally a danger for the neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, friendly India, and Iran, if it comes to a progressive line there.

In Pakistan power is basically limited to the military. They have a half million soldiers. They are professional soldiers. Although there are differences, they are directed by the Americans. The US can put anyone in power at any time.

The Pakistani military government has naturally tried to exploit the so-called Afghanistan problem with reactionary Arab countries, with the US, and also with China and to get as much help and support as possible. I do not want to leave unmentioned that the People's Republic of China is also supporting the Pakistani military government with large quantities of weapons and munitions. But the conflict is very hard in Pakistan as well as the ethnic conflicts, since there are several nationalities.

With regard to the Pakistani population, all the forces of the illegal parties are for the Afghanistan revolution. We have received many telegrams from leaders of these parties in which they fully support our revolution and reject the position of Pakistan.

It is a fact that the reactionary forces of America, China, Pakistan and the NATO countries have an interest in the limited Soviet contingent remaining in Afghanistan. In this way, these countries can use their help as a pretext for their dirty goals [...]

BABRAK: There is a matter that I'd like to raise. I don't know if it has been raised here to say that Afghanistan has labor and also mineral resources, and we will be in a position in the near future to take care of the needs of our friend the GDR. The riches of Afghanistan are enough to guarantee 50 million men the best living standard, if there was developed, socialist industry.

The main problem is the lack of energy [resources].

CPSU Memorandum, Information on Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz, 13 October 1982

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30 IV 2/2.035/70 p.106. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.*]

13 October 1982

Secret!

Information on talks between A. A. Gromyko and G. Shultz¹⁴

[...]

No new American thoughts on Afghanistan to signal. In general terms, Shultz supported a dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad, but we're not convinced of the sincerity of his statement. We presented our principled views on Afghanistan and demanded that the Americans end their interference and subversive behavior and seriously consider if it would not be better to move in the direction of a political solution.

[...]



Note on Conversation between East German Ambassador Kurt Krueger and People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) Politburo Member Anahita Ratebzad, 13 February 1983

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30 vorl. SED 30273. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.*]

13 February 1983

Ambassador Kurt Krueger (GDR) meets with Politburo member Anahita RATEBZAD

Towards the end of a three-hour talk, she asks about Afghan employees at the embassy. Krueger mentioned a driver...

She interrupted me and said: But you don't travel with that driver. I explained to her that I only go with a GDR driver and am sufficiently secure. She warned me again not to go with an Afghan driver since the counterrevolution pays large sums for abductions. She added that in this way 15 Soviet specialists were abducted near Mazar-e-Sharif and finally after long research found hidden in a mountain fortress on 1 February and then 10 were freed alive by parachutists. Five specialists had already been shot. The counterrevolution planned to take these specialists to Peshawar, but were pre-

vented when the roads were blocked in time by the armed organs.



East German Memorandum Information on the Situation in Afghanistan, 8 September 1983

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30 vorl. SED 30273. Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

8 September 1983

Foreign Department Information on the Situation in Afghanistan

Consolidation continues [...] Increasing cooperation of the revolutionary power with tribes, in particular with the main tribe on both sides of border, the Pashtuns, has had a noticeable influence on the change in power relations. Approximately 80% of the Pashtuns live on the Pakistani side. After decisions of the Elder Councils (Jingahs), they agreed with the Afghan government not to let counter-revolutionary bands have passage through tribal areas.

Forming tribal militia. Providing arms, money. Offer education in USSR to chiefs' children. 220 already in USSR.



Report of a USSR Ministry of Defense Operations Group Headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov about the Results of Operations, June 1984

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 284-5. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

The military situation as a result of conducting a whole series of operations against counterrevolutionary forces has notably improved.

During the five months there were 85 operations, of which 51 were joint operations of the 40th [Soviet] Army and Afghan army units, and 34 independent operations by Afghan units.

The Panjshir operation and combat operations in Herat had especially great importance for the improvement of the military situation...

A serious defeat was inflicted on the enemy in the course of combat operations in the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys and to the north. His main base was destroyed... Secret documents seized in Panjshir by our forces on 18 May 1984 per-

mitted us to uncover and destroy a broad IOA agent network existing in Kabul (in the central Party and government bureaucracy, including in the SGI [Government Information Service], *tsarandoy* [police], and Ministry of Defense) and other regions of the country...

In May and especially in June the number of groups entering into talks ready to recognize the DRA government and cease armed combat increased and the surrender of a number of groups occurred (in Panjshir and Andarab not counting the band of the leader Jumakhan (700 men), 8 groups totaling 600 rebels surrendered)...

At the present time in accordance with the decision approved by you, measures are being taken in the Panjshir and Andarab valleys to consolidate government authority. To this end, pressure has been put on the DRA government to increase its activity...

Recently the enemy has displayed activity in the south-east and the south of the country in the areas of Khowst and the provinces of Kunar, Kandahar, and in individual sectors of lines of communications.

Considering this, besides Panjshir and Andarab, at the present time troop combat operations are being conducted in the area of Khowst (25th Infantry Division, 666th Regiment "K", 2nd PGBR [trans. note: some kind of brigade; note that these are all Afghan units]; in the area of Kandahar (70th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, 15th Infantry Division, and the 466th Regiment "K" of the 2nd Army Corps); in the area of Farah (21st Motorized Infantry Brigade with the 4th Tank Brigade); in the area of Gurian, west of Herat (17th Infantry Division with the 5th Tank Brigade).

Combat operations will soon begin in the area of Jalalabad and Asadabad, in the provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar [with] the 66th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, and the 11th and 9th Infantry Divisions.

The closing of possible routes for the movement of caravans and groups from Pakistan continues using three "*spetsnaz*" [special forces] battalions...

The 40th Army continues to remain a decisive factor in stabilizing the situation in the DRA and takes on itself the main burden of the fight with the counterrevolutionaries [...] The Army is combat ready. Combat operations in the Panjshir and Andarab valleys have shown the capability of the troops of the Army and aviation to carry out combat missions in difficult mountainous conditions without special equipment at altitudes of 4,000-5,000 meters and where there are glaciers.

The personnel have operated selflessly and bravely. The overwhelming majority of combat mission carried out by aircraft have been at low altitudes. The Su-25 ground attack aircraft have displayed their good combat capabilities...

The operations of the troops permit several conclusions to be drawn about further improvement of their combat training and technical supplies not only of the 40th Army, but of the Armed Forces as a whole...

Several individual conversations have been held with DRA Minister of Defense Cde. [Abdul] Qadir and Chief of the Main Political Directorate Cde. Sadeki. In them the need

was stressed for greater activity and regular visits to the troops to analyze the results of combat operations and to take steps to increase their effectiveness; to step up political educational work with personnel, combat desertion; and to give other necessary aid to the formations and units of the Afghan army...



CPSU Memorandum, 24 October 1986

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/2383, p.122* Obtained and translated from German by David Wolff.]

24 October 1986

Secret

4 Copies

In keeping with our common practice, we would like to inform you of the most important results of the Sino-Soviet political consultations that took place in Beijing on 6-14 October [...]

In connection with the beginning of the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan, the Chinese side was told that we await corresponding steps from their side, they who are participating in an undeclared war against the DRA.



GRU [Soviet Military Intelligence] Dossier on Najibullah (Excerpt)

Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: *Iskon*, 1999), pp. 369-70. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Muhammad Najib (Najibullah) was born in 1947 in the province of Paktia into a prosperous family. He is a Pushtun and a Sunni Muslim. His father Akhtar Muhammad was the leader of a tribe and maintained relations with the former president of Afghanistan, M. Daud. Najibullah's roots are from the Ahmadzai, part of the Gilzai union of Pushtun tribes.

In 1964 Najibullah entered the medical school of Kabul University. He joined the "Parcham" faction of the PDPA in 1965. He was twice arrested in 1966 for active participation in anti-government demonstrations [*vystupleniya*]. He followed B[abrak], Karmal after the Party split in 1967. He was imprisoned in 1969 for political activity. In 1970 he was elected Secretary of the underground PDPA City Committee in Kabul from the "Parcham".

Nevertheless, in 1975 he graduated the University and

began his profession as a gynecologist; he worked several years in a number of provinces. He joined the united CC PDPA in 1978. After the coup in April 1978 he became a member of the DRA Revolutionary Council. In June of that year (when N[ur]. M[ohammad]. Taraki and H[afizullah]. Amin were in power) he was sent to Iran as DRA ambassador.

But he was removed from the post of ambassador in the summer of 1979 and emigrated to Yugoslavia. In the process he appropriated \$100,000 from Embassy funds. He returned to his homeland after the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. In 1980 he headed the state security organization and was again elected to the Revolutionary Council. He has been a member of the CC PDPA Politburo since 1981 and since 1985 he has been the Secretary of the CC PDPA for Ministry of Defense [MO], Ministry of State Security [MGB], and Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] issues.

He is an intelligent, clever, and a vicious politician. He is vain and ambitious.

A Pushtun nationalist, he is one of the motivating spirits of the policy of "Pushtunization" of Afghan society. Within his closest circle he speaks only in Pashto. He is inclined to select colleagues not for their professional qualities but for their personal devotion to him, predominantly relatives and fellow-villagers [*zemlyaki*].

He knows English, is married, and has three daughters. His wife is from a wealthy family. [From the dossier of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate on M. Najib]



Memorandum from KGB Chief Viktor M. Chebrikov, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR Defense Minister Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov, and CPSU Central Committee International Relations Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin to CPSU Politburo, 13 November 1986¹⁵

[Source: Boris Gromov, *Ogranichenny Kontingent (Limited Contingent)* (Moscow: *Progress*, 1994), pp. 230-233.]

Secret

Special Folder [*This notation omitted in the Gromov book*]

CCCPSU

Some positive movement in the activity of the Afghan leadership and the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] noted after the election of Najib as General Secretary of the CC PDPA continues to develop. The party organs have begun to work more actively, the forms and methods of propaganda are being reexamined, and new ways are being more intensively sought to influence broad sectors

of the population. There are certain positive changes in the condition of the Afghan armed forces and the level of their combat ability.

Nevertheless no noticeable improvement in the military-political situation in the country has been achieved. Cde. Najib is objectively assessing the situation and understands the complexity of the problems which lie before him.

Najib described his assessment of the situation in the country in conversations in Kabul with [First Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister] Cde. Yu[li] M. Vorontsov from 18 to 22 October 1986 (telegrams from Kabul N° 1179, 1182, 1188, and 1190).

In particular, Najib noted that of the 31,000-35,000 villages in Afghanistan the government has only 8,000 formally under control and they managed to hold elections to local bodies in a still smaller number of villages near cities, in only 2,000. In Najib's words, the urban population actively supports the Revolution, but there is no such support in the villages and the PDPA itself it at fault for not having explained the essence and the goals of the Revolution to the population. Cde. Najib thinks that at the present time the mission of the Party is to go from the city to the village.

Cde. Najib noted that the military activity of the counterrevolutionaries is not slackening. He said that at the present time 5,017 rebel groups are operating on DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] territory, which include 183,000 men, eighty thousand of which comprise the active combat force of the counterrevolutionaries. The tactics of the counterrevolutionary forces are changing and improving. Part of the caravan routes along which the supplies of the counterrevolutionaries travel are generally not covered at all. This requires a further stepping up of efforts to close the border.

Cde. Najib stressed that if we proceed from the position of solving all problems by military means then it will take 20-30 more years to normalize the situation at the present rate of strengthening and expanding government authority. In this regard he considers the stepping up of efforts directed at achieving national reconciliation as a pressing task.

In the opinion of Cde. Najib, they ought to enter into talks with those Islamic parties and organizations inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders who are ready to compromise and do not bear responsibility for bloodshed to such a great degree. A dialogue could also be held with monarchists. Cde. Najib thinks that they will never compromise with the aristocracy, feudal interests, large private landowners, and reactionary mullahs – the “fundamentalists.” Nevertheless it is possible to establish contacts with representatives of some of these individuals. When the PDPA achieves national reconciliation he considers it necessary to keep the posts of Chairman of the State Council, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; the Ministers of Defense, State Security, Internal Affairs, Communications, and Finance; the management of banks, the Supreme Court, the procuracy, and military justice bodies. Representatives of the other side could get the posts of Deputy Chairman of the State Council and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and also the

posts of Minister of Agriculture, Health, Irrigation; Deputy Minister of various ministries, and governors. The former king, Zahir Shah, could be given the post of Chairman of the National Patriotic Front or Chairman of Parliament. The political organizations of Islamic groups could become collective members of the National Patriotic Front and legitimize their activity on this basis. Cde. Najib expressed the completely reasonable opinion that they ought not to be hasty in adopting the DRA constitution, keeping in mind that much contained in it will depend on how the process of national reconciliation develops.

Cde. Najib is considering the possibility of a public announcement concerning questions of national reconciliation with a simultaneous proposal to the counterrevolutionaries for an armistice, let's say, for six months.

Cde. Najib views the issues of a political settlement and the withdrawal of Soviet troops as linked with national reconciliation. He said that he considers a reduction of the period of Soviet withdrawal from the DRA to two years is possible after a settlement is reached and expressed several ideas about the number of troops to be withdrawn during the first and second years. In connection with the other aspects of the settlement, he expressed an opinion about the advisability of international monitoring within the framework of a settlement without UN involvement; he suggested several versions of Iranian involvement in the settlement; he has a favorable attitude toward a possible increase in our contacts with the Pakistanis regarding the issues concerning the situation around Afghanistan.

Cde. Najib understands that until the present time little has been done in practice toward national reconciliation. It is evident that he is inclined to search for real approaches to this problem. He needs our support in this, especially since indeed far from everyone in the PDPA accepts the idea of reconciliation. Of great importance in this regard would be the organization of an official visit to the USSR by Cde. Najib before the end of this year in the course of which the questions of national reconciliation and a political settlement around Afghanistan could be discussed. The visit could further facilitate the strengthening of the position of this energetic, can-do Afghan leader.

Cde. Najib thinks that several personnel questions need to be decided to increase the effectiveness of the activity of the Afghan leadership.

In conversations with Cde. Yu. M. Vorontsov and also in other conversations in Kabul in the last few days he has especially stressed that [former Afghan President] B[abrak] Karmal ought to be removed from the PDPA Politburo and the position of Chairman of the DRA Revolutionary Council as soon as possible. Cde. Najib said that B. Karmal has abandoned Party and government work, occupies himself with faultfinding, and speaks against the policy of national reconciliation. Cde. Najib is afraid that B. Karmal's ambitiousness, aggravated by illness and alcohol abuse, could lead him to unpredictable acts. Quiet actions could remove him from his present posts if he were first convinced to do this.

For Cde. Najib's part, he raised the issues of replacing

Minister of Defense N[ur] Muhammed with Politburo member [and former Public Works and Defense Minister Col.-Gen. Muhammad] Rafi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh[ah] M. Dost with [PDPA Politburo member and former Finance Minister Abdul] Wakil (Dost would meanwhile continue to handle questions of national reconciliation but as a Minister for Special Assignments and simultaneously DRA Permanent Representative to the UN).

Najib's ideas concerning personnel issues are well-founded. The observations of Soviet representatives in Kabul, in particular, confirm that B. Karmal has not drawn the necessary conclusions on his own and his selfish opposition and lack of self-control displayed in ever more abrupt forms are paralyzing the activity of Cde. Najib and seriously impeding his work in the CC PDPA Politburo and the Party as a whole.

13 November 1986



Memorandum of Conversation between CPSU Secretary for International Relations Anatoly Dobrynin and Socialist Unity Party (SED) General Secretary Erich Honecker in Berlin, 20 January 1987

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/2384, pp. 32-33; translated from German by David Wolff.*]

20 January 1987

[...]

DOBRYNIN: The Soviet Union's relations with India are developing to a new level after the meeting with [Indian Prime Minister Rajiv] Gandhi.¹⁶ There was a very open one-on-one talk between the two leaders. We can even jokingly say that in some matters, he [Gandhi] had positions like a member of the Warsaw Pact.

HONECKER: We evaluate highly the results of M. Gorbachev's trip to India.

DOBRYNIN: Two words on Afghanistan. Najib wanted to come to Moscow alone.¹⁷ M. Gorbachev suggested meeting with the whole Politburo and to have a private meeting. Now Najib has understood that that is the correct step. He says it took him a half year to convince the others that Gorbachev had said just that. Two thirds of the Politburo were in Moscow. Comrade Gorbachev expressed a very simple thought: the Soviet Union has always been for friendship with Afghanistan. But now is the time for the Afghans to take power into their own hands, not to count on the Soviet troops,

looking on as they fight. The CPSU assumes that the Afghans must put themselves into play in order to let the Soviet troops leave soon. This could happen in about two years. The Afghan comrades were at first hurt. Najib knew about it in advance, but not the others.

He agreed with M. Gorbachev and said: it will be hard, but we can do it. Now Afghanistan is in a difficult phase. Najib suggested the solution of a national reconciliation and the Soviet side agreed. To his question as to who could be brought back from the emigration, we answered that he knows best. If someone is to be brought into the government, just do it, except for the key posts. Now practically everything is agreed except for the timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. With [UN Special Envoy Diego] Cordovez, we have been talking about three-and-a-half years. Pakistan demands a period of four months. The Soviet side advised him not to even talk about such a period. He suggested 18 months. He received the reply that he should speak with Afghanistan.

The solution of a national reconciliation was a surprise for the bandits. Their leaders want to have four weeks to think about it. They don't want to take advice from anyone in this period. [US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost was sent to [Pakistani President] Zia Ul-Haq¹⁸ to say it was a Russian trick. Comrade [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly G.] Kovalev was also sent to Pakistan to explain the Soviet position.



Memorandum by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Central Committee (CC) Department of "Foreign Policy and International Relations" on Activating the Relations with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Increasing the Assistance to Afghanistan with View to Promoting the National Reconciliation Process, 18 May 1987

[Source: *Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, File 87. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova and Baev.*]

To
Politburo of the CC BCP
Reg. No. 00.41-78/20.5.87

MEMORANDUM
By the CC BCP Department of Foreign Policy and International Relations

Re: Activating the relations with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and increasing the assistance to Afghanistan with view to promoting the national reconciliation process.

Comrades,

Our Soviet comrades have proposed that the People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with the other countries of the socialist community, provide additional help to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with view to promoting the national reconciliation process.

The Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] Najib at a meeting with the ambassadors of the socialist countries to Kabul, held on 12 April this year, declared that the PDPA and the DRA are in favor of strengthening and accelerating the relations with the fraternal socialist countries; more initiatives are expected on the latter's part, including initiatives in terms of an increase in the socio-economic assistance provided to Afghanistan.

The relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and DRA, and between the BCP and the PDPA, have been improving since December 1981, when the treaty on the establishment of friendly relations and close cooperation was signed in Sofia.

The summit meetings held and treaties signed between the two countries have been of particular significance for the further development of our bilateral relations. In this respect an invitation to undertake an official friendly visit to the P[eople's] R[epublic of] Bulgaria has been made to comrade Najib, Secretary General of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, on comrade Todor Zhivkov's behalf. Afghanistan suggests that this visit take place from 18 to 20 July or from 12 to 14 August. The BCP and the PR Bulgaria have been actively supporting the PDPA's policy and that of the Revolutionary Council and DRA government towards national reconciliation and normalizing the overall situation both within Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries by peaceful means; they firmly back up the friendly Afghani people's struggle to build a new, peaceful and independent and non-aligned Afghanistan.

Exchanges of delegations are being carried out on a broad scale. In 1986 our country was visited by the PDPA CC Politburo member and DRA Prime Minister of Sultan Ali Keshtmand, the PDPA CC Politburo member and DRA Deputy Prime Minister Mohammed Rafi, three ministers and other important politicians and state officials from Afghanistan. There have been several visits on the Bulgarian part since the beginning of 1987, including those of Krastyo Trichkov, vice-president of the National Council of the Fatherland Union, and Rumen Serbezov, chairman of the Central Cooperative Union. There has been exchange visits of other party, state or public delegations. A sustainable legal framework, within which bilateral relations may develop, has been established.

So far our country has been providing and still provides significant socio-economic assistance and aid to the DRA. This aid may be divided into the following items:

- a government credit of \$31.3 million has been extended to fund the establishment of cattle-breeding farm, a chicken-breeding farm, a fishery, a pottery and leather-processing works, and other properties

on Afghanistan's territory; the agreements already signed in this respect total \$31 million.

- a new government credit of \$30 million has been extended in 1986 to fund the designing of a brick works, the delivery and installation of its equipment, supplying with electricity villages throughout the country, building medium-size and small water-power stations, a mixed-type fodder plant, the expansion of a chicken-breeding farm, a fruit and vegetable-processing technological line;
- a credit line of 3 million exchange leva granted by the Central Cooperative Union in 1986;
- aid amounting to over 1.5 million exchange leva for telephone stations of the CC of PDPA and other organizations and agencies, textbooks, medicines, foods, footwear, clothing and special equipment;
- experts sent to work in various industries of Afghanistan's economy
- covering fees and other expenses for the education of about 100 students annually at the universities and the Academy of Social Sciences and Economic Management (the ASSEM) at the CC of the BCP;
- covering fees and other expenses for an 11-year education of 20 Afghan orphans at boarding-schools in Bulgaria;
- covering all expenses, including travel and accommodation of all Afghans visiting Bulgaria.

A sign of our solidarity with the people of Afghanistan and our support for the PDPA and the DRA are the wide range of events organized in our country such as meetings, rallies, press conferences to honor such important historical events as the anniversary of the April Revolution (27 April), the Day of Independence (18 August), the International Day of Solidarity with the people of Afghanistan (25 October).

We suggest that our country accept the Soviet comrades' proposal, and respond to the PDPA's appeal to provide assistance to the PDPA's policy of national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

We are therefore tabling a draft resolution of Politburo of the CC of the BCP, drawn up after considering the remarks and suggestion made by the following Politburo members: comrades [Prime Minister] Georgi Atanassov, [Party Secretary] Grisha Philipov, [Defense Minister] Gen. Dobri Dzhurov, [Foreign Minister] Petar Mladenov and [Economics Minister] Ognian Doinov. The financial aid for designing a new hospital in Kabul has been considered with the chairman of the Bulgarian Red Cross, K. Ignatov.

18 May 1987

First Deputy Head, CC BCP Foreign Policy and International Relations Department
/K. Atanassov/

Report to Soviet Minister of Defense Gen. Dmitri T. Yazov from Gen. Valentin Varennikov in Kabul, January 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 397-98. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Secret)

To the USSR Minister of Defense
General of the Army, D. T. Yazov

I report:

...after the visit of [Soviet Foreign Minister] Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze Cde. Najibullah asked to meet with Cde. Layek for a conversation. It ought to be noted that there are very close relations between Najibullah and Layek. They often meet together to discuss various questions, chiefly to submit them to the Politburo or the Defense Council. For the last year and a half Najibullah has repeatedly sent Layek to me for frank conversations, the content of which was doubtless transmitted to Najibullah.

On 10 January the meeting with Layek took place. He arrived under the pretext of discussing the situation in the Gardez – Khost region, [but] in fact he was interested in the opinion of Soviet representatives about the results of Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze's visit to Kabul.

At the beginning of the conversation I shared with Layek our estimate of the influence of the meetings with Cde. Eh. A. Shevardnadze on the Party and government bureaucracy of the country. In this regard Layek confirmed the conclusion that the Afghan leadership has finally understood that Soviet troops would soon begin a withdrawal from Afghanistan and this predetermines the necessity for decisive steps to strengthen the position of the PDPA regime and further stabilize the situation in the country.

I further described to Layek the most important problems which should be solved in the shortest possible time. He agreed that it is quite necessary:

1. To speed up the elections to local governments (villages, rural districts, provinces). During the elections the people themselves will decide whom to elect. Fearlessly start to involve the heads of local [rebel] groups in government bodies...
2. Consolidate the positions of government authority. The main figure in the province should be the governor. Examine the leadership echelon at the provincial level and remove people who do not enjoy authority among the population...
3. Strengthen the Party. At the upcoming CC PDPA plenum determine the role and place of the PDPA in the new conditions (a multi-Party system, coalition, the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops) and the tactics of their

future activities right now and for the long term...

4. Accelerate the strengthening of the bloc of leftist forces and its active inclusion in the political processes in the country...

5. Concentrate efforts in 8-9 key provinces (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Paktia, the Khost district, Nangarhar, Jowzjan, Balkh, and Kunduz), firmly holding the west, south, and some of the east of Afghanistan.

6. Start creating a coalition government now while Soviet troops are in the country. For this, it is necessary to look for nontraditional means, make contacts, and use all the possibilities for work with the most influential group leaders such as Ahmad Shah and Jelaluddin.

Regarding the question of strengthening the Party, Layek assured me that this would not be difficult to achieve. It is enough to stop factionalism at the highest level and everything will be in order. In his words, the differences at middle and lower levels of the Party bureaucracy are not sharp and easily eliminated. It is necessary to achieve Politburo unity [by] removing 3 or 4 people who are strenuously pursuing factional activity. Layek did not name who these people are.

...Layek noted that the policy of national reconciliation is the only correct way to solve the Afghan problem. Afghan leaders should not scare off the opposition while carrying it out – “the doors to talks should be open.”

I said to Layek that the opposition will not crawl to these doors itself. They need to be assiduously invited, moreover, into talks as equals so that the opposition can maintain their political face. Only in this case can you count on anything. For a long time only one method was used regarding the intransigent leaders – active combat operations. Now the time has come to again reexamine the attitude toward authoritative [rebel] leaders and make a decision about each one personally. The main this is to draw them into contact, into talks, and into participation in coalition government bodies and offer [them] prestigious positions in the provinces and in Kabul. At the same time, decide the problem of reducing the influence of important leaders by splitting away small detachments.

Not all Afghan leaders correctly understand this issue. The DRA Special Revolutionary Court has not yet revoked the sentence which in 1986 handed down a death sentence in absentia to seven important and authoritative leaders, including A. Shah and Jelaluddin. Threats are directed against them on Afghan television. All of this is obviously not going to help establish contact with them.

Layek agreed with these conclusions. However he expressed doubt that A. Shah and those like him would sit at a negotiating table (although the Afghan comrades still have not tried to propose this) since they hope that the absence of unity in the PDPA will lead to the destruction of the Party, which would facilitate the seizure of power...

Varennikov

January 1988

Note by USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov to Mikhail Gorbachev, Attaching State Planning Committee (Gosplan) Memorandum on Soviet Expenditures in Afghanistan, January 1988

[Source: Published in *Istochnik* (1995), vol. 3, p. 156. Translated by Gary Goldberg.]

SPECIAL FOLDER

Dear Mikhail Sergeyeovich,

I am sending you USSR Gosplan information about our material expenses in Afghanistan, including about the level of average daily expenses*

N. Ryzhkov

N° 92-op (2 pages)

MEMO

about Soviet expenditures in Afghanistan

Total financial expenses (millions of rubles):

1984–1578.5

1985-2623.8

1986-3650.4

1987-5374.0

including:

I. Military aid (millions of rubles)

	1984	1985	1986	1987
1. Maintenance and support of the Soviet Army	1196.8	2023.5	2341.6	3955.0
2. Maintenance and support of the DRA Army	381.7	600.3	703.8	
3. USSR MVD expenses	-	-	144	150
4. USSR KGB expenses	-	-	8	11
Total Military Aid	1578.5	2623.8	3197.4	4116

II. Economic aid and other expenses (millions of rubles)

	1986	1987
	actual	granted
1. Free aid	203	950
2. Economic assistance through GKEhS {State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations} channels	152	166
3. Through Ministry of Foreign Trade channels, export above import	28	67
4. Aid through preferential prices for Afghan goods delivered to the USSR: natural gas, wool, etc.	70	65
5. Deliveries within the framework of sponsored aid	-	10
Total economic aid		

III. Average daily expenditures (millions of rubles per day)

1984	1985	1986	1987
4.3	7.2	10.0	14.7

* - There is a note: “Cde. M. S. Gorbachev has been informed. V. Boldin. 17.01.88”

APRF. Packet N° 3 (88). Original



Information about the 6th Meeting of the Multilateral Group for Current Information of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries, January 1988

[Source: Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Opus 45-10, File 28. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova and Baev.]

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INFORMATION
About the 6th Meeting of the Multilateral Group for Current Information of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries

On 19-20 January 1988, the 6th meeting of the Warsaw Pact Multilateral Group for Current Information was held in Warsaw.

[...]

The following information was provided by the delegation of the USSR under the third item on the agenda:

[...]

2. On settlement of the situation in Afghanistan:

There are completely new trends in terms of the policy for national reconciliation and the further progress of the negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan in Geneva.

The material and legal framework, within which a national dialogue was to be initiated, has been established. The coalition structure of state authority was being firmly established. Many of the ministerial positions, among which that of prime minister, have been proposed to the opposition.

The unilateral ceasefire by the government has been extended to 15 July 1988. The economy has incorporated the capital of private Afghani, whose interests are legally protected.

Peace zones have been established in many regions of the country; over 120,000 refugees have come back, 35,000 former counter-revolutionaries have ceased armed struggle.

The military power of the Afghan army has been enhanced; the latter became quite obvious in the successful operation for the de-blocking of Khost.

During his visit to Moscow [UN Special Envoy] Diego Cordovez claimed that he hoped that the negotiations that are to start in February would end successfully. Afghanistan's and Pakistan's positions on the period within which the Soviet troops are to start withdrawing from Afghanistan have become closer. The former's position remains 12 months, whereas the latter's [is] 8 months.

Iran is not to join the Geneva process yet; it claims, however, that it will make an official statement about its support for any further agreements reached.

[Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze's visit to Kabul at the beginning of January has been highly appreciated by the leaders of Afghanistan; this visit was considered a sign of significant support for Afghanistan in one of the most important moments of its historical development. [...]



Joint Report by USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USSR Ministry of Defense and KGB Representatives in Kabul, February 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 403-04. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

[...] Detailed conversations conducted in recent days with Cde. Najibullah and other Afghan comrades and an analysis of the information arriving through various channels allows certain conclusions to be drawn about several features of the current military and political situation in Afghanistan.

With the publication of the announcement by M. S. Gorbachev and Najibullah an important period in the policy of national reconciliation is ending for which, as they note here, considerably more has been done to restore peace in Afghanistan than in previous years. At the same time a qualitatively new phase in the development of the situation is beginning, [but] by no means all of its constituent elements could be discerned right now. However the main thing is

clear – the point is coming when Afghans must identify and solve their problems themselves by those means which best correspond to their historical traditions. The forms of clarifying relations will be varied – in some places associated with armed struggle and in other places with negotiations - with the need for serious concessions, obviously mainly on the part of the government. But this will be an Afghan solution of an Afghan problem.

The comrades understand that the first period after the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be the most crucial when the armed opposition, judging from everything, will try to unleash massive pressure on government forces. As Cde. Najibullah thinks, it is important to hold out for two or three months, after which the opposition will begin to dissipate and different circumstances will present themselves which will weaken it. Most likely, government forces will have to retreat in several sectors, for in the opinion of Chief of the General Staff Sh[ahnawaz]. N. Tanay, [they] ought possibly to abandon in advance those places where the opposition has obvious military supremacy. This needs to be done so that the opposition can not then paint each local success as a great military victory.

...With the withdrawal of Soviet troops the opposition is deprived of the capability of using anti-Sovietism as a unifying factor. The conflicts between the commanders of the internal counterrevolution operating in Afghanistan itself and the leaders of their own parties outside the country have a very bitter nature...

In the opinion of Cde. Najibullah two outcomes are possible. The first: serious, prolonged battles with the counter-revolutionaries; the second – more favorable, where issues are decided not so much by military means as by various combinations, compromises, and talks using clan, ethnic, and local [*zemlyacheskiye*] relations.

Cde. Najibullah himself is inclined to think that the situation will not develop according to the worst outcome. He returned repeatedly to these thoughts and every time his statements expressed optimism.

The situation in Afghanistan, as it seems at the present time, confirms that the election of Cde. Najibullah as President is already bringing tangible results. In particular, recently a number of important figures of the domestic opposition are trying to make contact with Cde. Najibullah. Judging from their statements, they attach much importance just to the fact that they do not have to do business with a Party leader but with a President. Such a policy is being observed in the provinces where the commanders of armed groups prefer to do business with governors.

Of course it is not possible right now to foresee all the twists and turns of the situation. But it is very important for the Afghans to travel their own path, finally shedding attitudes of dependency and making decisions themselves. Doubtless here there might be and even will be unavoidable miscalculations and delays. But the main thing is not to commit big political mistakes.

Practice has confirmed the correctness of the main thrusts of future work which were outlined during the meetings be-

tween Cde. Gorbachev and Cde. Najibullah and specified during the working visit of Cde. E. A. Shevardnadze to Kabul in January of this year...



Soviet Gen. Valentin Varennikov's Proposals on How the Afghans Should Use Their Forces after the Soviet Withdrawal, March 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 407-09. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

The armed forces today are in condition to independently counter opposition pressure only in instances where they constitute large units. Small subunits (posts, outposts) and small garrisons, to battalion level, are extremely unsteady.

The leaders of the opposition, the US, and Pakistan are counting on the overthrow of the current regime and the seizure of power in the country under all alternatives of the development of events after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Thus, if the Geneva Accords are signed, when Afghanistan receives certain guarantees of non-interference, rebel operations will to a considerable degree be fettered by the responsibilities of the Pakistanis and the Americans, and will not be of an open nature, let's say, by shipping weapons and ammunition across the border. Accordingly, the counterrevolutionaries will be forced to operate in an atmosphere which is more difficult for them.

It is important to keep in mind that the counterrevolutionaries will obviously start to place their main reliance not on large-scale actions of armed groups but on infiltrating agents into the Party and government bureaucracy. Occupying responsible official positions, they can demoralize and recruit. At a certain time the counterrevolutionaries will try to occupy suitable positions in the government bureaucracy with these forces and support their operations with rebel detachments, which could sneak in with refugees (there are weapons in each population center)...

The military doctrine of the Republic of Afghanistan, with the proclamation of a policy of national reconciliation, has been completely subordinated to the mission of stopping the war. It has a peace-loving nature, having as its main idea ensuring the security of the government and the relative stability of the situation in the main regions of the country.

But in achieving the designated strategic goals and, in addition, tactical missions, the leadership of the Republic has still been relying not only on their own forces but on the international aid of the Soviet Union and the troops of the 40th Army.

...The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will fundamentally change the military and political situation and considerably reduce the opportunity for the Afghan leader-

ship to stabilize it. If measures are not taken in advance then many critically important regions and facilities can end up beyond the control of government forces in enemy hands.

Considerable men and equipment are required to protect such regions and facilities. Considering the low combat reliability of Afghan units in comparison with Soviet troops, one can make the conclusion that only bold and decisive steps in the use of actually available forces can allow [them] to count on success in holding important facilities.

In this regard it is advisable:

1. To examine critically the current dispersal of the troops of the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] armed forces throughout the entire country (especially the army troops, including border troops). Try not to hold all the main regions, as was ensured by the presence of the 40th Army, but concentrate efforts only on the selected areas ensuring the daily activity of the government and stability for the situation in key regions.

To create a concentrated grouping of armed forces. All garrisons which even now, when our troops are here, are difficult to provide for and support when they conduct combat operations are to be eliminated. Withdraw the subunits of these garrisons to troop basing areas. This chiefly affects garrisons in the areas of Barikot, Panjshir, and Badakhshan...

Such activities preclude the possibility of the defeat and occupation of these small garrisons by the rebels, which would cause political damage to the government and negatively influence troop morale.

The abandonment of small garrisons is to be carried out by holding a preliminary meeting with local authorities and concluding an agreement with them about handing over this area to local authorities for protection who, for their part, would be obligated not to take actions harmful to government bodies.

2. To carry out similar operations regarding those "nuclei" [*orgyadra*] of government authority in a number of districts and rural districts (totaling 17) which were at one time established by force.... These "nuclei" are to be removed and agreements signed with local authorities that they will hold elections for administrative bodies themselves without displaying hostility to government bodies.

3. At the present time and also after the withdrawal of Soviet troops the Afghan armed forces (in addition, the 40th Army) are not to organize large-scale combat operations and not to exacerbate the military and especially the political situation. When necessary, launch small, but effective, strikes only on targets which pose a direct threat (outside population centers).

4. Concentrating the main efforts on holding the most important areas and facilities of the country, the main

cities and highways of the country, the armed forces are to be used to carry out the following fundamental missions:

The Army. The main forces are to be in constant readiness to maneuver in order to inflict defeat on counterrevolutionary formations presenting a special danger to the existing regime – in the regions of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Part of the forces are to be used to cover the main lines of communications, pipelines...

MGB. The main mission is the timely identification of the counterrevolutionary underground, both in the capital and in provincial centers and also, and especially, in the armed forces.

Sarandoy. Its main forces are to be sent to protect and defend security zones, the most important cities, economic facilities, sectors of lines of communications, and also to support public order in Kabul and its suburbs...

5. Considering that the fate of the present regime mainly depends on holding the capital and the Kabul-Termez highway, bring up additional troops to Kabul, its suburbs, and also to the main airbase, Bagram...

6. Make a fundamentally new decision about border troops. The border troops of Afghanistan do not actually perform routine protection of the state border but wage combat operations the same as army troops to hold specified regions or population centers and also to cover sectors of routes from Pakistan into Afghanistan via which weapons and ammunition are delivered to the rebels.

At the present time the border troops, having a considerable manpower level (more than 60%) and complete (up to regulation) supply of combat equipment and weapons (from 80 to 100%) have been making a combat contribution for a year now. However they cannot provide guaranteed protection of the state border from penetration by enemy caravans even if they are reinforced manifold. It is impossible to do this without the complete involvement of the free tribes in the problem of protecting the border. The latter are even interested in the passage of the caravans since they get considerable reward from this.

A situation is developing in which there is no sense in having the border troops located right at the border. But considering that their maintenance and support is already a large problem even now, the need arises to transfer the majority of border subunits to the main lines of communication of the country, putting them at the main population centers.

...All the issues described have been tentatively discussed with Najibullah with the exception of the border troops, and has found his full support. As regards suggestions regarding the use of border troops he has for now only a gen-

eral idea. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief needs some more time to recognize the need for such a step...

Varennikov

Kabul, March 1988



[Soviet Military Intelligence] Report on US Aid to the Rebels, March 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran) (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp.410-411. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Memo

About US aid to the counterrevolutionaries

The US Administration, in spite of the prospect of achieving mutually advantageous agreements at the indirect Afghan-Pakistani talks in Geneva, continues to give broad military, financial, and political support to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.

The policy and practical activities of the US on the Afghan question are directed first of all at achieving the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the shortest possible time, the failure of the implementation of the program of national reconciliation, and the preservation of the military potential of the counterrevolutionaries at a level sufficient to support a struggle for power in the new conditions – that will arise in the event of a successful conclusion of the Geneva talks. Under pressure of extremist forces in Congress several representatives of the Administration are trying to prevent an end to the aid to the antigovernment forces, from being dependent on the withdrawal of Soviet military contingent. The demand is advanced that aid is not to be stopped right after the signing of the corresponding documents in Geneva, but it is to be maintained proportionate to a reduction in the numbers of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The root goal of the American policy is to establish a pro-Western reactionary regime oriented mainly towards Washington.

At the present time the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and other US agencies are active in planning anti-Afghan actions. The amount of official American aid to the counterrevolutionaries has exceeded two billion dollars. In 1988 the planned aid amounts to more than \$700,000,000. Recently the Americans have been emphasizing deliveries of modern anti-aircraft weapons to the rebels. In 1987 about 600 “Stinger” portable surface-to-air missiles were sent to the counterrevolutionaries and more than 100 rebels have been trained, having completed an expanded course for instructors in the use of this weapon in US armed

forces training centers and military bases in Texas and California. American military aid is being implemented directly via the headquarters of the rebel parties. The main part of the military cargo intended for the rebels is initially delivered to the port of Karachi. Subsequent operations – storage, transshipment to regions bordering Afghanistan, and transfer of the weapons to the rebels – are done as a rule with the participation of Pakistani armed forces subunits and special services.

Since the beginning of 1988 intensive deliveries of military cargo from the US to ports and airbases of Saudi Arabia, Oman, and several other countries have been noted. Weapons and ammunition are stored with the expectation of future [use].

With the participation of the Americans measures are being implemented to convert the rebel groups to a regular troop structure. As of 1 March 1988 22 so-called regiments have been formed on Pakistani territory and in Afghanistan, 43. New fire bases are being created for the counterrevolutionaries and the system of command and control is being improved.

The number of American advisers training rebels in military training centers in Pakistan and active in organizing combat operations and engineering works on Afghan territory has reached 250. The presence of American advisers has been noted in specialized centers situated in the region of the Pakistani cities of Barsak, Kohat, Parachinar, Quetta, Peshawar, Jamrud, Sadda, and Miram Shah. Their presence (the advisers) in rebel groups was confirmed by chairman of the “Alliance-7” [Islamic Party of Afghanistan leader Muhammad Yunus] Khalis at a press conference in Peshawar when he reported the death of one of the military advisers in December 1987.

With the active participation of Washington a broad psychological offensive has been organized against the Republic of Afghanistan which has the goal of discrediting the policy of national reconciliation being pursued by Kabul and preventing the formation of coalition government bodies. More than 50 radio stations overseen or run by the CIA and USIA make subversive transmissions in the various languages of the peoples of Afghanistan. More than \$1,000,000 was allocated by the CIA for the training of propagandists from among the rebels in 1988.



[CPSU] Memorandum on the Results of the Negotiations between USSR Central Committee (CC) Politburo member and USSR Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze with US President Ronald Reagan and US Secretary of State George Shultz in Washington on 22-24 March of this year [1988].

[Source: Stiftung Archiv der Parteien- und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Berlin, DY30/

2389, pp. 224, 228. Obtained and translated from Russian by David Wolff.]

Confidential (Doveritel'no)

The results of the negotiations between CC USSR Politburo member and USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze with US President R. Reagan and Secretary of State G. Shultz in Washington on 22-24 March of this year.

[...]

On Afghanistan. We firmly put the question on the necessity of the speedy completion of the Geneva process and the signature of an agreement with the participation of the US. In principle, announcing the desirability of a successful completion of the negotiations, the Americans are again raising additional conditions that can only be considered an attempt to slow or even disrupt the solution of the Afghan problem. In particular, under the excuse of “symmetry” of US and USSR duties as guarantors of the future agreement, the American side tried to get an interpretation of the agreement on non-interference that would have meant the legalization of Washington’s and Islamabad’s armed interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Warding off these attempts, we suggested to the President and Secretary of State that they weigh the consequences of the Americans quitting the peace process.

[...]



Report from General Valentin Varennikov to Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri T. Yazov, August 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 450-52. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

REPORT FROM KABUL

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

... Recently, especially in August of this year, among the Afghan leaders, mainly and including Najibullah, a tendency

has been displayed toward possibly receiving as much material and other resources as possible from the Soviet Union and also forcing the Soviet military to use maximally the men and equipment of the 40th Army. In this regard the favorable solution of these problems does not cause a feeling of gratitude from the Afghan friends but on the contrary, induces them to still greater demands, even complaints...

And what is more, if the Afghan army, MGB, and MVD units displayed unreliability then Najibullah initially indirectly, and now even more directly, says that this is explained by insufficient assistance from the 40th Army. At the same time he is trying to reduce the negative aspects in the operations of Afghan army units.

Here are several examples of such operations.

1. Constant unfounded inquiries about additional deliveries of weapons and combat equipment for the RA armed forces. At the present time there only exists an objective need to increase deliveries of combat transport helicopters. It is necessary to note in this regard that the organization of the combat employment of helicopters remains extremely poor in spite of measures taken by Soviet advisers. This leads to an unjustifiably large number of losses (in just the last month the RA Air Force lost four fixed-wing aircraft and eight helicopters). As regards other types of weapons, there should not be issues here. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly reported to Najibullah that the available combat equipment and crew-served weapons are not completely employed since they are very badly supplied with specialists (from 20 to 40% of tanks, BMPs [infantry combat vehicles], BTRs [armored transport vehicles], field guns, and mortars do not have crews, and many vehicles do not even have drivers) and accordingly are not being used.

In varied form and constantly (for the third year) insistent desires are expressed that military draft work be improved... Only in this case can they count on the maximum use of the potential which the army and the other branches of the armed forces already have through their own supply of technical equipment...

The Ministers of Internal Affairs and State Security are carefully concealing the situation of their troops, even their authorized strength; however, in these conditions it is known that the level of technical supply of the troops subordinate to them is normal (considering their possible missions) and there are even reserves of several kinds of weapons. For example, in the MGB arsenal alone there are 425 82-mm mortars.

As regards ammunition, Najibullah is carrying out a policy according to which there are to be no norms or procedures for expenditures; the phrase is simply used, "The enemy is shelling us but we are sticking to some kind of norms there." This incorrect judgment leads to irresponsibility in performing combat missions. The troops are, in general, shooting, but not at targets.

Such actions, in turn, will lead after the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Afghan combat units not being in

a condition, even minimally, to ensure the supply of troops with ammunition and fuel (right now the transport of the 40th Army has been put in operation for the needs of the Afghan army). It costs the military (the MO, MVD, and the MGB) nothing, with Najibullah's knowledge, for example, to consume a large amount of equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other material valuables at previous deployment areas when redeploying units from one point to another and while carrying out combat missions.

Examples: when withdrawing the 2nd Infantry Division from Panjshir in the 64th Infantry Regiment there were lost: four 76-mm guns, nine 82-mm mortars, two anti-aircraft machinegun mounts [ZPU], 1 heavy machinegun [DShK], and 180 assault rifles [AKM]; large reserves of material resources were thrown away by MVD and MGB battalions in Kunduz...

Many such examples could be given.

The Afghan leadership has constantly demanded additional deliveries of weapons, equipment, and ammunition, but does not show any frugality in this regard. It probably knows that any of their requests will be met by the Soviet side...

2. The attempt to gloss over the actual situation of the reliability of the troops of the RA armed forces. On 7-8 August Afghan troops abandoned the cities of Kunduz, Khanabad, and Taloqan.

The Khanabad garrison consisted of two MVD battalions and one MGB battalion and in Kunduz, three MGB battalions and two MVD battalions. The enemy, having one-third to one-fourth the forces, seized both population centers without a battle. During all this part of the garrisons went over to the enemy side right away and the rest were disarmed or fled to the area of the Kunduz airfield.

The Afghan leaders were initially indignant at the events. They remarked that all this was a surprise to them. Then they began to look for reasons to substantiate what had happened. Finally to an increasing degree they began to point out the bravery and courage of the combat units which had fled the cities without a defense.

On 18 August at a meeting of the Supreme High Command Najibullah stated that a majority of Afghan units which had participated in combat operations in the area of Khanabad and Kunduz had displayed heroism. I was forced to present a memo noting that the President had been deceived. Indeed, on 12 August I personally looked into the situation in detail which had developed when Kunduz and Khanabad had been abandoned on the scene. Even the leader of the combat operations, Lieutenant General Atsak, and member of the CC PDPA Politburo Karwal' sharply criticized the representatives of the former garrison which had been present at the meeting and the leaders of the province's Defense Council who had themselves displayed cowardice. Units of

the garrison surrendered the city without a battle, had no wounded, not to mention killed. He noted that if these units subsequently comprise a Kunduz garrison then the disgrace which had already occurred would be repeated. In this situation the President was forced to change his opinion and partially replace the units of the Kunduz garrison, putting army subunits in them...

3. There are attempts in a number of cases to shift responsibility for failures to the Soviets. North of Kabul is the district of Shakardara. A surface-to-air missile battalion was deployed within this district.

The situation around the battalion with time developed not in its favor; therefore, in July of this year it was proposed to withdraw the unit to a suburb of Kabul and thereby not create a conflict situation among the local population which is completely under the influence of the rebels.

However the proposal was not adopted. At the beginning of August the enemy blockaded the battalion. In connection with this they were forced to carry out massive strikes by artillery and aircraft (mainly Soviet) on all areas adjoining the battalion. Combat operations by Soviet troops were not envisioned since at this time they were supporting the withdrawal of troops of the 40th Army to Soviet territory in accordance with the approved schedule, and Afghan units of the Kabul garrison were occupied with battles in the provinces of Wardak and Logar along with other units of the 40th Army.

Having held out for four days, the personnel of the battalion threw away their weapons and combat equipment and fled. The enemy, exaggerating their victory, reported by radio to the leaders in Peshawar about their great success. This report was intercepted by an Afghan communications intelligence [unit] and reported to Najibullah, who stated harshly at a meeting of the RA Supreme High Command that "all this happened because the 40th Army did not use ammunition which would have more effectively destroyed the enemy." In connection with this I had to turn to the leadership of the Soviet Union so that it could give orders about the use of such ammunition; moreover, I said that here (in Shakardara) everything was wiped from the face of the Earth.

I explained to Najibullah that Soviet artillery had expended more than 9,000 shells and mortar shells on this area and 169 ground attack aviation sorties were conducted; any garrison could confidently hold out for months with such support. The battalion fled under pressure of rebel propaganda...

Analyzing both the above and the other actions of Najibullah one can conclude the increasingly tense situation in the country is making him less reliable.

At the same time a constant striving to solve all problems by military means is leading to a repetition of the mistakes of the past – to an aggravation, and not a rapprochement [in the relations] of the sides. The desire to hold on to all regions of the country by force and not

seek a compromise with the opposition cannot lead to favorable results in Afghanistan in general, primarily including the regions where the situation is heating up: Kunduz, Takhar, and Bamian...

Varennikov

August 1988



Decision "A", No. 130 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 12 August 1988

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, fond 1-B, opis 68, file 130-88. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova and Baev.]

Decision "A", No. 130 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 12 August 1988

In connection with the new situation in Afghanistan following signing the Geneva Agreements, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party finds it necessary to widen the political, economic and moral support to the Republic of Afghanistan. In view of that aim [the Politburo]:

1. Suggests that the Council of Ministers adopts a comprehensive decision for further activating the economic and scientific-technological cooperation and the preparation of cadres for the Republic of Afghanistan, including the private sector.
2. Does not object to the Council of Ministers offering free of charge to the Republic of Afghanistan clothing, shoes, tents, blankets, medicines, food and other things amounting to two million leva, including transport expenses for the returning refugees.
3. Offers that the National Council of the Fatherland Front, the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union and the Committee of the Movement of Bulgarian Women organize a campaign for collecting clothes and other means to help the returning refugees in the Republic of Afghanistan.
4. Offers free of charge to the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan a small enterprise amounting to 1 million leva and 100 thousand currency leva.

The help should be implemented through the Ministry of Foreign-Economic Relations.

Enclosure:

Memorandum from the International Relations Department of the BCP CC to Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 3 August 1988

Regarding: widening the political, economic and moral support to the Republic of Afghanistan

Comrades,

In connection with comrade Mikhail Gorbachev's letter to comrade Todor Zhivkov regarding Afghanistan, in view of the new situation in that country after signing the Geneva Agreements, the Politburo of the BCP CC entrusted the Foreign Affairs Commission at Politburo and Secretariat of the Bulgarian Communist Party with the preparation of an offer for the further widening of the political, economic, and moral support of the Republic of Afghanistan (Protocol No, 72 of 17 May 1988).

Additionally a letter was received by comrade Georgi Atanasov from Afghanistan's Prime-Minister Mohammad Hassan Sharq with an appeal for help at this difficult moment.

We are proposing a draft for decision, worked out by the Commission for Foreign Affairs at the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CC BCP with the participation of the "International Relations Department" of the CC BCP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

The draft of a resolution has been coordinated with the "Organizational", "Economic and Scientific-technical policy" and "Financial Economic" Departments of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

3 August 1988

First deputy-head of the "Foreign Policy and International Relations" department of the CC BCP:/K. Atanasov/



Report from General Valentin Varennikov to Soviet Defense Minister Gen. Dmitri T. Yazov, August 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 485-86. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Secret)

to the USSR Minister of Defense

General of the Army Cde. D. T. Yazov

I report.

Concerning Ahmad Shah Masoud... At the present time

A. Masoud is a figure who enjoys undisputed authority among the population and has powerful detachments with high combat [*boytsovskiy*] and propaganda qualities. The well thought-out social policy he follows and the agitprop work (construction of mosques, schools, hospitals, roads, providing the population with essential goods) enjoy the wide support of the people. A. Shah has categorically prohibited his formations from waging combat operations against Soviet troops, which they rigorously observe. At the same time he continues to speak out as an irreconcilable opponent of government authority, although he refrains from using force if government troops do not shoot (which is in accord with the policy of national reconciliation).

However, in our opinion, the existing roadblocks in the way of rapprochement between Najibullah and A. Shah can be overcome, although the President also thinks that Masoud will not now enter into any contact.

On 24 August of this year at a meeting of the Supreme High Command Soviet military representatives in the RA made the latest (in 1987-88) attempt to direct the attention of the Afghan leadership toward the need for an immediate resolution of this important problem. Fundamental measures are necessary regarding Ahmad Shah, primarily political ones. Najibullah, who agreed, said that it is Ahmad Shah Masoud, not the "Alliance-7," that is the real threat to the regime right now. At the same time he said: "Comrades E. A. Shevardnadze and V. A. Aleksandrov [the pseudonym of V. A. Kryuchkov] during their visit to Afghanistan at the beginning of this year were disposed toward the necessity of holding talks with Ahmad Shah, but if he refused them, then his groups need to be decisively smashed." In the presence of the ministers of the RA armed forces Najibullah let it be known in this regard that the main role in the solution of this problem (that is, smashing A. Shah) should be left to the 40th Army. He further noted that he (the President) had reliable information about A. Shah's ties with the CIA. Considering this, Najibullah continued, the strategic intention of A. Shah could be clearly imagined: to split off the 14 (although there actually are 12) northern provinces of Afghanistan, put the Americans in, and present this to the Soviet Union as a fait accompli. I replied to the President that nothing is excluded, but the problem [he] touched on needs to be studied (I have given information on these issues to Soviet Ambassador Cde. N. G. Yegorychev and the USSR KGB representative, Cde. V. A. Revin).

In our view, the adoption of the proposal of the President about involving the 40th Army in battles with A. Shah could place our troops in an extremely serious situation during the second stage of their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Doubtless there will be additional large losses; in general, their organized withdrawal at the set times could be disrupted. It is impossible in this matter to achieve the goal – namely the destruction of A. Shah – since it is necessary to know where he is and this has been ruled out – the agent network of Afghanistan has not been able to handle such a mission for eight years now. In addition, the operations of our troops would become a direct violation of the Geneva Accords. This

step would inflict damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union from which it would be difficult to recover [*trudnovospolnimyy*] and would also provoke a negative reaction inside our country...any violations of them [the Geneva Accords] would negatively reflect on the authority of the USSR.

...The following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The main danger for the current regime in the present situation is the domestic opposition (the so-called “second echelon”), but among all of its leaders it is Ahmad Shah Masoud. This conclusion is not new and has been made for the last two years, but the political steps regarding this figure remain unchanged (and they even often slip into military measures).

At the concluding stage and after the withdrawal of Soviet troops one ought to expect that Ahmad Shah will step up operations to seize the northern provinces. He will primarily concentrate them on the Kabul-Hairaton highway.

2. The time when a rapprochement was possible with A. Shah, dictating conditions to him, has actually long since been lost and he has become practically invulnerable. However opportunities to establish contact with him have not been exhausted. Therefore the Afghan leadership needs to offer the maximum possible concessions to him and make any compromises. He should know that all his conditions will be satisfied, including granting autonomy to the northern provinces, etc.

3. In the future Ahmad Shah might grow into an important political figure with whom the Soviet Union, in all probability, will have to cooperate and it would be to our advantage to have him as an ally and not an enemy.

Considering this, Soviet operational services [*operativnyye sluzhby*] should establish direct contact with him as quickly as possible; especially since, as A. Shah himself acknowledges, because he has no special objections to this...

Varennikov
August 1988



Report from USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and USSR Ministry of Defense (MO) and KGB Representatives, October 1988

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 492-493. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Secret)

On 4 October we met with RA [Republic of Afghanistan] President and General Secretary of the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan] CC [Central Committee] Najibullah.

...During the discussion of urgent domestic political problems we noted that the time had come now for active operations by each one of us. Something has already been undertaken – letters to Ahmad Shah [Masoud] and also the dispatch of RA government and USSR KGB representatives to Hazarajat.

The Soviet Ambassador expressed readiness to personally contact Ahmad Shah, if required, keeping in mind that the Soviet Ambassador does not have the burden of the past and is free in his contacts with the opposition.

...President Najibullah noted that... there is little time left, the four remaining months need to be used as if it were four years; therefore we need to follow the principle of military-political specificity; that is, proceeding from the situation on-site, employing force or negotiating and compromising. The key object of employing this policy, in his opinion, is the situation with Ahmad Shah. Only after deciding the issue with Ahmad Shah can the security of the highway be ensured...

N. Yegorychev (MID), V. Varennikov (MO), V. Zaitsev (KGB)

October 1988



Memorandum by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov, General Valentin Varennikov, V. Zaitsev, V. Yegorov, November 1988 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Tragediya i Doblest’ Afgana (Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1995), pp. 463-65. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Secret)

On the Situation in Afghanistan

The military-political situation in Afghanistan has a tendency toward further deterioration and exacerbation.

...The RA leadership is implementing measures of a military-political nature within the framework of the policy of national reconciliation to counter the extremist part of the opposition. The process of the transformation of a single-party regime into a multi-party one and the restructuring of the state political structure of the country on the basis of political pluralism and coalition rule continue. Of course, to successfully carry out the policy of national reconciliation

Najibullah's regime should ensure, from a position of strength, not of weakness, that the most irreconcilable opposition factions are driven back which, relying on the aid and support of Pakistan and the US, are rejecting peace initiatives of the Afghan government to reach compromise agreements and are increasing military pressure on government positions in a majority of provinces of the country.

At the present time the rebels control four of the 32 provinces of the country (Takhar, Bamian, Paktika, and Kunar), and have sealed off the provincial capitals of Kapisa, Wardak, Laghman, Uruzgan, and Ghazni. Rebel activities in the provinces of Herat, Farah, and Nimruz, which border Iran, have recently been stepped up.

The rebels are whipping up tension and trying to undermine the population's faith in the viability of the current regime by increasing the shelling of administrative centers, military and civilian facilities and attacking them; sealing off roads and seizing automobile convoys with freight; penetrating the Party and government bureaucracy and the RA [Republic of Afghanistan] Armed Forces to demoralize them from within; and disrupting VS [Armed Forces] conscription and increasing desertion.

Along with the incitement of malicious activity by the rebels in the central provinces of Kabul and Parwan, the armed opposition has recently increased attempts at setting up an economic blockade of the capital. The rebels are trying to impede the delivery here of freight to here via the roads from Soviet-Afghan border to Kabul and [from] Kabul to Jalalabad and to interrupt the power supply of the Afghan capital.

...Against the background of a systematic increase of activity by the armed opposition, with the start of the withdrawal of the OKSV [Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops] from Afghanistan the passivity and declining morale of the RA Armed Forces have become distinctly clear, which has found its reflection in their incapability in many instances of organizing effective resistance to the rebels. The events in the provinces of Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, and Kandahar (the capture of areas south of Kandahar, including the population center of Spin Boldak) are witness to this. The Afghan military leadership has not taken decisive and effective measures to increase the level of military, psychological, and morale reliability of the Armed Forces. The capabilities of existing training centers and courses for the training of military specialists are being poorly used. This negatively reflects on departmental attitudes and the lack of coordination of the activity of the military ministries.

The remaining partisan and factional differences in the PDPA leadership, which, although some were muted after the recent PDPA CC plenum, have not yet been permanently removed and are also leaving a serious negative imprint on the political morale and military condition of the RA Armed Forces.

...Many representatives of the Party and state bureaucracy in the provinces [*na mestakh*] are all the more often taking passive, temporizing positions, ignoring orders and demands coming from Kabul to strengthen government positions and implement the policy of national reconciliation,

and in a number of cases, under the influence of demoralizing propaganda, are entering into deals with the opposition to capitulate to ensure their personal security.

...The measures recently carried out to reorganize the governmental structure of Afghanistan in accordance with the principles of coalition government and a multi-party system have not yet had a serious stabilizing influence on the domestic political situation. The activity of the government of M. H. Sharq to a certain degree is hampered by the CC PDPA staff, but governors without party affiliation among local authoritative figures, for example, in Nangarhar province, [are being hampered] by the heads of several PDPA provincial committees. The national council (parliament) of Afghanistan, the majority of whose members are without party affiliation (more than 70%), are still pursuing a waiting game and not seriously looking for ways to more actively transform the policy of national reconciliation into reality, although they have declared it to be their main task. The activity of the bloc of leftist democratic parties as before does not go beyond the bounds of formal episodic meetings of their representatives and declarations of support for the policy of national reconciliation.

Taking the above into account, Soviet military aid continues to remain the most important stabilizing factor in the development of the situation in Afghanistan and largely thanks to it the armed opposition has not managed to seize key positions in the country, in spite of their efforts.

...Objectively, the present RA regime has considerable military and political potential (superior to the forces of the opposition). The task of the leadership of our Afghan friends is to ensure its maximum effective use. Special attention in this regard needs to be paid to organizing political propaganda work by all RA organizations...

Yu. Vorontsov, V. Varennikov, V. Zaitsev, V. Yegorov

November 1988



Letter from Ahmad Shah Masoud to the Soviet Chief Military Adviser, 26 December 1988

[Source: Boris Gromov, "Ogranichenny Kontingent" ("Limited Contingent") (Moscow: Progress, 1994), pp. p. 327, A.A. Lyakhovskiy, Plamya Afgana (Moscow: Iskon, 1999, pp. 499-500.)]

Mister Adviser!

I already wanted to go to the place to meet the Soviet representatives when I received your latest letter. I should say for the sake of clarity: we have endured war and your presence of 10 years. God willing, we will endure it a few more days. But if you begin combat operations then we will give you a fitting rebuff. That's all. From this day we will assign our detachments and groups the mission of being in full com-

bat readiness.

With respect, Ahmad Shah Masoud
26 December 1988



Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Najibullah and other Afghan Leaders on 13-14 January 1989, 14 January 1989 (Excerpt)¹⁹

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Tragediya i Doblest' Afgana (Tragedy and Valor of the Afghanistan Veteran) (Moscow: Iskon, 1995), pp. 485-87. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]*

[President of the Republic of Afghanistan (RA)] NAJIBULLAH. An Afghan brigade of 900 men and an MGB regiment are hardly capable of holding out against the rebels in Ahmad Shah's zone of influence in a proper manner. In this regard I request that the Soviet leadership examine the issue of the possibility of placing Soviet military units in the Salang area on a temporary basis; their functions would consist only of guarding the road.

The survival of the government itself depends on ensuring deliveries of cargo via the Hayraton-Kabul highway. The opposition cannot seize Kabul by military means but it will gamble on an economic blockade, fomenting discontent among the population and instigating it to act against the government. Therefore it is extremely important right now to create a sufficient reserve of food, fuel, and other essential goods in Kabul. However it will be possible to ensure the organization of shipments by ground or air only with the direct assistance of the Soviet side.

In this context I would like again to request the creation of an "air bridge" from Soviet territory to Kabul.

We think it desirable for a certain number of aviation resources [*aviasredstva*] to be at Soviet airfields in direct proximity to the Afghan border on continuous duty which could act quickly against the rebels in case a threatening situation arises in one or another area of the country.

The problem of creating the necessary reserves in Kandahar has remain unresolved until now. It seems that the situation right now permits [us] to try to send a column with freight to that city. The Afghan side can provide part of the subunits of the 4th AK and 2nd AK totaling 2,000 men. However, without the participation of Soviet troops it is impossible to escort the column.

EH. A. SHEVARDNADZE. As far as I know, the provision of considerable military forces is required to escort a column. A danger of armed conflict with the enemy is not precluded but at the present stage [we] would not want to suffer unnecessary losses.

On the preliminary level we would say that the idea of creating an "air bridge" to Kabul is completely doable.

The issue of carrying out air strikes from the Soviet Union has a very delicate nature. We understand that it will be difficult for you to do without the support of Soviet aircraft but it is one thing to launch strikes when Soviet troops are present and another after their withdrawal...Such measures could unavoidably provoke countermeasures from the US and Pakistan and an unfavorable international reaction.

We also consider it necessary to urgently study the issue of providing security for the Hayraton-Kabul highway. It is clear that without the use of the road it would be practically impossible to solve the problem of supplying the capital...(Kabul, 13.1.1989)...

[RA Prime Minister] M. H. SHARQ. Earlier we thought that all the damage which our motherland had suffered was connected with the war; however now we are convinced that the current administrative system has done us no less harm... We have a completely unrealistic budget which is based not so much on domestic sources of income but on free aid from the Soviet Union... You are giving us across-the-board aid but we have not justified your trust. The people ask why this happens... Our armed forces cannot provide security for freight shipments. At the transshipment bases bordering the USSR there is a three-month reserve of food for Kabul but we cannot deliver the food to the capital.

EH. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Understand, it is not so simple for us to give aid to Afghanistan. The butter, sugar, and flour which we are delivering to you is taken from the Soviet people but it doesn't reach those for whom it is intended. Therefore providing security for the Hayraton-Kabul road and the possibility of organizing an air bridge to supply the capital get top priority. (Kabul, 14.1.1989)...

[RA Minister of State Security] G. F. YAKUBI. As long as Ahmad Shah Masoud lives the Kabul-Hayraton route will be closed and consequently the problem of delivering freight and special equipment not only to the capital but to other regions of the country will remain acute. Whether or not this regime stands or falls depends on the solution of this problem...

EH. A. SHEVARDNADZE. Will there be a coup, if we admit such a possibility, supported by the population of the capital if the city is supplied with everything necessary, in particular kerosene, bread, etc.?

G. F. YAKUBI. I think they will not support one since the residents of Kabul are confident that in case of a coup G. Hekmatyar, who does not enjoy popularity in various social strata in the capital, will come to power...(14.1.1989, Kabul).

[RA Minister of Defense] SH[AHNAWAZ]. N. TANAY. The rebels are carrying out active operations directed at disrupting the Geneva Accords and demonstrating their power in

the hope of overthrowing people's power. In my opinion, the military and political situation in the country is in a crisis and this crisis will grow. (14 January 1989, Kabul).

[RA Minister of Foreign Affairs] A[BDUL] WAKIL. It is necessary for the Soviet side, considering the provisions of the Geneva Accords, to continue to help our armed forces by launching rocket, bombing, and strafing attacks, especially after 15 February.²⁰ [...] It is vitally important for us to maintain control of the airfields at Bagram and Kandahar and also the port of Hayraton. After the conclusion of the Soviet troop withdrawal Ahmad Shah Masoud will doubtless try to close the road through the Salang [Tunnel pass] [...]



Najibullah Assessment of the "Ahmad Shah Problem," January 1989²¹ (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 500-501. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Switching to more important and urgent problems, I would like to especially stress the following. At the present time no one has any doubt that the priority area should be the implementation of peaceful, political measures in the name of achieving a settlement. But at the same time it appears evident that in conditions of continuing interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by Pakistan, the US, and other countries and the opposition's rejection of a cease-fire, it is also impossible to forget military means. As it appears that right now it is exceptionally important as before to launch powerful missile, artillery, and air strikes on the bases, storehouses, and gatherings of enemy personnel in order to preempt his attempts to unleash a large-scale offensive after the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

In this context the issue of fighting the group of Ahmad Shah Masoud, who belongs to the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, holds special importance. Considering that his forces are capable of cutting the strategic Hairaton-Kabul highway in the area south of Salang right after the withdrawal of [Soviet] troops, blockading Kabul, and thereby creating a catastrophic situation for the capital, Ahmad Shah should be viewed as the main enemy of the government at the present stage.

The problem of Ahmad Shah has been around a long time but, in spite of measures taken, it is a very critical one, as before. In our view it is unwarranted to delay its resolution.

[...] For the last four years practically no large operations have been conducted against him with the exception of small individual strikes. As a result he has managed to create a powerful grouping totaling about 11,000 men and 2,500 [of them] right in the Panjshir. It needs to be recognized that

Ahmad Shah is also skillfully using the advantages arising as a result of our passivity.

At the present time a joint operation of Soviet and Afghan forces against Ahmad Shah has been planned, but it will be of a local nature, essentially limited to a cleaning out of adjoining road sectors and the replacement of Soviet posts with Afghan ones. We say that such an operation cannot inflict notable damage on the enemy and change the fundamental nature of the situation [...].



Minutes of CPSU Central Committee Politburo (excerpt re measures in connection with the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan), 24 January 1989 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 462-63. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

(Top Secret)

SPECIAL FOLDER

N°P 146/VI

To Cdes. [CPSU General secretary Mikhail S.] Gorbachev, [Soviet Premier Nikolai] Ryzhkov, [Party Secretary and Head of Social-Economic Policy Commission Nikolai N.] Slyun'kov [former KGB chief Viktor] Chebrikov, [Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze, [Head of CPSU International Affairs Commission Alexandr N.] Yakovlev, [State Planning Commission Chief Yuri D.] Maslyukov, [Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri T.] Yazov, [State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex Chairman and First Deputy Prime Minister Vsevolod M.] Murakhovskiy, [KGB chief Vladimir A.] Kryuchkov, [CPSU General Department head Valery] Boldin, and [Valentin] Falin – everything; [Soviet Finance Minister Boris] Gostev – points 2 and 6; Volkov – point 5; [Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Konstantin F.] Katushev – point 6.

Excerpt from Minutes N° 146 of the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 24 January 1989

Measures in connection with the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan

1. Agree with the ideas described in the note of Cdes. E. A. Shevardnadze, V. M. Chebrikov, A. N. Yakovlev, D. T. Yazov, V. S. Murakhovskiy, and V. A. Kryuchkov of 23 January 1989 (attached)²²

2. Proceed from the need to ensure the functioning of the Kabul-Hairaton highway and give the Afghan comrades

comprehensive assistance to organize security for this highway using their own forces, even as far as assuming the provisioning of these Afghan subunits [vzyatiye...na nashe dovol'stviye] for a certain time. USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance together with the USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], the USSR Ministry of Defense, and the USSR KGB are to present suitable proposals by 1 February 1989.

3. Cde. D. T. Yazov is charged with making a trip to Kabul for an additional evaluation of the developing military situation and to give practical assistance to the Afghan Side in the resolution of defense issues, including those affecting the security of the Kabul-Hayraton highway.

4. The USSR Ministry of Defense is to help the President of the Republic of Afghanistan work out various arrangements to declare martial law in Afghanistan.

5. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation are to study the issue of the possibility of using Soviet pilots on a voluntary basis and with appropriate material rewards on Afghan transport aircraft or Soviet transport aircraft which would be leased to the Afghan Side.

6. The USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations are to present ideas about granting additional economic aid to Afghanistan in the prescribed manner by 10 February 1989.

In this regard, provide for a trip to Kabul by Cdes. Yu. D. Maslyukov, B. I. Gostev, and K. F. Katushev.

7. Protocol. The CC CPSU Politburo Commission on Afghanistan with the participation of the CC CPSU General Department is to submit material on a documentary basis to the CC CPSU regarding all stages of the development of events in Afghanistan, beginning with the decision to introduce troops into this country and also ideas about possible alternatives of the future development of the situation in Afghanistan and the consequences for us ensuing from them.

CC SECRETARY M. GORBACHEV



Letter from Ahmad Shah Masoud to Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Afghanistan Envoy Yuli Vorontsov, 2 September 1989 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), p. 523. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Mister Vorontsov!

In reply to your letter of 31 July 1989 I want to say that the past support of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] by your government has been the reason for the deaths of more than 1,500,000 citizens of our country. About 5,000,000 people have left their homes, become refugees in neighboring and other countries, and Afghanistan

has been turned into ruins. In exchange for this support you have received only shame and thousands of young Russian men have been killed in the mountains and deserts. As a result you have suffered a military defeat and considerable economic loss.

With the ascension of a new leadership in the Soviet Union and the admission of past mistakes it was expected that the USSR would pay attention to the incorrect policy and reject a continuation of a similar policy in regard to Afghanistan, as a result of which peace and quiet would be restored in a country exhausted by war.

However, an analysis of the actions of the Soviet Union during the last six months forces us to conclude with regret that it has not changed its position in regard to the Afghan conflict and intends to attain its goals only by another means, that is, by using Afghans to murder Afghans.

Recognizing the Soviet Union as the chief culprit in the continuation of the war and the bloodshed in Afghanistan we would like to again stress the fact that in the first stage of the revolution a majority were thinking as though the Afghan people were in no condition to resist in the face of the tanks and aircraft of the Soviet superpower and that the Red Army would resolve all the issues in several days. However with the passage of time it has turned out that it was impossible to break the will of the people by force of arms. And before still more blood is shed, before the burden of responsibility on the Soviet leadership before God and history grows even more, and the fissure which has arisen between the Muslim people of Afghanistan and the Soviet people becomes wider, we would like to again remind you that the war in Afghanistan will not fade out until Soviet interference in Afghan affairs ends completely and the PDPA, which is impeding the implementation of the just aspirations of our Muslim people, leaves the political arena. As I believe, you and all the peoples of the world are again witnesses to the intensification of the fire of war on this Earth, which is not in accord with the interests of either the freedom-loving Muslim people of Afghanistan or the Soviet people.

Respectfully, Ahmad Shah Masoud
2 September 1989



Letter from Afghan President Najibullah to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 5 November 1989 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999); pp. 524-25. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

Dear Mikhail Sergeyeovich!

Bearing in mind the recommendations you repeatedly made to turn to you personally if the need arose or to ex-

change ideas, I decided to use this opportunity to describe questions troubling me at the present time...

As the experience of combat operations of recent months shows, we are managing to contain the enemy mainly by air, artillery, and missile strikes. Meanwhile, there is a shortage of various kinds of ammunition for various reasons. The ammunition delivered by the "air" bridge is being used up literally in only a few days. To supply the combat requirements of the troops it would be extremely desirable to maintain the functioning of the "air" bridge for the next half year, raising the number of sorties to 30-35 a day. This would permit the delivery of the necessary amount of ammunition and equipment to be ensured. And I would again like to stress the special importance for us of a resolution of the issue of daily delivery of 10-12 R-300 missiles...

On the basis of available information there are grounds to state that in the autumn and winter period the enemy is becoming more active around Kabul and also in several sectors of the Kabul-Hairaton highway. In order to wipe out the groups it seems advisable here (I talked with Soviet military consultants) to use the "Smerch" and "Tochka" missiles, which have increased accuracy. It is also extremely important to us to restart as quickly as possible the deliveries of the "Luna-M" missiles which were stopped unexpectedly, as a result of which the problem of hitting the enemy at great distances from Kabul became quickly aggravated.

Urgent aid is also required to restore the technical resources of the Air Force inasmuch as they lost about 70 aircraft and helicopters this year. It would be desirable to provide delivery to us of MiG-29, Su-27, and Mi-35 attack helicopters to increase the power of the Air Force.

Before the approach of winter we are creating the necessary reserves of food, fuel, and essential goods for the population and the troops in large administrative centers, and in view of its active use the technical condition of transport has long left much to be desired. Many vehicles are idle because of a lack of spare parts or generally are not subject to repair. It is desirable to accelerate the delivery from the Soviet Union of trucks and fuel trucks in accordance with prior agreements.

These are our most vital problems in the military field. I am confident that their resolution, together with the accumulation of the experience of independently waging combat operations and the improvement of military policy as a whole, will give the armed forces of the Republic of Afghanistan yet more confidence and increase their fighting spirit.

In conclusion, permit me, Mikhail Sergeevich, to assure you of the constancy of the feelings of friendship and appreciation which Afghans feel toward the Soviet people and you personally. The CC PDPA plenum which was held recently vividly demonstrated that the policy which we are following today is correct and that it enjoys broad support. I express to you heartfelt gratitude for the deep understanding of Afghan problems which you have displayed at all stages of our struggle. I hope that if you agree to this you will also agree to a personal meeting, the need for which is already apparent, in my opinion.

I will use the occasion to congratulate you, dear com-

rade, on the 72nd anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and wish the Soviet people success in carrying out broad revolutionary reforms in the Soviet Union under your leadership.

[...]



Letter from CPSU General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev to Afghan Government, 11 December 1989 (Excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 525-26. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

It is absolutely obvious that while the irreconcilable opposition, warmed and encouraged by the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia holds to an extremist policy, military measures will remain an important method of action to "persuade" the enemy of the evidence of the truth: there is no alternative to an intra-Afghan dialogue and peace talks.

At the same time the positive aspect in the military field already achieved opens new domestic and foreign opportunities to step up the political process...

Retaliatory missile strikes doubtless have great importance in the matter of repelling the barbaric acts of the opposition with respect to cities and the peaceful civilian population and disrupting its attacks. The Soviet Union decided some time ago, as you know, to allocate an additional 500 R-300 missiles for our Afghan friends. In this regard it is extremely desirable that the R-300 missiles being delivered be used in the most rational manner. I want to stress that we have done this by removing missiles from Soviet military subunits. Deliveries of such effective equipment such as the "Luna-M" have been restarted. One hundred such missiles will be sent to the Afghan side between the end of November and the new year, 1990.

We confirm our readiness to deliver modern MiG-29 aircraft to you...

Mi-35 [attack] helicopters will be delivered in the first quarter of 1990. Other issues are being examined regarding the deliveries of weapons which you raise in your message... (The text of the letter was approved at a CC CPSU Politburo meeting, Protocol N° P175/5).

Memorandum, “An Analysis of the “Islamic factor” in the Afghan Situation,” by A. Belousov, Deputy Chairman of the Tajik SSR KGB, July 1991 (excerpt)

[Source: A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamy Afgana (Flame of the Afghanistan Veteran)* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 591-93. Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg.]

[...] The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 against the background of the victorious conclusion of an “Islamic Revolution” in Iran was evaluated by the US and their allies as a large-scale expansion aimed at a fundamental change of the balance of forces in a strategically important region; a considerable part of the world’s energy providers [*ehnergonositeli*] are concentrated here.

As followed from materials of the Republic of Afghanistan MGB, at the suggestion of the US CIA this country where there was already a civil war underway was selected as a proving ground for a decisive countermeasure to the “Soviet expansion”; its failure would not only bring defeat to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the fall of the “pro-Communist Kabul regime”, but also destabilize the situation in the Central Asian republics of the USSR.

The plan of actions prepared jointly by the CIA with the special services of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which received the codename “Program-M” was predicated on the wide use of the Islamic factor, mainly by the armed Islamic opposition in Afghanistan.

“Program-M” provided for coordinating the activity of all mujaheddin detachments, equipping them with weapons, organizing the training of guerillas at special centers, creating an agent network in the DRA and the southern regions of the USSR, and enlisting various Islamic centers and fundamentalist organizations operating in Islamic countries in carrying out planned measures.

To destabilize the situation in the republics of Central Asia the special services intended to carry out propaganda directed at these republics and, with the aid of Afghan fundamentalist organizations, create underground religious structures along the lines of Egyptian “Islamic Brotherhood” and the “Militant Wahhabi” cells in Tajikistan and other republics of the USSR.

In accordance with “Program-M” coordination to exploit the capabilities of the Afghan Islamist groups in directing a “shakeup” [*raskachivaniye*] of the situation in the Central Asian republics and to transfer them to the territory of “holy war” (jihad) was directly entrusted to the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence agency...

However this did not mean that the CIA withdrew from the direction and coordination of the activities of the participants in the implementation of “Program-M”. American intelligence sort of pushed the Pakistani special services to the forefront for political reasons. The CIA “legal” residency, functioning under American Embassy cover in Kabul, conducted energetic activity in this direction...

According to available information special caravans have

been organized on Pakistani and Afghan territory to smuggle weapons into northern border regions from where it is to be transshipped to Soviet territory in small lots. Information has also arrived that Masoud’s detachments have been preparing to illegally ship a large amount of explosives and pistols to the USSR...

Great importance in “Program-M” has been devoted to the ideological influence of Muslims and nationalistic sections of the population in the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The special services of the US, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia and also leaders of Islamic armed opposition groups in Afghanistan have participated in carrying out measures in this direction.

According to statements of American Sovietologists the revival of nationalism in the USSR was directly associated with an increase in religiousness of the population. The awakening in the part of the Soviet people who profess Islam and nationalist feelings is considered by Sovietologists as a “special mixture of political and economic discontent and cultural and linguistic difference which could mobilize Muslims against Russian and European dominance.”

Radio broadcasts were given a special role in promoting Islamic ideology in Muslim regions of the USSR. Broadcasts in the languages of the Central Asian peoples were made both by Western countries and a number of Muslim states. At that time the Afghan opposition itself had only several small radio stations on Pakistani territory broadcasting to Afghanistan and the bordering Soviet republics.

In individual cases broadcasts were made to Central Asian republics with the aid of field radios. They were at the disposal of several mujaheddin formations operating in the northern regions of Afghanistan.

Radio propaganda from Islamic groups was marked by a harsh anti-Soviet, anti-Russian orientation. It contained open calls for the unity of Muslims of all countries; transferring “jihad” to Soviet territory; splitting off the republics of Central Asia from the Soviet Union; and support for the ideas of Pan-Islamism. The leaders of the Islamic opposition and the Western special services thought that the attainment of these goals would facilitate the wide distribution of propaganda materials of a religious and anti-Soviet nature in Soviet republics. They made efforts toward the delivery and distribution in the southern republics of the USSR of various printed material, audio, and video cassettes propagandizing Islamic ideas and, in particular, “holy war against the infidels”... (from an analysis of the issues of an increase of the Islamic factor made by the USSR KGB)

NOTES

¹ The following documents were compiled for the international conference, “Towards an International History of the War in Afghanistan,” organized in April 2002 by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Woodrow Wil-

son Center's Asia Program and Kennan Institute, George Washington University's Cold War Group, and the National Security Archive. Special thanks for their documentary contributions to Jordan Baev (Sofia), A. A. Lyakhovskiy (Moscow); Oldrich Tuma (Prague) and David Wolff.

² Excerpts of this conversations were previously published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 145-146. The conversation was conducted through an interpreter.

³ Taraki was also president of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan.

⁴ The Society of Muslim Brotherhood (Jam'iat-I Ikhwan al-Muslimin), founded in 1929 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna was a religio-political organization, pan-Islamic in outlook and aimed at imposing Islamic law on all aspects of the social and political life of the Muslim nation.

⁵ This circular is an implementation of Attachment 2 of the document agreed upon at the 27 December 1979 Politburo meeting, "Our Steps in Connection with the Development of the Situation Around Afghanistan"; the Politburo decision also carries the notation "Regarding Point 151 of Minutes N° 177" and the classification "Top Secret"]

⁶ This circular is an implementation of Attachment 8 of the document agreed upon at the 27 December 1979 Politburo meeting, "Our Steps in Connection with the Development of the Situation Around Afghanistan"; the Politburo decision also carries a "Flash" message precedence, the designation "Special", the notation "Regarding Point 151 of Minutes N° 177" and "Special Folder", and the classification "Top Secret."

⁷ Excerpts of this document were previously published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 161-2.

⁸ Dost traveled to New York on 4 January 1980 to participate in the United Nations Security Council meeting on Afghanistan. On 3 January 1980, the United States, Pakistan and other countries had requested the Security Council to debate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Security Council started discussing the crisis on 5 January. Afghanistan's deputy permanent representative to the UN, Abdul Hakim Tabibi, resigned from his post in protest against the Soviet intervention.

⁹ The first high-level Soviet-American meeting since the Soviet invasion took place on 16 May 1980 in Vienna on the occasion of the anniversary celebrations for the 1955 Austrian State Treaty that

had provided for an end to the occupation of Austria. Muskie and Gromyko conferred for three hours at the Hofburg Palace.

¹⁰ In response to the Soviet invasion, President Carter had threatened to boycott the 1980 Olympic Summer Games in Moscow. The US Olympic Committee voted on 12 April 1980 to endorse the president's call for a boycott.

¹¹ This conversation took place in the wings of the international scientific conference that took place in Berlin from 20-24 October 1980 and was called "The mutual battle for social progress of the workers' movement and the anti-imperialist peoples' liberation movement." See DY30/2367, p.43.

¹² Babrak Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union took place from 15 October –5 November 1980.

¹³ In March 1965, a Chinese government delegation led by Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Afghanistan to confer with King Zahir Shah.

¹⁴ Gromyko met with Shultz in New York on 28 September and 4 October 1982 during the UN General Assembly session in New York.

¹⁵ See the reference to this document in A. A. Lyakhovskiy, *Plamya Afghana* (Moscow: Iskon, 1999), pp. 371-2. See also Chernyaev's Notes from Politburo Meeting, 13 November 1986, in this *Bulletin*.

¹⁶ Gorbachev visited India from 25-28 November 1986; he and Rajiv spent nearly 10 hours in talks. See "Rajiv and Mikhail," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 December 1986, p. 27; and "Gorbachev in India," *New York Times*, 1 December 1986, p. A12.

¹⁷ An Afghan government and party delegation visited Moscow in December 1986.


¹⁸ Armacost visited Pakistan in mid-January 1987.

¹⁹ Shevardnadze visited Kabul 13-15 January 1989 to shore up the moral of the Afghan leadership in anticipation of the Soviet troop withdrawal by 15 February.

²⁰ The deadline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

²¹ Provided by Najibullah during Shevardnadze's visit in January 1989. See "Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Najibullah and other Afghan Leaders on 13-14 January 1989," 14 January 1989, above.

²² See *CWIHP Bulletin* 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 181-84).



**CWIHP congratulates Senior Fellow
Hope Harrison on her new book
*Driving the Soviets Up the Wall:
Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961*
Princeton University Press, 2003**

The Road to Helsinki: The Early Steps of the CSCE

On 29–30 September, the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies (CIMA) organized an oral history workshop at Villa Finaly, in Florence, on “The Road to Helsinki: The Early Steps of the CSCE.” Co-organizers were the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project in cooperation with the Parallel History Project.

The workshop brought together key diplomats who took part in the lengthy negotiations that led to the conclusion in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act for a moderated discussion with leading scholars in the field. The first of several conferences that the organizers envisage to hold in relation to the approaching 30th anniversary of the Final Act, the Florence meeting focused on the significance of the preparatory period in the evolution of East–West détente, the eventual dénouement of the Cold War, and the growth of multilateral diplomacy that later became the foundation of a new European security system.

The discussants addressed the crucial question of how much the CSCE was the result of a deliberate design rather than of an evolution often with unexpected turns. A former Soviet participant described the CSCE as “Brezhnev’s dream,” pursued with the support of “liberals” around amid skepticism of the largely conservative Soviet establishment. Western participants agreed on the skepticism that initially had to be overcome on the Western side. A veteran US diplomat testified that “if Kissinger had been secretary of state in 1969–72 the CSCE would have never started.”

The relative contribution of different actors to overcoming the initial skepticism was extensively debated in Florence. There was a dispute about what appeared to many as an ambivalent policy of the United States, reflecting discord among the key US agencies and personalities. Another former US diplomat, however, argued that there was a “hierarchy of policies” rather than different policies in Washington.

European participants were inclined to credit Western European actors, particularly Italy and France, with playing the main role in overcoming the initial skepticism by being the first to push for “movement of ideas and people”—from which developed the dynamic “Basket Three,” with the explosive issue of human rights. Several participants gave credit to the countries of the European Community acting for the first time as a group.

The Florence meeting led to deeper appreciation of the distinct roles that smaller countries in the CSCE, other than the superpowers, were able to assert, often far out of proportion to their geopolitical weight. This applied not only to the smaller NATO members and the neutrals and nonaligned but also, much more than had been known thus far, also to the junior members of the Warsaw Pact. And among them, it was not only the maverick Romania that stood out but, more surprisingly, also Poland and East Germany, asserting their own interests with rather than against the Soviet Union.

The scholars at the Florence meeting were impressed by the “esprit de corps” of the CSCE veterans, from both East and West, mostly junior diplomats in the early 1970s for whom the CSCE was the formative experience of their professional lives. The audience seemed quite prepared to believe that the “Helsinki process” was effectively invented by these diplomats “on the spot,” acting on their best instincts without too much guidance from their governments.

This report was written by Vojtech Mastny, CWIHP Senior Fellow, for the 2003 Annual Report of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP).

UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS OF 1968 (PART 2):

New Evidence from the Ukrainian Archives

Compiled, Introduced, Translated, and Annotated by Mark Kramer

The Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine (TsDAHOU), located in Kyiv, houses all the Soviet-era records of the former Communist Party of Ukraine (UkrCP).¹ These include documents from the UkrCP Politburo and Central Committee (CC) apparatus as well as many personal papers and reports to the Soviet Politburo from each of the officials who served as UkrCP CC First Secretary from 1939 to 1991: Nikita Khrushchev, Lazar' Kaganovich, Leonid Mel'nykov, Oleksii Kyrychenko, Nikolai Podgorny (Mykola Pidhornyi), Petro Shelest, Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi, Volodymyr Ivashko, and Stanyslav Hurenko.² All documents from the Soviet period at TsDAHOU are accessible. Although the photocopying regulations are peculiar (with prices dependent on the "value" of a document), it is possible to order copies of documents at substantially lower cost than at most archives in Moscow.³

For those studying the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis, TsDAHOU contains enormously rich holdings. Copies of some of the documents stored there are available at one or more archives in Moscow, but many of the items at TsDAHOU are not accessible in Russia, either because of continued secrecy restrictions or because the documents are present only in Kyiv. Numerous files in Opis' 25 of Fond 1 at TsDAHOU are replete with important materials about the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Among these are reports about Soviet military exercises and planning, redeployments of Soviet troops in the leadup to the invasion, the effects that the mobilization of reservists and requisitioning of civilian vehicles was having on the Ukrainian economy, and the morale of Soviet troops both before and after the invasion. Although a separate state security archive in Kyiv is still closed for research on Cold War topics, some materials from the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) and the Ukrainian branch of the KGB can be found in TsDAHOU. Translations of a number of Soviet Army documents and military counterintelligence reports, mainly from the commander of the Kyiv Military District, General Viktor Kulikov (who later was appointed a Marshal of the Soviet Union and commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact), the head of the district's Military Council, General Vladimir Golovkin, and the head of military counterintelligence (local units of the KGB Special Departments) in the Kyiv Military District, General Aleksei Shurepov, will be published along with my commentary in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

The thirty-one documents presented below fall mainly into two broad categories: (1) memoranda transmitted by the

UkrCP First Secretary, Petro Shelest, to the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), of which he was a full member; and (2) reports to Shelest from the Ukrainian KGB and from senior UkrCP officials, which he used extensively for his own memoranda (or sometimes retransmitted in full) to the CPSU Politburo. Also included are three other items prepared by Shelest: his report to high-ranking UkrCP officials about the April 1968 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee; the statement he presented to the next CPSU Central Committee plenum, on 17 July 1968, two days after a multilateral meeting in Warsaw; and a speech he delivered to high-ranking UkrCP officials on 18 July 1968, the day after the CPSU Central Committee plenum. All of these documents are best read in conjunction with the excerpts from Shelest's diary in Issue No. 10 of the *CWIHP Bulletin* and the materials from the Russian archives featured in future *CWIHP* publications.⁴

The memoranda translated here are only a small sample of the vast quantity of materials that Shelest dispatched to his colleagues on the CPSU Politburo throughout the 1968 crisis—often more than once a week, and sometimes more than once a day. As the documents below indicate, the tone of Shelest's reports was uniformly hostile to the events in Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian leader spoke bitterly about the growth of "anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary forces" in Czechoslovakia and the "pernicious effects" this was having in Ukraine and on the security of the USSR as a whole. He constantly urged "decisive [Soviet] action" to resolve the crisis, and warned that "if the healthy forces [in Czechoslovakia] are threatened with mortal danger and the counter-revolution keeps up its onslaught, we [must] rely on the will of our party, the will of our people, and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact to resort to the most extreme measures."

Well before the 23 March conference in Dresden, which brought together the leaders of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria to discuss recent events in Czechoslovakia, Shelest had begun commissioning reports about the repercussions of the Prague Spring from a number of senior officials in Ukraine, including Yurii Il'nyts'kyi, the first secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian Oblast committee, General Vitalii Nikitchenko, the head of the Ukrainian KGB, and Colonel Oleksii Zhabchenko, the head of the KGB directorate in Transcarpathian Oblast, the area contiguous with Czechoslovakia. Everything in their reports that reflected negatively on the Prague Spring was selected by Shelest to transmit to the CPSU Politburo.

One of the contacts on the Czechoslovak side who proved especially informative for UkrCP officials was Ján Koscelanský, the first secretary of the East Slovakian regional committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (*Komunistická strana Československa*, or KSČ). Koscelanský met regularly with Il'nyts'kyi in 1968 and, on a few occasions, with Shelest as well. Koscelanský started out as a strong supporter of Alexander Dubček and of the reforms in Czechoslovakia, and he generally remained well dis-

danger of right-wing opportunism in a fraternal Communist party and the growth of anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary forces in socialist Czechoslovakia.”⁷ Il'nyts'kyi's prominent role at the plenum and in other high-level forums in 1968 was clearly attributable to Shelest. The combined warnings of the two officials underscored Shelest's view that the Soviet Union must “provide urgent help to the Czechoslovak Communists and the Czechoslovak nation at this trying hour.”⁸

The documents presented here, along with Shelest's di-

[Petro Shelest] spoke bitterly about the growth of “anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary forces” in Czechoslovakia and the “pernicious effects” this was having in Ukraine and on the security of the USSR as a whole.

posed toward the Prague Spring, often seeking to reassure his Ukrainian interlocutors that most of their fears were unwarranted. Nevertheless, Koscelanský gradually became worried about “unsavory developments” and “excesses,” especially in the Czech lands. By 14 May, Koscelanský was warning that “it might be necessary for the Slovaks, together with the fraternal Soviet peoples, to liberate the Czech lands once again.”⁵ This comment, along with many other concerns that Koscelanský expressed, were relayed by Shelest to the full CPSU Politburo. Koscelanský was particularly apprehensive that the “Czechs [might] try to outfox the Slovaks,” creating a federalized state that would still leave the Slovaks in a subordinate position. Although Koscelanský repeatedly sought to allay Moscow's anxieties and to rectify the “mistaken impressions that some Soviet comrades have gained from poor information provided by the Soviet embassy,” his growing misgivings, especially about Czech-Slovak relations, gave Soviet leaders hope that they could exploit rifts among the KSČ reformers.

Koscelanský's chief contact in Ukraine, Yurii Il'nyts'kyi, the head of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian Oblast committee, exerted much greater influence during the crisis than his position normally would have given him. Having spent his whole career as a party official in Transcarpathia, Il'nyts'kyi quickly became apprehensive in 1968 about the spillover from Czechoslovakia. With Shelest's backing, he spoke out repeatedly in public against the “anti-socialist and revisionist elements” in Czechoslovakia who were “exploiting foreign radio stations and television outlets” to disseminate their “vile propaganda” in western Ukraine.⁶ Behind the scenes, too, as the documents here indicate, Il'nyts'kyi went to great lengths to highlight what he saw as a fundamental threat to the stability of Ukraine, especially his own oblast. Even though he was not a member of the CPSU Central Committee, he was among the handful of officials invited to speak at the Central Committee's plenum on 17 July 1968, which was convened to approve the results of the five-power meeting in Warsaw. Il'nyts'kyi's remarks at the plenum echoed Shelest's own speech (translated below) in denouncing the “grave

ary and newly released transcripts of Soviet Politburo meetings in 1968 (which I have discussed elsewhere), should eliminate any lingering doubts about the importance of Ukraine during the Czechoslovak crisis. Before the East-bloc archives were opened, several leading Western scholars had been cautious—and understandably so—in assessing Ukraine's role in 1968. In a major study published in 1974, Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj marshaled a good deal of evidence from open sources indicating “an important linkage between the situation in the Ukraine and the developments in Czechoslovakia,” but they acknowledged that they had no way of determining—at least from publicly available materials—whether the Ukrainian issue was a salient factor in the Soviet Politburo's deliberations in 1968.⁹ A year after the Hodnett/Potichnyj study appeared, another prominent Western scholar, Roman Szporluk, downplayed the role of Ukraine in 1968, arguing that there had been only “unconfirmed reports [in 1968] that the then first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party took a stand urging the invasion of Czechoslovakia. . . . Whatever the truth of these reports, Ukrainian leaders have probably exerted little significance on the external relations of the USSR.”¹⁰ Several years later, in a detailed analysis of Soviet policy during the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha was more willing to emphasize Shelest's role in the crisis, depicting him as a strong and influential proponent of military intervention in Czechoslovakia from an early stage.¹¹ Even so, her book was necessarily limited in the evidence it could provide about Ukraine. Although a few important new memoirs and declassified Western documents had become available in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the top-secret records of the Warsaw Pact countries themselves were still closed. Thus, until very recently it was impossible to offer any conclusive judgments about the role of Ukraine and of Shelest personally during the 1968 crisis.

The new archival evidence, new memoirs, and Shelest's diary leave no doubt that Hodnett's and Potichnyj's conclusion was accurate, and that Soviet leaders themselves were deeply worried about the link between events in Czechoslovakia and the growing unrest in Ukraine. The spillover into

Ukraine and other Soviet republics (Moldavia, the Baltic states, Belorussia, and Georgia) was by no means the only factor in the Soviet Politburo's decision to send troops into Czechoslovakia, but it clearly was of enormous importance.¹² Although the Soviet KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, was the most aggressive proponent of military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, Shelest and the then-Soviet president, Nikolai Podgorny (who had formerly served as UkrCP First Secretary), were nearly as vehement. Ukrainian leaders wielded greater "significance [sic] on the external relations of the USSR" in 1968 than many scholars had previously believed.

Quite apart from what the documents reveal about the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis, they also shed extremely useful light on some of the KGB's procedures. The reports compiled by Nikitchenko and Zhabchenko clearly were based on elaborate networks of "unofficial collaborators" in western Ukraine. Many ordinary citizens were willing to inform on their relatives, friends, co-workers, and neighbors. Although some of these informers may not have realized that the information they provided about other people's comments would be faithfully reproduced in KGB reports, it is likely that most of them were aware of the consequences of their actions.

The boldness of some of the remarks attributed to residents of western Ukraine in the KGB and party reports is striking. Despite the Soviet authorities' efforts to control the media and prevent an influx of "bourgeois, anti-socialist propaganda," it is clear that accurate information about events in Czechoslovakia was making its way to a significant number of ordinary citizens in Ukraine. Some of this information was gleaned either from first-hand observations (of those who lived near military bases) or from Ukrainian-language newspapers and journals published in Czechoslovakia, which were then shipped into western Ukraine. Other information, as Zhabchenko and Il'nyts'kyi acknowledged, came from Western radio broadcasts and from underground materials circulated in Ukraine. The wide range of critical comments cited in the reports suggests that these citizens' "unsavory, hostile sentiments" were typical of the views expressed by a large percentage of non-Communists and even of party members in western Ukraine. Although the KGB and UkrCP reports do not provide any firm statistical breakdown of popular attitudes toward events in Czechoslovakia, the findings are detailed enough to indicate that Hodnett and Potichnyj, far from overstating the spillover into Ukraine, may have been too circumspect. At the very least, the documents confirm that long-standing attempts to foster "monolithic unity" in Soviet Ukraine had yielded little more than a façade.

One final point worth noting about the Ukrainian documents is the evidence they provide about Soviet decision-making during crises—evidence that tallies very well with declassified materials from other countries. The documents indicate that large quantities of raw information from intelligence sources and the Soviet bureaucracy flowed upward in 1968, but that otherwise the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat depended very little on lower-level party and state agencies in their dealings with Czechoslovakia. Decision-making

throughout the crisis was from the top down (i.e., the CPSU Politburo ordered lower-level officials what position to adopt, rather than seeking policy advice from below).¹³ The Politburo kept all media outlets rigidly under its own control. From at least early March 1968 on, all significant articles and broadcasts about Czechoslovakia had to be cleared personally by top officials, and often by Leonid Brezhnev himself.¹⁴ A formal directive to this effect was issued by the Politburo in early June. Moreover, a vast number of documents from the Ukrainian archives—as well as countless items stored in repositories in Russia and other former Soviet republics—reveal that the CPSU Politburo transmitted frequent "informational reports" (i.e., binding "position papers") about the crisis to lower-level party and state organizations, including all those in Ukraine. These lower-level bodies were required to disseminate the Politburo's findings to senior employees and party members.¹⁵ By periodically setting forth the "official view" of events in Czechoslovakia and explicating the Marxist-Leninist rationale for Soviet policy, the Politburo was able to take advantage of the CPSU's entrenched practice of "democratic centralism," which prohibited any dissent or divergence from policies made at higher levels. Soviet leaders thereby enjoyed ample leeway to define the Party's stance during the 1968 crisis without unwanted interference from below.

The documents also show that the Politburo took elaborate steps to ensure that its informational reports were disseminated fully and properly, in strict accordance with its own decrees. One way of accomplishing this goal was by sending a Politburo member (or members) to oversee lower-level party meetings directly, as Shelest did on many occasions in 1968.¹⁶ In addition, the Politburo was able to use the CPSU CC Organizational-Party Work Department as a comprehensive monitoring and feedback mechanism. The first secretaries of all the republic, regional, oblast, and local party committees were obligated to report promptly back to Moscow on the dissemination of the Politburo's analyses and the reactions they encountered. Officials in the Organizational-Party Work Department were responsible for monitoring the performance of these lower-level party organizations and for distilling the huge volume of cables into a memorandum for the top CPSU leadership.¹⁷ This complex, iterative process allowed the Politburo to keep constant watch over the implementation of its decisions and to deprive lower-level party committees—in all the union-republics and outlying regions as well as in Moscow—of any conceivable opportunity or inclination they might have had to deviate from the Politburo's own position. In the unlikely event that officials outside the Politburo and Secretariat became uneasy about the tenor of Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia, they would have realized that it was pointless and even dangerous to give any hint of (much less try to act on) their misgivings.

The Politburo's use of multiple oversight procedures, as outlined in the new archival materials, underscores the importance that Soviet leaders attached to the implementation of decisions concerning Czechoslovakia. Until now, Western studies of the 1968 crisis have made no mention of this

point, presumably because no evidence was available. One of the very few scholars who did bring up the question of policy implementation, Jiří Valenta, argued that “it is reasonable to assume that Politburo decisions [during the crisis were] formulated in such a way as to give the . . . bureaucracies some room to maneuver.”¹⁸ Valenta’s assumption is contravened by documents in the Ukrainian and Russian archives, which show that, far from “giving the bureaucracies room to maneuver,” Soviet Politburo members closely monitored the implementation of key decisions in 1968 so that they could *prevent* lower-level bodies from gaining any “room to maneuver.” By the time the Politburo reached its final decision on 17 August to resolve the crisis through military force, well-developed oversight mechanisms were firmly in place.¹⁹ New evidence of these arrangements reinforces the notion of a top-down decision-making process

and undermines one of the central tenets of Valenta’s bureaucratic politics thesis, which suggests that lower-level bureaucracies may try to alter or thwart top-level decisions by selectively implementing them or by declining to implement them at all. Such tactics will work only if senior policy-makers are not keeping track of the way their decisions are being implemented or are unwilling to punish transgressions. That may well be true of many issues in most countries, but it was not the case with the Soviet Politburo’s handling of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968.

The top-down, highly centralized nature of Soviet decision-making in 1968 (and during other crises) was already evident from the CPSU Politburo transcripts and countless other documents in the Russian archives. It is useful to receive additional confirmation of this pattern from materials in Ukraine and the Baltic states.

A NOTE ABOUT THE TRANSLATIONS

Most of the documents translated here were originally in Russian, but some were in Ukrainian and one was in Czech. The archival source listing at the beginning of each translation specifies the original language of the document. The annotations are intended both to provide greater context for understanding the documents and to identify specific individuals, groups, events, and geographic features. The annotations also highlight any gaps and mistakes that arise in a particular document. When the mistakes are minor and are of no substantive import (e.g., a spelling or grammatical mistake), they have been corrected in the translated text, and the corrections are then indicated in the annotations.

Some of the Ukrainian, Russian, and Central European place names in the documents have been translated here in their Anglicized versions (e.g., “Moscow,” “Crimea,” “Russia,” “Ukraine,” “Czechoslovakia,” “Poland,” “Prague,” “Warsaw,” “Bucharest”), but the rest have been either transliterated or preserved in their original form. For the sake of consistency, all transliterations of Ukrainian surnames, given names, and place names have been rendered from the Ukrainian versions rather than the Russian. Thus, for example, “Kyiv” has been used instead of “Kiev,” “Volodymyr” instead of “Vladimir,” “Luhans’k” instead of “Lugansk,” “Mizhhir’ya” instead of “Medgor’e,” and “Kryvyi Rih” instead of “Krivoi Rog.” (The only exception, as noted above, is the name of Nikolai Podgorny, which has been rendered in its more familiar Russian version rather than the Ukrainian version, Mykola Pidhornyi.)

From 1933 to 1946, the Ukrainian language underwent a number of minor orthographic changes that generally were not adopted outside Soviet Ukraine. The version of the language used in current-day Ukraine—which is also the version used in the documents here—was formally approved by the UkrSSR Ministry of Education in 1946. This modified system is slightly more Russified than the Ukrainian spoken by most émigrés in Europe and North America. (Although recent immigrants from Ukraine would be accustomed to the modified orthography, the bulk of the émigré community still uses the orthography approved in 1928 by a special conference in Kharkiv of Ukrainian philologists, lexicographers, and grammarians.) The differences in transliteration are so small that they will be nearly imperceptible to anyone who does not know Ukrainian, but, for the sake of consistency, the modified orthography (i.e., the slightly more Russified version) has been used for transliterations of Ukrainian names and words.

All transliterations of Russian words, place names, surnames, and given names, including the names of ethnic Russian officials who lived or were temporarily stationed in Soviet Ukraine in 1968, have been based on the Russian versions of those names. The transliterations conform to the standard Library of Congress system.

– Mark Kramer

DOCUMENT No. 1

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, L. 1, original in Russian.]

Top Secret
CPSU CC

The CC of the Ukrainian CP believes it necessary to inform the CPSU Central Committee of the following.

On 18 February at 7:40 p.m., two Soviet train conductors on the Moscow-to-Prague line, Cdes. Muravin and Ryabov, were approached by an unknown person who described himself as a diplomat from the consulate in Kyiv and who, being in a drunken state, struck up a conversation with them about the Soviet hockey team, which recently took part in the winter Olympic games in Grenoble.²⁰ He asserted that Soviet hockey players do not know how to play and will lose again next year, all things being equal. He added that in his estimation he would put our team in around tenth place.

Then, shifting the conversation to political matters, he declared: "You removed Stalin and Khrushchev, and tomorrow you'll get rid of Brezhnev. The Czechs would be better off doing business with the West than with the Soviet Union. The Soviet people have us by the neck. It would be better if the Germans had destroyed half of Prague than for you to come with your tanks into the capital of Czechoslovakia. You Communists are worse than the imperialists."

During the check of documents at the border crossing, it was established that this individual was the ČSSR Consul-General in Kyiv, Josef Gorak, who was traveling from the Soviet Union to the ČSSR on diplomatic passport No. 004842.²¹

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

28 February 1968

No. 1/21

**DOCUMENT No. 2**

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, LI. 18-23, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

Attached is an informational memorandum from the Secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast of the Ukrainian CP, Cde. Yu. V. Il'nyts'kyi, about the events in Czechoslovakia.

P. SHELEST

21 March 1968
No. 1/22

CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE

STATUS REPORT

For your information I want to report that on 18 March 1968, the 1st Secretary of the KSČ's East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Jan Koscelanský, called me and requested that we meet at the border that same day. I should note that we have been having these sorts of meetings more or less regularly, mainly at his request. The meetings allow Cde. Koscelanský to share his views about ongoing party and economic work and also about events in the country. The most recent meeting before this one occurred on 10 January, when he informed me about the results of the October, December, and January plenums of the KSČ CC. At previous meetings, Cde. Koscelanský always had been accompanied by the chairman of the provincial executive committee and one or two secretaries from the regional committee. We have had the same level of representation on our side. But on this latest occasion, at his request, the meeting was one-on-one. Cde. Koscelanský informed me about recent events in his country.

He said that the municipal and regional party conferences in their country were very tempestuous. Sharp criticism was directed against the old methods of leadership, which had given rise to a cult of Novotný.²² In his view, the conferences went well. The first set of cadres in the party committees were elected by a secret vote.

Regarding the events under way in Czechoslovakia as a whole, he stated that they are wider and more profound, and will have more far-reaching consequences, than the events of 1948.

The Czechoslovak comrades believe that social development in their country after 1948 moved in the right direction until the beginning of the 1950s, when a period of the cult of personality began both in their country and in other socialist countries.²³

In the ČSSR this cult took a particularly monstrous form once Novotný arrived.

. . . . At present, new progressive forces have been growing, who have waged a decisive struggle against the conservatives. Now the question has arisen of how to foster conditions for the development of democracy in the full sense of that word.

Why, for example, was it possible in the bourgeois republic to criticize the president and to make caricatures of him, whereas it is impossible to do this in the socialist coun-

tries?

The Czechoslovak comrades believe that full democracy requires the elimination of any kind of censorship, the ending of instructions and orders from above to the radio, press, and television, the elimination of judicial proceedings and repression against citizens for their political views and statements, and the rehabilitation of all those who were repressed.²⁴ In connection with this the State Security



Alexander Dubček

Source: National Archives

organs behaved improperly during the cult of personality.²⁵ To ensure that there are no antagonistic classes in the country, the StB organs will be reduced to a minimum and the regular police organs will be expanded. Citizens will be permitted to leave the country, either permanently or temporarily, without any sort of restrictions; and the electrified fence along the border with the FRG will be removed.²⁶

Cde. Koscelanský said that they must work in such a way that the capitalists are fenced off from them, rather than being fenced off themselves from the capitalists.

The opportunity will arise to create new social organizations (student, peasant, and other organizations). A decision also has been adopted to postpone regular elections so that favorable conditions can be created for them.

A very important question, in their view, is the linkage of broad democracy with the leading role of the party. They understand it this way: Officials in party organs must be so authoritative and must speak with the masses so convincingly that the masses will support these officials as well as the party without any sort of pressure from above. For this purpose they need new cadres who are able to play such a leading role. . . .

. . . Many questions have been raised at the party conferences about why Comrade L. I. Brezhnev came to Czechoslovakia in December of last year.²⁷ In response to this question, the Czechoslovak comrades have been saying that Novotný invited Cde. L. I. Brezhnev without consulting any of the other members of the CC Presidium. When Comrade L. I. Brezhnev saw that there were two different points of view in the Presidium about how to resolve festering problems, he responded that we will not interfere in your internal affairs,

since your party is monolithic and solid, and the healthy forces in it can resolve all the problems.²⁸

Such an answer and such behavior by Cde. L. I. Brezhnev won universal approval.

Further on, Cde. Koscelanský said that some of the conservatives, in particular the ČSSR representative at CMEA, Simunek, justify the obsolescence of the economy by attributing it to the unequal trade agreements between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.²⁹ In response to this, I remarked to Cde. Koscelanský that I can't speak about trade as a whole, but Czechoslovakia now is third in the world in the production of metals per capita, and once you begin operating the metallurgical combine in Košice with a capacity of 6 million tons of steel a year—a combine that was equipped with assistance from the USSR and with our raw materials, and every day receives 23,000 tons of Kryvyi Rih iron ore and 6,110 tons of Donets'k coal—your country will occupy first place in these categories.³⁰ And this is at the same time when, for example, in our oblast there is a shortage of metal and we are unable to keep the work force busy.³¹

Cde. Koscelanský agreed with this and assured me that they are waging and will continue to wage a struggle against all those who try to cover up for their inactivity by making accusations against the USSR.

. . . Turning to the national question, Cde. Koscelanský said that Czechoslovakia will be a federated republic (Czechs and Slovaks), and the national minorities (Hungarians and Ukrainians) will be given autonomy.³² In response to this I said to him that autonomy is their internal affair, but I requested that he take a look at the Ukrainian newspaper "Nove zhittya," published in Prešov, which features nationalist opinions about the Transcarpathian in the name of the workers of the province, something that is completely unacceptable.³³ Cde. Koscelanský assured me that the current events are not a repetition of the events of 1956 in Hungary, since in Hungary the popular masses rose up against the party and Central Committee, whereas in the ČSSR they are speaking out against the conservatives and the Novotný group and are supporting their party, the CC, and friendship with the Soviet Union. The CC First Secretary, Dubček, enjoys great authority among all spheres of the population. He cited an example that when Cde. Dubček recently had to go to the hospital, students visited him and brought him bouquets of flowers and bottles of "Elinek" plum brandy.

Further on, Cde. Koscelanský reported that on 28 March, they have a CC plenum scheduled, where an "Action Program" will be adopted and the question of Novotný's tenure as President of the Republic will be decided.³⁴

In his view, the shortcomings of the current campaign arise not because many dishonorable people have joined in, but because some do not understand it properly. In addition, the Czechoslovak students sent a greeting to the Polish students, which obviously caused Cde. Gomułka to be angry at the Czechoslovak comrades.³⁵

In conclusion, Cde. Koscelanský requested that we convey to the Soviet friends that, beginning with Cde. Dubček and going through every rank-and-file Communist, they will

do everything possible to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union and to advance the cause of socialism on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

FIRST SECRETARY, TRANSCARPATHIAN
OBLAST COMMITTEE, CPOF UKRAINE

Yu. IL'NYTS'KYI



DOCUMENT No. 3

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, LI. 52-54,
original in Russian.]

Top Secret

No. 1382/23

CONVERSATION WITH THE CONSUL-GENERAL
OF THE ČSSR IN KYIV, J. GORAK

23 April 1968

At the invitation of Cde. Gorak, I met with him at the General Consulate building. From the outset J. Gorak emphasized that the discussion would be on an exceptionally "sober" basis, over a cup of coffee. During the conversation, he repeatedly alluded to his close ties with A. Dubček, with whom he had spoken recently about the latest events in Czechoslovakia. In passing, he noted that he, Gorak, has been appointed to take over soon as head of the Soviet Department in the ČSSR Foreign Ministry.³⁶ At the beginning of the conversation, the Consul-General said that he has sensed (and is set to inform Prague about this) an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion around officials at the consulate in Kyiv: Relations with individuals and organizations used to be trusting and open, but they have now given way to perfunctory and purely formal relations.³⁷

Brushing aside my objections on this point, he noted that in his view such an atmosphere is attributable to the improper and incompetent reaction of the Soviet people and senior officials in the Soviet Union to the events mandated by the process of democratization under way in Czechoslovakia.

He stated that it would be worth treating the Czechoslovak events with greater care, taking account in particular of the investigation into the reasons for and methods of the repressions in the ČSSR and the effort to clarify the motives for the suicide of the ČSSR deputy defense minister Janko and a number of political murders.³⁸ According to him, the KSČ CC leadership has deep suspicions that the former president of the ČSSR, A. Novotný, gave an oral command to

Janko, via the head of the CC's 8th Department, that in view of the circumstances they should use the armed forces to attempt to restore him (Novotný) to power.³⁹ If the investigation confirms these suspicions, the results will be published along with the findings of the investigation into the abuses of earlier years that led to the conviction of roughly 40,000 people and that caused Czechoslovak workers to feel even greater antipathy toward the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ In this connection, Gorak stated that the KSČ CC leadership is greatly upset about the frequent contacts between an employee of the Soviet embassy in Prague and the former president even after suspicions about Novotný were published in the press. Isn't it understandable, said Gorak, that these frequent private visits by embassy employees to Novotný remind Czechoslovak citizens of that earlier period of high activity by Soviet advisers, which has created a problem for us today of the rehabilitation of thousands of innocent people and the need to prosecute those who committed such actions?⁴¹

Returning to problems of economic development, Gorak particularly emphasized that Czechoslovakia is seriously considering the possibility of a large loan from the Western powers.⁴² In the hope of positively resolving this matter, as I understood from Gorak, the ČSSR may reassess some of its foreign policy positions, especially in its relations with the FRG and USA.⁴³

In conclusion the Consul-General mentioned the upcoming conference of Communist and workers' parties.⁴⁴ Taking account of the current situation, the KSČ will adopt the same position taken by the Italian and French Communist parties, since it is precisely these parties that have enormous experience regarding the socialist movement in the Western countries and are aware of the specific conditions of work in the industrially developed countries. It is also precisely these Communist parties that have displayed the most appropriate and favorable understanding of the essence of the Czechoslovak events and the aspirations of the ČSSR to assume leadership in the Communist and workers' movement in the Central European countries, which are united by identical features of their development.

The conversation took place in Russian, lasted two hours, and was of a confidential nature. The vice-consul, Cde. Doubrava, joined the conversation from time to time. During the conversation, the Consul-General harshly criticized the leaders of the GDR, especially W. Ulbricht, and also spoke negatively about the events in Poland and the leadership methods of W. Gomułka.

Third Secretary of the
Ukr Foreign Ministry
B. BAKLANOV

25.IV.68

DOCUMENT No. 4

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 97, Ll. 1-62, original in Russian.]

TOP SECRET

REPORT

DELIVERED BY P. E. SHELEST
AT THE PARTY MEETING
IN THE "ARSENAL" FACTORY
"ON THE RESULTS OF THE APRIL PLENUM OF THE CPSU
CC"

25 APRIL 1968

Comrades!

The Communist Party and its Central Committee constantly devote enormous attention to matters concerning the international situation and the development of the Communist movement as the basis for the victory of the forces of world socialism over capitalism.⁴⁵ This is necessary because imperialist reaction recently has been launching attacks against the socialist countries and is trying to weaken and create discord within the socialist commonwealth and the world Communist movement.

We must always remember the shrewd Leninist warning that imperialism, so long as it exists, will struggle with full force for every position and seek to attack the positions of socialism, probing for its weak points.

In connection with this, our party is confronted by an endless flow of new tasks. We live in a world divided into two irreconcilable camps—socialism and capitalism. A fierce, uncompromising class struggle is under way between them. This demands that we precisely and clearly define who is with us in this struggle, who our sincere friends are, and who is reliable and faithful.⁴⁶

Our party and people have learned a great deal from our 50 years of struggle against imperialism and reaction. We are able to discern the most insidious techniques of our enemies. The imperialists understand that nowadays they cannot overwhelm the socialist countries with a frontal attack. They are resorting to ever more refined tactics, trying to get us to let down our guard. They are also attempting to sow dissension among our ranks so that they can launch strikes against individual socialist countries.

All of this means that the Central Committee and the CC Politburo must keep close track of new phenomena and processes on the international scene, and must react to them in a timely manner. It also means that they must continually

perfect all of our foreign policy activity.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, on 9-10 April, was of exceptionally great importance for our party and for the peoples of the Soviet Union. As you know, the agenda of the Plenum was "On Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle by the CPSU for Cohesion in the World Communist Movement." . . .

. . . .⁴⁷

Comrades! The Communists and all workers of our country are especially alarmed about events in Czechoslovakia and the stepped-up activity of revisionist, Zionist, and anti-socialist forces in that country.

The situation in Czechoslovakia has become so complex because certain leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have failed to undertake a principled, class-based assessment of ongoing events. And some of them, having succumbed to the pressure of petit-bourgeois elements, are even ascribing legitimacy to the demands for "unlimited" democratization and freedom for everyone and everything. They assert that only under these circumstances will the party be able to carry out a "specific" policy suitable for Czechoslovak conditions.⁴⁸

At the same time, hostile elements cloaking themselves with false slogans of "democracy," "reform," and "freedom of thought" are launching an attack on the party and seeking to undermine socialist gains. In this regard, the enemies are acting slyly and insidiously. They are even extolling some of the new leaders, especially those who support notions of "unlimited democracy," "renewal," and "a special Czechoslovak path," as well as those who believe that the intelligentsia must "formulate the party's policy."

Some of the leaders of Czechoslovakia do not understand that by losing control over the propaganda organs—the press, radio, and television—and by condoning the persecution of so-called "conservatives" and the glorification of "progressives," they are causing the dissolution of the party and creating conditions for the stepped-up activity of hostile elements.

The Dresden conference of the leaders of fraternal parties,⁴⁹ which was convened at the initiative of the CPSU, undoubtedly had a great—and, I would even say, a sobering—effect on certain leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰

At this conference, the CPSU delegation provided a frank and scrupulous assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia, emphasizing that events could develop into a counter-revolutionary upheaval unless decisive measures are promptly implemented. Our delegation drew attention to the fact that in the current situation it is necessary above all to appeal to the working class and tell workers honestly about the situation in the party and the country and, by relying on the support of the working class, to embark on an offensive against reactionaries and anti-socialist elements. Only in these circumstances can the situation be rectified.

At the same time, the Czechoslovak comrades were told

that our party supports Cde. Dubček and the new leadership and is doing everything to help them remedy the situation and thereby strengthen the positions of the new leadership. We urged them to realize that the current leaders of the KSČ have an enormous responsibility for the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia and for ensuring the proper internal policy and foreign policy line of the KSČ.

Our delegation declared that the CPSU will not remain indifferent to the course of events. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are taking all necessary measures to forestall the victory of counterrevolution.

The prospects for wider economic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were also discussed in Dresden, and it was proposed that this matter be considered at the highest level in the near future.

All the delegations of the fraternal socialist countries completely supported and endorsed our assessment and candidly told the KSČ officials about their alarm at the situation in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak comrades acknowledged that the situation in the republic is complex, but they declared that Czechoslovakia is not turning away from the socialist path and will maintain a policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It also will uphold its obligations to the Warsaw Pact.⁵¹

The meeting in Dresden was timely and worthwhile. It helped the Czechoslovak comrades correctly grasp the situation in their country, and it had a significant effect on the proceedings and results of the recent KSČ CC Plenum. Just after the Conference, some KSČ leaders said that for them Dresden was a learning experience and that the Soviet comrades were absolutely correct when they warned about the threat of counterrevolution.

It must be said that the recent CC Plenum of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia showed that the party leadership is striving to regain control of events and focus the party's attention and the attention of all workers on the fulfillment of positive tasks of socialist construction.⁵²

The resolutions of the KSČ CC Plenum draw attention to the necessity of increasing the leading role of the party in the country. They also refer to the great importance of the activity of all organs of the party and state apparatus, including the army and state security organs.

But some leading officials at the Plenum, and even Cde. Dubček, to varying degrees supported the demands that are now fashionable in Czechoslovakia for comprehensive "liberalization." It must be said that overall Cde. Dubček's speeches, despite some negative points, provided a better sense that the KSČ leadership understands the necessity of waging a struggle against anti-socialist forces.

In the near future it will be evident to what extent the resolutions of this KSČ CC Plenum can help shift events in the country back onto the right path.

However, even after the KSČ CC Plenum, the situation in the country remains extremely complicated. The revisionist and right-wing opportunist elements, styling themselves as "progressives," continue to attack the party and denigrate

the achievements of socialism in the name of "renewal" and "democratic development." They are exploiting the press, radio, and television to further their anti-party aims, having planted anti-socialist and Zionist elements in the mass media.

Recently—on 13 April, to be exact—the central organ of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, "Rudé právo," published a long article by someone named Kaplan.⁵³ The author claims that the time has come to reexamine the party from its very roots. "This is an important step," he writes. "Changes should be made in all the policy-making procedures. The country's policies must be determined by the whole society, not just by one small part of it" (i.e., the party). Further on, Kaplan says that "all progressive forces have not yet had their say. Non-Communists must play an important role in the political and social life of the country and be able to influence the elections of political leaders." And this has been published repeatedly in the official organ of the Communist Party after the KSČ CC Plenum!

In the same newspaper someone named Šulc writes that the "new policy" cannot be devised by the "old people."⁵⁴

These pronouncements are being made in defiance of statements by certain members of the KSČ CC Presidium, who are calling for the "hysteria surrounding specific cases of rehabilitation to be condemned." They emphasize that the party cannot permit a mass exodus of officials and must support honest party workers. Šulc believes that "the issue here is not only about a 'changing of the guard,' when everything else remains the same, but about the beginning of fundamental changes in the party and society."

The newspaper "Práce," which generally has embraced anti-socialist positions, featured an article claiming that if matters are to be decided by a universal vote, it is doubtful that the KSČ has the right to continue to lead the society.⁵⁵

The failure of the Communist Party to put up a struggle against the revisionist and anti-socialist elements, and the discussions by Communists about "democratization" and "liberalization," have been skillfully exploited by the enemies of socialism to reinforce their activities. Of late, the People's (Catholic) Party and National Socialist Party have been increasingly active.⁵⁶ Until recently, these parties did not have primary organizations, but now they have set them up. It is sufficient to note that in the past three months alone, the People's Party has expanded by 100,000 members and is already demanding to be given not just one but several posts in the government.

We increasingly find in the press, radio, and television, and in speeches at gatherings of intellectuals and students, calls for "renewal." They explain that these statements are in support of a return to the republic of Masaryk and Beneš—that is, a bourgeois republic under the guise of "socialism."⁵⁷

The events in Czechoslovakia show that hostile elements in that country are being directed by a skillful hand from abroad. It has become known that since 1966, the West German and American governments have made an enormous effort in Czechoslovak society to undermine the authority and influence of the KSČ leadership headed by Cde. Novotný.



Petro Shelest

Source: National Archives

By skillfully manipulating the nationalist sentiments of Slovaks and Czechs and the discontent of various strata of the population with violations of “democracy”—discontent that is particularly acute among certain members of the intelligentsia and youth—they have succeeded in intensifying the struggle against leading figures in the party and state.

The US and West German imperialists are following a cautious policy and are deftly using all channels of ideological and economic influence to achieve a further weakening of the role of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the state affairs and political life of the country and to provoke a gradual schism between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. To this end, they propose to continue a broad campaign justifying and supporting demands about the necessity of carrying out fundamental reforms in the country, establishing a multi-party or at least two-party system in Czechoslovakia, and granting automatic rehabilitation to all those who were earlier convicted.

The revanchists from the Federal Republic of Germany are even proposing to give Czechoslovakia economic assistance of some 260 million marks to develop light industry and improve the population’s living standards.⁵⁸ Ideological subversion and bribery of Czechoslovak citizens are increasing.

This policy is reflected in articles in the Czechoslovak press. On 10 April the weekly “Student” published a lecture by some professor named Svíták under the title “With a Head

Against the Wall,” which he presented to students at Prague university.⁵⁹ In this lecture he voiced the demand: “Support the workers’ movement, but without any officials in the party apparatus; place intellectuals in charge of the movement.”

His entire presentation reflected a malicious, anti-socialist orientation. He criticizes the entire political system of socialism, declaring that the “maximum program of the Communist Party is our minimum program,” and that personnel changes in the leadership are of no interest to him. On the contrary, “we have a fundamental stake in adopting profound structural changes because they will clear the path to an open, socialist society.”

Finishing his lecture, this sorry excuse for a professor declared: “The totalitarian dictatorship is our enemy no. 1. We must destroy this dictatorship, or it will destroy us.”

Events in Czechoslovakia and to some extent in Poland confirm that the American and West German imperialists are using new and, I would say, step-by-step tactics. In Hungary in 1956 the imperialists urged the local reactionaries to embark on an armed attack to seize power, whereas in Czechoslovakia they are trying to establish a bourgeois order by “peaceful means.” That is, they are trying gradually to change the situation so that the reactionaries can gradually seize one position after another. They are building up their forces with the aim of launching a battle—that is, achieving a majority of the votes—in the upcoming elections to the National Assembly.

There is already a serious danger that the People’s and People’s-Socialist Parties in Czechoslovakia will take part in the elections not as part of the National Front (as was done previously), but on the basis of their own demagogic platform in the hope of gaining more votes and demanding the creation of a coalition government, in which the main role will be played by reactionary forces seeking to restore the bourgeois order.

The rationale for this new tactic of imperialism has been explicated by one of the American “theoreticians” of psychological warfare, Margolin.⁶⁰ He wrote that “in the future the role that artillery played in preparations for an infantry attack will be played by subversive propaganda. Its task is to destroy the enemy psychologically before the armed forces even begin to mobilize.” The author argues that “this sort of strategy, if applied correctly, can achieve fantastic results.”⁶¹

Whereas the imperialists and fascists used to speak openly about the destruction of socialism and the enslavement of the populations of other nations, bourgeois propaganda is now concealing its genuine aims by prattling on about “an increase in the material well-being of people,” “unlimited democracy” and “freedom,” and the “delights of the American way of life.”

Even the supervisors of that patently anti-Soviet broadcast station, Radio Liberty, have begun to claim that they are not anti-Soviet and not anti-Communists.⁶² They supposedly are interested only in the “development of democracy” and “equality among the Soviet republics,” as well as “personal freedom.”

The complexity of the struggle in a number of socialist countries is evident from the fact that they must struggle not only against a foreign enemy – imperialism – but also against the remnants of hostile classes and against manifestations of bourgeois ideology.

Bourgeois propaganda and malevolent imperialist intelligence services are using all manner of insidious techniques to try to undermine the trust that the peoples of socialist countries have in their current state and social order and in the internal and foreign policies of the Communist Parties. They are making every effort to discredit the Communists and leading organs of the party and to disrupt party and state discipline. They are also seeking to tarnish the activity of the state security organs, the police, the courts, the procurator's office, and the senior officials in those agencies. By inciting nationalist sentiments, the enemy is doing everything to undermine the friendship between the peoples of socialist countries. Under the guise of a "struggle for democracy," they are stirring up an outdated and unsavory mood among segments of the intelligentsia and young people.

At the same time, the imperialists are resorting to economic subversion. Through front organizations they are providing credits to certain socialist countries, supposedly in the hope of "building bridges" between West and East.⁶³ In reality they are seeking to undermine the socialist commonwealth and its economic ties.

Bourgeois propaganda and imperialist intelligence services are carrying out their subversive activities through a multitude of channels: the radio, the press, different unions, tourists, and other contacts. The big bosses of imperialism are taking vigorous measures to activate bourgeois-émigré counterrevolutionary centers.

During the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, hostile elements reared their heads. However, they did not dare to speak out openly in support of anti-Communist and anti-Soviet demands. They understand that this game is over once and for all. As a result, while providing cover for themselves with demagogic statements about "friendship" with the Soviet Union, the enemies at the same time are sowing doubts about some sort of "inequality" and about the pursuit of a special, "independent" foreign policy. They are also trying to undercut the leading role of the party.

We all are well aware that they must do this in order to lead workers astray, particularly the gullible younger workers, and to strengthen their anti-popular positions. Under the nationalist slogan of a "special course," they are waging a struggle against socialism and Communism.

At the moment it is still impossible to give any sort of definitive assessment of the events in Czechoslovakia. The CC Politburo supports continual ties with the Czechoslovak comrades and with the leaders of a number of fraternal parties to help the Czechoslovak friends.

We know that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia contains healthy forces, who are able to regain control of the situation and guide the country back onto the socialist path. Our task is to provide comprehensive assistance to these forces and to keep close tabs on the way events develop. In

the event of danger, all of our means and capabilities will be employed to thwart the intrigues of our enemies who want to tear fraternal Czechoslovakia out of the commonwealth of socialist countries.⁶⁴

The Communists of Ukraine and the entire Ukrainian nation wish, with all their heart and soul, great success to the Czechoslovak friends in their complex struggle to normalize the situation in the party and the country and to attain new victories in socialist construction.

....⁶⁵



DOCUMENT No. 5

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, Ll. 55-64, original in Ukrainian.]

TO CPSU POLITBURO MEMBER AND UkrCP CC FIRST SECRETARY
Cde. P. Yu. SHELEST⁶⁶

INFORMATIONAL REPORT

For your information, on 29 April 1968 I met the first secretary of the KSC's East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Ján Koscelanský, and had a three-hour conversation with him. The meeting, as on the previous occasion, occurred at his suggestion and was conducted one-on-one.

At the start of our conversation, Cde. Koscelanský asked me what had happened at the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which had focused on events in Czechoslovakia. I responded that the Plenum had not specifically discussed the situation in your country, but had merely reviewed current problems on the international scene and the struggle of the CPSU to achieve unity and cohesion in the world Communist movement. Among these problems was the recent development of events in Czechoslovakia.⁶⁷ Events in the ČSSR have been marked by the stepped-up activity of unsavory elements. Only if the current KSC leaders assess the situation properly and take necessary measures to overcome the difficulties they confront will events develop in the right direction.

After this, Cde. Koscelanský informed me about the proceedings of their regional conference. In his view, the conference passed off well, in a lively and critical atmosphere. The conference decided to replace two secretaries of the regional committee, Cdes. Kuľko and Kudelásek, who were subject to harsh criticism for having adhered consistently to the old line.⁶⁸ The post of secretary of ideology was filled by the director of the Košice museum, Ladislav Olexa, and the post of secretary of the regional committee for the Košice metallurgical combine was eliminated after the removal of Cde. Kudelásek. Also replaced was the head of the party

commission, Cde. Mockovčiak.⁶⁹

Cde. Koscelanský said it will also be necessary to replace a number of department heads. The sweeping replacement of leading personnel is motivated by the fact that a majority of them have already been in office a long time and are unable to respond properly to recent events. These people are now coming under heavy criticism, and the authority of the party is falling. The masses have demanded that new people be brought into the leadership, and as a result, the replacement of cadres needs to be completed.

According to Cde. Koscelanský, the delegates at the conference very warmly greeted the telegram that our party's Transcarpathian Oblast committee sent to the conference, regarding it as an important gesture of support from the Communists of the Soviet Union. They voted unanimously to thank the oblast committee for its telegram.

A bit later, Cde. Koscelanský spoke about the state of affairs in the country. He declared that the press, television, and radio are no longer subject to any kind of censorship. In this respect he said that literary figures and journalists are referring to a law adopted under feudalism that had specified there would be no censorship.⁷⁰ So why should there be any censorship under socialism? The press, radio, and television have reached the point where they will criticize any leader for his views. Cde. Koscelanský said that the CC First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Cde. Biľak, had been criticized openly in the press because he told a gathering of television producers and newspaper editors that they were not behaving properly.

In Moravia, the regional committee adopted a resolution condemning a particular newspaper's treacherous behavior. Afterwards, the newspaper in question criticized the regional committee until a new plenum was convened and the resolution was rescinded. The whole party conference proceeded through this largely reciprocal interaction between the regional committee and the newspaper.

I said to Cde. Koscelanský that I can't imagine why they are permitting immature people to spread propaganda among the population, and are not taking measures to control them. It's even possible to wage a public vendetta against any of the current leaders. In response, Cde. Koscelanský said that party officials should behave in a way that would not incur criticism from the masses or, naturally, the press. That's what you get, he said to me, when the CC organ "Rudé právo" is not controlled by the Central Committee and the editor-in-chief. The question of what materials to publish is decided spontaneously by a number of editors.⁷¹

Cde. Koscelanský insisted that the press is a great and nearly decisive force in society and deserves to be heeded. It gathers and formulates the views of the masses. Anyone who wants to work properly will need to have the support of the masses. Without this support, the CC could not have dismissed anyone from his post or brought in new officials. He then said that the principle of democratic centralism in the party is being violated. Many officials already are afraid of the press, radio, and television. The media reassess these people and begin to raise a fuss, and the officials themselves

are unable to do anything once they are called to account. We increasingly find a pattern in which people are first subjected to public criticism and then driven from their posts.

The growing disregard of the principle of democratic centralism is also evident from an example cited by Cde. Koscelanský. Cde. Koscelanský said that yesterday he had called the CC headquarters in Prague and informed them that a delegation of Ukrainian workers from Prešov had visited the regional committee and been received by a secretary of the regional committee, Ladislav Olexa. The CC Secretary with whom Cde. Koscelanský was speaking asked who this Ladislav Olexa is, since no one knows anything about him, and his candidacy has not been vetted by the Central Committee. So, you can see that, in defiance of common sense, officials are being appointed without any input from the highest party organs.

Many meetings are under way in the country, particularly meetings of students and workers. Cde. Koscelanský said that when he attended a meeting of students, he had been asked some 1,200 questions. In answering them, it was necessary to stick to the point, lest they start whistling, as happened with the rector of the university. Among the questions asked was whether the Transcarpathian region, having been taken illegally from Czechoslovakia, would be returned.⁷² I asked Cde. Koscelanský how he had responded to this question, but he avoided giving a direct answer.

Meetings have been taking place at factories to oppose the factory directors. Workers are demanding increased pay and are pressing all sorts of claims against the heads of the enterprises.

At the Košice metallurgical combine, for example, during one such meeting, the director, Cde. Knižka, was accused of receiving an excessively high salary, of owning a new car, of having a private room in the recreational facility, and of other such things. Newspapers all over the country covered this in full, and as a result, Cde. Knižka reached the point where he suddenly had a heart attack in Bratislava.

I said to Cde. Koscelanský that now you can see where "democracy" and the elimination of censorship are bound to lead. From the sidelines, it is easier to bellow and criticize than to work. And wouldn't you, too, be intimidated by this sort of vilification? As soon as you make a mistake, they use it to criticize you and dismiss you from your post. He agreed with me and said that during his remarks afterward at the factory meeting, he referred to these sorts of criticisms as "Chinese."⁷³ At this particular enterprise, he declared, they've already convened meetings three times to elect the head of the trade union organization, but no one has been willing to be elected, for fear of incurring criticism. As far as Cde. Koscelanský himself is concerned, he said that he had made clear at one of the meetings that if they begin criticizing him, he will promptly react in full force.

At the meetings, assemblies, and conferences, a large number of questions were raised about events in both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In connection with this, Cde. Koscelanský said that they write a great deal about these events in the capitalist countries, whereas in the socialist

countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, they are silent. He asked why this is so. I responded that, as far as I know, excerpts from Dubček's speech at the CC plenum and from the Action Program were published in "Pravda."⁷⁴ I also said that "Pravda" is not able to cover other news from your country when you yourselves don't know what you want, and when the slogans proclaimed by you are not fulfilled.

Cde. Koscelanský said that ordinary people, particularly workers, always greet conversations about the USSR with stormy applause. Although there are some who oppose the Soviet Union, they do so in private and do not dare speak openly this way at meetings and assemblies.

Then Cde. Koscelanský described the recent visit by the president of the republic, Ludvík Svoboda, to Bratislava. He said the president had never encountered such a warm reception as he did here, especially among young people. Cde. Koscelanský emphasized that even though in Prague there had been demonstrations against the election of Svoboda as president, in Bratislava they had deliberately organized a wide range of meetings for the president so that the Czechs would not think the Slovaks were acting against them. At the end of May, Svoboda will visit the East Slovakian region, and they are now busy arranging for him the same sort of reception that he enjoyed in Bratislava.

Further on, Cde. Koscelanský emphasized that three forces have now emerged: the conservatives, the progressives, and the radicals (consisting mainly of Jews) who want to drag the country to the right. Among the radicals is a well-known economist, a Jew, who has broad international Zionist links (I don't recall his name).⁷⁵ There was an attempt to bring him into the CC Presidium, but, Cde. Koscelanský said, the Soviet comrades were opposed to this, and so nothing came of it. Now this is one of the reasons that the radicals are calling ever more urgently for the convocation in 1968 of an extraordinary party congress.

In general, a great struggle has emerged around this question. In the Czech lands, the conferences adopted resolutions in favor of holding a congress this year.⁷⁶ In Slovakia, they also voted in favor of holding a congress, but they did not specify when it should be held and did not indicate whether it should be an extraordinary congress or the regular 14th.

The views of the progressives and radicals about the congress are as follows: The radicals favor convening an extraordinary congress that will remove Novotný and other current CC members (roughly 40 people in all) from the CC because they are a disgrace to the party. The progressives believe that a congress must be convened, but not this year. It should come only after meticulous preparations that will allow a new program and new party statutes to be adopted. If an extraordinary congress were held prematurely, it might enable unsavory people to infiltrate the leadership.

In May, a plenum of the KSČ CC will be held, and the progressives want to gain a definitive understanding of the radicals' views about a congress. If the radicals' motive for convening a congress is only their desire to remove Novotný's group from the CC, that can be done at the ple-

num: These people will voluntarily relinquish their duties as CC members, and replacements for them will be chosen from comrades who are now candidate members.

Cde. Koscelanský said that the provision in the constitution about the Communist Party's leading role in society will be removed. In response, I emphasized that in my view this would be extremely surprising and shocking, since it would be impossible to build socialism and Communism without the leading role of the party. In the process, new full-fledged parties will take shape, as cadres break apart and go their own way, and then seek to deprive the Communist Party of its leading role. In these circumstances, there will soon be 30 parties again in your country, as in the past. Why this is necessary is anyone's guess.

While agreeing that the number of parties might actually be increased, Cde. Koscelanský did not specifically address the other concerns I raised.

He repeated his earlier statements that true democracy is distinctive in that it does not provide for any kinds of secrets about matters that affect the party and the state. In this regard, everything that was discussed at the CC Plenums and at the party conferences was openly covered in the press, on radio, and on television.

At the end of the conversation, he said that political matters are not giving him any time to spend on other issues. For example, he does not know how economic matters and the spring harvest are progressing. He complained that they are working very hard and, in general, he was tired; he had put up with enough, and it would probably be better to be back at the institute delivering lectures than to be involved in politics.

We agreed that in view of the great value of these meetings, it would be worth setting up meetings of the CC secretaries of our republics—the Ukrainian and Slovak—on the Soviet-Czechoslovak border. He endorsed this proposal and said that on 3 May he would be meeting with Cde. Biľak and would inform him about our arrangement. This will be especially appropriate, he said, because Cde. Biľak is a native of our region but has not been back to East Slovakia since the day he was elected first secretary of the Slovakian CC.⁷⁷

Bidding farewell, I said we are convinced that the Czechoslovak Communist Party includes healthy forces who correctly understand how to deal with the situation and who want to guide the party and the country along a Marxist-Leninist path. He responded that he had recently given an interview in which the correspondents asked how he viewed the prospects for carrying out the Action Program. He had answered this question by saying: "It would be good if we succeed in carrying out this Program." I, Cde. Koscelanský added, deliberately put in the word "if," because this might or might not happen.

My personal impression from the conversation with Cde. Koscelanský is that whereas during our previous meetings he had behaved with great animation and had spoken enthusiastically about future plans and prospects, this was no longer the case. It is clear that the notes of doubt and worry that I could detect in Cde. Koscelanský's remarks stem from

the extreme difficulty of using theoretical concepts in practical activity.

He is beginning to question whether they will be successful in building socialism of a “Czechoslovak type.” I could see that Cde. Koscelanský himself is aware that things are not going the way they planned when they embarked on a “new course,” and that the situation in the country has been moving ever further to the right. But because he was one of the initiators of this “new course,” his own ambition does not permit him to speak candidly about what is going on right now in the country. It is true, he said, that it would have been better if this had begun in 1960 and had all been carried out gradually.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE TRANSCARPATHIAN
OBLAST OF THE CP OF UKRAINE
Yu. IL'NYTS'KYI

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DOCUMENT No. 6

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 81-85,
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12 May 1968

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

At the instruction of the UkrCP CC Secretary Cde. P. E. Shelest, I am sending you a report from the UkrCP Transcarpathian Oblast committee “On Certain Items Featured in Czechoslovak Television Broadcasts and in the Newspaper ‘Rudé právo’.”

Attachment: as indicated, 5 pages.

DEP. HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
UkrCPCC
A. ODNOROMANENKO

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF UKRAINE

Certain Items Featured in Czechoslovak Television
Broadcasts and in the Newspaper “Rudé právo”

1. On 6 May the ČSSR minister of internal affairs published a directive ending the jamming of radio stations of foreign countries that transmit radio broadcasts for Czechoslovakia. According to the television, the society viewed this decision very favorably.

2. A huge number of tourists from capitalist countries, especially from West Germany and Austria, are visiting Czechoslovakia every day. Some 50,000-55,000 tourists are arriving from the FRG and Austria every day. In coverage on Czechoslovak television at the end of April from an entry-exit border point, they reported that officials from the ČSSR border guard organs are faithfully greeting West German tourists without making any attempt to check their belongings and documents.⁷⁸ To cross the border, all a tourist has to do is stick his head out the window of a bus and show a paper to the border guard, who then smiles happily at him and wishes him a good time in Prague. The television correspondent emphasized the great “efficiency” of the border services and their hospitality to West German tourists.

Thus, in a very direct way, Czechoslovakia is being permeated every day with spies, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet literature, religious objects of all sorts, and other such things.

3. In some reports from the border, they broadcast pictures showing the border guards removing barbed wire from installations along the border with West Germany and Austria.⁷⁹ No doubt, the presence of such installations on the border is now superfluous and unaesthetic.

4. At the 1st of May demonstration in Prague, Czechoslovak television prominently displayed one of the posters held by the column of demonstrators: “We demand an opposition party.”⁸⁰ A bit earlier, the television showed a group of public speakers who openly stated that they must do away with the dictatorship of the Communist party, create an opposition to the Communist party, and establish a new polity using the model of the English and American two-party system.⁸¹

5. Television reports from the regional party conference in České Budějovice highlighted a presentation by one of the speakers, who affirmed the necessity of convening an extraordinary congress as soon as possible, where they would have to elect a completely new leadership and form a new party to replace the compromised KSČ.⁸²

6. At the 1st of May demonstration, one of the television announcers spoke very agitatedly about recent events in the country. “We see demonstrators holding up posters saying ‘We demand an opposition party’,” he said, “but this is not as bad as some other things that have been happening recently. Hostile elements have been taunting and throwing stones through the windows of former prosecutors, judges, and officials from the internal affairs and state security organs. . . . If you look at this realistically, the current victims are honorable people who struggled against criminals, sadists, and other hostile elements. And this is despite the fact that only one out of a hundred officials, perhaps, com-

mitted violations of the law.”⁸³

This same announcer spoke about the plight of economic management officials, indicating that honest directors who sacrificed everything for the success of their enterprises are now being driven from their posts under a variety of pretexts.

7. Elements hostile to socialism have penetrated the press organs, radio, and television. With censorship now lifted under the slogan of “broad information for the public,” they are highlighting unsavory features and deficiencies in various spheres of social life and prison life as well as grave shortcomings in the military barracks. They have even seen fit to show tactical-technical data about Soviet tank production and its weak points. During the broadcast the viewers were informed that more information will be shown about other military technology in the future. (The broadcast was on 4 May 1968.)

8. The former Uniate clergy has been sharply stepping up its propaganda activity in Eastern Slovakia. The congress that assembled in Košice devised an action program demanding the recognition and soonest possible restoration of the Uniate Church, “inasmuch as the Orthodox faith was forcibly set up as a replacement.”⁸⁴ The proceedings of the congress were broadcast on television, and reports about it were published in “Rudé právo.”

9. Jaromír Hetteš,⁸⁵ a secretary of the KSČ’s Eastern Slovakia regional committee, was asked about party cadres in an interview with a television correspondent at the end of April. Hetteš indicated that these cadres can be divided into three groups, beginning with those who lived and struggled during the first Czechoslovak Republic. They were prepared only to seize power, but were unable to manage the national economy. For that reason, a second group of party cadres came in as replacements, and they have remained in power up to now. Initially, they were progressive in their handling of the national economy, but now they have become conservatives.

New cadres are needed to ensure that the economy can develop properly in the future. “In our view, to resolve this matter,” said Hetteš, “it’s necessary to rectify the mistakes of the past whereby the top posts in the state and economic apparatus automatically went to KSČ members. We must now bring in more non-Communists without needing to worry that the chairman of a regional or village council will declare war if he does not happen to be a member of the KSČ.”

10. Systematic propaganda has been featured in “Rudé právo” and on radio and television about a new model of socialist democracy. The propaganda emphasizes that in this respect they have set out on an uncharted path that undoubtedly will earn broad support in the Western world. Incidentally, “Rudé právo” regularly features a compilation of reactions from around the world to the events in Czechoslovakia. Someone or other in the ČSSR is especially happy about seeing praise in the bourgeois press.

11. On 5 May “Rudé právo” featured an article on “Marx and the Communist Party,” which reached the conclusion that Marx was the last Communist philosopher of the XIX

century (and possibly of the XX).⁸⁶ It also spoke about the different components of the “Communist movement”: “The latest path of Lenin was (and to this day remains) the single complete application of Marxism and the single consistent development of Marxist doctrine. But it has gone in only one direction. Marx permitted far more directions than that.”⁸⁷ We are at the beginning of a search, which must proceed. There is no other way.”

12. On 24 April, “Rudé právo” published an article under the headline “Here, Too, We Need Improvements,” which deals with the work of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship.⁸⁸ Specifically, it says:

“The period of the cult of personality left many traces of formalism and official rigidity (or at least semi-official rigidity) on the movement that arose spontaneously and out of pure love in the face of the Second World War. In the past, certain political figures, who have left us with so many bad things to clear away, often made a monopoly of their friendship with the USSR, and with their verbosity and phraseology they more often harmed things than helped. . . .

“In addition, this period witnessed an unreasonable transfer of the Soviet experience, which meant that along with positive features, we imported things unsuitable for our country, not to mention outdated and egregiously unscientific concepts, such as the creation of a Lysenko school. . . .

“The routes were often stereotyped, most were group offerings, whereas individual tourism is insignificant. . . .”

A bit later the article refers to the presence of Czech students on the virgin lands, where they learned about life without adornments and agitation. They lived and worked with real people and did not exchange pat phrases, but were open, measured, and candid with one another. Our students established close ties with their young Soviet friends, who themselves today are seeking new paths to follow, do not like the phrases muttered by agitators, and are more critical than the previous generation was.⁸⁹

13. A presentation on television by the writer Lustig

At the end of April, the television gave broadcast time to the writer Lustig.⁹⁰ In his presentation, he spoke with open sympathy in favor of the Israeli aggressors, declaring that “such a small country as Israel, in the midst of the Arab world, was unable to wait until the midnight hour struck.”⁹¹

He called on the Czechoslovak government not to supply weapons to the Middle East, and condemned the supply of arms to Egypt by the Soviet Union.

14. On 3 May, “Rudé právo” published an article entitled “1st of May Referendum,” which characterized the demonstrations in Prague and other locales (and also the session of the people’s assembly) as a vote of confidence and trust in the party and government.⁹² The article strongly emphasizes that the demonstrations were spontaneous, that no recording machines were evident there, and that they were not carrying standard typeset posters prepared by appropriate departments in the propaganda establishment and by the party apparatus.

Further on, the newspaper says that all those who have eyes and ears can hear and see what the majority of the

people are aiming for. The 1st of May festivities have given all those, both in the ČSSR and abroad, who are likening the current events in the ČSSR to the Budapest events of 1956, ample grounds to rethink their position.

SECRETARY OF THE TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST
COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF UKRAINE

Yu. IL'NYTS'KYI

9 May 1968



DOCUMENT No. 7

[Source: TsDAHOV, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 65-69,
original in Russian.]

REPORT

On 13 May, I had a meeting with the head of the Interior Ministry Directorate in the East Slovakian region, Colonel J. S. Majer, at his request.⁹³ He arrived at the meeting alone. According to Cde. Majer, his deputy from State Security, Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Dovin, was home sick from a serious nervous disorder. Accompanying me was the head of the 5th Department, Cde. Maiorchuk.⁹⁴

Having said nothing about the reasons for and goals of the meeting, Cde. Majer began, at his own initiative, to speak about the situation in his country, which in his view is becoming more complicated and is characterized by the following:

1. The anti-socialist forces and demagogic and anarchical elements are stepping up their activity. The mass media—the press, radio, and television—remain in the hands of right-wing intellectuals, including many Zionists.⁹⁵ The press, radio, and television are ever more vigorously exploiting for their own ends the agitation, demagoguery, and incitement of passions around the so-called rehabilitations. Cde. Majer gave a direct assurance that something will be done to counter this. On 3 May in Prague a meeting of 50,000 students took place.⁹⁶ Speakers who endorsed Marxist positions were booed and jeered.

Several days ago, at the grave of one of the founders of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak who was a former general in the French service, Štefánik (roughly 60 kilometers from Bratislava), a demonstration of 100,000 people took place, featuring many speeches hostile to socialist Czechoslovakia.⁹⁷ At other meetings and demonstrations, too, the participants are carrying anti-Communist banners and yelling anti-

Communist slogans.

2. Three groups have taken shape in the KSČ CC Presidium:

- conservatives
- centrists
- rightists.

With regard to the conservatives, Cde. Majer was not able to report anything concrete. It is generally understood that they are adopting a wait-and-see position.

The centrists, headed by Cde. Dubček, also include Cde. Lenárt, Cde. Černík, the secretary of the Slovak Communist Party CC, Cde. Biľak, and the secretary of the party committee at the Košice metallurgical combine, Cde. Rigo—all of whom firmly support socialism and friendship with the USSR.⁹⁸

The right wing is headed by Smrkovský.⁹⁹ They are supported by pro-Zionist circles, including Goldstücker, the rector of Charles University (in Prague); Kriegel, a member of the CC Presidium; and Ota Šik. They advocate an orientation toward the West.¹⁰⁰

They are heatedly debating the question of whether to convene an Extraordinary Congress. Four regional organizations have declared their support for convening it.¹⁰¹ Among these is the Prague organization. This is especially unfortunate because the Prague committee is the largest and most influential of the party organizations, and includes many intellectuals among its members. In the Central Committee the rightist group headed by Smrkovský has spoken in favor of a congress.

Cde. Majer affirms that a serious danger has arisen that if an extraordinary congress is convened under current circumstances, the top of the party will be hijacked by rightists. He explains that this will be the likely result of the congress because pro-Zionist elements who have a stake in it enjoy wide support in the provincial party organizations, which in turn will have a strong influence on the congress delegates. They are also raising large amounts of money for this purpose, and, as indicated above, the press, radio, and television are in their hands.

3. Many reactionary organizations have been formed. The largest of them (with nearly 100,000 people) is the so-called Organization of Politically Active Non-Communists.¹⁰² Others include youth organizations, professional groups, sport clubs, Legionnaires (participants in the Czechoslovak rebellion in Siberia and their successors), cultural organizations, and others.¹⁰³

4. The working class is standing on the sidelines, away from these events. This can be explained by the fact that the KSČ, despite having a stake in activating workers, has been deprived of the means of activating them through the press, the radio, and so forth.

5. Colonel Majer showed me a leaflet he had been given, which had been typeset in Czech on a sheet of paper a bit smaller than the standard size. The leaflet was phrased in a Marxist-Leninist spirit and was written skillfully for public

consumption. It says that events in the ČSSR are nothing other than a struggle between socialism and capitalism, and that the question has arisen of who-whom.¹⁰⁴ It also says that the reactionary, bourgeois forces are trying, by means of demagoguery, imprecations, and wild speculation about the inevitable mistakes of the recent past, to lead Czechoslovak workers astray, do away with socialist gains, and plunge the country into the grip of imperialism. It then calls on workers to rise up in defense of the KSC and socialist gains, to put an end to the anti-popular actions of the reactionaries, and to defend their own rights. Cde. Majer says that these sorts of leaflets were distributed in large quantities in Prague. I get the impression that he suspects the Soviet organs are in some way involved in the dissemination of the leaflets. In an emphatically worried manner, he further said that reactionary leaflets in the form of brochures also are being distributed in the country.

6. The situation in Slovakia is significantly better than in the Czech lands, and in Eastern Slovakia it is better than in Western Slovakia.

7. Cde. Majer is very much interested in the reasons for and results of the meeting that took place in Moscow among the leaders of the CPSU, the MSzMP, the PZPR, the SED, and the Communist Party of Bulgaria.¹⁰⁵ We got the impression that this was one of the tasks he had been assigned in asking for this meeting. It is possible that the first secretary of the East Slovakia regional committee of the Slovak Communist Party, Cde. Koscelanský, was the one who gave him this assignment, though perhaps not at his own initiative.

8. On the situation in the army, Cde. Majer said only that it is unfortunate that almost the entire General Staff has been replaced.¹⁰⁶

9. Cde. Majer refrained from characterizing ethnic relations and the behavior of ethnic minorities (Hungarians, Ukrainians, Poles, Germans).¹⁰⁷ With regard to the Ukrainians, he said that in his region they number only 150 (though in reality the number is around 100,000).¹⁰⁸

10. He recounted a meeting he had with the head of the State Security directorate in the neighboring province of Poland, a colonel. The colonel had asked: "Where are you going, where are the Jews taking you?"¹⁰⁹

11. On the situation in the ČSSR State Security organs.

On 7-8 May a conference of the heads of regional Interior Ministry organizations and of the central apparatus took place in Prague. In a report to the conference, Minister Pavel did not give any sort of practical or basic guidelines of how to act in local branches.¹¹⁰ He does not take account of any sort of advice or opinions from the locales. He is occupying his post temporarily, as he himself said, giving himself only a year or two to serve in the post of minister. Cde. Majer speaks about him with irony and says that he will act not in accordance with what Pavel says, but in accordance with the orders of the former minister, since these orders have not been rescinded by anyone and are not in contradiction with the policy of the KSC. However, Pavel spoke (as Cde. Majer suggests, with the aim of demagoguery) in his report about indestructible friendship with the Soviet Union. These words

were met with stormy applause from the participants, and, as Cde. Majer observed, this reaction in the hall evoked displeasure from the minister, who concealed his sentiments only with great difficulty.¹¹¹

When the general part of the conference was over, the minister left. The leaders of the regional directorates managed to get him to come to their separate conference. They asked him sharp questions, including for example: "Not a single reasonable state, neither in the past nor at present, has refused to use such instruments as agent networks and operational equipment to defend its internal security. Why does the ČSSR intend to refuse these things, as minister Pavel himself said in an interview with journalists?" Having been deprived of the opportunity to give an evasive answer, he was forced to say that all these things can be used, but not against honest people.

Yesterday or the day before, Pavel appeared on television. His comments there were much better than the interview he gave to journalists on the eve of the conference and the speech he gave at the conference. This had a positive influence on the mood of State Security officials, who surmised that they had prompted these latest comments from Pavel.

The personnel of the country's State Security organs are top-notch. Without exception, they all firmly support socialist positions and friendship with the Soviet Union.¹¹² They, as Cde. Majer says, are unable to conceive of any other route.

12. It was noticeable that Cde. Majer was unusually optimistic and sought to "reassure" us. He affirmed that they are in a position to control everything and restore order. We get the impression that he subtly, through hints, tried to give us the idea that this assessment of events should be provided to our superiors.

13. Cde. Majer reported that the ČSSR deputy interior minister, Cde. Záruba, would like to award a medal of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society to Colonel Cde. Trojak.¹¹³ He subtly gave the hint that if such a meeting were held, Cde. Záruba possibly would recount something that would be of interest to us.

At the end of the meeting, Cde. Majer invited my wife, my children, and me to come to his house on 18-19 May.

HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB
UNDER THE UkrSSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
IN TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

A. ZHABCHENKO

14 May 1968
Uzhhorod
No. 3273

DOCUMENT No. 8

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 70-73, original in Russian.]

SECRET

Sole Copy

REPORT

on a Meeting with Czechoslovak Friends

On 13 May 1968 at the “Bohemia” border-control checkpoint, a meeting was held with Czechoslovak friends. Taking part from their side were the head of the State Security division at the Čierna station, Captain A. Široký, his deputy, Senior Lieutenant J. Katan, and the operations official in that same department, Senior Lieutenant J. Černický.¹¹⁴

Taking part on behalf of the UkrKGB of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers were Lieutenant-Colonel Oleinik and Lieutenant-Colonel Demochko from the Transcarpathian Oblast.¹¹⁵

The meeting took place at the initiative of the Czechoslovak friends and was intended as an exchange of views and an opportunity for the Czechoslovak friends to report on the situation in their country.

The friends declared that, above all, the situation in the country remains tense, especially in Prague, Bratislava, and other cities in the Czech lands. However, no one is taking radical measures to restore order.

As in the past, no one is in control of the press, radio, and television, which are waging a slanderous campaign against the party, against the State Security organs, and in some cases against the Soviet Union.

The ČSSR Interior Ministry, including the *Státní bezpečnost* (State Security) of Czechoslovakia, are not addressing issues required for a struggle against anti-socialist elements and their activities. Agent work on these matters is not being carried out at all.

Recently, according to the friends, State Security formations have been sponsoring conferences and meetings where the situation in the country has been discussed and a free exchange of views on the matter has been taking place.

In this regard, the friends held their own party meeting on 12 May. Their party organization consists of Communists from the State Security division at Čierna station and from border guards at the Čierna border-control checkpoint.

The friends affirmed that there is no unity in their ranks. Many Communists (especially the border guards) do not embrace correct, Marxist positions on questions pertaining to democracy and the internal and external policies of socialist Czechoslovakia.¹¹⁶

A significant part of the discussion at this meeting was devoted to criticism of party organs for their failure to defend

the State Security organs against the slanderers and hooligan elements.

To this end, some of the Communists in the party organization staged protests by refusing to pay their party dues for the month of May. One of the operational agents in this division, Captain Poustranský, who formerly had worked as a supervisor and who had been subject to slander and threats stemming from the actions of the organs during the 1950s, fell seriously ill as a result and, taking account of his family circumstances, expressed thoughts about committing suicide.¹¹⁷

After the party meeting, Cde. Široký reported, the friends decided at their own risk to renew work with agents.

The same sort of party conference took place in Prague, at the Ministry, where the Chairman of the National Assembly, Smrkovský, took part and spoke. In his remarks, as the friends could see, he gave what was supposed to be an objective assessment of the emerging situation in the country and called for a struggle against anti-socialist elements.¹¹⁸ However, everything he said remained just empty words. The categorical prohibition on the organs’ work in internal matters is still in force.¹¹⁹

Recounting articles published in “Rudé právo” that criticized the situation in the ČSSR and the leaders and press organs of other socialist states—Poland, Hungary, the GDR, and the Soviet Union—the friends at the same time expressed bewilderment and anxiety about the failure of ČSSR leaders to take part in the 8 May meeting in Moscow among delegations from the socialist countries.¹²⁰

The press in the ČSSR published an article reportedly entitled “. . . for the first time without the ČSSR . . .”¹²¹

In this connection, the friends reported that from operational sources and – even more – from the press they had learned that almost all the socialist countries disapproved of the situation in the ČSSR and the steps taken by the leaders of Czechoslovakia. However, the leaders had still done nothing to restore order in the country.

The GDR, the friends declared, supposedly expressed open dismay at the presence in the government of Smrkovský, as a former agent of the Gestapo.¹²²

With regard to the positions of the working class and peasantry, the friends again emphasized that these sorts of workers stand solidly behind the positions of the KSČ CC headed by A. Dubček. However, because of weak Marxist-Leninist preparation, they are not participating at all in the democratization process. As the friends put it, workers and peasants are unable to discuss philosophical matters with writers and other representatives of the so-called creative intelligentsia.

The friends expressed disquiet at L. Svoboda’s decision to release a new large party of amnestied individuals from prison to mark Victory Day.¹²³

Their activities are not yet firmly set, but in these circumstances this category of people might be exploited by elements hostile to the ČSSR.

The friends confirmed the information we received about the dissemination of leaflets calling for the removal of A.

Dubček and L. Svododa from their posts and the restoration of a government under Novotný.¹²⁴ However, they said that this took place only in Moravia and Bohemia. There were no such incidents on the territory of Slovakia.

They also confirmed our information about the indecisiveness of the party organs in bringing the so-called People's Militia up to a combat ready state.¹²⁵ In Čierna, there are no weapons ready for them to use. Worse still, the friends said, some people (though they didn't specify who) are speaking about the need to abolish this armed detachment of the party.

Referring to public statements, the friends mentioned a case a week or so earlier when a rebellion broke out among prisoners in one of the camps in the Czech lands.¹²⁶ A discussion focusing on democratization ended when the prisoners ravaged the premises—the living quarters and official areas—and tried physically to destroy the guards and administration. Order was not restored until troops from the Interior Ministry intervened.

As a result of this incident, the first during the tenure of Pavel as Interior Minister, he issued a directive on events in the camp. However, his directive did not specify any sort of concrete measures to prevent similar incidents in other camps. Even so, it was widely publicized in the press.¹²⁷

At the end of the discussion, the friends asked us whether reports in the Western press and radio were accurate about a concentration of Soviet tank forces along the border with the ČSSR for an invasion of Czechoslovakia and about a partial mobilization in the USSR to flesh out these units.¹²⁸

When told that all of this was merely connected with exercises that were under way, the friends noted that if our troops were actually deployed along the state border with the ČSSR, they would be reassured and, possibly, could act more quickly to restore order in the ČSSR.

The friends also noted that the Czechoslovak people are certain that if a threat to socialism in their country were ever to arise, the Soviet people and their army would provide them with necessary military assistance.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
UkrKGB UNDER THE UkrSSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

FOR TRANSCARP. OBL.
AT THE STA. AND CITY OF CHOP

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

DEMOCHKO

14 May 1968
No. 3231

DOCUMENT No. 9

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 81-85,
original in Russian.]

CPSUCC

Having just been in Transcarpathian Oblast, I believe I should inform the CPSU CC about the following: On 10-11 May of this year, in connection with the 23rd anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from fascist occupiers, the First Secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian Oblast committee, Cde. Il'nyts'kyi, and the chairman of the oblast executive committee, Cde. Rusyn,¹²⁹ visited the ČSSR at the invitation of the KSČ's East Slovakia regional committee and the Regional National Council.

The first secretary of the PZPR's Rzeszow province party committee, Cde. Kruczek, the chairman of the province executive committee, Cde. Duda, the first secretary of the MSzMP's Borsod province committee, Cde. Bodnár, and the chairman of the provincial council, Cde. Papp, were in the city of Košice, in the center of the region.¹³⁰

During the meeting, the first secretary of the East Slovakia regional party committee, Cde. Koscelanský, the chairman of the regional National Assembly, Cde. Gabriška, a secretary of the territorial party, Cde. Boboňko, the deputy chairmen of the National Assembly, Cdes. Ondrušek and Kubašovský, and two other senior officials from the KSČ regional committee and National Assembly, Cdes. Novický and Oleár, took part in the discussions for the Czechoslovak side.¹³¹

The Czechoslovak comrades sought to emphasize that at the invitation of the Soviet, Polish, and Hungarian friends to mark the anniversary, they wanted to express their solidarity with the socialist countries while at the same time doing everything possible to convince their guests that the events in Czechoslovakia will lead to good results. In their presentations, Cdes. Il'nyts'kyi, Kruczek, and Bodnár, when mentioning how favorably disposed the Soviet, Polish, and Hungarian peoples are to Czechoslovakia, expressed alarm at the processes under way in the KSČ and the country.

Judging from the conversation, the Czechoslovak comrades believe that the speeches by anti-socialist elements at the 1st of May festivities are perfectly normal and are a reflection of the success of "democratization." Cde. Koscelanský, in particular, emphasized this point. He also stated that sentiment is growing in the KSČ CC to ensure that a new constitution will not contain a provision enshrining the role of the Communist Party as the leading and guiding force in society. This is being done, the argument goes, to prove that the party can and must achieve its leading position not through administrative means, but through positive action. When our comrades and the Polish and Hungarian comrades expressed doubt about the appropriateness of this decision and argued that without the party's leading role it would be impossible to build socialism, Koscelanský declared that they [the KSČ and the Czechoslovak govern-

ment] are justified in carrying out experiments.

In response to this, he was informed that experiments should be conducted in a kitchen laboratory, not in a country, particularly on such an important matter that affects all Communists and the whole socialist camp. With regard to the organs of propaganda, Koscelanský declared that the party is deliberately not interfering in the press, radio, and television, since those media "helped the CC replace the 'conservative' cadres. When the time comes, we will restore order [in the mass media]." ¹³²

Cde. Koscelanský declared that they have 15,000 armed People's Militia forces in the region, which, together with the Prešov tank division, act only on his own orders, not the orders of the KSČ CC. At the same time, he expressed worry that violations of the law were occurring in the country, including instances when the peasants seized land and are preparing to gather the fall harvest solely for themselves.

After Cde. Koscelanský left for a conference in Prague of the secretaries of party committees, Cdes. Gabriška, Boboňko, and Ondrušek began to speak more openly about the danger posed by events in the country and about the need to adopt decisive measures vis-à-vis the propaganda organs; but they are afraid to carry these out.

Cde. Boboňko, a secretary of the regional party committee, said that cadres are being destroyed in the country. All it takes is for someone to say something bad about a senior official, and that official is promptly removed from his post. The party committees do not offer protection for such comrades. A bit later he said that in their region the peasants are illicitly putting up crosses in the schools (in almost every school), as was the case during the bourgeois republic. And no one is speaking out against the stepped-up activity of the Catholic church. ¹³³ The teachers are forcing the children of dismissed comrades to sit at separate desks and are mocking them. In the country, more than 7,000 senior party officials have already been dismissed and have been given no new work. Just a day or two ago, a group of young hooligans ransacked the apartment of the chairman of the Prague municipal executive committee, Cde. Černý. ¹³⁴

Referring to several senior officials, Cde. Boboňko said: "Smrkovský is Imre Nagy No. 2," who at the state's expense has installed 400 people in the newspapers, radio, and television to shape public opinion in a direction favorable to him. ¹³⁵ As far as Čisař is concerned, he's a complete swine, and the same is true of the new minister of internal affairs. ¹³⁶

During the conversations, we sensed that Cde. Koscelanský is well informed about the line of the KSČ CC, in particular about Cde. Dubček's line. He told our comrades that Cde. Dubček himself is already aware that things have gone very far. However, he [Dubček – trans.] is waiting for statements from below demanding that decisive measures be taken, and then, supposedly, he will take a firm stance. In a separate conversation with Cde. Il'nyts'kyi, Cde. Koscelanský said that Cde. Kruczek had stated, in a conversation with him, that the Poles are worried about the situation in Czechoslovakia and that, if it should prove necessary, they and the Hungarians will use their armies to help the Czecho-

slovak friends. ¹³⁷

It is worth noting that during the discussions, the Polish and Hungarian friends completely supported our comrades and displayed a unity of views. The Transcarpathian Oblast party committee is maintaining its ties with the KSČ's East Slovakian regional committee.

In private letters to friends, relatives, and acquaintances in Transcarpathian Oblast from Czechoslovakia, particularly from the Prešov region where nearly 200,000 Ukrainians live, the correspondents speak about the alarming situation in the Czechoslovak Republic and the persecution of Ukrainians, Hungarians, and Poles. ¹³⁸ In a letter to I. M. Chendei (a writer), ¹³⁹ one of his acquaintances, I. Prokipčak from Czechoslovakia, reports: "Our (i.e., the Ukrainian population's) situation is very difficult. We see that someone is sticking up for the Hungarian and Polish communities. Warsaw and Budapest from time to time speak out in defense of their compatriots. But no one is sticking up for us. As a result, nationalist pressure on us from a number of Slovak extremists is becoming all the more onerous and audacious."

On 13 May, at the request of the head of the interior ministry directorate in the East Slovakia region, Cde. Majer, a meeting took place with the head of the Transcarpathian directorate of the Ukrainian KGB, Cde. Zhabchenko. ¹⁴⁰ During the discussion, Cde. Majer spoke, at his own initiative, about the situation in the country and about the stepped-up activity of anti-socialist forces and demagogic and anarchic elements. He showed our comrades a leaflet, typeset in Czech.

The leaflet, invoking Marxist-Leninist principles, gives an evaluation of events in the country in a very impassioned style. It says that events in Czechoslovakia are nothing other than a struggle between socialism and capitalism, which raise the stark question: who will defeat whom? The leaflet calls on workers to stand up in defense of the KSČ and socialist gains, and to act decisively in putting an end to the anti-popular activities of the reactionary forces. Cde. Majer said that such leaflets were being distributed in large quantities in Prague. Our comrades got the impression that Cde. Majer suspects that the Soviet organs are in some way involved in the preparation and dissemination of these leaflets. ¹⁴¹

It is telling that, during the conversation, Majer was extremely interested in finding out the reasons for and results of the recent meeting in Moscow of the heads of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Bulgaria. These two matters obviously were the reason he requested to meet with our comrades. ¹⁴²

On that same day, a meeting took place at the "Chekhiya" industrial enterprise, again at the initiative of the Czechoslovak side. ¹⁴³ The head of the State Security division at the Čierna station, Captain Široký, his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Katan, and Senior Lieutenant Černický met with two high-ranking officials from the UkrKGB in Transcarpathian Oblast, Lieutenant-Colonels Cdes. Oleinik and Demochko.

This conversation focused on the question raised by the Czechoslovak comrades: whether reports in the Western press and on Western radio were correct about a concentra-

tion of Soviet tank forces along the border with Czechoslovakia and about a partial mobilization in the Soviet Union to bring these forces up to full strength.¹⁴⁴

In response to our explanation that a regular troop exercise was under way, the Czechoslovaks noted that if Soviet troops actually took up positions along Czechoslovakia's borders, they [the Czechoslovaks] would be calm and it would be possible to restore order in their republic more quickly. The friends stated that the Czechoslovak people are certain that if a threat to socialism arises in their country, the Soviet Union will provide all necessary military assistance to them.

It is essential to point out that in the western provinces [of Ukraine] and in Transcarpathia, where I had to be, the mood among people was very good. Everyone with whom I spoke fully supports the decisions of the April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and our readiness to provide all necessary assistance to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.

P. SHELEST

14 May 1968
Uzhhorod
No. 1/27



DOCUMENT No. 10

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 23, Ll. 1-3, original in Russian.]

CPSUCC

As a supplement to my memorandum from Transcarpathian Oblast on 14 May (No. 1/27),¹⁴⁵ I want to report: On 14 May, the first secretary of the KSČ's East Slovakian regional committee, Cde. Koscelanský, met at his initiative with two secretaries of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian Oblast committee, Cdes. Il'nyts'kyi and Belousov.¹⁴⁶

During this meeting, Cde. Koscelanský informed our comrades, at his initiative, about the conference of KSČ regional, municipal, and district secretaries that took place on 12-13 May in Prague.¹⁴⁷ During the debate at this conference, Cde. Koscelanský was the first to speak (attached is the text of his speech, which he provided to Cde. Il'nyts'kyi) and offered a proposal on behalf of the East Slovakian regional delegation calling on every member of the KSČ CC Presidium to express his opinion about whether the KSČ Action Program should be implemented. This proposal was adopted.

In his view, the most unsuccessful presentation was by the CC Presidium member Kriegel, who tried to convince everyone that no danger to socialism exists in the country.¹⁴⁸ The presentation by Smrkovský also displeased the partici-

pants, although it was somewhat better than the speeches that preceded it. Císař spoke more wisely. He said he had convened a meeting of the newspaper editors-in-chief in Prague and had given them clear-cut instructions on behalf of the KSČ CC Presidium. These instructions envisage the creation of collective organs of supervision over radio and television. Representatives from the government, trade unions, state bank, and National Front will serve on these organs.¹⁴⁹

Twenty-five of the people who spoke at the conference endorsed the speech by Cde. Koscelanský. Only two dissenting views were expressed, during the speeches by the secretaries of the KSČ Prague municipal committee and the KSČ Brno regional committee.¹⁵⁰

During the conversation, Cde. Koscelanský reported that Cde. Dubček is strongly supported by Comrade Biřak (whose speech at the conference was received warmly and enthusiastically) and Comrades Barbírek, Švestka, Vaculík, Kolder, Lenárt, Piller, Rigo, and Černík. Smrkovský, Kriegel, Špaček, Císař, and Slavík represent only a minority on the CC Presidium.¹⁵¹

In party circles it has become known, according to Cde. Koscelanský, that Smrkovský's speech at the conference was subjected to criticism within this minority group. The reason is that the small group is seeking to take over key posts in the party and government. In particular, Smrkovský is aiming to become president of the republic, Císař the KSČ First Secretary, and Šik the head of the government. This group is demanding that an extraordinary KSČ congress be convened promptly to change the composition of the CC. To forestall this, the East Slovakia regional delegation proposed that they select one Communist from each major party organization and have these representatives engage in discussions with certain CC members so that they will voluntarily relinquish their powers. These matters could then be resolved at the May plenum of the KSČ CC. But this proposal, as Cde. Koscelanský recognizes, has its drawbacks. The minority grouping will be able to achieve its aim of removing 40 members of the CC, a development that will paralyze the work of the CC and leave no option other than to convene a party congress. For this reason, he believes it is necessary to remove certain people from the CC. To give this position greater weight, he is proposing that they convene a Central Committee plenum of the Communist Party of Slovakia on the eve of the KSČ CC Plenum. At the Slovak CC plenum, appropriate decisions on this matter could be adopted, and the notion of convening an extraordinary party congress could be categorically rejected.¹⁵²

Cde. Koscelanský further reported that not only the old bourgeois and petit-bourgeois parties but also the Sudeten Germans are stepping up their activity in the Czech lands.¹⁵³ He stated that Germans who formerly lived in Czechoslovakia and are now in the FRG have bought up all the hotel rooms in Karlovy Vary and are preparing to hold a congress there.

Anti-socialist elements are also stepping up their activity in Slovakia. To curb this, the East Slovakia regional party

committee recently carried out a parade of armed People's Militia in the Rožňava district center. This parade was widely covered in the newspaper "Pravda"—the organ of the Slovak Communist Party CC—as well as in the local newspaper. This example will be emulated in other districts of the region.

The KSČ East Slovakia regional committee proposed to the Slovak Communist Party CC that at all meetings where a change of personnel would be approved, Communists and vanguard workers from all regions of Slovakia should take part, amounting to some 4,000-5,000 people. In this case, Cde. Koscelanský stated, Cdes. Biľak and Barbírek, who want to meet with me [Shelest – *Trans.*] here, will be able to travel to the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.¹⁵⁴ It is precisely with this in mind that he [Koscelanský – *Trans.*] requested today's meeting with Cde. Il'nyts'kyi.

At the end of the conversation, Cde. Koscelanský said that this meeting must be used as much as possible to strengthen friendship between the Czechoslovak and Soviet peoples. We have no certainty, he said, that the situation in the Czech lands will be fixed anytime soon. It might be necessary for the Slovaks, together with the fraternal Soviet peoples, to liberate the Czech lands once again.¹⁵⁵

On 14 May I visited the frontier posts and military units deployed near the Czechoslovak border.¹⁵⁶ I spoke with the soldiers and officers. The mood of all of them was good, ready for combat. Everywhere I went, the soldiers and officers requested me to let the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government know that they are ready to fulfill the orders of the Motherland and to carry out their internationalist duty to defend the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries.¹⁵⁷

P. SHELEST

15 May 1968
Uzhhorod
No. 1/28



DOCUMENT No. 11

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 65, L. 40, original in Russian.]

Secret, Copy No. 1

UkrSSR
COMMITTEE ON STATE SECURITY
under the Council of Ministers
of the Ukrainian SSR

17 May 1968

No. 10/2362

Kyiv

TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS DEPARTMENT OF
THE UKRAINIAN CP CC

Kyiv

In connection with the growing difficulty of operational conditions in the border oblasts of the UkrSSR (Volyns'k, L'viv, Transcarpathian, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivs'k)—difficulty caused by recent international events—and in connection with the increased ideological subversion carried out by the countries of the main adversary, the stepped-up activity of hostile anti-Soviet elements, the growing influx of foreigners from capitalist countries, the opening of new routes for tourists in automobiles, the greater travel by Soviet citizens abroad, and the significantly increased number of industrial and defense facilities that are deemed of special importance, it is necessary to strengthen counterintelligence work on all these matters.

However, at present there are acute shortages of operational and other cadres who can organize counterintelligence work in the UkrSSR KGB Directorates in Volyns'k, L'viv, Transcarpathian, Chernivtsi, and Ivano-Frankivs'k Oblasts. For this reason, we believe it is necessary to increase the staffing levels in the aforementioned KGB directorates by 208 people.

The Committee on State Security of Ukraine has sent appropriate recommendations to the all-union Committee on State Security with regard to this matter.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATE
SECURITY
UNDER THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
UKRAINIAN SSR

V. NIKITCHENKO



DOCUMENT No. 12

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 102-112, original in Russian.]

Top Secret

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

An analysis of materials coming in from various organs in the UkrSSR about the reaction of the republic's population to events in the ČSSR leads to the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of workers in the UkrSSR are reacting prop-

erly to events in that country, expressing full and unqualified approval of the internal and foreign policies of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

Interest in the abovementioned events has been particularly keen in the republic's oblasts that are contiguous with the ČSSR, where the population has the opportunity to hear and view Czechoslovak radio and television broadcasts and where various printed materials flow in directly from the ČSSR by mail and through channels of private visitors. These materials include publications that, in some issues, have featured defamatory and anti-Soviet materials.

Many residents of these oblasts in the republic express deep alarm about the future development of events in Czechoslovakia. . . .¹⁵⁸

Along with this, certain individuals are using the situation in Czechoslovakia to express openly hostile, anti-Soviet sentiments.

Negative commentary about the events is especially salient among nationalist, Zionist, religious, and other anti-Soviet elements.

Thus, a resident of Uzhhorod, S. V. Lendai, who is of Jewish nationality and works as a lawyer in the oblast collegium of lawyers, stated in a discussion:

“ . . . strikes have occurred at factories in the ČSSR and have lasted until the Communist directors were removed. One might think that here, too, the same thing will happen, since many Transcarpathian Communists support these movements in the ČSSR.”

A biology teacher at the V. Bychkovs'ka boarding school in Transcarpathian Oblast, I. N. Ivasyuk, who lived until 1958 in the ČSSR, said in one of the discussions:

“There, in the ČSSR, is a genuine democracy unlike what we have. We, too, need that kind of democracy.”

In the view of S. I. Bogysh, a bookkeeper at a drugstore in the Mizhhir'ya village of Transcarpathian Oblast:

“ . . . in Czechoslovakia they now want to establish the same type of regime that exists in Yugoslavia, that is, to distribute land to the peasants and disband the collective farms. In the USSR, they're also eliminating collective farms. Why should things have to remain along the lines that Stalin set up?”

In the view of a teacher at the Bilotserkivtsi middle school in the Rakhiv district of Transcarpathian Oblast, I. Yu. Vlad, who is of Romanian nationality, “there's not much time left before we settle accounts with those who are in power. . . .”

A certain I. I. Vovkulych, a resident of Onokivtsi village in the Uzhhorod district of Transcarpathian Oblast, even said in a village club: “Soon will come the time when they'll hang those stupid Russians.”¹⁵⁹

A student in the 3rd year of the Khust forestry technical school, M. I. Kurlyshchuk, after a Komsomol meeting where

he was not reelected by the Komsomol organization, said in the presence of an instructor and fellow students:

“Everything is done by coercion in our country. The CPSU long ago lost its authority among the people. The socialist countries increasingly are beginning to reject the CPSU's policy. This is being done by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Romania, and it is all because our government tries to impose its own policies on the other socialist states.¹⁶⁰ . . . In the near future the whole socialist system will fall apart, and I'll be happy to see it.”

Certain Zionist elements are commenting on the events in the ČSSR to promote their own aims. For example, someone named L. I. Shulman, who lives in Khust in Transcarpathian Oblast, declared:

“Czechoslovakia certainly will break away from the USSR, as Romania has already done. After that, Poland and Hungary will go down this same path. This will weaken the socialist system, and capitalism will become strong, all of which will benefit Israel. Once Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have broken away from the USSR, they will emulate Romania in establishing friendly relations with Israel.”¹⁶¹

Certain nationalist elements from the ethnic minorities living in Ukraine have expressed independent judgments. Two collective farmers from the Perekhrestya village in the Vynohradiv district of Transcarpathian Oblast, B. A. Komlosi and Yu. S. Szentmiklosi,¹⁶² the latter of whom is a candidate member of the CPSU, and certain other collective farmers of Hungarian background, have expressed satisfaction that the national question has been placed on the agenda in the ČSSR. In their view, it would be worth raising the question of autonomy for Hungarians in the USSR as well.¹⁶³

There are even some who believe that the ČSSR government intends to incorporate the territory of Soviet Transcarpathia back into the Czechoslovak state.

For example, the head clerk at the Rakhiv regional consumer union in Transcarpathian Oblast, I. I. Bobel, declared:

“Czechoslovakia is struggling and demanding that the Soviet Union give back Transcarpathia, since this territory is an integral part of the ČSSR, and Czechoslovakia aspires to reclaim it.”

Rumors of a different sort, amounting to a provocation, are circulating among the population in the border oblasts to the effect that the president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, was supposedly murdered, that the borders between the FRG and Czechoslovakia and on the territory of the ČSSR are open, that Bundeswehr troops have entered ČSSR territory, and that American military formations are congregated on Czechoslovakia's western borders.¹⁶⁴

The redeployment of individual Soviet military units for

military exercises and the measures to call up a certain number of reservists into the army are being interpreted in this light.

During one of the discussions, an instructor at the L'viv music academy, Vasylenko, expressed his view that the Soviet government intends to send its troops into Czechoslovakia to prevent it from leaving the socialist camp: "Today the Iron Division," he said, "moved with its logistical support branches to Poland. The transfer of the division to Poland and the mobilization are connected with the events in Czechoslovakia."

During a discussion at the "Teplokontrol" factory between officials of the USSR Ministry of Defense—3rd Captain Studenkyn, Major Kapytun, and the shop superintendent of the factory, Gargas—the question came up about the mobilization of some of the factory workers for service in the Soviet Army. Believing this measure to be necessary under the circumstances, Studenkyn said:

"If the Czechs have forgotten who liberated them in 1945, they must be reminded of this through the introduction of our troops onto their territory."

Agreeing with this, Kapytun added:

"If we fail to send troops into Czechoslovakia, West Germany will try to send its own troops, and we will lose not only Czechoslovakia, but also our authority in the eyes of the working class. The problem in Czechoslovakia concerns not only the government with its highly obscure behavior, but also the Czech working class, whom we are not justified in leaving to the whims of fate."

During a conversation with a foreman at the L'viv cinematographic factory, I. Mukalov, about the situation in the ČSSR, a worker from the "Luch" firm in L'viv, E. Butenko, declared:

"Evidently, the citizens of that country have forgotten about the decisive role of the Soviet people in their liberation. We must be vigilant, and that is why a mobilization of reservists for the army is under way."

Supporting Butenko, Mukalov said:

"The FRG revanchists can exploit the tense situation in Czechoslovakia to carry out their predatory and revanchist aims. Hence, the call-up of reservists into the Soviet Army is a necessary measure."

The head of the physics education faculty at Uzhhorod University, S. A. Mykhailivych, saw things this way:

"The redeployment of troops and mobilization of reservist units show that the Soviet government has reached agreement with the ČSSR government and, at

the ČSSR government's request, has sent Soviet troops onto the territory of Czechoslovakia under the guise of carrying out military exercises.¹⁶⁵ This will be a very timely measure. It will eliminate any possible repetition of the events that took place in 1956 in Hungary.

"The presence of Soviet troops will sober up the frenzied representatives of anti-socialist circles who want to restore the old order in Czechoslovakia."

Analogous suggestions about the possibility of sending Soviet troops into the ČSSR, and the reasons for and necessity of such a step, were mentioned by many other people.

A metalworker at the Uzhhorod station, M. Pryatka, recounted his meeting with soldiers from one of the military formations that had arrived at the Syurte station.¹⁶⁶ He praised their combat elan and high spirits and, in particular, he said that after the meeting he no longer had any doubt that "no matter what happens, the USSR in the end will triumph."

On the other hand, certain citizens, despite having many patriotic sentiments, are following the events in a one-sided and non-objective manner, evidently because of anti-Soviet radio broadcasts and various wild ideas and rumors.

For example, two residents of Malye Rativtsi in the Uzhhorod district of Transcarpathian Oblast, S. Király and Z. Adam, expressed the view that "the Czechs want to take back Transcarpathia, which is why [Soviet] troops are being moved here. But let them only try, and they'll come up empty-handed." For their part, a group of women from Borzhava village in the Berehovo district of this same oblast, who gathered after their husbands were called to the local military post, loudly criticized "the disorders in the ČSSR and the inability of the [Czechoslovak] government to restore order in the country without the help of the USSR, which made it necessary to call back our husbands into the army at the very moment when the springtime work in the fields is at its height."

Some residents of the republic's oblasts adjacent to the ČSSR¹⁶⁷ are expressing concern about the arrival of new military units in their oblasts and the partial call-up of reservists, as reflected in the correspondence sent to people in other regions of the USSR. The scale of the events has clearly been overstated in many of the letters.

For example, a female student at Uzhhorod state university, Tokar, reported in a letter to her parents:

"Panic has spread here because many of our fellow students have been drafted into the army and sent off to Czechoslovakia. They're saying that the Czechs are demanding the return of Transcarpathia. The situation is unpleasant."

Another female student at this university, L. Borovyk, indicates in a letter to her parents in the city of Kam"yanets'-Podil's'kyi:

"Everything with me is normal if you don't take into

account the international situation in general and our relations with Czechoslovakia in particular. I'm not exaggerating by saying that the panic here is all-encompassing. The store shelves are bare, that is, there are no matches, salt, or sausages. Without exception, all of the male students from the 6th year, and even the vice dean, have been mobilized into the army."

One of the residents of Domanintsi village in the Uzhhorod district of Transcarpathian Oblast wrote a letter to her parents in which she notes, in particular:

"I don't know how things are with you, but here the situation is abysmal, with all the men conscripted into the army and equipment from other oblasts passing through here day and night."

Instances also have been recorded of individual servicemen who have divulged state secrets connected with the redeployment of Soviet troops.

For example, a member of the Border Guards, Frolov, reported to his parents in a letter from a border-control checkpoint in the city of Mostys'ka:¹⁶⁸

"Here once again our 'neighbors' are experiencing some turbulence. Upon receiving a signal yesterday, the Samaro-Ulyanovsk Iron Division, deployed in L'viv, was put on alert. From 3:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m., vehicles and tanks constantly passed through, and some went across the border."

Another serviceman wrote to his acquaintance in Kuibyshev:

"Our division received a signal and went on alert this evening, and by 4:00 a.m. we had already marched off and gone across the border. It is unclear precisely where we are heading."

The leakage of secret information from military units is attested by the fact that numerous civilians are well informed about the redeployment of military formations based in the republic. Thus, during a conversation, an instructor at the Uzhhorod music academy, V. I. Shramya, said:

"On 9 May I returned from L'viv. All the troops deployed in L'viv Oblast are in units filled out with reservists, and they have now gone through Poland to the ČSSR-FRG border.

"The troops that have arrived in Transcarpathia are deployed in Khmel'nyts'ka Oblast. They are currently on the highest combat alert."

A laboratory assistant at Uzhhorod university declared:

"The military units that have arrived in Uzhhorod were

earlier deployed in Khmel'nyts'ka Oblast, and now they will be sent to the ČSSR. The military units deployed in Drohobych have received orders to march to Kraków."

The gathering and analysis of information about the reaction of the population to events in the ČSSR are continuing.

P. SHELEST

21 May 1968
No. 1/36



DOCUMENT No. 13

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 65, Ll. 41-46, original in Russian.]

TO THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF UKRAINE

Comrade P. E. SHELEST

Per your instruction, enclosed is a report about border controls and the transport of politically harmful literature, travel by people, and the inspection of freight trains.

ATTACHMENT: 5 pages

CHIEF OF FORCES IN THE WESTERN BORDER
DISTRICT OF THE KGB UNDER THE USSR
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

IVANOV

CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF
FORCES IN THE WESTERN BORDER DISTRICT OF
THE KGB UNDER THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

KOZLOV

22 May 1968

REPORT

On Controls at the Border to Prevent the Transport of Ideologically Harmful Literature and to Regulate the Inflow of People, and on the Inspection of Freight Trains

1. The border-control checkpoints have seized ideologically harmful literature in the following quantities:

in 1964 - 1,500 items
in 1965 - 23,942 items
in 1966 - 28,910 items
in 1967 - 33,570 items
1st quarter of 1968 - 11,833 items

The border guards exercise political control only when passengers are inspected by the customs organs. But because customs officials conduct inspections of citizens crossing the border only in exceptional cases, it is impossible to confiscate ideologically harmful literature in the majority of cases.¹⁶⁹

...¹⁷⁰

2. As a result of meetings held in the first half of 1966 by delegations from the USSR KGB Border Guards with delegations from Poland, the ČSSR, Hungary, and Romania, agreement was reached on inspections at border-control checkpoints of freight trains crossing the state border. The agreements entered into force that same year. In accordance with these agreements, the inspection of trains is carried out only when the trains are leaving the territory—that is, Soviet border guards inspect only the trains that are leaving the territory of the USSR, not the freight on trains arriving in the Soviet Union.

In 1966 (from the time that the single-side inspection of freight trains took effect) and 1967, the Soviet border guards did not inspect more than 33,000 trains arriving on the territory of the Soviet Union.

This inspection regime for freight trains can be exploited by intelligence services of the adversary to send its agents and politically harmful literature into the territory of the USSR.

An agreement with the Romanian delegation on 8 June 1966 provided for the single-side inspection of freight trains passing through the Ungheni station. On 1 August 1967 the Main Directorate of the USSR KGB Border Guards proposed to hold a meeting with Romanian internal affairs ministry officials to clarify the single-side inspection of cargo trains and introduce this practice at all points along the Soviet-Romanian border.

In light of this development, the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Moldavia, the Committees on State Security of these republics, and the command of the border district jointly sent a telegram to the Main Directorate of the USSR KGB Border Guards, which read as follows:

“The experience of the border-control troops in the district shows that single-side inspections of cargo trains, introduced in 1966, do not permit reliable security of the state border.

“The existing system of inspection work at border-control checkpoints in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary does not exclude the possibility of unhindered passage for border violators. The Polish and Hungarian border guards are so short-handed that they carry out the single-side inspections only formally. The trains are inspected only superficially, and no inspection regime has been set up at the checkpoints. The trains are allowed to go to the border without accompanying observers. The Czechoslovak border guards do not inspect cargo trains at all because this task since 17 April has been left to the customs organs. During the time that single-side inspections have been carried out, there have been four violations of the border into the USSR by freight trains (3 cases at the ‘Chop’ district border checkpoint and 1 at the ‘Brest’ district border checkpoint), as established by periodic inspections.

“Of the 14,378 freight trains that passed through the ‘Brest,’ ‘Chop,’ and ‘Mostys’ka’ district checkpoints and the ‘Ungheni’ border checkpoint during the first six months of this year, only 3,375 were inspected, and the remaining 11,003 passed into Soviet territory without any inspection.¹⁷¹

“The current internal political situation and the foreign policy course adopted by the Romanian government do not permit conditions suitable for introducing single-side inspections and registration of vehicles at all checkpoints along the Soviet-Romanian border. Such an approach would enable the Romanian side to convey ideologically pernicious literature into the USSR, literature that is now published in mass editions in Romania.¹⁷²

“Taking account of the increased subversive activity by the intelligence services of the USA, the FRG, and England against the USSR—and also the sharply reduced level of security along the western borders of Hungary and the ČSSR, as well as the policy of Romania—the district command, the Central Committees of the Communist parties of Ukraine and Moldavia, and the Committees on State Security of these republics believe it would be premature and undesirable to introduce single-side inspections of vehicles at the borders with Romania, the ČSSR, Hungary, and Poland.”

This request from the district went unheeded. On 13 January 1968 the Main Directorate of the USSR KGB Border Guards proposed to move to a single-side inspection of cargo trains along the whole Soviet-Romanian border.

3. In 1967 alone, some 828,576 foreigners, including 92,585 from capitalist countries, entered the USSR through border-control checkpoints in the Western District.¹⁷³

Under the existing regimen, established on 29 April 1964 by Directive No. 0122 of the KGB under the USSR Council of Ministers, the registration and reporting of citizens of socialist countries passing through border-control checkpoints into the USSR on official business, and the registration and reporting of tourists on single-entry visas who arrive on the basis of invitations and telegrams or in transit, are not being carried out with the necessary oversight by the border guards, state security organs, and police. As a result, individuals in these categories who arrive in the USSR have the opportunity to move unhindered around the whole territory of our country and, in general, to remain in the Soviet Union as long as they wish.

CHIEF OF FORCES IN THE WESTERN BORDER DISTRICT OF THE KGB UNDER THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(IVANOV)

CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF FORCES IN THE WESTERN BORDER DISTRICT OF THE KGB UNDER THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(KOZLOV)

22 May 1968



DOCUMENT No. 14

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 65, Ll. 20-22, original in Russian.]

Top Secret

CPSU CC POLITBURO

Imperialist intelligence services and foreign anti-Soviet centers have recently been strengthening their ideological subversion and stepping up their efforts to smuggle politically harmful literature into the USSR across our republic's western border. By way of comparison: In 1964 the border-control checkpoints in the Western border district seized 1,500 books, pamphlets, and journals of an anti-Soviet, nationalist, and religious nature, whereas in 1966-67 and the first three months of 1968 they have seized 74,317 pieces of this literature as well as many religious objects.¹⁷⁴

Ideologically pernicious literature has been confiscated from foreigners who are coming into our country from the

capitalist states, especially from the USA, the FRG, and France. Such literature also has been confiscated from numerous citizens of the socialist countries as well as a significant number of Soviet citizens who have been traveling abroad. To smuggle in this anti-Soviet literature, they have been adopting a number of devious techniques, including the use of secret compartments in suitcases, handbags, and specially equipped vehicles.¹⁷⁵

The deterioration and enervation of the work of customs organs and border guards at control-points in recent years have made it possible to bring ideologically pernicious literature into the USSR and abroad with impunity. At present, for example, the inspection of freight trains occurs only on one side, and a system has been introduced that enables all passengers, including tourists, to ride across the border with only selective inspections carried out at the discretion of customs officials and border guard troops. In many instances, tourist trains and buses do not get inspected at all. These openings are being exploited by the intelligence services and propaganda centers of the adversary.

In recent years the movement of people and transport vehicles across the border has sharply increased. In the period from 1964 to 1967 alone, permission for people to cross the border in the Western border district increased by one-and-a-half times, and the stream of vehicles grew by more than 20 percent.¹⁷⁶ During that same period the number of officials at the border-control checkpoints was reduced because of organizational restructuring, which prevented them from carrying out their duties satisfactorily.

Because of the significant reduction in the number of officers who were assigned to border-control checkpoints, the duties of control officers were replaced by control-sergeants.¹⁷⁷ This development substantially lowered the quality of work at the border-control checkpoints. Moreover, with the transition to a two-year term of service and the lowering of the conscription age to 18, the sergeant-controllers now have even less opportunity to acquire the experience and skills required to carry out the functions of controllers.¹⁷⁸ For this reason, an urgent necessity has arisen at the border-control checkpoints to bring in border-controllers who know foreign languages.

It is also impossible to regard as acceptable the current situation in which the registration and reporting of citizens from socialist countries who pass through border-control checkpoints into the USSR on official business, and the registration and reporting of tourists on single-entry visas who are entering on the basis of invitations and telegrams or in transit, are not carried out with necessary oversight by the border guards, state security organs, and police. As a result, individuals in these categories who arrive in the USSR have the opportunity to move about the whole territory of our country without hindrance or, in general, to remain in the Soviet Union for as long as they wish. Without a doubt, this situation can be exploited by intelligence services of the adversary to infiltrate their agents into our territory.

The growing complications that recent international events have posed for the operational situation, and the grow-

ing efforts by imperialist intelligence services to exploit legal and illegal channels to infiltrate the USSR with the aim of conducting disruptive activity and carrying out ideological subversion, have also created difficulty for the KGB organs in the border oblasts as a result of the inadequate numbers of operational personnel and officers.¹⁷⁹

To improve border control, strengthen counterintelligence work, and prevent hostile elements and politically harmful literature from being sent into the USSR, the UkrCP Central Committee requests that the CPSU CC Politburo consider increasing the number of personnel at border-control checkpoints in the Western border district by 1,500 and the number of operational agents in KGB organs in the Volyns'k, Transcarpathian, Ivano-Frankivs'k, L'viv, and Chernivtsi oblasts by 200.

We also believe it would be worthwhile to instruct the Committee on State Security under the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Ministry of Public Order, and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade to review the existing procedures for inspections of people and vehicles at the border and to enforce stricter control over foreign citizens who arrive on the territory of the USSR.

SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

22 May 1968
No. 1/34



DOCUMENT No. 15

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 152-160, original in Russian.]

No. 5/3574
25 May 1968
Uzhhorod

Secret

Copy No. 1

TO THE CPSU CC POLITBURO MEMBER AND
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE UkrCPCC

To Comrade P. E. SHELEST
Kyiv

Per your instruction, we are reporting the population's reactions to events in the ČSSR, based on materials received by the UkrSSR KGB Directorate in Transcarpathian Oblast

from 14 to 24 May 1968.

Information flowing into the UkrSSR KGB Directorate in Transcarpathian Oblast from 14 to 24 May indicates that the overwhelming majority of the population in the oblast, as before, correctly understands events in the ČSSR and approves the corresponding measures adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government.

...¹⁸⁰

In characterizing reactions to events in the ČSSR, the next largest group consists of citizens who, despite being patriotically inclined, are improperly assessing the events and are drawing inappropriate conclusions from those events for a variety of reasons, including that they have been misled by Western radio broadcasts.

A workman at the Khust felt-stripping factory, B. M. Lukechko, who was born in 1922 and is a member of the CPSU, declared:

“Our Communist Party has many enemies. More people hate us than we even imagine. The events in Czechoslovakia are of interest to many people. I believe that the much-anticipated deployment of the Soviet Army into Czechoslovakia would be unfortunate. It would lead to no good, and after this even more people would hate us.”

A resident of Seredne village in the Uzhhorod region, N. E. Danats'ko, a non-Communist who was born in 1914 and is a physician in the district hospital, said in a conversation with other residents of the village, referring to rumors about the forthcoming dispatch of Soviet troops into the ČSSR:

“This would be difficult to imagine, considering that the Soviet government would not want to incur the wrath of other nations. The Soviet government would not take such a risk, since this might spark the flames of war in the heart of Europe.”

A resident of Pavshino village in the Mukachevo region, Maria Kizman, who was born in 1951 and is a 10th-grade student, writes in a letter to her brother who was called into military service in Zaporizhzhya:

“Many young men from our village have been taken into the army. They were in the Pidhorodna barracks for three days, and then moved off to the Czechoslovak border . . .

“It hasn't yet been the case that the lads were afraid to go into the army; you'd speak with them, and they'd say only one thing: ‘Yes, we still have some days left at home, and then we'll be off somewhere . . .,’” and they almost cry. All of them are this way. Now every day you go into the cafeteria, and they're walking around and drinking, and you can hear them all around the town. They'll regret leaving Pavshino.”

A group of collective farmers from the market-garden brigade of Storozhnytsya village in the Uzhhorod district, when discussing recent events, said:

“The citizens of Czechoslovakia—the Czechs and Slovaks—are hostile to one another and are unable to get along. That is why Soviet troops will be sent to Czechoslovakia.”

A resident of Khust, D. D. Szongot, a hairdresser of Hungarian nationality who was born in 1913 and is not a party member, said in a conversation with a customer:

“I served from 1937 to 1940 in the Czechoslovak army in Slovakia, and I know that the Slovaks have strong nationalist inclinations.¹⁸¹ I would even say that they are more strongly nationalist than the Ukrainian underground fighters here were. Now that Dubček has come to power, the Slovaks will be inciting nationalist enmity even more.”

A stoker at the Khust ceramic factory, Vasyľ Vasyľovych Ruda, who was born in 1924 and is not a party member, said in a conversation with his fellow workers:

“President Svoboda demanded that the Soviet Union return Transcarpathia to the ČSSR. Svoboda will carry out his designs and not yield on them because he fought together with the Transcarpathians against fascist Germany.”¹⁸²

In addition, information continues to flow in about tententious and patently hostile reactions both to events in the ČSSR and to the measures adopted by the CPSU CC and Soviet government:

A worker at the Irshava weaving plant, Yu. V. Vovkanych, who was born in 1935 and is not a party member, said:

“Everywhere people hate the Russians. In Poland they threw thousands of the best people into prison because of their hatred for Russians. Romania is against the Russians. The Czechs also have overturned the regime that subordinated itself to the Russians. The Soviet regime in Czechoslovakia will be eliminated with the help of America.”

A former Uniate priest, Andrii Bits’ko, who is 57 years old and is now an upholstery specialist at the Mukachevo furniture combine, said:

“The policy of the new ČSSR government is structured properly; they want to have a genuine democracy. Take any example you wish. In the USSR they prohibited the ringing of church bells because the noise would disturb the tranquility of the population and its leisure. Supersonic jets flying over the city create much more

noise than the bells ever did, and the population has complained about this; but no one has prohibited these flights, which are continuing as always. Now where’s the logic in that?”

“The people of the ČSSR have reached a point where the church can act and develop freely, unlike in the USSR. Political events in the ČSSR will develop in the same way that they did here under Khrushchev once Stalin was gone. All of those whom Stalin persecuted, Khrushchev set free.¹⁸³ Dubček is doing precisely the same with those whom Novotný persecuted.”

Mykhailo Mykhailivych Demes, the head of the sausage division at the Khust public cafeteria factory, who was born in 1923 and is not a party member, complained that he isn’t being permitted to show what he can do. He then said:

“These events don’t alarm me because Transcarpathia will again go over to Czechoslovakia, where the old system can be restored as it existed until 1939, and I’ll become a wealthy private entrepreneur. I’ll show them what I can do.”

A dentist and resident of Mukachevo, Jozef Ida-Mois, who is a Jew born in 1914 and is not a party member, said in a conversation:

“Events in the ČSSR expose the weakness of the socialist camp. The ČSSR, like Romania, will soon be able to carry out an independent policy, in particular with regard to the Jews and Israel.

“Jews are happy that the Czechs and Slovaks have an animus against the Russians, but the USSR is using all manner of pressure against the ČSSR, including economic pressure.”

A teacher at one of the schools in Mukachevo, Vasyľ Vasyľovych Kampo, who is 52 years old and is not a party member, said:

“The friendship between the USSR and the ČSSR hindered the development of Czechoslovakia, as it earlier did with Hungary. The only difference is that the Czechs are much wiser than the Hungarians were in 1956. The Czechs have taken power into their own hands without any bloodshed, and are acting very intelligently. They haven’t done all that much for now, but they’ll gradually be able to do more. Everything is being done to establish the same sort of regime that existed in Masaryk’s time.”

A senior merchandising specialist at the Vinohradiv housewares plant, Vasyľ Medved, who was born in 1926 and is not a party member, said:

“The Czechs are fine lads; they’ll soon leave the stupid Russians behind as they rebuild Czechoslovakia the way it was under Masaryk. They lived so well then; they essentially had everything to their heart’s content. If they call me into active duty in the army, I won’t return any more to Transcarpathia. I’ll run away to the West.”

A worker at the Tyachiv scrap metal loading facility, Mykhailo Vakarov, who is 38 years old and is not a party member, declared:

“If the Soviet Union undertakes any military operations against the ČSSR, Russia will be confronted not only by the other socialist countries, but by the whole nation of Ukraine.”

Information continues to flow in about the assessments of events in the ČSSR made by citizens of that country who are currently in Transcarpathian Oblast on private or official business, as well as about assessments made by citizens of the USSR who are returning from trips to Czechoslovakia.

For example, Juda Simkhovych Fogel, a sales worker in the city of Rakhiv who was born in 1918, told others after he returned from his parents’ house in the ČSSR:

“On 1 May one of the columns of demonstrators in Prague were carrying a placard with the inscription ‘Greetings to Israel.’ In cities of the ČSSR, including Prague and Bratislava, they’re selling postcards with the portrait of the former president of the bourgeois Czechoslovak Republic, Tomáš Masaryk, in many shops. Citizens there are speaking with hatred about Novotný, describing him as an illiterate. They’re all collecting and telling jokes about him. Whenever a street in the city is being torn up, they say that the repair crews are searching for Novotný’s diploma.¹⁸⁴ The Czechs affirm that they support friendship with the Soviet Union because Czechoslovakia receives bread, oil, ore, and other goods and raw materials from the USSR. They condemn the events of 1956 in Hungary and declare that fascists and counterrevolutionaries gained sway there, whereas they, being cultured people, will struggle for democracy through other means.”

A resident of Prague, Ivan Lendl, told one of his relatives from the Irshava district of Transcarpathian Oblast, who was recently visiting him and has now returned home, that in the wake of Novotný’s dismissal the authorities are releasing all the political prisoners from jail and are returning their property to them.

Workers at the factory where Lendl works have had discussions to the effect that because General Svoboda struggled for the liberation of Transcarpathia and is now president, the Czechs might demand the return of Transcarpathia from the USSR, and the Sudetenland will be

given back to the Germans.

By now, political parties have been created in the ČSSR: the Democratic, Socialist, and People’s Parties. These parties are growing very rapidly; many members of the Communist Party are leaving the KSČ and joining the new parties.

Later on, Lendl said that during staff meetings at their factory, the workers ask Communists who will return money and property to the former prisoners—the state or the Communists?¹⁸⁵ They are demanding that the Communists return their money, since they were accomplices of Novotný. As a result of this attitude toward Communists, many of them are refusing supervisory duties and are becoming rank-and-file workers.

According to Lendl, only the Communists are still loyal to the Soviet Union. He asserted that the same sort of events will soon begin in Poland.

A teacher from the Uzhhorod middle school No. 8, Emyliya Pavlovna Dobys, who was born in 1929 and is not a party member, was in Prague from 1 to 10 May on personal business. At a teachers’ collective she said that when she met with Czechoslovak citizens in Prague, they often voiced dissatisfaction with our country. According to her, you could hear statements like: “We and you are not on the same path”; “What did we learn from you over these past 20 years”; “We won’t permit you to dictate to us”; and “Trading with you is disadvantageous because the Americans sell the same things for only one-fifth the price.”

Dobys also says that many young people are wearing pins with Masaryk’s portrait, and that German is being spoken everywhere in Prague. The residents of Prague are well aware that troops have been deployed along their border in Transcarpathia.

Having returned from a private visit to the ČSSR, Mykhailo Stepanovych Magyar, a teacher born in 1935 who lives in Khust, said in a conversation with his brother:

“During my stay in the Sudetenland, I could see that almost all the prisoners have been let out of jail, and they are now publishing articles of a virulently anti-Soviet character in different newspapers and demanding friendship and cooperation with the FRG. They are busy recounting the torment, degradation, and insults that they supposedly experienced.”

Having returned on 8 May from the ČSSR, a collective farm worker in Bedevlya village in the Tyachiv district, Mariya Vasylovna Tyashko, who was born in 1937 and is not a party member, said:

“In conversations in the ČSSR they say that democratization is under way, and they no longer need friendship between the USSR and ČSSR. An artist from one of the drama theaters in Prague (whose name I don’t know) spoke in this vein, describing the Russians as unfriendly. Half the audience in the theater greeted this statement with applause.

“The Germans who were expelled from the Sudetenland express hope in letters to their relatives that their former names will be restored. The Czechs view citizens of the USSR with disdain and speak in their presence about the need to sever the friendship and seek new paths of democratization.”

Having returned from the ČSSR, a worker at the Uzhhorod shoe factory, L. I. Mykovych, who was born in 1915 and is not a party member, says that he was pained by the speech that the poet Jan Procházka gave at a press conference demanding that the KSC and the government fully relinquish any control over literature and the arts and that all remaining restrictions on publishing be eliminated.¹⁸⁶ Students and intellectuals, according to Mykovych, are actively taking part in these events. The young people are not working at all; they’re simply holding meetings.

Varvara Morytsivna Kallus, a resident of Uzhhorod, says:

“Affairs in Prague are very serious and dangerous. So-called ‘modern’ youth, under the sway of American propaganda, are out on the streets. Members of the KSC (friends of Kallus) are dismayed; they feel that the rug has been pulled out from under them, and they don’t understand where it all will lead.

“In Prague they’re talking about how Germans from the FRG are speaking about the forthcoming occupation of the Sudeten region, just as Israel seized the Arab territories, and then they’ll have to let the UN get involved in the matter.”

Petro Iosifivich Grimut, a CPSU member who was born in 1938 and works as a supervisor at the automobile factory in Mizhhir’ya, said:

“Being in the ČSSR on a visit to my uncle, Nikolaj Grimut, who is a pensioner, I heard such statements as: ‘We all hate the Communists of the Soviet Union and especially (and here he names one of the leaders of the CPSU).¹⁸⁷ Even Khrushchev did not permit such interference in the affairs of foreign countries as he is doing now, but our country will move along its own path of development, and we will get by without help from the Soviet Union.’”

Another citizen of the ČSSR, Georgi Klevec, who was born in 1919 and is a native of Repinne village in the Mizhhir’ya district, spoke with great malevolence about the Soviet Union and [Soviet] Communists.

Nikolaj Grimut and Georgi Klevec intend to travel to Transcarpathia this year on personal business.

L. F. Bolyubakh, a foreman at the Mizhhir’ya autopark and CPSU member who was born in 1919 and who recently traveled to the ČSSR as a tourist, reports that one of the ČSSR citizens in Prague told Soviet tourists the following:

“You come here simply to buy things. You in the Soviet

Union do not have, and never had, any sort of truth and justice. You just live a big lie.”

In addition, Bolyubakh says that a huge number of Germans, predominantly young people, are currently in the ČSSR.

Gabriel Putraš, who is living in Prague and is obviously a clergyman, writes in a letter to the secretary of the Mukachevo diocese, Mykola Logoida:

“To our great regret, we on this occasion can in no way give a happy account of the life of our church. In Eastern Slovakia the Uniates have risen again, which has inflamed passions, as manifested by egoism, crude invective, and hatred toward everything that comes from the East, even toward things that are objectively good. . . . If the government completely rescinds the decision made in the 1950s to disband the Uniates in our country and does not return things to where they were on 1.1.1968 as we propose, the Uniates will be fully reestablished in all the parishes where they operated earlier.”

The priest Ivan Puškaš, who arrived in Uzhhorod from Eastern Slovakia (in the ČSSR), said in a conversation with the Uzhhorod priest Dmytrii Shoka:

“The Greek-Catholic episcopate is already active and is taking priests and parishes into the Uniate church.”

I. Ščada, a resident of Brno, writes to his relatives in Mukachevo:

“A situation has arisen here that is turning into a revolution. Everything is returning to the past, and very little of socialism remains. They’re rehabilitating all elements supportive of Masaryk.”

A serviceman in the Czechoslovak army, Štefán Vasilevič Popjuk, born in 1915 and a native of the Rakhiv district in Transcarpathian Oblast, traveled to his relatives on personal business, and during the registration at the district police department after his arrival on 11 May, he said:

“A. Novotný, being CC first secretary and president, accumulated all power in his own hands and sent to prison military servicemen who fought in the corps under General Svoboda. He ordered certain others to be shot. Svoboda himself was demoted. The people of Czechoslovakia demanded that Novotný appear on television to speak about his mistakes, but he refused, so they dismissed him and we went for three months without a president.”¹⁸⁸

Characterizing the situation in the ČSSR at present, Popjuk said that four political parties already exist there, and another two will soon be set up. All of them will function in accordance with the principle of equality and on the basis of

the Communist Party program. The restoration of capitalism in Czechoslovakia will not take place, since the old aristocracy under Masaryk and Beneš no longer exists, and even the Germans living in the ČSSR do not support the idea of returning to the former bourgeois Czechoslovakia.

Popjuk emphasized that he knows a great deal about the crimes of Novotný, since he worked until 1962 in the ČSSR state security organs. During the conversation, he also noted that military exercises involving the ČSSR, the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania will be held on ČSSR territory.¹⁸⁹

As Popjuk asserted, at present you can travel freely from the ČSSR to the FRG so long as you do it in civilian clothes, because German intelligence has its sights set on military personnel.

A citizen of the ČSSR, Lysý, who is a teacher and lives in Medzilaborce (in Eastern Slovakia),¹⁹⁰ was recently in Mukachevo and said in a conversation with one of her relatives:

“A struggle is under way in the ČSSR for democratization, with three aims in mind: the return of land plots to the peasants, the legalization of private enterprise, and the legalization of private crafts. The driving force behind these events comes from young people and students, who are demanding a return to the order that existed under Masaryk and Beneš.”

When Irina Slezan recently arrived in Uzhhorod from Košice, where she lives, she said:

“During the initial days of the ‘movement for renewal’ in the city of Banská Bystrica (in Western Slovakia), acolytes of Hlinka (the former premier of ‘independent’ Slovakia) went out onto the streets yelling fascist slogans and songs, but they were promptly called to order.”¹⁹¹

Information about this matter continues to flow in. Materials warranting higher-level attention will be reported to the UkrCP Transcarpathian Oblast committee and the KGB of the UkrSSR.

CHIEF OF DIRECTORATE OF THE KGB
UNDER THE UkrSSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
IN TRANSCARPATHIAN OBLAST

A. ZHABCHENKO

DOCUMENT No. 16

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 128-134, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

In connection with preparations for the Days of UkrSSR Culture in the ČSSR in May, a group of journalists from the Ukrainian SSR visited Czechoslovakia. They stopped in Prague, Bratislava, Brno, Ostrava, Hradec Králové, Banská Bystrica, and Košice, where they met and spoke with party activists, members of the press, television and radio employees, and the creative intelligentsia. The content of these discussions sheds light on the current situation, which is the backdrop for events now under way in Czechoslovakia.

Some of the Czechoslovak comrades, when characterizing the general situation in the country, told our journalists that “Czechoslovakia today is reminiscent of a furiously speeding stagecoach whose horses are pulling it from whatever side they please. The tragedy of the situation is that the stagecoach does not have a driver. That’s why no one knows where it will end up.”¹⁹² It was also said that “democratization” now is reminiscent of an uncontrollable rock avalanche that no one is able or brave enough to stop.

During a trip around the country, our journalists were repeatedly confronted by evidence that the KSČ is occupying a passive, wait-and-see position, and that members of the party often are not even putting up a fight before conceding the political battlefield to people who not only are estranged from socialism, but are even outright enemies. The reason for this, in their view, is the cult of Novotný, the disregard for principles of intra-party democracy, and the unjustified repression of many honorable people. Some of them cited a figure of 40,000 people who had been repressed, and others gave higher figures.¹⁹³ All these actions of the party were supposedly justified by the intensification of the class struggle under socialism.¹⁹⁴

Among the reasons for the KSČ’s loss of authority, they also mentioned that Novotný had blindly copied the experience of Communist construction in the USSR, based on simplistic and often subjective information about life in the USSR as a model for other socialist countries. The population had reacted very passionately to the many statements and press reports claiming that Soviet advisers working in Czechoslovakia deserved the greatest share of blame for the mistakes committed by Novotný and for the “deformation of society.”

These propagandistic notions confirm that criticism of Novotný in many instances is bound up with criticism of the socialist system in general, and especially with criticism of the Soviet Union.

As the evidence shows, the main discussions are being held on the question of the reestablishment of Masaryk’s bourgeois republic. In Prague, a Masaryk club has been set up, consisting of well-known writers, journalists, actors, and

scholars. On the streets, a brisk trade is under way in portraits of Masaryk. Everywhere they are organizing all kinds of photograph exhibitions and displays devoted to Masaryk. His philosophical works are being given great publicity. One of the popular slogans used by the columns of marchers in the 1st of May demonstration in Prague was the appeal "Study, study, study . . . only writings by Masaryk!" Residents of Brno carried posters with the inscription, "Lenin to the Russians, Masaryk to the Czechs!" Many of the Czech comrades with whom our journalists spoke emphasized that during Masaryk's time Czechoslovakia was a leading European power both economically and politically, whereas now it trails far behind.

It is often the case that this campaign to idealize Masaryk and to restore the arrangements that prevailed during the bourgeois republic is being supported and publicized by the KSČ. At a press conference for the UkrSSR journalists, a member of the KSČ CC, Jan Němec, stated: "We are publishing the works of Masaryk. But we are not afraid of a slide toward bourgeois democracy. Our press will help explore the works of Masaryk. The main thing in the process of democratization that is now under way is to unite Marxism-Leninism with democratic traditions so that we can create our own model of social development."

Throughout the country, particularly in the Czech lands, various new parties and committees are being set up with programs that have not yet been widely published. The most popular among them is the "K-231" union, the aim of which, according to the Czech comrades, is to restore the good names of those who "were destroyed or repressed by the agents of Beria" who supposedly were working in the State Security organs of Czechoslovakia. This union consists of some 70,000 to 130,000 people.¹⁹⁵ Its activities are supported by the KSČ. "If we were to act in any other way," J. Němec told our journalists, "we would not be worthy of our nation." In many discussions the subject came up of the "Union of Politically Active Non-Communists," the club of participants in the 1st and 2nd resistance, and others. They reported to our journalists that the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, of which Beneš was a member, has grown since December 1967 from 30,000 members to 40,000.¹⁹⁶ The number of members in the People's Party also has increased, and the same is true of the Slovak Renewal and Freedom Parties.¹⁹⁷ Rumors are circulating that all these parties will put forth their own candidates separately in the upcoming elections. "If the elections were held today," a secretary of the KSČ regional committee in Banská Bystrica, Cde. Urbanovič,¹⁹⁸ said in a conversation with our journalists, "there is a danger that the KSČ would suffer a crushing defeat, since it has lost all its authority."

According to the observations of our journalists, young people in Czechoslovakia are the furthest of all from socialism and from the Soviet Union. People of age 30 or younger make up only 5-6 percent of the members of the Society for Friendship with the USSR. The Czechoslovak Youth Union has ceased to function for all practical purposes.¹⁹⁹ In its place organizational committees have been set up to form separate unions of working-class, rural, and university youth.

In addition, the former bourgeois youth organizations—the Falcon sports association, the Boy Scouts, the Cub Scouts, and others—have been resurrected.²⁰⁰ On the first of May in Brno, separate detachments of these organizations marched through, demonstrating cadences from the bourgeois period of Masaryk's republic.

Young people are not volunteering to join the party, and the KSČ is therefore growing physically older in its complexion. According to a senior official in the KSČ's Eastern Bohemian regional committee, F. Kruml, 65,000 of the 160,000 party members in the region are over 50 years old, and nearly 50,000 are over 60, whereas only 8,000-10,000 are 30 or younger.

According to the Czechoslovak comrades, patently anti-socialist and anti-Soviet sentiments grew especially rapidly in April and May. Weekly broadcasts covering the Soviet Union disappeared from programs on Czechoslovak radio and television. In Prague, study groups and courses to learn the Russian language have been discontinued. In Brno, during the holiday marking the 23rd anniversary of the liberation of the city by the Soviet Army from the fascists, Soviet flags were torn down, and some groups of demonstrators carried placards reading "Even Further from Moscow!" In Prague, on the sides of houses and on park fences one finds graffiti saying "Down with Communism!" and "With Císař to freedom!" and "Democracy + Císař = Freedom."

Our journalists witnessed an attempt to disrupt the celebration of Victory Day in Prague in J. Fučík Park. During speeches by Comrade Svoboda and Konev and a triumphal concert, they shut off the microphones dozens of times.²⁰¹ This occurred in the presence of leaders of the ČSSR, Cdes. Dubček, Svoboda, Smrkovský, Černík, and Císař. It is worth noting that before the meeting started, the leaders of the ČSSR who attended the ceremony were busy hugging and kissing representatives of the recently revived petit-bourgeois club known as "Barracks." In that same park a concert took place that featured parodies of Soviet songs, with Soviet soldiers played by grotesque and dim-witted people and drunks.

Our journalists also were dismayed by what they found during a visit to the Prague museum of V. I. Lenin. In the exhibits there they saw many portraits family photographs, official photographs, documents, and written materials of Zinoviev, Rykov, Trotsky, Radek, Stolypin, Milyukov, Guchkov, Rasputin, Tsar Nicholas II, Hitler, Mussolini, and Mao Zedong.²⁰² As it turned out, this "modernization" of the museum was carried out during the process of "democratization."

Such items underscore what the results of "unlimited democracy" are. Our comrades said that many honest Communists and friends of the Soviet Union are receiving anonymous letters with threats of physical attacks. There have been instances when the children of "dogmatists" and of Novotný's supporters were forced out of the schools. In Prague alone, according to local data, nearly 20 party officials have committed suicide.²⁰³

Obviously, discipline and order in the Czechoslovak People's Army have gravely declined.²⁰⁴ Many soldiers are

wandering the streets. In conversations, some officers spoke openly against the Soviet Union. Officers and party officials confirm that the People's Army is now highly unpopular, and that young people do not want to serve in it.

From various sources, our comrades learned that roughly 40,000 Germans who fled to the FRG and Austria during the events of 1948 have now returned to Czechoslovakia.²⁰⁵

In conversations with the journalists, many Czech comrades expressed alarm at the emerging situation in Czechoslovakia. Doctor Erban, an old Communist and the chief editor for the press of the ČSSR Academy of Sciences, declared: "Our greatest problem now is that there is no unity in the government. If this continues a month longer, it will be too late to fix it. I must say that over the past 10-12 days, openly anti-Soviet sentiments have sharply increased. During three months of "democratization," we have regressed some 20 years. If the supporters of Masaryk win out, we will regress 50 years. But we are Communists and veterans of the party, and we will seek to halt these events. I think we must wage a resolute fight against the reactionaries and take steps to repeat what we did in February 1948."

The comrades from Slovakia also sought to emphasize the national element. Cde. Cvik,²⁰⁶ the secretary of the KSČ regional committee in Banská Bystrica, told our journalists: "The Czechs are disregarding a class-based approach and are ignoring the fact that Masaryk ordered the shooting of workers. He was a bourgeois leader, and Communists should not purvey his philosophy. We don't agree with the theories of Masaryk-Beneš-Novotný about a unified Czechoslovak nation.²⁰⁷ For us, the main thing is to resolve the matter of an equal federation of Czechs and Slovaks. We must build our own model of socialism, based on the Leninist precept that every nation puts something of its own into its model . . . We can assure you, comrades, that even when we change the methods of our work, we will not be departing from socialist positions by a single millimeter."

The editor of the regional newspaper "Východoslovenské Noviny," Cde. Šemorádik,²⁰⁸ said: "For us, the main thing is to have the same rights that the Czechs have. Why do we live four times worse off than the Czechs do? Why do we have two or three shifts in our schools, whereas the Czechs have just a single shift? In Slovakia they build factories that require hard physical labor, whereas in the Czech lands the work is easier and the pay is higher. For this reason we now say: Enough! We gave a spark to the process of democratization. If it turns out that this process does not resolve our grievances, we will place our machine-guns along the border with the Czech lands and unite our country with the Soviet Union.²⁰⁹ We will not relinquish to anyone the cause for which thousands of Soviet and Slovak soldiers died. Let everyone know—we are your friends to the very end."

A lot of statements, directed against the Soviet Union and the policy of the CPSU, lavished endless praise on the actions and services of Cde. Dubček. Teodor Fiš, the head of the editorial board for the "Political Literature" publishing house in Bratislava, said in a conversation: "I am dissatisfied

with the great power policy of Brezhnev. The policy of Khrushchev was better. Why are you interfering in our affairs? Why do you forbid us from obtaining a loan from the capitalist countries? Why are we unable to travel whenever we want to your country, the country of our friends, but are able to travel to the countries of our enemies—Austria and the FRG—whenever we wish? I believe that the KSČ has compromised itself by its own policy and its collusion with Beria's advisers. If the party breaks down completely, we will build socialism without it. Luigi Longo spoke to us about this possibility."²¹⁰

Adolf Hoffmeister, the secretary of the Artists' Union of Czechoslovakia and a close friend of Cde. Dubček, told our comrades that he regards Dubček as a national hero who reflects the sentiments and aspirations of the entire nation, and it is only now that artists have received genuine freedom.²¹¹

For informational purposes, the CC of the Ukrainian CP is transmitting these reports and observations of the group of journalists.

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE

P. SHELEST

30 May 1968

No. 1/38



DOCUMENT No. 17

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 166-167, original in Russian.]

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Recently the newspaper "Nove zhittya" and the journals "Duklya" and "Druzhno vpered," which are published in Ukrainian in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the Cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (KSUT), have begun to arrive regularly from the ČSSR for individual citizens and also for schools and museums in the Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast of the UkrSSR. As we reported earlier, these publications often feature materials that incorrectly depict the processes under way in the ČSSR and USSR, and are replete with attacks against well-known cultural figures in the UkrSSR, casting doubt on Ukraine's achievements during the years of Soviet power, and so forth.²¹²

During the period from March to May 1968, some 152 issues of the "Nove zhittya" newspaper, 10 issues of the "Duklya" journal, and 6 issues of the "Druzhno vpered" journal have been sent by the editors of these publications to

Ukrainians living in the ČSSR.

A large quantity of newspapers and journals have been sent to certain individuals for possible redistribution among Soviet citizens. Thus, a resident of the Kolomyi district of Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast, S. Smetanyuk, received 72 copies of the "Nove zhittya" newspaper, including 10 copies of the issues of the newspaper in which the full text of the "KSC Action Program" was published.²¹³ It is telling that this type of literature is often sent to people who in the past have displayed nationalist traits.

Certain citizens of the ČSSR are propagating anti-Soviet and nationalist views and are promoting so-called "democracy and liberalization" in personal correspondence.

The party organs of Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast are taking necessary steps to help workers understand events in the ČSSR and are implementing measures to prevent wider distribution of tendentious literature brought in from the ČSSR.

Reported for informational purposes.

SECRETARY OF UKRAINIAN CP
P. SHELEST

4 June 1968
No. 1/45



DOCUMENT No. 18

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 28, Ll. 180-189, original in Russian.]

Secret

UKRAINIAN CP CC

to Comrade P. E. SHELEST

On the Trip by a Delegation of Soviet Workers to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

As directed by the CPSU CC, a delegation of Soviet workers, consisting of 25 people altogether, was in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic from 25 to 29 May to exchange tokens of peace and friendship between the peoples of the ČSSR and the USSR in marking the 23rd anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupiers.

During their stay in the ČSSR, the delegation visited a number of cities and villages in Slovakia—Košice, Rožňava, Banská Bystrica, Rimavská Sobota, and the village of Švermovo—and also the Košice metallurgical combine, the Pešok machinebuilding factory, the Forestry Technical Insti-

tute in Zvolen, and other places.

At the invitation of the CC of the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), I went with six other members of the delegation (party officials) to Bratislava, where we had a discussion with secretaries of the KSS CC, officials of the party control committee, and the leaders of the Slovak National Assembly. On the evening of 28 May, I attended the official opening in Czechoslovakia of the Days of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR.²¹⁴

In general, the treatment of the Soviet delegation by Czechoslovak officials was exceptionally polite and courteous, though not always sincere.

As a rule, the leaders of local party organs, senior officials in the regime and in public organizations, and representatives from the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Union took part in all the ceremonies. During the whole time we were in Slovakia, not a single openly hostile remark was made about the Soviet delegation.

However, the behavior of most of the leaders of local party and other organizations reflected alarm, uncertainty, and trepidation about their own fate.

We got the impression that senior officials were trying to prevent members of the delegation from having broad interaction with workers, peasants, intellectuals, and rank-and-file Communists. They avoided open contacts and held candid discussions only among a narrow circle—during train or car rides, or at other convenient times when no one else was around. There were no mass meetings of the delegation with the public, aside from a meeting on the Soviet-Czechoslovak border in the village of Švermovo.

At our request, discussions were organized at the Pešok machinebuilding factory and the Košice metallurgical combine with instructors and a group of students from the Forestry Technical Institute in Zvolen. We had nearly a three-hour discussion with the members of the Presidium of the KSS Central Slovak regional committee (in Banská Bystrica), which took the form of an exchange of views about party and council work.

In all, the members of the delegation had roughly 20 collective discussions and many individual conversations with the Czechoslovak comrades and local population, which enabled them to form certain impressions of the situation in local party organizations and workers' collectives.

1. The discussions and personal observations indicate that the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia does not fully correspond with the optimistic assessment provided in reports from KSC leaders.

Many local comrades declared to us that in recent weeks the situation in the KSC and the ČSSR not only had failed to stabilize, but had become even worse and more tense. Developments in this respect are working to the benefit of the anti-socialist forces. The anti-socialist elements are becoming increasingly active, and the influence of the KSC is weakening. At the factories, according to the local comrades, the KSC's primary party organizations are being kept apart from the workers' collectives. At some of the enterprises, new trade union committees are being selected without Commu-

nist participants; unjustified changes in management are under way; unrealistic demands are being voiced for increases in pay; and discipline is sharply deteriorating. Workers at the factories are restless and are often expressing dissatisfaction, which in a number of cases is justified. Some of the workers at the Pešok machinebuilding factory declared: "Earlier they said to us that the working class is in charge of the country, but now only the intellectuals appear on television and radio. We ourselves have no such opportunity."

The KSČ's primary party organizations, district committees, and regional committees are effectively abstaining from any sort of mass-political work among the population.

Workers and the local party aktiv express varying opinions, and disagreements have emerged about the ongoing events. We could definitely sense that a deliberate attempt is under way to remove from the political arena not only A. Novotný, but also all of those who actively worked with him and supported him.

Under the influence of anti-Communist elements, the population and even many leading party officials openly express the view that the KSČ should not be a ruling, leading party and should instead be only a prominent force in society.²¹⁵ They also say that the KSČ should not interfere in the work of the government, public organizations, and so forth.

2. On the basis of information at our disposal, we believe that conditions in Slovakia are more auspicious, and that the Communist Party of Slovakia is in full control of the situation and is not yielding to the onslaught of anti-socialist forces.

Nevertheless, it is clear that even in Slovakia the political situation is complex and dangerous. Negative processes are spreading ever more widely, and anti-socialist, anti-party, and anti-Soviet developments are intensifying. A good deal is being said about the federalization of the country and about the improper treatment to which the Slovaks have been subjected by the central ČSSR organs.²¹⁶ Hostility toward the Czechs is rapidly increasing. In addition, the local comrades were speaking about the shared historical experiences of the Slovak, Russian, and Ukrainian peoples and the similarities of their cultures, languages, and other features. As in the Czech lands, the active resistance of anti-socialist elements in Slovakia has undermined the measures that the KSČ CC is trying to carry out to establish control over the mass media and propaganda organs.²¹⁷

Thus, under the influence of forces hostile to the KSČ, the Social Academy of Slovakia, the workers of Tesla Strašnice and the Plzeň turbine factory, and peasants from the J. Komenský mass cooperative adopted a resolution to continue the so-called "democratization process," with demands for freedom of the press and freedom of speech and a struggle against those who are seeking to obstruct these processes.

Communists and workers of the Košice metallurgical combine also adopted a resolution demanding that democratization and liberalization be continued. In a television broadcast in Bratislava on 28 May they said that a proposal is in the works to give land back to landowners in the mountain-

ous districts of the Carpathians.

Kulaks and other petit-bourgeois elements are engaged in a vigorous propaganda campaign against the KSČ's primary party organizations and against cooperatives. All sorts of wild stories are circulating about bad conditions in the public economy and its loss-making nature.²¹⁸ The party aktiv are being harassed and threatened with physical reprisals.

Despite the greatly increased activity of hostile elements, the CC of the Communist Party of Slovakia is not taking appropriate measures to rebuff them. There has been no increase at all in the activity of party members; quite the contrary. The work of many party committees is exceptionally poor. For example, the secretary of the KSS Central Slovakia regional committee, Cde. A. Ťažký, said, during a conversation between the Soviet delegation and members of the regional committee presidium, that after the January (1968) Plenum of the KSČ CC, the regional committee was left without secretaries and without an apparatus.²¹⁹ As a result, the oblast party organization was unable to carry out any sort of work. Not until very recently, after the selection of a new presidium, was it possible for work in the oblast committee to resume. However, the party organs even now are functioning poorly in the locales and are not giving instructions to the primary party organizations or relying on them.

At the Pešok machinebuilding factory, which has 2,800 workers and 560 KSČ members, organizational and ideological work has been neglected. For 7 years the factory included no one from the oblast party leaders, and after the January Plenum of the KSČ CC, there was no one even from the district leaders. No one came to speak at the factory, and no one explained the situation and the tasks ahead. No party slogans and exhortations can be heard at the factory. On the walls in the factory sections they have put up photographs of half-naked women, rather than agitational posters.

According to the acting director of the East Slovak metallurgical combine (in Košice), party and work discipline at the combine has recently deteriorated. Many demagogues have infiltrated the combine, spreading dissent about improper economic relations with the USSR and other matters.

It is alarming that during the official meetings, receptions, and discussions, none of the Slovak comrades would speak about the leading role of the party or about the KSČ CC. They expressed no practical suggestions about how to organize party work under modern circumstances.

The majority of employees in Slovakia with whom we met were bitterly critical of the former KSČ CC leader A. Novotný and the former oblast committee secretaries because there had been no collective leadership in the party and no collective discussion of directives and decisions.²²⁰ All party work was extremely centralized and secretive. Many discussions are being held about instances of legal violations, unworthy behavior by former party leaders and their alienation from the masses, the loss of party spirit, and even moral and political collapse.

As a rule, all the leading officials tried to assure us that

everything there is going well, and that the process of democratization is necessary for them and valuable for the KSČ and the ČSSR. Don't worry, they often said to us, you can rest peacefully, knowing that we have everything under control and are coping with the situation. Different opinions are of no danger to us. They work to the benefit of our struggle for socialism. Certain leaders declare that the KSČ even has a stake in such processes because they supposedly help the party expose its enemies, who can then easily be vanquished and rendered harmless. However, the reality of the situation raises doubts about the accuracy and sincerity of these statements.

We get the impression that the party aktiv overall are not especially alarmed about the fate of the party and the cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia. They are not carrying out a fundamental and clear-headed assessment of the situation in the country and the party. They are giving in to euphoria and smugness. Even during confidential discussions, none of the party officials said that the party is devising practical measures to normalize the situation in the country.

As we observed, the situation is all the more complicated because the KSS is not carrying out a necessary ideological struggle against revisionists on the theoretical front. In this respect, a typical instance occurred during a discussion between the members of our delegation and a group of instructors and students from the Forestry Technical Institute in Zvolen, including the prorectors of the institute, the head of the department of Marxism-Leninism, and the secretary of the party committee.

During the discussion they said it is unnecessary to teach students about the history of the party. On questions of philosophy, political economy, and "political studies," the educational institutes themselves must work out their own programs in accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Higher Education, without any sort of interference from the KSČ CC. Instructors from the institute believe it is necessary to eliminate general economic planning in the country, leaving the state planning organs responsible only for certain of the most important categories (volume of financing, deductions from profits, and taxes). All other categories must be based on recommendations from the enterprises themselves, including the nature and volume of production, marketing, and so forth. They believe that the collapse of Communist youth organizations in the educational institutes is a normal development. During a discussion with our delegation, the students of this institute declared that the Czechoslovak Youth Union has outlived its purpose and should be disbanded completely.²²¹ The students do not want to be in the same organization with workers and peasants, since these groups have their own special interests. They propose to create a "Student Parliament" as a union of students, which would be concerned with the students' everyday life, culture, and academic programs, without any sort of political platform.

The leaders of party organizations in Slovakia who came to office after the January and April plenums of the KSČ CC include officials with politically immature and even patently

revisionist outlooks.

Among examples of this phenomenon worth citing is the ideology secretary in the KSS Central Slovakia regional committee, a former instructor in philosophy, Čiřík, who, in the presence of a large group of people at dinner on 26 May, expressed anti-socialist and anti-Soviet views with great relish.²²² He declared that Marxism is obsolete, and that during the period of struggle against the "conservatives," the ideology of Marxism-Leninism has been experiencing a crisis, which has essentially negated the leading role of the party. He said that the USSR did a lot of harm to Czechoslovakia and is not able to serve as a model of socialism because people's living standards in the USSR are inadequate and salaries are low. A bit later he said that there are four groupings in the KSČ CC Presidium.²²³ To ensure unity in the leadership, it will be necessary to remove "conservatives" from the CC Presidium and to reconcile the views of the other members. None of the local officials who were present spoke up against these unsavory views, even though none of them supported what had been said.

The members of the Soviet delegation gave a decisive rebuff to this sorry excuse for an ideologist, attacking his theoretically bankrupt and anti-socialist views.

Along with such elements, there are undoubtedly healthy forces in Slovakia, who view the situation in the country with alarm and recognize how dangerous it is. They are speaking frankly about the necessity to be ready for an armed struggle against the enemies of socialist Czechoslovakia.

A number of Slovak comrades – the secretary of the KSČ²²⁴ Rožňava district committee, Cde. A. Molnár, the chairman of an agricultural cooperative, Cde. Boruška, the former commander of a partisan detachment, Cde. Kuchta, and others – said that they will stick by the Soviet Union and the CPSU to the very end, and that the comrades in Prague should talk less and do more.

Even if they gain a reprieve in Prague, they declared, we ourselves will take up arms in defense of socialist Czechoslovakia. In this struggle we will rely on the working class and the working peasantry, who are faithful to socialism, and on the armed People's Militia at the factories and cooperatives, who fully support the KSČ and stand for friendship and unity with the Soviet Union. A number of such comrades (7-8 of them) asked me to assure them that the Soviet Union will not leave them to their own fate. They requested that we accelerate the schedule for maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact armed forces.

These same comrades said that the anti-socialist forces in the KSČ have systematically disrupted the work of the party. Many primary party organizations and Communists who are dedicated to the party are acting without any definite plan and without centralized leadership. Even if the party organizations adopt resolutions against the anti-socialist forces, no one will read the resolutions aloud. Even in the party organizations themselves, not all the Communists will always know about the resolutions because party discipline has plummeted and fewer than half the members of the party are bothering to turn up for meetings.

In such circumstances, the Communists and party activists awaited the May plenum of the KSČ CC with great alarm. None of them ventured to predict how it would turn out. Some of them expressed the view that even if the Plenum adopts proper resolutions, there is no certainty that they would be implemented in a timely manner under the current KSČ CC leadership.

3. In a highly confidential discussion with me, the first secretary of the Central Slovakia regional party committee, Cde. A. Ťažký, who has close ties with Cde. Biľak, reported that Cde. Dubček supposedly has at his disposal a document showing that at the time when criticism of the KSČ CC and of A. Novotný was unfolding [in March 1968], a list was compiled of 60 leading party officials who would have to be put under arrest.²²⁵ These lists included Cde. Dubček and Cde. Biľak among others. Generals Šejna and Janko were supposedly involved in this plot. A. Ťažký also said that if A. Novotný would not step down from the CC voluntarily or behaved improperly, Cde. Dubček would read this document aloud at the May Plenum of the KSČ CC.

During the visit to the Košice metallurgical combine, a secretary of the East Slovakia party committee, Štefan Boboňko,²²⁶ also told me confidentially that the chairman of the combine's party committee, Cde. Rigo, who is also a member of the KSČ CC Presidium but does not command authority among them, said before leaving for the CC Plenum that, in light of the situation in the country, he would declare he was stepping down from the CC Presidium.²²⁷

4. Having been apprised of the situation in party organizations and workers' collectives in Slovakia, we can affirm that the portrayal of events in the ČSSR and KSČ offered at the latest session of the CPSU CC Politburo is correct.²²⁸

The pressure from right-wing forces has steadily increased in recent days, and the influence of anti-socialist parties, societies, and clubs is growing.

At the same time, the strength of the KSČ, the influence of the party on the masses, and party discipline overall have greatly diminished. Party organizations are working unsatisfactorily even in implementing the recently adopted "KSČ Action Program." As before, there are still no fundamental changes for the better in the mass media and propaganda organs.

Under these circumstances, according to many of the Czechoslovak comrades, it is difficult to foresee how the "KSČ Action Program" will proceed, even though it must remain the basic document of the forthcoming congress. Hence, the convocation of a KSČ congress in September and the elections due in the middle of next year for the ruling organs might lead, in the view of the party aktiv, to a sharp erosion of socialist positions and a reduction of the KSČ's leading role and authority.

Based on an analysis of the facts and the events under way in the political life of the ČSSR and KSČ, it is impossible to ignore the danger that if events in the future continue to develop in the same way as now and the KSČ CC does not

act as soon as possible to adopt concrete and decisive measures—including the dismissal of officials and disbandment of organizations that are hostile to the KSČ, socialism, and the USSR—there may well be a fundamental reorientation of the internal and external policy of Czechoslovakia, and we will lose the ČSSR as a friendly and socialist country.

V.SHCHERBYTS'KYI

4 June 1968

No. S-251



DOCUMENT No. 19

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, Ll. 1-6, original in Russian.]

Secret

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A Slovak writer, Miloš Krno, who is a Communist and former partisan, has just been in the city of Kyiv.²²⁹ He has traveled to Ukraine numerous times in the past and was a counselor at the Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow at the end of the 1940s.²³⁰ Krno is the author of several stories published in Ukraine, in particular a story about a Hero of the Soviet Union, Ján Nálepka.²³¹ This story was dedicated to friendship between the Soviet and Slovak peoples.

Evaluating the situation in Czechoslovakia, Krno spoke in support of strengthening friendship with the Soviet people and with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, in conversations pertaining to the current and future state of affairs in the ČSSR, his unease was palpable, and he seemed somewhat reticent.

In his view, the reasons for the ongoing events in the ČSSR are as follows:

"... Because of the rude leadership of Novotný and his cronies, an extremely tense situation emerged in the country, especially in a material sense. Overall, living conditions in Czechoslovakia aren't all that bad nowadays, but in neighboring countries—the FRG and Austria—the standard of living is much higher. Enemies of the party are citing this and are now exploiting every mistake committed by the previous leadership, which was installed by Khrushchev. They say to the population: you see how socialism stultifies the development of the country and takes a negative toll on our material conditions.²³² If there were no Communist Party, thousands of innocent people would not not have suffered,

and all of us would be much better off materially.”

Krno indicates that many people, including workers, are being allured by this agitation. It could even lead to an attempt at a coup d'état.²³³ There are three forces that might prevent it, and Krno is almost certain about this:

1. The leadership of the Communist Party, if it displays firmness and regains control of the situation in the country.
2. The working class, the majority of which still supports the Communist Party, forming armed patrols and a newly organized Communist division.²³⁴
3. In an extreme case, intervention by the Warsaw Pact countries.

On the question of the reactionary forces, he said the following:

The National Front includes three parties: the Communist, Socialist, and People's (Catholic). Until recently the last two of these parties consisted of only a few dozen members and were purely nominal. But now the opposition forces have taken them over. The Socialist Party already numbers 300,000 people, and the Catholic Party numbers 150,000 people.²³⁵ Incidentally, the clergy, some of whom have joined this party, prefer to maintain a wait-and-see position, since they are afraid that a coup d'état might prove unsuccessful and that they would end up compromising themselves. An article by Blažek in issue no. 13 of the weekly publication of the ČSSR Writers' Union, "Literární Listy," is among the commentaries that reveal the current mood in the Socialist Party.²³⁶ Blažek writes that no party has ever voluntarily left the historical arena, and that all such parties must be removed by force.²³⁷ Now the turn of the Communist Party has come, and it, too, must be removed by force.

In addition to these two parties, there are a number of officially registered clubs. Among them is the Club of "Politically Active Non-Communists." It was organized quite recently but has already become a *de facto* mass party. Its base is in Prague, but there are branches all around the country.²³⁸ It plays a role similar to the role played by the "Petöfi Circle" in Hungary, with the main difference that the latter consisted of only several dozen literary figures, whereas the Club of "Politically Active Non-Communists" already numbers many thousands of people.²³⁹ It is the *de facto* rallying point for bourgeois parties that were disbanded in the past. This club might become the spearhead of an organized coup d'état. Members of the club are taking advantage of the new "press freedom" to publish a variety of fraudulent documents in the newspapers. These items even include spurious "letters of Stalin," which contain orders for the physical annihilation of revolutionaries.²⁴⁰ They are also disseminating rumors about our efforts to arrange the murder of Masaryk and other such things.²⁴¹

An organization known as "Clean Hands" has been set up in Prague.²⁴² (It consists of people who took no part in the repressions.) They say about these "Clean Hands" that they will very skillfully be able to suppress all Communists and all pro-Soviet Czechs and Slovaks. Representatives of this organization say among themselves:

"Democratization will be completed when only two Communists are left in the ČSSR and they end up killing each other."

Club "231" is named for the article in the ČSSR Criminal Code under which many innocent people were convicted in the past. Initially, this club was not very large, and its chief missions were to seek the rehabilitation of those who had been unjustly convicted, to provide them with material sustenance and employment, to press for their readmission into the party, and so forth. More recently, however, this club has taken on an entirely different cast. For one thing, many new members who were never arrested in Czechoslovakia have now joined. This increase in membership has owed a good deal to criminals, whom the leaders of the club have reclassified as "victims of Novotný's regime." At present, the club is harboring dark criminal elements who support trouble-makers and are prepared for any actions that will undermine the existing order.

The activity of anti-Soviet, anti-socialist elements is leading above all to the persecution of pro-Soviet citizens and to demands for the ouster of all officials who held any sort of post in the ČSSR party or state apparatus over the past 20 years. The same thing, says Krno, happened in Hungary, where they began by focusing just on Rákosi and then shifted their attacks to the entire party and government apparatus.

Krno stated that he expects decisive changes in connection with the KSČ CC plenum, which "must resolve the fate of our country."²⁴³ With regard to the future of the ČSSR, he is gloomy. Novotný, says Krno, committed a huge number of mistakes, which his enemies have never failed to exploit. He carried out the same policy of unjustified repressions that Rákosi did in Hungary. The enemies of the USSR blame the Soviet Union for these repressions. But now a letter has been discovered from Stalin to the Czechoslovak leaders concerning the repressions and Soviet advisers.²⁴⁴ In the letter, Stalin writes that the arrest of class enemies is a matter for the Czechoslovaks themselves to handle, and that we make no recommendations about this matter: Let them determine themselves who should be prosecuted and who should not. Thus, says Krno, the arrests of thousands of innocent people and their annihilation should be blamed not on the Soviet Union but on Novotný and his ilk. Now many judges are committing suicide. They sentenced innocent people to death on the basis of false accusations, and now the relatives of those who perished are demanding vengeance.

Characterizing the situation in the KSČ CC, Krno notes that a deep rift has occurred in the CC. Dubček is displaying a lack of resolution, and only two of the members of the Politburo²⁴⁵ are supporting him on all matters. The rest are

speaking out against him.²⁴⁶ A split also has occurred in the party as a whole. For example, in the Moravian city of Ostrava the KSČ has split into two factions: the “Bolsheviks” and the rightist faction. In these circumstances, the legal and illegal activities of opposition parties—the Socialist and Catholic, which have been growing in size—have increased.

Some members of the KSČ CC are even openly claiming that full-fledged opposition parties should be allowed to exist.²⁴⁷ They base their position on the statement by V. I. Lenin that an opposition is necessary to monitor the actions of the ruling party. But, says Krno, the danger is that in today’s circumstances, the opposition inevitably will become an active hostile force and will group all the reactionary elements around itself.

This kind of situation demands more resolute measures on the part of the KSČ CC, but because of the mistaken actions of today’s leaders of the Communist Party, all of this is leading to the growth of malevolent forces inside the country. The KSČ has lost control of the country, and now it will be difficult to regain control.

Krno distinguishes the situation in the Czech lands from that in Slovakia. He says that in Slovakia things are much better, and that no anti-Soviet sentiments have emerged there. But the following contradictions exist there: A struggle is under way for greater Slovak independence and for the federalization of the country. There are some nationalist contradictions. The main thing is that unrest has emerged among the ethnic Hungarian minority, which in Slovakia numbers 400,000 people.²⁴⁸ The Hungarians are demanding autonomy.

The root of the evil is entirely in the Czech lands, where class enemies from the former bourgeoisie and officials from the disbanded bourgeois parties are active.

In this connection, Krno speaks favorably about the upcoming maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact countries, and especially about the arming of workers’ patrols.²⁴⁹ This force, he says, will be capable of actively countering the reactionaries, but the KSČ CC must display the requisite energy and firmness. And Krno is not at all certain whether this will happen.

Krno spoke with particular disapproval about the situation in the ČSSR Writers’ Union, where reactionary and Zionist officials have taken over the leadership. They are persecuting Communist writers, for example V. Mináč, and are setting reactionary writers against them.²⁵⁰ With regard to the treachery of V. Mňačko, he says that Mňačko evidently was just a provocateur.²⁵¹ During the cult of personality, he subscribed to an ultraleft position, which he maintained until the most recent writers’ congress, where the reactionary forces gained ascendance. He then suddenly changed his position 180 degrees and fled to the West, where he received roughly half a million dollars for his little book ridiculing Novotný. Now he has traveled back to the ČSSR for a week. They restored his citizenship to him, but he is willing to return permanently only after the “complete liberalization” of the country.

Krno cited an example that illustrates the mood among students. At the First of May demonstration the columns of

students gave vent to many anti-Soviet slogans, including “Don’t interfere with American efforts to defend civilization in Vietnam!” American students who are studying in Prague were dismayed by these statements. They exclaimed:

“You should be ashamed! We, as Americans, have spoken out on this matter against our own government under Johnson, and now you’re defending these murderers!”

Reported for informational purposes.

P. SHELEST

6 June 1968

No. 1/48



DOCUMENT No. 20

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, Ll. 40-45, original in Czech (cover note from Shelest in Russian).]

CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

In the population centers of the Czech lands and Slovakia, an appeal to the population signed by the “Action Committee for a democratic and socialist Czechoslovakia, the borders of which were established 50 years ago” has been posted on the sides of houses and other buildings.

The appeal raises the question of revising the existing border between Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

We succeeded in obtaining a photograph of the appeal that has been circulated. We are sending you a copy of the photograph of the appeal.

In this same report, we are sending you a translation of the appeal from Czech to Russian.²⁵²

P. SHELEST

8 June 1968

No. 1/50

Prague, 14.V.1968

Esteemed friends!

In connection with the 50th anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic and the process of renewal that is currently under way in our state, our duty—and the duty of every honorable citizen of this state—is to tell the historical truth to our peoples and to struggle for the freedom and independence of our state.

Thousands of the best people from our nations have given their lives for the creation and freedom of our state. The great thinkers and humanists T. G. Masaryk, M. P. Štefánik, and E. Beneš fought their whole lives for the freedom and vigor of our state.

Our greatest duty is to explain to you, the members of our intelligentsia, and through you to our whole society, the historical truth about the difficulty with which our freedom was achieved in the First and Second World Wars and about the ease with which we lost it, thanks to certain individuals.

The blame for this lay with some of our own countrymen, but most of all the blame lay with Stalin's cult of personality and his policies. Even though we fought against fascism on all fronts during the First and Second World Wars and proved victorious, we nonetheless were confronted by a problem affecting a beautiful part of our country, Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This part of our land had never, in our whole history, belonged to Russia.²⁵³ Its people had unanimously and voluntarily chosen 50 years ago to enter the unified family of Czechs and Slovaks, forming the republic of Czechoslovakia. In 1945 the people of Subcarpathia, having been reduced during the war to starvation, were deceived and betrayed by Stalin's policy.²⁵⁴

Immediately after the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic, thousands of the best sons of Subcarpathia fled in 1939-1940 across the border so that they could take up arms to help drive out the fascists and completely liberate our republic from occupation.²⁵⁵ Despite the countless tragic victims who were deported to Siberian prison camps (only because the people came as they would to their friends in order to liberate our homeland), those who remained alive joined the First Czechoslovak Corps in Buzuluk and voluntarily went to die on the front to liberate their homeland. That is how strong and irrepensible the desire of these people was to defeat fascism and liberate our country.

When the First Czechoslovak Corps was being organized in Buzuluk, 95 percent of the residents of Subcarpathian Ruthenia joined it. The First Czechoslovak Brigade included more than 85 percent of them, and they took part in every battle all the way to Prague.²⁵⁶

In 1944, during the most arduous battles to cross Dukla Pass, two officers (lieutenants) from the First Czechoslovak Army, Turjanica and Vas,²⁵⁷ deserted and came as agents to Subcarpathian Ruthenia without the consent or knowledge of the Czechoslovak command.²⁵⁸ With the help of collaborators and Hungarian stooges, they engaged in illegal agitation among the people for the unification of Subcarpathian Ruthenia with Soviet Russia, not stopping at anything.

Immediately after the liberation of Subcarpathia, military commissariats were set up in all its regions.²⁵⁹ They conducted a mobilization and call-up of people and equipment

for the First Czechoslovak Army, which at that time was fighting on the territory of Slovakia. All the young men living on the territory of Subcarpathia who were suitable for military service joined the First Czechoslovak Army and went to the front voluntarily. They were placed in barracks from which they were supposed to be sent to Slovakia to serve in the First Czechoslovak Army. But despite this, after they were placed in barracks where Soviet units also were deployed, the abovementioned soldiers were secretly transported in vehicles at night and taken from there not to the First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia, but to Soviet units in Poland; and from there they were sent still further, to the Far East against Japan. They did not return from there until 1948 or later, by which time Subcarpathia had been severed from the Czechoslovak Republic.²⁶⁰ Along the way, many of them who understood that they had been betrayed jumped off the freight trains and did their best to return, after walking many days, to the First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia.

That is what actually happened.

With the help of collaborators, the agents of Turjanica and Vas exerted crude political pressure on the women and elderly men who remained at home. Lists were compiled, and the agents traveled from house to house and forced people to sign a call for the unification of our territory with Soviet Russia. "If you sign this for Soviet Russia, you will receive flour and bread, but if you sign for the Czechoslovak Republic, you and your whole family will be sent to Siberia." Old people who did not know how to write signed with X's, but they wept and lamented that they were being forced to sign for Russia at the same time that their sons and husbands were fighting in our Czechoslovak Army for our Czechoslovak Republic, which they never stopped dreaming about during these many years. In large cities such as Uzhhorod, so-called "elections" were held, but the results were predetermined by the fact that agitators visited the electoral officials and sternly warned them that any votes against unification with Soviet Russia would mean that their entire families would be deported to Siberia.²⁶¹ Official papers with the inscription "Election Results" were sent to Moscow as a "Manifesto of the Will of the People" in Subcarpathia. We all now know very well what sort of "popular will" this was from the experience of the next 20 years.

In accordance with Stalin's plan, territory had to be carved off from the Czechoslovak Republic, including Košice and the Lower Tatras in the Poprad region.²⁶² Doctor Beneš and the Slovak National Council protested against these actions in regard to the Czechoslovak Republic and also demanded that Košice, Chop, Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Berehovo be left in Czechoslovakia. Stalin had to retreat somewhat from his plan and to leave Poprad, but the cities of Chop, Uzhhorod, Mukachevo, and Berehovo and the whole eastern part of Subcarpathia were still included in the territory taken from the Czechoslovak Republic.

These facts clearly show that what happened was not the wish of the Czechoslovak people. Instead, it resulted from the illegal diktat of Stalin and a policy that contradicted international law and all the treaties pertaining to the creation

of the Czechoslovak Republic concluded 50 years ago, which precisely indicate that the Czechoslovak Republic consists of the territory of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.²⁶³

The people of Subcarpathia were never Ukrainian (or greater Ukrainian) at any point in their history.²⁶⁴ They have their own written tradition, language, and history. Olbracht and others have brilliantly shown the national features and rich culture of Subcarpathia, whose people even after 23 years of having been shorn from the Czechoslovak Republic are still speaking and writing in their own language.²⁶⁵ It has long been known that in educational institutions in the non-Russian republics, instruction is carried out in Russian, irrespective of nationality. In Subcarpathia to this day they are still living and working in accordance with our time zone, even though during those 23 years Moscow time was officially introduced there.²⁶⁶ Our traditions are also being preserved with regard to all the holidays.

The Czechoslovak Republic lost part of its territory that is very well endowed with minerals and raw materials, which we now have to purchase for hard currency. The area could be a wonderful, simply miraculous hub of tourism for all of Europe. It is worth also speaking about the presence there of a large number of diligent, hard-working people who must now go looking for seasonal work all around Russia.

Thousands of sons of Subcarpathia, Slovakia, Moravia, and Bohemia gave their lives on all fronts of the First and Second World Wars for the freedom and independence of our country and for its territorial integrity and unity. Those who remain alive must uphold the legacy of their dead countrymen. We are a heroic and unshakable country. The time has come for the next generation to learn the historical truth about the struggle by our nations to achieve what thousands of the fallen were unable to accomplish. If we do not do this, the new generation will never learn the truth.

Now, in connection with the 50th anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic and the restoration of legality in the state and the establishment of a federation, each of us must make every effort to create a federation that includes the territory of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The example of Yugoslavia attests that this is possible in our circumstances, in the framework of a single state.

Action Committee for a democratic and socialist Czechoslovakia, the borders and territory of which were established 50 years ago

196 signatories

Esteemed friends,

You know from your own experience that for now it is still impossible to publish these signatures. Recent events have shown that the majority of our leaders are inclined only

to replace certain officials, not to replace the whole system of control of the political, administrative, and economic affairs of our country.

Our best opportunity is now at hand, after 20 years of lost time, to establish a genuinely democratic socialist order, the very thing for which our writers, artists, and scholars have been struggling over these past 20 years by pointing out the correct path to our nations. Only our intelligentsia, who managed to survive during this period, can show our nations the proper path of our statehood and true history, the path for our democracy and socialism, and the path to renewed pride for our people, who have been so heroic in the past.



DOCUMENT No. 21

[Source: *TsDAHOU*, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, Ll. 15-19, original in Russian.]

C P S U C C

A delegation of workers from the ČSSR was in the city of Uzhhorod and in Kharkiv Oblast from 25 to 29 May. They were visiting our country to exchange tokens of peace and friendship in commemoration of the 23rd anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from fascist occupiers. The delegation, headed by the KSČ CC Presidium member and acting chairman of the Slovak National Council, Cde. František Barbírek, consisted of 22 representatives of different organizations and departments in Czechoslovakia. There was only one construction worker in the delegation and not a single worker from an agricultural cooperative.

During their stay in Kharkiv Oblast and Uzhhorod, the delegation held discussions with officials from party and government organs, visited the museum of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship in the village of Sokolovo, and stopped at a collective farm, a university, a tractor factory, and a school, where they had meetings and conversations with workers and saw the sights in Kharkiv and Uzhhorod.

During these meetings and conversations, the guests displayed great interest in the development of the economy and culture of Kharkiv, both the city and the oblast. They raised many questions, particularly about the transition of Kharkiv enterprises to a new economic system, about the average salaries of workers, about pregnancy leaves for female workers, about apartment rent and the price of one square meter of living space in cooperative buildings, about sports in educational institutions and enterprises, about efforts to hold discussions on political themes among university students, about the entry of Communist youth members into the party, and about other matters.

In official speeches as well as private conversations, the

head of the delegation, Cde. F. Barbírek, and certain other delegation members repeatedly spoke about the friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples and about the gratitude that the Czechoslovak people felt to the Soviet Union for liberating them from the fascist yoke. They assured the Soviet people that the ČSSR always would be a loyal ally of the USSR. Referring to the difficulties that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is currently experiencing, many members of the delegation expressed anxiety about them, but declared that the KSČ is making every effort to overcome them and to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and unshakable internationalism. They expressed certainty that the May plenum of the KSČ CC would facilitate the expeditious restoration of order in the country.²⁶⁷

Cde. F. Barbírek also said that “*Rudé právo*” and a number of other press organs are no longer under the control of the KSČ CC, that anarchy has engulfed the country, and that the state security organs are under the leadership of a “bad man, Josef Pavel, who is complicating the situation, but his instructions, it would seem, are now being ignored, and he will soon be removed from his post.”²⁶⁸ The so-called “non-party clubs” and other parties that are actively working against the KSČ are gaining strength in the country. On this matter, Cde. F. Barbírek always emphasized that the KSČ is overcoming these difficulties and that the ties between the KSČ and CPSU and between the ČSSR and USSR will become stronger.

Other members of the delegation also expressed certainty that the KSČ will be able to overcome the difficulties and lead the country along the path of socialist development. Representatives of Slovakia in the delegation repeatedly noted that the situation in the Slovak regions of the country is better than in the Czech lands, and that the Slovak Communist Party is in control of the situation. Speaking about this in particular were the secretary of the KSS Košice municipal committee, Cde. Severin Martinka, the secretary, Cde. F. Barbírek, Cde. Kamil Makúch, and others.

A member of the delegation and editorial official at the journal of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship, “*Svět Sovětů*,” Ivanna Gotlibová, who in the past evidently was an editorial employee at “*Rudé právo*,” took the initiative in arranging conversations with Soviet officials, to whom she expressed approval of the changes under way in the ČSSR and spoke idealistically about Tomáš Masaryk. “Masaryk,” she declared, “was a great man who got along well with everyone and had a rapport with the common man. He was for Lenin, but condemned the methods of Stalin. During Masaryk’s time, a total of only 3-4 people were killed in demonstrations, whereas in Gottwald’s time a vastly larger number of innocent people perished.” Referring to a recent article in the newspaper “*Sovetskaya Rossiya*,” she said that “the Soviet press features baseless criticism of Masaryk, which evokes dissatisfaction among the whole population of the ČSSR.”²⁶⁹ For this reason, all the journalists at our publication have come out in defense of Masaryk.” In other conversations, I. Gotlibová gave vent to open malice against the

USSR. In particular, she said: “I would like to see what is happening in our country take place in the USSR as well. Your leaders should be closer to the people, as ours are. I don’t see Ukraine; its language, culture, and everyday life are stifled. This is especially evident in the educational institutions. Only this year did I actually hear the anthem of the UkrSSR.”²⁷⁰ I’m not opposed to the USSR or to socialism, but I’m very much opposed to Stalinist bureaucratism. Our ideal is Solzhenitsyn and his book ‘One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.’”

The remarks by I. Gotlibová were rebuffed every time. Members of the ČSSR delegation joined us in condemning her behavior. When she attempted to offer a toast at an official reception in honor of the delegation, several of the Czechoslovak comrades, including a worker, Ludvig Kožuch, prevented her from speaking, saying that at this sort of festive occasion it would be unworthy to have her offer a toast on behalf of the delegation.

Some members of the delegation of Slovak descent expressed dissatisfaction with the nationality policy carried out earlier in the ČSSR.

In lunchtime toasts at the university in the Zmiiv district during a reception in honor of the delegation, Cde. F. Barbírek explained the reasons for the current situation in the ČSSR when he mentioned numerous mistakes of the former KSČ leadership, which, in his view, had produced dissatisfaction in the country, particularly in Slovakia. These mistakes reached their height when the current president of the ČSSR, Ludvík Svoboda, was removed from his posts without any reason and was forced to work as a bookkeeper in an agricultural cooperative. The mistakes also culminated in the imprisonment, without any justification, of many former commanders of the partisan detachments that served during the Slovak national uprising. Countless appeals by Slovaks to A. Novotný requesting that he give Slovakia the rights of a republic with a capital in Bratislava went unheeded.²⁷¹

The secretary of the municipal committee of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship in Bratislava, Cde. Rudolf Vlášek, said: “In the past, the Czechs did not regard us, the Slovaks, as human beings: A teacher or cook in Slovakia who did the same work as someone in the Czech lands and Moravia would receive much less pay. The disparity could be as much as 300 *koruny*. Whenever a Slovak traveled to Prague, he would have to hide his nationality, since they would give a Slovak no more than a single-room apartment for his entire family, whereas they’d give a Czech at least 2-3 rooms for the same size family.” Cde. R. Vlášek expressed certainty that this situation will be changed and indeed is already changing. Great credit for this improvement is due to A. Dubček, who was characterized as “a strong, determined man who, having only the facts at hand, moved against the state of affairs that existed under Novotný.”

The secretary of the Vsetín district committee of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship, Cde. Ilič Kouda, said that journalists and some editors of “*Rudé právo*” are behaving badly. On the editorial board of the newspaper, they have created an opposition and are speaking out against

the editor-in-chief.²⁷² He reported that Communists have been driven from the leadership in a number of trade unions and that the people who have taken over were convicted in the past for various reasons, including for abuses.

In response to a question about what A. Novotný is doing now, Cde. Kamil Makúch said that “he’s been having regular discussions with Cde. Chervonenko.²⁷³ As a result of these discussions, information reaching the USSR is not always reliable, despite the very accurate reports provided to the Soviet Union by the USSR consul in Bratislava, Cde. Kuznetsov.”²⁷⁴

In discussions with our officials in Kharkiv, Cde. F. Barbírek spoke in favor of a comprehensive strengthening of ties between Slovakia and Ukraine and an exchange of work experience between the UkrSSR and a future Slovak Republic.²⁷⁵

Reported for informational purposes.

P. SHELEST
SECRETARY OF THE UKRAINIAN CP

17 June 1968

No. 1/54



DOCUMENT No. 22

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, LI. 203-209, original in Russian.]

TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

On 9 July 1968, the secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast committee of the Ukrainian CP, Cde. Yu. V. Il’nyts’kyi, met at 4:00 p.m. on the Soviet-Czechoslovak border with the first secretary of the KSČ’s East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Koscelanský. The meeting took place one-on-one at the request of Cde. Koscelanský.

Cde. Il’nyts’kyi told me that when the meeting began, Cde. Koscelanský informed him about the work of the commission that was set up to arrange the future federalized structure of the Czechoslovak Republic. He said there is no unity in the commission because the Czechs, in seeking quietly to replace the national basis for the division of the country with a territorial basis, are plotting to create a federation of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia. The Slovaks do not agree with this because the Czechs and Moravians constitute a united whole, and they will be able to form a majority. As a result, Cde. Husák and one of the Czech comrades have currently been instructed to study the matter and to seek a compromise between the Czechs and Slovaks.²⁷⁶ Cde.

Koscelanský affirmed that the Slovaks will not yield in their demand for equality when deciding on a federalized structure for Czechoslovakia.²⁷⁷

During the discussion, Cde. Il’nyts’kyi expressed worry that the forthcoming extraordinary congress of the KSČ might result in the ascendance of rightist elements. Of the 1,400 delegates elected for the congress, only 280 are Slovaks (according to rough data).²⁷⁸ These delegates might select a CC and Presidium in which Slovaks will be a minority, and it is possible that they will elect members who will take the country to the right.²⁷⁹

Cde. Koscelanský responded to Cde. Il’nyts’kyi that such a situation will not arise because it is planned at the beginning of the congress to adopt a resolution that all further resolutions will be enacted only if at least two-thirds of the delegates—two-thirds of the Slovaks and two-thirds of the Czechs—vote for them.

In response, Cde. Il’nyts’kyi warned Cde. Koscelanský that this sort of resolution might not be adopted, since the delegates at the congress were elected not by national origin, but by the number of Communists. Moreover, during a secret vote it will be impossible to discern who voted for one resolution or another (Czechs or Slovaks). Cde. Koscelanský responded to this by saying that they are certain that a necessary resolution will be adopted. He also affirmed that the newly elected CC leadership will include people who deserve that status, including Cdes. Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský. In Cde. Koscelanský’s view, the new CC will not include Cdes. Kolder (on account of his amoral behavior), Indra, Švestka, Rigo, and Barbírek. Those elected to the CC, according to the recommendations of regional and municipal conferences, will include some hard-working old cadres and many new comrades, who will be able to lead the country along a new path.

Cde. Koscelanský also informed Cde. Il’nyts’kyi about the conduct of recent party conferences. He reported that both in the center and in the districts, cities, and regions, the conferences went well. At the party conference in Bratislava, criticism was directed at Cde. Biľak, who, incidentally, has been elected a delegate to the congress, but only by coming in 29th of the 32 candidates who were given votes.²⁸⁰ When asked how he would explain this, Cde. Koscelanský said there were two reasons. First, there is the question of his national origin. Cde. Biľak is a Ukrainian, and the Slovaks say that all three members of the KSČ CC Presidium from Slovakia are not actually Slovaks (Cde. Rigo is a Gypsy; Cde. Barbírek, as was recently established, is a Czech; and Cde. Biľak is a Ukrainian). Second, Cde. Biľak has not displayed sufficient initiative in replacing the old heads of departments of the Slovak Communist Party CC as well as senior officials in the Slovak National Council.

During the conversation, Cde. Il’nyts’kyi complained to his interlocutor that the Czechoslovak press, radio, and television had recently been stepping up their coverage and broadcasts of anti-socialist, anti-popular, and anti-Soviet materials, particularly the publication of the so-called “2,000 Words” manifesto.²⁸¹ Cde. Koscelanský responded that it

was not worth paying attention to this matter, since 1,960 of the 2,000 words in the article had been lifted from the KSČ Action Program (albeit in paraphrase), and only 40 words, which had been condemned by all the regional and district conferences, had been deemed improper. Cde. Koscelanský argued that it was not worth attaching any special significance to such articles, since by criticizing them (as was done by Cde. Konstantinov in “Pravda”) you might do more harm than good.²⁸² Regarding the statements by Cde. Konstantinov, he expressed the view that it would be better to conduct these sorts of discussions in theoretical journals, rather than in the mass press. Cde. Koscelanský also reported that he personally had been insulted by articles published in the GDR press that had equated the KSČ “progressives” with American imperialists.²⁸³

Cde. Koscelanský acknowledged that some of the rightist elements behind the onslaught in the press and on radio and television had hoped that the KSČ leadership would turn to the right. However, because this did not happen, they are now trying to provoke the leadership into using force against them. But we, declared Cde. Koscelanský, will not give in to these provocations and will not behave that way if only because the West would think that we are retreating from democracy.²⁸⁴ Now, said Cde. Koscelanský, we shouldn’t spend further time on fruitless discussions, but should instead do more for the people and think about how to achieve good results at the forthcoming party congress. Already, he emphasized, we have attained results, and the people are supporting us. Whereas in the past, he continued, it was difficult to engage the people in a conversation, there are now so many who want to speak with us that we do not even have enough time to meet with them all. It is also extremely important, according to Cde. Koscelanský, that we have substantially raised the pay of workers and are compensating peasants for equipment that was made common property during the period of collectivization, and so forth.

Summing up what he had said, Cde. Koscelanský declared that many new things are now being created in the development of socialism (as shown, in particular, by the newly coined slogan of “democratic socialism”). However, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries now do not understand the essence of these internal events. Perhaps they will grasp these changes only after three to four years, as was the case with Yugoslavia, when it was first proclaimed revisionist, and then, after eight years had passed, the other socialist leaders began kissing the party and state leaders of that country.²⁸⁵

Czechoslovakia, Cde. Koscelanský emphasized during the conversation, was formerly at the same level of economic development as the leading West European capitalist countries, but it now lags far behind them. Thanks to the new path of “democratic socialism,” we are trying to bolster the country’s economy. It is not accidental, Cde. Koscelanský declared, that many in the West now say that if the KSČ succeeds in creating a new model of “democratic socialism” (of a European nature), this will be a great setback for the bourgeoisie.

Cde. Koscelanský noted that internal reactionaries will continue to engage in various attacks, if only to provoke the leadership of the country and party into using force and if only to compromise the new ideas of democratization.

Toward the end of the conversation, Cde. Koscelanský sought to reassure Cde. Il’nyts’kyi that all the anxiety about the threat to socialism in the ČSSR is unwarranted. He emphasized that these worries, obviously, have arisen mainly because the information provided to the CPSU CC Politburo and personally to Cde. Brezhnev by the Soviet embassy in Prague is so unreliable. The Soviet embassy, he said, had long been accustomed to the old times of Novotný and is now totally unable to grasp the spirit of the current situation.²⁸⁶ For this reason, he continued, it would be essential to replace the current personnel at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union’s worries and anxiety about extremist elements in the ČSSR are not always understood by the Czechoslovak comrades, Cde. Koscelanský emphasized. To illustrate the point, he noted that one of the speakers at the KSČ Prague conference had earned applause from the audience when he declared that they are grateful to the Soviet Army for having liberated them in 1945, but do not want to see it on their territory now.²⁸⁷

Cde. Koscelanský also reported that enormous criticism had been voiced about the letter from the meeting of the People’s Militia that was sent to workers in the Soviet Union, and also about the personal behavior of the head of the People’s Militia, Cde. Gorčák.²⁸⁸ The workers of Czechoslovakia did not know about this letter and learned about it only from the Soviet press. Responses to the letter, published in the Soviet press, are viewed here as interference in the ČSSR’s internal affairs.

Cde. Koscelanský also informed Cde. Il’nyts’kyi that sessions of the KSČ CC Presidium had been held both yesterday and today, where they had considered what stance to take on the letters sent to the KSČ CC Presidium by the CPSU CC Politburo and by the CCs of the Communist parties of Poland, the GDR, and Hungary.²⁸⁹ In Cde. Koscelanský’s view, the KSČ CC Presidium finds itself in a difficult position, since, on the one hand, it is impossible to publish these documents in the press, but on the other hand, they need to explain the documents to the nation. All these documents, Cde. Koscelanský declared, propose the holding of a conference of the leaders of the Communist parties of socialist countries to discuss the events in Czechoslovakia. However, he personally does not understand why such conferences need to be convened so frequently.

At the end of the discussion, Cde. Il’nyts’kyi told Cde. Koscelanský that from the conversation it was clear that they [the KSČ leadership] were not at all worried about recent events in the country and in the party, whereas “I had thought,” said Cde. Il’nyts’kyi, “that you were coming to request appropriate advice or assistance. However, this is not the case.” In response, Cde. Koscelanský said with great optimism that everything in the ČSSR is going well, and that there is no basis for any alarm. If something unfortunate

should happen, he said, they themselves will ask us, as an older brother, to provide necessary assistance.

During earlier meetings with Cde. Il'nyts'kyi, Cde. Koscelanský had said that it is a very difficult time right now and that he obviously will wait until after the congress to go on vacation. However, at this latest session, he suddenly declared that on Saturday he is leaving on vacation and is driving his car to Romania, all the way to the Black Sea. When Cde. Il'nyts'kyi asked him why he was not going to the Crimea "after Cde. Shelest invited you and you accepted his invitation," Koscelanský responded that the Crimea is too far and that the KSC CC had approved a decision to send him on vacation to Romania.

Reported for informational purposes.

P. SHELEST

10 July 1968



DOCUMENT No. 23

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 97, Ll. 141-149, original in Russian.]

Speech by Cde. P. E. Shelest at
the CPSU CC Plenum, 17 July 1968²⁹⁰

Comrades!²⁹¹

The issue being discussed by the CPSU CC Plenum²⁹² is of exceptionally great importance for the whole international Communist and workers' movement and for the cause of socialism.

What we are considering today is not merely some minor difficulties or complex processes, as some of the leading officials in Czechoslovakia keep on trying to convince us. Instead, what we are considering is a grave, right-wing opportunist danger in a fraternal Communist party and the growth of anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary forces in socialist Czechoslovakia.

What is especially troubling is that the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are paying lip service to the existence of a serious danger, but at the same time are making no effort to wage a decisive struggle against it.

Why not? Can it be that they are spineless, wishy-washy liberals?²⁹³ Hardly! Dubček, Černík, and certain other leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia know no equal when it comes to the struggle against so-called "conservatives," even though these "conservatives" do not pose the slightest threat to anyone.

But with barely a murmur during this struggle they have dismissed hundreds of senior party officials and subjected

them to groundless attacks, harassment, and outright persecution. This has affected not only officials in the center, but nearly all the secretaries of regional, municipal, and district party committees.

The KSC leaders failed to take into account that these officials included many hard-working and devoted Communists who created the party, worked in the anti-fascist underground, and bore the entire burden of establishing a workers' and peasants' government and of building socialism in that country.²⁹⁴

At the same time, the KSC leaders have failed to hold even a single member of the nefarious right-wing opportunist group strictly accountable before the party, and have not even voiced any criticism of the rightists.²⁹⁵ By now these rightists can be regarded as an organized group. Under the guise of a phony democracy, they are displaying what for Communists is an unacceptable degree of tolerance for the statements of anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary elements, and they are thereby essentially betraying the interests of the working class and of socialism.

At the April Plenum of the CPSU CC it was said that the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had lost control over the mass media – the press, radio, and television.²⁹⁶ The Czech leaders acknowledged this, too.

Since then, more than three months have passed. But has the situation changed? No, not at all. If anything, it has deteriorated further.²⁹⁷ And the point to be stressed here, as you understand, is that the whole matter could have been resolved within hours if they had simply restored order and reasserted control over everything. But nothing of the sort has been done. As before, these supremely powerful levers of ideological influence are under the control of opportunist and anti-socialist elements, who are actively using them to carry out political terror, deceive the working class, and strike at the party's healthy forces. In the press, on radio, and on television, they openly purvey hostile, counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet propaganda. They have exerted great pressure on the ongoing district and regional party conferences, and they are continuing with their unfounded persecution and vilification of devoted party cadres.²⁹⁸ They are pinning the label of "conservatives" on these honest cadres and are extolling the so-called "progressives," that is, the members of the right-wing opportunist and revisionist group.²⁹⁹

Only in these circumstances could a patently counterrevolutionary manifesto appear in the central newspapers under the title of "2,000 Words."³⁰⁰ Despite the KSC CC Presidium's formal condemnation of this document, the press, radio, and television are giving wide and positive coverage to it. Moreover, this disgraceful document has become a lively topic of discussion at district and regional party conferences. At some of the conferences, through the connivance of the CC and regional party committees, the document has been endorsed by some of the delegates.

This shows how demagoguery about freedom of speech can be exploited by counterrevolutionaries. This is where the game of "unlimited" democracy and a Czechoslovak "model of socialism" has brought us!

The Czechoslovak comrades babble on about their wholehearted support for “democratic socialism.” But they disregard the fact that our country, the first country in the world in which socialism triumphed, has already been living and prospering for more than 50 years in accordance with socialist laws. What sort of “democratic socialism” are they promoting? If you examine their statements closely, you can see that the word “democratic” is a cover for a transformation of the socialist order, depriving it of its class essence.³⁰¹ As you know, no such thing as abstract democracy exists in nature. Democracy always was and is class-based. Anyone who fails to recognize this cannot be called a Communist.

Some people in Czechoslovakia are urging that the Communist Party should become an elite party, not a party of the working class. This “theory” is alien to Marxism-Leninism insofar as Communists always have totally defended and continue to defend the interests of the vanguard element of our society – the working class.

But this, unfortunately, is not the only problem. All sorts of hostile groups are taking shape in the country. The former right-wing Social Democrats are resurrecting their party, something that no self-respecting Communist Party should ever permit.³⁰² In Czechoslovakia, however, these groups are encountering no resistance at all. Moreover, the leaders of the KSČ claim that the CPSU and other fraternal parties are supposedly dramatizing and exaggerating the situation in their party and country. They are saying this to gloss over the urgency of the situation and to make us let down our guard.

For this reason we can say, with full responsibility, that by losing control [of the mass media], abandoning the principles of democratic centralism, and failing to punish the increased activity of the right-wing opportunist group, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is deviating from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and a class-based, proletarian assessment of the processes and events under way in the party and country. How can it be that a “permanent” session of the Prague municipal party committee is being allowed to carry out subversive work against the decisions and measures of the KSČ CC, attacking the CC from right-wing opportunist positions?³⁰³

Undoubtedly there are healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. But if they are not soon mobilized and do not adopt decisive measures in the near future to destroy the enemies of socialism, and if we fail to provide them with comprehensive support, it cannot be excluded that the Communist Party will gradually be transformed into a social-democratic entity and the country will lose its socialist gains. This is something that we, the Soviet Communists, cannot permit.³⁰⁴ The other fraternal parties that took part in the Warsaw meeting also will not permit this. Our means and capabilities, and the efforts we have exerted in connection with the changing situation in Czechoslovakia, have probably³⁰⁵ been inadequate thus far. That is why we must act quickly to use every possible means of halting the counter-revolution.

In his report Comrade Brezhnev convincingly gave a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Communist

Party of Czechoslovakia and in the country. His report showed what enormous work the CC Politburo of our party and the CC Politburos of the other fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties have been carrying out to help the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia objectively and correctly comprehend the situation and to prevent them from abandoning socialism or taking steps that will be inimical to their party and to socialism.

It must also be said that they [the Czechoslovak leaders] have listened closely to our arguments and agreed with our points. They have even thanked us for our advice and claimed that all the negative things happening in their party and country can supposedly be explained by the fact that they, as new leaders, have not yet fully gained control of the situation and have not yet been able to embark on a struggle against the enemies of socialism.

Life has shown that some of these leaders are only masquerading under revolutionary phrases and are pretending to support friendship with our party and country and devotion to the cause of socialism. In reality they are playing a double game – saying one thing and doing another.

As you know, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted an important document, the so-called “Action Program,” even though a better program had already been laid out in the resolutions of the KSČ’s 13th Congress.³⁰⁶ We did not express open criticism of the³⁰⁷ “Action Program,” but we candidly told the Czechoslovak comrades about its shortcomings, particularly that it deviated from a Marxist-Leninist conception of the leading role of the party. We warned them that their enemies might exploit the weak points in this program. Unfortunately, that is precisely what happened. With the connivance of the KSČ CC, the rightist elements are disseminating their propaganda by seizing on the weak points of the “Action Program.”

It is not by chance that forces hostile to socialism exploited this “program” when composing their own counter-revolutionary manifesto, the “2,000 Words,” which was aimed at discrediting the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and inciting anarchy and a fundamental change of the social order.³⁰⁸ The document was an attempt to bring about the ideological destruction of the Communist Party and to push it onto a bourgeois-liberal path, placing Czechoslovakia in opposition to the commonwealth of socialist countries.

Obviously we must now speak openly about and voice Marxist-Leninist criticism of this “Action Program” so that we can help the healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia understand how far they have been dragged into an opportunistic morass by certain leaders of the party.

It is impossible to understand why the Czechoslovak comrades have displayed such complacency when faced with the intensifying propaganda of Western imperialist circles, particularly the USA and West Germany. The point here is not only that with the advent of new leaders this propaganda has not been given a necessary rebuff, but that in Czechoslovakia itself the propaganda is being featured prominently in the newspapers, on television, and on radio. The only thing this accommodating approach by the KSČ CC Presidium has

achieved is to play into the hands of the counterrevolutionaries.

Has this situation arisen by chance? No, it is not by chance. This is evident from the unusual interest that the imperialist circles of the United States of America and West Germany have shown in the events in Czechoslovakia, and the elaborate promises they have made that they will extend large-scale credits once a government of right-wing opportunist elements³⁰⁹ has come to power and broken away from the Soviet Union. The West German revanchists are especially delighted by these events. They have even put forth the notion of a “united Europe.”³¹⁰ They are claiming that “the hour of truth, having arrived in Czechoslovakia in various spheres of social and state activities, is creating an important basis for a united Europe.”

These designs of our class enemies must induce caution among all Communists.³¹¹ Indeed, at the Warsaw meeting of the leaders of parties and governments of the socialist countries, it was said, with all the candor one would expect of Marxist-Leninists, that a mortal danger is hanging over the Communist Party and socialism in Czechoslovakia, and that all necessary assistance must therefore be given to that country to extirpate the forces of counterrevolution, uphold the unity of the party on a Marxist-Leninist basis, and defend socialism – the great achievement of the working class in Czechoslovakia.

Every party bears responsibility first and foremost before its own working class and its own people. At the same time, each party bears responsibility before the international forces of socialism.

In fulfilling our internationalist duty, our party and people bore enormous sacrifices to destroy the dark forces of fascism and liberate the occupied peoples. Our relations with the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia have been sealed with the blood of our joint struggle against the common enemy, reinforced by our fraternal alliance relations.

As a result, we are unable—and do not have the right—to stand idly by while all this is happening so close to our western border, in socialist Czechoslovakia. And if the Czechoslovak leaders do not want to mobilize the party and people in a sustained struggle against the counterrevolution to defuse it and then deal it a decisive blow, we must openly tell them that we have a different view and might end up on the opposite side of the barricades.³¹²

They must also know that the Soviet Union and its friends in the Warsaw Pact will never permit the counterrevolution to tear apart the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia. In this respect, we have every right to do whatever is needed to fulfill our alliance obligations and defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people.

In the dangerous situation that has unfolded, we must act in a well-conceived way, but also boldly and decisively, since time is slipping away. The threat to the great cause of socialism does not give us the right to behave in any other way.

As a participant in the Dresden and Warsaw meetings and also in meetings with the leaders of the Communist Party

of Slovakia, I want to emphasize the profound unease that the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of the socialist countries and the KSČ’s own healthy forces feel about the situation in Czechoslovakia and the unanimity of their views about recent events and about measures that must be carried out to protect the gains of socialism in Czechoslovakia.³¹³ The letter sent by the participants in the Warsaw meeting to the KSČ Central Committee unquestionably will help the party’s healthy forces launch a decisive attack against the opportunist group and mobilize the workers and all laborers to destroy the counterrevolution and defend socialism.

The conclusions of Comrade Brezhnev’s report are very serious and totally correct. The steps he mentions there are absolutely essential. The Communists of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people are well aware of what is going on in neighboring Czechoslovakia and are assessing it properly. They ardently and unanimously support the measures carried out by the CPSU Central Committee and will do everything to provide urgent assistance to the Communists and Czechoslovak people at this trying hour.³¹⁴



DOCUMENT No. 24

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 1-18, original in Russian.]

Comrades!³¹⁵

My task, in reporting to you about the Warsaw meeting of the delegations from the Communist and workers’ parties of the socialist countries, and also about the CPSU CC Plenum that just ended after considering this matter, is facilitated somewhat by the fact that the decree from the CPSU CC Plenum and the Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia from the fraternal parties, as well as the results of the Warsaw conference, have been published, and you undoubtedly have read them. What is more, the CPSU CC has been continually providing information to the party aktiv about events in Czechoslovakia and the measures adopted by the CPSU and fraternal parties.³¹⁶

These documents have meticulously and clearly defined the position we have adopted, provided an assessment of the ongoing events in Czechoslovakia, and drawn all necessary conclusions. After thoroughly discussing the whole report presented by Cde. Brezhnev, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee affirmed the correctness of his assessments and conclusions. The Plenum wholeheartedly voted its complete approval of the CC Politburo’s actions on this matter. With unswerving unanimity, the CPSU CC Plenum expressed its admiration and total endorsement of the results of the Meeting in Warsaw of the delegations from the Communist and workers’ parties of the socialist countries.

The Warsaw meeting was the third in a series of meetings on the Czechoslovak question. Dresden, Moscow, and now, finally, Warsaw. Even so, the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has not drawn appropriate conclusions from the advice and warnings they have received from the other fraternal parties. This has caused the situation in that country to deteriorate even further and to become even more complex. Moreover, the KSČ leadership refused even to take part in the Warsaw conference, having thereby placed themselves in opposition to the parties of the five other countries.

All the participants in the Warsaw conference believe that extremely dangerous events are occurring in Czechoslovakia, that the KSČ is deviating from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and that a threat has now arisen that the KSČ will be transformed into a social democratic party. There is a grave danger that this transformation will be realized as early as the KSČ's 14th Congress.³¹⁷

The urgency of that danger can be seen in the whole course of events and also in the composition of the delegates who were chosen to devise the KSČ's new Party Rules. The new rules omit the principle of democratic centralism and downgrade the leading role of the party by providing for the formation of factions and groups and the freedom to hold discussions of any sort.³¹⁸ Moreover, the KSČ leadership recently adopted a number of mistaken and dubious decisions and steps that will continue to enervate the party rather than strengthen it.

The upcoming elections to the National Assembly, which the rightist elements intend to carry out without the Communists, might lead to a further and irrevocable departure of Czechoslovakia from socialism, the restoration of capitalism, and the establishment of a bourgeois republic.³¹⁹

Thus, the problem today is not just some minor difficulties or complex processes, as the leading officials in Czechoslovakia keep trying to assure us. Instead, the problem is that a grave, right-wing opportunist danger has arisen in a fraternal Communist party, and that anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia are growing. The basis for a counterrevolution in that country is the lingering presence of bourgeois elements who are unremittingly hostile to Communism.

The KSČ has been diluted by the escapades of petit-bourgeois and even bourgeois parties, especially the Social Democratic and National Socialist Parties.³²⁰ Of the pro-Beneš forces alone, more than 250,000 were admitted into the KSČ. All this has greatly complicated the situation and is vitiating the class essence and class orientation of the party.

Everyone at the Warsaw conference agreed that the alarm expressed by Communists in the socialist countries about the situation in the KSČ has grown rapidly. Since January, the situation has become increasingly dangerous. The resolutions of the May plenum of the KSČ, especially the passage acknowledging the rightist danger as the main threat, have not been carried out. The weaknesses and mistakes of the KSČ leadership are being skillfully exploited by the right-wing opportunists and reactionaries in the struggle against

the KSČ and the socialist order. The country is experiencing many trends hostile to Marxism-Leninism, including different types of reformism, revisionism of both the right and the left, and national-chauvinism. In all of this we see a danger that the imperialist and anti-Communist forces are dealing a blow not only to Czechoslovakia, but to all of our socialist countries and to the international Communist and workers' movement.

We understand that on matters of European security our strength is based on the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, the unity of our efforts and actions, our economic might, and our ideological conviction in the irreconcilable struggle against class enemies.

The KSČ, through its own actions, is weakening the socialist forces in Europe and is violating the common line of the socialist countries on foreign policy issues. Evidence for this comes from the invitation to Brandt to visit Czechoslovakia, where, by some accounts, he will bring up the matter of the return of the Sudeten Germans to Czechoslovakia.³²¹ And what are we to think when we hear ever louder statements opposing the Warsaw Pact? The government organs [of Czechoslovakia] are flirting with the FRG and the United States of America. There is a danger that Czechoslovakia will fall under their influence, since it is known that the USA wants to create a Little Entente that would encompass Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the FRG, thereby establishing American hegemony in Europe.

The serious mistakes of the Czechoslovak leaders bring joy to our enemies. The imperialists in the USA and the FRG do not conceal the fact that they have selected Czechoslovakia as the target of their ongoing actions. They are trying gradually, through peaceful means, to destroy the socialist order there. But it is possible under some circumstances that they will use other means as well. We must be prepared for all of this.

That is why, in the letter to the KSČ CC, officials from the fraternal parties who took part in the Warsaw conference candidly, firmly, and resolutely expressed all their concerns about the danger that is looming over Communists and socialist gains in Czechoslovakia. They called on them to embark on a vigorous struggle against the right-wing opportunist danger and the threat of a counterrevolutionary takeover. The situation has now reached the point where the loss of every hour through indecisiveness is playing into the hands of our enemies.

Do the Czechoslovak leaders yet understand the full complexity of the situation, and will they draw the necessary conclusions? We'll be able to tell in the near future.

It must be said that in addition to everything that has happened, a further complication arises from the fact that certain leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia are losing their class instinct. They pay lip service to the existence of a serious danger, but at the same time they fail to wage a decisive struggle against it.

One might ask: why? Can it be that they are just spineless, wishy-washy liberals? Hardly! Dubček, Černík, and certain other leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslo-

vakia know no equal when it comes to the struggle against so-called conservatives, even though the latter pose no threat to anyone and include many devoted Communists.

Under the banner of this struggle, they have dismissed hundreds of party, council, economic, administrative, and military officials and subjected them to groundless attacks, harassment, and outright persecution. This has occurred both in the center and in outlying areas. They have replaced almost all the secretaries of regional, municipal, and district parties. This action, too, was not motivated by any real necessity.

The Czechoslovak leaders disregarded the fact that among all these officials were many hard-working and devoted Communists, who created the party, worked in the anti-fascist underground, fought in the ranks of the Soviet Army against the fascists and in the partisans, and bore the entire burden of establishing a workers' and peasants' regime and of building socialism.

At the same time, these leaders have failed to impose strict party disciplinary measures against even a single member of the vile right-wing opportunist group of Kriegel, Císař, Šik, and others.

The rightist elements are carrying out endless attacks and seeking to isolate and put pressure on the healthy forces in the KSČ. They are now putting forth a new slogan: With Dubček against the Dubčekites! And they are engaged in an unrestrained campaign to compromise and persecute the best cadres of the KSČ who adhere to sound political positions. This applies, in particular, to Kolder, Indra, Bifak, and others.

Moreover, under the guise of democracy, the Czechoslovak leaders are displaying what for Communists is an unacceptable degree of tolerance for the statements of anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary elements and their direct attacks against the USSR and the other socialist countries—Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, and Hungary. In this way, they are fundamentally betraying the interests of the working class and of socialism.

At the Dresden conference it was said that the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has lost control of the mass media – the press, radio, and television. The Czech leaders acknowledged this at the time. They assured us that they would adopt the most urgent and decisive measures to restore order in the party and the country. Since then, more than three months has passed. But has the situation changed? No, not in the slightest. Not only has the situation failed to improve; it has actually gotten worse. And the point to be stressed here, as you understand, is that the matter could have been resolved within hours if they had asserted order and taken the situation into their own hands. But nothing of the sort has been done.

As previously, these powerful levers of ideological influence are under the control of opportunist and anti-socialist elements, who are actively using them to carry out political terror, deceive the working class, and exert pressure on the healthy forces in the party.

The press, radio, and television are openly featuring hostile, counterrevolutionary, anti-socialist propaganda and

are bringing pressure to bear on the district and regional conferences that are now under way. They are continuing to engage in unfounded persecution against devoted party cadres and are branding them with the label of “conservatives” while extolling the “progressives,” who are members of the opportunist, revisionist group.

Only in such circumstances could a patently counter-revolutionary manifesto appear in the central newspapers in Czechoslovakia under the title “2,000 Words.”³²² Despite the KSČ CC Presidium's formal condemnation of this document, the press, radio, and television are giving wide and positive coverage to it. Moreover, this shameful document has become a lively topic of discussion at district and regional party conferences. At some of the conferences, through the connivance of the CC and regional party committees, the document has been endorsed by some of the delegates.

What is occurring in Czechoslovakia and in the KSČ is far from an internal matter. It is an attempt to strike a blow against the socialist countries and against the international Communist movement.

Demagoguery about freedom of speech is being exploited by the counterrevolution to inflict the most dangerous blows against the revolutionary gains of the working class.

That is where the game of “unlimited” democracy, a Czechoslovak “model of socialism,” and “renewal” has brought us! All of this indicates that the activity of a hostile center, possibly in the KSČ CC Presidium itself, long ago conceived these plans and operations.

The Czechoslovak comrades babble on about their wholehearted support for “democratic socialism,” but they disregard the fact that our country, the first country in the world in which socialism triumphed, has already been living and prospering for more than 50 years in accordance with socialist laws. What sort of “democratic socialism” are they promoting?

If you look closely at what is going on, you find that the word “democratic” is a subterfuge for a transformation of the socialist order, depriving it of its class essence. No such thing as abstract democracy exists in nature. Democracy always was and is class-based. Anyone who fails to recognize this cannot be called a Communist.

The KSČ leadership should have understood long ago that Western policy in Eastern Europe is a seductive policy for unstable elements. Various types of economic reforms and an improvement of the economy in return for Western credits – this is only a trap by the bourgeoisie.³²³

Some in Czechoslovakia are calling for the Communist Party to become an elite party, not a party of the working class. These rightist forces want to soften and dilute the KSČ even more. They are proposing to give the party an injection by suddenly bringing into its ranks some 250,000-300,000 young people, primarily students.³²⁴ What does this mean?

This “theory” is alien to Marxism-Leninism insofar as Communists always have totally defended the interests of the vanguard in our society, the working class. The pro-

posed growth and increased membership of the party must come primarily at the expense of workers.

But that, unfortunately, is not where matters end. It is all too obvious that the KSC, from January on, has been losing one position after another, and that the most important segments in the country are ceding leadership to the hostile forces. A full-fledged counterrevolution has now engulfed the political arena. Now they are no longer speaking, as they were earlier, about mistakes and shortcomings connected with the activities of certain individuals. Instead, they are blaming everything on the party and the socialist order. The chronology of events attests to the consistent and rapid expansion of the rightist elements.

All manner of hostile groups are emerging in the country. The former right-wing Social Democrats have reestablished their party and set up primary organizations as well as district and regional supervisory centers.

All of these hostile and provocative outbursts and actions have not been met with a necessary rebuff either from the KSC leadership or from the government. Moreover, the KSC leaders say that the CPSU and other fraternal parties supposedly are exaggerating the situation in their party and country.

This is being done to gloss over what is in fact a dangerous situation, to induce us to let down our guard, and to disorient the healthy forces in the KSC.

For this reason, we can say, with full responsibility that by losing control [of the mass media], discarding the principles of democratic centralism, engaging in unprincipled discussions and malicious criticism, and failing to punish the increased activity of the right-wing opportunist group, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is abandoning the principles of Marxism-Leninism and a class-based, proletarian assessment of processes and events in the party and country.

How can it be that a "permanent" plenum of the Prague municipal committee is allowed to carry out its subversive work against the resolutions and measures of the KSC CC and attacking the CC from a right-wing opportunist standpoint?

Undoubtedly, there are healthy forces in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but if they do not soon begin to act and do not take decisive measures in the near future to destroy the enemies of socialism, and if we do not give them comprehensive support, it cannot be ruled out that these healthy forces will come under pressure and be thrown out of the party.³²⁵ That would be a tragedy for the KSC, the working class, and the socialist order of Czechoslovakia.

This is something that we, the Soviet Communists, will not permit. It is also something that the other fraternal parties who attended the Warsaw Meeting will not permit. Obviously, our means and capabilities, and the efforts we are making in connection with the changing situation in Czechoslovakia, are already inadequate. For that reason, it is essential to act faster in using all means and measures to put an end to the counterrevolution.

We undoubtedly are using all political, ideological, and

psychological means to influence events, but if, in the struggle, the healthy forces end up being threatened with mortal danger and the counterrevolution keeps up its attacks against the KSC and socialist gains, we will rely on the will of our party, the will of our people, and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact to resort to the most extreme measures.³²⁶

We understand that there may be a great uproar, and it is even possible that there will be rash actions and armed resistance by extreme right-wing elements acting at the behest of foreign intelligence services.³²⁷ Perhaps this will complicate the situation in the international Communist and workers' movement.³²⁸ We will be using decisive measures to teach a fundamental lesson to the imperialist intriguers as well as the rightists and counterrevolutionary elements.

A blow also will be struck against some anti-party and anti-popular elements who are active from time to time in certain countries that are friendly to us. The counterrevolutionary elements can then blame themselves. Everything must be done to preserve the KSC as a Marxist-Leninist party and to preserve the socialist gains of the working class in Czechoslovakia.

At the CPSU CC Plenum, Comrade Brezhnev's fully authoritative report gave a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in the country. It showed the enormous work carried out by our party's Politburo and the Politburos of the other fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties in helping the leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia evaluate the situation objectively and properly, and in helping them forestall any retreat from Marxism-Leninism.

They have been warned against taking any ill-conceived actions that would be disastrous for the party and for socialism. It must be said that they closely listened to our explanations, agreed with our arguments, and even thanked us for the advice and claimed that all the negative phenomena in the party and the country can be explained by the fact that they, as new leaders, still have not fully gained control of the situation. They also claimed that they will not relent in the struggle against the enemies of socialism, and they assured us that they would need just two weeks to restore order—which soon became a month, and then a month-and-a-half.

The months passed, and matters did not improve. On the contrary, the situation became even more alarming and dangerous. Finally, after assuring us that the situation would be remedied after the May plenum of the KSC CC, and then after the district and regional party conferences, they are now assuring us that it will be fixed after the 14th KSC Congress. But there is great reason to be doubtful about this.

Life has shown that some of these leaders merely assumed the guise of revolutionary phrasing, friendship with our party and country, devotion to the cause of socialism, and fawning assurances. In reality, they acted as double-dealers, saying one thing and doing another.

As you know, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted an important document, the so-called "Action Program," even though the best program for them would have been the resolutions of the KSC's

13th Congress.³²⁹

We have not expressed open criticism of the "Action Program," although we have candidly told the Czechoslovak comrades about its weaknesses, in particular about its retreat from the Marxist-Leninist conception of the leading role of the party. We said that this program itself provided for a further weakening of the KSČ. It envisages an unacceptable partnership with other parties in supervising the country's affairs.

We warned them that their enemies might exploit the weak points of this program. Unfortunately, that is precisely what happened. With the connivance of the KSČ CC, the rightist elements are conducting propaganda precisely by exploiting the weak and ambiguous points in the "Action Program." On this basis, the Social Democrats are stepping up their activity, and various clubs of a dubious nature and purpose are taking shape.

We must now candidly speak out and criticize the "Action Program" from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The point here is not only that with the advent of a new leadership, this propaganda has not been given a necessary rebuff, but also that in Czechoslovakia itself the propaganda has been given pride of place on the pages of newspapers and on television and radio.

In Prague, an American and unadorned Zionist gives a public speech in which he calls socialist Poland a "social-fascist" country, but Dubček and Černík simply remain silent.³³⁰ It is obvious that all of this is being indulged from above. Such an accommodating stance by the KSČ can only play into the hands of the counterrevolution.

Are these developments accidental? Not in the least! This is evident from the unusual interest that the imperialist circles of the USA and West Germany are displaying toward events in Czechoslovakia and the elaborate promises of large-scale loans that they will give if right-wing opportunist forces come to power and break away from the Soviet Union.

The German revanchists are especially happy about these events. They have even broached the idea of a "united Europe," that is, they say that the "hour of truth, having arrived in Czechoslovakia in different spheres of social and state life, is creating favorable conditions for a united Europe."³³¹

Still, these enemies understand certain things; Bonn and even the Pope in Rome are evaluating the situation in Czechoslovakia and do not want to establish diplomatic relations or conclude any type of agreements, much less give credits, until the KSČ has been destroyed once and for all.

The effort by class enemies to bring about the destruction of the KSČ must instill caution in all of us Communists. Caution is precisely what was expressed at the Warsaw meeting of the leaders of the parties and governments of the socialist countries, where it was said, with all the frankness customary of Marxist-Leninists, that a terrible danger is hanging over the Communist Party and the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia. That is why all necessary aid will be provided to the KSČ to destroy the forces of counterrevolution, bolster the unity of the party on a Marxist-Leninist basis, and

defend socialism and the great gains of the working class in Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Gomułka said in his speech that the inviolability of the borders of the socialist countries rests on our unity, the strength of the Soviet Union, and the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact.³³²

Comrade Kádár declared that the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the government are ready for any actions that are needed to block the path of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Ulbricht said that the Czechoslovak leadership is not in a position to contend with the raging counterrevolution and the demagogic elements, and our duty is to use all means to help the KSČ and its healthy forces gain control of the situation and restore order in the country.

Comrade Zhivkov said that obviously the means we have brought to bear so far have proven insufficient, and the fate of the country and the KSČ are not in the hands of the current leaders. Increasingly, the right-wing and counterrevolutionary elements are in control of the situation. We must comprehensively support and deliver a blow against the counterrevolution through all possible means.³³³

From our delegation, Comrade Brezhnev said that the CPSU and government and the peoples of our multinational country are ready to provide all possible means of assistance to socialist Czechoslovakia against the burgeoning counterrevolution. Every party bears responsibility first and foremost before its own working class and its own nation. At the same time, it bears responsibility before the international forces of socialism.

In fulfilling our internationalist duty, our party and people bore colossal sacrifices to destroy the dark forces of fascism and to liberate the peoples. Our relations with the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia are sealed in the blood we jointly shed during the struggle against a common enemy. They are also sealed in fraternal allied relations.³³⁴

The demagoguery of certain KSČ leaders on this matter is inappropriate and pernicious, and it plays into the hands of class enemies. For this reason we are unable and do not have the right to stand idly by while all of this is going on in socialist Czechoslovakia, so close to our western borders.

And if the Czechoslovak leaders do not want to mobilize the party and country for a struggle against the counterrevolution to neutralize it and then deal it a fatal blow, we can openly say that we see things differently and might end up on the other side of the barricades.

They must know that the Soviet Union and its friends in the Warsaw Pact will not permit the counterrevolution to rend asunder the Communist Party and people of Czechoslovakia. In accordance with this, the Warsaw Pact countries will fulfill their alliance obligations to defend the socialist gains of the Czechoslovak people.

We must react sharply to the complex events in Czechoslovakia. These events affect the interests of all socialist countries, and we cannot stand on the sidelines, since we are Communist-internationalists.

The rightist forces are trying to cover up their under-

ground counterrevolutionary activities by pontificating about sovereignty. To be sure, we respect the sovereignty of every country, particularly a socialist country. But if, under the cloak of sovereignty, the counterrevolutionary forces are eviscerating the Communist Party, destroying socialist gains, and undermining alliance obligations, we are not able to tolerate this and must give a decisive rebuff that will annihilate the rightists, destroy the counterrevolution, protect the party and socialist gains, and thereby uphold the existing sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.³³⁵ The behavior of the rightists and their games about sovereignty are reminiscent of a boat sailing on the sea, with each passenger sitting in his own place. Everything begins fine, but imagine that one of the passengers begins drilling a hole in the boat under his sovereign seat, while declaring that sovereignty must be observed. Would it not be better in this case if all the others in the boat ganged up against and tossed overboard anyone who would defend such sovereignty?

In the dangerous situation we face, we must act in a well-conceived way, but boldly and decisively, since time is running out and the threat to the great cause of socialism does not entitle us to act differently.

I, as a participant in the Dresden and Warsaw meetings and also in bilateral meetings with the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, would like to emphasize the profound anxiety of the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of the socialist countries and of the KSC's healthy forces about the situation in Czechoslovakia. I would also like to emphasize their unanimous assessment of events and of the measures that must be taken to preserve socialist gains in that country.

The letter sent by the participants in the Warsaw meeting to the KSC Central Committee undoubtedly will help the healthy forces deal a blow to the opportunist group and mobilize the workers and all laborers to destroy the counterrevolution and defend socialist gains in Czechoslovakia.

Comrades! Permit me to express my certainty that Communists in the capital of our republic and the capital oblast, as well as all other workers in the hero city and oblast of Kyiv, unanimously and fervently support the measures and actions of the Central Committee and CPSU CC Politburo aimed at defending socialist gains in Czechoslovakia.

The Communists of Ukraine and the whole people of our republic know very well what is going on in our neighboring state, Czechoslovakia. They evaluate the situation properly and forthrightly.

We assure the CPSU CC that we are ready at any moment to provide urgent assistance to the Communists and Czechoslovak people in the difficult situation that has emerged.

DOCUMENT No. 25

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 1-4, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

At the invitation of the oblast committee of the CP of Ukraine, a delegation from the East Slovakian³³⁶ region of the ČSSR, headed by the first secretary of the KSC regional committee, Cde. Miroslav Štěpán, visited the Chernihiv oblast of the UkrSSR from 20 to 24 July to learn about the livelihood of workers and the further development of friendly ties.

The delegation consisted of the following:

Josef Grösser – chairman of the oblast national committee

Jaroslav Ondráček – member of the KSC oblast committee presidium; professor and chair of the department for infectious diseases at the Hradec-Králové medical faculty of Charles University

Václav Jindřich – worker at the “Škoda” factory in Hradec-Králové; secretary of the enterprise party organization

Jaroslava Prof – livestock specialist at a state farm; member of the KSC's Trutnov district committee

During their stay in Chernihiv oblast, the members of the delegation learned about work routines in party and government organs and about the daily lives of collectives at enterprises, collective farms, and educational institutions.

The Chernihiv oblast committee of the CP of Ukraine reports that during the discussions the leader of the delegation, Cde. Štěpán, reviewed the current situation in the ČSSR and expressed approval of the processes under way there.

The thrust of his comments was that over the past 20 years the economy of the ČSSR has not developed, national income and people's living standards have not increased, the management of economic and social affairs has been marked by subjectivism and capriciousness, and conditions have been unsuitable for the fruitful activity of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and party and economic workers. He declared that popular trust in the party was undermined by the unreasonable policies of A. Novotný.

Cde. Štěpán repeatedly emphasized that these shortcomings and the discontent they produce are supposedly the result of an uncritical view and blind imitation of Soviet planning methods, Soviet work styles, and the methods of the Soviet party and state apparatus.

During the discussions, the Czechoslovak comrades emphasized that it was impossible to continue that way, since it was threatening the ideals of socialism and the authority of the party. Although they claimed that the process of democratization of social life and the elimination of subjectivist ele-

ments in economic development are supported by a majority of the party and the people, they did not deny that anti-socialist, hostile forces are trying to exploit this process for their own aims.

When Cde. Štěpán was asked why anti-socialist elements in the ČSSR were being permitted to return to active political life and to use the mass media, he made an unconvincing attempt to attribute this to the lack of unity in the CC and the party, the resistance from supporters of A. Novotný, and the necessity of having the people exert pressure on them. Cde. Štěpán also tried to depict this as a tactic aimed at demarcating social forces so that they can identify who the friends and foes of socialism are. He declared that half of the Czechoslovak nation currently supports the KSČ, a quarter are wavering, and the remaining quarter do not support the party's policy.

When asked why this "process" has been dragged out and the KSČ CC, the government, and the local party organs are not always in control of events, Cde. Štěpán argued that the demarcation of social forces is not yet completed. The Communists and healthy forces of the nation, he added, will not permit a change in the socialist course or in the internal and foreign policies of the state; nor will they permit any erosion of friendship with the Soviet Union.

One of the members of the delegation, Professor Jaroslav Ondráček, who was elected a member of the KSČ regional committee presidium at the recent party conference, expressed strong support for the process of "democratization." From his statements it was evident that his sympathies lie with the countries of the West. During one of the discussions, he stated: "I don't understand and cannot explain to students why we must live worse than the West Germans. After all, their economy suffered more during the war years than ours did, and they have a capitalist system whereas we have socialism. Nonetheless, living standards in their country are much higher than in our country." He spoke a lot about the shortcomings in arrangements for cultural exchanges and tourism between our countries. During one of the discussions, he reported that his daughters twice had gone on vacation in the FRG, whereas he supposedly was unable to send them on vacation to the Soviet Union. Although he gave a favorable assessment of the actions of young people and students in the ČSSR, he did not deny that they are leaning toward anarchism.

A worker at the "Škoda" factory in Hradec-Králové, Cde. Václav Jindřich, currently serves as the secretary of the factory's party committee in addition to his regular duties at work. At the recent regional party conference he was chosen a member of the KSČ regional committee. In the past he worked in the KSČ CC apparatus, but he was dismissed because of his disagreement with the CC's line on economic issues. He worked as a secretary at one of the KSČ district committees, but was soon removed from his post. He was then arrested and served time in prison. He is an active supporter of the "democratization" process, and he spoke in support of the economic platform outlined at the May plenum of the KSČ CC by the ČSSR deputy prime minister, Cde.

O. Šik. According to the members of the delegation, Cde. Jindřich will be elected a delegate to the 14th KSČ Congress and will be recommended to be brought into the CC.

From the discussions with another member of the delegation, the chairman of the regional national committee, Cde. J. Grösser, it is evident that of all the members of the delegation, he has the most clear-headed view of the situation in his country and realistically sees the threat posed by anti-socialist forces. According to him, the greatest danger is that no one in the ČSSR is in any way exercising leadership and no one knows what techniques and methods must be adopted to build socialism according to a "Czechoslovak model."

While pointing out the serious dangers arising from the situation in the country, he said that as a representative of the old leadership (until May of this year, Cde. Grösser worked as a first deputy chairman of the regional national committee), he is now unable to draw attention to himself, since he will immediately be removed from office. He repeatedly stated that he will do everything required of him to forestall the consolidation of rightist forces in the region. Cde. Grösser reported that he has been called many times on the phone in his apartment by people threatening him with physical reprisals.

When the leader of the delegation, Cde. Štěpán, explained the essence of events in the ČSSR and answered questions, he said that the ongoing process will not impinge on the foundations of socialism or the ČSSR's friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. When asked why Czechoslovakia is tolerating anti-socialist actions, he answered that "even a pure stream brings scum to the top," and that the Czechoslovak people have enough common sense, strength, and courage to clean out everything that is carried up. However, he was unable to say concretely how the party, government, and local organs will regain control of the process, and he limited himself to general comments about the party's authority and the healthy forces in the nation.

The members of the Bureau of the Chernihiv Oblast committee of the Ukrainian CP and the members of the Executive Committee of the oblast Council of Workers' Deputies who took part in the discussions with the Czechoslovak comrades conveyed to them their anxiety about the growing signs of anti-socialist trends in the process of "democratization." They also rebutted the mistaken interpretation that the Czechoslovak comrades have of the essence of this process.

Reported for informational purposes.

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

22 July 1968
No. 1/74

DOCUMENT No. 26

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 29-32, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

The Transcarpathian Oblast party committee reported to the UkrCP CC that on 16 July a meeting along the border took place between the second secretary of the oblast party committee, Cde. V. G. Dykusharov,³³⁷ and a secretary of the KSČ's East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Jaromír Hetteš, who is the acting leader of the regional committee while Cde. J. Koscelanský is on vacation. Cde. Hetteš's request for the meeting was motivated by a need to discuss the agenda for an upcoming visit of a delegation of party workers from the East Slovakia region to Transcarpathia.

Also taking part in the meeting were the head of the financial department of the KSČ's East Slovakia regional committee, Cde. J. Vislocký, the first secretary of the KSČ's Michalovce district committee, Cde. A. Pirč, the head of the financial department of the Transcarpathian Oblast party committee, Cde. P. M. Honcharyk, and the first secretary of the UkrCP's Uzhhorod district committee, Cde. H. I. Shman'ko.³³⁸

During the meeting the Slovak comrades spoke about the current situation in the ČSSR and, in particular, about the situation in the East Slovakia region.

The KSČ regional committee secretary, Cde. Hetteš, was inclined to play down the danger arising from the situation in the country. When Cde. Hetteš was not present, the first secretary of the KSČ's Michalovce district committee, Cde. Pirč, and the head of the financial department of the KSČ regional committee, Cde. Vislocký, disagreed with Cde. Hetteš's views and said that a very alarming situation is emerging that might have all sorts of unpleasant consequences.

During the discussion, the comrades emphasized that they are alarmed by the fact that the KSČ CC has not informed party organizations about the content of the letters that came in from the fraternal parties.³³⁹ They reported that in connection with this, at Cde. Hetteš's initiative, a session of the presidium of the KSČ's East Slovakian regional committee took place on the night of 15 July, where they discussed this and other matters pertaining to the situation in Czechoslovakia and relations with the Soviet Union. Cde. Hetteš reported that he had asked every member of the presidium to offer his opinion about these matters. All of those who spoke, with the exception of the chairman of the regional national committee, Cde. Gabriška, emphasized the necessity for the KSČ CC to strengthen friendship with the Soviet Union. In particular, Cde. Hetteš said that "Czechoslovakia is the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is Czechoslovakia." Cde. Gabriška did not make any definite comment about this, but merely said evasively that he shares everyone else's view.

During the meeting, the Slovak comrades reported that the protocol of this session of the KSČ regional committee,

with a demand for the KSČ CC to carry out a firmer and more precise line in strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union as well as a demand for the leadership of the party and government to go to Moscow for negotiations, is being sent to Prague via a secretary of the KSČ regional committee, Cde. Boboňko.³⁴⁰ Cde. Boboňko is supposed to meet personally with Cde. A. Dubček to convey this protocol to him and to inform him about the views of the KSČ East Slovakia regional committee.

During the meeting at the border, the Slovak comrades expressed their views about a number of personnel questions. For example, Cde. Vislocký expressed his fear that Cde. V. Biľak might not be reelected first secretary of the Slovak Communist Party CC at the upcoming KSS Congress.³⁴¹ He reported that Cde. V. Biľak is viewed negatively by the first secretary of the KSČ's East Slovakian regional committee, Cde. J. Koscelanský, and more recently by the first secretary of the KSČ's Central Slovakia regional committee, Cde. Ťažký. The secretary of the Slovak Communist Party CC who is responsible for ideological affairs also has an unfavorable opinion of Cde. V. Biľak. The Slovak comrades reported during our meeting that at the dinner after the regional party conference, Cde. J. Koscelanský had said it was abnormal for a Ukrainian to be in control of the Slovak nation³⁴² and for a Gypsie (he was referring here to Cde. E. Rigo—a member of the KSČ CC Presidium and chairman of the party committee of the East Slovakian metallurgical combine) to be representing the East Slovakian region. Cde. Vislocký indicated that possible candidates for the post of KSS CC first secretary include J. Zrak, the first secretary of the KSČ's Bratislava municipal committee, and an academician named Pavlík.³⁴³

The Slovak comrades reaffirmed the view they had expressed earlier that there is no unity in the KSČ CC leadership. They had an unfavorable opinion of Cdes. J. Smrkovský, F. Kriegel, and O. Šik. Cdes. Hetteš and Vislocký also spoke negatively about the ideology secretary in the KSČ's East Slovakian regional committee, Cde. Olexa, who describes the Soviet comrades as "dogmatists."³⁴⁴

Cde. Vislocký reported that the regional committee of the State Security organs apparently had received a ciphered message from Prague instructing them to monitor the deployment and movements of Soviet troops along the Soviet-Czechoslovak border.³⁴⁵

Cde. Hetteš requested that we inform the leadership of our party that, in his view, it is counterproductive to engage in open polemics in the press, as was done with the article by F. Konstantinov published in "Pravda."³⁴⁶

With regard to the "2,000 Words" appeal, Cde. Hetteš said that he condemns the part of it that is of a clearly counterrevolutionary nature. But he said that 80 percent of the document has been taken more or less verbatim from the KSČ Action Program, whereas only about 20 percent is counterrevolutionary and deserving of condemnation. During the conversation, he also asserted that it was impossible to lump the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia together with the Communist parties of the GDR, Hungary, and Romania, since these countries took part in the war against the Soviet Union.

The Slovak comrades mentioned that a week ago at the Soviet-Hungarian border in the vicinity of Komárno, Cdes. A. Dubček and O. Černík met with the head of the Hungarian government, Cde. E. Fok.³⁴⁷ At this meeting, the Czechoslovak comrades seemed to be hoping that the Hungarian comrades would support them at the forthcoming conference in Warsaw. After this meeting, Cdes. A. Dubček and O. Černík traveled to Košice, where they also invited Cde. L. Svoboda for a brief vacation in the Tatras.³⁴⁸ At the KSČ East Slovakian regional committee headquarters, the three of them held a prolonged discussion. Cde. Vislocký reported that at lunch after the discussion, Cdes. A. Dubček and O. Černík insisted that they would rather be put into prison or become manual laborers than to retreat from the course proclaimed by the January plenum of the KSČ CC.

Reported for informational purposes.

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

24 July 1968
No. 1/77



DOCUMENT No. 27

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 32, Ll. 198-201, original in Russian.]

29 August 1968
Registration No. 96/s

Secret

TO THE CPSU CC POLITBURO MEMBER AND
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE UKRAINIAN CP

Comrade P. E. SHELEST

MEMORANDUM

on measures adopted to deal with people who have expressed unsavory views about events in the ČSSR.

The absolute majority of workers in Luhans'k Oblast wholeheartedly and completely support the policy and measures of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government vis-à-vis the events in Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, there have been certain individuals who have expressed unsavory views. Appropriate work is

being carried out with them.

The Councils of Workers' Honor in a number of collectives convened sessions where they discussed the improper behavior of certain individuals.³⁴⁹

For example, at a session on 27 August, the Council of Workers' Honor at Automotive Transport Enterprise No. 12115 in Kommunars'ka discussed the case of a taxi driver, I. K. Khudobyn, who was born in 1923 and is not a party member. While driving passengers around, he expressed anti-Soviet views, claiming that the unemployed in America live better than workers do here. He extolled the multiparty systems in capitalist countries and condemned the Soviet political order, and he spoke disapprovingly about the sending of troops by Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia.

Some 15 people took part in the Council session: a leader of a chauffeurs' brigade and champion of Communist labor, V. G. Belyaev, a soldier in the Great Patriotic War and leader of a taxi drivers' brigade, D. I. Frolov, a participant in the defense of Moscow and taxi driver, I. S. Zakotyn, a soldier in the Great Patriotic War and champion of Communist labor, the chauffeur A. E. Vdovchenko, and others.

The chairman of the Council explained who everyone was by referring to the services that each had performed. He then provided information about Khudobyn's anti-Soviet outbursts.

From the questions that were asked it was clear that Khudobyn lives well and owns his own home. In his collective, no one had ever interfered with him in any way. It was also clear that he had never been in any of the countries he extolled.

The members of the Council angrily condemned Khudobyn's despicable behavior.

A leader of a chauffeurs' brigade, V. G. Belyaev, a taxi driver, I. S. Zakotyn, the head of auto column No. 2, I. I. Luchko, and a worker, E. S. Hodzevskyi, said that Khudobyn is disparaging the Soviet regime even though it gave him the right to live and work freely and provided him with material sustenance, and that he is extolling a life he has never seen and does not know.

In his speech, a taxi driver, Cde. Zakotyn, said: "I participated in the Finnish and Great Patriotic Wars. I took part in the battles to liberate Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. I was in Germany. None of these countries is better than our Motherland. You should remember that, Khudobyn. And there is nothing better than our Communist Party, nothing better than our Soviet government. It is simply disgusting for me to look at you after your ridiculous comments."

The members of the Council who spoke demanded that Khudobyn atone for his transgressions by performing honest labor.

In his own remarks at the end of the Council session, Khudobyn acknowledged his guilt and implored the Council of Workers' Honor to let him stay in the collective. He declared that he will work flawlessly, and that if it should prove necessary, he will be the first to go wherever the Motherland sends him.

The Council adopted a decision to trust Khudobyn and

keep him in the collective, but they warned him that if such misdeeds are ever repeated, the Council will request the state security organs to hold him accountable before the law.

Councils of Workers' Honor also met at the "Cultivated Crystal" Mine of the "Red Coal Vein" Trust, at Mine No. 63 of the "Red Partisan Coal" Trust, at "Dry Quarry" Mine No. 1 of the "Red Coal Mine" Trust, at the "Black Sea" Mine of the "Lysichans'k Coal" Trust, and at other sites.

In total, the Councils of Workers' Honor reviewed the cases of 10 people, including a worker at the "Cultivated Crystal" Mine, Yu. G. Rastokyn, a worker at Mine No. 63, L. D. El'tsev, a worker at "Dry Quarry" Mine No. 1, V. I. Sherep, a rock-cleaning worker at the "Black Sea" Mine, V. I. Lanov's'kyi, a worker at the "Central" Mine of the "Anthracite" Trust, A. M. Shklyar, a coal-cutter at Mine No. 68 of the "Red Partisan Coal" Trust, A. M. Runchak, a worker at Artem Mine No. 10 of the "Kommunars'k Coal" Trust, N. N. Abramenko, a tractor-driver at the technical supply facility of the "Lysichans'k Coal" Trust, E. Ermakov, and a house-painter at NOD-4 of the Luhans'k railroad division, K. M. Karyukyn.

At the "Proval's'kyi" collective farm in the Sverdlovs'k district, a party meeting considered the case of a Communist and chauffeur at the collective farm, I. V. Trebnykiv, who expressed unsavory views. The party meeting expelled him from the ranks of the CPSU.

Oblast committee secretaries and bureau members of the Ukrainian CP took part in the meetings of Councils of Workers' Honor.

The reviews by the Councils of Workers' Honor of the cases of individuals who expressed unsavory views are of great educational significance. Through these meetings, the workers themselves provide a correct political assessment of recent developments and deal a rebuff to the demagogues and slanderers.³⁵⁰ The workers also assume control over the future behavior of the individuals whose cases are discussed by the Council.

Councils of Worker' Honor also are stepping up their activity at other enterprises and organizations. Their attention is focused on the struggle against coal-cutters, violators of labor discipline, and other individuals who have engaged in immoral, anti-social acts.

OBLAST COMMITTEE SECRETARY, UKRAINIAN CP

V. SHEVCHENKO³⁵¹

DOCUMENT No. 28

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 32, Ll. 207-208, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

On 27 August, Radio Liberty broadcast a Ukrainian-language appeal from the Czech writer Miroslav Zikmund to the Soviet public.³⁵² This appeal reportedly had been disseminated earlier by the underground "Brno" radio station.³⁵³

"In these tragic times for my native land," the appeal says, "I, Miroslav Zikmund, appeal to the public of the Soviet Union. . . . You always referred to us [Czechoslovakia] as the most loyal country in the entire socialist camp. Can you really now believe that we are counterrevolutionaries?"

"I firmly appeal to you: Demand from your leaders—from Leonid Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, and other Politburo members as well as from the directors of factories, research institutes, and editorial boards—that the occupation of my homeland cease immediately. Demand an explanation of this unsurpassed treachery by your state officials, who have sacrificed the idea of socialism for great-power interests, caused a split in the international Communist movement, and blemished the honor of the Soviet peoples."

Radio Liberty emphasized that Zikmund is speaking not only for himself, but also on behalf of his friend and fellow writer, Jiří Hanzelka, who has traveled many times to the USSR.

In the final part of his statement, Zikmund specifically appealed to his friends in the Soviet Union, saying: "I request that you, Zhenya Evtushenko, not remain silent."³⁵⁴ Although I am speaking with you today on my own, without Yurii Fedorovych, this does not mean that he is of a different view.³⁵⁵ On the contrary, how could he feel differently when NKVD agents are riding all around our country, just as they did in your country during the Stalinist terror, to arrest thousands of our people who are guilty only of having sought true socialism—socialism with a human face—and of having yearned for freedom, independence, and sovereignty for nations throughout the world, including Czechoslovakia? I request that you not remain silent in the face of this terrible aggression!"

Reported for informational purposes.

SECRETARY OF THE CC, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

30 August 1968
No. 1/95

DOCUMENT No. 29

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 32, Ll. 168-172, original in Russian.]

Top Secret

CPSU CC

At the invitation of the Satu Mare, Maramureș, and Suceava county committees and the Tulcea municipal committee of the Romanian Communist Party,³⁵⁶ delegations of workers from Transcarpathia, Ivano-Frankiv'sk, and Chernivtsi oblasts and the city of Izmil, consisting of 3-4 people each, visited these counties of the Socialist Republic of Romania (with which they maintain permanent friendly ties) on 22-26 August to take part in ceremonies commemorating the 24th anniversary of the liberation of the country from fascist oppression.

The oblast committees and Izmil municipal committee of the Ukrainian CP reported to the UkrCP CC about the results of these trips and the nature of the meetings and discussions they had with the leaders of the above-mentioned [Romanian] counties.

The Soviet delegations witnessed the reactions of the Romanian side to the latest events connected with Czechoslovakia.³⁵⁷

Above all, it was evident that the population of Romania has not been given objective information about the state of affairs. It was also evident that information about the Soviet Union has been hushed up, and that a frenzied atmosphere of hostility has been stirred up against our country. Broadcasts on Soviet radio are being jammed at the same time that broadcasts on all the radio stations of capitalist countries are being received without hindrance.

Over the course of three days, the delegation from Ivano-Frankiv'sk oblast (led by the deputy chairman of the oblast executive committee, Cde. A. R. Kakhno) kept on asking the Romanian comrades to give them a Soviet newspaper. These requests, however, went unfulfilled, even though in the past our newspapers always had been on sale in Baia Mare. During commemorations of the liberation anniversary in this city in previous years, Soviet films were always shown, but this year they decided to show only films from the FRG, Italy, and France.

The central Romanian newspapers are refusing to publish materials from TASS and instead are providing tendentious coverage of the events in Czechoslovakia, adhering to the same position that the RCP leadership has adopted toward those events. They also frequently rely on information from underground radio stations in Czechoslovakia.

The official position of the Romanian leadership vis-à-vis the events in Czechoslovakia was clearly manifested during the conferences, workers' demonstrations, receptions, meetings, and discussions in which the members of the Ukrainian oblast delegations took part.

During the speeches at the workers' demonstrations, the first secretaries of the RCP county committees and the RCP Tulcea municipal committee described the assistance provided to the Czechoslovak people by the five socialist countries as an "invasion," "occupation," and other such things. The first secretary of the RCP's Satu Mare county committee, Cde. Uglar,³⁵⁸ even drew a parallel between the dispatch of troops from the socialist countries into the ČSSR and the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam. In response to these statements, certain people in the audience, who had been specially planted there, cried out: "Invaders, go home!"

The demonstrations, as a rule, were opened by armed detachments of the so-called "Patriotic Guards," which were recently set up.³⁵⁹ In a speech delivered at a demonstration in Baia Mare, the first secretary of the RCP's Maramureș county committee, Cde. Blaj,³⁶⁰ claimed that the sovereignty of the country is under threat. At the end of his speech he declared: "We will not permit any infringement of our sovereignty."³⁶¹

At a meeting in Suceava, the first secretary of the RCP county committee, Cde. Bobu,³⁶² proclaimed a slogan: "We will live, work, fight, and defend our country." But he did not explain whom they would be fighting and from whom they would be protecting the country.

During the demonstrations and meetings, there were no slogans at all about Soviet-Romanian friendship. Nor did the speakers bother to say anything about this. The only thing they mentioned about the Soviet Army is that it struggled jointly with the Romanian army against fascism.

During the receptions, meetings, and discussions, the Romanians' point of view about the events in Czechoslovakia was imposed on the members of our delegations.³⁶³ For example, in a speech at a reception hosted by the RCP's Satu Mare county committee, in which delegations from Transcarpathian Oblast (led by the chief of the Organizational-Party Work Department of the oblast party committee, Cde. V. Yu. Galla) and from the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Megyei province of Hungary (led by a secretary of the MSzMP province committee, Cde. Kállái) took part,³⁶⁴ the first secretary of the county committee, Cde. Uglar, said: "At the instruction of the RCP CC, I must make a statement to the delegations of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian People's Republic that the Central Committee of our party condemns the measures taken by the Soviet Union and the four other socialist countries toward Czechoslovakia. The Central Committee regards these measures as aggressive acts, of the sort that humanity has never before known." He then repeated the main points in the well-known speech by N. Ceaușescu on this matter.³⁶⁵ Uglar also declared that the RCP CC regrets that the CPSU CC and the Central Committees of the parties of the other socialist countries did not consult with the leaders of the RCP and SRR and did not inform the Romanian leaders of their intentions vis-à-vis the ČSSR. He said that after N. Ceaușescu's recent trip to the ČSSR, the Romanian leader had declared that there was no danger at all of a counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia.³⁶⁶

Members of the Soviet delegations explained to the Ro-

manian comrades that they are mistaken in their assessment of the underlying nature of the Czechoslovak events. During a farewell breakfast in Satu Mare, which was attended by members of the Bureau of the county party committee and members of the county executive committee, Cde. Yu. V. Galla declared that the delegation cannot agree with the statements that Cde. Uglar made at the county committee headquarters and during the meeting, which accused the USSR and other socialist countries of invading the ČSSR. "Our army," said Cde. V. Yu. Galla, "has never taken on the role of an invader. Everyone knows that we have an army of liberation. Aggression and invasions are alien to our foreign policy and are antithetical to Marxism-Leninism, the principles of proletarian internationalism, and the essence of our social order."

The next speaker, the leader of the delegation from the Szabolcs-Satu Mare³⁶⁷ province of Hungary, Cde. Kállái, also expressed regret about the unfounded allegations that our countries had committed aggression. He declared: "Having survived the counterrevolutionary rebellion of 1956, we [in Hungary] knew better than anyone else that the recent events in Czechoslovakia resembled the situation in Hungary in 1956. One must say with regret that even though the counterrevolutionaries and imperialists drew certain conclusions from the Hungarian events of 1956 and began resorting to other methods, the leaders of the KSČ did not draw any sort of lessons from the Hungarian events."³⁶⁸

Of particular interest is a private conversation that Cdes. V. Yu. Galla and Kállái had with Cde. Uglar during one of the lunches. When Cde. V. Yu. Galla asked Cde. Uglar whether he really believes what he was saying during his formal speeches and whether he agrees that the KSČ would have been subverted from within by rightist elements, Cde. Uglar responded that he and Dubček had studied together in Moscow and therefore he understands Dubeck's character extremely well. Cde. Uglar said he was surprised when he learned that Dubček had been elected First Secretary of the KSČ CC. He then said it was deplorable that such a great furor had been stirred up in Romania around the Czechoslovak question. But at that point he shifted the conversation to a different topic, explaining that they were too isolated in their discussion from the others attending the lunch.

It is worth noting that, as a rule, the official agenda for our delegations was arranged in such a way that the participants got together with only a small group of people and spent more of their time in transit or at enterprises that were not open on the day of their visit.

During the rare contacts that the members of the Soviet delegations had with typical workers in Romania, they heard statements sympathetic to our country. For example, a mechanic on the ferry that transported the delegation from Izmail said: "Who knows where we would be now if there hadn't been the assistance from the Soviet Army and the Russians in general? . . . I wouldn't rule out the possibility that we would be slaves similar to those who are now still under the imperialist yoke." At a festive reception in Baia Mare, some old Romanian Communists asked the delegation

from Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast to convey their greetings to the Communists of the Soviet Union.

Reported for informational purposes.

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE
P. SHELEST

3 September 1968
No. 1/98



DOCUMENT No. 30

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 64, Ll. 59-60, original in Ukrainian.]

No. B-40-151

18 September 1968

To the Central Committee of the Ukrainian CP³⁶⁹

The Kyiv municipal committee of the Ukrainian CP has learned that on 16 September 1968 an anonymous leaflet appealing to students at the T. G. Shevchenko Kyiv State University was found and sent from Kyiv to the head of the university committee.³⁷⁰

The text of the leaflet was prepared on a typewriter in Russian script and signed by a group known as "Voice of the People."

The state security organs are seeking to identify the author and typist of this leaflet.

Attachment: photocopy of the text of the leaflet in 2 languages

Secretary of the Kyiv Municipal
Committee of the Ukrainian CP

[signed]

Comrade Students!

You are the intellect and heart of the Country and
Nation! You are the light of verity and the rays of truth!
You are the conscience and soul of the people!

It is your obligation and your duty before the people:

1. To struggle against the runaway bureaucratism of the ruling-party bureaucrats.
2. To wage a merciless struggle against loathsome censorship, which whitewashes everything and is inimical to the nation.
3. To struggle against the parasitism of the privileged party class, demand the elimination of food stores reserved exclusively for party bosses, demand that special hospitals be closed, and organize a march against the pillaging of collective farms and state farms by oblast, municipal, and district party bosses.³⁷¹
5. To struggle against the regime of personalized power and the bosses who hold power in oblast, municipal, district, republic, and all-union establishments and institutions.³⁷²
6. To speak out against the falsification of elections for people's deputies.
7. To struggle for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly.
8. You must harshly denounce the bosses, who are frightening the people and surrounding themselves with a dim-witted, stony, and fawning protective guard.

Follow the example of the French, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and Spanish students.³⁷³

It is time to cast off the yoke and smash the willfully despotic and tyrannical clique of crazed bosses. Down with despotism and whitewashing propaganda. Return to Leninist freedom and Leninist democracy.

Voice of the People.



DOCUMENT No. 31

[Source: TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 257, LI. 2-5, original in Russian.]

CPSU CC

From 24 to 26 October 1969, a party-state delegation from the ČSSR, which was in the Soviet Union for an official, friendly visit at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee,

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, visited Kyiv.

On the first day of the visit, I joined the chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, Cde. V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the UkrSSR Supreme Soviet, Cde. A. P. Lyashko, in receiving the ČSSR party-state delegation headed by the KSCC First Secretary, Cde. G. Husák.³⁷⁴ Joining us at the reception were the members of the UkrCP CC Politburo, the candidate members of the UkrCP CC Politburo, the first deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the UkrSSR Supreme Soviet, the deputy Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, and others.

During the conversation, I told the Czechoslovak guests about the UkrCP's work and about the productive activity in the republic in honor of the 100th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth. I also told them about our comprehensive, friendly ties with the other socialist countries, in particular our ties with Czechoslovakia.

Cde. G. Husák thanked me for the heartfelt greeting extended to the delegation by the workers of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. He then gave a detailed overview of the emerging situation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

He declared that after January 1968 the KSCC was transformed into a mere discussion club. Opportunistic groups who embrace positions hostile to Marxism-Leninism appeared within the party and even in its very highest organs. All of this had a negative influence on all aspects of the political and economic life of the country.

Cde. G. Husák emphasized the close ties between the internal counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia and the imperialist countries of the West, and he noted the "importance and necessity" of sending allied troops into the territory of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. "We regard this action," Cde. G. Husák said, "as internationalist assistance from the Soviet Union and other fraternal workers' countries to Czechoslovakia in the intensifying struggle against anti-socialist forces and as support to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia."

Further on, Cde. G. Husák indicated the difficulties hampering the work of party and state organs, which are the result of the unbridled chauvinist propaganda carried out by the mass media over the past year-and-a-half to two years.

In these circumstances, said Cde. G. Husák, we must "start all our work all over again." In his estimation, the rightist forces are further entrenched in many mass organizations of workers – for example, in professional, youth, and student unions. A difficult situation persists on the cultural front, which up to now has been subject to the influence of Western propaganda. In connection with this, Cde. G. Husák noted that not all visitors arriving in Czechoslovakia understand our difficulties. These difficulties can be alleviated only by vigorous political-educational work and even, possibly, by administrative measures.

A large group of activists, Cde. G. Husák continued, have now lined up in support of the leadership. These activists support correct policies and are aiding the struggle to fulfill

the decisions of the May and September Plenums of the KSČ CC. Nonetheless, 50-60 percent of party members are doing nothing for the party. In general they are still unable to be defined. Now the KSČ is paying special attention to the re-registration of all party members and an exchange of party cards.³⁷⁵

Emphasizing the enduring need for the theoretical suitability of Communists on a Marxist-Leninist basis, Cde. G. Husák noted the great difficulties in the party's political-educational work. Because the faculties of Marxism-Leninism at the higher educational institutes, in his view, failed to come to terms with this and themselves became hotbeds of opportunism, the question has arisen about creating new party schools.³⁷⁶

Having indicated that the state system of economic management was practically destroyed, Cde. G. Husák recounted a number of important economic problems looming before the party: an increase in productivity and the stabilization of prices, wages, and foreign trade. In search of the most effective means of resolving these matters, the Czechoslovak specialists are studying the practice and experience of the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries—the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and others. It is absolutely clear to us, said Cde. G. Husák, that “we cannot develop as a country outside the camp of socialism.”

We constantly think, said Cde. G. Husák, about ways to strengthen friendly ties with the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, and about ways to overcome misunderstandings that have arisen in the international Communist and workers' movement in connection with the Czechoslovak question.³⁷⁷ Cde. G. Husák noted, in particular, that the Italian Communists still do not have a proper understanding of the Czechoslovak events.³⁷⁸ We must do everything, he emphasized, to ensure that “the Czechoslovak question will be a question only of friendship between our parties and states. There should not be any other sort of Czechoslovak question in the Communist movement.”

At the end of his speech, Cde. G. Husák expressed certainty that the process of consolidation in Czechoslovakia will proceed in the future with rapid steps in both the political and the economic spheres.

The next day, the ČSSR party-state delegation laid wreaths at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, at the graves of Czechoslovak soldiers in the Luk'yanov cemetery, and at the monument erected in honor of the soldiers of the Czechoslovak First Brigade, which took part under the command of Ludvík Svoboda in the battles to liberate Kyiv.

Later that day, the members of the delegation visited the Ukrainian technical design and research institute for superhard materials and instrumentation. After touring the laboratories and shops, the guests met with the staff of the institute. At the meeting, the director of the institute and Hero of Socialist Labor, V. N. Bakul', and the Chairman of the ČSSR Federal Government, Oldřich Černík, both spoke. On that same day the Czechoslovak friends stopped by the Exhibit of Advanced Work in the UkrSSR National Economy.

On 26 October the ČSSR party-state delegation toured

the Kyiv transportation system and rode to the village of Kodaky in the Vasyl'kivs'kyi region of Kyiv oblast, where they learned about the economic work and life of the collective farmers.³⁷⁹ After this, a Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship meeting took place in the village, attended by as many as 3,000 people. Those who spoke at the meeting, other than the collective farmers, included the Chairman of the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi, and a KSČ CC Secretary, Vasil Biľak.

In honor of the ČSSR party-state delegation, the CC of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Presidium of the UkrSSR Supreme Soviet, and the UkrSSR Council of Ministers hosted a luncheon. At the luncheon, in accordance with the instructions of the UkrCP CC, the Presidium of the UkrSSR Supreme Soviet, and the UkrSSR Council of Ministers, I gave a speech welcoming the members of the ČSSR party-state delegation. A speech responding to my remarks was delivered by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, S. Sádovský.

On that same day the Czechoslovak friends flew off to Moscow.

The texts of the speeches of the members of the ČSSR party-state delegation are attached.

Transmitted for informational purposes.

CC SECRETARY, CPOF UKRAINE

P. SHELEST

29 October 1969

NOTES

¹In Ukrainian, the name of the archive is Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads'kykh Ob'ednan' Ukrainy.

²Because the Russian version of Podgorni's name is so familiar (from his time as Soviet president) and the Ukrainian version is unfamiliar, I will use the Russian version here. For all other officials who were of Ukrainian descent, I will use the Ukrainian versions of their given names and surnames.

³The head of the reading room determines the “value” of a document, based mainly on whether the item is also stored in the Moscow archives (or some other repository outside Ukraine). The purported “value” does not necessarily correspond at all with the historical importance of a document.

⁴See Mark Kramer, “Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 (Part 1): New Evidence from the Diary of Petro Shelest,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 234-247.

⁵See Document No. 13 below. Excerpt No. 2 from Shelest's diary (pp. 236-239) in my article in Issue 10 of the CWIHP *Bulletin* includes a virtually identical statement by the hardline First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, Vasil Biľak.

⁶See, for example, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, “Istoriya i sovremennost',” *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kyiv), 29 June 1968, p. 2; and Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, “Vernost' internatsionalizmu,” *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kyiv), 7 June 1968, p. 2. For a more elaborate statement of Il'nyts'kyi's views, see his

“Nashe znamiya – internatsionalizm,” *Kommunist Ukrainy* (Kyiv), No. 1 (1969), pp. 85-93.

⁷“Rech’ tov. Yu. V. Il’ nitskogo na Plenum TsK KPSS 17 iyulya 1968 goda,” in “Plenum TsK KPSS: XXIII sozyv – Iyul’skii Plenum TsK KPSS (17.VII.1968),” 17 July 1968 (Top Secret), in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), Fond (F.) 2, Opis’ (Op.) 3, Delo (D.) 112, Listy (Ll.) 71-76. I have provided a translation of, and commentary on, Il’nyts’kyi’s speech in Part 3 of my “Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968” in a future *CWIHP Bulletin*.

⁸“Rech’ tov. P. E. Shelesta na Plenum TsK KPSS 17 iyulya 1968 goda,” in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 112, Ll. 41-51.

⁹Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Canberra: Australian National University’s Research School of Social Sciences, 1970), p. 2.

¹⁰Roman Szporluk, “The Ukraine and the Ukrainians,” in Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers, and Frederic Harned, eds., *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 30-31.

¹¹Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 23-24, 170-177, 213-225, 258-261, 284, 304, 314-315, and 361-362.

¹²On the spillover into Moldavia, see my articles in Issues 11 and 12-13 of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, pp. 263-264 and 326-335, respectively. On the spillover into the Baltic states and Belorussia, see General V. M. Chebrikov et al., *Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*, No. 2173 (Top Secret), Moscow, 1977, pp. 543-545. (A copy of this document, obtained from the Latvian archive, is on file in the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies offices.) See also “TsK KP Latvii: Informatsiya ob itogakh oznakomleniya chlenov Tsesisskogo RK partii s pis’mom TsK KPSS ‘O sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii,’” No. 1022 (Secret) from B. Indan, Secretary of the Cesu regional committee of the Latvian Communist Party (LaCP), 12 May 1968, in Latvijas Valsts Arhivs (LVA), Fonds (F.) 101, Apridos (Apr.) 32 Lietas (Li.) 82, Lapa (La.) 6; “TsK KPSS Otdel Organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty: Informatsiya ob otnoshenii trudyashchikhsya Estonskoi SSR k voprosam, svyazannym s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii,” from A. Bader, Secretary of the Estonian CP, 25 October 1968 (Secret), in Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal (ERAF), F. 130, S. 3141, J.A. 30, N. 203, Ss. 1-5; and “TsK KPSS Otdel organizatsionno-partiinoi raboty: Informatsiya ob otklikakh trudyashchikhsya Estonskoi SSR na sobytiya v Chekhoslovakii,” No. 0149 (Secret), ERAF, F. 130, S. 3141, J.A. 30, N. 203, Ss. 28-30. For evidence of “anti-Soviet incidents” and the spread of “hostile bourgeois ideology” from Czechoslovakia into Georgia, see “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 13995 (Top Secret), 23 May 1968, from V. Mzhavadnadze, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, to the CPSU Secretariat, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 22, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 22, Ll. 5-9.

¹³Evidence about the top-down pattern of decision-making, based on newly declassified materials, is provided in my forthcoming book, *Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion*. This new information undercuts much of the utility of the “bureaucratic politics” framework employed by Jiří Valenta in *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Further doubts about Valenta’s approach are raised in Mark Kramer, “The CPSU International Department: Comments and Observations,” in Sergei Grigoriev et al., *The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1995), esp. pp. 109-111.

¹⁴See, for example, the top-secret memorandum from the director-general of the Soviet TASS news agency, Sergei Lapin, 11 March 1968 in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 25, L. 3. Lapin asked the CPSU Politburo for permission to publish in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* a brief dispatch from the official Polish Press Agency about recent unrest in Poland. Brezhnev personally approved the request: A notation in his handwriting at the bottom of the memorandum says “tov. Brezhnev L. I. soglasen” (“Comrade L. I. Brezhnev agrees”).

¹⁵See, for example, “Informatsiya TsK KPSS o sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 23 March 1968, covered in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, Ll. 47-59, LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 71, La. 42-48, and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 10, Ll. 1-12; “Ob itogakh aprel’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS” (Top Secret), 18 April 1968, covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 71, La. 39-41 and LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 82, La. 9-11; “O sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 8 May 1968, covered in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, Ll. 82-86 and LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 82, La. 1-39; “Informatsiya TsK KPSS po vazhneishim voprosam vneshnei politiki i polozheniya v otdel’nykh sotsialisticheskikh stranakh” (Top Secret) and “Informatsiya TsK KPSS o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii i o nekotorykh vneshnepoliticheskikh shagakh rumynskogo rukovodstva” (Top Secret), 18 June 1968, covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 71, La. 82-94 and Li. 82, La. 54-55, and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 92-99 and D. 10, Ll. 15-26; “O sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 8 July 1968, covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 82, La. 59-65 and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 10, Ll. 27-50; “Ob itogakh iyul’skogo Plenuma TsK KPSS i itogakh Vstrechi v Varshave delegatsii kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran” (Top Secret), 18 July 1968, covered in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 21-35; “Informatsiya o vstreche v Chierne-nad-Tissoi i soveshchanii v Bratislave” (Top Secret), 4 August 1968, covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 71, La. 69-75 and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 24, Ll. 127-135; “Informatsiya o ‘Kommyunike o sovetsko-chekhoslovatskikh peregovorakh,’” 26 August 1968 (Top Secret), covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 82, La. 71-77; “Informatsiya TsK KPSS o sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 2 September 1968, covered in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 82, La. 78-89; “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. P1513 (Secret), 30 September 1968, from I. Shvets, deputy head of sector in the CPSU CC Department for Party-Organizational Work, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 10, L. 97; “O polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 7 February 1969, covered in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 176, Ll. 1-18 and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 21, Ll. 79-111; “O sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 12 February 1969, covered in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 21, Ll. 161-185; and “O sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii” (Top Secret), 27 March 1969, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 177, Ll. 1-8. See also “TsK KPSS,” Memorandum No. 14194 (Top Secret), 27 May 1968, from V. Stepakov, K. Rusakov, and V. Zagladin, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 19, Ll. 109, 133-136.

¹⁶See, for example, Documents Nos. 4 and 25 below. See also “Tsentral’nyi Komitet KPSS,” Memorandum No. 3/40 (Top Secret), from A. Lyashko, Secretary of the UkrCP, 11 May 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 27, Ll. 82-86; and “Tsentral’nyi Komitet KPSS: Informatsiya o reagirovaniya trudyashchikhsya Ukrainkoi SSR na sobytiya v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. 1/89 (Secret), from P. Shelest, 22 August 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 117-121. Among countless examples of meetings where other CPSU Politburo members (Mikhail Suslov, Viktor Grishin, Yuri Andropov, etc.) presided, see “Tsentral’nyi Komitet KPSS: Informatsiya o sobranii partiinogo aktiva Latviiskoi respubliki,” High-Frequency Cable (Top Secret) from Yu. Ya. Ruben, 19 April 1968, in LVA, F. 101, Apr. 32, Li. 71, La. 39-41; “TsK KPSS:

Informatsiya ob itogakh oznakomleniya partiinogo aktiva Moskovskoi gorodskoi partiinoi organizatsii s informatsiei TsK KPSS o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii i o nekotorykh vneshnepoliticheskikh shagakh rumynskogo rukovodstva,” Report No. 17459 (Secret), 25 June 1968, from V. Grishin, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 10, Ll. 24-26; “TsK KPSS: Informatsiya ob oznakomlenii partiinogo aktiva Moskovskoi gorodskoi partiinoi organizatsii s ocherednoi informatsiei TsK KPSS ‘O polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii,’” Report No. 19176 (Secret), 11 July 1968, from V. Grishin, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 10, Ll. 46-48; and “Informatsiya ob otklikakh gor. Moskvyy, v svyazi s polozheniem v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. 20188 (Top Secret), 21 August 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 105-110.

¹⁷See, for example, the department’s summary memorandum on the distribution of the Politburo’s June 1968 report, “TsK KPSS: O rasprostraneni Informatsii TsK KPSS o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii i nekotorykh vneshnepoliticheskikh shagakh rumynskogo rukovodstva,” Report No. 17254 (Top Secret), from N. Petrovichev, deputy head of the CPSU CC Organizational-Party Work Department, to the CPSU Politburo, 24 June 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 92-99.

¹⁸Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968*, p. 145.

¹⁹“K voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii: Vypiska iz protokola No. 95 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK ot 17 avgusta 1968 g.,” No. P95/1 (Top Secret), 17 August 1968, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 45, Prot. No. 38. For further evidence from Ukraine and Russia of the Politburo’s oversight of the final decisions, see “Informatsiya o reagirovaniyakh inostrannykh turistov v svyazi s vvodom v ChSSR voisk SSSR i drugih soyuznykh stran,” Memorandum No. 124-1/177s (Secret), from I. Ishchenko, head of the Intourist branch in Kyiv Oblast, 23 August 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 220-223; “Pervomu sekretaryu Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Ukrainy, Tovarishchu Shelestu P. E.,” Memorandum No. 19/0707 (Top Secret) from Colonel-General V. Kulikov, commander of forces in the USSR’s Kyiv Military District, 23 August 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 31, Ll. 138-140; “Stenogramma Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii i pravitel’stv NRB, VNR, GDR, PNR i SSSR po voprosu o polozhenii v Chekhoslovakii,” 18 August 1968 (Top Secret), in Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, Sbíрка Komise vlády ČSFR pro analýzu událostí let 1967-1970 (ÚSD-SK), Z/S 22; “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 19 avgusta 1968 g.,” 19 August 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 474-482; “Shifrtelgramma,” from Chervonenko to the CPSU Politburo, 21 August 1968 (Extremely Urgent/Top Secret), in ÚSD-SK, Z/S – MID, Nos. 37 and 39; and an interview with the supreme commander of the invasion, Army-General Ivan Pavlovskii, in “Eto bylo v Prage,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 19 August 1968, p. 5. Among other things, Brezhnev sent a CPSU Politburo member, Kirill Mazurov, to Prague to oversee the whole operation and report back directly to the Politburo. See “Shifrtelgramma,” 21 August 1968 (Top Secret), from Kirill Mazurov to the CPSU Politburo, in Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 059, Op. 58, Portfel’ (Po.) 124, D. 574, Ll. 184-186. See also the interview with Mazurov in “Eto bylo v Prage,” p. 5.

²⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The winter Olympic games in Grenoble, France, on 6-18 February 1968, had ended on the very day of this incident. Since the mid-1950s, the Soviet ice hockey team had dominated the Olympic ice hockey competitions, and the Czechoslovak team also had been a perennial medal winner. (Suspensions had long abounded that one of the reasons Soviet and Czechoslovak ice hockey teams had done so well is that their players were

secretly being paid, in contravention of Olympic rules at that time. Revelations in the early 1980s bore out those suspicions and led to changes in Olympic procedures.) At the Grenoble games, the Soviet ice hockey team won the gold medal and Czechoslovakia took the silver. During an early round of the tournament, the Czechoslovak team had beaten the Soviet team, giving rise to exuberant celebrations in Czechoslovakia. Although Czechoslovakia’s chances for a gold medal were dashed after a loss to Canada (which took the bronze medal), the performance of the Czechoslovak team was good enough to give hope that it might win a gold medal at the next Olympics, due to be held in 1972. This was not the first – or the last – time that ice hockey rivalries affected Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in the late 1960s. On 1 April 1967 the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Stepan Chervonenko, sent a top-secret cable to Moscow warning that the final Soviet-Czechoslovak game at the World Ice Hockey Championships in Vienna a few days earlier had brought “a wave of anti-Soviet sentiments” to the surface in Czechoslovakia. Chervonenko noted that “recent encounters between Soviet and Czechoslovak athletes have begun to go beyond questions purely of sports prestige and national pride and have acquired a political character, which might have a detrimental effect on Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.” He recommended serious consideration of “the option of temporarily halting matches on Czechoslovak territory between Soviet and Czechoslovak athletes” and “the option of refusing to send Soviet referees to international competitions in which Czechoslovak athletes are taking part.” See “Otdel TsK KPSS: tov. K. V. Rusakovu,” Cable No. 355 (Top Secret), 1 April 1967, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 300, Ll. 44-54, transmitting a report “Informatsiya o reaktcii v ChSSR na match sbornykh hokkeinykh komand SSSR i ChSSR na chempionate mira v Vene.” Some two years later, in March 1969, another Soviet-Czechoslovak ice hockey game, which was followed by boisterous celebrations in Czechoslovakia of the national team’s victory over the Soviet Union, served as a pretext for the final Soviet crackdown against Dubček, who was forced to relinquish his post as First Secretary at a KSC Central Committee plenum the following month.

²¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Gorak was a frequent target of Shelest’s criticism in 1968, as is evident in several of the documents below (see, for example, Nos. 3 and 9).

²²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Following the death of Klement Gottwald in March 1953, Antonín Novotný became First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. When Novotný’s main rival, Antonín Zapotocký, the President of the ČSSR, died in November 1957, Novotný succeeded him while also keeping his post atop the Communist Party. From that point until the end of 1967, Novotný ruled as both KSC First Secretary and President of the ČSSR.

²³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This period marked the height of show trials in Czechoslovakia, which continued even after the deaths of Josif Stalin and Klement Gottwald in March 1953. For the official report on this era, which was suppressed in Czechoslovakia after the August 1968 invasion, see Jiří Pelikán, ed., *Potlačená zpráva: Zpráva Komise ÚV KSC o politických procesech a rehabilitacích v Československu 1949-68* (Vienna: Karz, 1970). For detailed background and statistics on the use of political repression in Czechoslovakia during the Gottwald and Novotný years, see František Gebauer *et al.*, *Soudní perzekuce politické povahy v Československu 1948-1989: Statistický přehled*, Study No. 12 (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1993), esp. pp. 3-178.

²⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For a very useful overview of these issues, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 333-411.

²⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The State Security (Státní bezpečnost, or StB) organs in Czechoslovakia, modeled after the Soviet state security apparatus, were a notorious instrument of repression under both Gottwald and Novotný.

²⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Czechoslovak border guards had begun dismantling the barbed-wire and electrified fences along the border with West Germany as early as the last week of March and the first week of April; see "Les militaires enlèvent des barbelés à la frontière germano-tchèque," *Le Monde* (Paris), 5 April 1968, p. 5. A law permitting free travel abroad was discussed in parliamentary committees in the summer of 1968 and was due to be enacted in the fall.

²⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: When a deep split emerged in the fall of 1967 between the anti-Novotný and pro-Novotný forces on the KSČ Presidium, Novotný urged the CPSU General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, to come to Prague in December 1967 as a gesture of support. Crucial meetings of both the KSČ Presidium and the KSČ Central Committee were due to be held that month, and Novotný was eager to have Brezhnev attend. The KSČ leader extended the invitation when he was in Moscow in early November 1967 during the 50th anniversary celebrations of the "October Revolution," and he did so without consulting or even informing his colleagues on the KSČ Presidium, much to their dismay later on. Brezhnev had never been particularly close to Novotný (in part because of Novotný's well-known misgivings about the dismissal of Brezhnev's predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, in 1964), but the Soviet leader decided to accept the invitation, not realizing that Novotný had kept the matter secret from other top Czechoslovak officials. Brezhnev often resorted to "personal diplomacy" in difficult situations, and in this case he was hoping to mend the political rifts in Czechoslovakia and to forestall a showdown between Novotný and his opponents. In the end, though, Brezhnev's visit, far from helping Novotný, contributed to his downfall. Brezhnev initially had intended to offer strong support for Novotný in the leadership dispute, but soon after he arrived in Prague on 8 December, he realized how unpopular the KSČ First Secretary had become. Brezhnev spent 18 consecutive hours holding individual meetings with senior Czechoslovak officials, and by the end he was convinced there was nothing to gain if he tried to prevent the impending dismissal of Novotný from the top party post. Hence, during the rest of his brief visit, Brezhnev generally refrained from appearing to take sides whenever the question of leadership in the KSČ arose (though he did openly endorse Novotný's position on the role of the KSČ Presidium vis-à-vis the KSČ Central Committee). Brezhnev also decided that it would be best if he did not attend a KSČ Presidium meeting scheduled for 11 December, lest his presence be construed as too overt an endorsement of Novotný. Instead, the Soviet leader flew back to Moscow on the evening of the 9th. Brezhnev's abrupt departure and his lukewarm support for Novotný left the KSČ First Secretary vulnerable to a challenge from the anti-Novotný forces, a challenge that paid off when the KSČ Central Committee convened in the latter half of December 1967 and early January 1968. For valuable declassified materials and memoirs about Brezhnev's visit, see "Z vystoupení L. Brežněva při setkání s vedením KSČ na Pražském hrade, 9.12.1967," 9 December 1967 (Top Secret), in ÚSD-SK, D VII; "Záznam telefonického rozhovoru J. Kádára s L. Brežněvem, 13.12.1967," 13 December 1967 (Top Secret), in ÚSD-SK, Z/M; A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniya diplomata, sovetnika A. A. Gromyko, pomoshchnika L. I. Brezhneva, Yu. V. Andropova, K. U. Chernenko i M. S. Gorbacheva* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994), pp. 144-147; and Alexander Dubček, *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubček*,

trans. and ed. by Jiří Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), pp. 120-123.

²⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This account of Brezhnev's visit is largely accurate (though again it should be noted that Brezhnev did support Novotný's position on a few key issues). It was later widely reported, both inside and outside Czechoslovakia, that Brezhnev had told senior Czechoslovak officials "*Eto vashe delo*" ("This is your own affair") when he was asked to intervene in the KSČ leadership dispute. Declassified materials from Brezhnev's visit show that he made remarks very similar to *eto vashe delo*, but whether he actually used those three words is unclear. Dubček, who was present at the meeting, later was unsure whether Brezhnev had used the expression. Other prominent KSČ officials, such as Josef Smrkovský and Jiří Pelikán, did believe that Brezhnev had uttered the three words, but neither of them was actually present at the meeting. Whatever Brezhnev did or did not say, his posture by the end of his two-day visit was very much in keeping with the spirit of "*Eto vashe delo*." That, however, was not the way Koscelanský viewed the matter at the time. In a secret conversation with the Soviet consul-general in Bratislava at the end of 1967, Koscelanský argued that "Brezhnev's arrival in Prague was very harmful because it implied that come what may, Novotný should be kept in his posts. Brezhnev pretended not to want to interfere in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs, but everyone understood what his real purpose was. He was there to bolster Novotný's standing in the Party." Cited in "Informatsiya k voprosu o polozhenii v rukovodstve KPCh," Cable No. 110 (Top Secret) from I. Kuznetsov, Soviet consul-general in Bratislava, to A. A. Gromyko and K. V. Rusakov, 28 December 1967, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 9-14.

²⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to Otakar Šimůnek, who, in addition to serving as the Czechoslovak representative at the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, was a full member of the KSČ Presidium and a ČSSR deputy prime minister. (He was removed from those posts in April 1968.)

³⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Kryvyi Rih and Donets'k are both in heavily industrialized areas of Ukraine. Kryvyi Rih, in central Ukraine, is the site of a huge iron ore combine and a central power generating station. Donets'k, in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, is at the heart of the Ukrainian coal mining and natural gas industries.

³¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Similarly, Nikolai Baibakov, the head of the Soviet State Planning Agency (Gosplan), informed the CPSU Politburo that Czechoslovakia was obtaining many raw materials from the USSR that it could not get from other suppliers unless it paid in hard currency. Czechoslovakia, he added, also was receiving substantial quantities of machinery and semi-finished goods. Trade with the USSR, according to Baibakov, amounted to one-third of Czechoslovakia's total foreign trade. See "Spravka o zhizhennom urovne naseleniya Chekhoslovakii," Memorandum to CPSU Politburo member A. P. Kirilenko, 26 July 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 562, Ll. 7-21.

³²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The large Hungarian community in southern and eastern Slovakia, numbering more than 560,000 (and perhaps as many as 750,000) in 1968, seized the opportunity during the Prague Spring to voice long-standing grievances. From the time the Czechoslovak state was created in 1918, perennial tensions had emerged in Slovakia between the Slovaks (who had languished for centuries under Hungarian rule) and the Hungarians, who in 1968 complained openly about postwar "re-Slovakization" and the suppression of their cultural heritage. The Cultural Union of Czechoslovak Hungarian Workers (*Csehszlovákiai Magyar Dolgozók Kulturális Szövetsége*, or Csemadok) was especially ac-

tive in pursuing far-reaching autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, including separate Hungarian institutions and schools. These demands provoked hostility among many Slovaks, who sought to restore the local branches of *Matica Slovenska* (the main Slovak cultural organ) as a counterweight against *Csemadok*. See Robert R. King, *Minorities Under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 109-123. The much smaller Ruthenian community, numbering roughly 60,000-65,000 and concentrated mostly near Prešov in Eastern Slovakia, initially were less active than the Hungarians in 1968, but were gradually emboldened by the sweep of reforms. In this document, Koscelanský and Il'nyts'kyi refer to the Ruthenians as "Ukrainians," but that is not strictly correct. Although the Ruthenian and Ukrainian languages are now almost indistinguishable (especially the written languages), the Ruthenians actually are a distinct group known as *Rusyny*, who lived for many centuries under Hungarian rule. See Ivan Vanat, "Do pytannja vzyvannja terminiv 'Zakarpattja' ta 'Prjasivscyna'," in *Zovten'i ukrajins'ka kul'tura* (Prešov: Kul'turna spilka ukrains'kykh trudyashchykh, 1968), pp. 602-603. From 1919 to 1938, Subcarpathian Ruthenia (*Podkarpatska Rus*) was an integral part of Czechoslovakia, but it was reoccupied by Hungarian troops from 1939 to 1944. In mid-1945 it was incorporated into Soviet Ukraine, leaving only a small percentage of Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia. (In early 1946, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was converted into Ukraine's Transcarpathian Oblast.) In the 1950s the Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia were harshly persecuted, but in 1968 they made a short-lived – and fruitless – effort to achieve greater autonomy. The Cultural Association of Ukrainian Workers (*Kul'turna spilka ukrains'kykh trudyashchykh*, or KSUT) pressed demands not only for autonomy, but for restoration of the Ukrainian National Council in Czechoslovakia, which had been abolished in 1949. (The Council ended up not being revived, but if it had been, it was due to be renamed the Council of Czechoslovak Ruthenians.) The Ruthenian community in Prešov had long been putting out a number of Ukrainian-language publications, and had also been broadcasting Ukrainian programs on the Prešov radio station. These publications and broadcasts were readily available to many residents of western Ukraine, particularly those in Transcarpathian Oblast, as is evident from the documents I compiled for Part 3 of my "Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968" in the next *CWIHP Bulletin*.

³³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: At times, some of the Ukrainian-language publications based in Prešov, including *Nove zhittya*, did indeed feature criticism of the situation in Soviet Ukraine. For a detailed overview of these publications, see Hodnett and Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, esp. pp. 54-75.

³⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Actually, Novotný was forced to resign "for reasons of ill health" just three days later (i.e., on 21 March) amidst a plethora of revelations about recent abuses. After an unconventional "nomination campaign" in late March, which included nominations of Čestmír Císař, Josef Smrkovský, and other leading reformers as potential successors to Novotný, General Ludvík Svoboda was formally approved as the new president on 30 March 1968. Novotný's resignation and Svoboda's candidacy had been endorsed at a preliminary session of the KSČ Central Committee plenum on 28 March. The main part of the plenum began a few days later, from 1 to 5 April, culminating in a vote approving the new KSČ Action Program (*Akční program Komunistické strany Československa*) on 5 April. The program, as published in a lengthy supplement to *Rudé právo* on 10 April, laid out a wide-ranging agenda of political and economic reform. It became the symbolic blueprint of the Prague Spring from April through August 1968. By

the standards of the Soviet bloc in the mid- to late 1960s, the Action Program was remarkably bold and comprehensive, and it was intended as the prelude to a longer-term program of sweeping reform that would be worked out by the government and the legislature.

³⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: During the first few weeks of March, Polish students held riots and demonstrations on the streets of Warsaw and many other Polish cities, carrying signs in support of Dubček and proclaiming "*Polska czeka na swego Dubczeka*" (Poland is awaiting its own Dubček). When the Polish authorities violently quelled the protests, Czechoslovak students responded by issuing a message of solidarity with the Polish students. The episode helped convince Władysław Gomułka that events in Czechoslovakia, if allowed to proceed, would have an "increasingly detrimental effect on Poland." Gomułka became the first Soviet-bloc official to attack the Czechoslovak reforms publicly when, in a speech before party activists on 19 March, he averred that "imperialist reaction and enemies of socialism" were gaining strength in Czechoslovakia. See "Umacniajmy jedność narodu w budownictwie socjalistycznej Ojczyzny: Przemówienie Władysława Gomułki na spotkaniu z aktywem warszawskim," *Żołnierz Wolności* (Warsaw), 20 March 1968, pp. 3-4. The full speech was republished in *Pravda* (Moscow) on 22 March 1968, pp. 3-4. For a detailed overview of the turmoil in Poland, see Jerzy Eisler, *Marzec '68: Geneza – przebieg – konsekwencje* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Trio, 1991), which also includes an extensive bibliography. In addition, see the comments by one of Gomułka's chief rivals and his eventual successor, Edward Gierek, in Janusz Rolicki, ed., *Edward Gierek: Przerwana dekada* (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), pp. 46-48. The unrest in Poland posed a dilemma for Soviet officials, who initially were unsure what, if anything, they should say about the riots. The director-general of the Soviet TASS news agency, Sergei Lapin, felt the need to contact the CPSU CC Politburo for permission just to publish in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* a brief dispatch from the official Polish Press Agency. Brezhnev personally approved the request. See Lapin's secret memorandum of 11 March 1968 in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 25, L. 3. A notation in Brezhnev's handwriting at the bottom says "*tov. Brezhnev L. I. soglasen*" ("Comrade L. I. Brezhnev agrees").

³⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Department for the USSR was the first of ten regional departments in the Czechoslovak foreign ministry. Although the foreign ministry had less responsibility for Soviet-Czechoslovak relations than the KSČ CC International Relations Department did, the impending transfer of Gorak to this post was viewed with concern in Moscow.

³⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For earlier evidence of Gorak's dissatisfaction with the work climate in Soviet Ukraine, see Document No. 1 above.

³⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In late February 1968, General Jan Šejna, the chief of the KSČ's branch committee in the Czechoslovak ministry of national defense, defected to the United States shortly before he was to be arrested on charges of corruption. Rumors spread that Šejna and General Miroslav Mamula, the head of the KSČ CC's Eighth Department overseeing the armed forces and internal security apparatus, had been behind attempts by the Czechoslovak military in December 1967 and early January 1968 to keep Novotný in power, apparently at Novotný's request. Although details of the "Šejna affair" remained murky even after an official investigation was completed (for lengthy excerpts from the report, see "Proč utěkl Jan Šejna: Výsledky setřetí projednány vládou," published in *Rudé právo* on 12 June 1968, pp. 1-2), what came out was damaging enough that it inspired newspapers throughout Czechoslovakia to publish bitter criticism of Novotný and his supporters. Confronted by these revelations and attacks, hard-line

KSČ officials came under increasing pressure to resign. Among many officials who were forced to resign between 5 and 14 March 1968 were Jan Kudrna, the interior minister, and Jan Bartuška, the procurator general, who together had controlled the country's internal security apparatus in close liaison with the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB). A number of high-ranking Czechoslovak army officers, including Mamula, also were replaced. On 14 March, the same day that Kudrna and Bartuška were dismissed, an announcement was made of the suicide of a deputy defense minister, General Vladimír Janko, following reports of his collaboration with Šejna in December and January on behalf of Novotný. The outpouring of criticism that ensued in the Czechoslovak press led to further calls for Novotný's resignation, and the volume of those demands increased following disclosures that Novotný's son had been a friend of Šejna, and that Šejna's rapid advance in the armed forces had been attributable solely to Novotný's largesse rather than to any professional qualifications.

³⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The fullest official investigation of the reasons for Janko's suicide was not declassified until 1994; see "Informace o samovraždě gen. Vl. JANKA," 14 March 1968 (Top Secret), in Vojenský Historický Archiv (VHA), F. Sekretariát Ministera národní obrany (MNO), Operační správa Generálního Štábu (GS/OS), 154/277.

⁴⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: By this point (23 April), a special commission had been set up under Jan Piller to accelerate and complete the rehabilitations that had begun very slowly in Novotný's final years. No law on rehabilitation had yet been enacted, but Dubček and other senior KSČ officials had pledged at the April plenum of the KSČ Central Committee that a comprehensive law would soon be adopted.

⁴¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On the role of Soviet "advisers" in the violent repressions in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s, see Karel Kaplan, *Sovětské poradci v Československu, 1949-1956* (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny, 1993), esp. pp. 17-58.

⁴²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: At around this time (i.e., in late April), Czechoslovak deputy prime minister Ota Šik indicated that Czechoslovakia urgently needed a loan of at least \$500 million to buy machinery and other badly-needed goods from the West. Šik left no doubt that although he would try to obtain the loan from the Soviet Union, he would turn to Western governments (particularly West Germany and the United States) if necessary. Informal overtures to the West German government about this matter had begun in early 1968, but Šik's public announcement provoked a barrage of criticism from East German leaders, and it also sparked deep misgivings in other Warsaw Pact capitals, including Moscow. The proposed loan was one of the topics that Soviet leaders raised when they summoned Czechoslovak officials to Moscow on 4 May. See "Zapis' peregovorov s delegatsiei ChSSR, 4 maya 1968 goda," 4 May 1968 (Top Secret) in APRF, F. 3, Op. 91, D. 100, Ll. 14, 28-29, 47, 59, 103-104, and 111.

⁴³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On 17-19 April, just a few days before this conversation with Gorak, a senior representative of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), Egon Bahr, paid a secret, unofficial visit to Prague. His arrival was not made public because Czechoslovakia's contacts with the FRG were still deemed highly sensitive. In April 1967, three months after Romania broke ranks with the Warsaw Pact countries and established full diplomatic relations with West Germany, the six other active members of the Pact met in Karlovy Vary and agreed that they would not pursue diplomatic ties or even significantly improve relations with the FRG unless the West German government formally recognized the permanent existence of two German states and accepted the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line and the border between the two

Germanies. These conditions, championed by the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, formed what was supposed to be a binding "Ulbricht Doctrine." By the spring of 1968, however, as West German foreign minister Willy Brandt continued to promote *Ostpolitik*, there were increasing signs that one or two of the Warsaw Pact countries, especially Czechoslovakia and Hungary and perhaps even the Soviet Union, might construe the Karlovy Vary commitments more flexibly than Ulbricht would have liked. The East German leader took a number of steps to try to forestall any deviation from the Karlovy Vary agreements, but he remained fearful that Czechoslovakia would press ahead independently in the same way that Romania had. Even under Novotný, the Czechoslovak government had agreed to the establishment of a West German trade mission in Prague, and economic ties between the two countries had increased briskly in the first few months of 1968. In March 1968 the Western press disclosed that Czechoslovakia had made overtures to the West German government about obtaining a loan, and those reports were soon publicly confirmed by ČSSR deputy prime minister Ota Šik (see previous annotation). Moreover, the KSČ Action Program, adopted in early April, had called for Czechoslovakia to "pursue a more active European policy" and to "promote mutually advantageous relations with all states." These passages, combined with the gradual improvements in West German-Czechoslovak relations, could not help but antagonize Ulbricht. Thus, when Egon Bahr arrived in Prague on 17 April, Czechoslovak officials were aware of the need for discretion. At the same time, they wanted to explore opportunities that seemed potentially rewarding. Although the SPD was still only a partner in a coalition government, Brandt's party was expected to have a chance before long to form its own government (as indeed proved to be the case). It turned out that the talks with Bahr produced few results – see the declassified account, "Informace o rozhovorech mezinárodního oddělení ÚV KSČ s představitelem SPD E. Bahrem," 17-19 April, in Státní Ústřední Archiv (SÚA), Archiv Ústředního Výboru (ÚV) KSČ, F. 02/1, Ll. 120-126 – but the very fact that the two parties had established direct contact was significant. When word of the meeting later leaked out, Ulbricht angrily accused the Czechoslovak authorities of having reneged on the Karlovy Vary commitments.

⁴⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to a worldwide conference of Communist parties, which the Soviet Union was hoping to convene in Moscow in November 1968. Because of the Czechoslovak crisis, the conference was not held until June 1969, when seventy-five Communist parties officially gathered and another three took part unofficially. Fourteen parties, led by the Chinese and Albanian, declined to attend.

⁴⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest is referring here to a CPSU Central Committee plenum held on 9-10 April 1968. The full transcripts and supporting documents for this plenum were declassified in 1995 (though the materials were not actually available for another five years, reflecting the ambiguity of what the words "classified" and "declassified" mean in Russia). See "Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS – XXIII Soyvz: Aprel'skii Plenum TsK KPSS (9-10 aprelya 1968 g.)," 9-10 April 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, Dd. 89-108. The plenum (and Brezhnev's keynote opening speech) were organized around the theme of "Ob aktual'nykh problemakh mezhdunarodnogo polozheniya i bor'be KPSS za splochnost' mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya" (On Current Problems Concerning the International Situation and the CPSU's Struggle for Cohesion in the World Communist Movement). Although Shelest's lengthy speech to the "Arsenal" party aktiv covered all the issues discussed at the plenum by Brezhnev and other officials, only the sections dealing specifically with Czechoslovakia are included here. Substantial portions of Shelest's

speech at the plenum itself are featured in Part 3 of my “Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968” the *CWIHP Bulletin*. Shelest’s “Arsenal” speech is much longer and more detailed than his plenum speech, and the “Arsenal” speech touches on certain events in Czechoslovakia that occurred after the plenum was over. However, more than two dozen brief paragraphs (or portions of paragraphs) from the plenum speech are repeated almost verbatim in the “Arsenal” speech. Many of these duplicated paragraphs do not pertain to Czechoslovakia and are therefore not included in the translation here. A small number of duplicated paragraphs concerning events in Czechoslovakia are included here (and are marked as such by annotations) because they were modified significantly from the plenum speech. Numerous paragraphs about Romania that were repeated almost verbatim have been omitted because they can be found in my translation of Shelest’s plenum speech in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

⁴⁶ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The last three sentences in this paragraph and the whole of the next paragraph are taken almost verbatim from Shelest’s plenum speech.

⁴⁷ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Omitted here are lengthy sections about the Vietnam war, U.S.-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet relations, internal developments in China, tensions between the Soviet Union and Cuba, plans for the upcoming world Communist conference, tensions with Romania, and other matters that do not bear directly on the Czechoslovak crisis. The section on Czechoslovakia begins on p. 34 of Shelest’s 62-page speech.

⁴⁸ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This paragraph and the next three brief paragraphs are taken almost verbatim from Shelest’s plenum speech.

⁴⁹ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: On 23 March 1968 the Soviet and East German authorities hurriedly convened an emergency meeting in Dresden. Romania was not invited to take part, but the leaders of the six other Warsaw Pact states – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union – met to discuss recent developments in the Eastern bloc. The Romanians were excluded because they had been uncooperative at top-level meetings in Budapest and Sofia earlier in the year and would probably have behaved in a similar manner at Dresden if they had been invited. Evidently, the rushed timing of the Dresden conference was determined not only by pressure from Ulbricht and the Polish leader, Władysław Gomułka, but also by the approach of a KSC Central Committee plenum (which formally started on 28 March) and by Brezhnev’s desire to act before a successor to Novotný could be named as Czechoslovak president. Having been left out of many of the recent personnel decisions in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Politburo this time wanted to ensure that a politically acceptable candidate would replace Novotný.

⁵⁰ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Of all the major gatherings between Czechoslovak leaders and their East-bloc counterparts during the 1968 crisis, the Dresden conference was the only one that remained inscrutable until very recently. In the pre-glasnost era, authoritative analyses of the crisis by Western scholars, notably the books by H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) and Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), contained only brief, sketchy descriptions of the Dresden meeting. Even after the former East-bloc archives opened in the early 1990s, much of what transpired in Dresden remained obscure. Verbatim transcripts of the other multilateral conferences held in 1968 were quickly located in the archives, but no stenographic accounts of the Dresden meeting turned up, and it was generally assumed that none existed. Brezhnev had explicitly requested at the outset of the conference that no minutes

be taken and that the stenographers be ordered to leave the room. His request was duly observed. Hence, the closest thing to a stenographic report in the former Soviet archives and in most of the East European archives was the handwritten notes of the participants. Until 1993, these notes, as well as interviews with and memoirs by participants at Dresden, were the only first-hand source of what went on at the conference. It is now clear, however, that a secret stenographic record – albeit a somewhat incomplete one – was kept by East German officials, thanks to a hidden recording system. The proceedings apparently were taped and transcribed without the knowledge of the other participants, including the Soviet delegates. A copy of the transcribed proceedings, “Stenografische Niederschrift der Beratung von sechs Bruderparteien in Dresden am Sonnabend, dem 23. März 1968,” 23 March 1968 (Top Secret), is stored in the former SED archives in Berlin, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarhiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV 2/201/777 and 2/201/778. It was discovered in late 1993 by a German researcher, Lutz Priess. The transcript largely corroborates the notes and retrospective accounts of several of the participants in the Dresden conference. For example, the description provided by János Kádár in a lengthy interview in early 1989, based on the extensive handwritten notes he took at the meeting, is amply borne out by the stenographic record. See the interview and documents in *János Kádár: Végrendelet* (Budapest: Kalligram Könyvkiadó, 1989). Much the same is true of the detailed notes produced by other officials such as Vasil Biľak and Władysław Gomułka, whose perspectives on the conference were very different from Kádár’s. Biľak’s notes are available on file cards in SÚA, Archiv ÚV KSČ, F. Gustáv Husák (01), A.j. 131, in Prague, and Gomułka’s notes, titled “Spotkanie w Dreźnie,” can be found on notepad sheets (some of which are inscribed “I Sekretarz Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej”) in the Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Archiwum Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej (KC PZPR), Paczka (Pacz.) 119, Tom (T.) 54, in Warsaw. For the most part, both the tenor and the content of the session are accurately reflected in earlier records. The discovery of the stenographic report is still of great importance, however, not only because it confirms these other sources, but also because it fills in many key gaps. As with the other multilateral meetings in 1968 for which detailed transcripts have recently become available, the Dresden conference can now be studied as fully as needed.

⁵¹ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest’s brief account here is selective, but generally corresponds well with the transcript and other newly declassified documents. During preliminary contacts to set up the Dresden meeting, Brezhnev and Ulbricht had assured Dubček that the talks would focus on multilateral economic and trade matters and on ways of improving military cooperation in the Warsaw Pact. Invitations were extended to the heads of central planning from all the participating countries. It turned out, however, that the presence of those economic officials was almost wholly cosmetic. The discussion turned immediately to the internal situation in Czechoslovakia, forcing the KSČ delegates onto the defensive throughout. Dubček and his colleagues were dismayed when they realized what the underlying purpose of the meeting really was, and the KSČ leader voiced a strong “reservation” about the sudden change of agenda. Nevertheless, the five Czechoslovak officials continued to take part in the meeting (rather than walking out) and thereby inadvertently legitimized the notion that Czechoslovakia’s “internal affairs” were a valid topic for a multilateral conference. Dubček spoke vigorously in support of his domestic program and reaffirmed Czechoslovakia’s loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. All the other KSČ officials at the conference, including those like Vasil

Biřak and Drahomir Kolder who were distinctly uncomfortable about the reform process, supported Dubček's position and rejected allegations that the KSČ had lost control of events. The response that the Czechoslovak delegates got, however, was surprisingly hostile. In a lengthy, emotional statement, Brezhnev warned that "chaos" would ensue unless the KSČ took urgent steps to reassert strict control over the media, forestall the rise of unofficial political associations, and bolster the "leading role" of the KSČ. The criticisms expressed by Gomuřka and Ulbricht were stronger still. Both leaders charged that a full-scale counterrevolution was already under way in Czechoslovakia. Gomuřka's speech, in particular, was laden with invective and abusive comments that at times threatened to break up the conference. The Hungarian leader, János Kádár, was much more conciliatory, arguing that "the Czechoslovak comrades themselves know best" how to cope with their own problems; but even Kádár sought to convince Dubček and the other KSČ officials that resolute measures were needed soon to prevent the onset of a full-fledged "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia. In response, Dubček and the other Czechoslovak officials again staunchly defended the Prague Spring and their own actions, arguing that the KSČ enjoyed greater popular support than ever before and that the Party was fully in control of events. Despite these assurances and the uneasy compromise that ensued, the Dresden meeting left no doubt that the Prague Spring was creating a serious split between Czechoslovakia and its Warsaw Pact allies.

⁵²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest is referring here to a plenum of the KSČ Central Committee on 1-5 April, which adopted the party's new Action Program, called for the rehabilitation of all persons unjustly repressed under Gottwald and Novotný, and elected a new KSČ Presidium and Secretariat.

⁵³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The article in question is Karel Kaplan, "O výsledcích lednového plenu ÚV KSČ," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 13 April 1968, p. 3. Kaplan, a prolific historian, was a member of the commission headed by Jan Piller on political and judicial rehabilitations. In that capacity, Kaplan had access to many secret documents in the party and Interior Ministry archives, which he was able to use to good effect, publishing shorter commentaries as well as longer, serialized articles. Kaplan also was one of five members of an official "Commission on the History of Czechoslovakia After 1945" (*Komisa pro dějiny Československa po r. 1945*), which was set up in early 1968 to reassess the country's history. On the same page on which Kaplan's own article appeared in *Rudé právo* on 13 April, an article was published by the full commission to rebut the speech that Novotný had delivered ten days earlier at the KSČ Central Committee plenum. (Although Kaplan was forced to live in exile in Munich after Soviet troops crushed the Prague Spring, he was able to continue publishing valuable books and articles based on his earlier research. Following the demise of the Czechoslovak Communist regime in 1989, Kaplan returned to Prague, where he took up a senior research post at the Institute for Contemporary History and produced a large number of document anthologies and analytical works.)

⁵⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to Zdislav řulc, "Program nové politiky," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 13 April 1968, p. 1.

⁵⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Presumably, this refers to Miloř Fiala, "Potřeba kritiky," *Práce* (Prague), 12 April 1968, p. 3.

⁵⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The People's Party and Socialist Party in the Czech lands had ceased to be effective organizations after the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Both parties nominally continued to exist as part of a National Front with the Communist Party, but they had to defer to the KSČ on all matters large and small. In 1968, however, the People's Party and

Socialist Party were gradually revived as separate entities. Although they had not yet become fully independent parties by the time of the Soviet invasion, they were moving in that direction. This was evident as early as March 1968, when the People's Party elected new officers and issued a statement that it would henceforth promote a "Christian worldview." That pledge was reaffirmed when the People's Party released a new program the following month proclaiming itself "an independent and democratic political party . . . committed to a Christian worldview." Although the party indicated that it would remain in the National Front for the time being, it described the Front as no more than "a voluntary grouping of independent and fully equal political parties" and "a forum for dialogue and exchanges of views." The Socialist Party also elected new officers in March 1968 and pledged to become an independent champion of democratic values. In April the Socialists issued a program declaring that Czechoslovakia must embrace "democratic socialism," based on "humanism, democracy, and personal freedom." The Party affirmed that it would "pursue its own goals in accordance with its members' interests" and would never again accept "the right of a single political party to claim to have a universal, uniquely justified, and exclusively correct interpretation of socialism." Further statements from the People's Party and Socialist Party continued through the summer of 1968, and the membership of both parties rapidly expanded.

⁵⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneř were two of the three co-founders of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. Masaryk served as President of Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1935 (he died in 1937), and Beneř succeeded him, serving as President (including a period in exile during the Nazi occupation) until June 1948, a few months after he was forced to acquiesce in the Communist seizure of power. (Beneř died within three months of his resignation.) After 1948, the memory of Masaryk and Beneř was still widely revered in Czechoslovakia, but officially the Communist authorities had denounced them as "bourgeois opponents of socialism."

⁵⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Economic ties between Czechoslovakia and West Germany had been expanding since the mid-1960s, when Novotný had agreed to the establishment of a West German trade mission in Prague. Economic relations between the two countries continued to develop rapidly in the first few months of 1968. In late March 1968, the Western press disclosed that Czechoslovakia had made overtures to the West German government about the possibility of obtaining a large hard-currency loan (in the range of 200 million to 300 million Deutschmarks). These reports, as indicated in the annotation to Document No. 3 above, were subsequently confirmed by Czechoslovak deputy prime minister Ota řik. The revelations provoked a sharp rebuke from the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, who wanted to forestall any improvement of relations with West Germany unless the West German government formally recognized the permanent existence of two German states and accepted the Oder-Neisse border (with Poland) and the inner-German border (with East Germany) as inviolable.

⁵⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This refers to a celebrated speech by Ivan Sviták, a former Communist and Marxist philosopher who became one of the harshest critics of the Communist regime as far back as the mid-1950s. (A series of articles by Sviták in *Literární Noviny* in 1956 and 1957 had brought the first of many official condemnations of him as a "revisionist" and "opportunist.") Before 1968, Sviták had been subjected to reprisals and disciplinary measures (he was dismissed from the Institute of Philosophy in 1964 and then expelled from the KSČ), but in 1968 he became a highly visible proponent of fundamental political changes, includ-

ing free elections, which, he argued, the Communist Party could win only if it transformed itself from “a militarized, bureaucratic organization into a civilian party that upholds fundamental human rights” and “respects the sovereign will of the people as the basis for all power.” In his lectures at Charles University and in other public forums, Sviták especially tried to organize young people around the cause of radical democratization. Many of his essays and commentaries from 1968 were published in translation in the West, notably in the collection *The Czechoslovak Experiment, 1968-1969* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). Some of his other writings from that period are in an earlier anthology, *Verbotene Horizonte: Prag zwischen zwei Wintern* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1969).

⁶⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to Leo Jay Margolin, a professor of business administration at New York University and Manhattan Community College. Earlier, he had written a widely-used book about psychological warfare in World War II, *Paper Bullets: A Brief History of Psychological Warfare in World War II* (New York: Froben Press, 1946).

⁶¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This paragraph and the next three were taken almost verbatim from Shelest’s speech to the plenum.

⁶²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The future of Radio Liberty (RL) and Radio Free Europe (RFE) was under review in Washington even as Shelest spoke (though he most likely was unaware of the confidential deliberations). In the mid-1960s, lengthy articles in *The New York Times* and other American newspapers revealed that the two broadcasting agencies had been receiving secret funding from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These disclosures sparked a debate about the desirability of preserving RFE and RL. Senior officials in the Johnson administration were trying to devise funding and programming options that would prevent Congress from eliminating (or at least drastically curtailing) the radios’ activities. See “The Future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,” memorandum from the secretary of the interagency 303 Committee to President Johnson, 25 September 1967 (Secret/Eyes Only), in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Eastern Europe, 1964-1968*, Vol. XVII (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 56-66 (hereinafter cited as FRUS with years and volume numbers).

⁶³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: On 23 May 1964, President Lyndon Johnson adopted a “bridge-building” policy toward East-Central Europe, announcing that “we will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid.” See his speech in Lexington, Virginia in U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Vol. 1, pp. 708-710. For an intriguing collection of declassified materials on the implementation of this policy over the next four years, see FRUS/1964-1968/XVII, pp. 12-112, *passim*. An extended rationale for “bridge-building” was laid out by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book *Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America’s Role in Europe* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). The basic notion was that the United States and other Western countries would seek to build political and economic “bridges” to East European countries (rather than going through Moscow) in the hope of loosening those countries’ ties with the Soviet Union.

⁶⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Some phrases (but no entire sentences) in this paragraph were taken from Shelest’s speech to the plenum.

⁶⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Omitted here are another 17 pages of Shelest’s speech that condemn “Zionists, bourgeois chauvinists, and nationalists” and that deal generally with the world Communist

movement and preparations for the world Communist conference slated for November 1968.

⁶⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Appended to this document is a cover note in Ukrainian, dated 5 May 1968, which reads: “For the Information of members and candidate members of the UkrCP CC Politburo. As ordered by Cde. P. Yu. Shelest.”

⁶⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Il’nyts’kyi’s disclaimer is accurate. As the declassified transcript of the plenum (“Plenum Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS – 9-10 aprelya 1968 goda”), shows, the situation in Czechoslovakia was only one of many issues discussed there.

⁶⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Ján Kuľko had been serving as a regional committee secretary since August 1965, and Alfons Kudelásek had been in that post since February 1963.

⁶⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Ján Mockovčiak’s surname is slightly mistransliterated in the Ukrainian, but is given in the correct form here. Mockovčiak had been in charge of the control and auditing commission since December 1962.

⁷⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to a decree issued by the Habsburg imperial government on 15 March 1848, the day after Prince Clemens Metternich was forced to resign as Imperial Chancellor amidst revolutionary turmoil in Vienna. The decree, which abolished all forms of censorship, was one of several bold – but ultimately inadequate – measures to forestall social upheaval. The law did not withstand the counterrevolutionary backlash of 1849, but it lasted long enough to become intertwined with the Czech “national awakening” led by František Palacký. The 1848 decree was cited in 1968 by, among others, the Club of Independent Journalists and the Club of Independent Writers that emerged within the Czechoslovak Union of Writers in March-April 1968. See “Kruh nezávislých spisovatelů,” *Literární listy* (Prague), 4 April 1968, p. 1; “Rezoluce mimořádného sjezdu čs. novinářů k tiskovému zákonodárství,” *Novinář* (Prague), Vol. XX, Nos. 7-8 (1968), pp. 261-262; and V. Skutiná, “Censura trva,” *Literární listy* (Prague), 20 June 1968, p. 3. Because the revolutionary measures of March 1848 had been welcomed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, numerous Czechoslovak writers and commentators in 1968 defended their calls for free speech by pointing out that Marx himself had described a free press as “the omnipresent, all-seeing eye of the national spirit” and “the spiritual mirror in which the nation views itself.”

⁷¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The publication procedures for *Rudé právo* were mentioned by Oldřich Švestka, the editor-in-chief, during a secret conversation with editors of the CPSU daily *Pravda* at around this time. See “Zapis’ besedy Prezidiuma TsK Kommunisticheskoj partii Chekchoslovakii, glavnyim redaktorem gazety ‘Rudé právo’ tov. Oldrzhikom Shvestkoi,” by A. I. Lukovetz, member of the editorial board at *Pravda*, transmitted to the CPSU Politburo by Mikhail Zimyanin, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, 20 May 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 26, Ll. 33-40.

⁷²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For an extended discussion of this issue, see Document No. 20 below.

⁷³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This is an indirect reference to the phenomenon in China known as the “Greater Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (or Cultural Revolution, for short), which lasted from October 1966 until the death of Mao Zedong a decade later. Some of the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, perpetrated by the Red Guards under Mao’s broad direction, came at the very time that reforms were getting under way in Czechoslovakia. The Cultural Revolution was aimed at destroying much of the Chinese Communist Party, an entity that Mao periodically scaled back through ruthless purges, and was also targeted against anyone suspected of being an “intellectual.” In 1967, the so-called Cultural

Revolution Authority (headed by Mao, Jiang Qing, and Lin Biao) set up a Revolutionary Committee in Shanghai, which launched a chaotic wave of terror across China. High-ranking officials were subject to public denunciations, ritual humiliation, and severe beatings, and the same practices were replicated at all levels of Chinese society. A vast number of people were tortured and killed. Despite the closed nature of Chinese society, horrific accounts of cruelty and violence made their way out of China, and official broadcasts of public denunciations were widely available. Koscelanský obviously is referring to these scenes of vicious humiliation when he refers to the criticism as “Chinese.” The definitive work on the genesis of the Cultural Revolution is the three-volume study by Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 1983, and 1997). For a concise account of the Cultural Revolution, see Jean-Louis Margolin, “China: A Long March Into Night,” in Stéphane Courtois, ed., *The Black Book of Communism*, ed. by Mark Kramer, trans. by Mark Kramer and Jonathan Murphy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 513-538.

⁷⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Il’nyts’kyi is correct here. Brief excerpts from the KSČ Action Program and from Dubček’s speech were published in Moscow *Pravda* on 17 April. Presumably, Koscelanský was hoping that lengthier excerpts would appear and that Soviet journalists and commentators would refer to the Action Program more frequently and favorably.

⁷⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The figure in question here is Ota Šik, who was appointed a deputy prime minister (responsible for economic affairs) in the government formed by Oldřich Černík on 8 April.

⁷⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The reference is to an extraordinary 14th congress of the KSČ. The KSČ’s regular 14th Congress was not due to convene until 1970, but by the early spring of 1968 many officials and commentators in Czechoslovakia were proposing that the congress be held a good deal earlier to accelerate the reform process and permit the formation of a new Central Committee. In late May 1968, the KSČ Central Committee approved the convocation of an extraordinary congress beginning on 9 September 1968. Following the intervention of Soviet troops on 20/21 August, a group of KSČ officials managed to convene an emergency congress in Vysočany with a somewhat limited (though surprisingly large) number of delegates, but the results of that congress were nullified by the Moscow Protocol signed by top Czechoslovak and Soviet officials on 26 August.

⁷⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: See Excerpt No. 2 from Shelest’s diary in my article in Issue 10 of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, pp. 236-239. As Koscelanský says here, Biľak had made his career in East Slovakia, where the local KSS branches traditionally had been more hardline and less urbane than their counterparts in Central and Western Slovakia. (Many Czechs tended not to distinguish among Slovaks, but the Slovaks themselves had long been cognizant of the regional differences.) A large number of officials from Biľak’s network in East Slovakia were elevated to higher-level positions during and after the post-invasion “normalization.”

⁷⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In response to Soviet complaints, Smrkovský had pledged in the spring of 1968 to introduce new border controls, but, for various reasons, the government took no immediate action along these lines.

⁷⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: See my annotation to Document No. 2 above. Czechoslovak border guards had begun dismantling the barbed-wire and electrified fences along the borders with West Germany and Austria in late March and early April; see “Les militaires enlevés des barbelés à la frontière germano-tchèque,” *Le Monde* (Paris), 5 April 1968, p. 5.

⁸⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In the document, this phrase is rendered in a rough Ukrainian transliteration (“Zhadame opozichnu stranu”) of the Czech slogan “Žádáme opozičnou stranu.”

⁸¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The May Day celebrations in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were one of the highlights of the Prague Spring. In contrast to the regimented and officially-orchestrated activities of previous years, the celebrations in 1968 featured vast and exuberant crowds who turned out spontaneously to voice enthusiastic approval of Dubček and the ongoing reforms. Marchers in the official parade – as well as many spectators – held banners calling for a multiparty system, free elections, the “restoration” of democracy (as in Masaryk’s time), and even a reassessment of Czechoslovakia’s ties with the Soviet Union. The excitement surrounding the May Day events was heightened still further by the celebration of the Majáles, the Czechoslovak student festival traditionally held in university towns on 1 May. Even under Novotný, the Majáles tended to be boisterous and irreverent (akin to Mardi Gras), often to the displeasure of the Communist authorities. During the limited “thaw” in Czechoslovakia in 1956, students used the Majáles in both Prague and Bratislava to call for nationwide political reforms, expanding on demands made by several delegates at the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers’ Union in April 1956. Soon thereafter, the “thaw” came to an end, and Novotny banned the Majáles for the next nine years. The revived celebrations in 1965, accompanied by flamboyant and off-color posters, again provoked official anger, especially when the American “beat” poet Allen Ginsberg, who was visiting Czechoslovakia, was elected “King of the Majáles” in Prague. (Ginsberg was promptly expelled from the country.) In 1966, the Majáles proved equally controversial, and at least a dozen students in Prague were arrested. Much the same happened in 1967. The student festivities in 1968 thus continued a long-standing pattern of unorthodox celebrations, with the added fervor generated by the Prague Spring. In large, carnival-like rallies around the country, Czechoslovak students (and other celebrants) called for sweeping political reforms and voiced support for the changes initiated by Dubček. The students in Prague also held a demonstration in front of the Polish embassy to express solidarity with Polish students (whose rallies in Warsaw in March were brutally suppressed) and to protest the anti-Semitic campaign under way in Poland. (An even larger rally of Czechoslovak students was organized for the same purpose two days later, provoking a vehement official complaint from the Polish government on 6 May.) For an account of the Majáles activities and other May Day celebrations in 1968, see František Janáček and Jan Moravec, “Mezník i rozcestí reformního hnutí (duben-květen),” in Jiří Padevět, ed., *Československo roku 1968*, 2 vols. (Prague: Parta, 1993), Vol. 1 (*Obrodný proces*), pp. 90-92.

⁸²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: By this point, as reported in *Rudé právo* on 27 April 1968, regional party conferences in Prague, Brno, and Plzeň as well as České Budějovice had called for an extraordinary KSČ congress to be convened in 1968 rather than 1970.

⁸³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Behind the scenes, numerous Czechoslovak officials and diplomats were expressing similar concerns to Soviet leaders. See, for example, “Zapis’ besedy s gosudarstvennym sekretarem ministerstva kul’tury i informatsii ChSSR t. B. Khneupekom,” Cable No. 115 (Top Secret), from V. K. Zhuravlev of the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia to K. V. Rusakov and A. A. Gromyko, 1 February 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 71-76; “Zapis’ besedy s zamestitelem zaveduyushchego ideologicheskim otdelom TsK KPCh tov. Ya. Shimekom,” Cable No. 232 (Top Secret) from I. A. Cherkasov, 20 February 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 94-96; “Zapis’ besed s zam. zav. mezhdunarodnogo otdela TsK KPCh tov. M.

Millerom v fevrale 1968 goda,” Cable No. 211 (Top Secret) from I. I. Udal'tsov, minister-counselor at Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, to M. Suslov, K. Rusakov, and A. Gromyko, 5 March 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 97-101; “Zapis' besedy so starshim referentom mezhdunarodnogo otdela TsK KPCh t. F. Seminyum, 4 marta 1968 goda,” Cable No. 208 (Top Secret), from I. I. Udal'tsov, minister-counselor at Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, to M. Suslov and K. Rusakov, 5 March 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 102-103; “Zapis' besedy s sekretarem TsK SChSD t. Bendoi V., 1 marta 1968 goda,” Cable No. 201 (Secret), from R. A. Lozhnikov, 2nd secretary at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, 4 March 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 106-107; “Zapis' besedy s zaveduyushchim otdelom molodezhi TsK KPCh t. Ya. Svobodoi i glavnyim redaktorom zhurnala ‘Zhivot strany’ (‘Partiinaya zhizn’) t. I. Valentoï, 4 marta 1968 goda,” Cable No. 241 (Secret) from M. N. Kuznetsov, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, to M. Suslov and K. Rusakov, 12 March 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 110-115; and “Zapis' besedy s chlenom Prezidiuma TsK KPCh, sekretarem TsK KP Slovakii tov. Savol'chikom, 28 fevralya 1968 goda,” Cable No. 238 (Secret) from M. N. Kuznetsov, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, to K. Rusakov, 14 March 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 116-118.

⁸⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Uniates, or Catholics of the Old Eastern (or Byzantine) Rite as they were more formally known, had been forced to merge with the Russian Orthodox Church in March 1946. Most of the Uniates' property and funds were then confiscated by the Orthodox Church. After a further clampdown in 1948, all former Uniate parishes were forcibly closed, and many clergy and ordinary worshipers were persecuted, imprisoned, or, in some cases, murdered. From then on, no Uniate masses were legally permitted anywhere in the Soviet Union. Yet somehow, even under Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, scattered groups of Uniates were able to keep their faith alive through underground services, especially in western Ukraine (around L'viv as well as in the Transcarpathian region). Although adherents of the faith were severely punished when discovered, the Soviet authorities never wholly succeeded in eliminating the underground Uniate communities in Ukraine. For declassified materials on the destruction of the Uniate Church in western Ukraine, see the documents in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial-no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), F. 17, Op. 125, Dd. 313-315. In Czechoslovakia, the fate of Uniates was, until 1968, similar to the fate of Uniates in the Soviet Union. The Uniate diocese in Eastern Slovakia (centered around Prešov) was forcibly disbanded in April 1950 by the new Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, and a large number of Uniate clergy and worshipers were then persecuted and imprisoned. Over the next 18 years, Uniate rituals were strictly forbidden in Czechoslovakia. During the Prague Spring, however, underground Uniate clergy in Eastern Slovakia sought to have their church legally revived. An appeal to this effect was first drafted in April 1968, and by June the government had endorsed the appeal, giving permission for more than 170 Uniate priests to officiate services. Although tensions soon emerged between the revived Uniate Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church (mainly because the latter had seized most of the Uniates' property after 1950), the revitalization of the Uniate faith in Czechoslovakia was a momentous development in 1968. For a useful overview, see Silvia Ruzicková, “Postavenie cirkví a náboženských společností na Slovensku v rokoch 1968-1970,” in Komisia vlády SR pro analýzu historických udalostí z rokov 1967-1970 and Politologický kabinet SAV, *Slovenská spoločnosť v krízových rokoch, 1967-1970: Zborník štúdií*, 3 vols. (Bratislava: Komisia vlády SR, 1992), Vol. II, pp. 185-233, esp. 211-229.

⁸⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The document incorrectly transliterates Hetteš's given name as Jarolim rather than Jaromir.

⁸⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The article in question is M. Janda and A. Roček, “Marx a Komunistická strana,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 5 May 1968, p. 7.

⁸⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These two sentences were underlined by typewriter in the original.

⁸⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference is to Emil Šip, “I zde třeba zlepšovat,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 24 April 1968, p. 2. All ellipses in the excerpts quoted here were in the original document.

⁸⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This passage is underlined (by typewriter) in the original. For evidence about the restive mood among students in the Soviet Union, especially in Ukraine, see “Studenchestva i sobytiya v Chekhoslovakii,” report transmitted by KGB chairman Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Secretariat, 5 November 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 48, Ll. 120-153. See also the comments by Brezhnev, Aleksandr Shelepin, and Mikhail Solomentsev in “Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 marta 1968 goda,” 21 March 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 147-158.

⁹⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The writer in question is Arnošt Lustig (b. 1926), a survivor of Auschwitz, who consistently denounced the Czechoslovak government's decision in June 1967 to break ties with Israel, a decision that he claimed was motivated purely by anti-Semitism. Lustig also was one of three prominent writers (Pavel Kohout and Jan Procházka were the others) who signed a letter on 3 May 1968 to the Polish authorities condemning the anti-Semitic campaign under way in Poland. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Lustig was forced into exile and has lived in the United States since 1973 (though in recent years he has spent four months a year in the Czech Republic). For an illuminating interview with him by Pavlina Kostková, see “A Small Stone in a Big Mosaic,” *Central Europe Review*, Vol. 3, No. 28 (22 October 2001), pp. 1 ff.

⁹¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Lustig is referring here to the Six-Day Mideast War in June 1967. In late May 1967, Egyptian President Gamel Abdel Nasser sent troops into the Sinai Peninsula, expelled United Nations peacekeeping forces from the area, proclaimed a “readiness for war” with Israel, and imposed a blockade on the Straits of Tiran, preventing Israeli ships from entering the Gulf of Aqaba. Shelling and terrorist attacks against Israel, which had been occurring on a daily basis even before Egypt occupied the Sinai, intensified along the Syrian and Jordanian borders, as the Egyptian, Syrian, and other Arab armies mobilized for a coordinated, all-out offensive that would “pave the Arab roads with the skulls of Jews.” Faced with imminent attack, the Israeli army preempted the Arab offensive by launching a series of lightning strikes that proved devastatingly effective. Within an hour, more than half of the Egyptian air force's 410 combat planes had been destroyed; and soon thereafter the Egyptian and Jordanian armies were in full-scale retreat. For a concise, insightful overview of Israel's military operations, see Michael Howard and Robert E. Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967*, Adelphi Paper No. 41 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967). An excellent reassessment of the events leading up to and following the Six-Day War, as well as the conflict itself, is provided in Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), which draws extensively on newly declassified materials and memoirs from numerous countries. Among other things, Oren's book reveals that Egypt's move into the Sinai in May 1967 was spurred in part by disinformation from Soviet officials, who claimed that Israel had deployed nearly a dozen brigades along the border

with Syria in preparation for an attack. In reality, as Soviet officials were well aware, no such deployments by Israel had occurred.

⁹²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference is to Emil Šip, "Prvomájové referendum," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 3 May 1968, p. 2.

⁹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Ján Majer, a career officer in the State Security organs, actively supported the August 1968 invasion and was appointed first deputy interior minister in 1969.

⁹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Major Volodymyr Maiorchuk had been head of the 5th Department (responsible for border security) of the Ukrainian KGB in Transcarpathian Oblast since July 1967.

⁹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Here (and elsewhere in Soviet documents) the term "Zionists" is a codeword for Jews.

⁹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The mass meeting of young people in Old Town Square (*Staroměstské náměstí*) on 3 May, organized by KAN (see below) and student groups as a follow-up to the boisterous May Day rallies, featured harsh criticism of the KSČ and of Soviet relations with Czechoslovakia. It also featured condemnations of the anti-Semitic campaign under way in Poland. The outpouring of criticism at the meeting was so unsparing that it prompted a lengthy rebuke in *Rudé právo* on 5 May; but this response, far from curbing student unrest, emboldened many of the youth organizers.

⁹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to General Milan Štefánik, a co-founder of Czechoslovakia, who died in a plane crash in 1919 at the age of 38. The demonstration at Štefánik's grave on 5 May was convened to express dissatisfaction with the pace of efforts in 1968 to reconfigure Czech-Slovak relations. Although the speakers did not call for Slovak independence, many criticized what they regarded as "deliberate obstructiveness" and "condescension" on the part of the Czechs.

⁹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The officials mentioned here, along with Alexander Dubček and prime minister Oldřich Černík, include Jozef Lenárt, Vasil Biľak, and Emil Rigo, all of whom except Lenárt were full members of the KSČ Presidium. Lenárt had been a full member until 5 April 1968, but he was demoted to candidate status when he became a KSČ Secretary.

⁹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Josef Smrkovský, an influential proponent of reform in 1968, had been appointed to the KSČ Presidium on 5 April. Although Smrkovský was not among the most radical officials in 1968, he did embrace measures that, in cumulation, brought far-reaching liberalization. In early February 1968, he wrote a celebrated "manifesto" in *Rudé právo* (following up on another widely discussed article he published in *Práce* on 21 January) that laid out the types of reforms the new KSČ leaders were hoping to pursue. See "Jak nyní dál: Nad závěry lednového pléna ÚV KSČ," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 9 February 1968, p. 2.

¹⁰⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The references here are to three prominent Czech Jews: Edward Goldstücker, the head of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union and former prorector of Charles University; František Kriegel, a full member of the KSČ Presidium from April to August 1968 who supported radical liberalization; and Ota Šik, a distinguished economist and supporter of free-market reform who was appointed a deputy prime minister on 8 April.

¹⁰¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The four organizations supporting an early Congress were the South Moravian, South Bohemian, and West Bohemian regional committees and the Prague municipal committee.

¹⁰²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to the Club of Politically Active Non-Communists (*Klub angažovaných nestraníků*, or KAN), which was set up in April 1968 by a group of 144 leading intellectuals and other prominent figures. The club was intended as a political outlet for non-Communist proponents of far-

reaching political and economic reform and, eventually, as the foundation for a liberal democratic party. The two main organizers were Jiřina Mlynková and Ludvík Rybaček, who published several early statements of the group's aims in the writers' weekly *Literární listy*. The club's Manifesto, which was released on 13 May 1968 under the signature of the founding members as well as a few other well-known individuals, including both members and non-members of KAN, proclaimed a commitment to liberal democracy, political pluralism, and the principles embodied in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights. See "Manifest Klubu angažovaných nestraníků," *Svobodné Slovo* (Prague), 11 July 1968, p. 1. KAN's manifesto indicated that the club would seek to foster public debate about these principles and to enable members and supporters of KAN to take an active part in elections to the National Assembly. To this end, KAN helped organize the mass demonstration in Prague on 3 May as well as many other meetings and public rallies. The club also applied to participate in the National Front and received tentative indications that its bid would be approved. The application was still formally pending, however, when Soviet tanks moved into Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968. By that point, the club had been a constant target of Soviet criticism, and thus it was not surprising when Soviet leaders insisted that the group be forcibly disbanded. In September 1968, under the terms of the Moscow Protocol, KAN was permanently banned. During the years of "normalization" under Husák and Jakeš, scattered attempts to rekindle public support for KAN were quickly and brutally squelched. Not until after Communism collapsed in Czechoslovakia in late 1989 was KAN finally resurrected. The club never again approached the visibility it attained in 1968, but as of March 1993 it still claimed – perhaps in an overstatement – several thousand members in the Czech Republic. In the spring of 1995 KAN's leadership voted to merge with the Christian Democratic Party (KDS). The Slovak branch of the group was always very small both in 1968 and after 1989, and it ceased to exist altogether when the Czechoslovak state split apart at the end of 1992.

¹⁰³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For overviews of these organizations, see Galia Golan, *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia: The Dubček Era, 1968-1969* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); Vladimír Horský, *Prag 1968: Systemveränderung und Systemverteidigung* (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1975), pp. 101-257; Vladimír V. Kusin, *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (London: Macmillan, 1972); and Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, pp. 563-613.

¹⁰⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This phrase in Russian *kto-kogo* (or in Czech *kdo-koho*) is the famous expression first used by Lenin during the Bolsheviks' rise to power. It casts all political activity in a zero-sum framework whereby one side's gains can come only at all others' expense.

¹⁰⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to a meeting on 8 May 1968, four days after Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders had held bilateral talks in Moscow. The full transcript of the five-country meeting is available in "Zapis' besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol'shi," 8 May 1968 (Top Secret), in *ÚSD-SK, 07/15, Archivná jednotka (A.j.) 8, LI. 151-182*.

¹⁰⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This claim is exaggerated. Although a large number of senior military officers had been replaced, the changes did not yet affect "almost the entire General Staff." See Michael Štěpánek-Stemmer, *Die tschechoslowakische Armee: Militär-historische und paktpolitische Aspekte des 'Prager Frühlings' 1968* (Köln: Sonderveröffentlichung des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1979), pp. 117-134.

¹⁰⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Omitted from this list is the large Gypsy (Roma) minority in Czechoslovakia, which may have numbered as many as 250,000-350,000. In part because the Gypsies/Roma were not politically organized in 1968 and in part because of engrained discrimination, the Gypsies/Roma were not accorded the same status that other minorities received under Constitutional Act No. 144, adopted in October 1968 in connection with the federalization of Czechoslovakia.

¹⁰⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Actually, the number of Ruthenians (described here as Ukrainians) in Czechoslovakia was a good deal smaller than 100,000 – most likely around 60,000. Of these, most (roughly 40,000) lived in the Prešov region of Slovakia, and another 21,000 lived in the Czech lands. For more on the Ruthenian (*Rusyn*) community in Czechoslovakia, see the relevant annotations in Document No. 2 above and Document No. 20 below. Contrary to Il'nyts'kyi's allegations, the Ruthenians' demands in 1968 did not include the recovery of Transcarpathian Oblast/Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The large majority of Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the Slovak and central Czechoslovak authorities, realized that it would be pointless to try to reclaim that territory from Soviet Ukraine.

¹⁰⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: At the time, an anti-Semitic campaign was under way in Poland led by Edward Gierek and Mieczysław Moczar's "Partisans." This may have helped prompt the Polish colonel's question.

¹¹⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to Josef Pavel, an ardent reformer who had been appointed minister of the interior in March 1968, with responsibility for the State Security organs as well as the regular police. In Czechoslovakia, as in other Warsaw Pact countries, the local police were controlled by the central ministry of interior rather than by local governments. Although local officials obviously had some influence over the police within their jurisdiction (both directly and indirectly), the centralized administrative structure often caused friction between the central ministries and local officials.

¹¹¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Pavel had taken a number of steps by this point that indicated his wariness of the Soviet KGB's role in Czechoslovakia, a position that infuriated Moscow. This was one of the reasons that Soviet leaders repeatedly demanded that Pavel be replaced.

¹¹²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For the most part, this assessment was accurate. Although Soviet leaders were concerned that reformist sentiments might eventually spread into the Czechoslovak State Security (*Státní bezpečnost*, or StB) organs, they had far greater confidence about the reliability of the StB than about the reliability of the Czechoslovak army. At Moscow's behest, the Czechoslovak army was confined to its barracks when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia and for several days thereafter. By contrast, Soviet commanders relied on the StB for supporting functions during the invasion. In the early morning hours of 21 August, StB units arrested Dubček and other leading KSČ reformers.

¹¹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Colonel Jan Záruba was actually the first deputy interior minister, not just a deputy minister. He had been appointed to that job in April 1965 at the same time that Josef Kudrna was appointed minister; but unlike Kudrna, who was forced to resign in March 1968, Záruba had held onto his post.

¹¹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In order, these ČSSR State Security officials were Anton Široký, Jozef Katan, and Jiří Černický, all of whom were from the Čierna region.

¹¹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These UkrKGB officials were Vasyl' Oleinik and Pavlo Demochko.

¹¹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Soviet officials, too, were increasingly worried about the spread of reformist sentiment within the

Czechoslovak Border Guards. These concerns had become so acute by August 1968 that preliminary detachments of Soviet troops were sent to neutralize the Border Guards before the main invading forces moved in.

¹¹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A number of Czechoslovak officials (and former officials) from the State Security organs, the Justice Ministry, the Public Security Ministry, and the Interior Ministry had committed suicide in the spring of 1968 after the publication of reports documenting their participation in the mass repression and abuses of the 1950s.

¹¹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This Interior Ministry conference took place on 6 May. See "Bez důvěry veřejností nemůže bezpečnost plnit úkoly," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 7 May 1968, pp. 1-2. Smrkovský's speech there earned tentative approval from Brezhnev at the five-country meeting in Moscow two days later: "We also have information about Cde. Smrkovský's speech at a meeting of activists in the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 6 May, that is, just after he returned from Moscow. Cde. Smrkovský said it was necessary to struggle against counterrevolution and to appeal to the people for help and support. If the measures that the KSČ leadership and the government must take do not help, it will be necessary to act as in February 1948, that is, to have the working class come out into the streets with arms. If this information about Cde. Smrkovský's speech is accurate, it's a good sign that the Czechoslovak leaders drew the proper conclusions from the Moscow talks [on 4 May]." Cited from "Zapis' besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol'shi," 8 May 1968 (Top Secret), in SÚA, Arch. ÚV KSČ, F. 07/15, L. 157.

¹¹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Under the KSČ Action Program, the State Security (StB) forces were supposed to concentrate exclusively on foreign counterintelligence, not on internal matters. Responsibility for domestic anti-crime activities and public order was to rest solely with a separate Public Security (VB) body. Draft legislation laying out these responsibilities was approved by a parliamentary committee in June, but had not actually taken effect by the time of the Soviet-led invasion. Other sweeping reforms were planned in the Czechoslovak security apparatus, but these, too, were never adopted because of the invasion. For an outline of the planned reforms, see the lengthy, top-secret report on "Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present, and the Basic Ways of Resolving Them," prepared under the auspices of Josef Pavel for the KSČ's Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress. A copy of the report, which was leaked to the Soviet embassy and transmitted to the Soviet Politburo, can be found in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 310, Ll. 121-153. The elimination of the StB's domestic functions was cited by Walter Ulbricht during the Warsaw Pact conference on 8 May as an example of the "counterrevolution" under way in Czechoslovakia: "[Josef Pavel] is doing great harm to the Communist Party and to socialism. In effect he is liquidating the State Security organs, dividing them into two parts: into counterintelligence organs, and into those dealing with public order, that is, the police. By the way, this step is mandated in the Action Program, where it says that security organs should fight only against foreign intelligence services and do not have the right to be concerned with the life and opinions of Czechoslovak citizens. This means that today the KSČ leadership and the leadership of the ČSSR, as a socialist country, are rejecting the one thing that every state needs for its existence and are destroying the instruments of state power. And this is being done in conjunction with declarations that socialist democracy is 'much more expansive than bourgeois democracy.' Yet bourgeois countries maintain and strengthen their police forces and use them to fight against the Communist movement. . . . So, in Czechoslovakia

the revisionists are ‘expanding’ bourgeois democracy by destroying their own organs of state power. And this is called socialist democracy!” Cited in, “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi,” L. 32.

¹²⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: What is not mentioned here is that KSČ leaders were deliberately excluded from the 8 May meeting. When Dubček and his colleagues were summoned to Moscow for bilateral talks on 4 May, they were not even informed that a multilateral meeting would be taking place four days later. The Czechoslovak authorities did not learn about the meeting until they read a brief communiqué about it in the press. See the transcript, cited above.

¹²¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to Z. Hoření, “Schůzka pěti v Moskvě,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 11 May 1968, p. 3, which argued that Czechoslovakia and the KSČ apparently had been “excommunicated from the inner core” of the socialist camp. See also the follow-up story by Zdeněk Hoření, “Ještě ke schůzce pěti,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 13 May 1968, p. 7.

¹²²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The East German authorities had been waging a vehement campaign against Smrkovský since late March, when a senior SED Politburo member, Kurt Hager, singled out the KSČ official for special condemnation. See “Wir sagen Ja zur sozialistischen Verfassung,” *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 27 March 1968, p. 7. Hager and Ulbricht kept up these criticisms in subsequent weeks, including at the Moscow conference on 8 May, as mentioned here. See “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi,” Ll. 161-168.

¹²³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: “Rozhodnutí presidenta republiky o amnestii,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 9 May 1968, p. 2.

¹²⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In the leadup to the KSČ Central Committee plenum in May 1968, a considerable number of pro-Novotný leaflets were distributed anonymously in Prague and Brno by hardline elements from the StB and the KSČ central apparatus. Some Czechoslovak officials suspected that Soviet KGB or embassy personnel were responsible for the leaflets. (See, for example, the comments of Ján Majer cited in Document No. 9 below.) It is clear, from documents that are currently (or were formerly) available in the Russian archives, that Soviet embassy officials were well aware of the leaflet distribution, but it is not yet clear whether they instigated or actively abetted the campaign. It was widely rumored at the time that the printing facilities of *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, a Prague-based journal published in many languages by the CPSU International Department, had been used in producing at least some of the leaflets, but no conclusive documentary evidence along these lines has yet emerged. Presumably, materials stored in the KGB archive and Presidential Archive, which are not yet available, would shed greater light on the matter.

¹²⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The People’s Militia (*Lidová milice*) were paramilitary units under the direct control of the KSČ leadership. These units, known for their staunch loyalty to orthodox Marxism-Leninism, had been among the chief enforcers of Communist rule.

¹²⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to a violent uprising at a prison camp (“corrective educational facility”) in Minkovice u Liberce on 23-24 April, which erupted after egregiously harsh conditions were not eased. The incident was widely covered in the Czechoslovak press and led to calls for sweeping reforms of the prison system. See “Vzpouza v nápravně výchovném ústavu v Minkovicích,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 24 April 1968, p. 2; “První den po vzpouře vězňů,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 25 April 1968, p. 6; and K. Lorenc, “Případ Minkovice,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 26 April 1968, p. 3.

¹²⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: See “O aktuálních otázkách ministerstva vnitra,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 1 May 1968, p. 9; and “Bez důvěry veřejností nemůže bezpečnost plnit úkoly,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 7 May 1968, pp. 1-2.

¹²⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Documents pertaining to these events will be published in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹²⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Vasyl’ Rusyn had been the head of the Transcarpathian Oblast executive committee since May 1957 and was also a candidate member of the UkrCP Central Committee.

¹³⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The officials listed here are Stanisław Kruczek, Edward Duda, Ferenc Bodnár, and Lajos Papp.

¹³¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The officials listed here, in addition to Koscelanský, are Jozef Gabriška, Štefán Boboňko, Vincent Ondrušek (his name is misspelled here as Ondruško; later in the document it is spelled correctly), Jozef Kubašovský, Ján Novický, and Štefán Oleár.

¹³²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Dubček and other Czechoslovak officials frequently reassured their Soviet counterparts in 1968 that they would soon “restore order” in the mass media, but Soviet leaders increasingly doubted that these promises would ever be fulfilled.

¹³³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: These same matters were raised (almost word for word) by Yurii Il’nyts’kyi, the first secretary of the UkrCP’s Transcarpathian Oblast committee, in his speech to the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July 1968. See Part 3 of my article in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹³⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Ludvík Černý had been the lord mayor of the Prague municipal executive committee since July 1964.

¹³⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The references here are to Josef Smrkovský, one of the most influential members of the Czechoslovak leadership (who became a full member of the KSČ Presidium on 5 April 1968), and Imre Nagy, the reformist prime minister in Hungary in 1953-1955 who was briefly restored to power in October-November 1956, during the abortive revolution in Hungary. After Soviet troops invaded Hungary en masse in early November 1956, Nagy sought refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, but he subsequently was arrested by Soviet forces who deceived him into leaving the embassy building. In June 1958 he was executed by the Hungarian government and buried in an unmarked grave. Until 1989, Nagy was officially portrayed by the Hungarian and Soviet authorities as the leader of a “counterrevolutionary rebellion” and a “traitor.”

¹³⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The references here are to Čestmír Císař, a KSČ Secretary since 5 April 1968, and Josef Pavel, the newly appointed interior minister (see Document No. 7 *supra*). Both were identified with the avidly pro-reform group in the KSČ. From early May on, Soviet leaders repeatedly – but unsuccessfully – urged Dubček to remove Císař and Pavel from their posts.

¹³⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Kruczek’s statement reflects the sentiments that Gomułka and other senior PZPR officials were expressing both privately and (to some extent) publicly. See, for example, Gomułka’s comments in “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi,” Ll. 1-42. See also the interviews with high-ranking Polish military officers who took part in the invasion, in Lech Kowalski, ed., *Kryptonim “Dunaj”*: *Udział wojsk polskich w interwencji zbrojnej w Czechosłowacji w 1968 roku* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1992).

¹³⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: These allegations pertain to national minorities in Czechoslovakia: the large Hungarian community and much smaller Ruthenian (*Rusyn*) community in Slovakia (discussed above), and the small Polish community (numbering roughly 71,000) in eastern Moravia, near the borders with Poland and Slovakia. The number of Ruthenians in the Prešov region (de-

scribed here as Ukrainians) was far less than 200,000, as discussed earlier.

¹³⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Ivan Chendei was a well-known writer, satirist, and intellectual in the Subcarpathian Ruthenian region (i.e., the Transcarpathian Oblast) of Soviet Ukraine. As of 1968, his books, published both in Ukrainian/Ruthenian and in Russian translation, included *Bereznevyi snih: Povisti ta opovidannya* (Kyiv: Molod', 1968); *Teren tsvite: Novely, povist'* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 1967); *Koly na ranok blahoslovlyalosya* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1967); *Znaiomtes': Tyachiv, Rakhiv, Yasynya* (Uzhhorod: Karpaty, 1966); *Yak cholovik vid'mu pidkuvav, a kishku vkhyyv pratsyuvatakh: Zakarpats'ki narodni kazky* (Uzhhorod, Karpaty, 1966); *Ptakhy polyshayut' hnizda: Roman* (Kyiv: Radyans'kyi pys'mennyk, 1965); *Poedyinka: Opovidannya* (Kyiv: Derzhlitvydav, 1962); *Teren tsvite* (Uzhhorod: Zakarpats'ke obl. vyd-vo, 1958); *Viter z polonyn: Opovidannya ta povist'* (Kyiv: Derzhlitvydav Ukrainy, 1958); *Skav pip cherez plit: Zbirka zakarpats'koho ukrains'koho narodnoho humoru i satyry pro relihiu, tserkvu i popiv* (Uzhhorod: Zakarpats'ke obl. vyd-vo, 1958). He continued to produce many books and short stories (and even a film script) in the 1970s and 1980s.

¹⁴⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See the preceding document for Zhabchenko's account of this meeting.

¹⁴¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See the comments about this matter in Document No. 8 above.

¹⁴²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest's strong assertions here provide a valuable illustration of his tendency to put the most sinister gloss possible on events in Czechoslovakia. Zhabchenko's own report (see Document No. 7) was much more qualified in its assessment of Majer's motives. By contrast, Shelest chose to state unequivocally that the only reasons Majer wanted to meet with Zhabchenko were to complain about the anti-reformist leaflets and to find out what had happened at the 8 May conference in Moscow.

¹⁴³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For an account of this meeting by one of the Ukrainian KGB participants, Lieut.-Colonel Pavlo Demochko, see Document No. 9 above.

¹⁴⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A large-scale effort was indeed under way to mobilize Soviet troops in the leadup to joint military exercises and preparations for other contingencies on Czechoslovak territory. Documents attesting to the redeployments of units, the call-up of reservists, and the requisitioning of civilian vehicles will be featured in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*. Originally, joint exercises had not been due to take place in Czechoslovakia until 1969, but that schedule was moved ahead to June 1968. As it turned out, Soviet troops began entering Czechoslovakia even earlier – in late May 1968 – just after a delegation of high-ranking Soviet military officers visited the country to make arrangements for the upcoming exercises.

¹⁴⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See the previous document.

¹⁴⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Borys Belousov had been an oblast committee secretary in Transcarpathia since February 1965.

¹⁴⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For the proceedings stored in the Slovak archives, see "Poradca vedúcich tajomníkov krajských, okresných a mestských výborov KSČ 12.-13. mája 1968," in Slovenský národný archív (SNA), F. ÚV KSS, Č. 68/10, A.j. 2.

¹⁴⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: František Kriegel was consistently among the most radical supporters of political liberalization in 1968. He was a full member of the KSČ Presidium from June to August 1968 and chairman of the National Front from April to early September 1968. The National Front was a grouping of parties and public organizations that had long been a figurehead for Communist domination, but Kriegel and other reformers in 1968 sought to convert the Front into a more pluralistic institution.

¹⁴⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Proposals to establish "advisory and initiating boards" for the mass media in the spring of 1968 provoked unease and opposition among journalists and writers, who feared that censorship might gradually be reimposed in Czechoslovakia, as had happened in Poland after 1956. (Censorship had been eased in Poland during Władysław Gomułka's return to power in October 1956, but Gomułka soon restored the earlier restrictions and guidelines.) Although Čestmír Cisař had pledged that the KSČ "does not intend to resume any form of direct control over the press," many journalists and writers in Czechoslovakia were at least as wary of an internal clampdown as they were of foreign military intervention. See "Aktiv Pražských novinářů," *Novinář* (Prague), Vol. XX, No. 4 (1968), p. 112.

¹⁵⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This refers to two of the leading members of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia: Bohumil Šimon (first secretary of the KSČ's Prague municipal committee and a candidate member of the KSČ Presidium) and Josef Špaček (first secretary of the KSČ's South Moravian regional committee and a member of the KSČ Presidium). The Prague municipal committee and the South Moravian regional committee were both strongholds of radical reformist sentiment.

¹⁵¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The officials mentioned here, in addition to those already identified, include František Barbírek, Oldřich Švestka, Martin Vaculík, Drahomír Kolder, Jan Piller, Josef Špaček, and Václav Slavík. Barbírek, Švestka, Kolder, Piller, and Špaček were full members of the KSČ Presidium; Vaculík was still a candidate member of the KSČ Presidium (though he was removed in late May); and Slavík was a member of the KSČ Secretariat (beginning in April 1968) and had earlier been involved in the establishment of an Institute of Political Science under the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

¹⁵²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Koscelanský's predictions here turned out to be ill-founded. The May plenum of the KSČ Central Committee voted to convene an extraordinary KSČ congress on 9 September 1968, nearly two years ahead of schedule. The decision to hold an early congress proved crucial, for it greatly reduced the amount of time available to the Soviet Union to eliminate the "threat" posed by the Prague Spring. Soviet officials believed that ardent reformers would dominate the KSČ congress and would remove all the "healthy forces" (hardliners) who potentially could set up an alternative regime if Soviet troops were to move into Czechoslovakia. To ensure that the "healthy forces" would still be in a position to act, Soviet leaders realized that they would have to end the Prague Spring before the newly scheduled KSČ congress took place.

¹⁵³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The ethnic Germans in the Sudetenland, along the Czechoslovak-German border, were subjected to mass reprisals in the early postwar period. After President Beneš issued Decree No. 33 on 2 August 1945, almost all ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia were deprived of their citizenship, rights, and protection, leaving them in the status of "traitors." (The only ones who were permitted to stay were the small number who had repeatedly spoken out against Nazi Germany.) Over the next year, more than 3 million Germans in Bohemia and Moravia were forcibly "transferred" (i.e. expelled) to Germany, where they had to forfeit all the property they had left behind. By late 1946, only around 165,000 ethnic Germans remained in the Czech lands, and they were not permitted to reclaim their citizenship until 1953. For recent analyses of the expulsions, based on newly declassified archival materials, see the relevant chapters in Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds., *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948* (Boulder, Col.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). (My own chapter in the Ther/Siljak volume provides extensive citations to recent works on the subject in German, Czech, Slovak,

and Hungarian as well as in English.) The displaced Sudeten Germans formed an association in the FRG (the Landsmannschaft) that urged the West German government to seek compensation and redress for the indiscriminate expulsions. The Landsmannschaften were influential in West German politics in the late 1940s and 1950s, but their influence began to wane in the 1960s, especially with the advent of *Ostpolitik*. Even so, the Sudeten Germans were unwilling to back down on their demands, and the Landsmannschaft continued to function as a highly visible – though ultimately unsuccessful – lobbying group.

¹⁵⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On 25 May, Shelest and Ukrainian prime minister Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi (who was also a candidate member of the CPSU Politburo) met with Biľak and Barbírek in the small Slovak town of Vyšné Nemecké, just across the border from Uzhhorod. This visit, marking the start of the festive "Ukrainian Days of Culture" in Czechoslovakia, was covered extensively in the Ukrainian press. See, for example, "Torzhestva na granitse SSSR i ChSSR: Vstrecha estafet Moskva-Praga i Praga-Moskva," *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kyiv), 26 May 1968, p. 1. What the press accounts did not mention, however, was the secret meeting that Shelest had with Biľak and Koscelanský in a mountain cottage along the border and in Uzhhorod the previous evening. (See Excerpt No. 2 from Shelest's diary and my commentary on it in Issue 10 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 236-239.) The secret visit, which established a clandestine backchannel between the Soviet Politburo and the "healthy forces" in the KSČ, proved to be of great importance for Soviet policy.

¹⁵⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See Excerpt No. 2 from Shelest's diaries and my commentary on it in Issue 10 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 236-239.

¹⁵⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These units had been deployed there in anticipation of the forthcoming military exercises on Czechoslovak territory. More about these preparations will be featured in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹⁵⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These comments echo what Soviet defense minister Marshal Andrei Grechko said a month earlier, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 10 April 1968. After expressing alarm at the situation in Czechoslovakia, Grechko declared that "we [in the Soviet Army] are ready, at the behest of the party, to join with the armies of the [other] Warsaw Pact countries in coming to the assistance of the Czechoslovak nation if the imperialists and counterrevolutionaries try to tear Czechoslovakia away from the countries of socialism." Quoted from "Plenum TsK KPSS – Aprel' 1968 goda: Zasedanie tret'e (Vechnoe, 10 aprelya)," 9-10 April 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 93, L. 7.

¹⁵⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Omitted here are several brief comments by residents of Transcarpathian Oblast who expressed "full and unqualified approval" of Soviet policy and alarm about events in Czechoslovakia. Favorable comments about Soviet policy were always cited in documents of this sort, but the far more interesting portions are the unfavorable comments. Later on in the document, the comments of some other residents who expressed dismay at recent events in Czechoslovakia are included, but that is because they shed interesting light on public sentiment about Soviet military preparations in the leadup to the invasion.

¹⁵⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The word "moskalei," used in this sentence, is a pejorative term referring to Russians. It would have the same connotation that a term like "Yankees" or "gringos" would have when used by Latin Americans about the United States.

¹⁶⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: It is interesting that the speaker included Cuba among these countries. Serious tensions between the Soviet Union and Cuba had indeed emerged behind the scenes in the 1960s, but few people outside the ruling circles in Havana and

Moscow were cognizant of those tensions. Not until the early 1990s did solid information about the Soviet-Cuban differences in 1968 come to light. The recently declassified transcripts and supporting documents of the April 1968 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee reveal that the disputes with Cuba were discussed there quite candidly, both in Brezhnev's main report and in the comments of other senior officials. For example, one of the members of the CPSU Politburo, Viktor Grishin, who spoke immediately after Brezhnev, declared that he and other Soviet leaders were "dismayed by the deterioration of Soviet-Cuban relations resulting from the special approach adopted by the Cuban leadership on the question of socialist construction and the paths for development of the world revolutionary process. In these circumstances, the CPSU CC Politburo is adhering to a correct policy and is not compromising its principled line. The Politburo is displaying maximum steadfastness and patience and is striving to help the Romanian and Cuban leaders return to correct positions." Quoted from "XXXIII Sozyv: Aprel'skii Plenum TsK KPSS (9-10 aprelya 1968 g.)," 9-10 April 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 96, L. 5.

¹⁶¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Unlike all the other Warsaw Pact countries, Romania did not break relations with Israel after the June 1967 Mideast War. The Czechoslovak government's decision to sever ties with Israel came under sharp criticism in 1968 from numerous reformers (especially from writers) within Czechoslovakia; but no change of policy resulted. The mention of Poland here (if cited accurately) is curious insofar as a vicious anti-Semitic campaign was under way in Poland at the time.

¹⁶²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Russian version of these Hungarian surnames is slightly different from the Hungarian (adding a 'v' before the 's' in the '-losi' ending), but I have used the proper Hungarian version here.

¹⁶³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Under the border demarcations at the end of World War II, the territory of Soviet Ukraine expanded by more than 25 percent (165,300 square kilometers), bringing tens of thousands of ethnic Hungarians under Ukraine's jurisdiction, predominantly in the new Transcarpathian Oblast. As of the mid-1960s, the Hungarian community in Ukraine numbered roughly 150,000. Restiveness within this community in 1968 was by no means unprecedented. Recently declassified materials in the Russian archives reveal that unrest was rife among the Hungarians in western Ukraine during and for some time after the 1956 revolution in Hungary. I am currently working on an article about this matter and will provide translations of several key documents in the next issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

¹⁶⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These rumors had been deliberately stirred up by the East German authorities, who highlighted the presence of U.S. tanks in Czechoslovakia in several articles in *Berliner Zeitung*, *Junge Welt*, *Neue Zeit*, and other newspapers on 9 and 10 May. What the East German accounts failed to mention is that the World War II-vintage American tanks (or models of tanks) had been brought to Czechoslovakia by a film production crew to make a documentary. See the Czechoslovak response to the East German reports in "Americké tanky v ČSSR: Tendenční výmysl Berliner Zeitung," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 11 May 1968, p. 3.

¹⁶⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Actually, it was not until 24 May – three days after this document was compiled and shortly after Marshal Grechko had visited Czechoslovakia – that the ČSSR ministry of national defense announced that "joint command-staff exercises will be held in June [1968] on the territories of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The staffs of all services of the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries will take part in the joint exercises. The objective is to test cooperation and command-and-control under current operational conditions and to improve the readiness of troops and com-

mand staffs.” See “Stánovisko Ministra národní obrany,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 25 May 1968, p. 1. It was not until 29 May that the first Soviet military units moved into Czechoslovakia, evidently without informing the Czechoslovak authorities. That same day, the chief of the Warsaw Pact’s main staff, General Mikhail Kazakov, arrived in Prague with an integrated command staff and a Soviet military liaison unit to make preparations for the forthcoming exercises.

¹⁶⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The Syurte station is in the Uzhhorod district of Transcarpathian Oblast.

¹⁶⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: A small typographical error has been corrected here.

¹⁶⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Mostys’ka is an old city in the western part of L’viv Oblast, along the current border with Poland.

¹⁶⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For further discussion of this point as well as additional data through the first quarter of 1968, see the lengthy report prepared a few weeks earlier, “TsK KP Ukrainy: tovarishchu Drozdenko V. I.,” Report No. 92-s (Secret), from Yu. Il’nyts’kyi to V. I. Drozdenko, 23 April 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 65, Ll. 28-39.

¹⁷⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Omitted here are excerpts from Soviet legislation on customs and border-control regulations.

¹⁷¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: These checkpoints were located at various points along the USSR’s western perimeter. The Brest checkpoint was in southwestern Belorussia (now Belarus), on the border with Poland. The Chop station was in Transcarpathian Oblast, south of Uzhhorod, at the conjunction of the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Ukrainian borders. The corresponding checkpoint on the Czechoslovak side of the border was Čierna and Tisou, and on the Hungarian side was Zahony. The Mostys’ka checkpoint, as I noted in an annotation to the previous document, was in the western portion of L’viv Oblast in Ukraine, along the current border with Poland. The Ungheni checkpoint was in western Moldavia (now Moldova), along the current border with Romania.

¹⁷²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For other highly classified Soviet reports on Romania’s efforts to ship “ideologically pernicious” literature into the USSR, see Memorandum No. 2039-A (Top Secret) from Yu. V. Andropov, chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 30 August 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 58-67; “O Pozitsii Rumynii v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. MB-4809/65 (Top Secret), from V. Makashev, deputy secretary-general of the Soviet foreign ministry, 16 October 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 188-194; “TsK KPSS: O nekotorykh problemakh sovetsko-rumynskikh otnoshenii v svete pozitsii, zanyatoi rukovodstvom RKP v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii,” Report No. 686 (Top Secret), from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Politburo, 23 Sept 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 106-121; and “Ob otnoshenii Rumynii k sobytiyam v Chekhoslovakii (Politicheskoe pis’mo),” Cable No. 1000 (Top Secret), A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and the CPSU Secretariat, 23 Sept 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 130-154. See also my article on the matter, “Moldova, Romania, and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 326-334.

¹⁷³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For a more detailed breakdown, see “TsK KP Ukrainy: tovarishchu Drozdenko V. I.,” L. 28.

¹⁷⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For additional data, see the previous document and “TsK KP Ukrainy: tov. Drozdenko V. I.,” Ll. 28-39 (cited above). Here, as in other documents, Shelest cited only statistics that cast a particularly bad light on the spillover from Czechoslovakia.

¹⁷⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For accounts of individuals who used these various methods of smuggling literature into the Soviet Union, see “TsK KP Ukrainy: tov. Drozdenko V. I.,” esp. Ll. 31-34. See also “Tsentral’nomu Komitetu Komunistychnoi Partii Ukrainy,” Memorandum No. 112-2/10s (Secret), from F. Horyn, head of the Chop station customs inspectorate, I. Mushka, inspectorate at the Chop station customs inspectorate, and H. Timoshenko, inspector at the Chop station customs inspectorate, 6 March 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 64, Ll. 13-15.

¹⁷⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The numbers provided here imply that a sharp tightening of the inspection system would have caused crippling delays in border traffic. Before 1968, such delays would undoubtedly have seemed excessively burdensome, but the deepening crisis with Czechoslovakia in 1968 was generating pressure for a crackdown at border posts, no matter what the effect on cross-border traffic.

¹⁷⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In the Soviet military and security forces, the divide between commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) was enormous – much wider than in most Western countries. In the U.S. and other Western armed forces, large contingents of well-trained, professional NCOs (sergeants and corporals) have long been a staple. There was no direct equivalent in the Soviet army. Soviet NCOs were enlisted men who underwent up to six months of additional training before being assigned as petty and warrant officers. The Soviet NCOs often experienced abuse at the hands of mid-level and senior officers, and they, in turn, frequently mistreated and exploited the conscripts under their command.

¹⁷⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest is referring here to the Soviet Union’s new regulations for military service adopted in 1967. The new Law on Universal Military Service, which applied to conscripts for the security services and customs service as well as the regular army, reduced the period of service from three years to two and lowered the age of conscription from 19 to 18. See Army-General S. M. Shtemenko, *Novyi zakon i voinskaya sluzhba* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968). The shortening of the term of conscription was attributable to the steady expansion of the conscription pool (the number of 19-year-old males had risen to nearly 2 million by 1967). The lowering of the draft age was designed to bring young men into the army right after they had completed their secondary schooling (normally at age 18), rather than leaving a year in between.

¹⁷⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: See also Chebrikov *et al.*, eds., *Istoriya sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti*, pp. 512-557.

¹⁸⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Omitted here are a few pat quotations from oblast residents who supported the Soviet Union’s policy toward Czechoslovakia.

¹⁸¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The period to which the speaker is referring marked the inception of Slovak “independence” after German forces occupied the Czech lands. Nationalist sentiment in Slovakia was especially pronounced during those years.

¹⁸²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Ludvík Svoboda had been the wartime commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak armed units that fought alongside the Soviet Red Army. He subsequently was appointed minister of national defense in Czechoslovakia, a post he held until being demoted in the purges of 1950. See Svoboda’s memoirs of his wartime experiences in *Z Buzuluk do Prahy* (Prague: Orbis, 1961).

¹⁸³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This statement seems odd coming from someone who cares as deeply about religious freedom as the speaker does. On religious matters, unlike on most other issues, Khrushchev was nearly as repressive as Stalin. Khrushchev launched

a violent anti-religious campaign in 1954 and eased it only slightly in the latter half of the 1950s. Then, in February 1960, he appointed a hardline ideologue, Vladimir Kuroedov, to oversee religious affairs, marking the start of another intense anti-religious campaign, which continued almost unabated through the remaining four-and-a-half years of Khrushchev's tenure. Although the Brezhnev era was hardly a time of great religious freedom, Brezhnev did allow more scope for religious worship than Khrushchev did.

¹⁸⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Novotný, the son of a bricklayer, received only an elementary education and served as an apprentice to a locksmith. He received no secondary schooling and was devoid of intellectual curiosity. Before World War II, he was a middle-ranking KSČ official, but at the close of the war he landed the key post of regional party secretary in Prague. By remaining staunchly loyal to the party leader, Klement Gottwald, Novotný continued to advance in the party hierarchy, especially after Gottwald moved against Rudolf Slánský in 1951. Novotný's rise to the highest post in the KSČ thus was attributable to Gottwald's largesse, rather than to any gifts or acumen on Novotný's part. Novotný's lack of education and his limited intellectual capacity made him a frequent target of private jokes.

¹⁸⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: After the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, they acquired vast amounts of property through the expropriation of businesses, factories, farms, large estates, and other holdings both large and small. Although "ownership" (i.e., effective control) of the property was transferred in some cases to state agencies and public organizations, ultimate control rested with the Communist Party. In 1968, a good deal of discussion emerged in Czechoslovakia about the possible compensation for those who had been unjustly imprisoned under Gottwald and Novotný, as well as restitution for people whose property had been confiscated in 1948 or after. (The proposals, however, were never intended to cover potential claims from the roughly 3 million ethnic Germans who had been expelled from the Sudetenland in 1945.) The law on judicial rehabilitations, adopted in late June 1968, provided for material compensation in some cases, but the law was never implemented. The Soviet invasion in August 1968 put an end to any further discussion of the matter, and it was not until after 1989 that a program of restitution and compensation was finally adopted (though again excluding the Sudeten Germans).

¹⁸⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Jan Procházka, a well-known writer, was an outspoken proponent of freedom of expression and other reforms throughout the Prague Spring. At the 4th Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in June 1967, he denounced official censorship and called for "freedom of creativity," demands that led to his removal as a candidate member of the KSČ Central Committee. From that point on, Procházka was often cited by Soviet leaders as a key organizer of the "anti-socialist" forces.

¹⁸⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The context (especially the next sentence) suggests that the person singled out here was Leonid Brezhnev.

¹⁸⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The speaker is mistaken here, evidently because he believed that when Novotný was removed as KSČ First Secretary in early January 1968, he was also removed as President. In fact, Novotný retained his post as President until 21 March, when he finally resigned "for reason of ill health" under intense political pressure. Svoboda was formally approved as the new president on 30 March. Hence, Czechoslovakia went only nine days, not three months, without a president.

¹⁸⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The notion that Romania would have participated in the maneuvers is obviously far-fetched. The Romanian leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu, had kept Romanian troops

out of most Warsaw Pact activities from the mid-1960s on, and he was strongly supportive of Czechoslovakia in 1968. There was never any likelihood that Romania would contribute troops to the joint maneuvers.

¹⁹⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Medzilaborce is a small town in the northeastern part of Eastern Slovakia, along the border with Poland.

¹⁹¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Zhabchenko's parenthetical interjection about Hlinka is mistaken. Andrej Hlinka, a Catholic priest who founded the ultranationalist Slovak People's Party (*Hlinková slovenská ľudová strana*) in the interwar period, died in August 1938, eight months before Slovakia became nominally independent. Although Hlinka himself was not a fascist, some of his followers, who formed paramilitary units known as the Hlinka Guard, openly advocated a fascist, pro-Nazi program. One of the members of the pro-Nazi group, Vojtech Tuka, served as prime minister during Slovakia's brief period of "independence" (1939-1945) after Germany occupied the Sudetenland, Bohemia, and Moravia. Tuka and his supporters were increasingly able to outflank Hlinka's clerical successor, Jozef Tiso, the president of Slovakia, who, despite his strongly Christian nationalist leanings, initially hoped to forestall the outright Nazification of Slovak society.

¹⁹²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These statements harken back to a famous passage in the novel *Dead Souls* (first published in 1842) by the great 19th-century Russian writer Nikolai Gogol: "And you, my Russia, are you not also speeding along like a troika [three-horse carriage] that nothing can overtake? Is the road not smoking beneath your wheels, and are the bridges not thundering as you ride across them, leaving everything far behind...? What does that awe-inspiring progress of yours foretell? What is the unknown force that lies within your mysterious horses? Surely the winds themselves must be lodged in their manes, and every vein in their bodies must be an ear stretched to catch the celestial message that bids them, with their iron-clad breasts and hooves that barely touch the earth as they gallop, to fly forward on a mission of God. Where, O my Russia, are you speeding off to? Where? Answer me! But no answer comes – only the strange sound of your carriage bells. The air roars past you, dividing into a thousand pieces, for you are overtaking the whole world, and one day you will compel all nations and all empires to stand aside and let you race ahead!"

¹⁹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The figure of 40,000 is at the lower end of the generally accepted range of 38,000 to 80,000 who were unjustly accused and repressed. See Gebauer *et al.*, *Soudní perzekuce politické povahy v Československu 1948-1989*, pp. 3-111.

¹⁹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This refers to Stalin's infamous dictum that class struggle intensifies as socialist development approaches Communism. The implication was that violent repression had to be increased to cope with the surging struggle.

¹⁹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These figures are accurate but misleading. Most of the members took little active part in the organization.

¹⁹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The figures given here are roughly correct, albeit somewhat high. (Only about 18,000 to 20,000 members were actively involved in the party.) The active membership of the Czechoslovak People's Party was closer to 50,000, which may be the reason that the figure of 40,000 was cited here. For more on the non-Communist Czech parties in 1968, see the relevant annotation to Document No. 4 above.

¹⁹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Slovak Freedom Party (*Slovenská strana svobody*, or SSS) and the Slovak Renewal Party (*Slovenská strana obrody*, SSO) both were created in the late 1940s out of remnants of the Slovak Democratic Party, which had been set

up just after World War II as a *de facto* successor to the banned Slovak People's Party. In the 1946 elections, the Slovak Democratic Party won 62 percent of the vote in Slovakia, compared to only 30 percent for the Slovak Communist Party. In response, the KSS (supported by the KSČ) used a variety of legal and illegal means to pressure and destroy the Democratic Party, a process that was completed by 1947, several months before the Communist takeover. The Slovak Freedom Party was established in late 1946 by former Democratic Party members who had been persuaded by the KSS to leave, and the Slovak Renewal Party was set up in 1948. The two parties continued to exist after 1948 within the National Front (i.e., under KSČ domination), but were largely moribund. By the mid-1960s, their membership had been reduced to almost zero. In 1968 the Slovak Freedom Party and Renewal Party, headed by Michal zákovič and Jozef Mjartan, respectively, experienced a slight revival, but remained of little efficacy. In neither case did the party's membership exceed 1,000. Hence, although it is true, as Shelest claims, that "the number of members [of the SSS and SSO] has increased," the increase was of very little significance.

¹⁹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Miroslav Urbanovič had been a secretary in the Central Slovakian regional committee of the Czechoslovak Youth Union since June 1965.

¹⁹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The official Czechoslovak Youth Union (*Československý svaz mládeže*, or ČSM), the equivalent of the Communist Youth League (*Komsomol*) in the Soviet Union, was greatly discredited and weakened during the Prague Spring. Its membership fell sharply, and even those who still belonged to the ČSM took no part in its activities.

²⁰⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For cogent discussions of these youth groups, see Golan, *Reform Rule in Czechoslovakia*, pp. 69-78; Horský, *Prag 1968*, pp. 183-190; Kusin, *Political Grouping in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement*, pp. 81-96; and Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, pp. 596-599.

²⁰¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Marshal Ivan Konev and Marshal Kirill Moskalenko were distinguished military commanders in World War II and were appointed to a number of top-ranking command and defense ministry positions in the postwar era. In 1968 they were still serving, respectively, as Inspector-General and Chief Inspector of the Soviet armed forces. From 8 to 14 May 1968 the two officers led a high-ranking Soviet military delegation on a visit to fifteen Czechoslovak cities at the behest of the CPSU Politburo. See "Sovětská vojenská delegace odcestovala," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 15 May 1968, p. 1. The ostensible purpose of the trip was to mark the 23rd anniversary of Victory Day on 9 May (commemorating the defeat of Germany in World War II), but the Soviet delegation also toured a large number of military facilities, defense industrial plants, and security force bases to assess both the popular mood and the readiness of Czechoslovakia's "healthy forces" to "combat the counterrevolution." In addition, the visit was clearly designed to exert pressure on the KSČ leadership, as Brezhnev privately acknowledged at the five-power meeting in Moscow on 8 May. By "sending a large military delegation," he argued, the Soviet Union was taking a "concrete measure" to "help our friends defend the leading role of the [KSČ] and uphold the cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia." (Quoted from "Zapis' besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol'shi," L. 159.) In this regard, Konev's speech during the Victory Day celebration (which Shelest mentions here) was unusually blunt in warning that "the Soviet armed forces are always in full combat readiness" and will "always firmly and reliably defend our socialist gains and our frontiers of the socialist camp," especially in "the ČSSR, which is a bridgehead right next to the capitalist world."

²⁰²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: All of the individuals mentioned

here were officially regarded as mortal enemies – past or present – of the Soviet regime. The names of Trotsky, Rasputin, Nicholas II, Hitler, Mussolini, and Mao Zedong are undoubtedly familiar to all readers, but the other names may be somewhat more obscure. Grigorii Zinoviev, Aleksei Rykov, and Karl Radek were rivals of Stalin who were executed in the 1930s after losing out in the power struggle. (Rykov had sided with Stalin against Zinoviev, but Stalin subsequently turned against Rykov as well.) Pyotr Stolypin was the Russian prime minister and internal affairs minister under Nicholas II who carried out significant land reforms in 1906 – reforms that were staunchly opposed by the Bolsheviks, who demanded outright expropriation. Stolypin was assassinated by a terrorist (who was also a secret police agent) in 1911. Pavel Milyukov was the founder and leader of the Constitutional Democrat (Cadet) party in Russia, which tried to prevent the Bolsheviks from coming to power. Aleksandr Guchkov was a leading figure in the Cadet party. Both Milyukov and Guchkov had to flee abroad after the Bolsheviks seized control in Russia.

²⁰³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Although the figure of 20 is much too high, a number of Czechoslovak officials had committed suicide in 1968, especially those who had been involved in torture and repression in the early 1950s. Josef Sommer, the chief physician at Ruzyně prison who had been implicated in many years of coercive practices against political prisoners, committed suicide on 26 April. At around the same time, Jan Břešťlanský, the deputy chair of the Supreme Court, and Jiří Počepický, the investigative chief in the Prague branch of the State Security, both killed themselves. Their deaths, like Sommer's, followed revelations in the press about the investigative and judicial abuses of the 1950s. A somewhat different case was the suicide of General Vladimír Janko, who, as discussed in annotations to Document No. 2 above, killed himself in March 1968 after disclosures of attempts in December 1967 and January 1968 to keep Novotný in power through military force.

²⁰⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Turmoil increasingly engulfed the Czechoslovak People's Army (*Československá lidová armáda*, or ČLA) in the spring and summer of 1968. The ouster of many staunchly pro-Soviet military officers and National Defense Ministry personnel in the spring of 1968 allowed the reform movement to extend far into the ČLA. A lively debate arose in Czechoslovakia, both publicly and privately, about the possibility of sharply reducing military spending and transferring resources to the civilian economy. Implicit in any such move would be a diminution of the country's military obligations to the Warsaw Pact. Further controversy about Czechoslovakia's role in the Warsaw Pact arose in mid-May 1968 (around the time Shelest was preparing this document) when twenty-one ČLA officers from the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy released a "memorandum" that strongly criticized the Pact's structures and proposed numerous reforms both in the alliance and in Czechoslovak policy. The implementation of these measures would have resulted in a markedly different Soviet-East European military relationship. The Gottwald Memorandum received overwhelming support within the Czechoslovak armed forces, and many of the document's proposals were included in drafts prepared by the National Defense Ministry for consideration at the KSČ's upcoming Fourteenth Congress. Combined with the ongoing personnel changes and the debates over military spending, the Gottwald Memorandum sparked fresh apprehension in Moscow about the future of Czechoslovakia's contribution to the Warsaw Pact. Detailed reports from the Soviet Defense Ministry and KGB, which were sent regularly to the CPSU leadership, offered a gloomy view of the "military-political standing and combat readiness of the Czechoslovak armed forces." See, for example, the voluminous reports and memoranda in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd.

232, 243, and 309. In a briefing to the CPSU Politburo on 23 May, Marshal Grechko claimed that the Czechoslovak army was “rapidly deteriorating” and was “no longer capable of defending the border with the FRG.” Cited from “Rabochaya zapis’ zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 23 maya 1968 g.,” 23 May 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 260-262. A few weeks later, Soviet military officials warned Brezhnev that if the number of “ČLA officers who favor ‘democratic reforms in the army’” continued to grow, it would accelerate the “grave decline in the Czechoslovak army’s combat capability.” Cited from Shelest’s diary, “Dnevnik P. E. Shelesta,” in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), F. 666, D. 1, L. 325. Brezhnev, in turn, urged the KSČ leadership on 4 May to realize that “when your army is being weakened, this is not and cannot be a purely internal matter. We count on your [army’s] strength, just as you rely on the might of the Soviet Union.” Cited from “Zapis’ peregovorov s delegatsiei ChSSR, 4 maya 1968 goda,” L. 144.

²⁰⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Actually, almost all of the Germans who left Czechoslovakia after World War II did so in 1945 and 1946 (as discussed above), not 1948. They were forced out in mass expulsions. Of the very large German community that existed in Czechoslovakia before World War II (nearly 3.5 million), only a small fraction (roughly 165,000) remained after 1946, and the numbers gradually declined thereafter.

²⁰⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Rudolf Cvik had been first secretary of the Central Slovakian regional committee since July 1960 and was also a member of both the KSČ Central Committee and the KSS Central Committee until the end of May 1968 (shortly after the Ukrainian delegation visited Czechoslovakia), when he stepped down under pressure at the KSČ Central Committee plenum.

²⁰⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Although it may seem strange to lump Novotný with Masaryk and Beneš, the speaker is correct that on one key issue – the need for a united Czechoslovakia, with Czechs in a dominant role (at least implicitly) – the views of the three were similar. Many Slovaks developed a general resentment of *majorizacia* (majority domination) and tended to make relatively few distinctions among Czech leaders. For a cogent overview of the Czech-Slovak divide, placing the events of 1968 into a wider context, see Carol Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of the State, 1918-1987* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

²⁰⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Anton Šemorádik had been editor-in-chief of *Východoslovenské noviny* (East Slovakian Newspaper) since December 1966. His surname is mistransliterated as “Shemuradi” in Shelest’s memorandum, but the proper Slovak spelling is given here. I am grateful to Darina Kozuchová, the chief librarian at Šafárik University in Košice, and Lubica Poklembová, the head of the regional bibliographic department at the State Research Library in Košice, for materials from the archive of *Východoslovenské noviny* confirming that Šemorádik was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper in 1968.

²⁰⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Proposals to have Slovakia become a Soviet republic, rather than be reunited with the Czech lands, were devised as far back as the early 1940s by several prominent members of the Slovak Communist Party. See Article 2 of “Programa Komunistickej strany Československa,” 1 May 1941, reproduced in *Sborník Ústavu dejín KSS*, Vol. I (Bratislava: Ústav dejín KSS, 1959), p. 12. The idea also was taken up by a few Slovak nationalists who had served in Jozef Tiso’s government. In particular, the Slovak defense minister, General Fran Čatloš, transmitted a secret “Memorandum” to Stalin in 1944 via Slovak Communist intermediaries. In the Memorandum, Čatloš promised to support

the Red Army during its entry into Slovakia and to turn over the entire Slovak Army to the Soviet Union, while allowing Slovakia to become a constituent part of the USSR after the war. This plan aroused hostility from both Beneš and the Czechoslovak Communists. Although Soviet officials reassured Beneš that they had “no intention of protecting traitors” such as Čatloš, they expressed interest in “temporarily” following up on the defense minister’s ideas. See Zdeněk Fierlinger, *Ve službach ČSR*, 2 vols. (Prague: Orbis, 1948-1949), Vol. II, p. 326. Only after further protests by Beneš did the Soviet government finally reject Čatloš’s proposal. In the meantime, the status of Slovakia continued to provoke tensions among Czechoslovak Communists. In September 1944 the Slovak Communists and Social Democrats held a joint congress in Banská Bystrica, where they formally merged into a single Communist Party. The exiled KSČ leaders (led by Klement Gottwald) were not consulted or even informed in advance about this step. Although the statement issued by the joint congress indicated that KSS officials were willing to accept a new “Czecho-Slovak” state based on strict “equality” between the Czech lands and Slovakia, it also left open the possibility that events might “force our nation to turn in the direction of other fraternal nations,” meaning the Soviet Union. Cited from “Rezolúcia zjednocovacieho zjazdu Komunistickej strany Slovenska a Československej socialnodemokratickej strany robotnickej na Slovensku,” *Pravda* (Banská Bystrica), 17 September 1944, p. 2. The prevailing sentiment among top KSS officials (e.g., Ladislav Novomeský and Gustáv Husák) – who argued that Slovakia would be better off by joining the Soviet Union after the war – was one of the major points of contention with Gottwald and the other leading Czech Communists, who by 1944 had come out firmly in support of restoring Czechoslovakia as a unitary state. Gottwald was aware that Soviet leaders were unwilling to endorse Slovakia’s accession into the USSR, but the proposal itself, by indicating a degree of independence on the part of the KSS, ran contrary to the KSČ leader’s intention of recentralizing the Communist Party. In part for this reason, Slovak Communists who had played a prominent role in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising and in the wartime Slovak National Council (e.g., Husák) were singled out for persecution after February 1948 on charges of “bourgeois nationalist deviations.”

²¹⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Luigi Longo, the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), had visited Czechoslovakia on 5-7 May 1968 during a hard-fought parliamentary election campaign in Italy, the first nationwide elections since Longo took office after Palmiro Togliatti’s death in 1964. Although the Italian Communists were initially cautious about the changes in Czechoslovakia, they soon became enthusiastic supporters of the Prague Spring. Longo’s meetings with Dubček were widely covered in both the Czechoslovak and the Italian media. During private sessions with the KSČ leader, Longo readily acknowledged that the PCI hoped to “take full advantage” of the excitement created by the reforms in Czechoslovakia to enhance its own electoral prospects and to legitimize its program of “open, democratic socialism” for Italy. Longo’s unreserved support for the Prague Spring during his visit irritated many Soviet officials. At the summit of the “Five” in Moscow on 8 May, Brezhnev complained that Longo’s remarks were being “exploited by the unhealthy forces in Czechoslovakia.” (Cited from “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditel’yami bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi,” L. 158.) Many other formerly secret documents from the PCI leader’s visit were declassified in the early 1990s and are now available in the files of ÚSD-SK and at the SÚA. See, in particular, “Zpráva o návštěvě generálního tajemníka Italské Komunistické strany soudruha Luigi Longa v Praze ve dnech 5.-7. května 1968,” May 1968 (Top Secret) in SÚA, Arch.

ÚV KSČ, F. 02/1, A.j. 30, Ll. 173-176.

²¹¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Adolf Hoffmeister, born in 1902, received a legal degree and served as a diplomat in the late 1940s and 1950s, but spent most of his career both before and after World War II on artistic, cultural, and literary pursuits. He was a renowned caricaturist and sketch artist, and his portraits of well-known contemporaries were similar in quality to the drawings by David Levine featured in *The New York Review of Books* in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Hoffmeister was the illustrator of dozens of books and was in wide demand for his satirical and political cartoons. He also gained prominence as a painter, writer, art and music critic, and food and wine connoisseur. Many anthologies of his drawings, paintings, cartoons, and writings are available in a number of languages, including English. (Hoffmeister lived for a while in Great Britain and the United States, so he ended up publishing a substantial number of cartoons in English translation.) For a small but useful sample of his wide-ranging art, theater, and music criticism, see *Kuo-Cha: Cestopisná reportáž o čínském malířství* (Prague: Státní nakladatelství krásné literatury, 1954); *Mrakodrapy v pralese* (Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1964); *Slepcova píšťalka aneb Lidice: Hra o předešlé a třech* (New York: Vydaly New-Yorské listy, 1942); *Hry a protihry* (Prague: Orbis, 1963); *Karel Václav Klíč: O zapomínaném umělci, který se stal vynálezcem* (Prague: Státní nakladatelství krásné literatury, 1955); and *Současné čínské malířství* (Prague: Nakl. československých výtvarných umělců, 1959). For a useful collection of his popular travel writings, see *Lety proti slunci/Pohlednice z Číny/Vyhlička s Pyramid/Made in Japan* (Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1959), which covers China, Egypt, and Japan. A good sample of Hoffmeister's artistic work is now also on display at the appropriately named Hotel Hoffmeister in Prague, which has a whole gallery devoted to his drawings and paintings. Hoffmeister was appointed chairman of the Czechoslovak Union of Fine Artists in December 1964, a post that commanded great authority in Prague. In that capacity he actively promoted cultural and political freedom. He died in 1973.

²¹²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For a concise survey of materials published in these and other Ukrainian-language periodicals in 1968, see Hodnett and Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, pp. 14-15, 17.

²¹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Soviet authorities had declined to publish more than very brief excerpts from the Action Program in the Soviet press. Of the Warsaw Pact countries (other than Czechoslovakia), only Romania published the whole program.

²¹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These festivals were extensively covered in the Ukrainian press as well as in secret reports prepared by Soviet diplomats and intelligence sources. See, for example, "Tsentral'nyi Komitet KPSS," Memorandum No. 1/61 (Top Secret), 25 June 1968, transmitting a report from V. I. Klovov, member of a UkrSSR government delegation attending the Ukrainian Days of Culture in the ČSSR, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, Ll. 161-165; "TsK KPSS: Informatsiya o prebyvanii v ChSSR delegatsii USSR v svyazi s Dnyami kul'tury Ukrainy v Chekhoslovakii," Memorandum No. 1/62 (Top Secret), 25 June 1968, in TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 30, Ll. 150-156; and a large number of reports, memoranda, and cables in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd. 60, 66, and 298-300.

²¹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This passage and others below were underlined by typewriter in the original document.

²¹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Under Novotný, no discussion was permitted of possible changes in the Czech-Slovak relationship. That taboo disappeared soon after the Prague Spring began, when proposals to federalize the country, with separate Communist Parties and republic governments for the Czech lands and Slovakia

alongside the central party and state organs, were vigorously debated. The KSČ Action Program committed the authorities to pursue federalization (albeit without any specific guidelines), and a scheme for federalization took shape in the spring and summer of 1968. Following the Soviet invasion, however, the scheme was only partly implemented. On 28 October 1968 the Czech Republic and Slovakia received their own separate governments (of equal status) alongside the federal government, and the National Assembly was divided into two chambers of equal status, thus partly assuaging Slovak grievances about "majority domination" (*majorizacia*). This structure was fully implemented in January 1969, and it was the only product of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia that survived the whole period of "normalization." Nevertheless, the federalization of the state was more than offset by the retraction of plans to federalize the Communist Party. Before the invasion, the intention had been to set up a separate Czech Communist Party, which would be equal to the Slovak Party. Both would have existed alongside the KSČ. After the invasion, Brezhnev pressured the KSČ leadership to abandon plans to form a Czech Party, apparently because he feared that such a move would weaken the KSČ and set a precedent for the establishment of a Russian Party that would detract from the CPSU. (During one of the post-invasion negotiations, Brezhnev remarked: "If the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [in the USSR] has no Communist party of its own, why should there be a separate Communist party for the Czechs?") At a KSČ Central Committee plenum in November 1968, Czechoslovak leaders finally succumbed to Moscow's pressure, announcing that plans to establish a Czech Party would be postponed indefinitely. A separate Communist Party of Slovakia (*Komunistická strana Slovenska*) continued to exist under the KSČ's auspices, but no separate Czech Party was set up. Instead, the November plenum merely created a KSČ CC "Bureau for the Czech Lands," a modest step that was widely viewed in Slovakia as a disappointing retreat. The failure to establish a separate Communist Party for the Czech lands implied that the Czechs, represented by the KSČ, were broadly overseeing Slovakia and the KSS.

²¹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For an illuminating survey of cultural developments and changes in the mass media in Slovakia in 1968, see Juraj Fabian, "Analýza masových oznamovacích prostriedkov (1967-1970)," in Komisia vlády SR pre analýzu historických udalostí y rokov 1967-1970, *Slovenská spoločnosť v krízových rokoch: Zborník štúdií*, 3 vols. (Bratislava: Politologický kabinet SAV, 1992), Vol. 2, pp. 116-184 (hereinafter cited as Komisia vlády SR, *Slovenská spoločnosť v krízových rokoch*, with appropriate volume and page numbers).

²¹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This criticism, voiced earlier by economists such as Ota Šik and Radoslav Selucký, was a prominent theme in the landmark document authored by Otakar Turek and three other senior economists, *Nástin koncepcie ďalšieho rozvíjanie ekonomické soustavy řízení*, which was published as a supplement to the newspaper *Hospodářské noviny* in both Prague and Bratislava on 5 April 1968. For a recent analysis of the economic conditions in Slovakia in 1968, see Michal Štefanský, "Niektoré aspekty ekonomicko-sociálneho vývoja na Slovensku," in Komisia vlády SR, *Slovenská spoločnosť v krízových rokoch*, Vol. 1, pp. 95-125.

²¹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In addition to serving as first secretary of the KSS Central Slovakia regional organization, Anton Ľazký had been elevated to the KSS CC Presidium just two months earlier, on 9 April. He was known to be a strong supporter of political liberalization and a far-reaching restructuring of the Czech-Slovak relationship.

²²⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Discontent in Slovakia had mounted during the final years of Novotný's reign because of a

perception that Novotný wanted to perpetuate Slovakia's subordination to the Czech lands. Dubček was able to use the issue in late 1967, when he was still first secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, in his bid to displace Novotný as head of the KSČ. Although Dubček and other KSČ leaders initially envisaged only modest reforms in Czech-Slovak relations, the question of federalization (of both the state and the Communist Party) was on the agenda by the early spring of 1968.

²²¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On the decline of the Czechoslovak Youth Union in 1968, see my annotation to Document No. 16 above.

²²²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The official in question is Vladimír Čiřík, who took office in March 1968.

²²³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For a similar analysis of the contending factions on the KSČ Presidium, see Brezhnev's comments at the five-power conference in Moscow on 8 May, transcribed in "Zapis' besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeli bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol'shi," Ll. 152-154.

²²⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The document mistakenly says CPSU here rather than KSČ, but the context makes it obvious that KSČ is correct.

²²⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For similar comments by a senior KSČ official about Novotný's efforts to stay in office, see "Zapis' besedy Prezidiuma TsK Kommunisticheskoi partii Chekhoslovakii, glavnyim redaktorom gazety 'Rudé právo' tov. Oldrzhikom Shvestkoi," by A. I. Lukovets, member of the editorial board at Moscow *Pravda*, transmitted to the CPSU Politburo by Mikhail Zimyanin, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, 20 May 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 26, Ll. 33-40.

²²⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Boboňko's surname is incorrectly transliterated in the document as Bobojko.

²²⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: If Rigo did say this before leaving for the plenum, he clearly changed his mind by the time he got there, for he made no mention of stepping down.

²²⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The "latest session" of the CPSU Politburo was on 27 May, a session that proved crucial for Soviet policy. (See my commentary preceding Excerpt No. 2 from Shelest's memoirs in Issue No. 10 of the CWIHP *Bulletin*, pp. 236-239.) The transcript of the session is "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27-ogo maya 1968 g.," 27 May 1968 (Top Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 45, D. 99, Ll. 270-274. See also "TsK KPSS," Memorandum No. 14194 (Top Secret), 27 May 1968, from V. Stepakov, K. Rusakov, and V. Zagladin to the CPSU Politburo, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 19, Ll. 109, 133-136.

²²⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Miloš Krno originally was trained as a lawyer and diplomat, and was actively involved in Slovak politics in the late 1940s and 1950s; but he had simultaneously begun a separate career as a writer. By the late 1960s he had written many works – novels, poems, and collections of stories – that were widely popular in Slovakia, and he had become a prominent figure in the Slovak literary and cultural community. Outside Slovakia, however, most of his work was relatively unknown. His writings as of 1968 included *A kto ma čaká?* (Bratislava: Smena, 1968); *Kým dohorela cigareta* (Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ, 1968); *Sialene predstavenie* (Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ, 1966); *Tažká hodina* (Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ, 1965); *Výstrel sa vracia* (Bratislava: Smena, 1965); *Jastrabia pol'ana* (Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ, 1963); *Živiteľka* (Bratislava: Slovenské Vyd. Politickej Literatúry, 1960); *V burke: Poezia* (Bratislava: Obroda, 1949); and his account of the Slovak National Uprising, *Viadkut: Poviedky z povstania* (Bratislava: Pravda, 1946). He wrote numerous other books in the 1970s and 1980s, including two volumes of memoirs.

²³⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Krno's stint at the Czechoslovak

embassy in Moscow actually came in 1950-51, when he was only 28 years old.

²³¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest is referring here to Krno's *Vrátim sa živý* (Bratislava: Slovenský spisovateľ, 1961). Jan Nálepka (1912-1943) was a schoolteacher who became a captain in the Slovak and Soviet partisans during World War II. Under the *nom de guerre* Repkin, Nálepka joined the Czechoslovak partisans in mid-1942 and immediately established close contact with the Soviet Army. In May 1943, he formally enlisted in the Soviet partisans at the behest of the Soviet commander, Major-General A. N. Saburov. Under Saburov's direct command, Nálepka took charge of a Czechoslovak unit responsible for sabotage and reconnaissance in occupied Ukraine and Belorussia. In the fall of 1943, Nálepka's unit helped drive German troops out of the Ukrainian town of Ovruch and helped capture the main bridge just outside the town. On 16 November 1943, Nálepka was killed by German machine-gun fire as his unit battled for control of the local railway station. Soon thereafter, Soviet and Slovak Communist leaders sought to memorialize Nálepka as an exemplar of socialist courage and "a symbol of the fraternal bonds between Slovak and Soviet fighters in the struggle for the freedom and independence of their countries." He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and was the subject of numerous artistic and literary works, including Krno's novel.

²³²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Soviet leaders were well aware of these arguments and tried – in vain – to refute them. See, for example, "Spravka o zhizhennom urovne naseleniya Chekhoslovakii," Ll. 7-21.

²³³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: What Krno has in mind here is a "creeping" coup d'état by "anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary" elements, not a violent military takeover.

²³⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference to armed patrols harkens back to the units that were set up to facilitate and consolidate the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. The specific division to which Krno refers was set up in March-April 1968 under the auspices of the KSČ People's Militia.

²³⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These figures are much too high, at least with respect to active members (which in both cases numbered well under 100,000).

²³⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Vladimír Blažek was a prominent advocate of radical liberalization. The article in question is "Soukromý politický deník," *Literární listy* (Prague), No. 13 (31 May 1968), p. 2.

²³⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This statement, which picks up on Marx's famous dictum that no ruling class has ever given up power without a struggle, is taken out of context by Krno and Shelest. Blažek was a proponent of open, multiparty elections. Although he was doubtful that the KSČ would ever accept free elections, he was clearly seeking peaceful change.

²³⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This is not entirely accurate. The branches of KAN were located predominantly in urban areas of the Czech lands. Although the organization hoped to expand its presence in Slovakia, little progress toward that goal had been achieved before the Soviet invasion.

²³⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Petőfi Circle was set up in March 1956 by the Stalinist leader in Hungary, Mátyás Rákosi, who intended it to be a debating forum for the youth league of the Hungarian Workers' Party (MDF). Rákosi believed that an outlet of this sort would help defuse growing social tension. To his dismay, the club quickly became a leading organ of the anti-Rákosi opposition. On 30 June 1956, Rákosi induced the MDF Central Leadership to adopt a resolution banning the Petőfi Circle and de-

nouncing “anti-party elements” and the “anti-party views” of “a certain group that has formed around Imre Nagy.” This resolution came too late, however, either to end the Petöfi Circle or to forestall the ouster of Rákosi in mid-July 1956. (Rákosi was forced to flee to the Soviet Union, where he lived the remaining fifteen years of his life.) The Petöfi Circle continued to function over the next few months, as social turmoil in Hungary culminated in a full-fledged revolution on 23 October 1956.

²⁴⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: As early as mid-March 1968, some allusions to Stalin’s complicity in the Czechoslovak terror of the 1950s began appearing in the Czechoslovak press. The most comprehensive analysis was presented in the three-part series by Karel Kaplan, “Zamyšlení nad politickými procesy,” *Nová mysl* (Prague), Vol. XXII, No. 6 (June 1968), pp. 765-794; Vol. XXII, No. 7 (July 1968), pp. 906-940; and Vol. XXII, No. 8 (August 1968), pp. 1054-1078. Further installments of Kaplan’s research were due to be published in the same journal, but those plans were cancelled after the Soviet invasion.

²⁴¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Jan Masaryk, the son of Tomáš Masaryk, served as foreign minister in the final non-Communist government under Beneš and, for a very brief while, in the first government established by the KSČ. Masaryk died under mysterious circumstances in March 1948. His defenestration was officially portrayed as a suicide, but there were strong suspicions in Czechoslovakia – both then and afterward – that Soviet secret police “advisers” killed him and subsequently covered it up. (Those suspicions have been largely confirmed by declassified materials, though conclusive evidence remains sealed in the former KGB archives.) On 3 April 1968 the Czechoslovak government announced that it was opening a new investigation into Masaryk’s death. One of the founders and leaders of KAN, Ivan Sviták, was instrumental in bringing about this official inquiry. Not surprisingly, the investigation sparked bitter reactions in Moscow. On 7 May, Soviet leaders issued a statement via the TASS news agency that allegations of Soviet involvement were being concocted by “enemies of socialist Czechoslovakia” who were seeking to “stir up anti-Soviet sentiments among politically unstable people.” At the five-power meeting in Moscow the following day, Brezhnev expressed hope that the TASS statement would undercut “provocative insinuations by reactionary circles . . . that Masaryk was murdered by Soviet agents.” Cited from “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeliyami bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi,” L. 156. In a top-secret report prepared after the invasion, the Soviet KGB denounced KAN (and especially the “reactionary philosopher Sviták”) for having “instigated the [KSČ’s] provocative campaign ‘to uncover all the circumstances’ of Jan Masaryk’s suicide.” See “O deyatel’nosti kontrevolyutsionnogo podpol’ya v Chekhoslovakii,” 13 October 1968 (Top Secret), prepared by A. Sakharovskii, chief of the KGB’s 1st Main Directorate, transmitted by Soviet KGB chairman Yurii Andropov to the CPSU Politburo, in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 21, D. 32, L. 109.

²⁴²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This “organization” consisted of a small number of people who took part in a mass symposium in late May 1968 on “the cult of personality in Czechoslovakia,” a forum co-sponsored by the KSČ Institute of History and the Gottwald Museum. The “Clean Hands” group argued that all KSČ officials in the 1950s bore responsibility for the mass repressions, and that all “dirty” politicians should be forced to retire and placed under arrest. See “Informatsiya o diskussii ‘Kul’t lichnosti v Chekhoslovakii,’” Cable No. 15815 (Secret), from R. Lozhnikov, second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Prague, to M. Suslov, P. Demichev, and K. Rusakov, 6 May 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 25, Ll. 134-142. Aside from their contributions to this symposium,

the members of the group played little role in the Prague Spring.

²⁴³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Krno is referring here to the plenum that was held a week earlier, at the end of May.

²⁴⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This letter from Stalin, written in 1951, was cited by Biřak in his speech at the May 1968 plenum of the KSČ Central Committee. The speech was published in *Rudé právo* on 5 June, the day before Shelest spoke with Krno. See “Z diskuse na plenu ŮV KSČ ve dnech 29 května-1 června 1968: Odpovědnost vůči dnešku,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 5 June 1968, p. 2. Biřak used the letter to buttress his contention that responsibility for the violent repression in Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s lay with KSČ officials, not with Stalin. Biřak’s position, however, was at best misleading. Although Czechoslovak leaders (e.g., Gottwald and Novotný) did bear responsibility for the show trials and other repression, the whole process was instigated and guided by Soviet state security “advisers” in the ČSSR Public Security Ministry, Justice Ministry, and Interior Ministry, who were acting at Stalin’s behest. For an authoritative study of the role of these “advisers,” see Kaplan, *Sověřtší poradci v Československu, 1949-1956*, esp. pp. 8-47. In 1951, Stalin personally ordered the removal and – four months later – the arrest of Rudolf Slánský, the KSČ General Secretary, whose show trial and execution in 1952 were the most spectacular in a longer series of repressive incidents. Crucial evidence about these events was released from the Russian Presidential Archive in the late 1990s for four large volumes of collected documents, published as T. V. Volokitina et al., eds., *Sověřskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944-1953: Dokumenty*, 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999 and 2002); and T. V. Volokitina et al., eds., *Vostochnoi evrope v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov: 1944-1953*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Sibir’skii Khronograf, 1997 and 1999).

²⁴⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This should be Presidium, not Politburo.

²⁴⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Krno’s assessment here is wide of the mark. The extent of disagreement within the KSČ Presidium varied from issue to issue, but it was rare that Dubček encountered strong opposition. Indeed, he managed to preserve greater harmony on many issues than one might have expected in the face of such great turbulence at home and pressure from abroad.

²⁴⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This statement is misleading. Although some KSČ officials occasionally had hinted at the possibility of genuine “opposition parties,” Dubček had consistently rejected the idea. His view was endorsed by the KSČ Presidium as a whole. Moreover, it is questionable whether any groups outside the KSČ could have marshaled the resources and support to become “full-fledged” parties. On this point, see Skilling, *Czechoslovakia’s Interrupted Revolution*, pp. 546-555.

²⁴⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This number is much too low. Even the official statistics put the number of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia at 560,000. See Československý statistický ůřad, *Statistická ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky, 1968* (Prague: ČSŮ, 1968), p. 312. Unofficial estimates put the figure at around 600,000 to 700,000, or possibly even higher.

²⁴⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The final arrangements for the Warsaw Pact’s “Šumava” military exercises were set during a visit to Czechoslovakia on 17-22 May by a high-ranking Soviet military delegation led by the defense minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko. See “Zpráva o pobytu delegace ozbrojených sil SSSR v ČSSR,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 23 May 1968, p. 1. This delegation was following up on the talks held a few days earlier by the Konev-Moskalenko delegation (see above), which had been in Czechoslovakia from 8 to 14 May, and on a visit in late April by Marshal Ivan Yakubovskii, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed

forces, who met at length with the ČSSR national defense minister, General Martin Džúr. Krno's mention of "the arming of workers' patrols" refers to the upcoming meeting of the KSČ People's Militia (*Lidová milice*), the paramilitary units that had helped to impose and enforce Communist rule in Czechoslovakia. The meeting, held on 19 June, was supposed to demonstrate the willingness of the People's Militia to uphold Communist principles in the face of an "anti-socialist onslaught." (For further information about this meeting, see my annotations in Document No. 22 below.)

²⁵⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This refers to Vladimír Mináč, a Slovak writer (1922-1996) who had been among the signatories of a letter protesting the highly critical speeches that were delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union in June 1967. The motives of those who signed the letter were varied. Old-line Communists signed it because they rejected all demands for reform. Other signatories, however, particularly a number of Slovak writers, endorsed the letter because they believed that the Congress was being diverted onto issues that were predominantly of interest to Czechs. Evidently, Mináč fell into this category. He maintained a wary stance – endorsing certain reforms, while disapproving of others – once the Prague Spring was under way. Although he was not among the most diehard opponents of liberalization, his signature of the protest letter in June 1967 and his cautious approach thereafter caused tensions with other writers (especially Czech writers) in 1968 who actively supported the reform movement.

²⁵¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest gives the wrong first initial of Ladislav Mňačko, a Slovak writer whose novels, short stories, essays, and commentaries were celebrated for their anti-Stalinist themes. In April 1956, during the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union, Mňačko was at the forefront of those demanding far-reaching political and social reforms. He also gained prominence for his condemnation of the KSČ's periodic reliance on anti-Semitism, dating back to the show trials of Slánský and other leading figures in the early 1950s. In the summer of 1967 Mňačko strongly criticized Czechoslovakia's opposition to Israel during the Six-Day Mideast War. In a further gesture of protest against Czechoslovak policy, he traveled to Israel in August 1967. The KSČ authorities promptly denounced Mňačko as a traitor and stripped him of his citizenship, forcing him to live in exile. His case became one of the main pretexts for Novotný and his chief aide, the ideology secretary Jiří Hendrych, to shut down *Literární noviny*, the predecessor of *Literární listy*. Mňačko was not permitted to return to Czechoslovakia for even a brief visit until mid-1968. Following the Soviet invasion he had to leave the country again, and at that point he settled in West Germany and Austria. After the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia was ousted in late 1989, he moved back to Bratislava and died there in 1994.

²⁵²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The translation here is directly from the Czech text rather than the Russian version, which is incomplete and idiosyncratic.

²⁵³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This statement is accurate. The Subcarpathian Ruthenian region had never been part of the Tsarist Russian empire.

²⁵⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The area known as Subcarpathian Ruthenia (*Podkarpats'ka Rus'*), a poor, mountainous region adjoined by western Ukraine, eastern Slovakia, northeastern Hungary, and southeastern Poland, was under Hungarian rule from the 11th to the early 20th centuries. During that time, the population consisted predominantly of Ruthenians (*Rusyny*), a small East Slavic group whose national identity was tenuous (indeed almost non-existent) until well into the 19th century. In 1918-1919 the Ruthenians, like the Slovaks, willingly joined the new Czechoslo-

vak Republic so that they could be free of Hungarian domination. Over the next twenty years, Subcarpathian Ruthenia became a separate, partly autonomous province of Czechoslovakia. In October 1938, when German troops were directed to begin occupying Bohemia and Moravia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was granted full self-governing status. Under the pro-Ukrainian leadership of Avhustyn Voloshyn (who displaced the initial leader, Andrii Brodii), the region changed its name to Carpatho-Ukraine. In early 1939, the Axis powers shifted course and approved Hungary's bid to re-annex Carpatho-Ukraine. In desperation, the Carpatho-Ukrainian government proclaimed "independence" on 15 March 1939, just hours before the region was occupied by Hungarian troops, who remained there for the next five-and-a-half years. In October 1944, Soviet units from the 4th Ukrainian Front drove the Hungarians out of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and set up a 20-member Czechoslovak delegation at Khust to create a new government for the region. (In the meantime the USSR's 2nd Ukrainian Front, which included the First Czechoslovak Corps headed by General Ludvík Svoboda, moved into eastern Slovakia via the Dukla Pass, where they encountered heavy fighting.) The Khust delegation, despite its mandate, was increasingly outflanked by the Subcarpathian Communist Party, which relied on the backing of the Red Army to subvert and take over local national councils. On 19 November 1944, the Subcarpathian Communists met at Mukachevo and issued a "demand for Transcarpathian Ukraine to be reunited with Soviet Ukraine." A week later, the Communists established a 17-member National Council at Mukachevo, which "unanimously" reaffirmed the call for "reunification" with Ukraine. From that point on, the Communist-dominated Council held all power in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (which the Council invariably referred to as "Transcarpathian Ukraine") and laid the groundwork for a merger with Soviet Ukraine. The process reached its culmination on 29 June 1945, when the newly restored Czechoslovak government agreed under pressure to sign a treaty ceding the region to Ukraine. This treaty reversed a large number of earlier public and private statements by Soviet officials and exiled Czechoslovak leaders, who had pledged that Subcarpathian Ruthenia would be an integral part of postwar Czechoslovakia. In March 1946 the region was formally renamed Transcarpathian Oblast, and the Ukrainization campaign accelerated. For a superb overview of the history of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, as well as extensive notes and a comprehensive bibliography (through the mid-1970s), see Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978).

²⁵⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: More than 20,000 inhabitants of Subcarpathian Ruthenia fled to eastern Galicia in 1939-1940 after Hungarian troops moved into Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Almost all of the refugees were arrested by Soviet troops on charges of having illegally entered Soviet territory. (Eastern Galicia, like the rest of eastern Poland, was occupied by Soviet troops in September 1939.) They were brought before military tribunals, where they were convicted of espionage and sentenced to lengthy terms in hard labor camps. Roughly three-fifths of them died in the camps. The rest might have perished as well had it not been for the intervention of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, which pleaded with the Soviet authorities to release the imprisoned Ruthenians, if only to provide manpower for the First Czechoslovak Corps that General Ludvík Svoboda began organizing in July 1941. Not until early 1943, however, were some 2,700 prisoners finally freed and permitted to join Svoboda's units. The delay evidently arose because Soviet officials wanted to ensure that those who were released would not be inclined to turn against the USSR. See Illya Voloshchuk, "Politychni vidnosyny u chekhoslovats'komu viis'ku v SPSR," in

Shlyakh do voli: Zbirnyk spohadiv i dokumentiv pro natsional'no-vyzvol'nu borot'bu ukrains'koho naseleण्या Chekhoslovachchyny proty fashyzmu v 1939-1945 rr. (Bratislava-Prešov: SPVVUL, 1966), Vol. 2, pp. 214-215.

²⁵⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The percentages here are exaggerated, but it is true that a large majority of Subcarpathian Ruthenian males joined the First Czechoslovak Army, and that after Ruthenian prisoners were freed from Siberian labor camps in 1943, Ruthenians accounted for a highly disproportionate share (two-thirds) of the troops under Svoboda's command. Of the 3,348 soldiers in the Corps by late 1943, 2,210 were Ruthenians. Czech soldiers numbered only 563, and Slovaks only 543, with other nationalities accounting for the remaining 231. See Ivan Vanat, "Zakarpats'kyi ukrainci v chekhoslovats'komu viis'ku v SRSR," in *Shlyakh do voli*, Vol. 2, pp. 183-201.

²⁵⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Ivan Turjanica and Ivan Vas were long-time members of the Subcarpathian Communist Party, which had gained a sizable following among Ruthenians during the pre-war period. Turjanica played an especially important role in determining the fate of the Subcarpathian region. He had been a member of the Subcarpathian Communist Party since 1925, and in 1932 became editor of the party newspaper, *Karpats'kii Proletar*. He escaped to the Soviet Union after Hungarian units occupied Carpatho-Ukraine, and he then joined Svoboda's First Czechoslovak Corps. At the same time, Turjanica was given the rank of a political officer in the Red Army. In late October 1944 he was appointed a member of the delegation set up by Soviet troops to form a governing body for Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Shortly after the delegation arrived, Turjanica publicly declared that Subcarpathian Ruthenia would be restored as an autonomous province of Czechoslovakia. But by mid-November 1944, he had reversed his position in line with the goals promoted by Moscow. At the conference of the Subcarpathian Communist Party at Mukachevo, he argued that it was time to fulfill the "age-old desire" of the Ruthenians to be "reunited" (*vozz'ednannya*) with Soviet Ukraine. When the Mukachevo Council was established a week later, Turjanica was appointed chairman and Vas was placed in charge of internal security. From that vantage point, they were able to eliminate any further obstacles to the transfer of Subcarpathian Ruthenia to Ukraine. Subsequently, from 1946 to 1948, Turjanica served as General Secretary of the renamed Transcarpathian Oblast Communist Party. For more on Turjanica's exploits, see František Němec and Vladimír Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia* (Toronto: William B. Anderson, 1955); Vasyl Markus, *L'incorporation de l'Ukraine subcarpathique a l'Ukraine sovietique, 1944-1945* (Louvain: Centre Ukrainien d'Etudes en Belgique, 1956); and Borys Spivak, *Narysy istorii revolyuciinoi borot'by trudyashchykh Zakarpattya v 1930-1945 rokakh* (Uzhhorod: Vydavnytvo L'viv's'koho universytetu, 1963). Němec was the head of the Czechoslovak delegation that was established at Khust in October 1944. Markus was an ethnic Ukrainian who took part in the Mukachevo Council, but who went along with the resolutions only under heavy pressure.

²⁵⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The account here is partly correct, but also partly garbled. By this point (late 1944), Turjanica and Vas had already left the First Czechoslovak Corps. Turjanica, as noted above, had been appointed in October 1944 as a member and political adviser of the Czechoslovak delegation at Khust. It was from there that Turjanica went off on his mission with Vas in early November 1944, having explained to the head of the delegation, František Němec, that he was going to visit his mother in Mukachevo. See the first-hand account and documentation in Němec and Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia*, pp.

108-109, 232-233.

²⁵⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Czechoslovak delegation at Khust included two generals who were supposed to oversee the drafting of young men from Subcarpathian Ruthenia for Svoboda's units, which were still encountering fierce resistance near Dukla Pass.

²⁶⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This account is broadly accurate. See Němec and Moudry, *The Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia*, pp. 136 and 142-143, as well as document no. 57 in the invaluable documentary appendix of the Němec/Moudry book.

²⁶¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This account, too, is broadly accurate. Another point worth mentioning here is that shortly after Turjanica arrived in Mukachevo, he founded a newspaper, *Zakarpats'ka Pravda*, which vehemently promoted the cause of "reunification" with Soviet Ukraine, implying that anyone who opposed the idea must be a "Hungarian traitor and spy."

²⁶²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These are portions of eastern Slovakia, where the inhabitants included a substantial number of Ruthenians.

²⁶³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The post-armistice "treaties pertaining to the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic" include the Treaty of Versailles (signed on 7 May 1919), the Treaty of Saint-Germain (signed on 10 September 1919), and the Treaty of Trianon (signed on 4 June 1920). Other crucial documents preceding these treaties were the Cleveland Agreement (signed on 25 October 1915), the Pittsburgh Agreement (signed on 30 May 1918), the Declaration of Independence (adopted by the Czechoslovak National Council on 28 October 1918), and the Declaration of Turciansky Svaty Martin (issued on 30 October 1918).

²⁶⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: To a large extent this is accurate, but in 1944-1945 Soviet Ukrainian officials argued that Subcarpathia Ruthenia had briefly been part of Kyivan Rus' in the 13th century, and that Ukraine was therefore reclaiming one of its territories rather than seizing new land.

²⁶⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The reference here is to Ivan Olbracht (1882-1952), a well-known Czech writer in interwar Czechoslovakia, who wrote frequently about Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Of particular note is his collection of essays *Hory a staleti* (Prague: Melantrich, 1935), which deals with the economic hardships in Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Two years later he published a short-story triptych *Golet v údoleni* (Prague: Melantrich, 1937), which depicts Hassidic Jewish life in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, a subject that comes through particularly vividly in the story "O smutných očích Hany Karadžičové." Olbracht's writings were republished in 1972 along with two of his novels (also written in the 1930s) by the same publisher in a volume entitled *Zakarpatská trilogie*.

²⁶⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Moscow time (which during the Soviet era was also used in Ukraine) was introduced in Subcarpathian Ruthenia on 5 November 1944. Until then, the area had been on East-Central European time, two hours behind Moscow time.

²⁶⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The KSČ Central Committee plenum ran from 29 May (the day that this visiting delegation returned to Czechoslovakia) to 1 June 1968.

²⁶⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These comments by Barbírek about the loss of control over the press were echoed, almost word for word, in subsequent reports by the Soviet KGB on the "counterrevolutionary underground in Czechoslovakia." See, in particular, "O deyatel'nosti kontrrevolyutsionnogo podpol'ya v Chekhoslovakii" (cited in my annotation to Document 19), Ll. 1-34.

²⁶⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The article to which Gotlibová is referring is M. Shiryamov, "Ch'i interesy zashchishchal Masarik?"

Sovetskaya Rossiya (Moscow), 14 May 1968, p. 2.

²⁷⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: All the union-republics of the USSR (except for the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics) had their own national anthems from January 1950 on. The Ukrainian anthem was "Zhyvy Ukraina" (Live on, O Ukraine), composed by Andrii Lebedynets with lyrics by Mykola Bazhan and Petro Tychyra (A young poet, Oleksa Novyts'kyi; accused Bazhan and Tychyra of plagiarism and demanded to be listed as a co-lyricist, but his complaints, though not without merit, were brushed aside). (A revised version of the lyrics was adopted in March 1978.) In 1992, the newly independent state of Ukraine shifted its national anthem to "Shehe ne vmerla Ukraina" (Ukraine Has Not Yet Died), based on music composed in 1863 by Mykhailo Verbyts'kyi and lyrics adapted from an 1862 poem by Pavlo Chubyns'kyi.

²⁷¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Changes in the status of Bratislava were the first measures taken in 1968 to rectify the Czech-Slovak relationship. In late February 1968, laws and constitutional amendments were adopted to make Bratislava the "capital city of Slovakia" and to elevate the status of Bratislava's municipal national committee to a status equal to that of the Prague municipal committee – that is, a status roughly equivalent to that of each of the Czech and Slovak regional committees.

²⁷²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The editor-in-chief of *Rudé právo* was Oldřich Švestka, a member of the KSČ CC Presidium, who later became one of the signatories of the secret letter urging Soviet military intervention. For his views at the time of this visit, as expressed in a secret conversation with his counterparts at the CPSU daily *Pravda*, see "Zapis' besedy so chlenom Prezidiuma TsK Kommunisticheskoi partii Chekhoslovakii, glavnyim redaktorom gazety 'Rudé právo' tov. Oldřichom Shvestkoi," by A. I. Lukovets, member of the editorial board at *Pravda*, transmitted to the CPSU Politburo by Mikhail Zimyanin, editor-in-chief of *Pravda*, 20 May 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 26, Ll. 33-40.

²⁷³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Stepan Chervonenko was the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, who took an active part in trying to discredit the Prague Spring. Among Chervonenko's numerous contacts was Novotný even after the latter had been removed as president.

²⁷⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This view of Igor Kuznetsov's reports is generally correct. Cables from the Soviet consulate in Bratislava were sometimes distorted, but usually far less so than those emanating from the Soviet embassy in Prague. See, for example, "Informatsiya k voprosu o polozhenii v rukovodstve KPCh," Cable No. 110 (Secret), to A. A. Gromyko and K. V. Rusakov, 26 December 1967, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 10-13; "Informatsiya k voprosu o polozhenii v rukovodstve KPCh," Cable No. 1 (Secret), to A. A. Gromyko, 2 January 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 7-9; and "Zapis' besedy s chlenom TsK KPS tov. Ya. Mrazikom," Cable No. 21 (Secret), to A. A. Gromyko, 14 February 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 301, Ll. 71-74.

²⁷⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The federalization of Czechoslovakia, including separate Communist Parties and republic governments for Slovakia and the Czech lands, was due to take effect in the fall of 1968. Barbírek obviously had these plans in mind when he referred to a "future Slovak Republic." (He decidedly was *not* proposing an independent Slovakia.)

²⁷⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See my annotation later in this document for more about Gustáv Husák's role in July 1968.

²⁷⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The notion of full "equality" between the Czech lands and Slovakia, and the elimination of "majority domination" (*majorizacia*), were central demands put forth by

Slovak officials and groups in 1968.

²⁷⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The data cited here by Il'nyts'kyi are inaccurate, though the proportions are roughly correct. A total of 1,543 delegates were elected, of whom some 1,251 (81 percent) were from the Czech lands and 292 (18 percent) were from Slovakia. In terms of nationality, the proportions were slightly more even. The 1,215 Czech delegates represented 78.6 percent of the total pool, and the 300 Slovaks made up 19.4 percent. The remaining 28 delegates included 14 Hungarians, 7 Ukrainians, and 7 Poles. It is worth noting that the projected representation of Slovak delegates at the Fourteenth Congress in 1968 was greater than at the Thirteenth Congress in 1966, when Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by 1,192 to 265 (82.6 percent versus 17 percent).

²⁷⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: As in other documents, Il'nyts'kyi here assumed (as Soviet officials generally did) that most Slovaks were decidedly less reform-minded than the Czechs.

²⁸⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In early July 1968, a few days before this meeting between Il'nyts'kyi and Koscelanský, a municipal party conference was held in Bratislava. Although Gustáv Husák did not yet occupy a senior position in either the KSS or the KSČ, he was able to gain wide publicity at the conference by voicing strong criticisms of those who were "obstructing reform," a not-so-subtle reference to Biľak, among others. Husák declared that the long-festered problems in Slovakia should be blamed "not just on Novotný," but on "some of our Slovak comrades as well." He demanded that a Slovak Party congress be held in late August, prior to the KSČ's Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress that was due to start on 9 September. A Slovak party congress, he argued, would give a much-needed fillip to the reform process. The municipal conference endorsed his suggestion, and two weeks later (on 18 July) the KSS Central Committee formally voted to hold an early Slovak party congress on 26 August. This change of date was important because it established a de facto deadline for Soviet military action. Soviet leaders feared that if they did not act before the KSS congress took place, reformist forces in the Slovak party would use the gathering to press for the removal of Biľak and other hardline, pro-Soviet officials, paving the way for the wholesale ouster of "healthy forces" at the KSČ's own congress two weeks later. Thus, the concern was that if the Soviet Union waited beyond 26 August before sending in its troops, it would be faced with a fait accompli that would be extremely costly and difficult to undo.

²⁸¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The landmark "Two Thousand Words" ("Dva tisíce slov") manifesto was an ardently pro-reform statement drafted by Ludvík Vaculík and signed by nearly 70 writers, artists, scientists, athletic champions, and other prominent figures. It was published simultaneously in three Prague daily newspapers and the Czechoslovak writers' weekly *Literární Listy* on 27 June 1968. In many respects, the article was intended to help, not disparage, the government. It praised the KSČ leadership for having initiated reforms, and it called on Czechoslovak citizens to work with, rather than against, the KSČ, or at least with the party's reformist members. Moreover, the statement cautioned against the use of pro-reform tactics that were "illegitimate, indecent, or boorish." At the same time, the article urged citizens to resort to "direct action" at the district, local, and regional levels – including public criticism, strikes, demonstrations, and picketing – to compel orthodox, hard-line officials to relinquish their posts. The signatories emphasized that the need to "cleanse" Czechoslovak socialism of its past errors could no longer be deferred, and that events over the next few months would determine the country's fate. At a time of deepening hostility between Czechoslovakia and its Communist allies, not to mention the conflicts within the KSČ, these injunctions and other portions of the manifesto's language seemed indis-

creet and even threatening. Not only did the article imply that Soviet-Czechoslovak relations were “inequitable”; it also warned of the “possibility that foreign [i.e., Soviet] forces will interfere with our internal development,” and pledged that Czechoslovak citizens would defend the reform process “even with arms if necessary.” These words, in combination, aroused deep anger and concern in Moscow about a resurgent “counterrevolution” against both the Communist Party and all pro-Soviet elements in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet embassy had learned on 26 June from unnamed “friends” that a controversial document was about to be published. The chief editor of the CPSU daily *Pravda*, Mikhail Zimyanin, who formerly had been the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, happened to be in Prague on the 26th. His analysis of the “2,000 Words” and a translated copy of the text were promptly relayed to Moscow by the current Soviet ambassador in Prague, Stepan Chervonenko. Soviet leaders therefore learned right away about this “anti-socialist call to counterrevolution.” In Czechoslovakia itself, the article was widely hailed, but Dubček was irked by the authors’ call for direct action at the local level, which he perceived as a threat to his own gradual approach. Dubček also was aware of the implications of the document vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the other orthodox members of the Warsaw Pact. As a result, he led the KSČ Presidium in officially condemning the Manifesto shortly after its publication. See “Předsednictvo Ústředního výboru KSČ k prohlášení Dva tisíce slov,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 29 June 1968, p. 1. See also “Stánovisko vlády ČSSR k ‘2000 slov’,” 28 June 1968 (Secret), in VHA, F. Sekretariát MNO, 1968-1969, 158/200. In practical terms, though, little that Dubček could have done at that point would have diminished Moscow’s anger. The simple fact that such an “inflammatory” and “anti-socialist” statement had been published convinced many in the Soviet leadership that the KSČ was no longer in control of events. Indeed, Brezhnev had been speaking with Dubček by phone only hours before the article appeared; and thus he realized, based on Dubček’s failure to mention the upcoming publication, that the Czechoslovak leader himself must not have known about the manifesto until after it was published. The whole episode thus seemed to confirm Brezhnev’s suspicion that the KSČ had lost whatever influence it still had over the press, and with it a large part of its “leading role” in Czechoslovak society.

²⁸²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Fyodor Konstantinov was a prominent headline commentator for the CPSU throughout the 1968 crisis. However, the main article in the Soviet press denouncing the “2,000 Words” manifesto was not by Konstantinov, but by the pseudonymous I. Aleksandrov, “Ataka protiv sotsialisticheskikh ustoev Chekhoslovakii,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 11 July 1968, p. 4. The article by Konstantinov to which Koscelanský is referring here was not a response to the “2,000 Words” manifesto; instead, it came in response to a lengthy speech delivered by the reformist KSČ CC Secretary, Čestmír Císař, on 6 May to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx’s birth. See “Marxův myšlenkový odkaz je záštitou, oporou a inspirací: Večer k 150. výročí narození Karla Marxe,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 7 May 1968, pp. 1, 3. In the speech, Císař declared that “every Marxist-Leninist Party must have its own policy, which takes account of national conditions.” He insisted that no Party (i.e., the CPSU) could have a “monopoly on the interpretation of Marxism in contemporary circumstances,” and he chided those who wanted “a part of the Communist movement to be subordinated to another part of the movement.” Konstantinov was assigned the task of drafting a comprehensive rebuttal to Císař’s speech, “Marksizm-Leninizm – Edinoe internatsional’noe uchenie,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 14 June 1968, pp. 2-3. Císař promptly responded in a lengthy article, “V cem je síla živého marxismu-leninismu: Odpověď akademiku F.

Konstantinovovi,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 22 June 1968, p. 3. Konstantinov later responded to Císař’s reply, publishing another lengthy article, “Leninizm-Marksizm sovremennoi epokhi,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 24 July 1968, p. 4.

²⁸³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: For samples of the articles that might have antagonized Koscelanský, see Hajo Herbell, “Bonn zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung,” *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 24 May 1968, p. 6; and “Graf Razumovsky und die ‘2000 Worte’,” *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 3 July 1968, p. 7.

²⁸⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: To the extent that this statement is accurate, it sheds interesting light on the influence that Western countries wielded vis-à-vis events in Czechoslovakia – probably without even realizing it.

²⁸⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Koscelanský is referring here to the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in mid-1955. At the end of World War II the Communist regime in Yugoslavia was staunchly loyal to the Soviet Union, but by 1948 Stalin had provoked a bitter conflict with Yugoslavia, a conflict that came to the brink of war. The enmity between Moscow and Belgrade remained acute through the rest of the Stalin era. Soon after Stalin’s death, however, leaders on both sides began pursuing a Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation, an effort that culminated in a landmark visit to Belgrade by Khrushchev in May 1955. A vast amount of formerly secret documentation on the Soviet-Yugoslav split and the subsequent rapprochement has been released from the Russian, Yugoslav, and other East European archives since the early 1990s. On the reconciliation in 1955, see, among many other items, the hundreds of documents in “Ob itogakh sovetsko-yugoslavskikh peregovorov” in “Plenum TsK KPSS – XIX Sozyv: 4-12 iyulya 1955 g.,” July 1955 (Strictly Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 1, Dd. 157-180. See also the many valuable materials pertaining to Soviet-Yugoslav relations in 1955 in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, Dd. 306, 342, and 404 and RGANI, F. 5, Op. 30, Dd. 88, 90, 121, and 170. On the split itself, see the relevant items in the four volumes of declassified documents edited by T. V. Volokitina et al. (under the titles *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope* and *Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov*, both cited in my annotation to Document No. 19 above), as well as “Sekretnaya sovetsko-yugoslavskaya perepiska 1948 goda,” *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), Nos. 4-5, 6-7, and 10-11 (1992), pp. 119-136, 158-172, and 154-169, respectively. For insightful analyses drawing on newly declassified materials, see Leonid Gibianskii, “The Origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav Split,” in Norman M. Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds., *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 122-152; I. Bukharkin, “Konflikt, ktorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt’ (iz istorii sovetsko-yugoslavskikh otnoshenii),” *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow), No. 6 (31 March 1990), pp. 53-57; L. Ya. Gibianskii, “U nachala konflikta: Balkanskii uzel,” *Rabochii klass i sovremnyi mir* (Moscow), No. 2 (March-April 1990), pp. 171-185; I. V. Bukharkin and L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Pervye shagi konflikta,” *Rabochii klass i sovremnyi mir* (Moscow), No. 5 (September-October 1990), pp. 152-163; L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Vyzov v Moskvu,” *Politicheskie issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 1 (January-February 1991), pp. 195-207; and the related series of articles by L. Ya. Gibianskii, “K istorii sovetsko-yugoslavskogo konflikta 1948-1953 gg.,” in *Sovetskoe slavyanovedenie* (Moscow), No. 3 (May-June 1991), pp. 32-47 and No. 4 (July-August 1991), pp. 12-24; and *Slavyanovedenie* (Moscow), No. 1 (January-February 1992), pp. 68-82 and No. 3 (May-June 1992), pp. 35-51.

²⁸⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Tens of thousands of pages of documents in the former CPSU Central Committee archive (RGANI), which were available in 1992 and the first four months of

1993 (but are now off-limits again), confirm that officials at the Soviet embassy in Prague did their best in 1968 to convince Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders that a grave threat to socialism and to the USSR's security existed in Czechoslovakia. However, it is doubtful that Koscelanský is justified in saying that these reports had "misled" the members of the CPSU Politburo (which implies that their position would have been different if they had received less alarmist information). On the contrary, all evidence suggests that Soviet leaders correctly understood that, from their perspective (of wanting to maintain orthodox Communism in the Soviet bloc), the developments in Czechoslovakia represented a profound threat.

²⁸⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Soviet troops had not been permanently deployed in Czechoslovakia since December 1945, but Soviet units had begun entering Czechoslovak territory in late May 1968 for "Šumava" military exercises that began on 19 June. The exercises, which had been hurriedly moved up from their originally scheduled date in 1969, lasted well beyond their projected completion date of 30 June. The aim, as several of the Warsaw Pact generals privately indicated at the time, was to "paralyze and frighten" the "anti-socialist forces" in Czechoslovakia, to "intimidate wavering elements" in the KSČ, and to "bolster and protect true Communists dedicated to the revolution and to socialism." Cited from the top-secret briefing notes prepared by General István Oláh, Hungarian deputy minister of defense, and General Ferenc Szücs, deputy chief of the Hungarian General Staff, for the MSzMP Politburo, 5 July 1968, in *Magyar Honvédség Központi Irattára* (MHKI), 5/12/11, dok. 1. The political objectives cited by Oláh and Szücs took on even greater salience and urgency as tensions increased during the first few weeks of July. Even when the "Šumava" maneuvers finally ended in late July, the Soviet troops that had been taking part in the exercises remained in Czechoslovakia, fueling rumors that Soviet military commanders were hoping to gain a permanent presence there. A top-secret report to the CPSU leadership from the Soviet military attaché in Czechoslovakia, Lieut.-General Nikolai Trusov, left no doubt that the prolonged troop deployments were "causing ill will among the Czechoslovak population" and were widely regarded as a "violation of the sovereignty and national pride of the Czechs and Slovaks." See "Obzor pressy, peredach radio i televideniya v otnoshenii s komandno-shtabnom ucheniem i prebyvaniiem sovetskikh voisk na territorii Chekhoslovakii," Report No. 5-va to K. Katushev, K. Rusakov, and A. Gromyko, 18 July 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 3-9. Yet even after leaders in Moscow became aware of these sentiments, they made no effort to clarify the status of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. KSČ representatives often were unable even to meet with Marshal Ivan Yakubovskii (the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, who was overseeing the maneuvers), much less get accurate information from him. Time and again in the first half of July 1968, senior Czechoslovak officials announced specific dates as a "deadline" for the military withdrawals, only to find that the Soviet forces had no intention of pulling out. Some limited withdrawals occurred in the second week of July, but they came to an abrupt halt almost before they started. Reports then emerged that Soviet troops were setting up special electronic jamming gear, complex logistical equipment, large-scale ammunition stores, and other facilities that suggested they might want to remain on Czechoslovak territory indefinitely. See "Odjezd sovětských vojsk," *Rudé právo* (Prague), 19 July 1968, p. 5. Those reports gained extra credence after the Czechoslovak intelligence service intercepted a phone conversation between Marshal Yakubovskii and one of his deputies, General Mikhail Kazakov, in which Yakubovskii averred that Soviet forces would remain in Czechoslovakia "at least until 20 September," the projected closing date of the KSČ's Extraordinary

14th Congress. Cited in Pavel Tigrid, *Why Dubček Fell* (London: Macdonald, 1971), p. 68. Although Soviet leaders did finally agree at the end of July to pull out their troops temporarily, the deployments by that point had been highly beneficial for Soviet military planners. The command headquarters that Yakubovskii set up for the exercises remained intact, as did the elaborate military communications network at Ruzyně Airport just south of Prague, which linked Soviet units in Czechoslovakia with the Soviet High Command and with forces in neighboring Warsaw Pact countries. The retention of these installations in July and August greatly facilitated Soviet preparations for the invasion. (The communications center, in fact, proved invaluable in directing Soviet military air traffic on the night of 20-21 August.) The continued troop deployments also enabled the Soviet Union to put together a final list of military bases, air fields, and weapons depots in Czechoslovakia and to monitor the activities of Czechoslovak army units stationed at those sites. Most important of all, the protracted "Šumava" exercises served as a kind of "dress rehearsal" for the real military operation on 20-21 August. The units and entry routes employed during the exercises were, in almost all cases, the same ones used during the invasion.

²⁸⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A "letter to the Soviet people" from the KSČ People's Militia (*Lidová milice*), the paramilitary units who were traditionally among the most orthodox, pro-Soviet elements of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, had been published in the Soviet press on 21 June 1968. The letter and a resolution were approved on 19 June at a nationwide gathering in Prague of some 10,000 to 12,000 members of the People's Militia. According to the declassified transcript of Brezhnev's speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July 1968, the People's Militia conference was convened on the basis of the Soviet Union's "repeated recommendations and urgent advice." See "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," in "Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS – 17 iyulya 1968 g.," 17 July 1968 (Top Secret), in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 214, L. 18. Newly declassified documents (e.g., the items in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 1, Ll. 101-104 and D. 24, Ll. 104-126) also reveal that a highly publicized campaign of letter-writing by Soviet "workers" in support of the KSČ People's Militia in late June and early July was entirely orchestrated by the CPSU CC Propaganda Department. In many cases, the Soviet workers who supposedly had written "spontaneous" letters of support for the People's Militia were unaware of the letters until they read about them in the Soviet press.

²⁸⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Koscelanský is referring here to numerous letters sent in the first week of July urging the KSČ leaders to regain political control in Czechoslovakia and inviting them to take part in a multilateral summit meeting in Warsaw. On 4 July, the Soviet Politburo dispatched a letter to the KSČ Presidium expressing "alarm" at recent events in Czechoslovakia and demanding that the Czechoslovak authorities "adopt concrete and effective measures" to repulse the "anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary forces." Similar letters, though with an even more hostile and minatory edge, were sent to Prague by the East German, Polish, and Bulgarian Communist Parties (Koscelanský mistakenly omits mention of Bulgaria), and a somewhat less threatening letter was sent by János Kádár of Hungary. The letters were not published, but word of them quickly leaked out. In a follow-up to these documents, Brezhnev sent a letter to Dubček on 6 July inviting him to an allied meeting in Warsaw, which was intended to bring together the top officials of all the Warsaw Pact countries (other than Romania) to consider what the Soviet leader described as "the threat to Communism in Czechoslovakia posed by the Two Thousand Words." The other leaders of the "Five" (a group consisting of the Soviet Union,

East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary) extended similar invitations to the KSČ First Secretary over the next few days. But Dubček, having been buoyed by expressions of support from the press and the public as well as from KSČ organizations, rejected all such invitations, claiming that only a series of bilateral talks on Czechoslovak soil would be worthwhile in light of the wide discrepancy between the KSČ Presidium's views of the situation in Czechoslovakia and the views expressed by the leaders of the "Five." Dubček indicated that a joint conference could follow the bilateral meetings, but he urged that Romania and Yugoslavia be invited to take part as well. His position on this matter was unanimously endorsed by the KSČ Presidium (even by the hardline members such as Biřák and Kolder) at both of the meetings that Koscelanský mentions here, on 8 and 9 July. See "Shifrtelgramma," 10 July 1968 (Top Secret/Eyes Only), from S. V. Chervonenko, Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, to the CPSU Politburo, in AVPRF, F. 059, Op. 58, Po. 124, D. 571, Ll. 145-149. The leaders of the "Five" declined to take up Dubček's proposals, in part because they believed he was just trying to buy time until the KSČ's Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress, scheduled for September 1968, had created a *fait accompli* that would leave the reformists in the KSČ beyond any challenge from the party's "healthy forces." Brezhnev and his colleagues decided to proceed with the meeting in Warsaw even without Czechoslovakia's participation.

²⁹⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This plenum was convened on 17 July to endorse the Soviet delegation's actions at the recently-concluded Warsaw meeting. For the declassified transcripts, see "Iyul'skii Plenum TsK KPSS (17.VII.1968)," in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, Dd. 108-119, as cited above. The plenum was designed to convey the CPSU Politburo's views and to affix the Central Committee's imprimatur on the Politburo's stance. Despite earlier speculation by Western analysts, the transcripts and other newly declassified materials show that the plenum was *not* convened as a way of responding to pressure from below or of seeking advice from the Central Committee. On the contrary, the plenum was merely an element in the top-down process that characterized Soviet decision-making throughout the crisis. Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues determined the outcome of the plenum in advance and used it to ensure that the Politburo's position would be binding on all lower-level party organizations. Brezhnev opened the plenum with a lengthy speech highlighting the results of the Warsaw meeting and the events that led up to it. Shelest spoke immediately after Brezhnev. The Ukrainian leader had taken part in the Warsaw meeting (as he did in the Dresden conference), and, aside from Brezhnev, he was the only member of the Soviet delegation in Warsaw who spoke at the 17 July plenum. The marked-up version of Shelest's speech, before it was published in the final stenographic account (*stenograficheskii otchet*) of the plenum, is stored in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 112, Ll. 41-51. The version in the stenographic account is in RGANI, F. 2, Op. 3, D. 114, Ll. 9-9ob. The version of the speech stored in the Ukrainian archives (as translated here) is the typescript that Shelest actually used at the plenum. It contains the markings he made before delivering his remarks. The marked-up typescript is nearly identical (though not quite) to the version of his speech in the "author's copy" (*avtorskii ekzemplyar*) and stenographic account of the plenum transcript. The transcript incorporates the changes that Shelest made in handwriting on his typescript, but the paragraph formatting is different, and in one or two places the wording is very slight different. The mark-ups on the "author's copy" were designed mainly to bring the uncorrected copy into line with the original typescript that Shelest used. The changes that Shelest made in the typescript, and the mark-ups that he made on the "author's copy" of the plenum transcript on 18 July

(according to a date Shelest added next to his signature on the final page of the speech), will be noted here.

²⁹¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the plenum transcript, the exclamation point was deleted, and a comma was inserted, linking the "Comrades" with the next sentence.

²⁹²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the plenum transcript, this was changed from "CPSU CC Plenum" to "Central Committee Plenum."

²⁹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the typescript, the word translated here as "spineless" was *beskharakternye*, but Shelest changed it in handwriting to *beskhrabetnye*. The two words mean roughly the same thing (spineless, weak-willed, unprincipled).

²⁹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest added the words "in that country" in handwriting at the end of this sentence.

²⁹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The typescript included "of Kriegel, Cisař, Šik, and others" after the word "group," but Shelest deleted that portion and ended the sentence there. He then added the brief sentence immediately after it.

²⁹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See Shelest's report on this plenum in Document No. 4 above. See also the text of his speech at the plenum in Part 3 of my accompanying article in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

²⁹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest added the word "further" (*eshche bol'she*) in handwriting.

²⁹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The "district and regional party conferences" to which Shelest is referring here are the sessions that were being held throughout Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 to elect delegates for the KSČ's Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress. Soviet leaders had been hoping that the conferences would support the KSČ's "healthy forces" at the expense of radical reformers, but these hopes were sorely disappointed. A popular backlash in Czechoslovakia against the Soviet, East German, and Polish condemnations of the Prague Spring helped reform-minded KSČ officials garner an overwhelming share of votes at the party conferences – precisely what the Soviet Politburo feared most. Candidates who openly supported the "Two Thousand Words" manifesto did particularly well. By early July 1968 it was clear that ardent reformers in the KSČ were going to dominate the Fourteenth Congress, gaining ample leeway to remove orthodox, pro-Moscow officials en masse. This prospect accentuated the time constraints that Soviet leaders believed they were facing, and it spawned even greater anxiety in East Berlin and Warsaw about a possible spill-over from Czechoslovakia.

²⁹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest added the word "right-wing" by hand before the word "opportunist."

³⁰⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the typescript, the word "political" appeared right after the word "counterrevolutionary" in this sentence, but Shelest crossed it out.

³⁰¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the typescript, this paragraph ended here. Shelest moved the next paragraph up to this one, adding the words "As you know" at the beginning.

³⁰²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with the KSČ after the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. For the next twenty years the Social Democrats ceased to exist as an independent entity. Some of the leaders of the disbanded party (e.g., Zdeněk Fierlinger and Evžen Erban) were given senior posts in the KSČ, but other officials had to work in menial jobs or, in certain cases, were arrested and imprisoned. In the early spring of 1968, numerous journalists, political commentators, and former Social Democrats called for the party to be restored as an independent force. Dubček brushed aside these proposals, and the KSČ Presidium and Central Committee consistently reaffirmed the Communist Party's leading role and condemned

attempts to revive the Social Democratic Party. Fierlinger and Erban both joined in the denunciations of the “anti-Communist” proposals to reestablish the Social Democrats. Despite these obstacles, a preparatory committee was set up in Prague in March-April 1968 to pave the way for a revival of the Social Democratic Party. Similar committees were soon formed in Brno, Ostrava, Plzeň, and other cities. By the summer of 1968, more than 150 such groups had been established. The KSC̄ discouraged the formation of these committees, but did not take concrete action to disband them. However, pressure for some sort of crackdown gradually increased, as senior party officials warned that after the 14th KSC̄ Congress the Social Democrats might reemerge as a full-fledged political party with a program attractive enough to Czechoslovak citizens that the party would become “a real opposition force.” Cited from “Zpráva o současné politické situaci Československé socialistické republiky a podmínkách činnosti Komunistické strany Československe (srpen 1968),” report by the KSC̄ Secretariat, August 1968, in SÚA, Arch. ÚV KSC̄, F. 02/1, Ll. 25-26, 44. The Soviet invasion in August 1968 put an end to any further prospect that the Social Democrats would be revived as an independent party. The Moscow Protocol, signed on 26 August by Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders, specifically prohibited the formation of a Social Democratic Party and other “anti-socialist organizations.”

³⁰³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The KSC̄’s Prague municipal committee, headed by Bohumil Šimon, was arguably the most radical organization within the Communist Party. Almost every member of the committee strongly advocated comprehensive reform and democratization. Starting in early July 1968, the Prague committee established a “permanent session,” which Soviet leaders construed as an attempt to forge an alternative power structure alongside the KSC̄ Central Committee and Presidium. In a top-secret report prepared after the invasion, the Soviet KGB alleged that “the Prague municipal party committee, which assumed the role of an underground CC of the KSC̄, became the counterrevolutionary core of the party organs. The top posts in the Prague municipal committee were long ago taken over by right-revisionist and extremist elements . . .” The report also alleged that after Soviet troops marched into Czechoslovakia, “the [KSC̄] leadership used the Prague municipal committee and an operational staff within the Interior Ministry to form a network consisting of underground radio stations, the press, television, armed counterrevolutionary groups, and supplies of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The KSC̄’s Prague municipal committee played a key role in organizing protests against the five socialist countries,” in “convening the ‘14th KSC̄ Congress,’” in “organizing hostile activities on the radio,” and in “fomenting anti-Soviet hysteria in the ČSSR and confusing the majority of the population, causing them to oppose the USSR.” Cited from “O deyatel’nosti kontrevolyutsionnogo podpol’ya v Chekhoslovakii,” Ll. 117-118.

³⁰⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest changed this from “will not permit” to “cannot permit,” though in the process he made a slight grammatical error that was corrected in the plenum transcript.

³⁰⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest added the words “vozmozhno i” (probably) here in handwriting. It sounds somewhat awkward in English, but in Russian it is a way of softening the statement.

³⁰⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The 13th Congress of the KSC̄ took place in May and June 1966. No reforms of any sort were proposed there, and the Congress merely approved an orthodox Marxist-Leninist program for the “construction and development of socialism.” For the official proceedings and related documents, see *XIII. sjezd Komunistické strany Československa* (Prague: ÚV KSC̄, 1966 and 1967).

³⁰⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In the “author’s copy,” Shelest inserted the word *etu* here, changing “the” to “this.”

³⁰⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest’s allegation is accurate in one minor respect. Almost all of the language in the 2,000 Words article was based directly or indirectly on the Action Program.

³⁰⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest changed this word in the typescript from “forces” to “elements.”

³¹⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: These remarks were first cited in “Na chto nadeyutsya v Bonne: Podozritel’naya voznya na stranitsakh zapadnogermanskoi pečati,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 15 May 1968, p. 2. Similar comments were reported in A. Butenko, “Pod fal’shivym flagom ‘navedeniya mostov,’” *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 16 May 1968, pp. 2-3 and V. Stepanov, “Vedushchaya sila stroitel’stva kommunizma,” *Izvestiya* (Moscow) 11 May 1968, pp. 2-3, which noted that “imperialists” and “revanchists” believe that “any signs of liberalization . . . will lead to the evisceration of Communism.” The notion of forging a “united Europe” through increased contacts with the East-Central European states underlay the West German government’s initial conception of Ostpolitik, including its approaches to Czechoslovakia in 1968. This early version of Ostpolitik was similar to the U.S. policy of “bridge-building.” The goal of both policies was to establish a web of direct links with the East-Central European states – outside Moscow’s auspices – to encourage internal liberalization and a gradual loosening of ties with the Soviet Union, leading over time to the erosion of the East-West divide in Europe. On the logic of West German policy in Europe before and during the Czechoslovak crisis, see Adolf Müller and Bedřich Utitz, *Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei: Zwei Nachbarvölker auf dem Weg zur Verständigung* (Freudenstadt: Campus Forschung, 1972), pp. 203-298; James H. Wolfe, “West Germany and Czechoslovakia: The Struggle for Reconciliation,” *Orbis*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 1970), pp. 154-179; Libor Rouček, *Die Tschechoslowakei und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949-1989: Bestimmungsfaktoren, Entwicklungen und Probleme ihrer Beziehungen* (Munich: Tuduv, 1990); Eric G. Frey, *Division and Détente: The Germanies and Their Alliances* (New York: Praeger, 1987); Boris Meissner, ed., *Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961-1970: Kontinuität und Wandel – Dokumentation* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970); Klaus Hildebrand, *Integration und die Souveränität: die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949-1982* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991); and Lawrence L. Whetten, *Germany’s Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). The notion that increased contacts with the East-Central European states would eventually lead to a “united Europe” was very different from another conception of a “united Europe” that had long been associated with Franz Josef Strauss, the conservative nationalist leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU) in West Germany. Strauss and other CSU politicians emphasized West European unity *against* the Soviet bloc. In their view, it was misguided to seek improved relations with the Communist states as a stepping-stone to larger goals. They argued that the FRG’s policy in Europe should focus predominantly on building increased cohesion among the Western capitalist countries. Policy toward the Soviet bloc, they contended, should remain as it had been in the 1950s.

³¹¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest crossed out the words “us and” after the word “among.”

³¹²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest made two small changes in this sentence that toned it down slightly. First, he changed the perfective verb *podnyat’* to the imperfective *podnimat’*, giving it the sense of a more sustained struggle. Second, he changed the final part to “might end up on” instead of “are on.”

³¹³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the typescript, the last part of this sentence read: "must be adopted to protect socialist gains." Shelest changed it by hand.

³¹⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In the plenum transcript, a parenthetical "Applause" (*Applodimenty*) was inserted by the stenographer at the end of this paragraph.

³¹⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This document is untitled and undated, but a number of things – a brief cover note, the content of the document, and references to it in other documents – indicate that it is a report delivered by Shelest to an expanded meeting of the UkrCP Central Committee and the UkrCP Kyiv Oblast committee on 18 July 1968. A CPSU Central Committee plenum had been held the previous day (see Document No. 23 above) to endorse the Soviet delegation's performance at the Warsaw meeting. Shelest's presentation to the UkrCP Central Committee was part of a massive effort to transmit the CPSU Politburo's views (as endorsed by the CPSU Central Committee plenum) to Communist Party organizations all around the Soviet Union. Although some passages from Shelest's remarks to the CPSU Central Committee plenum are repeated almost verbatim in his speech to the UkrCP Central Committee, the latter contains many paragraphs and sentences that are not in the plenum speech. Moreover, even when passages are duplicated, it is useful to see what Shelest chose to emphasize (and omit) for the UkrCP Central Committee, and it is also valuable to gauge how he presented his case.

³¹⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: These informational reports, as discussed in the introduction to this collection of Ukrainian documents, were part of the strategy embraced by the CPSU Politburo to maintain a top-down style of decision-making during crises. The periodic informational reports were distributed to party organizations and government agencies throughout the Soviet Union (and in other Communist countries). The officials in these bodies were responsible for disseminating the Politburo's views to all party members and reporting back to the Politburo on the "wholehearted and unanimous support" that the reports had earned.

³¹⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: As this statement indicates, Shelest and other Soviet leaders were well aware that the KSČ's Extraordinary 14th Congress was likely to result in the ouster of orthodox Communist officials and the election of a strongly pro-reform Central Committee.

³¹⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A draft of revised statutes for the KSČ ("Návrh stánov Komunistickej strany Československa"), which were widely expected to be approved at the upcoming 14th Congress, was not published until 10 August (when it appeared as a 16-page supplement to *Rudé právo*), but many of the suggested changes were already known. The proposed statutes represented a major shift in the Prague Spring, for the process of democratization was to extend to some of the most basic aspects of party procedure. By guaranteeing protection for the continued espousal of dissenting views after a decision had been made, the draft statutes (as Shelest argues here) would have contravened the principle of "democratic centralism," which had always been one of the fundamental attributes of a Soviet-style Communist regime. This point had been highlighted in the Warsaw Letter: "We were convinced [in early 1968] that you would defend the Leninist principle of democratic centralism as your most treasured possession. Ignoring either aspect of this principle – whether democracy or centralism – inevitably weakens the party and its leading role, and transforms it into a bureaucratic organization or a debating club."

³¹⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The elections to the ČSSR National Assembly (i.e., the parliament, which was renamed the Federal Assembly after the Czechoslovak state was federalized in October 1968) were due to be held in November 1968. Most observ-

ers expected that reformist forces, including non-Communist representatives, would gain a dominant majority of seats. From 1948 until 1968, the parliament had been of negligible importance in Czechoslovak politics, but during the Prague Spring the National Assembly had assumed a prominent role, not least by passing legislation for major reforms.

³²⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: For more about these parties, see my annotation regarding them in Document No. 23 above.

³²¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: No formal invitation to West German foreign minister Willy Brandt had in fact been extended, but rumors had been circulating over the previous few weeks that the Czechoslovak government was holding secret negotiations with Brandt and other senior West German officials. (Secret talks had been held with one of Brandt's chief aides, Egon Bahr, in mid-April 1968, but the most senior participant from the Czechoslovak side – the deputy head of the KSČ International Relations Department, Josef Šedivý – was well below the level of a KSČ Presidium member. Moreover, the talks did not lead to any breakthroughs on any major issue. See the declassified report on the talks, "Informace o rozhovorech mezinárodního oddělení ÚV KSČ s představitelem SPD E. Bahrem," cited above.) In addition to playing up speculation about an imminent trip by Brandt to Czechoslovakia, headline East European officials contended that Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiří Hajek had met secretly with Brandt in Vienna. The East German authorities, in particular, repeatedly accused the Czechoslovak government of seeking to strike a secret deal with the FRG, exchanging diplomatic recognition for large-scale credits. Ulbricht had reiterated this allegation during the Warsaw meeting a few days earlier, and it may well have been these comments that prompted Shelest's remarks. See "Protokól ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych – Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR – w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.," Copy No. 5 (Top Secret), 14-15 July 1968, in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Arch. KC PZPR, P. 193, T. 24, Dok. 4, esp. Ll. 8-14. No doubt, Shelest's comment was also influenced by a recent shift in Soviet policy. As recently as mid-June, Soviet leaders had authorized the Soviet ambassador in East Germany, Pyotr Abrasimov, to meet with Brandt in East Berlin. The West German foreign minister was not required to show his passport when he traveled across the intra-Berlin border. The East German authorities were dismayed when they learned of Moscow's decision (see the relevant dispatches from Abrasimov in RGANI, F. 5. Op. 60, Dd. 344 and 345), but Soviet leaders proceeded nonetheless. In the first two weeks of July, however, Soviet policy toward the FRG hardened as tensions with Czechoslovakia increased. On 11 July, the Soviet newspaper *Izvestiya* suddenly began publishing secret correspondence between Moscow and Bonn on the possibility of a renunciation-of-force agreement. This action signaled a temporary halt in the progress toward formal diplomatic relations. It also signaled that, for Moscow, a resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis was now more important than a rapprochement with West Germany.

³²²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On the "2,000 Words" article, see my annotation in Document No. 22 above.

³²³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This point reinforces one of the major themes in East Germany's coverage of events in Czechoslovakia around the time of the Warsaw meeting and shortly thereafter. See, for example, "Mit dem Blick auf die Stärkung der sozialistischen Arbeiter-und-Bauern-macht die Fehler überwinden," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 30 July 1968, p. 6. See also "Die Strategie des Imperialismus und die ČSSR," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 13 July 1968, p. 6.

³²⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This refers to Čestmír Cisař's idea, first proposed at a joint meeting of the KSČ Presidium and

KSC Secretariat on 21 May 1968, of forming a separate youth wing within the Communist Party. (The discredited Czechoslovak Youth Union had been under the KSC's auspices, but members of the organization were not automatically admitted into the party. Císař wanted to bring young people directly into the KSC.) Císař's proposal came at an auspicious moment, just a month after the commission chaired by Jan Piller had set forth recommendations that would have eased a large number of "old Communists" out of the KSC. Soviet leaders realized that many young people in Czechoslovakia were enthusiastic supporters of the Prague Spring, whereas older KSC members tended to be skeptical of – and even hostile to – the reforms. Hence, Soviet officials denounced Císař's proposal, claiming that it was aimed at "removing from active political life all Communists who are of the soundest ideological-political orientation and who are resolutely speaking out against the right-wing danger." At the Soviet-Czechoslovak meetings in Čierna nad Tisou in late July and early August 1968, Brezhnev also argued (as Shelest does here) that "Cde. Císař's proposal to have the KSC admit 200,000 to 300,000 young people, supposedly to provide an 'injection' for what he calls the 'older' Party, glosses over the deleterious class impact of this grave step." Cited from "Záznam jednání předsednictva ÚV KSC a ÚV KSSS v Čierna n. T., 29.7-1.8.1968," 1 August 1968 (Top Secret), in SÚA, Arch. ÚV KSC, F. 07/15, Sv. 12, A.j. 274, Ll. 17-18.

³²⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This statement indicates a further recognition that the deadline for Soviet action was 26 August 1968, when the Slovak Party Congress was due to convene. As the documents here make clear, Soviet leaders knew that Biľak and others were likely to be excluded from the KSS leadership, paving the way for a decisive victory by "rightist forces" at the 14th KSC Congress in September. Shelest's statement reveals his growing doubts about the ability of the "healthy forces" to act in time without Soviet military support. His contacts with Biľak, as documented in the excerpts from Shelest's diary in my article in Issue 10 of the CWIHP *Bulletin* (pp. 234-248), had given him ample grounds for skepticism.

³²⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This seems to have been the first direct mention by Shelest to a gathering of other UkrCP officials in 1968 about the likelihood of a military solution to the crisis.

³²⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This comment indicates that Soviet leaders were still uncertain whether the incoming troops would encounter armed resistance in Czechoslovakia. No doubt, this uncertainty influenced the size, timing, and nature of the invading force as it was mobilized over the next few weeks. Grechko made sure that the contingent of soldiers entering Czechoslovakia would be large enough and sufficiently well-armed to crush any groups that might take up arms against the invasion. The potential for indigenous resistance also spurred Soviet officials to adopt political and military precautions that would facilitate the entry of Soviet and allied troops into Czechoslovakia. For example, Warsaw Pact commanders diverted Czechoslovak troops, equipment, and ammunition to western Bohemia, ostensibly for use in forthcoming exercises. The real purpose, however, was to keep the ČLA well away from the main routes that would be used by incoming forces. By the time the invasion began on the evening of 20 August, the risk of encountering armed resistance in Czechoslovakia was deemed to be small. (Moreover, Grechko reduced the risk still further at the start of the invasion by phoning the Czechoslovak defense minister, General Martin Dzúr, to warn him that if ČLA units fired "even a single shot" at the incoming troops, the Soviet Army would "crush the resistance mercilessly" and would ensure that Dzúr himself was "strung up from a telephone pole and shot.") Even if the risk of encountering armed resistance had been greater, Shelest's

comment suggests that it would not have been enough to deter Soviet military action.

³²⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This statement provides further evidence that Soviet leaders were under no illusions that military intervention in Czechoslovakia would be unanimously welcomed by Communist parties in Western Europe and other non-Communist countries. But the consensus in Moscow was that increased discord within the world Communist movement would be an acceptable price to pay for the restoration of orthodox Communism in Czechoslovakia. During a meeting with the leaders of East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary a month after the invasion, Brezhnev disparaged the objections raised by West European Communist officials: "Well, let them make a fuss; the main thing has been done – the path to counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia has been blocked." Cited from "Zapis' peregovorov s rukovoditelyami kompartii i pravitel'stv Bolgarii, Vengrii, GDR, Pol'shi, 27 sentyabrya 1968 goda," 27 September 1968 (Top Secret), in ÚSD-SK, Z/S 13, L. 37.

³²⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See my annotation about the KSC's Thirteenth Congress in Document No. 23 above.

³³⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest is referring to a celebrated public lecture by the then-professor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Prague on 14 June 1968. In his speech, Brzezinski offered strong support for the KSC's efforts to carry out sweeping reforms and "improvements of socialism." His comments about Poland, to which Shelest is referring here, were made during a discussion period after the main lecture. Brzezinski's remarks sparked angry commentaries in the Soviet, East German, and Polish media, which alleged that Brzezinski's endorsement of the Prague Spring merely underscored how "bankrupt and obsolete" the KSC's "right-wing opportunist and revisionist policies" truly were. See, for example, "Vneshnyaya politika i ideologicheskaya bor'ba na sovremennom etape," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 6 (June 1968), pp. 3-7. At the Warsaw meeting, Ulbricht denounced Brzezinski again, claiming that the "2,000 Words" statement had been inspired by "the well-known American Sovietologist Brzezinski, who was in Prague and delivered a public lecture. Many people attended, and a discussion ensued. No one who was present contested Brzezinski's thesis. Not a single person there expressed opposition. Nor did Dubček express even the slightest opposition [to Brzezinski's remarks]. . . . What is going on here? Is it not a counterrevolution if an American anti-Communist can speak publicly in Prague and purvey slanders about People's Poland before the members of the Party, saying that this is a fascist country? And it was not only People's Poland that he attacked; he also attacked the Soviet Union." Cited from "Protokół ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych – Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR – w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.," Ll. 9-10. Most likely, Ulbricht's denunciation of Brzezinski's speech helped prompt Shelest's criticisms of this "American and unadorned Zionist." Evidently, Shelest mistakenly assumed that anyone who would condemn Poland's Communist regime (which was promoting an anti-Semitic campaign at the time) must be an "unadorned Zionist" (i.e., a standard codeword in East-bloc countries for a Jew).

³³¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This paragraph and the preceding one appeared as a single paragraph (with slightly different wording) in Shelest's speech at the plenum the previous day. The two paragraphs are significantly toned down, however, by the paragraph that comes immediately after them – a paragraph that does not appear in Shelest's plenum speech.

³³²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Shelest's very brief summary of points emphasized by speakers at the Warsaw meeting is largely accurate. The full transcript is available in "Protokół ze spotkania

przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych – Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR – w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.”

³³³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Shelest’s summary of Zhivkov’s remarks is accurate, but it is puzzling why Shelest did not also mention that Zhivkov explicitly urged the allied countries to “restore the dictatorship of the proletariat” in Czechoslovakia through military intervention: “There is only one appropriate way out – through resolute assistance to Czechoslovakia from our parties and the states of the Warsaw Pact. At present, we cannot rely on internal forces in Czechoslovakia. . . . Only by relying on the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact can we change the situation.” (Cited from “Protokół ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych,” L. 29.) Shelest noted in his diary that in informal conversations with Zhivkov right before and after the Bulgarian leader’s speech, Zhivkov had urged the Warsaw Pact countries to be “more decisive,” adding that “the sooner troops are sent, the better.” Cited from “Dnevnik P. E. Shelesta,” Ll. 338-339.

³³⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: At least one line appears to be missing here, but the omission has no discernible impact on the substance of Shelest’s speech.

³³⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This statement encapsulates what later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. Compare, for example, S. Kovalev, “Suverenitet i internatsional’nye obyazannosti sotsialisticheskikh stran,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 26 September 1968, pp. 2-3; S. Kovalev, “O ‘mirnoi’ i nemirnoi kontrrevolyutsii,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 11 September 1968, p. 4; and “Zashchita sotsializma – vysshii internatsional’nyi dolg,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 August 1968, pp. 1-2. For a cogent review of the genesis of the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Karen Dawisha, “The 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Causes, Consequences, and Lessons for the Future,” in Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, eds., *Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition and Consent* (London: Heinemann, 1981), pp. 9-25. See also Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in Carole Fink, Detlef Junker, and Philippe Gassert, eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 61-124.

³³⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This is clearly a typographical error. It should read East Bohemian, not East Slovakian.

³³⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Volodymyr Dykusharov had been the second secretary of the Transcarpathian Oblast committee since February 1966.

³³⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The officials mentioned here include Jozef Vislocký, Alexander Pirč (whose first initial is mistakenly given here as J, evidently because of confusion with Ján Pirč, a member of the KSS Central Committee), Petro Honcharyk, and Hryhorii Shman’ko.

³³⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to letters sent by the Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian, and Hungarian leaders in early July. See the annotation in Document No. 24 for an explanation of these letters.

³⁴⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: These references to the Soviet Union and negotiations with Moscow reflect the controversy surrounding Dubček’s decision not to attend the conference in Warsaw on 14-15 July. The letter to the KSCĽ Central Committee from the five countries taking part in the Warsaw Meeting had arrived in Prague by the 16th, but it had not yet been published.

³⁴¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: It was already clear by the time of this meeting (16 July) that the Slovak Communist Party would be holding an early congress. Two days later, on 18 July, the KSS Central Committee formally voted to begin the Slovak party congress on 26 August, some two weeks before the opening of the KSCĽ’s Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress.

³⁴²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Koscelanský is referring here to

Vasil Biľak, who was of Ukrainian descent.

³⁴³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Jozef Zrak had been first secretary of the KSCĽ’s Bratislava municipal committee since May 1965. He also was a member of the KSS Secretariat, and in April 1968 he was elected to the KSS Presidium. Zrak was a strong supporter of the reformist trends in the KSCĽ. Ondrej Pavlík had been a full member of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and a corresponding member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences since 1953. He also had served as President of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in 1956. Like Zrak, Pavlík was known for his reformist leanings.

³⁴⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Ladislav Olexa, who was appointed regional secretary for ideology in April 1968, had previously been director of the State Museum in Košice. For earlier Soviet concerns about Olexa, see Document No. 5 above.

³⁴⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: A directive to this effect had indeed been issued by Oldřich Černík and Josef Pavel in mid-July, shortly before the meeting recounted here. See the drafts of instructions in ÚSD-SK, B – Archiv MV, F. IM. Similar orders were given to the Czechoslovak ambassadors in the Central European countries surrounding Czechoslovakia: Václav Kolář in the GDR, Antonín Gregor in Poland, and Jozef Púčik in Hungary. Over the next few weeks, dispatches from these embassies and from StB officials provided ominous accounts to the KSCĽ leadership of a steady military buildup around Czechoslovakia’s borders. See, for example, Cables Nos. 7103, 7187, 7259, and 7269 in ÚSD-SK, K. Archiv MZV, Received Dispatches/1968.

³⁴⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: On these polemical skirmishes between Konstantinov and leading KSCĽ officials, see my annotations in Document No. 22 above.

³⁴⁷TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: The information provided here is incomplete. Although Ernő Fock took part in the bilateral Czechoslovak-Hungarian meeting in the Slovak town of Komárno on 13 July, the main Hungarian participant was the MSzMP leader, János Kádár. Also taking part for Hungary was Károly Erdely, a senior foreign ministry official and aide to Kádár. The meeting, which had been initiated by Dubček and Černík, lasted more than four hours, but it produced no results. Kádár emphasized to the two KSCĽ leaders that they were making a “grave mistake” by refusing to attend the Warsaw Meeting, but he did not succeed in changing their minds. Dubček and Černík, for their part, quickly sensed that Kádár was more interested in trying to convince them to come to Warsaw than in serving as a genuine intermediary. Moreover, even before the session in Komárno began, the two Czechoslovak leaders had learned, from a Czechoslovak Press Agency dispatch, that Soviet and East European officials were already arriving in Warsaw for a meeting the next day. This disconcerting news not only guaranteed that the talks with Kádár would make little headway, but also prompted Dubček and Černík to send an urgent message of protest to Brezhnev via the Czechoslovak ambassador in Poland. For a detailed summary of the Komárno meeting, see Kádár’s top-secret report to the MSzMP Politburo, titled “Comrade Kádár’s and Comrade Fock’s Meeting with Comrade Dubček and Comrade Černík,” 15 July 1968, in *Magyar Országos Levéltár* (MOL), 288, 5/462, ő.e. Kádár also discussed the meeting at some length in his presentation to the Warsaw Meeting on 15 July 1968; see “Protokół ze spotkania przywódców partii i rządów krajów socjalistycznych – Bulgarii, NRD, Polski, Węgier i ZSRR – w Warszawie, 14-15 lipca 1968 r.,” Ll. 18-20. For a useful secondary account of the 13 July meeting, based on new archival sources, see István Vida, “János Kádár and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” *The Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 161-162. Dubček’s posthumously published memoirs incorrectly claim that the meeting in Komárno came at Kádár’s invitation; see Dubček, *Hope Dies Last*,

p. 162. Newly available documents leave no doubt that it was Dubček, not Kádár, who initiated the meeting.

³⁴⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Tatra Mountains, running along the Polish-Slovakian border in the central Carpathians, were a favorite vacation and hunting site for Czechoslovak leaders and their Warsaw Pact counterparts.

³⁴⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Enterprise-based disciplinary bodies and quasi-judicial organs were set up during the first few years of the Soviet regime. Despite significant modifications over the years, these bodies retained their main function of enforcing the regime's strict labor codes. Under Khrushchev, reliance on the workplace disciplinary organs and Comrades' Courts (*tovarishcheskie sudy*) steadily increased, but the system was scaled back in the 1960s after Soviet legal specialists demonstrated that the expansion of it was leading to flagrant abuses and illegal rulings. Even so, the workers' councils were still formally empowered to discipline errant workers – powers that came in handy on occasions like this when the regime wanted to prevent or, if necessary, punish any deviations from the official line. For an overview of the disciplinary system from the Soviet perspective, see Yuri Il'inskiĭ, *Sudyat sami: Tovarishcheskii sud za rabotoi* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Znaniĭ, 1964).

³⁵⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: One of the chief goals of the enterprised-based disciplinary bodies, as indicated here, was to foster a milieu in which ordinary citizens would participate affirmatively in Communist rituals and promote the draconian enforcement of official strictures.

³⁵¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Viktor Shevchenko had been first secretary of the oblast party committee since December 1964 and a member of the UkrCP Central Committee since February 1966.

³⁵²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Miroslav Zikmund was a prominent Czech writer and commentator on international affairs. He co-authored many books with Jiří Hanzelka, another highly respected writer who was a signatory of the “2,000 Words” manifesto and an ardent proponent of drastic reform. Their books were popular not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in many foreign countries, including the Soviet Union. Several of Zikmund's and Hanzelka's works were translated into Russian, English, German, and other languages. For a representative sample of their output in Czech, see *Afrika – snu a skutečnosti* (Prague: Orbis, 1955); *Tam za rekou je Argentina* (Prague: Orbis, 1956); *Obrácený půlměsíc* (Prague: Nakladatelství Politické Literatury, 1961); and *Cejlon – raj bez andělů*, 2nd ed. (Prague: Svoboda, 1991). See also a collection of some of their other essays in *Zvláštní zpráva* (Prague: Lidové nakladatelství, 1990).

³⁵³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: A lengthy, top-secret report compiled by the Soviet KGB in October 1968 noted that the “Brno” underground radio station was one of at least 35 such facilities that were operating unhindered in Czechoslovakia during the first week after the invasion. “O deyatel'nosti kontrevolyutsionnogo podpol'ya v Chekhoslovakii,” report from A. Sakharovskii, head of the KGB's 1st Main Directorate, October 1968 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in RGANI, F. 4, Op. 21, D. 32, Ll. 99-157. Even after these transmitters were discovered, many continued to function for several days longer.

³⁵⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Zhenya is the diminutive for the first name of the well-known Soviet poet and publicist Evgenii Evtushenko. Unlike the great dissident Andrei Sakharov and a number of other Soviet human rights activists (including a small group who were beaten and arrested after staging a demonstration in Red Square to protest the Soviet invasion), Evtushenko failed to speak out against the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

³⁵⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Zikmund is referring here to Jiří

Hanzelka, using the Ukrainian version of his given name and adding a patronymic.

³⁵⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Satu Mare and Maramureş counties of Romania are both in northern Transylvania, adjacent to Ukraine's Transcarpathian Oblast. The Suceava county is in northern Bukovina, abutting Ukraine's Chernivtsi Oblast (which itself was formerly northern Bukovina). Tulcea is in the easternmost portion of Romania along the Danube delta in northern Dobruja, just across the border from the Ukrainian city of Izmail. It is worth noting that in February 1968, Romania had adopted a new territorial-administrative system, which replaced the old structure of 16 regions and 150 districts with a simpler arrangement of 39 counties (*judete*). The new Satu Mare and Maramureş counties ended up with somewhat lower percentages of ethnic Hungarians under their jurisdictions than the old Satu Mare and Maramureş regions had.

³⁵⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On this topic, see the various items cited in my annotation to Document No. 13 above.

³⁵⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Iosif Uglar had been first secretary of the RCP's Maramureş regional committee since January 1959. He was also a member of the RCP Central Committee.

³⁵⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: In an emergency speech to the Romanian nation on 21 August 1968, Ceauşescu announced that “we have today decided to set up armed Patriotic Guards” that will give “our people their own armed units to protect their peaceful labor and the independence and sovereignty of our socialist homeland.” The wording of this announcement was somewhat misleading. An entity known as the Patriotic Guards had in fact existed in Romania since November 1956, when it was set up by a party decree to help cope with the spillover from the Hungarian revolution. Until 1968, however, the Guards were little more than a paper organization. Their functions were limited mainly to the safeguarding of heavy industrial areas. What Ceauşescu meant in his 21 August speech is not that he would *create* Patriotic Guards, but that he was mobilizing and fleshing out units that had long been dormant. See Major-General Constantin Antoniu *et al.*, *Armată Republicii Socialiste România: Sinteză Social-Politică și Militară* (Bucharest: Editura Militară, 1978), pp. 141-167. From 1968 on, the role of the Patriotic Guards sharply increased. As Romanian military strategy and doctrine shifted increasingly from large-scale offensive operations (à la the Warsaw Pact) to territorial defense, the Patriotic Guards became the preeminent force responsible for front-line defense and mountain warfare. When fully mobilized, the Patriotic Guards consisted of some 900,000 troops, most of which were prepared to fight in mountainous terrain. The regular Romanian army was much smaller.

³⁶⁰TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Gheorghe Blaj had been a secretary in the RCP's Maramureş regional committee since December 1961.

³⁶¹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This pledge repeats, almost word for word, a statement in Ceauşescu's speech of 21 August 1968 (discussed below).

³⁶²TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Emil Bobu had been the first secretary of the RCP's Suceava regional committee since July 1967. He also was a member of the RCP Central Committee.

³⁶³TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The basic Romanian position was outlined not only in Ceauşescu's speech of 21 August (see next annotation), but also in a communique issued jointly by the RCP Central Committee and the Romanian government that same day. See “Comunicat,” *Scinteia* (Bucharest), 22 August 1968, p. 1. The communique expressed “great alarm” at the “flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal, socialist, free, and independent state, an action that contravenes all the principles on which relations between socialist countries are based as well as universally

recognized norms of international law.” The statement called for the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet and East European troops to “allow the Czechoslovak people to handle their internal affairs themselves, without any outside interference.”

³⁶⁴TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Volodymyr Galla had been a department chief in the UkrCP’s Transcarpathian Oblast committee since July 1965. Sandor Kállái had been a secretary of the MSzMP’s Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Megyei regional committee since June 1964. The Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Megyei region in northeast Hungary, based around Nyíregyháza, is contiguous with Subcarpathian Ruthenia in Ukraine. Kállái’s surname is slightly mistransliterated in the document, but has been corrected here.

³⁶⁵TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This refers to Ceaușescu’s famous “balcony speech,” on 21 August 1968, just hours after Soviet troops had begun moving *en masse* into Czechoslovakia. From a balcony at the RCP Central Committee headquarters in downtown Bucharest, Ceaușescu denounced the Soviet Union for having “flagrantly violated the freedom and independence of another state,” and he described the invasion as “a colossal error and a grave danger to peace in Europe and to the fate of socialism around the world.” Ceaușescu vowed that Romania would take all necessary steps to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity: “It has been said that in Czechoslovakia there was a danger of counterrevolution. Perhaps tomorrow they will claim that our meeting here has reflected counterrevolutionary trends. If that should be the case, we warn all of them that the entire Romanian people will never permit anyone to infringe on the territory of our homeland.” Cited from “Cuvîntul tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 22 August 1968, p. 1. Although Ceaușescu gradually toned down his criticisms of the Soviet invasion over the next several days, his balcony speech on 21 August brought him great acclaim for his defiance of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

³⁶⁶TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: During a visit to Czechoslovakia on 15-17 August 1968, Ceaușescu publicly hailed the Prague Spring and denied that counterrevolutionary forces were active in the ČSSR. He also signed a new treaty of friendship and cooperation with Czechoslovakia even though he had declined to conclude such an agreement with the Soviet Union. (The new Soviet-Romanian treaty was not signed until 1970, after a good deal more negotiation and bickering.) Ceaușescu’s trip to Czechoslovakia came just a few days after the Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito, finished a “working visit” of his own to Prague. During that visit, on 9-11 August, Tito was greeted by jubilant, overflowing crowds. A similar welcome was extended to Ceaușescu. For a sample of the coverage of Ceaușescu’s visit, see “Rumunská stranická a státní delegace v Praze: N. Ceaușescu srdečne vítán v naší zemi,” *Rudé právo* (Prague), 16 August 1968, p. 1; “Înceierea vizitei în Republica Socialistă Cehoslovacă a delegației Române de partid și de stat condusă de tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 18 August 1968, pp. 1, 5; “O nouă pagină în cronică relațiilor frățești Româno-Cehoslovace,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 17 August 1968, pp. 1-2; “Interviul acordat de tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu televiziunii din Praga,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 17 August 1968, p. 3; “Entuziastul miting de la uzinele ‘Avia’ din Praga,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 17 August 1968, pp. 1-2; “Solemnitatea semnării Tratatului de prietenie, colaborare și asistență mutuală,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 17 August 1968, p. 3; and “Conferința de presă a tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu,” *Scînteia* (Bucharest), 17 August 1968, p. 3. The KSČ’s attempts to play down the two visits seemed to have no effect on the extravagant public displays. Although both Tito and Ceaușescu urged caution upon Dubček and sought to avoid any provocative remarks during their stays (despite prodding by some Czechoslovak journalists), the dominant impression left from both trips was

the spontaneous adulation that the Czechoslovak people had displayed toward two foreign leaders who had successfully defied Moscow in the past. (This was certainly the impression that most Soviet officials had; see, for example, the top-secret reports “Zapis’ besedy s sekretarem Ispolnitel’nogo komiteta TsK SKYu, M. Todorovichem,” Cable No. 380 from I. A. Benediktov, Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, to K. F. Katushev and K. V. Rusakov, 14 August 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 279, Ll. 20-23; and “Zapis’ besedy s general’nym sekretarem TsK RKP N. Chaushesku, 19 avgusta 1968 goda,” Cable No. 842 from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, 20 August 1968, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 47-52. Many other evaluations expressing similar sentiments can be found in the same files.) This outpouring of popular enthusiasm – the country’s apparent “yearning for its own Tito,” as *Literární listy* put it – spawned new rumors about a possible alliance among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Those rumors, as in the past, were quickly denied by the leaders of all three countries, but hard-line officials elsewhere in Eastern Europe, particularly Walter Ulbricht, seized on the rumors as “proof” of their earlier warnings that a “Little Entente” was being formed to “sever Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union and from the whole socialist commonwealth.”

³⁶⁷ TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This is a misprint in the document. It should read Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, which is adjacent to the Satu Mares region in Romania.

³⁶⁸TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: This is not entirely accurate. Because Dubček was unable to mollify Soviet displeasure over the internal changes in Czechoslovakia, he strove to reassure Moscow about the firmness of Czechoslovakia’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact and the “socialist commonwealth.” Looking back to the events of 1956 in Hungary, Dubček and other Czechoslovak officials had concluded that by upholding Czechoslovakia’s membership in the Warsaw Pact and maintaining Party control over the reform process, they could carry out far-reaching domestic changes without provoking Soviet military intervention. (See Dubček’s comments about this matter in *Hope Dies Last*, pp. 178-179.) Their judgment in this instance was probably erroneous even in the case of Hungary, inasmuch as the first Soviet intervention in 1956 and the decision to intervene a second time actually predated Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Whether valid or not, however, the “lesson” that KSČ officials drew from the 1956 crisis – that internal reform would be tolerated so long as membership in the Warsaw Pact and CMEA was never questioned – induced them to make frequent references to the “unbreakable” friendship and alliance between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. As domestic liberalization gathered pace, Dubček continued to issue repeated expressions of solidarity with Moscow and to pledge that Soviet interests would be safeguarded under all circumstances. In the end, all these assurances came to naught.

³⁶⁹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Scrawled across the upper left of the document is a note dated 21 September 1968 indicating that the memorandum was distributed to Shelest and the KGB directorate.

³⁷⁰TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: See the notations in Shelest’s diary pertaining to this incident in Excerpt No. 4 in my article in *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 10.

³⁷¹TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: All the points here refer to perquisites enjoyed by Communist Party leaders and the *nomenklatura* (senior party and state officials at all levels).

³⁷²TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Nothing has been omitted in between Points 3 and 5. The poorly typed leaflet does not include a Point 4.

³⁷³TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: Student unrest was widespread in 1968 not only in these countries, but in numerous others, includ-

ing Italy, West Germany, the United States, Poland, and – perhaps most of all – Mexico, where troops opened fire on a demonstration in Tlatelolco, leaving hundreds dead or wounded. For discussions and comparisons of most of these cases, see the relevant chapters in Fink, Junker, and Gassert, eds., 1968: *The World Transformed*.

³⁷⁴TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Gustáv Husák played a key role in the Slovak Communist Party during World War II and was instrumental in the Communist takeover in Slovakia in 1947-1948, but he fell victim to the high-level purges carried out by Klement Gottwald in the early 1950s and was imprisoned in 1951 on charges of "bourgeois nationalism." He was later rehabilitated and reemerged as a key figure in the KSS. Through much of the Prague Spring, Husák had been a proponent of moderate reform (and in particular a restructuring of Czech-Slovak relations), but after the Soviet-led invasion he shifted steadily toward a hardline, anti-reformist position. Under Soviet auspices in April 1969, he replaced Dubček as First Secretary of the KSČ. Soviet leaders had backed Husák for this post mainly because they believed he would be more acceptable to the Czechoslovak population than would some of the other prospective candidates, who were widely seen in Czechoslovakia as little more than Soviet puppets. Husák consolidated his power at a KSČ Central Committee plenum in September 1969 (a month before this visit to Kyiv), ushering in a period of harsh "normalization." He remained the party leader until 1987.

³⁷⁵TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: To extirpate the remnants of the Prague Spring, the new KSČ leaders authorized the head of the KSČ CC's Control and Auditing Commission, Miloš Jakeš, to oversee a large-scale purge. Hundreds of thousands of pro-reform members of the KSČ were expelled from the party and, in many cases, deprived of meaningful jobs. Many also found that their children faced exclusion or expulsion from higher education and promising career paths. The repercussions from this purge were felt for the next 20 years. See Jakeš's brief first-hand account (which seeks to defend his own unsavory role) in his recent memoir, *Dva roky Generálním tajemníkem* (Prague: Regulus, 1996), pp. 54-66.

³⁷⁶TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Reformist sentiment spread into the KSČ's Higher Party School and numerous other institutes of higher education in Czechoslovakia throughout the Prague Spring. A harsh crackdown on reform-minded faculty at these schools had taken place in the mid-1960s under Novotný's auspices. The historian Milan Hübl, who had consistently spoken out in support of sweeping reform, was a particular target of Novotný's anti-reformist backlash in late 1963 and 1964. Hübl and two of his colleagues at the Higher Party School, Zdeněk Jičínský and Karel Kouba, were removed from their posts, and both Hübl and another dissident historian, Ján Mlynárik, were personally denounced by Novotný in May 1964. Several other historians at the Higher Party School were transferred to different assignments, and the historical faculty as a whole came under sharp criticism from the KSČ Presidium in 1964. In 1968, however, the reformers were back in favor. Not only was Milan Hübl restored to his post at the Higher Party School, but he was also appointed rector. Other important changes of personnel occurred at several universities (including Charles University), at the Institute for the History of Socialism (formerly known as the Institute for the History of the KSČ), at the KSČ's official publishing house, and at a number of research centers affiliated with the Academy of Sciences, including the Institute for the History of the European Socialist Countries and the Institute of Czechoslovak Literature. Proposals for sweeping reform of the academic system and research facilities were actively discussed and refined in the spring and summer of 1968. Many leading scholars at the KSČ's schools and institutes, at the universities, and at the Academy of Sciences institutes were prominently involved in the

broader attempts to press ahead with comprehensive political reform. By writing commentaries in the press, giving public lectures, helping out with the drafting of the Action Program and the preparation of documents for the Fourteenth KSČ Congress, signing pro-reform appeals and petitions, serving as members of various commissions (on rehabilitations, historical reassessments, federalization, and economic reform), and writing speeches for key party and state officials, a large number of scholars made enthusiastic contributions to the Prague Spring. This was particularly evident in the Czech lands, but it was also true in Slovakia. Husák's comments here reflect his awareness that the initial "normalization" had only partly diminished the groundswell of reformist sentiment that emerged at party schools and other higher education facilities in 1968. A more rigorous purge soon followed.

³⁷⁷TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Husák is referring here to the numerous fissures that emerged in the Communist world as a result of the Soviet-led invasion. Within the Warsaw Pact itself, Albania used the invasion as an opportunity to withdraw formally from the alliance. (Albania had ceased to be a *de facto* member of the Warsaw Pact as far back as 1961, but had not yet formally pulled out.) Another Pact member, Romania, refused to take part in the invasion and promptly condemned it. Although Romania's defiance rapidly ebbed in late 1968 and 1969, Romanian policy never came fully back into line with the policies of the other Warsaw Pact states. Outside the Pact, the invasion was denounced by China (which was only six months away from its own military clashes with the Soviet Union on the Ussuri River) and even caused a good deal of disquiet in Cuba (though Cuban leader Fidel Castro ultimately decided to offer public support for the Soviet action). Equally important, the invasion led to a momentous rift among non-ruling Communist parties. Many of the West European Communist parties, especially the Italian and Spanish, had watched Dubček's reform program with great sympathy and hope. The violent suppression of the Prague Spring aroused open and vehement opposition to the Soviet Union within these parties and stimulated the rise of what became known as "Eurocommunism." The defection of most of the major West European Communist parties from the Soviet orbit was nearly as important in its long-term consequences as the earlier splits with Yugoslavia and China, and far more important than the break with Albania. The emergence of Eurocommunism mitigated potential Soviet influence in Western Europe and significantly altered the complexion of West European politics. More important, the Eurocommunist alternative – an alternative that, unlike the Prague Spring, could not be subdued by Soviet tanks – became a potentially attractive, and thereby disruptive, element in Eastern Europe.

³⁷⁸TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: On the reaction of the Italian Communist Party to the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Joan Barth Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinguer* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 137-169; Donald L. M. Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, *The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France*, Studies in International Affairs No. 33 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1975); and George R. Urban, ed., *Eurocommunism: Its Roots and Future in Italy and Elsewhere* (New York: Universe Books, 1978).

³⁷⁹TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The Vasyl'kivs'kyi region (raion) of Kyiv oblast is to the southwest of the Kyiv metropolitan area, adjacent to the Kievo-Svyatoshnyn'skyi raion in which Kyiv itself is located. Kodaky is located almost precisely in the center of Vasyl'kivs'kyi raion.

NEW EVIDENCE ON COLD WAR CRISES

Russian Documents on the Korean War, 1950-53

Introduction by James G. Hershberg and translations by Vladislav Zubok

More than five decades after combat ceased in the summer of 1953, the Korean War continues to animate scholarly interest both for its historical importance and its ongoing political relevance. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, tensions persist between the U.S. government and the communist regime in Pyongyang, now ruled by the reclusive son, Kim Jong Il, of the man who led North Korea at the time of the June 1950 thrust across the 38th parallel. Of all the major events of the Cold War, the Korean War has also been among those to benefit most expansively from the opening of communist sources. Beginning in the late 1980s, Chinese materials began to emerge through *neibu* (internal) publications of biographies and documentary compilations of materials of leaders such as Mao Zedong. And since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian archives have coughed up treasure troves of documents, many of which have appeared in English translation through the Cold War International History Project's *Bulletins* and Working Papers.

The documents presented below emerged from the collection at the U.S. Library of Congress of papers of the late Soviet/Russian historian Dmitri Volkogonov which were transferred to Washington following his death in 1995.¹ As Volkogonov had enjoyed privileged access to Moscow archives while writing his biographies and profiles of Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders, his papers contained thousands of pages of photocopies of archival documents on a wide range of subjects spanning the entire history of the USSR. The Korean War documents translated here were among those included in materials from the Russian Presidential Archives (known formally as the Archive of the President, Russian Federation, or APRF), which the Library of Congress only opened in January 2000, after the rest of the collection.²

The first two documents, from late May 1950, further illuminate the secret coordination between Pyongyang and Moscow in the final weeks leading up to the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel on 24 June. In Document No. 1, the Soviet ambassador, Terentii Shtykov, relates a 29 May conversation with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung regarding preparations for the offensive against the south that Stalin had authorized during Kim's secret trip to Moscow earlier that spring. In addition to reporting on the arrival of promised Soviet military and economic aid and urgently requesting more, Kim displays his eagerness to attack, insisting that combat readiness would be sufficient by the end of June even though Soviet military advisers had suggested waiting until the troop concentrations and detailed planning had pro-

gressed further. Sensing his "mood," Shtykov endorses Kim's timetable, as well as his urgent requests for medical supplies and automobile gasoline—requests which Stalin, in Document No. 2, immediately vows to fulfill. More portentously, Stalin also generally accepts Shtykov's views, indicating approval of Kim's arguments that military preparations justify launching the assault on the south by the end of June.³

The third document, a coded 8 July 1950 telegraph from Stalin (using the *nom de guerre* Fyn Si) to Shtykov, gives some insight into the *vozhd's* sternness—and how nerve-racking it could be to work for him. By early July, the North Korean offensive had succeeded in driving the South Korean military out of Seoul and far south of the 38th parallel, but not everything has gone according to plan—the people in the south had failed to rise up against the Syngman Rhee regime, as Kim had foreseen (or at least hoped⁴), and the United States under President Harry S. Truman had intervened militarily, contrary to Kim's promises to Stalin that the war could be won quickly before Washington could make a difference. Nevertheless, the North seemed clearly to be winning the war—so it must have been jarring for Shtykov to receive a harshly-worded message from his tyrannical boss accusing him of having behaved "incorrectly" for promising Pyongyang Soviet advisers without permission, adding sarcastically that he should remember that he represents the USSR, not Korea. The promised advisors, Stalin adds rather blithely, could visit the front in civilian clothes disguised as "Pravda" reporters, but Shtykov would be held "personally responsible before the Soviet Government" if they were taken prisoner—an ominous phrase that must have made the ambassador gulp with terror.⁵

Documents No. 4 through No. 7 add further detail to one of the most crucial moments in the Korean War to be exposed by the opening of communist sources—the maneuvering between Stalin and Mao Zedong in October 1950 as U.S.-led forces crossed the 38th parallel following the successful Inchon landing in mid-September, Kim Il Sung's forces retreated in disarray and his regime teetered on the brink of collapse, and his Soviet and Chinese patrons pondered how to react, in frantic consultations that ultimately produced China's decision to enter the war.⁶ In Document No. 4, Stalin cables his chief political and military representatives in Pyongyang on 1 October 1950 in response to messages relating the increasingly dire straits of the North Korean forces as they were driven back across the 38th parallel, as well as a desperate appeal from Kim for direct Soviet intervention to save his regime.⁷ Once again, he sharply criticizes his underlings, blaming them for "erroneous" behavior by dodging

Kim's questions and failing to offer coherent or effective advice and thereby fostering "uncertainty" in the Korean leadership. Exhorting them to provide "firm leadership," Stalin (unrealistically, given the situation on the ground) demands that they establish defenses along the 38th parallel to prevent further American advance and even go on the offensive by organizing "guerrilla warfare" in the south behind enemy lines.

At the end of his message, Stalin alludes to the possibility of Chinese "volunteers" coming to North Korea's rescue, and notes that a response to Kim's appeal for Soviet armed support would be forthcoming in a few days. As previously released documents show, the Soviet leader hoped, and had reason to anticipate, that Beijing would provide the needed forces, and sent a message to the Chinese leadership that same day—1 October 1950—suggesting that China send at least five or six divisions of "volunteers" to Korea and confidently predicting that "our Korean friends" would be "glad" when they learned of Beijing's action.⁸ However, much to the surprise and consternation of the Soviet ambassador in Beijing, and then of Stalin himself, Mao had demurred, responding on October 2 that China had tentatively opted not to enter the conflict. His reasons included the U.S. advantage in military equipment, China's weakened internal condition following decades of civil strife, and the danger that a clash with America could drag the Soviets into the fray, triggering World War III. While speaking of the need for caution and the regrettable possibility that the North Korean comrades might have to convert their struggle into a partisan war, Mao left the door ajar by noting that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo had not yet taken a final decision on the matter.⁹

Mao's startling message set the stage for one of the most dramatic documents yet to emerge from the communist archives—Stalin's strongly-worded response arguing that China should enter the Korean War, and brushing aside concerns about the risks of igniting a world war with the confident assertion—"Should we fear this?"—that the Soviets and Chinese together were stronger than the Americans and British, and if war were inevitable, better it happen now, before a rearmed Germany and Japan could contribute to the Western military alliance. Stalin also argued that Beijing could secure a broad range of advantages by entering the war and defeating the Americans, not just by precluding Washington's use of Korea as a "springboard" to threaten China but also by causing the Americans to make concessions with regard to Japan and Taiwan.

The *CWIHP Bulletin* published the first evidence of this momentous message from Stalin to Mao in early 1996—but at the time, it was only available in the form of an extended quotation in a message dispatched from Stalin to Kim on 7 October 1950, thereby leaving uncertain precisely when that message had been delivered to Mao and whether the version Stalin gave Kim had been complete or accurate.¹⁰ This ambiguity, in turn, contributed to confusion over what role, if any, Stalin's forceful message had played in pressuring, or convincing, the split Chinese Communist Party leadership to reverse the tentatively negative position toward military inter-

vention contained in Mao's aforementioned 2 October 1950 message to Stalin, and instead shift towards a commitment to enter the war. Chinese sources, while making clear that Mao had overcome serious divisions to convince the CCP Politburo to endorse in principle the idea of sending military forces to Korea, did not clarify precisely when the group endorsed that decision—which it formally if secretly ratified on 8 October 1950 putting Peng Dehuai in charge of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) and informing Kim of this move—and whether the decision preceded or followed the reception of Stalin's letter.¹¹

Documents No. 5 and No. 6 offer new evidence on the text and timing of Stalin's letter. In Volkogonov's materials from the APFR, a draft of the letter was found and is reproduced here with Stalin's handwritten insertions in italics. There is no marking to indicate how the earlier text had been produced, but it bears Stalin's imprint so clearly that one must suspect that it had been dictated to an aide, and then reviewed for further changes. A copy of the final message was also found, and this adds a small but interesting section which Stalin omitted when he quoted the communication afterward in his own cable to Kim Il Sung. That portion dealt with China's domestic affairs, in which Stalin alluded to Mao's prior citation, in his 2 October message, of his people's longing for peace and likely discontent if plans for peaceful reconstruction were ruined as factors in the CCP leadership's reluctance to join the war in Korea against the Americans. While politely acknowledging that Chinese leaders knew the situation better, Stalin hinted at a derisive view of Beijing's position—its communist virility, as it were—if it let "malcontents" and "bourgeois parties" prevent it from fulfilling its revolutionary duty. More to the point, the implication of weakness and inability to perform added to the pressure on Mao to live up to Stalin's standards as a loyal ally, less than a year after the signing of the February 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty. (Mao would later say that Stalin suspected him of being a second Tito and only trusted him after he intervened in Korea.¹²) Stalin also expressed readiness to receive Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao at his dacha on the Black Sea to discuss the whole matter face-to-face.

In addition to resolving questions about the text of Stalin's message, the documents finally clarify the matter of timing. A handwritten notation on the final version indicates that it was dispatched from Stalin's Black Sea retreat by high-frequency phone to comrade Nikolai Bulganin in Moscow at 11 p.m. on 5 October. And document No. 7, a ciphered cable from Soviet ambassador in Beijing N.V. Roshchin, dated 7 October, reports that he delivered Stalin's message to Mao at 10:30 p.m., Beijing time, on 6 October 1950. In a meeting that lasted past midnight, Roshchin read Stalin's message—he may not have provided the written text, which would explain its apparent absence from Chinese archives—and heard Mao express full agreement with Stalin's analysis of the international situation, including the danger of joint war against the United States, and evident enthusiasm for Chinese military involvement in Korea, with even more forces than Stalin had proposed—at least nine divisions rather than five or six. At

the same time, Mao enumerated various technical and numerical weakness that would hamper a military struggle against the Americans and made clear that Beijing would rely on Moscow for multi-faceted support, including air cover—a hint of the hard bargaining ahead, beginning with the forthcoming secret trip of Zhou (who attended this meeting) and Lin Biao to talk with Stalin personally. Regarding timing and strategy, Mao already had conceived the plan that would end in a stunning (if temporary) success—letting the Americans advance more deeply into North Korea, extending their supply lines, before the Chinese would level a damaging blow, which is what occurred in late November-December as the

eager to end the conflict as well, despite Zhou Enlai's insistence to Stalin in a meeting on 20 August 1952 that Mao favored a continuation of the war.¹⁴ Yet, in any case, Stalin's admonition to stick to a hard line in the Panmunjom talks precluded any real progress—brushing aside the suffering of his allies, he told Zhou that the “North Koreans have lost nothing” other than casualties, and enthused that the war was “getting on America's nerves.”¹⁵

In the conversation presented here, Stalin closely, and at times sharply, questioned the visiting North Korean and Chinese officials on the progress of the fighting, and showed particular interest in the combat qualities of the American

Once Stalin died, in March 1953, both Soviet and Chinese leaders immediately agreed on the need to liquidate the conflict even at the price of making concessions on the prisoner issue.

Americans were pushed all the way back to the 38th parallel.

Roshchin's report of his conversation with Mao does not entirely dispel the uncertainty over whether Stalin's message influenced China's ultimate decision to enter the war. Mao, evidently, had already come down strongly in favor of doing so, and hearing Stalin's ardent plea must only have confirmed his view that China's involvement was necessary for the good of the Sino-Soviet alliance on which he had risked so much as well as for the other advantages he could perceive from rebuffing the Americans—both to help consolidate the revolution against potential domestic enemies, as Chen Jian has argued¹³, and to head off a long-term security threat from an ascendant U.S. military presence on the border with Manchuria. It is still not clear, however, whether he had already prevailed upon the Politburo to endorse his course of active intervention in Korea, in which case Stalin's message was superfluous, or whether Mao was able to use this fresh evidence of strong Kremlin desire for Chinese entry to convince remaining holdouts of the necessity for this course of action. Only full contemporaneous notes or minutes of the CCP Politburo session could conclusively resolve the issue.

Jumping ahead to the latter stages of the war, Document No. 8 presents the Soviet record of Stalin's 4 September 1952 conversation with visiting North Korean leader Kim Il Sung and Chinese military commander Peng Dehuai. At the time, the Panmunjom negotiations between the warring sides begun the previous summer remained stalemated, especially over the issue of the mandatory repatriation of communist POWs, and fighting continued with the two enemy armies dug in on a front close to the 38th parallel, to which the US-South Korean forces had been driven back following Beijing's massive intervention in late 1950. By this point, previously released Russian documents make clear, the North Koreans were tiring of the war, particularly the heavy toll inflicted by American aerial bombardment, and probably the Chinese were

soldiers. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai, the commander of the “Chinese People's Volunteers” in Korea, had been summoned to Moscow in the midst of a series of conversations between Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in order to give the Soviet leader a clearer picture of how Pyongyang and Beijing viewed the military situation, particularly in light of Zhou's statements that North Korean morale was faltering.¹⁶ Stalin immediately interrogated his guests on this point, extracting an affirmation that the mood was “good” and the military situation “favorable” and only then the rather significant qualification—“if you do not include the bombing.” Obviously trying to buck up the North Koreans, who complain of being “grossly undersupplied,” Stalin tries to meet their requests for additional support, but then homes in on the question of whether a divergence exists between Pyongyang and Beijing over how to handle the negotiations with the Americans. After Kim minimizes the dispute (while admitting he and the Chinese desire an armistice “as soon as possible”), Stalin offers some tactical advice on the prisoner issue, mostly to gain the upper hand in international opinion, but then shifts the question to something that seems closer to his heart—how do the Americans rate in combat? In his earlier talk with Zhou Enlai, Stalin had disparaged the US soldiers as “weak,” “merchants ... obsessed with buying and selling.”¹⁷ Now he probes for further details, wondering whether they fight “with inspiration, with skill, or with numerical superiority”—almost as if he were sizing them up as potential adversaries in a World War III showdown he knew he had the power to ignite, and must often have imagined. Near the end of the conversation, Stalin turns the conversation in a more critical direction, letting an associate ask some skeptical questions about optimistic battlefield reporting, needling Peng Dehuai as to whether Chinese pilots were “afraid” to engage in combat operations without Soviet guidance, and condescendingly lecturing General Peng to institute a “system of rewards and decorations” in the “anar-

chist-like” Chinese army. One suspects that the Chinese commander left the meeting with gritted teeth. In sum, it is a document that not only offers further insight into Stalin’s mindset during his final year, but additional justification for the observation that he was happy to fight the Korean War to the last North Korean or Chinese, even as he carefully sheltered the USSR from direct clashes with the Americans.

Once Stalin died, in March 1953, both Soviet and Chinese leaders immediately agreed on the need to liquidate the conflict even at the price of making concessions on the prisoner issue.¹⁸ The final armistice was not signed, however, until 27 July 1953, after some final maneuvers by both sides, including Syngman Rhee’s sudden release on June 18 of more than 25,000 North Korean POWs without notifying Washington, a move that threatened to torpedo a potential deal and exacerbated growing US irritation with Rhee.¹⁹ Document No. 9, a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing for transmission to Chinese leaders, offers some insight into the comparatively mild communist response to these events, and to Moscow’s perception of the increasingly tense US-South Korean relationship. Already consumed with both internal and external crises in the wake of Stalin’s demise—including, in past weeks, an uprising in East Germany and the arrest of Lavrenty Beria—the Kremlin evinced little interest in reigniting the Korean conflagration. Instead, it applauded a draft Chinese-North Korean communication to the head of the U.S. delegation at Panmunjom that, while “[a]rgumentative and occasionally bordering on being insulting,” agreed to continue the armistice talks. Molotov’s message also complimented Beijing for not falling into Rhee’s trap, allegedly set in cahoots with aggressive U.S. “ruling circles,” of using provocative actions to undermine the armistice talks; instead, the moderate Sino-North Korean position had helped isolate the Americans and the Rhee “clique” in world public opinion and frustrated bellicose American designs both abroad and at home. Encouraging the Chinese not to be diverted from the path to the armistice, even as it launched a last mini-offensive, the Soviets added a warning that Kim Il Sung should not attend the final signing ceremony (he didn’t) due to the danger that he might fall victim to the “dangerous tricks” of the Seoul regime—a harbinger of the mutual ill-will and distrust that would characterize both the signing at Panmunjom and the tense military standoff that would ensue for more than half a century, the last frontier on the globe where the Cold War never really ended.

James G. Hershberg is Associate Professor at George Washington University and editor of the CWIHP Book Series (Stanford University Press/ Woodrow Wilson Center Press); Vladislav M. Zubok is Associate Professor at Temple University.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador in Pyongyang Terentii Shtykov to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky (for Stalin), 30 May 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM 30 May 1950

Top secret

Distribution: .1 - Stalin
2. - Stalin
3. - Molotov
4. - Malenkov
5. - Beria
6. - Mikoyan
7 - Kaganovich
8 - Bulganin
9 - Vyshinsky
10 - Gromyko

From Pyongyang, No. 16030, received at 13: 40, 30 May 1950.

16033 16044

Special no. 408-410

SPECIAL, OUT OF ORDER

To Vyshinsky (for the Instantsia [Stalin])

On 29 May I had a meeting with Kim Il Sung at his request. In the beginning of the conversation Kim Il Sung informed me that the armaments and ammunition he had requested during his stay in Moscow had largely arrived. The armaments have been sent to the newly formed divisions and by 1 June all the arms will be distributed among soldiers. Then he informed that he toured the new divisions, familiarized himself with the military preparations and believed that the divisions would be in full combat readiness by the end of June.

Kim Il Sung said that the head of [the North Korean] general staff completed at his request the principled decision for the offensive. The scheme of this decision was reported to him jointly by the head of the General Staff and the adviser General Vassilyev. He approved the decision and the choice of directions of the main offensive during the campaign. He asked me to meet, together with him, with the head of the General Staff and the adviser General Vassilyev, so that we could look at this decision together. I avoided such a joint meeting by saying that I could see the adopted decision at General Vassilyev’s.

Kim Il Sung then said that they are wrapping up on the organizational issues on the Army by 1 June. The Navy is somewhat lagging behind, since it has not received from the [Soviet] Union one trailer and one large destroyer [*bolshoi okhotnik*]. The crews of these ships have been manned, but cannot be trained in the absence of the ships. [Kim Il Sung]

asked me to take appropriate measures to speed up the arrival of the ships. I replied that according to our information the ships will be delivered to Korea in early June. After this Kim Il Sung pointed out that [North Korean] infantry troops were ready for combat. 8 divisions out of 10 infantry divisions are already fully prepared for the offensive. A tank brigade and a motorized regiment are also prepared. Three new rifle divisions will finish preparations in June. This suits them since they are intended for the second echelon.

Then he pointed out that the Southerners have no complete data on the situation in the People's Army and its combat readiness. However, they are now undertaking a number of measures to reinforce their army, although there are no big changes in the South Korean army. Considering that the people's army is ready for combat operations, he would like to begin military actions against the South at the end of June. There are two reasons why it is not advantageous for the Northerners to postpone the beginning of military actions. First, the Southerners might disclose their intentions and take measures to reinforce their army. Second, there could be rain in July, and then one would have to put off the offensive until September and this would be highly undesirable. Then Kim Il Sung pointed out that, according to the report by the head of the General Staff, they will need 16 days for concentration of troops. Therefore, they should begin deploying the troops in the area of concentration on 8-10 of June. Kim Il Sung pointed out that he has not discussed this question officially with the members of the Party's Political Council and intends to do it in the next few days, depending on the timing for the beginning of military actions. I evaded a direct answer about the timing for the beginning of military actions, saying that this is a serious issue and he should seek the counsel of the military about how much time they would need for preparation of troops, and consult the members of the Political Council, and only then take a final decision.

Footnote [*primechaniie*]

After the conversation with Kim Il Sung on these issues I fetched the advisers Generals Vassilyev and Postnikov to find out what they think about the readiness of troops and the feasibility of beginning military actions at the end of June. Generals Vassilyev and Postnikov believe that concentration of troops and detailed work on the operation with the commanders of divisions and regiments would take much time. Therefore it would be inappropriate to begin the campaign in June. However, considering the possibility of rain in July and [the danger that] the Southerners, if they discover the preparations of the Northerners for military actions, might start reinforcing their army, they are inclined to support [the idea] that one could complete preparations of the troops of the people's army and launch the campaign at the end of June.

My opinion is the following:

Since Kim Il Sung is in the mood to launch the campaign at the end of June and one could complete preparations of troops by that time, we should agree with this deadline.

After this Kim Il Sung reported that [North Korean Foreign Minister] Pak Hon Yong and he discussed the plan of political measures that envisage a proposal to the Southerners for a peaceful reunification of the country. At first they plan to appeal to them on behalf of the Fatherland's Front, and then on behalf of the government. He asked me to receive Pak Hon Yong and helped him to compose these documents. I agreed.

At the end of the conversation Kim Il Sung requested that I take appropriate measures to accelerate the delivery of medical supplies they requested from the Trade Office [of the USSR], for they have not yet received them, and also the delivery in June-July of 10-15 thousand tons of oil. Kim Il Sung underlined that they were in a grave crisis with automobile gasoline. I promised him that I would take measures.

I support the request of Kim Il Sung, since they have a dire need for medical supplies and automobile gasoline.

I am waiting for urgent instructions on the discussed issues.

30 May 1950. SHTYKOV

[Handwriting at the bottom of the page]



DOCUMENT No. 2

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Andrei A. Gromyko to Soviet Ambassador in
Pyongyang Terentii Shtykov, 31 May 1950**

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

No. 9849, received at 22:30 and sent at 23:55 on 31 May 1950.

To Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador.

Urgent, out of turn

In reply to your no. 408-410

The Instantsia [Stalin] approves your proposals. Delivery of medical supplies and oil will be accelerated.

GROMYKO

DOCUMENT No. 3
Telegram from Stalin to Soviet Ambassador in
Pyongyang Terentii Shtykov, 8 July 1950

Ciphered telegram # 36275.

Copy no. 2
To be returned after 6 days
Top Secret
8 Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Union SSR.

Only by wire

[in handwriting at the very top] for Cde. Stalin.

8 July 1950

To Pyongyang, Soviet Ambassador

It appears that you behave incorrectly, for you promised the [North] Koreans to give them [Soviet] advisers, and did not ask us for permission.

You should remember that you are a representative of the USSR, not of Korea.

Let our advisers go to the front headquarters and into army groups in civilian uniforms as correspondents of "Pravda" in the required numbers.

You will be personally responsible before the Soviet Government that they would not be taken prisoners.

FYNSI [Stalin]

Typed in 3 copies:

NO. 1 - for Stalin
No. 2 - for Stalin
No. 3 - for Bulganin

Typist Budanova 8 July 1950, 19:35

Correct: head of dispatch of 4th Division 8 Department of the GSSA.

Colonel Gonchar.

DOCUMENT No. 4
Telegram from Stalin to Soviet Officials in
Pyongyang, 1 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM # 75352
1 October 1950

To be returned after 6 days
Top Secret
8 Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Union SSR.

To Pyongyang – SHTRAUS [pseudonym for Soviet Amb. Shtykov], MATVEEV [pseudonym for M.V. Zakharov, Stalin's personal military envoy]

We have received your cable of 30 September and 1 October. These cables show that cde. KIM IL SUNG and other comrades from the Korean leadership pose before you a set of questions and that you dodge these questions. We consider your behavior to be erroneous. In the emerging grave situation it is natural for the Korean comrades to solicit advice and assistance, but cde. SHTYKOV keeps silent and thus contributes to the sense of uncertainty in the Korean leadership. Cde. MATVEEV was sent to Korea not for transmitting summaries on the events in Korea, which we kept receiving anyway. Until now he has not yet presented to Moscow [authorities] his detailed assessment of the military situation in Korea, not to mention any suggestions or advice that may flow out of this situation. Thereby he makes it more difficult for us to take this or that decision on Korean matters. Cde. MATVEEV does little to assist the Korean leadership which is revealed by the fact that the Korean leadership still lacks any plan of defense of the republic along the 38th parallel and Northbound, and does not have a plan of withdrawal of troops from South Korea.

Keep these directions in mind in your subsequent activities in Korea.

Immediately visit KIM IL SUNG and PAK HON YONG and tell them the following:

First. Will the enemy advance to the North of the 38th parallel? We should base ourselves in this question on the worst-case scenario, that is, that the enemy will try to capture North Korea. Therefore one should without delay mobilize all forces and prevent the enemy from crossing the 38th parallel, that is, to be prepared to fight the enemy to the North of the 38th parallel.

We should not underestimate the strength and capabilities of the Korean republic in the matters of organizing defense. There is a big potential and resources for mobilization in the Korean North. Under the present difficult circumstances one should at any cost and in the shortest possible time resolve the task of creating combat-ready armed forces, both through reinforcement of the existing troops as well as through formation of new ones. We will fully supply all these troops

with armaments.

We hold as erroneous the opinion that North Korea cannot offer resistance along the 38th parallel and to the North of it. The Korean government possesses forces, it only should organize them and utilize all resources for defense. It must do everything to speed up formation of divisions and units - the armaments for them are already on the way to Korea. At the same time it is necessary to take more energetic measures towards withdrawal of troops from the South, having in mind that there is no solid front-line in the South, therefore troops have good chances to reach the North. This matter should be done in a hurry, for the Americans will certainly attempt to deprive the troops of this possibility in the nearest future.

Second. In the South, behind the enemy's lines, one should make a transition to guerilla warfare, in the shortest period of time to develop energetic guerilla activities, using to this goal, along with the guerilla fighters from the local population, the remaining armed units when their advance to the North is precluded. The guerillas should have a task - to disrupt and terrorize the area behind the enemy's lines by disrupting roads [*kommunikatsii*], destroying headquarters and lines of communications, attacking the enemy's officers and soldiers and through other active measures.

Third. The emerging situation requires firm leadership and its restructuring [*perestroiki*] in the light of new tasks of organization of sturdy defense. To this end one needs, above all, to put an end to the existing mood of uncertainty in the leadership, to define sharply and strictly the duties of the leading comrades by assigning to each one specific tasks and responsibilities on select issues of the country's defense. With merciless and immediate measures one must break the neck of the reaction and ensure order behind the frontlines. For the struggle with paratroopers - terrorists of the enemy one should create the elimination units of local self-defense from among reliable people. The government must have at its disposal, wherever it is located, a strong military fist consisting of the reliable people loyal to the government. One should undertake all measures without delay to mine major ports and areas of possible landing of the enemy; here we will render the needed assistance.

Fourth. As to the question posed in the letter of cde. KIM IL SUNG to cde. FYN-SI on the assistance with armed forces [to North Korea], we consider as a most appropriate form of such assistance to be the assistance by volunteer units. On this question you have to take consultations, first of all, with Chinese comrades.

You will receive in a few days the answer to the letter of cde. KIM IL SUNG.

FYN-SI [STALIN]

2 copies - 1 - cde. Vasilevsky

2. - cde. Fyn Si, 13.11.50

Correct: head of dispatch of 4th Division 8 Department of the GSSA. Colonel Ogurtsov.

Typed by Budanova 2.10.50, 6:00 [am]

[Handwritten across the document] "The answer is [agreed upon?]" "I" [Stalin]

INSTRUCTION OF THE CC VKP(b)

Draft

The question of Korea

To accept the proposed draft telegram to cde. Shtykov and cde. Matveev

SECRETARY CC

Accepted on 1. Oct. 1950

Voted FOR:

Cde. Beria

Bulganin

Kaganovich

Malenkov

Mikoyan



DOCUMENT No. 5

Draft Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 4 October 1950 (italicized passages inserted and bracketed passages deleted by hand)

[DRAFT CIPHERED TELEGRAM] First original version

TO BEIJING, SOVIET AMBASSADOR

FOR MAO ZEDONG

5 October 1950

I received your response.

I considered it possible to turn to You with the question of [sending to Korea a] *minimum* five-to-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel (and the enemy has already crossed, as is known, the 38th parallel in several places). There could be no doubts that, without such declarations by the Chinese comrades, I would have deemed it impossible to address You with the abovementioned question, *and, incidentally, I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard [platz-d'arme-trans.] for the USA or for a future militarist Japan [against China].*

While raising before You the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I was basing myself on the following considerations [in the area] of international [situation] character: 1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war; 2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable at present of rendering any military assistance to the Americans; 3) *In view of this*, the USA will [would] be compelled [in the view of that] to yield in the Korean question, i.e. agree to such conditions of resolving the Korean question that would be advantageous for Korea and that would not give the enemies a possibility to transform Korea into their springboard; 4) *I believe that* the USA would be compelled to return Taiwan to China and, ultimately, [5]. The USA would be compelled to give up also on the separate treaty with Japanese reactionaries as well as the conversion of Japan into its satellite. [6] The USA will have to agree to the presence of the representatives of the Central People's government of China at the UN and the Security Council].

I do not believe that China could obtain these concessions as a result of passive temporizing and patience. I believe, on the contrary, that without serious struggle and without new imposing display of its force China will not obtain these and similar concessions, as well as it will not obtain Taiwan, which the Americans keep in their hands in fact not for Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.

[It is not excluded, although unlikely that sending five-six divisions] *One can suppose, that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war, which in turn would drag China into the [big] war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact.* [But one should not fear this] *Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not*, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states, without Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now, do not present a serious military force.

Such were considerations of a foreign policy nature that I proceeded from when I was requesting a *minimum* of five-six divisions from You, while believing that You would find it possible to send these divisions to Korea, because earlier You had declared about your readiness to send Chinese armed forces to Korea.

But Your reply contains a consideration that is new to me, the one on the domestic situation of China which, in my opinion, is of decisive significance. You assert that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be very many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. *I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership* But this means that China, with regard to its internal situation, is not ready for a new war. [In such a big country as China, the future of the people is decided not by foreign

policy factors, but by *the factors* of domestic situation. Of course, You should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else.] If the internal situation in China does not allow You to risk such steps that might lead to a new war, then one should think *in general* if one should undertake such a risk. Therefore I fully understand You and [your position] *Your predicament.*

As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.

Respectfully PHILIPPOV [STALIN]

4 October 1950

2nn



DOCUMENT No. 6
Final Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 5
October 1950 (new sections italicized)

[Stalin reproduced most of the text of his message to Mao in his cable to Kim Il Sung on 8[7] October 1950, translated by Kathryn Weathersby and Alexandre Mansourov and published in CWIHP Bulletin no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 116. The comparison between the documents reveals that only the date, an introductory phrase, and the final two paragraphs were omitted.]

From cde. PHILIPPOV

October 5, 1950

I received your reply [...]

Your reply contains one consideration about the domestic situation in China that is new to me. You insist that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership. Of course, you should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else. Would it be, however, possible to overcome the difficulties of internal situation in China or it would be impossible - only the Chinese comrades can decide it.

As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.

Respectfully,

PHILIPPOV

5 October 1950

[Handwritten] Dispatched to cde. Bulganiin via VCh [high-frequency phone] at 23 hours, 5 October.

**DOCUMENT No. 7**

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to China, N.V. Roshchin, to Stalin, 7 October 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM NO. 25348

SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL
STAFF OF THE SOVIEV ARMY

Top Secret.

7 October 1950

Copies to: 1 - cde. Stalin
2 - cde. Stalin
3 - cde. Molotov
4 - cde. Malenkov
1. - cde. Beria
2. - cde. Mikoyan
3. - cde. Kaganovich
4. - cde. Bulganiin

Received from Beijing on 11: 55 on 7 October, 1950.

URGENT [*vne ocherednaia*]

To FILIPPOV [STALIN]

In response to Your no. 4676

On 6 October, at 22:30 of Beijing time I visited MAO ZEDONG and passed to him your reply.

After listening to me, MAO ZEDONG declared that:

1. He is in full agreement with your assessment of the current international situation and the prospects for its possible evolution.
2. He is very glad that your answer speaks about a joint struggle of China and the USSR against the Americans. He emphasized that, if one goes to war, then, unquestionably, one should go to war now. He added that he has just expressed the analogous idea at the session of the CCP CC Politburo .
3. As to the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea, MAO ZEDONG believes that it makes sense to send not five-six divisions, but at least nine divisions.

However, he pointed out the extremely low level of technical equipment of these divisions, as they have only 108 artillery pieces and do not have tanks at all.

MAO ZEDONG also remarked, referring to the materials received from the Korean friends that the US corps (three divisions) include around 1,500 artillery pieces of different caliber, including tanks.

MAO ZEDONG believes that in order to defeat one US corps, Chinese should have four-to-one superiority in human force and three-to-one superiority in technical equipment.

MAO ZEDONG underlined that he can easily resolve the issue of infantry, thanks to available reserves, but as to technological equipment of Chinese troops they totally count on the assistance of the Soviet Union.

He also said that currently they do not have the trained cadres to man artillery units, tanks and other technical means.

Concerning the issue about the timing of entry of Chinese troops into Korea, MAO ZEDONG noted that they are ready to start moving their divisions in the next few days, but he believes it is not appropriate to make haste with this; it would be better to give Americans a chance to advance deeper to the North, since this would lead to their dispersal and would facilitate for the Chinese to defeat it in parts.

4. MAO ZEDONG paid special attention to the issue of aviation. He pointed out that, according to the data of the Korean friends, the Americans have about 1000 aircraft in the Korean theater, while the Chinese still have no aviation. It is necessary to have aviation, in the opinion of MAO ZEDONG, for:

- a) the cover of the Chinese ground troops that will be sent to Korea;
- b) for combat operations on the front;
- c) for the cover of the largest industrial centers: Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Mukden (Anshan, Fushun).

MAO ZEDONG believes that the Americans can, first of all, destroy from the air the Chinese industrial base, disorganize economic life and mess up communications. Such a situation, said MAO ZEDONG, might create serious discontent in the country, particularly on the part of national bourgeoisie, and put the people's government in an extremely difficult position. MAO ZEDONG declared that the Chinese government cannot ensure itself the air cover of the troops and industrial centers, and the equipment from the Soviet Union is essential.

1. MAO ZEDONG drew attention to the fact that in Korea the roads and communications are destroyed and this gravely complicates the task of supplying the army. In this case, he said, the Chi-

nese could rely only on Soviet assistance in providing transportation means.

2. MAO ZEDONG declared that the Chinese government does not possess sufficient funds for purchasing the required armaments for aviation and the ammunition. The entire 1951 budget is two billion two hundred million American dollars, of which only two hundred million could be directed for the armament.

3. Having said all the above, MAO ZEDONG said it is necessary to send immediately ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to report to you on the developments and all the considerations of the Chinese friends. ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO may depart by plane on 8 October. They could be flown from Beijing until Irkutsk. Our special plane is required in Irkutsk.

MAO ZEDONG expressed a wish, that ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO be accompanied by SHI ZHE and FEDORENKO. Present at the conversation were: ZHOU ENLAI, U SU XIAN and FEDORENKO. The conversation lasted for 1 hour and 45 minutes.

I am waiting for your instructions,

ROSHCHIN

No. 2318
7.10.50



DOCUMENT No. 8
Soviet Record of Meeting of Stalin, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, and Chinese Military Commander Peng Dehuai, Moscow, 4 September 1952

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF I. V. STALIN AND KIM IL SUNG AND PENG DEHUI

4 September 1952

In attendance:

From our side, comrades Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich.

From the Chinese and Korean side: Zhou En-lai, Chen Yun, Li Fu-chun, Zhang Wentian, Su Yu, Pak Hon Yong

Translators: Mun, Shi Zhe and Fedorenko.

STALIN: What is the mood of the Korean people?

KIM IL SUNG: The mood is good.

STALIN: Does [North Korean Foreign Minister] PAK HON YONG agree?

PAK HON YONG: Yes, the mood is good.

STALIN: What about in the armies?

KIM IL SUNG: In the armies the mood is also good.

STALIN: And what does PENG DEHUI think?

PENG DEHUI: Good.

KIM IL SUNG: The overall situation is favorable, if you do not include the bombing raids.

STALIN: Do you have any fighter aviation?

KIM IL SUNG: We have one division.

STALIN: China will have a hard time introducing its air force because everyone can declare that these are not volunteers anymore, but government troops. Volunteers do not have their own air force. We can ask: would it be advantageous for the democratic camp? In my opinion, it would not be advantageous to announce that the Chinese government... [portion cut off]

Troops wage the war. KIM IL SUNG should have Korean aviation.

KIM IL SUNG: If material conditions allow, we could form 1-2 aircraft divisions.

STALIN: Although the Korean people are tired of war, they deserve to be called heroic people. Since the Korean has suffered, we are ready to disarm our 1-2 divisions for the benefit of Korea.

KIM IL SUNG: We thank you.

STALIN: Do you have a division of fighters?

KIM IL SUNG: Yes we have.

STALIN: It could change seats [i.e., its pilots could be transferred to new divisions - trans.]

KIM IL SUNG: There is another division, in the training school.

STALIN: We can provide a material basis for 1-3 divisions.

KIM IL SUNG: We could find people for 1-3 divisions.

STALIN. Good, we will give you the material base for 3 divisions. What else does Korea lack?

KIM IL SUNG. As a result of the constant intensification of the enemy's bombing we need to build up our anti-aircraft artillery. Recently we asked for 5 regiments of anti-aircraft artillery, but we really need 10 regiments. We asked 5 from you, comrade STALIN, and 5 - from the Chinese comrades. Mao Zedong said that currently it is impossible for China to meet Korea's request. Therefore we are asking you to give us 10 regiments of anti-aircraft artillery.

STALIN. How many divisions do you have on the ground [*nazemnikh divizii*]?

KIM IL SUNG. We have 18 divisions.

STALIN. And how much of artillery?

KIM IL SUNG. We have a few regiments, but they are under-armed.

STALIN. There are two artillery regiments in our division. The same situation is in China. What about you?

KIM IL SUNG. We have a similar system.

STALIN. If you lack something, make an appropriate list.

KIM IL SUNG. We have such a list.

STALIN. Do you have mortars?

KIM IL SUNG. Yes, 122-mm [caliber].

STALIN. We will give you material base for 10 divisions of anti-aircraft artillery.

KIM IL SUNG. We thank you, comrade STALIN.

In our ground troops we lack 122-mm howitzers and other armament. We could present additional requests.

STALIN. What else do you lack?

KIM IL SUNG. Especially acute is the problem with supplies for engineering troops and communication troops. Here we are grossly undersupplied. The same situation is in aircraft. We lack equipment and materials [*oborudovaniia I materialov*]. This is what will force us in a month to stop production of shells of 122-mm caliber.

STALIN. Give us the list of materials you need.

KIM IL SUNG. This list is made.

STALIN. What is the situation with food, with bread and rice?

KIM IL SUNG. We have a good harvest this year, but we will not last on it until next year. Mao Zedong promised to procure us with clothing and food.

STALIN. Do they eat wheat in your country, or only rice?

KIM IL SUNG. During our hardest times you, Comrade STALIN, had sent us a gift of 50 thousand tons of food-stuffs. Our people like wheat flour. Overcoming present difficulties, the Korean people try to make ends meet, but we lack means of transportation and we cannot solve this problem by ourselves. We would like to receive automobiles, tractors and chemical fertilizers from the Soviet government.

STALIN. Give us an appropriate list.

They say that you, Chinese and Koreans, have a disagreement of some sort about how to conduct negotiations with Americans. Is that right?

KIM IL SUNG. In my opinion, there are no serious conflicts of opinion. We have agreed to the versions, suggested by our Chinese comrades. But taking into consideration the grave situation, in which the Korean people found itself, we are interested in signing the armistice as soon as possible. Our Chinese comrades are also interested in that.

STALIN. We have discussed this issue with the Chinese delegation. There was a proposal not to agree to the American conditions in regards to the prisoners of war, and instead to insist on our own conditions. Someone has expressed an opinion that if the Americans do not want to return 20% of Chinese and Korean POWs, then it would be advisable to detain 10% of American POWs until the Chinese and Korean POWs are released; or to say that if they don't release these 20% of Chinese and Korean prisoners-of-war, then we would not return 20% of their POWs as long as they hold Chinese and Koreans POWs. Perhaps this arrangement is even better.

We could settle on this and negotiate a cease-fire. As for the talks about the unreleased portion of the POWs, we can continue them after the cessation of hostilities, after the cease-fire.

I do not know how you would feel about this, but I think that this arrangement would convince everyone of the sincerity of your stand.

The Americans might say that 20% of Chinese and Korean POWs do not want to return to their homeland. In this case it would be advisable to declare that we do not believe this.

This combination delays the question of 20% of POWs while 60% of them are released. This is the core of the proposal.

Our Chinese comrades believe that at the present time we should not introduce any new proposals and that we should bide our time, until new proposals are introduced by Americans, in order for us to make revisions. Do you know about this?

KIM IL SUNG: We have heard about this from Mao Zedong.

STALIN: And what did Mao Zedong say on this issue?

KIM IL SUNG: During his conversation with us, Mao Zedong suggested a few alternatives: the first was to continue to insist on the release of all POWs; the second — to negotiate the question of POWs after the armistice; the third — due to the detention of our POWs by the opponent, we also have to detain a corresponding quantity of their POWs.

In this manner, Mao Zedong's point of view coincides with your point of view, comrade STALIN.

We believe that these 3 options are the most appropriate ones. But I would like to ask for your advice on what steps we should take to secure a resolution of the question.

STALIN: In my opinion, we should continue to dispute the release of all POWs for some time (a month or a few weeks). If we don't succeed, then we should propose the 20% deal. We are talking here not about different versions, but about different stands. The first stand is the release of all POWs; the second is non-release of POWs up to 20%.

True, one may ask another question: is it advisable to make any new proposals now, or should we bide our time until Americans make a new proposal[?] We have to insist on the complete exchange of POWs and see how the situation will turn out.

The second arrangement is advantageous for you and for your campaign. They do not release 20% of your POWs and you do not release 20% of their POWs. The second arrangement would introduce discord into the American camp. There would be a campaign for the release of POWs and for the cessation of war. That would be advantageous to you.

That is our opinion on this issue.

How do Americans conduct themselves in battle: do they fight well?

PENG DEHUAI: The weakest trait of Americans is their poor morale.

STALIN: The reason for this is the unpopularity of the war. I would like to know how they fight: with inspiration, with skill, or with numerical superiority?

PENG DEHUAI: During the period of January-February [1952] Americans conducted more than 200 offensive attacks, but their success rate was only 1%. On the other hand, we conducted only 30 offensive attacks in a month, 80-90% of which were successful.

STALIN. What were these successes are exactly about?

PENG DEHUAI. We managed to destroy small units of the enemy - a platoon or a company.

STALIN. Do you agree, KIM IL SUNG?

KIM IL SUNG. Of course I agree.

STALIN. American fortifications are strong?

PENG DEHUAI. In the recent time their fortifications became much stronger, but our fortifications became reinforced as well. The American constructions are weaker than ours, but their building equipment is better.

STALIN. How many fortified lines do they have?

PENG DEHUAI. 3 lines.

STALIN. And how many lines of fortifications do you have?

PENG DEHUAI. Essentially 2 lines, and the third is only under constructions.

STALIN. And do you have minefields?

PENG DEHUAI. We do not have enough mines and barbed wire. We capture them from the enemy and use them against the enemy.

STALIN. During the war we widely practiced minefields. There were special maps that indicated passages for our troops. We believe it is impossible to wage a war without minefields.

PENG DEHUAI. Our positions are at a very close distance to the enemy - only 300 - 500 meters.

STALIN. Your positions must be too much forward-based.

PENG DEHUAI. It may be because since April we continue advancing.

STALIN. And what is the distance between the lines of fortification?

PENG DEHUAI: The distance is not great, it depends on the terrain. In some places the lines converge, while in others the distance reaches 20 kilometers. At the present time we are creating structures from reinforced concrete.

STALIN: Do you have entrenchments?

PENG DEHUAI: Yes.

MALENKOV: What explains the fact that we take few prisoners, while the opponent takes many?

PENG DEHUAI: On the whole we took more prisoners than the opponent.

STALIN: How many Chinese and Korean prisoners are there?

PENG DEHUAI: According to our calculations, there are 12

thousand Chinese prisoners, but according to the American announcements, there are 20 thousand. The number of Korean prisoners is greater because Americans managed to take a great number of Korean prisoners before October 1951. During their offensive attacks Americans also captured a significant number of prisoners from reserve brigade forces.

Since Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War, a total of 12 thousand troops were taken prisoner, 8 thousand of which were Americans. The number of *lisynmanovskikh* [North Korean] POWs is 40 thousand. However, due to difficult living conditions, many foreign POWs have died.

KIM IL SUNG: Based on the list produced by us, the total number of prisoners taken by us is 12 thousand people, 4,416 of which are foreigners, and the rest — “*lisynmanovtsy*.” POWs include 300 American pilots, 30 of whom are officers. Around 27 thousand South Koreans were transferred to the divisions of People’s Revolutionary Army. There were no media announcements about these POWs.

MALENKOV. Do you rotate Chinese volunteers at the front-line?

PENG DEHUAI. Yes we do.

MALENKOV. Does it mean that Chinese divisions have training opportunities?

PENG DEHUAI. Yes. By August 1953 all the divisions of volunteers in Korea will be replaced. All commanding cadres of the People’s Liberation Army of China (on the level of the army, corps, division) will be fully rotated through the Korean front.

STALIN. Do you have “Katyushas” [rocket-launchers]?

PENG DEHUAI. We have one division on the frontline and another in the rear.

STALIN. Are there guerilla units acting behind the enemy’s frontline?

KIM IL SUNG. Yes, they act, although conditions are very hard.

STALIN. Are there Japanese among prisoners?

PENG DEHUAI. There are only American Japanese.

MALENKOV. How you could explain that during the carpet bombing raids of American aviation in North Korea so few planes are shot down?

PENG DEHUAI. We believe that not a few [were shot down]. Since the beginning of war 5,800 American planes were shot down.

STALIN. Have Chinese pilots mastered jet-planes?

PENG DEHUAI. Chinese pilots can take part in combat operations when they are guided by Soviet pilots.

STALIN. So what, are they afraid?

PENG DEHUAI. They have enough courage, but they cannot fly in formations.

STALIN. You should let them fly more, only in the air they can train. There was a time when Soviet pilots also did not want to fly, they preferred to sit in schools. But gradually they began to fly, they learned to fly. Now we evaluate pilots by the number of flights. Those who have more flights get decorations. School training gives little. Combat training provides real experience. You should not be afraid to be in the air; on the contrary, you should feel in the air like at home. [STALIN, of all people, had real phobia of flying - trans.] You should also train them to fly at night. Otherwise you will not have aviation. You also need to have a system of rewards and decorations.

Do you have orders and medals?

PENG DEHUAI. Not yet. We would like to introduce them in 1953.

STALIN. You cannot go on like this. In my opinion, they [the Chinese] have an anarchist-like disregard of orders and medals. They did not even have generals. They believe that all this is against [the principles of] communism. In reality, the system of ranks, insignia and the system of rewards in the army is of enormous importance; you cannot build a real army without them. Otherwise, only partisan formations can exist like that. For 15 years they waged a civil war, expelled American imperialists, scored victory, but there are no military ranks, insignias and orders in the army. This is wrong. You should give a serious thought to it. The officer corps should be well taken care of, there should be salary, etc. The main thing is to preserve and take care of officer cadres, to create all necessary conditions for them, for they are military specialists.



DOCUMENT No. 9

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, 4 July 1953

Ciphered Telegram # 13464
Tenth Department of the MFA SSSR
Top Secret

Received; 19:20 on 4 July 1953

Sent: 21:20 on 4 July 1953.

To: Beijing, Soviet Ambassador

URGENT [vne ocheredi]

1211-1220. Pay a visit to Siu-Tsuan and tell him the following.

1. The Soviet government regards the measures planned by the government of the PRC as correct. The Soviet government is also in agreement with the draft answer to [U.S. General Mark] Clark from Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

2. The Soviet government believes that the entire course of armistice negotiations testifies to a resolute success of the tactics employed by the Sino-Korean side in these negotiations. The Sino-Korean side demonstrated to the whole world its striving for peace and readiness to conduct negotiations and find the ground for a compromise while protecting their state interests. American ruling circles became isolated in their policy that leaves the blame for the delay of the armistice negotiations and for the continuation of war in Korea in the eyes of the world public opinion at the door of the US.

3. As to Syngman Rhee and his recent provocative actions aimed at complicating the negotiations and at delaying the end of the war, we believe that it is not his independent policy. It is absolutely obvious that all the recent actions of the Syngman Rhee clique and the fuss around them were done in execution of certain tasks set by the US ruling circles which act to please the most aggressive segment of American monopolists. Due to the successful tactics of the Sino-Korean side all the obstacles to the conclusion of an armistice agreement have been removed. This put in a tight corner not only American foreign but also domestic policy, since there is no more possibility to refer to the aggravation of the international situation, to the Korean war, etc. Under the new circumstances the US ruling circles face serious political difficulties in sustaining the atmosphere of military hysteria, high military appropriations, etc. Therefore American ruling circles are taking advantage of Syngman Rhee and the noise around him in order to maintain in the US (and not only in the US) the unstable semi-military political atmosphere and to delay, in one way or another, the conclusion of an armistice. However, the thrust of public opinion in the US as well as in other countries has increased so much that the US ruling circles could hardly manage to put off ending the Korean war for long. This does not exclude that all kind of noise around Syngman Rhee continues and that, perhaps, there would be some new attempts to delay the conclusion of the armistice in Korea.

4. The Soviet government deems it necessary to return to the question about the trip of Kim Il Sung to Punmunjom to sign the armistice agreement. We cannot ignore the defiant conduct of the Syngman Rhee clique, for it may play some kind of dangerous tricks on Kim Il Sung. Therefore, Kim Il Sung should be advised against going to Punmunjom. Instead, he should order another responsible Korean com-

rade to sign the agreement on behalf of the KPDR. We hope that the Chinese friends will agree with this.

Telegraph the results,

MOLOTOV

Copies: 1 - cde. MALENKOV

2 - cde. Molotov

3. cde. Khrushchev

4 - cde. Vyshinsky

5 - cde. Gromyko

6.- cde. Zorin

7. - 10th department

8 Copy.

Shown to cde. Podtserov, Fedorenko.

NOTES

¹ See Mark Kramer's obituary of Volkogonov in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 93.

² For more information on the Volkogonov collection at the Library of Congress, go to <http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/text/volkogon.html>. Most of the documents here can be found in the Korea folder in box 27.

³ For a discussion of the broader context of this document, see Kathryn Weathersby, "Should We Fear This?" *Stalin and the Danger of War with America*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 39 (July 2002).

⁴ See, e.g., Kim's comments to Shtykov on 17 January 1950, in Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950, in Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), p. 8.

⁵ For a discussion of the rationale behind Stalin's withdrawal of Soviet advisors from the front line immediately before the invasion began, see K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996): p. 31.

⁶ For previously released Soviet evidence on this topic, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 94-119.

⁷ For messages from Pyongyang in late September, including Kim's appeal to Stalin, see Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 110-114.

⁸ See message from Filippov (Stalin) to Mao and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 114. As early as July 5, Stalin had communicated with Zhou about the advisability of concentrating nine divisions of Chinese "volunteers" who could enter the war should the enemy crossing the 38th parallel, and had promised air cover in that event. See Filippov (Stalin) to N.V. Roshchin (with message for Zhou), 5 July 1950, see *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 112-113.

⁹ See Mao Zedong to Stalin, 2 October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 114-116. This Russian document contradicted a previously released Chinese version of a Mao message to Stalin of the same date indicating that China had decided to enter the war; it appears that this earlier version was an unsent draft. See Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 100, 106-107 fn 30; Shen Zhihua, trans. Chen Jian, "The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 237-242; and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 54-55, 303 fn 34-36.

¹⁰ See Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov), 8 [7] October 1950, Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 116-117. See also K. Weathersby, "'Should We Fear This?' Stalin and the Danger of War with America," *CWIHP Working Paper No. 39*.

¹¹ See esp. the paperback edition of Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994 [& 1996]), pp. x-xii, 171-189, and Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, esp. pp. 55-58, 90.

¹² See, e.g., Mao's comments to Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin on 22 July 1958 in Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, "The Emerging

Disputes Between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly Available Chinese Documents," *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 155, 156.

¹³ See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, *passim*.

¹⁴ See record of Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 12.

¹⁵ Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 12. For a detailed discussion of Russian documents on the armistice negotiations, see Kathryn Weathersby, "Stalin, Mao, and the End of the Korean War," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 1998): 90-116.

¹⁶ For the context of this discussion, see the record of the Stalin-Zhou conversations on 20 August 1952, 3 September 1952, and 19 September 1952, in *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 9-20. Zhou had raised the possibility of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai coming to Moscow during his talk with Stalin on August 20.

¹⁷ Stalin-Zhou conversation, 20 August 1952, *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 13.

¹⁸ See in particular K. Weathersby, "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), esp. pp. 34-35 and documents on pp. 80 ff.

¹⁹ See William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 330-339.

From the CWIHP Annals



Former US Deputy Secretary of State **Strobe Talbott** (right) discusses **William Taubman's** "*Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*" (2003) at a 26 March 2003 CWIHP seminar.

From the CWIHP Annals



Former Polish President and Nobel Peace Prize recipient **Lech Walesa** addresses the conference “The Economic Cold War,” organized by CWIHP, The Economic Cold War History Project (Academy of Finland and University of Tampere) and the Russian State Archives of Contemporary History (RSACH). The conference took place in the House of Estates (Säätytalo) in Helsinki on 14-16 September 2003. For more information visit the CWIHP website at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.

Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar **Marilena Gala** (University of Florence) discusses her new research project on “The European Security Issue” at a 15 December 2003 CWIHP seminar.



Leopoldo Nuti (University of Rome III, left) and **Samuel F. Wells, Jr.** (Woodrow Wilson Center) at the 28-30 September 2003 Critical Oral History Conference on “The Road to Helsinki.” The conference on the lead-up to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was co-sponsored by the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies, CWIHP and the National Security Archive. Held at the Villa Finlay in Florence, the meeting featured several former ambassadors involved in the CSCE negotiations, including Jacques Andreani (France), James Goodby (USA), John Maresca (USA), Yuri Dubinin (Russia), Yuri Kashlev (Russia), Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (Italy), Nicolai Ecobescu (Romania). About 50 scholars and students attended the meeting, which was held in cooperation with the Zurich-based Parallel History Project. For more information visit the CWIHP website at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba: New Evidence

By Svetlana Savaranskaya

The most studied crisis of the twentieth century—the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962—never fails to provide researchers with new puzzles. As Raymond L. Garthoff pointed out in *CWIHP Bulletin 11*, “Each new tranche of revelations about the Cuban Missile Crisis helps to answer some old questions about it, but also raises new ones.”¹ One of the most interesting questions still remaining concerns Soviet intentions regarding the weapons not explicitly covered in the exchange of letters between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, and the evolving nature of the Soviet-Cuban military agreement.

The new documents from the Russian archives that became available at the Havana Conference² (“The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 40th Anniversary Conference”) in October 2002 shed new light on Khrushchev’s decision to deploy and then to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba. They also invite further discussion on the following questions: what were the Soviet intentions regarding the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba? What was the nature of the debate in the Soviet Union on the removal of these weapons from Cuba? Were there differing positions between the military and the political leadership on this issue? When, and why, was the final decision to withdraw those weapons made? When did the last tactical nuclear warhead leave Cuba?

We know that Khrushchev’s initial decision to deploy a nuclear-armed group of Soviet forces in Cuba included sending both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (80 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, as specified in the original plan for “Operation Anadyr” of 24 May 1962). In early September, Khrushchev augmented the plan by adding 6 nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bomber and 12 short-range tactical nuclear missiles for the dual-use Luna complex. (Later in September he also revised the plans for naval deployment, drastically reducing the naval capability specified in the plan.)

Until January 1992, US officials had been unaware of the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962.³ This type of weaponry had not been explicitly covered in the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Khrushchev had promised Kennedy that the “the so-called offensive weapons would be removed,” which referred to the short- and medium-range ballistic missiles SS-4 (R-12, with a range of 1,050 miles) and SS-5 (R-14, with a range of approx. 2,000 miles) capable of reaching US territory. Even if the Americans had known about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, it would have been hard for them to make an argument that tactical nuclear weapons were offensive since their short range allowed them to be used only as battlefield weapons against an invading force.

Exploiting the ambiguity of Khrushchev’s phrase, the US demanded the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers declaring them an offensive weapon. After Moscow decided to withdraw the bombers, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan,

sent by Khrushchev to Havana, discussed the US demand with the Cubans. Mikoyan presented the issue in such a way that the Soviet government appeared to be consulting with the Cubans on the withdrawal of the IL-28s.

No such pretense was taken, however, on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons; there were no consultations with the Cuban leadership. Much to their surprise the Cubans were told that the tactical nuclear weapons were to be returned to the Soviet Union, even though they were not covered by the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange. A more definitive answer to the question of why the Soviets decided to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba may become feasible only after full access to the minutes of the CPSU Presidium sessions in the fall of 1962 (the so-called “Malin Notes”), which remain classified in the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow.⁴ Unfortunately, the selections of the Malin notes declassified so far do not contain any references to the discussion of whether to remove tactical nuclear weapons, which one would suspect, must have taken place at the Politburo some time in November 1962.

Nevertheless, the newly declassified documents from the Presidential Archive (“Special Declassification,” April 2002) and from the personal archive of Mikoyan’s son, Sergo Mikoyan, show that Khrushchev was ambivalent about the tactical nuclear weapons and their safety throughout the crisis, and that eventually he concluded that they were just too dangerous to be left in the hands of the Cuban ally. There are also some indications of differences between the Soviet military (who might have wanted to keep the weapons on the island) and Khrushchev.

The earliest sign of the Soviets ambiguity on the issue of tactical nuclear weapons emerged in September in discussions concerning the predelegation of authority to use the tactical nuclear weapons in the event of an US invasion of Cuba. The question was whether local commanders should have the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons if they were under attack, and if it was impossible to contact Moscow. Concerning the predelegation of authority to use the weapons in the event of an invasion of Cuba during which it was impossible that contact with Moscow. As General Anatoly Gribkov, the top Soviet military official in Cuba in 1962, explained in his 1996 book *Operation Anadyr*,⁵ a directive predelegating the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons had been prepared by the General Staff but, it was never signed by Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, likely reflecting Khrushchev’s unwillingness to predelegate the authority to launch to the local commanders.

Even though the directive was never signed, Malinovsky apparently remained apprehensive as to whether General Issa Pliev, commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba, understood the procedures for using tactical nuclear weap-

ons in a critical situation. On 27 October he sent an urgent telegram to Pliiev “categorically confirming that you are prohibited to use [tactical] nuclear weapons.” The cable might have been prompted by the shooting down of an American U-2 plane that day, despite the fact that Soviet commanders did not have the authority to do so.

According to the newly declassified Presidium materials, in anticipation of President Kennedy’s address to the nation on 22 October 1962, the Soviet leadership discussed the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons if the U.S. paratroopers landed on Cuba immediately after President Kennedy’s speech. Specifically, Malin notes Khrushchev saying “To give instructions to Pliiev—to bring the troops to combat readiness. To make every effort not to use atomic

of the military agreement with Moscow, which was supposed to be signed during Khrushchev’s visit to Cuba. Moscow was silent regarding the agreement. The discussions in the beginning of November in Moscow apparently came to no conclusion. The Malinovsky-to-Pliiev telegrams dated early November tentatively assumed that the tactical nuclear weapons would stay in Cuba.

On 8 November, Mikoyan sent a telegram to Moscow prompting Khrushchev to make a decision regarding the military agreement and suggesting his version of the solution—transferring the remaining weapons to the Cubans after the Soviet specialists trained them, and then gradually withdrawing most of the Soviet specialists so that the USSR could not be accused of having a military base in Cuba (Soviet official

[Among] the most interesting questions still remaining concerns Soviet intentions regarding the weapons not explicitly covered in the exchange of letters between US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

[weapons] in the early stages. If there is a landing [of U.S. forces]—tactical atomic weapons, and strategic—[wait] until instructions (excluding the use of the means of Statsenko’s equipment).

After Khrushchev’s decision to remove the strategic weapons from Cuba, the available cable traffic between “Reed” (Malinovsky) and “Pavlov” (Pliiev) reveals that there was considerable ambiguity regarding the withdrawal of the tactical nuclear warheads. At the beginning of November, Malinovsky suggested that warheads for cruise missiles, Lunas and the Il-28 bombs should be left in Cuba because “so far their withdrawal was not discussed.”⁶

The Cubans, of course, were very interested in the fate of the remaining military equipment and fully expected that those weapons that were not a part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange would remain in Cuba. This interest was expressed repeatedly in the Cuban leaders’ inquiries about the fate of the unsigned military agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba in the conversations with Mikoyan.

On 6 November, Mikoyan sent a long letter to the CPSU Central Committee summarizing his first conversations with the Cuban leaders.⁷ In that letter he described an episode during which Fidel Castro alleged that the Soviet Union had promised the Americans in the Khrushchev letters to “withdraw all weapons and all military specialists from Cuba,” to which Mikoyan replied, reassuring Fidel: “And you know that not only in these letters but today as well, we hold to the position that you will keep all the weapons with the exception of the offensive weapons and associated service personnel, which were promised to be withdrawn in Khrushchev’s letter.”⁸

Not fully reassured by Mikoyan’s clarifications, the Cubans kept pressing the Soviet representatives about the fate

policy at the time was to have no military bases on foreign soil). The telegram does not even mention the tactical nuclear weapons, and it is unclear whether Mikoyan included them with the “remaining weapons.”

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko responded to Mikoyan’s telegram approving his suggestion on the part of the Presidium. Between 6 November and 12 November, all available evidence indicates, tensions between the USSR and Cuba were declining, and Mikoyan’s conversations with the Cuban leaders were quite friendly and cordial. They visited state farms and educational centers and discussed various issues concerning Soviet-Cuban cooperation.

But on 12 November, the emerging fraternal bliss was shattered by the confrontation over the Soviet decision to withdraw the Il-28s. Although Mikoyan tried to be as sensitive as possible in framing the issue of withdrawal by seemingly asking for Cuban consent, the Cuban leader quickly realized the decision had already been made in Moscow.⁹

The Cuban reaction to the Soviet decision to withdraw the Il-28s was so openly negative—Castro even refused to meet with Mikoyan for several days—that it surprised and alarmed the Moscow leadership. In addition, on 15 November, Castro, while visiting his troops and without consultation with the Soviets, issued an order to shoot at any low-flying US reconnaissance aircraft. That move surprised the Kremlin, which at that moment was engaged in difficult negotiations with the United States over the conditions of withdrawal and inspections of weapons.

Khrushchev once again realized that he could not control his independent and emotional ally Fidel Castro, and that such an alliance, given the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on the island, could be downright dangerous. Castro’s order led to an unprecedented outburst of anger and irritation on the part of Khrushchev, who called the Cuban leader

“unreliable” and threatened to withdraw all of the Soviet forces from Cuba if Castro did not immediately correct his course.¹⁰

Khrushchev’s long telegram to Mikoyan on 16 November signified a turning point in the Soviet-Cuban story of crisis resolution. Although we will only know for sure when the Soviet Presidium minutes become available, one may hypothesize that the decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba was made between 15 November and 21 November. On 20 November, Malinovsky ordered Pliev to load all tactical nuclear weapons on the ship “Atkarsk” and return them to the Soviet Union. Gribkov stated at the October 2002 conference in Havana that the last nuclear warhead left Cuba on 20 November.¹¹

On 21 November, Mikoyan sent a telegram to Moscow, in which he concluded that all tactical nuclear weapons should be removed from Cuba. This telegram read in stark contrast to his telegram of 8 November. On 22 November, the CPSU Presidium issued instructions to Mikoyan in connection with the Cuban Foreign Ministry’s message to the Cuban representative at the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, that “we should keep the tactical nuclear weapons.” Mikoyan was instructed to make sure that the Cubans stop talking about any nuclear weapons and to inform them that “these weapons belong to us, and are to be kept in our hands only, we never transferred them to anyone, and we do not intend to transfer them to anyone. In addition, as we have told the Americans, all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba.”¹²

The issue reached its culmination during the meeting between Mikoyan and the Cuban leadership on the evening of 22 November, at which Mikoyan confronted the Cubans with the fact that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from Cuba even though they were not part of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. This unexpected turn of events was clearly hard for Castro to accept, but eventually he stopped trying to pressure Mikoyan into finding some way to keep those weapons, or even any significant Soviet military presence on the island. According to the available documents, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba was never raised again after 22 November.

Most likely, the decision to withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons resulted from “nuclear learning” on the part of the Soviet leadership. Although the Khrushchev initially intended to leave the tactical nuclear weapons along with the rest of the equipment not covered in the exchange of letters in Cuba, he soon began to appreciate the danger of an inadvertent nuclear conflict and some time in the second half of November 1962 Moscow apparently resolved to withdraw them. However, more evidence is still needed to be able to state conclusively when the final decision was made and what the main argument was for removing the tactical nuclear weapons.

The documents below became available as a result of international collaboration between the National Security Archive and the Russian scholars, military veterans of the Cuban missile crisis and archivists. For a more extensive look at the new Russian documentation on the Cuban Mis-

sile Crisis, consult the websites of the National Security Archive (<http://www.nsarchive.org>) and the Cold War International History Project (<http://cwihip.si.edu>) as well as the forthcoming book by Sergo A. Mikoyan.

Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya is director of Russian programs at the National Security Archive at The George Washington University.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 22 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV

In connection with the possible landing of Americans participating in the maneuvers in the Caribbean Sea on Cuba, undertake urgent measures to increase combat readiness, and to repel the enemy by joint efforts of the Cuban army and all units of the Soviet troops, excluding the weapons of Statsenko’s and of all Beloborodov’s cargo.

Director

#4/389

22 October 1962

23.30



DOCUMENT No. 2

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 23 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV

From 00 Moscow time on 24 October establish two-way radio connection on two directions on radio station R-

100. Also establish round-the-clock reception on the radio receiver “Volna-K” in radio network # 21 at the frequency 17.1 kHz.

Director
23 October



DOCUMENT No. 3

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 25 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV personally

In connection with the fact that US Navy is blockading approaches to Cuba, we made a decision not to send 665 and 668 RP [missile regiment] to you. You should not unload warheads for R-14 from transport ship “Alexandrovsk.” If they are already unloaded, organize secret loading back onto “Alexandrovsk.” Transport ship “Alexandrovsk” with the warheads for R-14 should be prepared for transportation back to the Soviet Union, accompanied by “Almetievsk.” Remove the cannons with the crews. Carefully instruct captain of the ship and head of the echelon about their conduct on their way and their actions in accordance with their instructions. In case of extreme situation they have to sink the ship.

Report on readiness of “Alexandrovsk” for departure.

Director
25 October

DOCUMENT No. 4

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 27 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV

Stop all work on deployment of R-12 and R-14—you are aggravating the United Nations. Camouflage everything carefully, work only at night.

Director
27 October



DOCUMENT No. 5

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 27 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK...to Comrade PAVLOV
to # 8/154

We categorically confirm that you are prohibited from using nuclear weapons from missiles, FKR [cruise missiles], “Luna” and aircraft without orders from Moscow.

Confirm receipt.

Director
76639
27 October 1962
16.30



DOCUMENT No. 6

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 27 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET

TROSTNIK to Comrade PAVLOV
to # 8/162

Send "Alexandrovsk" accompanied by steamship "Bratsk" to the Soviet Union.

Director
27 October



DOCUMENT No. 7

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 28 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET
TROSTNIK to Comrade PAVLOV

We believe that you were too hasty in shooting down the US U-2 reconnaissance plane; at the time an agreement was emerging to avert, by peaceful means, an attack on Cuba.

We have made the decision to dismantle the R-12s and remove them. Begin to implement this measure.

Confirm receipt.

Director

No. 76645
28 October 1962
16:00



DOCUMENT No. 8

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 28 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET
TROSTNIK to Comrade PAVLOV

In addition to the order not to use S-75s, you are ordered not to dispatch fighter aircraft in order to avoid collisions with US reconnaissance planes.

Director

No. 4/835
28 October 1962
18:30



DOCUMENT No. 9

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 30 October 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET
TROSTNIK comrade PAVLOV

Load warheads for R-12 on "Alexandrovsk" and send the transport accompanied by the ready ship to the Soviet Union.

Director
30 October



DOCUMENT No. 10

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), early November 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET
From TROSTNIK to Comrade PAVLOV

Weapons should be transferred to the Cubans after the training on the following timetable:

MSP – 3 to 4 months,
Air Defense and Naval – 8 to 10 months,
Air force – 8 to 10 months,
Missiles "Luna" and FKR with conventional loads will be probably left in Cuba.

Send your considerations.

Director
[early November 1962]



DOCUMENT No. 11
Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliiev), ca. 5 November 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

TOP SECRET
From TROSTNIK to comrade PAVLOV

With regard to warheads for “Luna,” FKR [cruise missiles] and IL-28 airplanes, so far their withdrawal has not been discussed. They should be left in Cuba under your command.

Director
76190/sh
[circa 5 November 1962]



DOCUMENT No. 12
Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 6 November 1962

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Special Declassification April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya and Andrea Hendrickson.]

TOP SECRET
Making Copies Prohibited

Copy No. 12
CIPHERED TELEGRAM

CC CPSU

It seems to me that it is now possible to go over some conclusions from the conversations I have had here. In connection with this I would like to cite a few characteristic mo-

ments.

Several hours before my arrival in Havana the Cuban leadership had decided that two representatives of the leadership would meet me at the airport, [Ernesto “Che”] Guevara and [Defense Minister] Raoul Castro. However, two hours before my arrival, upon receiving the text of my statement at the airport in New York in support of Cuba, their intentions changed and the entire leadership (except for the president) with Fidel Castro himself greeted me warmly and in a brotherly fashion. They all came with me to the residence and we conversed for about 15 minutes.

For the first conversation, Fidel received me in his private apartment. He went outside into the street and greeted me in front of the house where the car stopped and walked me to the upper floor. You received his statements, which he made in a calm, friendly tone, but in essence I could feel the acute dissatisfaction with our policy.

The next — second — meeting took place at the Presidential Palace. All six leaders participated in the conversation. Each time they met me in the corridors of the palace and accompanied me to the room where the discussions were held, and at the end of the discussions they all walked me to the car and we parted warmly. I was treated warmly everywhere.

During the conversations they acted calmly and listened attentively when I, in the course of several hours, tried to dispel their doubts, citing all possible arguments, one point after another, trying to prove that our policy was correct. They all listened to me with great attentiveness and took notes. I had the impression that I was speaking persuasively except for two moments, about which Fidel Castro posed questions during the conversation, expressing his dissatisfaction and his alarm.

1. The American radio and press have disseminated information that there is allegedly one section in the confidential letter from [Nikita] Khrushchev to [John F.] Kennedy from 26 October that cannot be published.

Apparently, that led him to entertain some suspicions.

Fidel asked whether there was another message from Khrushchev in addition to what had been given to him. I said that there was not. Fidel said: “If so, why would Kennedy, in his response from 27 October to Khrushchev’s 26 October letter already be mentioning the Soviet proposal to dismantle, and other things, although that was not directly mentioned in the confidential letter from Khrushchev from 26 October?” Apparently he suspects that there is another message from Khrushchev that was hidden from him, or a section of Khrushchev’s letter of 26 October that was not shown to him.

I explained that in his response from 27 October Kennedy formally responded only to the confidential letter of 26 October. However, in reality, he responded both to this one [26 October] and, mainly, to Khrushchev’s message from the 27th, which was openly transmitted on the radio, although Kennedy’s letter did not cite it directly. I said that all of the letters from Khrushchev to Kennedy, and everything that

was received from Kennedy confidentially, were given to Fidel. I participated in all the meetings and I know this very well, but if you want me to check again, then I will check all the documents I have with me and will add to my information tomorrow.

We checked everything carefully. After that, I said that actually there was one Kennedy letter, as we just found out, that did not make it to Fidel, but it does not have any serious meaning. It was his confidential letter from 25 October in response to the confidential letter of Khrushchev from the 23rd, the text of which he has. In that letter, Kennedy continues to insist that the Soviet people allegedly lied to the Americans by secretly delivering the missile systems to Cuba. We read the text of the second short letter.

All these explanations allayed their suspicions, and after that Fidel immediately spoke and one could see that he was satisfied and that this question no longer had significance for him.

2. I said further: we had our information that the Americans were on the verge of attacking Cuba, and we received a telegram from Fidel Castro with similar information from other sources that within the next 24 hours an attack was expected. Then we decided to tie Kennedy's hands before world public opinion, and to thwart the invasion of Cuba. Then comrade Khrushchev on 28 October made the open statement on the radio ordering the dismantling and removal of the missiles. Of course, under normal conditions the draft of Khrushchev's letter would have been coordinated with our Cuban friends, but that would have required encoding, decoding, and translating it — and the same regarding the reply. That would have taken so much time that normal consultations would not have had a chance to be completed; the invasion of Cuba could have occurred and Cuba could have perished.

We had no other choice but to solve the main problem—prevent the attack against Cuba, hoping that our Cuban friends would understand the correctness of such actions, even though the normal procedures of consultation were not observed.

We only had 24 hours before the invasion of Cuba. One has to take into account that we had just hours left, and we could not act in any way differently than we did. And we have the results. The attack on Cuba was prevented, peace was preserved. Although you are right that not everything regarding procedures of consultation was followed that would have been possible under normal conditions.

It seems as though this got through to them and they understood me. When I finished all of these explanations, Fidel on his part responded and gave his assessment of all the previous discussions and his own analysis in the following words:

“I would like to respond to Comrade Mikoyan.

“We listened to Comrade Mikoyan's statement and explanation with great attention. Undoubtedly, these explanations, which help us to better understand the developments, were very valuable. We are thankful for your desire to explain all these developments to us and for all your efforts in

this regard. We have no doubts about your arguments regarding the fact that strategic missiles, after they have been discovered by the enemy, as a practical matter lose all military significance — or their significance becomes extremely small.

“We thank you for all these explanations and we understand that the intentions of the Soviet government cannot be assessed only on the basis of an analysis of the most recent events, especially because circumstances change very quickly and new situations develop. In [our] analysis, we have to take into account all the decisions that have been made on the basis of which the strategic weapons were deployed to Cuba and the agreement was signed. We intended to publish the agreement after completion of the assembly of the strategic missiles and after the elections in the USA. These decisions are evidence of the firm decisiveness of the Soviet Union to defend Cuba. They allow one to understand the political line of the Soviet Union correctly. Therefore I repeat that the analysis of the Soviet position can be correct only if one takes account of all the events and decisions, both in the period preceding the crisis and during the crisis as well.

“We do not doubt that if all the work on the assembly of the strategic weapons had been completed under conditions of secrecy, then we would have had a powerful means of deterrence against the American plans to invade our country. In this way the goals which both the Soviet government and the government of the Republic of Cuba pursued would have been attained. We believe, however, that the deployment of the Soviet missiles on Cuba had significance for the interests of the entire Socialist camp. Even if one does not see this deployment as providing military superiority, it had political and psychological importance in the struggle to deter imperialism and to prevent it from carrying out its aggressive plans. Therefore the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not only in the interests of defending Cuba but of the Socialist camp. This was done with our full consent.

“We understood the importance of this step very well, and we believe that it was the right step.

“We fully agree that we should not allow the unleashing of war. We have nothing against [your statement] that the measures you undertook pursued two goals, namely not to permit an invasion of Cuba and to avoid unleashing a world war. We are in full agreement with these goals, which the Soviet Union pursued.

“A misunderstanding emerged regarding the form that discussion of this issue took. However we understand that circumstances demanded quick actions and the situation was not normal. Evaluating past occurrences, we came to the conclusion that we could have conducted consultations on these critical issues in another form. Here, for example, the issue we are now discussing. It relates to the effect my letter had on the Soviet government decision [to withdraw the missiles] and the making public of the Soviet government's letter of 28 October. It is true that my letter did not have any relation to the issues raised in the letters of 26 and 27 October exchanged between the Soviet government and the government of the USA. [My] letter pursued one goal — to inform

the Soviet government about the inevitability of an invasion of Cuba. In it we did not speak about the slightest vacillation on our part; we clearly announced our willingness to fight. In addition, we did not say that we expected an invasion. We wrote that although it was possible, it was less probable. More probable, in our opinion, was an air attack with the sole purpose of destroying the strategic weapons on Cuba. The basis of the Soviet government decision of 28 October was already laid out in the letter to Kennedy dated 26 October and was clearly outlined in the letter of N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy from 27 October. Those two documents contain the real basis of the decision, which was stated in the letter of 28 October. Thus, Kennedy's letter from 27 October meant his acceptance of Khrushchev's proposal from 26 October regarding his [Khrushchev's] consent to remove not only the strategic arms, but all the weapons if the United States would stop threatening Cuba with invasion. After all, this threat from the United States was the only reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When Kennedy accepted that proposal (we did not know that he had accepted it), conditions emerged for developing the Soviet proposals and preparing a declaration regarding the agreement of both sides. You could have told the United States that the USSR was prepared to dismantle the equipment but wanted to discuss it with the Cuban government. In our opinion, this is how the question should have been resolved instead of immediately giving instructions on the withdrawal of the strategic weapons. This approach would have allowed us to weaken international tension and would have given us an opportunity to discuss the issues with the Americans under more favorable conditions. This way, we could have reached not only a lessening of international tensions, and not only discussed this issue under better conditions, but also attained a signed declaration.

"However, this is only a simple analysis of preceding events, which does not have any special importance at the present time.

"Now it is important for us to know what to do in the new conditions. How are we going to try to attain our main goals and at the same time not permit the unleashing of aggression and fight for the preservation of peace? Of course, if with time we can ensure a really stable peace, then in light of these new facts we will be able better and more correctly to assess the importance of those steps that have already been taken. The results of our struggle in the future will speak about the importance of the events of today. Of course very little in this struggle will depend on us.

"We are very grateful for all the explanations that Comrade Mikoyan has given us, and for his efforts to make us understand the development of recent events. We take into account the special conditions under which it was necessary to act. We do not have any doubts about the friendly nature of our relations, which are based on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet Union is unshakable. We know that it respects our sovereignty and is prepared to defend us from aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore at present it is most important for us to define our future joint steps.

"I would like to assure you, Comrade Mikoyan, of our complete trust."

Upon listening to this, it became clear that in general things were going well and that the mood was changing for the better compared to what it had been at the beginning.

However even this statement had moments [points] that could not be left alone without new explanations. On my part, I expressed satisfaction with the progress of discussions and with the analysis of past events, and said that I have to make two comments, not with the purpose of prolonging the discussion about the past, but to bring some clarity.

First. It is not clear where our comrades got the understanding that the Soviet Union gave the Americans its consent to withdraw all weapons and all military specialists from Cuba, as if the Soviet Union gave its consent to that in Khrushchev's confidential letter of 26 October. If that were so, then the Americans would have stuck to that and it would have been mentioned both in Kennedy's statement published in the press and in the next letter from Khrushchev. But you know that both Kennedy and Khrushchev in all these statements spoke only about the so-called "offensive" weapons and the personnel supporting them. You simply misunderstood one phrase in Khrushchev's letter from 26 October where it speaks about the withdrawal of Soviet specialists. In this context Khrushchev had in mind not all specialists but, as it follows from the documents, only those who were involved with "offensive" weapons. And you know that not only in these letters but today also, we hold to the position that you will keep all the weapons with the exception of the "offensive" weapons and associated service personnel, which were promised to be withdrawn in Khrushchev's letter.

Fidel confirmed that this is correct.

Second. F. Castro's question about whether, instead of ordering the dismantling of strategic weapons we could have made a different decision—a legitimate question. However, we had information that an invasion on Cuba was to begin in the next several hours: it could be that they really intended to deliver an air strike against the positions of the strategic missiles first, but an invasion of Cuba would follow after that. We had to act decisively in order to thwart the plan of the invasion of Cuba. We understand that by doing that we had to sacrifice the opportunity for consultations with the Cuban government in order to save Cuba.

I did not think it necessary to comment again on Fidel's statement, in particular about the fact that the weapons deployed in Cuba had as their purpose the defense of the interests of the entire socialist camp. By that, he reiterated that he did not agree with my previous statement in response to his similar statement in which I said that these weapons were deployed not in the name of, and not for, the camp, and not for the Soviet Union. It was done only, exclusively, in the interests of defending revolutionary Cuba itself, which has international importance, great importance, for the entire socialist camp.

Then I turned to the issue of how necessary collaboration between the Soviet Union and Cuba, as between two

socialist countries, is. But in this case, we were talking about something more than that. We have to have an especially close collaboration due to the fact that Soviet weapons and Soviet military personnel are located in Cuba. Therefore our actions need to be coordinated. Even if we have differences of opinion we should strive for unity in our actions. Therefore I propose to work out a plan of joint coordinated actions without touching upon the past. I would like to hear what proposals our Cuban comrades have in this respect because we need to act together. This is how the issue stands now because our victory in preventing a military attack on Cuba should be confirmed by a diplomatic victory. Here we should show the necessary skill in diplomacy and policy while firmly defending our main goals.

The Americans are interested in prolonging the Cuban crisis. We are interested in its speediest resolution through negotiations between the interested sides and then through the Security Council. We are interested in finalizing everything with an international document that defends the interests of Cuba, and removing the blockade and the dangerous situation in the Caribbean basin.

Interim Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant, who obviously sympathizes with Cuba, can play a great, positive role. It would be good if the Cuban comrades helped U Thant so that he could have at his disposal enough arguments and information to make a statement in the Security Council, which would have approximately the following content: that he is convinced that the "offensive" weapons were dismantled and removed, and that thus the conditions for lifting the blockade and normalizing the situation have been created.

Regarding the dismantling, U Thant could cite the Americans' own statement that according to their air reconnaissance the dismantling has been completed, and therefore the need for aerial inspections of the dismantling has disappeared. Only one fact remains unconfirmed, which could be raised by our enemies; it is the fact of the loading and dispatching of these weapons on Soviet ships. I think that you could allow U Thant's neutral representatives to arrive by ship at a Cuban port and, without setting foot on Cuban territory, to observe the fact of the loading and dispatching of these weapons on Soviet ships. That would require 3-4 days and all the work would be completed in that time.

I also said that the earlier we resolve the issue of the withdrawal of these "offensive" weapons and the inspection of the fact of their withdrawal, the sooner the quarantine can be lifted, which is in Cuban interests in the first place. The Soviet Union will bear big losses because its ships are sitting at sea with shipments for Cuba, and they cannot proceed under the quarantine. We cannot tolerate these losses any longer, and we have to take joint measures to achieve the lifting of the quarantine; my proposal regarding inspection of ships in Cuban ports could facilitate matters. (I felt that we came to such an understanding that the Cubans would accept the proposal. Comrade Alekseev, who sat next to me, whispered in my ear that the Cubans will definitely accept it.)

I added: I am asking you not to give an answer to this

question now. We could interrupt our conversation and you could discuss it without us, and then we could meet again, continue our work and listen to your opinion.

Then suddenly Fidel, in a calm tone, made the following unexpected statement:

"A unilateral inspection would have a monstrous effect on the morale of our people. We have made large concessions. The American imperialists freely carry out aerial photography, and we do not prevent them from doing so because of a request by the Soviet government. We need to search for some other formula. I want to say to Comrade Mikoyan, and what I am telling you reflects the decision of our entire people: We will not agree to an inspection. We do not want to compromise the Soviet troops and risk peace throughout the world. If our position puts peace throughout the world at risk, then we would think it more correct to consider the Soviet side free of its obligations and we will resist by ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to defend our dignity ourselves."

I was not worried about his refusal to allow the inspections at the ports. I was shocked by the final part of his statement. Everyone was quiet for several minutes. I thought: how do I proceed with this matter?

I decided not to comment on this shocking statement. I thought that maybe it was something they had not thought through, or maybe they had discussed that as a possibility among themselves, and then he just blurted it out unexpectedly. After some thought, [Cuban President Osvaldo] Dorticos said that Fidel expressed their common opinion. The rest were silent.

I said I did not understand such a sharp reaction to my proposal. First of all, we were not talking about inspections of Cuba, either by air or land, which we had already discussed. We were talking about inspections on Soviet ships in Cuban waters, and ships are considered the territory of the state to which they belong. We were speaking about Soviet ships and therefore Soviet, not Cuban, territory. What this has to do with the infringement of Cuban sovereignty is impossible to understand. Finally, I do not have direct instructions from my government to present this proposal. I only did it hoping to make it easier for U Thant to support the Cuban cause in the UN and taking into account the favorable atmosphere that has developed in our conversations.

I repeated that our Central Committee instructed me to give thorough explanations of the Soviet position on all issues of interest to our Cuban comrades without imposing my opinion and without putting any pressure on you in order to obtain your consent for inspections of Cuban territory.

Fidel noted: why can we not carry out these inspections of the ships in neutral waters? I said that I believe, of course, it is possible, but that does not have any relationship to Cuba. He agreed.

Several hours later, in the meeting with Dorticos, Guevara, and [Carlos Rafael] Rodriguez, Dorticos stated: We have analyzed Comrade Mikoyan's latest proposal for loading the strategic missiles on the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our opinion is as follows: taking into account the need to

keep up the morale of our people and, in addition, wishing not to allow legal disputes regarding the issues of the extra-territorial location of the ships, we would like to give a final response to Comrade Mikoyan. We believe that it is impossible [for us] to accept this proposal. We have to reject it because we do not accept in principle inspections on Cuban territory, in our air space, or in our ports.

The statement that F. Castro blurted out was so unexpected that this formulation of the issues caught not only us but all of his friends unawares. It appears that the awkwardness of the situation touched even Castro himself.

Dorticos came to his rescue, suggesting we take a break from our work. How could one explain F. Castro's statement? We had the impression that he had not planned on saying this, but that it had slipped out.

Moreover, F. Castro's friendly attitude toward us and his desire to find a commonality of opinion with us about cooperation in the future did not give any reason even to imagine that such thoughts were in his head. After all he had already accepted in full sincerity that the removal of missiles from a military point of view would not weaken the defense of Cuba, and he expressed his interest in keeping our other powerful defense weapons in Cuba, expressing concern lest we remove certain other types of weapons from Cuba under pressure of the Americans.

One would like to believe, and most likely it is truly so, that the phrase Castro used was a result of his passing mood and his desire to show how important the issue of not allowing any kind of inspections is for the Cuban revolution, and that in order to preserve this principle they are prepared for anything.

One should not forget the complicated personal qualities of Castro's character, his acute sensitivity. While in power, he made many thoughtless statements caused by a fleeting impressionability [*vpechatlitel'nost'*] which he later regretted.

The provocative buzzing [*podzuzhivaniye*] of the American press to the effect that Castro has lost his independence, and that the Soviet people are in command in Cuba undoubtedly has had an influence on him.

The Embassy knows that Castro takes it hard when he reads the statements of reactionary agencies in which he is called a "puppet of the USSR." The North American press especially blows out of proportion the issue of inspections, alleging that Castro would have to retreat under our pressure, notwithstanding his categorical statements about the impermissibility of any form of inspections.

Castro probably believes that after his militant statements against inspections, accepting them in any form means compromising his position as a leader of the people of Cuba and Latin America, and that he could begin to lose prestige. We should not exclude the possibility that Castro actually suspects us of intending to put pressure on him on this issue, and that he decided to make such a statement in order once and for all to cut off any possibility of our doing so, as a way of emphasizing the inviolability of the principles that he defends.

In my opinion, we should not yet draw any conclusions based on only this one statement.

I will be able to get a better feel for his real mood and understand the direction of his thinking on this issue better in my future talks with him.

One should not forget that in the evening, when the conversation continued with Dorticos, Guevara, and Rodriguez, Dorticos mentioned at the very beginning of the conversation that Fidel Castro could not come because he felt unwell. It was clearly felt that they wanted to erase what had happened; they don't want us to take Fidel's outburst seriously. It is not a coincidence that the next day — today, 6 November — in the evening Guevara half-jokingly noted: "We Cubans are not Albanians, and we will not demand the liquidation of your military bases on Cuba." This was said after I responded to their question about what to do next with the known agreement about military aid by saying that as soon as we overcome the current crisis in the Caribbean we will discuss it in a calm atmosphere and hopefully will arrive at a decision coordinated in a brotherly fashion. All three confirmed their full agreement.

In addition, today in his conversation with [Aleksander] Alekseev, Rodriguez said that he had just met with F. Castro and told him about the most recent and, in his opinion, very warm and friendly conversations with me, about which Castro was very pleased.

Immediately after this Rodriguez expressed his regret regarding such an unpleasant end to our conversation of 5 November. Rodriguez did not say anything about F. Castro's opinion. However, the fact that he himself raised this issue speaks to the fact that the Cuban leaders, apparently, have discussed the situation that has been created and are now trying to repair it.

6.XI.62 A. Mikoyan

Example 39

Printed 8.XI.24

Issued by Shiryanev

Correct:

(signature)

Nikolaev Ezhov



DOCUMENT No. 13

Excerpt from Protocol No. 66 of Session of CC
CPSU Presidium, 16 November 1962

[Source: Personal Archive of Dr. Sergo A. Mikoyan.
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

About Instructions to Comrade A. I. Mikoyan

To approve the text of instructions to comrade A. I. Mikoyan (attachment – special folder).

CC Secretary
To paragraph 1 of protocol # 66

Extraordinary
Special folder

Havana
Soviet Ambassador
To comrade A. I. Mikoyan

We are sending you the confidential oral reply from [John F.] Kennedy to our oral confidential message.

From this letter, you can see that Kennedy has agreed to our assurance regarding the removal of the IL-28s with the crews and equipment. If we give Kennedy this assurance, then he will immediately lift the quarantine. From his letter, it is clear that he does not even demand that it be published, but, so to speak, is relying on a gentleman's agreement regarding the removal of the IL-28s over the period of, as he says, 30 days. Therefore, it seems like it would not be difficult to reach an agreement on this issue.

But this is not the main issue. The main issue is stopping the overflights of Cuba and [getting] confirmation of the non-invasion guarantees, which were given in Kennedy's letter of 27 and 28 October.

From Kennedy's letter, it is clear that currently he is holding us to our promises to remove offensive weapons and to our statement that with the consent of the Cuban government we agree to inspections by U.N. representatives of the removal of the weapons, which the Americans call offensive, from Cuba, on condition that the United States gives guarantees through the United Nations that it will not invade Cuba nor that it will allow such an invasion by other countries of the Western hemisphere.

We, to our regret, did not find any understanding on the part of the Cuban government of our efforts aimed at confirming the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba through the United Nations. Moreover, the Cuban government publicly announced that it does not agree with the steps we are trying to take in the negotiations that began in order to achieve confirmation through the United Nations of the U.S. obligations mentioned above in the interests of Cuba. Therefore, the necessary cooperation between us and the government of Cuba on this issue has not been established from the very beginning, and therefore the statements that we made in our letters look as if they have no basis, which Kennedy is exploiting as a pretext for refusing to confirm his pledge at the United Nations not to attack Cuba.

We, the Presidium of the Central Committee, in full quorum, discussed this issue fully, taking into account the last letter from Kennedy, and believe that the position of our friends on this issue cannot be considered rational. Living in a world that contains two antagonistic camps means that you cannot always rely only on weapons. Under certain

conditions one has to show significant flexibility, so that while relying on force, i.e. on weapons, one is still able to use diplomatic channels as well, when the situation demands that and when it is in our interests.

We believed and now believe that we accomplished a big favor for Cuba when we snatched the statement out of Kennedy about a non-invasion of Cuba. We believe that if our missiles and our weapons had not been deployed in Cuba, then Cuba would already have been invaded by the armed forces of the United States. The military maneuvers that were announced by Pentagon in October – that was precisely the announcement of the invasion of Cuba. Therefore, if our Cuban comrades are able to think that the missiles we deployed invited the U.S. threat to Cuba, then that is a big delusion.

We believe that Kennedy's proposal, and those proposals that were expressed by U Thant, created a good opportunity to resolve the difficulties in the issue of inspection over the withdrawal of our missiles. In particular, we had in mind U Thant's proposal to the effect that he and the U. N. officers accompanying him could be given an opportunity to visit the locations of dismantlement of our missiles and to make sure that they were being dismantled. That proposal was the most reasonable and the most appropriate for our side.

There was also the second proposal – for ambassadors of five Latin American countries represented in Cuba to visit the locations of dismantlement of the missiles as a tour.

How could Cuba's sovereignty suffer from this in any way? But they rejected [those proposals]. We simply do not understand that.

It was also suggested that representatives of nine neutral states Ghana, Guinea, UAR, Austria, Sweden, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil visited the locations of dismantlement. We had no objections against those countries, because we had no doubts in their good will toward Cuba. That proposal was also rejected.

All this creates a situation where we were denied an opportunity to cooperate with the Cuban government in this question in favor of Cuba, – not in our interest, but precisely in Cuba's interest.

Now the Cubans have taken the following step – they sent the protest against the overflights of the American aircraft over the Cuban territory to the Security Council. This is correct. But, at the same time, they issued a warning that if such flights continue, then American aircraft would be shot down. In the situation where the diplomatic contacts have been established and the negotiations are going on, of course, it is a step that does not encourage the fastest resolution of the conflict around Cuba.

The American aircraft, as is well known, fly over Cuba from the first days of the Revolution. Civilian planes also fly [over Cuba]. We have information that in this year and even in August and September American planes were flying over Cuba and that Cubans issued an order not to shoot down these planes; in any case, they did not open fire and did not shoot them down. The question arises, what does it mean to press such an ultimatum now, when the diplomatic negotia-

tions are going on [?]. If we raise such conditions, we would have to implement it, i.e. begin to shoot down the planes.

We believe that our people cannot participate in this, because, according to our deepest conviction, not all opportunities have been used for realization of mutual obligations of the sides, which arise from the exchange of correspondence with President Kennedy. To act in such a manner now would lead to a military conflict, and it could develop if one would follow such a course, —it could not be justified by anything and would have no grounds. This is our understanding of the situation, and this is our assessment of the position of our Cuban friends on the issue of American flights over Cuba.

All this puts us in a very difficult situation already, because there are our people [in Cuba] servicing these weapons. Of course, they will believe that these weapons would have to be used. But we cannot give an order to our people to use those weapons, because to give such an order would mean to start pulling ourselves into a war. And we do not want that and we consider it irrational.

In addition, we believe—and this is very important—that, even if they opened fire against the American aircraft, and we would regret if such a development occurred, if that would have been done, that fire would not be effective. It would not result in a real strengthening of Cuban security by military means. But it could cause an onset of U.S. military actions against Cuba. And it is a fact that the United States possesses military capabilities which exceed the capabilities that Cuba has now many times, even though now it is much better armed than it was before. Therefore, to open fire against the American aircraft would be an irrational act, which would give the most notorious reactionary forces in America an opportunity to press Kennedy toward the extreme militaristic positions. They, those forces, do exactly that—they put pressure on Kennedy and use the opportunities that the Cuban comrades' current position creates for them.

We have done and are doing everything possible in order to shield Cuba from intervention and to arm Cuba. We undertook a great risk, and we knew that we were taking a great risk, because a danger of unleashing the thermo-nuclear war really did emerge at the most intense moment. Now with our diplomatic actions we have rapidly brought down this tension and put the negotiations of the two sides that are involved in the conflict in diplomatic channels under such conditions that present for both sides the mutually beneficial resolution of the situation. All this is being done primarily for Cuba and not for us. However, it looks like Cuba does not want to cooperate with us. Cuba, which now does not want to even consult with us, wants practically to drag us behind itself by a leash, and wants to pull us into a war with America by its actions. We cannot and will not agree to this. We will not do it, because we see the conditions that were created with our efforts and that allow us to resolve the issue of Cuban security without war, the issue of non-invasion guarantees.

If the Cuban comrades do not want to cooperate with us on this issue and do not want to undertake measures which

would help us resolve this issue and avoid being pulled into a war together with us, then apparently the conclusion that we see is that our presence in Cuba is not helpful for our friends now. Then let them state that openly, and we will have to make conclusions for ourselves. If our Cuban comrades undertake measures that in their opinion protect their interests — it is their right. But then we have to raise the issue with them that we would be forced to remove from ourselves all responsibility for the consequences to which their steps might lead them. If they do not take our arguments into account, then it is clear that our side cannot bear responsibility for it.

We regret it, and we regret it very much, but we will have to state the following—because our advice is not being taken into account, we disclaim any responsibility, because we cannot be attached by force to those actions which we consider irrational. In such a case, let the Cuban comrades bear full responsibility for the situation and for the possible consequences.

What should be the conclusion and what would be the next step, if of course the Cuban comrades would agree to take rational steps?

We believe, as we have already informed you, that we can give an oral assurance to President Kennedy that we are going to withdraw the IL-28s from Cuba under the condition that the President promises to lift the quarantine immediately, which he expressed willingness to do.

The issue of non-intervention guarantees is more complicated now. As you can see from Kennedy's latest confidential letter, he ties this question to the realization of our promises regarding inspections. Therefore, the question of lifting the quarantine and our obligation to withdraw the IL-28s is not the main question now, but realistically only an interim condition for the solution of the main issue, because of which essentially, as the Russians say, the whole mess had developed in the first place, is to squeeze out of the United States and to affirm through the United Nations an assurance of non-invasion of Cuba. The United States, of course, got into a difficult situation, taking into account the fact that they for many years after the revolution in Cuba had made statements that they could not tolerate a state of a different socio-political system in the Western Hemisphere. Now, as it clearly follows from the President's letters of October 27 and 28, they, i.e. the United States, stated exactly the opposite, namely: the United States agreed to tolerate a state of a different socio-economic system and is willing to undertake an obligation not to intervene in Cuba and to deter other countries of Western Hemisphere from intervention, if we withdraw the weapons, that President Kennedy characterized as offensive, from Cuba.

Our understanding is that all this means a significant important step in the interest of Cuba, in the interest of its independent development as a sovereign socialist state. Unfortunately, the Cuban comrades do not understand that. Now the Cubans by their stubbornness and, I would say, by their certain arrogance which shows in their statements about sovereignty, help the most extreme reactionary forces of the

United States to reject the obligations stated in Kennedy's letters and help those forces to put pressure on Kennedy, so that he would be forced to disavow those obligations with a long-term target [in mind] – to ultimately embark on a military invasion of Cuba.

It is clear that this would only be in the interests of the enemies of the Cuban revolution.

Therefore, we believe that the Cuban comrades should gather their courage and reconsider their position in this issue. They should choose one of the options, which are presented to them: either U Thant's representatives, or ambassadors from five Latin American countries, or representatives of nine neutral countries. If they do not accept these proposals, the United States will be the only winner, and they will score this victory only because we could not rationally use [the bargaining chips] which we were able to obtain during the period of the most critical tension in our relations, when we were on the brink of war.

We consider it incorrect to open fire against the American aircraft in the present situation. If I was to use imaginative language, now after the tension has subsided, a certain type of truth emerged, when none of the sides opens fire. The Americans are flying over Cuba, but they were flying there before. To open fire against the U.S. aircraft now would mean to reject the diplomatic channels and to rely only on weapons, i.e. to make a choice of possibly unleashing a war.

We believe that this is irrational, and we will not participate in it. We are negotiating with the Americans. We want to cooperate with Cuba, and if Cuba wants to cooperate with us for its own benefit, – we will be happy. But if Cuba does not want to cooperate with us, then obviously our participation in the resolution of the Cuban conflict would not bring any benefit. In such a case, we would have to find out the opinion of the Cuban leadership and after that discuss the new situation, so that we could make appropriate conclusions for ourselves regarding our people who are presently in Cuba. Frankly speaking, we have deepest regrets that at the time when on our part we are making all efforts to use every opportunity with the purpose of achieving a confirmation of U.S. obligations not to intervene in Cuba through the United Nations, our Cuban friends do not exhibit any desire to cooperate with us in this cause.

We do not believe that the Cubans would want to allow war, and if they do not want that, then it would be irrational to deny us and themselves an opportunity to quickly remove the remaining elements of conflicts on the conditions of the obligations that were already undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States in their correspondence.

You should personally think it over once again, because you know the situation and the personalities of the people with whom you are going to talk. You need to bring our thoughts and our wishes to their comprehension. Let them respond to you and let them take the responsibility upon themselves. If they do not want to cooperate with us, then obviously the conclusion is clear that they want to take all responsibility upon themselves. It is their right—they are a government and they are responsible for their country, for

their policy, but then they should not involve us in their business. If they do not want our cooperation, we cannot follow their policy, which in addition is irrational in this issue.

In order to give Kennedy a response on this issue, we would like to know your opinion.

At this point we do not know yet how the events will develop, but obviously if the negotiations get prolonged, then the Americans will complicate the whole issue more and more. They have such an opportunity, because they have a more favorable strategic and geographic situation. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, they could stall, and they do not suffer and do not lose anything from the prolongation of this conflict. But the losers here first of all would be Cuba and us, both in a material respect and in the political and moral sense.

The President raises the issue regarding some guarantees for the future in regard to the issue of sending the so-called offensive weapons to Cuba. He even says that it allegedly follows from our correspondence that we undertook an obligation regarding inspections in the future with a purpose of not allowing further shipments of such weapons to Cuba. By the way, we have not undertaken such an obligation in our correspondence, although in Kennedy's letters that question had been raised. Presenting everything in such a light as if there existed a mutual agreement on that issue, Kennedy, of course, exaggerates. However, it follows that by doing it, he is trying to get the highest possible price from us for his confirmation through the U.N. of the pledge not to invade Cuba. This also complicates the issue.

Now to the question of U.N. posts. Earlier we presented this position to you and now we repeat that the idea of creating of such posts, as means of preventing an unexpected attack, seems reasonable. Kennedy apparently is consciously trying to link our proposals on that issue, which we made during consideration of arms control issues, to Cuba. He even puts the question in such a way: that creation of U.N. posts in the region of the Caribbean Sea, including the corresponding area of the United States, allegedly requires organization of such posts in the Soviet Union as well. Of course, it is not difficult for us to explain that our proposals regarding the posts were made at the time when negotiations on the issue of general and full disarmament were conducted in London and later during the negotiations in Geneva on prevention of surprise attacks. Therefore, those proposals concerning with the ports of the Soviet Union do not have and cannot have any relationship to Cuba, because at the time when they were made no Cuban issue had existed. We are hoping that Kennedy will understand the inappropriateness of raising the issue about the U.N. posts in the territory of the Soviet Union in connection with the Cuban issue and would not insist on that.

Now we are moving toward the Plenum. We have already informed you of our opinion, and we are now even more convinced that we made the right choice when we recommended that you should stay longer in Cuba, even while we understood that your long stay there is beginning to outgrow the framework of necessity. As you have probably

noted, the Americans are already saying that apparently the difficulties in our relations with the Cubans are so substantial that Mikoyan has to stay in Cuba for a long time and cannot leave yet. We even admit that it might be possible that the Cubans are beginning to feel certain awkwardness as a result of your prolonged stay in Cuba.

In short, we obviously have to reach an agreement now: if there is no hope for Cuban cooperation, then probably you will have to leave Cuba. But then we will say that since our Cuban friends do not need our cooperation, we have to draw appropriate conclusions from all this, and we will not impose ourselves.

In any case, we believe today that the decision about your trip to Cuba was correct, and your stay there was useful. Now, when you have these important and serious conversations with the Cuban friends, we would like you to take all the circumstances into account and to test the grounds regarding your further stay in Cuba. If you feel that the Cubans are not inconvenienced by your further presence, it would probably be useful for you to stay there longer. Your presence in Cuba represents, one can say, a deterrent factor both for the United States and for the Cubans.

N. Khrushchev
12-yav, ll



DOCUMENT No. 14

Telegram TROSTNIK (REED—USSR Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky) to PAVLOV (Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba General Isa Pliev), 20 November 1962

[Source: *Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.*]

TOP SECRET

From TROSTNIK to comrade PAVLOV

Missiles with conventional loads for “Luna” and FKR [cruise missiles] should be left in Cuba. Send 6 nuclear bombs, 12 warheads for “Luna” and 80 warheads for FKR to the Soviet Union on steamship “Atkarsk.”

Director
November 20

NOTES

¹ See Raymond L. Garthoff, “New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev Nuclear Weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis” in *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 11, Winter 1998, pp. 251-262

² “The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: 40th Anniversary Conference” Havana, Cuba, 11-13 October 2002, co-sponsored by the National Security Archive at George Washington University in partnership with Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Affairs and Cuban institutions. The conference was the latest in a series of critical oral history meetings on the Cuban Missile Crisis and generated worldwide headlines by gathering U.S., Russian and Cuban veterans of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis for two days of discussions in Havana on October 11-12, 2002, followed by a tour of the last surviving remnants of the missile emplacements on the island. Cuban President Fidel Castro hosted the 40th anniversary conference and participated fully in both days’ deliberations.

³ See Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Tactical Weapons Disclosure Stuns Gathering,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 2-4

⁴ *Editor’s Note*: Certain portions of the “Malin Notes” have been published recently in Moscow: *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964: Chernovye zapisi zasedanii, stenogrammy*, ed. Aleksandr A. Fursenko (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003). See also Mark Kramer, “The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956,” *CWIHP Bulletin* No. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 385-410.

⁵ Operation “Anadyr,” as the operation for transporting Soviet military personnel and equipment was codenamed, was given its name to disguise the actual final destination of the cargo. Anadyr is a river in north-eastern Russia, and military personnel assigned to the operation were issued winter uniforms to create an impression of an operation that would take place in the northern regions. See Anatoly Gribkov and William Y. Smith. *Operation Anadyr: US and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Chicago: edition q, 1994).

⁶ Telegram from Malinovsky to Pliev, published in *On the Brink of Nuclear Precipice*. (Moscow: Gregory-Page, 1998), p. 365. The author thanks Jim Hershberg and Raymond Garthoff for locating and supplying this manuscript.

⁷ See Vladislav M. Zubok, “Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union: Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban Leadership, November 1962.” in *CWIHP Bulletin*, Issue 5, Spring 1995, pp. 59-77.

⁸ Mikoyan’s telegram to Politburo, 6 November 1962, Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002.

⁹ See Memorandum of conversation between Castro and Mikoyan, published in *Operation Anadyr*.

¹⁰ Khrushchev’s telegram to Mikoyan, 16 November 1962, printed below.

¹¹ Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali note the same uncertainty regarding when the weapons were actually withdrawn in their book *One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

¹² Presidium Instructions to Mikoyan in Cuba, 22 November 1962. Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation, Special Declassification, April 2002.

CONFERENCE REPORTS, RESEARCH NOTES AND ARCHIVE UPDATES

Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference

By Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok

In the summer of 1999 the National Security Archive at the George Washington University, in cooperation with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), launched a new initiative, “Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War.” The main goal of the project was to explore the archives in Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku to determine to what extent Cold War era documents, including materials still classified in the central archives in Moscow, would be accessible there. The Caucasus Initiative also aimed at bringing scholars from these three republics into the larger international network of Cold War scholars and at incorporating the results of the regional scholars’ research into the wider canvas of historiography of Cold War and Soviet history. The first meeting of scholars from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the United States took place in Tbilisi in October 2000.¹ The workshop was one of the first meetings between Armenian and Azeri historians after the years of war and alienation that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. It demonstrated that scholars from the three countries were greatly interested in exchanging research results and archival information among themselves and with their Western colleagues. After some discussion, the participants agreed on the agenda for a future conference.

This next meeting took place on 8-9 July 2002 in the Tsinandali Conference Center at the foot of the Big Caucasus Range in the Kakhety Valley in Georgia. Seventeen scholars participated in the conference, including *Laura Abbasova* (Baku State University), *Levan Avalishvili* (Tbilisi State University), *Jamil Hasanli* (Baku State University), *Eldar Ismailov* (Baku State University), *Georgi Kldiashvili* (Tbilisi State University), *Marziya Mammadova* (Baku State University), *Georgy Mamulia* (Black Sea University), *Eduard Melkonian* (Institute of General History, Armenia), *Karen Khachatryan* (Institute of General History of Armenia), *Ketevan Rostiashvili* (Tbilisi University), *Ronald G. Suny* (University of Chicago), *Francoise Thom* (Sorbonne University), *Amatun Virabian* (Archival Department of the Republic of Armenia), and *Andrei Zubov* (Institute of International Relations, Moscow).

The most archive-intensive and potentially significant part of the conference focused on the relationship between local nationalist aspirations and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s plans at the end of World War II. *Jamil Hasanli* presented a paper based on his extensive research on Soviet policies in

Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945-1946. The archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan contain a detailed and apparently complete set of documentation on the implementation of Stalin’s plans to extend Soviet influence and to acquire oil in northern Iran. The documents demonstrate how Stalin worked to achieve his expansionist goals by exploiting the nationalist feelings of Azeris living on both sides of the Soviet-Iranian border.²

Throughout the Soviet occupation of Iran (1941-1946), as *Hasanli*’s research shows, there was an unresolved ambiguity, perhaps even tension, between Stalin’s strategic goals in Iran and the Azeris’ nationalist agenda. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Mir Jafar Bagirov said in his instructions to a team of Soviet officials leaving for northern Iran in 1941: “By fulfilling your task, you will do a great service to the people of Azerbaijan. By implementing this honorable task, you will satisfy the desire of brothers divided for centuries.” Most Soviet officials thought that support for the Iranian Azeri minority had to be placed at the center of Soviet policies. Stalin, however, equivocated. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 officials, only 600 men were commandeered from Soviet Azerbaijan into Iran in 1941-1942. Soviet occupation authorities also sought support from much smaller Kurdish, Armenian, and even Georgian minorities in northern Iran, possibly to counterbalance Azeri influence there.

After he proclaimed the reunification of Ukraine and Belarus in May 1945, Stalin found it expedient to respond positively to national expectations in the Southern Caucasus. Moscow urgently instructed the commissar of foreign affairs of Soviet Azerbaijan to prepare a memorandum about northern (Soviet) and southern (Iranian) Azerbaijan, demonstrating that they were historically and culturally identical. The memorandum was to emphasize that it was an opportune moment for the “liberation” of southern Azerbaijan. On 21 June and 6 July 1945 Stalin’s Politburo secretly ordered the exploration of oil fields in northern Iran and, simultaneously, the creation of separatist regimes in that area based on the Kurdish and Azeri nationalist movements. In Moscow, the troika of Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrenty Beria, and Georgi Malenkov was responsible for the implementation of these plans. Stalin met with Bagirov, a close friend and protégé of Beria, and personally instructed him to take charge of both operations.³

By December 1945, the newly founded Democratic Party

of Azerbaijan (ADP) claimed political control over the ethnically Azeri territories in northern Iran. In combination with Stalin's refusal to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran, this effort unleashed one of the first international crises of the Cold War. Pressed by the United States and the United Nations, Stalin pulled his troops out of Iran in 1946. Subsequent events showed that the Soviet leader coldly sacrificed ADP leaders, Kurdish separatists, and other nationalist activists had cast their lot in with the Soviets. While *Hasanli* persuasively argued that Soviet goals in Iran were a combination of economic (oil) and security interests, the importance of regional nationalist aims during the crisis should not be discounted. Even today some scholars in Azerbaijan see the outcome of the Iranian crisis as a setback for their republic.

In her paper *Laura Abbasova* looked at another crisis that contributed to the rise of the Cold War: Soviet territorial claims on Turkey in 1945-1946, which eventually jolted Washington into action. Relying on archival evidence from Baku, as well as documents provided by other participants at the October 2000 workshop, *Abbasova* found, much to her surprise, that, behind the edifice of Soviet foreign policy, another "cold war" was being fought among the leaderships of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Soviet demands on Turkey revived the aspirations of Armenians, who remembered vividly their forced exodus from Turkish territories where they had lived for centuries. But the Soviet claims also intersected with the demands of the Georgian leadership to 'reclaim the historic lands' populated by the Laz in Trabzon along the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea. Authorized by Moscow (where Georgians were prominently represented in the Soviet leadership), Georgian historians *Dzhanashia* and *N. Berdzenishvili* published an article in December 1945 providing the historical and cultural justification for annexation of Trabzon. Their main rivals were the Armenians who argued that, out of 26,000 square kilometers (sq. km.) of the claimed Turkish territories, 20,500 sq.km. should be incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In response, Georgian Commissar of Foreign Affairs *Kiknadze* sent a memorandum to Moscow with a proposal to re-distribute the Turkish territories differently: while Armenia would receive only 12,760 sq.km., Georgia's share would grow to 13,190 sq.km. *Abbasova* wondered how such conflicting demands could emerge in Stalin's "totalitarian regime," and to what extent they were the product of local nationalism or inspired by Moscow.

Karen Khachatrian presented new archival material on the Turkish crisis of 1945-1946 from an Armenian perspective. Earlier in Soviet history, *Khachatrian* stressed, the Soviet government had neglected Armenian national interests and made territorial concessions to Turkey and to the pro-Bolshevik forces in Azerbaijan. Moscow's denunciation of the Soviet-Turkish Treaty on 19 March 1945 produced great enthusiasm among Armenians all over the world. The files of the Foreign Ministry of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in Yerevan contain appeals and letters from the Armenian émigré communities around the world, including those in the United States, appealing to "great Stalin" and demand-

ing "justice." *Khachatrian* found that the leadership of Soviet Armenia became an intermediary between the voices of the Armenian diaspora and the central government in Moscow. The secretary of the Armenian Communist Party, *Gregory Arutyunyan*, repeatedly wrote to Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister *Molotov* encouraging them to include the issue of returning the "Armenian historical lands" in the negotiations with the allies about the post-war settlement. Stalin seemed sympathetic, and, in connection with his plans for Turkey, authorized a global campaign for the repatriation of Armenians émigrés to Soviet Armenia. The number of repatriates quickly exceeded Soviet expectations and Armenia's modest resources. Very soon the republic was flooded with hundreds of thousands of people; the authorities needed additional resources to house, feed, and "re-educate" the newly-arrived.

As *Khachatrian's* research shows, by 1948 the problem of Armenian repatriates caught Stalin's attention. Soviet pressure on Turkey had failed to produce any territorial concessions and led Ankara to seek US protection. Many repatriates languished in Soviet Armenia in the less-than-comfortable conditions and began to think of returning home. Gradually, the repatriates turned from a diplomatic asset in Stalin's game into an economic burden and, for the paranoid Soviet leader, a growing security threat. There were signals to Stalin from both Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders warning that "a greater Armenia" might develop separatist plans and that Armenians should not be trusted. Soon the repatriates were resettled away from the state borders (see *Document No. 1*). On 14 September 1948, Stalin, then at his dacha on the Black Sea, sent a cable to *Georgy Malenkov*, instructing him to look into the case of a fire on board a Soviet ship bringing a group of Armenian repatriates to the Georgian port of *Batumi*. Stalin's suspicions that British-American agents were among the repatriates triggered snowballing investigations and repressions that resulted in the halt of Armenian repatriation and the exiling of thousands of repatriates into settlements and camps in Kazakhstan.

In his paper, *Eduard Melkonian* looked at the Armenian repatriation and demands in 1945-48 from the perspective of the "Spyurk," the Armenian diaspora. Based largely on Western archival sources, *Melkonian's* presentation traced the sources of the split among the Armenians abroad between the anti-Communist *Dashnaktsutyun* faction and the *Rankavar* faction, which had reconciled itself to the incorporation of Armenia into the Soviet Union. During the 1920s and early 1930s the *Rankavar* Armenians and the network of charity organizations, one of which was chaired by *Kallust Gulbenkyan*, helped Soviet Armenia, but the repression of the 1930s ended this assistance. After the end of World War II the Armenian community in the United States began to lobby for the revival of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) that had granted a considerable part of Anatolia to the Armenian state. As the Truman administration adopted the policy of containment, Armenian demands clashed with American strategic interests. At a crucial meeting with representatives of the Armenian community, Under Secretary of State *Dean Acheson*

asked whether they realized they were in effect supporting annexation of Turkish lands by the Soviet Union.⁴ The Armenians left the meeting in dismay, realizing that their hopes were not to be fulfilled. As the rivalry between the United States and the USSR grew, both great powers used the Armenian Diaspora as a tool to promote their influence in the Middle East.

Georgy Mamulia presented Georgian findings and perspectives on the thorny issue of territorial claims and ethnic

and hatred between troops in the Trans-Caucasian military district and the local population as well as incidents of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet outbursts. According to *Francoise Thom*, Stalin's expansionist policies further stimulated ethnic passions and rivalries. As a result, the Soviet leadership faced considerable internal problems as it sought to expand Soviet influence abroad.

Other presentations and discussions at the conference dealt with the domestic politics, ideology, culture and per-

The participants, many for the first time, were able to transcend the boundaries of narrow “national projects” that have dominated historiography in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

politics behind the façade of the Turkish and Iranian crises. He described how a small Georgian minority in Iran, the Fereidans, were caught in the pressures and counter-pressures of the rising Cold War. In 1945 this compact ethnic community, along with other ethnic minorities that populated northern Iran, came to Moscow's attention as a possible instrument for fomenting unrest in Iranian domestic politics. *Mamulia* discovered differences between Tbilisi and Moscow in their position towards the Fereidans; while the Georgian leadership wanted to repatriate the Fereidans to Georgia, Moscow clearly preferred to keep them in Iran. The future of the Fereidan Georgians was sealed only after Stalin realized that his plans to obtain influence in northern Iran were foiled by both Iranian intransigence and US pressure.

Mamulia's paper also focused on other pawns of the rising Cold War tensions—the Meskhety Turks and other minorities that moved to Georgia after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's drift to the West resulted in a campaign against potential “Turkish agents” and massive ethnic cleansing of Turkic elements in the Soviet borderlands (*Document No. 2*). On orders from Stalin, the Georgian Interior Ministry carried out “Operation Volna” (Wave) in 1949: 36,705 Meskhety Turks, Greeks, and repatriated Armenians were exiled into Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics.

In the discussion of these findings, the participants, many for the first time, were able to transcend the boundaries of narrow “national projects” that have dominated historiography in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for decades. In his comments *Ronald Suny* pointed out that, in a broader historical perspective, the Armenian territorial demands were more serious and far-reaching than Azeri and Georgian demands which seemed to be inspired largely by Moscow and by educated, local elites. The Armenian repatriation offered more potential, but also greater risks for the Soviet regime. Other participants pointed to the Soviet secret police documents from the Georgian, Armenian, and Azeri archives that reflect the strong inter-ethnic tensions in South Caucasus at the end of World War II, which extended into later periods (*Document No. 3*). Contrary to the myths about “one Soviet people,” these documents capture many cases of conflict

personalities in the republics of the Southern Caucasus during the Cold War. *Thom* presented a richly researched paper on the role of Lavrenty Beria and the significance of the “Mingrelian Affair” (1951-1953). In addition to archival research in Moscow, Tbilisi and Paris, she also interviewed veterans of the Menshevik Georgian émigré community in France. Traditionally, the “Mingrelian Affair” was held to be primarily about rampant corruption in Georgia involving Mingrelians, an economically active minority in Georgia, many of them connected to Beria. But, as *Thom's* paper demonstrated, the “Mingrelian Affair” was a multi-layered phenomenon, and the fight against corruption was not its most important dimension. The “Mingrelian Affair” gained prominence due to Stalin's growing mistrust of several of his lieutenants (Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgy Malenkov, Anastas Mikoyan), who had come to power after the purges and had consolidated their positions during the World War II. To his immense irritation, Stalin found that they had developed solidarity and collective survival tactics that fended off Stalin's attempts to eliminate any one of them. Most ambitious and influential within this group was Beria, an ethnic Mingrelian.

Thom discovered heretofore unknown facets of the “Mingrelian Affair.” One was the “Gegechkori case.” E. P. Gegechkori was a prominent leader of the Menshevik Georgian government-in-exile based in Paris, which was heavily penetrated by Soviet intelligence. He was also father of Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. Stalin knew and tolerated these circumstances, considering them a political vulnerability that could be used against Beria, if need be, in the future. With Stalin's consent and permission, Beria ran all contacts with the Menshevik exiles in Paris through his personal intelligence network. But when international tensions mounted after the beginning of the Korean War, Stalin grew suspicions of Beria's special ties to the Georgian exiles and decided to cut them. The affair contributed, as *Thom* demonstrated, to Stalin's growing irritation at his powerful lieutenant.

Eldar Ismailov provided a political profile of a crucial player in the southern Caucasus, Mir Jafar Bagirov of

Azerbaijan. Considering his central role in 1945-46, it was fascinating to learn how Bagirov managed to survive the failure of Stalin's gamble in northern Iran. Besides his friendship with Beria, the key to Bagirov's survival was the fact that he was the first ethnic Azeri to hold the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Historically and culturally, the population of Azerbaijan was a potentially explosive ethnic mix. Moreover, because of its oil, the republic was also of special strategic significance to the Soviet Union. *Ismailov* portrayed Bagirov as a man of limited education, but with great acumen and political instincts. New tensions over Iran and Turkey could have presented a threat to Bagirov's position. Stalin's ever suspicious plot-seeking mind could have conceivably turned against leaders of Turkic ethnic origins, as Turkey came to be seen as a possible base for infiltration of Azerbaijan. Bagirov understood this danger well and pre-emptively decided to lead the campaign to denounce pan-Turkic tendencies. In 1949 he launched a campaign to denounce Imam Shamil, the leader of the anti-Russian independence movement in the Caucasus in 1840s and 1850s. According to documents found by *Ismailov* in the Baku archives, during the Azeri leader's meetings with Stalin, Bagirov proposed that the history of Islamic peoples living on Soviet territory be rewritten. Subsequently, Bagirov moved to eradicate Turkic cultural ties among Azeri educated elites and stressed an "Azerbaijani identity" quite distinct from a pan-Turkic identity. In the context of the propagandist preparations of the early Cold War, Stalin could not have but appreciated Bagirov's efforts to create anti-Turkish sentiments in Azerbaijan.

To pre-empt Stalin's potential suspicions, Bagirov also unleashed massive repression against those party members who had any connections with Iran or Turkey—having relatives in those countries or even having visited them was considered sufficient grounds for a person to be forcibly relocated away from the border areas to other regions of the country. Finally, Bagirov proposed to Stalin that veterans of the ADP and other separatist movements, who after 1946 had found refuge in Baku, should be relocated to Siberia or Kazakhstan.

Georgy Kldiashvili and *Levan Avalishvili*, two young historians from Georgia, examined Georgia's role in the USSR's military preparations during the Cold War. Chronologically this paper was broad, covering the period from 1946 through the 1970s. During the early phase of the Cold War, particularly when tensions between the USSR and Turkey remained high, military installations were constructed in Georgia on a significant scale. The paper did not provide any conclusive evidence on war preparations against Turkey. Much more significant was the material on the readiness of Georgia for a possible aerial attack and atomic warfare. As Georgian archival documents show, the republic did not have a functioning civil defense system in 1950. A spate of measures intended to correct this situation were planned for 1951-1952. But the Georgian authorities failed to implement the plans for aerial and atomic defense after Stalin's death, and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis caught them totally unprepared. Beginning in

1963 new allocations of funds and prodding from Moscow forced Georgian leaders to address their previous slacking and neglect. For instance, construction of a communication center for "special conditions" (i.e., war), planned as early as 1958, finally began in 1963. This haphazard approach, as the available documents suggest, continued until the end of the Soviet Union.

What happened to a considerable part of the military construction allocations in Georgia can be deduced from the paper of *Ketevan Rostiashvili* on the growing corruption in the republic. By the end of the 1960s, the Georgian economy was choked by corruption. *Rostiashvili* estimated that 50-60 percent, perhaps as much as 70 percent of the Georgian economy moved into the "gray" or black market. Official reports of the Union ministries (including the USSR Ministry of Finance) acknowledged, for example, that 72 million kilowatts of electric power had been stolen. But efforts to check corruption, most significantly the campaign spearheaded by the head of the Georgian KGB, Eduard Shevardnadze, only led to a mushrooming of the controlling agencies. The number of "people's controllers" in Georgia reached the grotesque figure of two hundred thousand people. There were 10,000 to 12,000 "inspections" annually that achieved no results and only kept increasing the amount of paperwork. *Rostiashvili* concluded that corruption and inefficiency seriously undermined mobilization and military-construction efforts in this strategically-exposed republic. These conclusions remain relevant, as the independent Republic of Georgia remains mired in all-pervasive corruption, until recently ironically under the leadership of the same Eduard Shevardnadze.

Another highlight of the conference was the discussion on the state of the archives and prospects for new archival discoveries. Participants emphasized the special significance of the personal "funds" (collections) of M.J. Bagirov in Azerbaijan as well as "special dossiers" in the Armenian State Archives. The head of the Armenian Archival Service, *Amatun Virabian*, presented a brief analysis of the "special dossiers" and their content.

Finally, the participants became engaged in a discussion of the international and national contexts of contemporary history of the southern Caucasus. It was stressed that the Cold War remains a potentially fruitful context for re-integrating disparate historiographic projects developed in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. *Andrei Zubov* proposed a comparative analysis of imperial policies in the southern Caucasus, implemented by Tsarist Russia, the early Soviet state in the 1920s, and the late Soviet Union during the Cold War era. *Suny* shared his experience of debates among American historians on Stalin's state-building and Soviet social and cultural developments with the participants.

The Tsinandali conference demonstrated a great potential of cooperation between Western historians and the scholars from the republics in the southern Caucasus. Starting from scratch, the project "Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the Cold War" is developing into a productive international network of scholars working on topics of contempo-

rary Soviet history. Within two years the project's participants studied and analyzed an impressive amount of archival information in the state and party archives of Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku. Their papers provide the first drafts of what will eventually become the contemporary history of the region during Soviet rule. Preliminary results and conclusions demonstrate that scholars from Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan greatly benefited from international cooperation, as well as from personal interaction with leading Western scholars. At the same time the detailed regional research makes an important contribution to the new Cold War history as it begins to abandon its traditional focus on the "two towers" of super-power confrontation and deal with a more diverse set of topics, among them the role of satellites and clients, their "subaltern strategies" to make their voices heard in the great power game, the spill-over effect of Cold War crises, and the national, cultural, and social developments inside the Cold War "home fronts."

We plan to develop and support this research network with all available means, promote close ties with archivists in all three republics, and organize periodic workshops. We also intend to bring the results of this project to the attention of Cold War scholars and a broader Western scholarly community. For further information, contact Svetlana Savranskaya at Svetlana@gwu.edu or CWIHP at coldwar1@wwic.si.edu.

Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya is Director of Russian programs at the National Security Archive at The George Washington University. Dr. Vladislav Zubok is Associate Professor of history at Temple University.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Memorandum, "About the Mood of a Part of the Armenians Repatriated From Foreign Countries," from Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Grigory Arutinov to Soviet Leader Josef Stalin, 22 May 1947

[Source: National Armenian Archives. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

SECRETARY CC VCP/b/

Comrade STALIN I. V.

ABOUT THE MOOD OF A PART OF THE ARMENIANS REPATRIATED FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Out of 50,945 Armenians, who arrived from foreign countries, 20,900 are able to work; they all were given employment at industrial enterprises, construction, in the teams of craft cooperation, and the peasants—in the collective and state farms.

The main mass of repatriated Armenians adjusted to

their jobs and takes an active part in productive activities. A significant part participates in the socialist competition—for early fulfillment of the plans, and many of those exhibit high standards in their work.

There is a small part of the repatriated, who initially switched from one job to another and subsequently engaged in trade and speculation on the markets. The number of [those individuals] reaches 600 to 700 people.

Among the members of this group exists a sentiment in favor of re-emigration. According to our information, 21 persons crossed the state border into Turkey at various times. 110 people were detained in the border zone for violations of the border regulations, and they are charged with attempting to cross the border [illegally]. In addition to that, we know of up to 300 people who are inclined to re-emigrate. Usually, under interrogation, the detained persons explain their motivation to flee the Soviet Union as due to economic factors.

The analysis of their situation on the part of the CC CP(b) of Armenia shows that all of them were given employment upon their arrival, were provided with housing, and received assistance at their workplaces both in food and money. All this notwithstanding, they have not settled into their jobs, but engaged in sales on the market.

The majority of these persons are between 18 and 27 years of age. According to the statements of their parents and family members, they did not work anywhere before their arrival in Armenia and were "separated" from their families.

The repatriated almost unanimously condemn the behavior of this group of repatriates and call them traitors.

Taking into account the material difficulties of the first years after relocation, the government of Armenia provides systematic assistance to the needy.

Besides the provision of bread on the ration card system for all relocated Armenians and members of their families, they are periodically given [other] food products—flour, cereals, sugar—and other goods—kerosene, soap, footwear etc.—above the usual provision.

The government of Armenia provided 2,300 thousand rubles from the financial assistance fund to those repatriates who have large families and are needy.

Up to 30 million rubles was provided already for construction of individual houses from state credit. The repatriated persons are building 3,890 houses, and further selection of plots for such construction is in progress.

The CC CP(b) of Armenia and the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR outlined measures to strengthen the border regime in order to prevent border crossings. Among those measures in the relocation of the repatriates, who settled in the villages adjacent to the line of the state border, to deeper regions of the republic.

Those people who express re-emigration sentiments are being relocated from the border regions and the city of Leninakan to the deep regions of the republic.

It was decided not to settle arriving Armenians in the villages located in the 5-kilometer border zone in the future.

Joint measures for increasing the number of border posts and checkpoints, as well as the number of border personnel,

were outlined to the USSR Ministry of Interior.

We are undertaking measures for strengthening political work among the repatriated Armenians.

SECRETARY OF CC CP(B) OF ARMENIA

(ARUTINOV Gr.)

22/V-1947

N 513/c



DOCUMENT No. 2

Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Zhelesnikov, Head of the Special Department of the KGB at the USSR Council of Ministers for Transcaucasus Military District, to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, Comrade P.V. Kovanov, 19 September 1956

[Source: Georgian Presidential Archive Fond 14, opis (finding aid) 31, delo (file) 297. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

SPECIAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE TRANSCAUCASIAN
MILITARY DISTRICT OF THE COMMITTEE OF STATE
SECURITY AT THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

19 September 1956

No. 2/8098

Tbilisi

Top Secret

Copy No. 2

To the SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GEORGIA

Comrade Kovanov P. V.

I report that the last months of 1956 were characterized by an increase in infiltrations by Western agents from Turkey across the land border into the areas of deployment of the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, and by an increase in [the number of] visits to the Transcaucasus, and mainly the areas of troop deployment, by foreign tourists and officials of capitalist diplomatic missions among whom persons engaged in intelligence work were noted.

Over the course of June, July and August, two Turkish agents and two American intelligence agents were dispatched from the Turkish side across the state border. All of them received meeting quarters on the territory of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

In addition, on 11 August of this year, an unimpeded crossing of the border from Turkey by four unknown criminals took place in the area of Akhaltsikhe in the Georgian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. On 22 August they crossed back into Turkey approximately in the same

area. In the exchange of fire, which occurred when they were returning from the USSR, one violator was killed. Fake documents, with which agents of foreign intelligence [services] are usually equipped, were found on him.

Military identity card number series GD No. 694861 issued by the Leninakan City Military Committee and passport series U-OF No. 676430 issued by the First Police Department of Kutaisi were confiscated from the body.

This attests to the fact that the Turkish intelligence [service] knows well the procedures of preparation and issuing of documents in the area.

The analysis of the instructions received by the above-mentioned three agents from the Turkish and the American intelligence [services] shows that the intelligence [services] exhibit serious interest in obtaining detailed information about the location, number and equipment of the military units, and also pay attention not only to the general information, such as in what area a certain group [of forces] is located, but to detailed reports on the location of particular units.

For example, agent "VOLGIN," who arrived from Turkey in July of this year, pointed out that the Turkish intelligence [service], which had information about the location of the 4th army battalions, instructed him to find out precisely in which settlements the units of those battalions were quartered and with what weapons they were equipped with.

Agent Sochlyan, who arrived from Turkey at approximately the same time, was instructed to carry out reconnaissance of the units of the Yerevan garrison.

The [Western] intelligence [services] devote great attention to the collection of information about the air force units and to the changes in their equipment, which are taking place at the present time.

For example, the same Turkish agent "C" received an assignment to find out whether new secret airports were being built in the neighborhood of Yerevan.

The American agent Moroz, who was deployed in the area of Leninakan in July of this year, had orders to find the airport near the settlement Saganlugi (Tbilisi region), and to find out what kind of aviation was based at that airport, and to what extent this airport was equipped to handle modern aviation. He was also ordered to obtain by any means (to steal or to pressure the servicemen to sell to him) a catalog with the description of the front section of the MIG-17 airplane.

Regarding the issue of the [Soviet] Navy, these agents received the following instructions: agent "M" was instructed to go to Baku and collect information about submarines, and in particular, about missile and radar equipment on them.

Turkish intelligence instructed agent "B," mentioned above, to establish the location of the Navy headquarters in Baku, and as well as the types of ships based in the port of Baku.

It was recommended to the agents that they collect that information both by means of personal observation and from conversations with people who possess the relevant information.

For example, it was suggested to agent "B" that while he

collected information about the number [of troops in] a certain unit, quartered in the winter accommodations, he should also determine the length and width of the barracks, the number of floors, the number of windows, and how many guards were on duty. If [the troops] were quartered in camp conditions—to count the number of tents.

It was recommended to determine the types of naval vessels by means of visual observation. For this purpose, the agent was shown pictures of various types of Soviet ships at the intelligence [service] offices, including several types of our submarines.

As was mentioned above, it was suggested to the American agent “M” that he should not hesitate to use violence or bribery of servicemen in order to obtain the catalog description of the MIG-17 plane.

All of the above-mentioned agents received the assignment to identify morally unstable people and individuals dissatisfied with the Soviet regime to encourage them to cross into Turkish territory, or to use them for intelligence purposes on our territory.

For example, Turkish agent “C” received an assignment to select such people from among those previously tried for various crimes, to collect biographical and personal information from them, to report it to Turkish intelligence, to encourage the most adversarially inclined of them to cross into Turkey, and to supply them with a pretext for that.

Agent “B” was assigned to escort one person to Turkey, to collect information about two residents of Baku, including one officer of the 4th Army, and to prepare one other person for subsequent relocation to the Crimea with an assignment from Turkish intelligence. It is characteristic that it was recommended to the agent that he should arrange his first meeting with the person under consideration [in order] to get to know him in a restaurant with some drinking, but to follow him beforehand by the means of outside surveillance. The same agent had the assignment to study the public mood of the population in connection with the struggle against the Stalin’s personality cult and condemnation of Bagirov.

The efforts of Turkish intelligence to encourage Soviet citizens to betray their Motherland is expressed in other ways as well.

In 1955, and especially in the summer of 1956, numerous incidents were registered in which Turkish servicemen, and in some cases civilians as well, struck up conversations with soldiers of our border forces soldiers, and in the course of such conversations conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and encouraged them to cross over into Turkish territory, promising them safety and guarantees that these people would not be transferred back to the USSR.

Those facts were most often noted with regard to border troops units 38 and 39 on the section [between] Akhaltsikhe and Leninakan. Similar incidents were also noted on the section of the border with Iran. In certain cases those actions succeed, which was proven by the escape to Iran of three servicemen of the Azerbaijan border troop district between May and August, 1956. As interrogations of the traitors of the Motherland ROTANOV, BONDAREV, and

GORBUNOV have shown, all of them were subjected to intelligence interrogations in Turkey, and they have given the foreign intelligence [services] sensitive information about the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District. It is characteristic that all these persons were encouraged to cooperate with Turkish, American, and British intelligence [agencies].

Some unstable elements and adversarially inclined persons from among the Soviet citizenry also show an interest in the Soviet-Turkish border—they arrive at the villages located close to the border, including the areas of troop deployments, with treacherous designs and search for ways to cross into Turkey or Iran. Such incidents are most often, registered in the regions of Batumi, Akhaltsikhe, Leninakan, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Lenkoran.

During the eight months of 1956, 22 people who attempted to betray their Motherland were detained in those areas.

In 1955, and especially 1956, the influx of various foreign tourist and other groups and of official representatives of capitalist diplomatic missions, who systematically visit various regions of the Transcaucasus, has increased.

Most often, such foreigners are representatives of the United States, France, England, Turkey, and some other countries. These individuals, and especially diplomatic personnel, make visits to mainly strategically important regions of Sukhumi-Tbilisi, Kutaisi-Yerevan-Baku, and Leninakan-Batumi. Groups of troops are stationed in those regions and along the highways leading to those [regions].

Observation of foreigners has registered their intention to collect information about the troops by means of visual observation, photography, and use of other technology. The foreigners devote great attention to investigation of highways important from the military point of view, such as the Georgian military road, the road through the Suram and other mountain ridges.

There were some noted incidents of meetings between the foreigners and re-émigrés, and people who moved to establish permanent residency in the Transcaucasus republics from countries in the Middle East, from France, and other countries, and who mainly settled in the Armenian territory.

A large number of tourists visit the region of the Black Sea Coast, where in August of this year packages with NLF (National Labor Front) anti-Soviet literature were discovered, addressed to the population and servicemen of the Soviet Army.

The circumstances described above were pointed out to all KGB Special Departments in the region. They were instructed to conduct counterintelligence work taking into account the information presented above.

Head of Special Department of the KGB
At the USSR Council of Ministers for Transcaucasus
Military district
Lieutenant General

(ZHELEZNIKOV)

DOCUMENT No. 3**Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic A. Yuzbashyan, 14 March 1979**

[Source: *Armenian National Archives. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.*]

Top secret
Copy No. 1

REPORT

(presented at the session of the Bureau of the CC CP of Armenia on 6 March 1979)

Under the influence of the most aggressive forces of imperialism, the foreign policy course of the United States government and its allies clearly exhibits a tendency toward returning to a policy “from the position of strength” and to the “cold war.” The current leadership of the PRC [People’s Republic of China], who unleashed undisguised aggression against socialist Vietnam in February of this year, has practically merged with the forces of imperialism in its anti-Soviet aspirations. Therefore there clearly exists an attempt by our enemies to create a united anti-Communist front.

In the implementation of the aggressive course against the countries of the socialist commonwealth, and mainly against the Soviet Union, an important role is given to the special services and the anti-Soviet foreign centers, the subversive activity of which has acquired a global character.

One would like to especially emphasize the fact that the enemy, without giving up its final strategic goals, has adjusted its tactics [and] focused on conducting ideological subversion which has as its goal “exploding” socialism from within. A powerful, multi-branch apparatus has been put in service for ideological subversion. And the imperialist countries long ago raised this line of subversive activity to the level of state policy.

By acting in skillful and diverse ways, and by actively using specific features of different regions of the USSR all the channels through which people travel in and out [of the Soviet Union], and the mass media, the enemy often achieves his dirty goals. Under the influence of hostile Western propaganda, negatively inclined individuals inside the country, including those in the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], still commit anti-state, and anti-Soviet crimes.

Notwithstanding the absence of a social base in the country for anti-Soviet activity there are certain marginalized individuals who choose the criminal way [of life]. This kind of person also exists in our republic.

Protecting Soviet society from the overtures of the reactionary imperialist forces is the main task of the organs of state security, which they successfully fulfill under the unwavering control and daily leadership of our Party.

All the people, the widest strata of our society, take part in fulfilling that noble task. And it is precisely in this connection that we should consider the CC CPSU Resolution of 23

May 1977, “About Raising the Vigilance of the Soviet People.”

Even taking into account the obvious exceptional character of this crime, it appears that the case of the “Bombers,” which was presented today to the Bureau of the CC CP of Armenia bears clear traces of all these processes and phenomena, so to speak, of the external and internal order, which were mentioned above.

Brief summary of the case:

During the evening of 8 January, in various public places in the city of Moscow, criminal elements carried out explosions of hand-made bombs, resulting in human casualties, destruction and damage to state property. The explosions occurred in the metro train, in grocery store No. 15, and next to the window of grocery store No. 5. As a result of the explosions, 7 people were killed, and 37 people were injured to varying degrees.

At the end of October 1977, criminals were preparing to detonate new explosives, this time at the Kursky Railway Terminal. However, the measures for ensuring safety in public places, undertaken jointly by the organs of the KGB and MVD, scared the criminals, and they fled hurriedly leaving behind a bag with the explosives.

As a result of the additional measures which were undertaken the operative group of the Armenian SSR KGB, working in coordination with the USSR KGB, succeeded in capturing the criminals at the beginning of November 1977. They turned out to be: S[tepan] S. Zatikyan, head of the group, born in 1946 in Yerevan, and resident of Yerevan, non-affiliated, married, did not complete higher education; A. V. Stepanyan, born 1947 in Yerevan, resident of Yerevan, with a secondary education; Z. M. Bagdasaryan, born 1954 in the village of Kanachut in the Artashatsky region, and resident of Kanachut, with a secondary education.

From 16 to 24 January 1979, the Collegium for Criminal Offenses of the USSR Supreme Soviet held an open trial session to consider the criminal case charging S. S. Zatikyan and his two accomplices with anti-Soviet activities and committing a subversive act.

During the course of the trial the information received earlier by the KGB organs was fully confirmed with regard to the fact that Zatikyan, having served a four-year sentence for anti-Soviet activities, did not disarm ideologically, and, moreover, chose the road of extremist methods of struggle against the Soviet state. After being indoctrinated in a hostile spirit, he involved his accomplices in the preparation and implementation of the subversive acts.

In the course of the investigation and trial in this case, a large amount of material and other evidence was collected. Approximately 750 victims and witnesses were questioned, 140 expert tests were made, and over 100 searches were conducted; persuasive evidence was collected in the residences of the criminals, linking them to the explosions.

This gave [the investigation] the opportunity fully to reveal Zatikyan’s and his accomplices’ roles in the crimes they prepared and committed, even during the preliminary investigation. In particular, Zatikyan stated during the pre-

liminary investigation the following: “I did not testify against my own will, I told the truth that I built the explosive devices ... that my actions ... represent just one method of struggle against the regime that exists in the Soviet Union.” Later, during the trial, Zatikyan refused to give testimony. However, his accomplices gave extensive testimony about the circumstances of preparing and carrying out the new subversive acts. Zatikyan was fully implicated by his accomplices and other witnesses, by the conclusions of the experts, as the main ideological and practical organizer of the subversive acts and the main actor in building the explosive devices.

Taking into account the exceptional danger and the grave consequences of the crimes committed by him, the court sentenced Zatikyan and his accomplices to the ultimate measure of punishment—the death sentence. The verdict was received with approval by the numerous representatives of the Soviet public who were present in the courtroom, including representatives from our republic. By the way, one of the jurors and all three defense lawyers were also from our republic. The sentence was carried out.

Using the Zatikyan case as an example it would be instructive to trace how he came to his evil design and who and what helped him in that.

Brief background:

Over the last 12 years, the Armenian KGB has uncovered and liquidated more than 20 illegal anti-Soviet nationalist groups created under the influence of hostile Western propaganda. Altogether, about 1,400 people were engaged in anti-Soviet activities in some form or another.

In accordance with the Party’s principles, the organs of state security have given and continue to give preference to preventive and prophylactic measures, and consider arrest an extreme measure only. Those arrested represented only 4.3% of the individuals who were proven to have engaged in anti-Soviet activities. Zatikyan was one of them—he was a member of one of the anti-Soviet nationalist groups, which pompously named itself NUP (National United Party). It was created by the unaffiliated artist Khachatryan Aikaz, born in 1918 (in 1978 he was sentenced to 1.5 years of prison for a common crime), who, upon learning about Zatikyan’s role in the explosions in Moscow, called himself his “spiritual father.”

In 1968, Zatikyan was arrested and sentenced, as was already mentioned, to four years in prison. At his arrest, they confiscated a document written by Zatikyan—“Terror and Terrorists”—in which he made an effort to justify the methods of extremism and means of struggle against the Soviet state.

During his stay at the correctional labor colony, and then in prison (where he was transferred because he systematically violated the regime, and negatively influenced other inmates, who chose the road of improvement), Zatikyan not only did not change his ways, but, on the contrary, nursed thoughts about even more extreme methods of hostile activity.

One should also note that Zatikyan admired the Dashnaks [Armenian Revolutionary Federation, an ultra-nationalist movement whose territorial ambitions include the Karabakh region and those parts of “Greater Armenia” currently within the borders of Turkey and Georgia]. In the course of the investigation, and during his trial, he called the Dashnaks a “sacred party.”

One of Zatikyan’s accomplices—Stepanyan—participated in an anti-Soviet nationalist gathering. For that, in 1974, he was served an official warning in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 25 December 1972. However, that official warning did not bring Stepanyan to his senses, did not stop him from committing the crime.

The USSR KGB gave a positive assessment to the investigative and trial measures undertaken by the organs of state security of the USSR. The Armenian KGB also took an active part in that work.

However, all this took place after the first series of explosions had occurred in Moscow. And the second series of explosions had already been prepared. There should have been no explosions at all. In any case, after the explosions, the criminals should have been quickly discovered and arrested. However, that did not happen. We realize that we have obviously made some mistakes here. The republican KGB drew the following lessons from the “Bombers” case.

One can name the following reasons [as those] that contributed to the emergence of the “Bombers:”

1. Enemy influence from the abroad in the framework of the ideological subversion carried out by the adversary.
2. Negative influence by some hostile individuals on the young people.
3. As was already mentioned, mistakes in our work, in the work of the Armenian KGB.
4. Loss of sharpness of political vigilance among some categories of the population, as a consequence of a certain weakening of the ideological work.

In addition to that, there is some concern about persons who are not involved in productive labor, as well as such aliens to our social regime [who practice] phenomena such as bribery, theft of socialist property, petty crime, and vicious systematic libel against honest Soviet people in the form of anonymous letters and statements.

All this not only darkens the general moral and political climate in the republic, but also represents potential fertile grounds for marginalized elements, who then slide toward anti-Soviet activities.

Foreign Armenian colonies represent a special concern for us. Let us dwell on just one question out of the whole system of issues related to this situation. The processes and developments occurring in the colonies, taking into account their various connections with the republic, influence the situation here. The enemy, primarily the United States, actively works with the foreign Armenian colonies—they use

all means to encourage persons of Armenian nationality to move and establish permanent residency in their country. Today already 600,000 Armenians reside in the United States.

An Armenian Bureau was created and is now functioning in the State Department, and Columbia University is planning to create an Armenian Cultural Center.

All these events unquestionably serve the same anti-Soviet goals.

There are plans to increase the Armenian diaspora in the United States to one million people. This could have serious consequences for us. The best organized force in the foreign Armenian colonies is the anti-Soviet nationalist party Dashnaktsutyun. It is the most dangerous for us due to a number of circumstances (experience, knowledge of the situation, absence of language barrier, etc.).

That is why the CPSU CC resolution of 27 December 1978 about strengthening our work with the Armenians residing abroad has a great significance in trying to interfere with the efforts of the American administration to extend its influence on the foreign Armenian colony.

The KGB of the Armenian SSR reports its suggestions regarding the realization of the above-mentioned CPSU CC resolution to the Armenian CP CC separately.

Dashnak propaganda is being skillfully and inventively carried out, and it reaches its addressees more often than other kinds of propaganda. We have to give them credit—they choose topics for ideological attacks against us in a fine and clever manner.

Take for example slogans like “Great and united and independent Armenia.” Or the way they threw in the so-called “land issues” (both internal and external). It is natural that the Dashnaks did not pass by Sero Khanzadyan’s letter, did not miss the clearly non-scholarly polemics between Z. Buniatov and some of our scholars. They did not shy away from the case of Zatikyan and his accomplices either. In addition, every time the Dashnaks choose the most skillful and at the same time innocent forms for their propaganda (for example about the “purity” of the Armenian language, about creation of genuinely Armenian families, etc.), which represents nothing other than acts of ideological subversion.

Of course, the current situation, the growing might of the socialist forces, and, first of all, of our country, could not but affect the Dashnak strategy, but their essence, their strategic designs remained unchanged, and we should start from that assumption in our work. Naturally, we should also work against the Dashnaks—to try to limit, decrease their practical anti-Soviet activity.

It is necessary to point out that lately the enemy has been devoting more attention to the socio-political sphere in his intelligence endeavors. In our republic, they are interested in such issues as the attitude of the local people to the Russians, Azerbaijani, and other peoples of the Soviet Union, to the “land” problem (both internal and external), to Turkey, and to the United States. [They are interested in] how the genocide is taught in schools, what kind of nationalist outbursts happen in the republic, and how the nationalities issue is being resolved, and how the authorities treat the so-

called dissidents, etc.

It is not hard to notice where the enemy is aiming—this is not just an expression of idle interest! The enemy is trying to weaken, and if possible to undermine, the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union—the basis of our power.

In our republic, to some extent, the acts of ideological subversion, which are conducted now within the framework of the campaign for the so-called “defense of human rights” have made their impact. There emerged the so-called “Group of Assistance for the Helsinki Accords” (the group was dissolved, its leader—Nazaryan—was sentenced to 5 years in prison at the end of 1978). There also emerged an all-Union “leader” of the so-called “Free Labor Unions”—some Oganesyanyan [in our republic]. As a result of the prophylactic work, he renounced his unbecoming activity.

The actions named above did not bring success to the enemy. They are not that dangerous for our republic. The Dashnak propaganda, and everything that originates in the Armenian foreign colonies is a different issue. The Dashnaks exploit the nationalist feelings of the people, speculate on them. The Armenian KGB constantly takes that fact into account in its work.

Information in the Soviet press and on the radio about the trial and the sentence in the case of the “terrorists” caused sharp indignation against the criminal actions taken by Zatikyan and his accomplices in the entire Soviet Union, in all the strata of population of the republic. The people throughout the republic condemned those actions and approved the sentence of the USSR Supreme Soviet, emphasizing that those criminals have nothing in common with the Armenian people, which owes all its accomplishments, and its very existence in the Soviet state, to the great Russian people.

At the same time, we should not close our eyes to the fact that there are some hostile individuals with anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments, who are nursing thoughts about separating Soviet Armenia from the USSR, express extremist sentiments (read excerpts).

For example, an unidentified person called the USSR KGB in Moscow after Zatikyan and his accomplices’ sentence was carried out, and expressed a threat to “avenge” the sentenced.

The KGB of Armenia sees this main task as follows: to prevent and to interdict in a timely manner all extremist and other adversarial expressions on the part of the negative elements.

In this, we are starting from the assumption that in the current conditions, only politically well-prepared Communist members of the security organs can carry out the demanding tasks of ensuring state security, of protecting Soviet society from the subversive actions of the enemy’s special services, from the foreign anti-Soviet centers, and from some hostile individuals inside the country. We believe that no Communist can have any kind of neutral, or passive position in issues of ideology.

The issues of ideological and political preparation and internationalist education of the personnel have been and will remain at the center of attention of the Collegium, the Party Committee of the KGB of the republic, and the party

organizations of the [KGB] units.

The Armenian KGB works under the direct control of and direction of the CP CC of Armenia, and it constantly feels the assistance and support of the Central Committee and the government of the republic.

Officers of the Armenian KGB assure the CC CP of Armenia that they will apply all their skills and power to fulfill the tasks entrusted to them.

Chairman of the Committee for State Security
Of the Armenian SSR

[signature]
M. A. Yuzbashyan

14 March 1979

NOTES

¹ See *Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), CWIHP, p. 309.

² See the documents provided by Hasanli, printed in *CWIHP Bulletin* 12/13, pp. 310-314.

³ See *CWIHP Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 310-312.

⁴ Eduard Melkonian, "The Armenian Diaspora and its Coexistence with the Outside World: Processes of Political Adaptation (the 1920s-1950s)," paper presented at the Conference, "Cold War in the Caucasus," 8-9 July 2002.



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The Cold War History Research Center in Budapest was established in December 1998 as the first scholarly institution founded as a non-profit organization in East Central Europe. Its main goal is to become a clearinghouse center for Cold War research in East Central Europe. The Center plans to develop its web site, established in 2000, into a central provider of English language materials on contemporary history of the region.

Recently the Center has initiated the establishment of a Cold War History Library that would serve as a central depository of publications on Cold War history to be available for all interested researchers in East Central Europe. Since funding for the library has not yet been secured, the Center encourages regional and international scholars and institutions to send copies of their books and articles (published in any language) to the Center's library at the address above.

A Cold War Odyssey: The Oswald Files

By Max Holland

On 20 June 1999, Russian president Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly handed US President Bill Clinton more than 80 pages of “declassified” Soviet-era documents pertaining to the shocking murder of President John F. Kennedy.¹ In doing so, Yeltsin added yet another chapter to the already convoluted saga of Moscow’s archival response to the November 1963 assassination.

There have been 10 authorized and significant disclosures in the nearly four decades since 22 November by the Soviet Union and its successor states.² Primary information has become available via three routes: the transfer of actual documents; the release of summaries based on authorized access to documents; and the publication of books based on privileged or unusual (to say the least) access to key archival files.

This piecemeal release of documentation began within days of the assassination, in recognition of the gravity of questions about Lee Harvey Oswald’s sojourn in the Soviet Union from October 1959 to May 1962.

- On 25 November 1963, Anastas Mikoyan, deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, presented an expurgated version to the US State Department of the KGB’s 23 November summary report about Oswald, hurriedly compiled for the CPSU Central Committee after Oswald’s arrest.³
- On 30 November 1963, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, gave Secretary of State Dean Rusk photocopies from the embassy’s consular file on the Oswalds. The documents included a letter from Oswald dated as recently as 9 November.⁴
- In May 1964, after a request from the presidential Commission on the assassination, chaired by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, transmitted via the State Department, the Soviet government provided additional routine documents (such as Oswald’s application for an exit visa) generated during the American’s 2½-year stay in Moscow and Minsk, Belarus (then Belorussia).⁵

This May 1964 release would be the last disclosure for nearly 30 years, although US interest in Soviet records never flagged during the remaining decades of the Cold War. Most notably, in the late 1970s the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) conducted another investigation into President Kennedy’s death and reopened the issue formally. Meetings were held between HSCA representatives and officials at the Soviet embassy in Washington. At one such encounter, a senior Soviet official explained that the request presented Moscow with “serious problems.” If Soviet agencies answered some questions, “they might find themselves having to answer other questions and, in the final analysis, no one would be satisfied with their responses anyway.”

Ultimately, the Soviet response to HSCA was that “all relevant documents concerning Oswald had already been transmitted” to the Warren Commission and that “no further documents could be made available.”⁶

The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities and so the pace of releases picked up again, although disclosure to deepen historical understanding was seldom the guiding principle. The release of Soviet-era, assassination-related documents remained highly erratic and often influenced by other considerations.⁷

- In November 1991, ABC News “Nightline” broadcast a program devoted to summarizing information contained in Oswald’s 6-volume, 4-foot thick KGB case file, then on deposit in the central KGB archives in Moscow.⁸
- In August 1992, *Izvestiya*, a Moscow newspaper, published a 5-part series based upon Oswald’s KGB case file, No. 31451.⁹ The file itself was now in the possession of the Belarusian KGB (BKGB) after having become the object of a tug-of-war between Russia and Belarus. The latter claimed ownership on the grounds that the bulk of the dossier had been compiled by BKGB counterintelligence agents.¹⁰
- In 1993, Oleg Nechiporenko, a retired KGB colonel, published a memoir in which he recounted, among other things, Oswald’s September 1963 visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City, where Nechiporenko was posted at the time.¹¹ Nechiporenko’s account was partially based on access to archival documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CPSU Central Committee, KGB/BKGB, and the author reproduced parts of several documents verbatim in his text.
- In 1994, Yeltsin’s journal for the tumultuous period August 1991 to October 1993 was published in the West as *Boris Yeltsin: The Struggle for Russia*.¹² Without much explication Yeltsin’s gratuitously included (in an appendix) portions of four KGB memos to the Central Committee CPSU from 1963, all of which pertained to the assassination.
- In 1995, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned over five KGB memoranda (a total of 17 pages) in response to a query from the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), the first official US entity to reopen the matter since the end of the Cold War.¹³ This very limited response did not even include the four KGB documents Yeltsin cited in his 1994 memoir.
- Also in 1995, Norman Mailer published a book most notable for its narrative about Oswald’s years in Minsk. This portion of Mailer’s book was based upon privileged access to Oswald’s case file and BKGB officers who had been directly involved. Mailer quoted actual

transcripts from the electronic surveillance of the Oswalds' apartment, as well as from reports written by the BKGB officers who had tailed Oswald in Minsk.¹⁴

• In 1997, Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali published *'One Hell of a Gamble.'* Though mostly devoted to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the book contained a chapter on the assassination and its aftermath which drew upon select documents from KGB, GRU, and Foreign Ministry archives.¹⁵

Yeltsin's 1999 gift thus fit squarely into a pattern of disclosure by installment. As the State Department prepared translations of this latest tease, Russian officials involved in gathering the records cautioned against expecting too much from the once-classified documents. "They don't contain any new revelations," Vladimir Sokolov, a Foreign Ministry archivist, told *Moscow Times* in late June. "There's nothing new or sensational there."¹⁶ Sokolov's assessment seemed accurate once the National Archives released the translations in August 1999. Though interesting (one of the items was Oswald's handwritten 16 October 1959 letter to the Supreme Soviet requesting immediate asylum and citizenship), the documents did not alter Washington's conclusion regarding KGB recruitment of Oswald, nor did they even shed much new light on what was already known about Oswald's time in the Soviet Union.

Indeed, once the translations became available, it seemed as if there was even less to Yeltsin's gift than initially met the eye. Mixed in among genuinely "TOP SECRET" documents were such innocuous items as a news commentary published by TASS in November 1963. The release also contained Khrushchev's long-available letter of condolence to President Johnson, along with several other routine condolence letters.¹⁷ Moreover, some of the documents that Yeltsin made available so ostentatiously had already been quoted from at length in Nechiporenko's 1993 memoir, and one CPSU Central Committee document had been previously released to the ARRB in 1995.

Nonetheless, there were a few truly novel documents mixed in among the Yeltsin papers, and these shed archival light on the past and ongoing reluctance to open relevant Soviet files. It has long been understood that Moscow faced an enormous problem after a self-styled Marxist, who had actually lived in the Soviet Union, was arrested in connection with President Kennedy's assassination. The preternaturally secretive Soviet leadership was agonizingly caught between a rock and a hard place: damned if it wasn't forthcoming and likely to be damned if it was (or so the Communist leaders thought). What had never been previously documented, however, is the torturous internal wrangling that occurred before Soviet leaders released the handful of records made available in 1963-1964.

The single most revealing episode involves two familiar figures—Anatoly Dobrynin and Anastas Mikoyan—who apparently played the key roles in bringing about the second Soviet release, that of documents from the Washington embassy's consular files. Working together, they managed

to bridge the gap between what reason suggested and what caution and ideology dictated. Dobrynin's actions, in particular, illustrate why he was so invaluable to both sides during the cold war. Few if any envoys had Dobrynin's suppleness of mind and ability to square the circle between two systems that could barely comprehend each other's logic. Little wonder that Dobrynin was Moscow's ambassador to six cold war American presidents, as the subtitle of his memoir, *In Confidence*, points out.¹⁸

The idea to make the consular records available apparently originated with ambassador Dobrynin not long after Oswald's arrest on the afternoon of 22 November. A prompt search of the embassy's consular files had revealed several pieces of correspondence, including a letter from Oswald dated 9 November. Because of its proximity to the assassination, Dobrynin immediately realized this letter was bound to be especially sensitive, regardless of its contents. In a TOP SECRET/HIGHEST PRIORITY cable to Moscow, Dobrynin reported that US authorities were undoubtedly aware of both the consular file and the latest letter because all mail routed via the US Post Office was routinely opened by the FBI. Although the US government knew that the Soviets knew about the mail-opening operation, Dobrynin anticipated that "U.S. authorities may ask us to familiarize them with the correspondence in our possession." The Soviet ambassador then proposed sharing the letter if not the entire file once internal Foreign Ministry documents had been removed, "inasmuch as there is nothing that compromises us in this correspondence."¹⁹

While Dobrynin's proposal was conditional—the documents were to be offered "as a last resort," as if to underscore the favor—it nonetheless qualified as a remarkable suggestion. Consular records were considered highly privileged and rarely exchanged, even between governments with the best of diplomatic relations.²⁰ In addition, the notion of agreeing to yield these documents at any point was all the more remarkable given the highly-charged atmosphere that was rapidly developing. As Dobrynin observed in the last line of his 22 November cable, the pervasive radio and TV coverage of the assassination was "alluding more and more often to the fact that the assassin was evidently connected with 'extreme leftist elements.'"²¹

Dobrynin heard nothing back about his proposal for two days. Finally, on Monday, 25 November, the CPSU Central Committee approved the draft response proposed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and KGB chief Vladimir Semichastny. The answer to Dobrynin was almost predictable, or at least in keeping with familiar Soviet behavior. "In the event that the U.S. authorities request you to provide information," began the instructions, "you can give them the following information on this matter." The balance of the cable was the most limited recitation of bare facts imaginable—nothing, indeed, that the US government did not already know from its own files on Oswald, consular and otherwise.²²

Moscow's rigidity was understandable to a degree. While still reeling from the assassination, the Communist

leadership (along with the rest of the world) had had to absorb a second shock on 24 November, namely, the murder of the accused assassin. To Soviet leaders already prone to believe in conspiracies, Oswald's murder *while in police custody* was incomprehensible—unless of course there was a conspiracy. In all likelihood the self-proclaimed Marxist (who had already been slandered by Moscow as a “Trotskyite”) had been silenced before the real perpetrators could be identified.²³ Given this unnerving situation it was not surprising for Moscow to hew to the most conservative approach imaginable. Despite Oswald's murder by a nightclub owner named Jack Ruby—or perhaps because of it—the effort to link Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union to probable contact with the KGB—and possible recruitment—was unabated among some elements of the US news media.

The day before Dobrynin received the Central Committee's instructions on 25 November, Anastas Mikoyan, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, arrived for the state funeral bearing a redacted KGB report about Oswald's Soviet sojourn. The two officials clearly discussed the matter, because on Tuesday, 26 November, Dobrynin sent another TOP SECRET/HIGHEST PRIORITY cable to Moscow. In this second cable, in which Mikoyan concurred, Dobrynin presented an entirely different rationale for yielding the consular records. Rather than basing his argument again on straightforward pragmatic grounds—namely, that Moscow had nothing to hide—this time Dobrynin appealed directly to the conspiratorial mind-set that pervaded the Central Committee.

Like all the other correspondence in the consular file, Oswald's 9 November letter was genuine, differing only in that it was typed rather than handwritten. Yet, and without any real evidence backing him up, Dobrynin now insisted that Oswald's 9 November letter was “clearly a provocation . . . [designed to give] the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own.” The letter, wrote Dobrynin, was probably a forgery, and “one gets the definite impression that [it] was concocted by those who . . . are involved in the President's assassination.” Or if Oswald himself wrote it, Dobrynin asserted, it was probably dictated to him and then he was “simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.” In essence, the Soviet ambassador now argued that disclosure was necessary to expose and pre-empt the “organizers of this entire provocation” before they used the letter “to try casting suspicion on us.”²⁴ It was a shrewd way of evoking the objectively correct (and self-interested) decision from the Central Committee, but the reasoning was Byzantine. If Dobrynin truly believed the 9 November letter was a forgery, Soviet interests would arguably be better served if this devastating trump card were held in reserve, to be played, if necessary, once the US government officially committed itself as to the identity of the assassin(s).

When Mikoyan returned to Moscow later in the week, in all likelihood he played a significant role in shaping the Central Committee's response. The deputy chairman had come back with a firm impression about how the US government intended to proceed in the assassination's wake, as evinced

by a 25 November cable Mikoyan dispatched while still in Washington. In this cable Mikoyan had reported on his conversations with US officials, most notably, Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, the State Department's leading Soviet expert and the US ambassador in Moscow who had permitted Oswald's return in 1962. “Judging from everything,” Mikoyan had concluded, “the U.S. government does not want to involve us in this matter, but neither does it want to get into a fight with the extreme rightists; it clearly prefers to consign the whole business to oblivion as soon as possible.”²⁵

Mikoyan obviously confused the State Department's desire not to roil US-Soviet relations unnecessarily with a supposed government-wide inclination not to apprehend alleged co-conspirators. Thompson and other Soviet hands had concluded that Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union was an unfortunate coincidence and that Moscow had nothing to do with President Kennedy's assassination. Therefore, insofar as possible, they wanted the controversy over Oswald to be treated as a matter separate from the pursuit of improved relations between the superpowers. Still, there was no actual basis for Mikoyan's assertion that the US government was uninterested in bringing other supposed perpetrators to justice. Mikoyan's point of view was primarily a reflection of his and/or Soviet ideology regarding the assassination, rather than an accurate judgment.

Notwithstanding Mikoyan's misreading of Washington's intentions, his perspective, combined with the logic of Dobrynin's second cable, apparently evoked a dramatic change in the Central Committee's position.²⁶ Three days after sending his 26 November cable, Dobrynin finally received an answer and it was more than the Soviet envoy had dared ask for. In a complete about-face, the Central Committee now instructed Dobrynin to provide photocopies of all consular correspondence with the Oswalds, including the especially sensitive 9 November letter, and *without waiting for a request from U.S. authorities*.²⁷

As if to act before Moscow could possibly change its mind, Dobrynin arranged to see Rusk the very next afternoon, even though it was the Saturday of the Thanksgiving holiday weekend. In a subsequent cable describing the meeting, Dobrynin reported that the US Secretary of State thanked him *twice* for the photocopies. “It was evident that Rusk was quite unprepared for this step on our part,” Dobrynin wrote, “while at the same time (judging from his general behavior) he was pleased with this development.” Rusk asked Dobrynin if he could make the correspondence available to the newly-formed Warren Commission. Dobrynin replied that it was left “totally to [Rusk's] discretion whether to present this material to anyone, as we were sure he would properly appreciate our step and would act appropriately.”²⁸ Most interestingly, in his report to Moscow, Dobrynin made no mention of the *other* part of his instructions. Upon presenting the photocopies to Rusk, Dobrynin was supposed to assert that from the moment the 9 November letter arrived, the Soviet embassy suspected it was “either a forgery or . . . a deliberate provocation.”²⁹

Some 32 years later, Dobrynin recounted this episode in his 1995 memoir, but stripped it of all its drama and complexity. According to the former Soviet ambassador, following Oswald's arrest officials immediately checked embassy files.

The consular department had kept all of its correspondence with the Oswalds, and it contained nothing blameworthy. I suggested to our government that this correspondence be made available to the Americans, and Moscow quickly approved. We immediately handed over copies to Rusk . . . [who] was clearly unprepared for our unusual act and did not conceal his satisfaction.³⁰

Dobrynin either intentionally smoothed out this episode, or gave it short shrift because this was the way he actually remembered it. At the time, however, this unprecedented act by the Soviet Union was a dramatic development. Since Dobrynin had imposed no conditions on how Rusk could use the consular documents, the Secretary of State saw no reason to keep the file-sharing secret; indeed, he was eager to publicize every shred of Soviet goodwill in the wake of the assassination. The State Department told the Washington press corps about the file-sharing as soon as it occurred, and the disclosure made headlines in every major American newspaper.

While it may be just as misleading to invest this episode with great meaning as it was for Dobrynin to gloss over it, it does seem to explain why even the most innocuous documents from Soviet files have had to travel such laborious routes before being disclosed. Admittedly, some relevant documents, such as Oswald's case file, remain too sensitive simply to hand over. Despite the passage of time, they undoubtedly reveal intelligence sources and methods, and the means of surveillance in the former Soviet states may not have changed all that much.³¹ Yet if there were an inclination to disclose as much as possible, even the case file could be redacted to protect sources and methods. Much more revealing is the fact that many records of interest, such as those that reflect high-level decision-making after the assassination, do not involve intelligence sources and methods at all and yet remain closed.³²

The political regimes may have changed, but a culture of suspicion persists in the successor states to the USSR, especially with respect to President Kennedy's assassination. Soviet propaganda/disinformation about the "real forces" responsible for the assassination exert such a grip on the Russian imagination that these states cannot bring themselves to disclose all but a handful assassination-related records.³³ That the records are exculpatory is irrelevant.

Max Holland is a research fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. He is writing a history of the Warren Commission for Alfred A. Knopf, and received the J. Anthony Lukas Work in Progress Award in 2001 from Columbia and Harvard Universities. The author is indebted to Vladislav Zubok, Raymond Garthoff, and Anna

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NOTES

¹ William Drozdiak, "Affable but Ailing Yeltsin Gives JFK Files to Clinton," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1999 and Jane Perlez, "U.S. and Russians Strive to Repair Frayed Relations," *New York Times*, 21 June 1999. Though the presentation of the documents directly to President Clinton came as a surprise, elements of the U.S. government had been requesting access to Soviet-era, assassination-related documents for several years. Vice President Al Gore raised the matter, for example, with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin in March 1998. See Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), *Final Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 141.

² When KGB officer Yuri Nosenko defected to the United States in February 1964, he carried with him some first-hand knowledge of the Oswald case; the Nosenko episode is outside the scope of this article, which is limited to authorized disclosures of documents.

³ Walter Pincus & George Lardner, "Warren Commission Born Out of Fear: Washington Wanted to Stop Speculation," *Washington Post*, 14 November 1993. Although the Warren Commission had access to this KGB summary document, unlike other records provided by the Soviet government, it was not included among the Commission's exhibits. The Commission did not want to create the impression that it had relied on such a document.

⁴ Murrey Marder, "Russia's File on Oswald Is Handed Over to U.S.," *Washington Post*, 1 December 1963; the entire file, translated by the FBI, became Warren Commission Exhibit 986. See *Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy: Exhibits 885 to 1053*, Volume XVIII (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 480-539.

⁵ *Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy: Exhibits 885 to 1053*, Volume XVIII (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). The Warren Commission's request is Exhibit 984, pp. 399-402. A State Department translation of all the Soviet documents submitted in response is Exhibit 985, pp. 403-479.

⁶ Memorandum to Jeremy Gunn, 24 January 1996, Box 16, David Marwell Files, RG 541, JFK Assassination Records, NARA. See also *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2d session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 103.

⁷ As noted below, author Norman Mailer achieved better access than an official agency of the U.S. government.

⁸ ABC News Nightline, *The KGB Oswald Files*, Broadcast 22 November 1991.

⁹ Sergei Mostovshchikov, "Agent Development Case No. 31451," *Izvestiya*, 6, 7, 10-12 August 1992.

¹⁰ *Izvestiya*, 7 August 1992. According to a 1999 *Washington Post* account, all relevant files were consolidated in Moscow after the assassination. These included records on Oswald's 1959 defection, his sojourn in Minsk and 1962 repatriation; the assassination itself; Oswald's September 1963 visit to the Soviet embassy in Mexico City; and Soviet investigations of the assassination. The records reclaimed by the BKGB pertained only to records generated in Minsk; it is more than likely, however, that the Russian

KGB made a copy of the case file before letting the records go. See George Lardner, "Papers Shed New Light on Soviets, Oswald," *Washington Post*, 6 August 1999.

¹¹ Oleg Nechiporenko, *Passport to Assassination: The Never-Before-Told Story of Lee Harvey Oswald by the KGB Colonel Who Knew Him* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993).

¹² Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), pp. 305-309.

¹³ *Washington Post*, 6 August 1999, and ARRB *Final Report*, p. 141. English translations of the documents, prepared by the State Department, can be found in Box 34, Jeremy Gunn Files, RG 541, JFK Assassination Records, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA). The ARRB was established under U.S. law in 1992, after public complaints about the large number of U.S. government documents about the assassination that remained classified. Under the legislation, the ARRB was instructed to gather assassination-related documents into an omnibus collection at the National Archives, one that would include records generated by private parties and foreign governments.

¹⁴ Norman Mailer, *Oswald's Tale: An American Mystery* (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. xx-xxi, and *Washington Post*, 6 August 1999. Mailer's access was negotiated by his long-time collaborator Lawrence Schiller.

¹⁵ Aleksandr Fursenko & Timothy Naftali, *'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958-1964* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997). Two of the KGB documents cited in *Gamble* were among the documents Yeltsin presented in his 1994 memoir.

¹⁶ "Sarah Karush & Brian Whitmore, "JFK Files May Yield Clues Into . . . Yeltsin?" *Moscow Times*, 25 June 1999; see also David Hoffman, "Oswald Letter Is Among Documents From Russia," *Washington Post*, 23 June 1999.

¹⁷ The condolence letter to LBJ was published in the 1996 *Foreign Relations of the United States* volume on Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges, and was published in the Soviet press in 1963, along with several other similar letters.

¹⁸ Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

¹⁹ Special Telegram No. 1967-1968, 22 November 1963, Documents Provided by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 20 June 1999 (hereafter Yeltsin Documents).

²⁰ *Washington Post*, 1 December 1963.

²¹ Special Telegram No. 1967-1968, 22 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents.

²² Resolution of the CC CPSU, "On Measures (to be Taken) to Discredit the Slandorous Fabrications in the American Press Regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's 'Connections' with the Soviet Union," 25 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents. It's not absolutely clear this instruction was sent to Dobrynin, since the document is labeled as a "Draft." If so, Dobrynin's 26 November cable was sent after he had not received any response to his 22 November suggestion re the consular files.

²³ Victor Riesel, "Soviet Insinuations Call for Query on Oswald," *Dallas Morning News*, 6 December 1963. Labeling Oswald in this manner was not altogether inaccurate; Oswald was an avid reader of Trotskyite periodicals in addition to literature that was more to Moscow's liking.

²⁴ Telegram Special No. 2005, 26 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents.

²⁵ Telegram Special No. 2002-2004, 25 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents.

²⁶ Recently published Presidium minutes are silent on this

matter; see footnote 31.

²⁷ Central Committee CPSU, "Excerpt from Protocol No. 126," 29 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents.

²⁸ Telegram Special No. 2054-2056, 30 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents.

²⁹ "Excerpt from Protocol No. 126," 29 November 1963, Yeltsin Documents. Rusk's notes on the conversation also indicate that Dobrynin did not carry out this part of his instructions.

³⁰ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 108.

³¹ The BKGB chief, Eduard Shirkovskiy, made precisely this argument in 1992. See State Department Cable re Oswald Files, 4 November 1992, Box 16, David Marwell Files, RG 541, JFK Assassinations Records, NARA.

³² In addition to keeping the Oswald's case file under lock and key, there are yawning gaps in the KGB, Central Committee, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents that have been released haphazardly. For example, almost none of what must have been substantial communications between Moscow and the Soviet embassy and/or KGB *rezidentura* in Mexico City have seen the light of day. And according to Dr. Vlad Zubok, in the recently published minutes of the Central Committee Presidium (Politburo), "there is a conspicuous absence of any discussion and/or mention of the Kennedy/ Oswald matter." See Protocol no. 125, Session 26 November 1963, in: A.A. Fursenko, i.a. (eds.), *Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964 Chernoviie protokolnie zapisi zasedanii. Stenogrammi. Postanovlenia*, vol. 1 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003).

³³ Though outdated, the best work on Soviet exploitation of the assassination remains Armand Moss, *Disinformation, Misinformation, and the 'Conspiracy' to Kill JFK Exposed* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1987). See also Max Holland, "The Power of Disinformation: The Lie That Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination," *Studies in Intelligence*, No. 11, Fall-Winter 2001, pp. 5-17.



Document No. 1
Cipher Telegram from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin to CPSU Central Committee,
22 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration]

[handwritten: 1279 [?] 146121 3

TOP SECRET

CIPHER TELEGRAM

WASHINGTON 53927 07 30 23 XI 63

_____53928

Special no. 1967-1968

HIGHEST PRIORITY

At 16 hours 00 minutes, the US telegraph agency reported that police in Dallas, Texas, had arrested US national Lee H. Oswald, 24 years old, chairman of the local branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, on suspicion that he had

assassinated Kennedy.

It is also reported that Oswald was in the USSR some time ago and is married to a Russian woman.

It was ascertained by checking at the consular section of the embassy that Oswald really did spend several years in Minsk, where he married Soviet citizen Marina Nikolayevna Prusakova (b. 1941). In June 1962, they returned to the US. In March 1963, Prusakova applied to return with her daughter to the USSR for permanent residency.

The KU [?] of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR (letter no. KU-USA-540058-24518 of 7 October 1963) reported that her application was rejected.

The consular section of the embassy has the correspondence between Prusakova and Oswald regarding her return to the USSR. The last letter from Lee Oswald was dated 9 November (the text was transmitted on the line [sic] of nearby neighbors).

It is possible that the US authorities may ask us to familiarize them with the correspondence in our possession.

The US authorities are aware of the existence of this final correspondence, since it was conducted through official mail.

Inasmuch as there is nothing that compromises us in this correspondence, we might agree to do this as a last resort (after removing our internal correspondence with the MFA).

Please give instructions on this matter.

Radio and television, which have interrupted all other programming and are broadcasting only reports relating to the murder of the President, *are alluding more and more often to the fact that the assassin was evidently connected with "extreme leftist elements."*

22 November 1963

A.Dobrynin



Document No. 2

Top Secret Cipher Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CPSU Central Committee, 25 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration.]

[handwritten: 1088/48121 [?] 11/26/1963

TOPSECRET 46
CIPHERTELEGRAM

Copy no. 12

WASHINGTON 54416 11 30 26 XI 63 54419 54417
Special no. 2002-2004

HIGHEST PRIORITY
CC CPSU

Today, during the President's reception, I had a number of brief conversations with US officials.

In the remarks of these persons, two things are worth noting:

1. All of them ([Secretary of State Dean] Rusk, [US Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn] Thompson, disarmament agency director Foster, high-ranking officials from the State Department), in addition to expressing their deep appreciation for the Soviet government's decision to send its special representative to Kennedy's funeral, made a point of saying from the outset they were sure that President Kennedy's policy on Soviet-US relations, as well as US foreign policy in general, would be kept [the same] under the new president—Lyndon Johnson.
2. In his conversation with me, Thompson pointedly touched on an issue he had discussed yesterday with comrade [Soviet ambassador] Dobrynin – the commentaries in the Soviet press concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, particularly the circumstances surrounding the investigation of this entire matter.

The gist of Thompson's comments was that the emphasis given in the Soviet press to the involvement of extreme right-wing circles in Kennedy's assassination (and then in Oswald's murder) complicates the situation of those in the US who favor improvement of Soviet-US relations, because the US press immediately counters such statement with assertions of Oswald's "communist and Cuban connections."

I told Thompson we did not want to make any complications; however, neither could we ignore a situation where the US government had not yet investigated all the circumstances surrounding the assassination, but the U.S. media were senselessly reproaching us and Cuba in connection with Kennedy's murder.

Thompson replied he was aware of that, but asked me to understand his remarks. The government is now investigating all the particulars of the case, Thompson said, and it is in our common interest to see that the Soviet press confine itself to setting forth the facts and refrain from "premature conclusions" until the end of the investigation, since this was only playing into the hands of right-wingers who were using this to fan anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria.

Judging from everything, the US government does now want to involve us in this matter, but neither does it want to get into a fight with the extreme rightists; it clearly prefers to consign the whole business to oblivion as soon as possible. Our reaction to these murders has already played its role. The President stated today publicly that a thorough investigation would be carried out.

I believe that in further statements by our press, this point should be taken into account. This will help weaken attempts to foment an anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban campaign.

A.Mikoyan
25 November 1963

Document No. 3
Cipher Telegram from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to CPSU Central Committee, 26 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration.]

LS no.0692061-26
 JS/BL
 Russian

[handwritten: 1077/4367[?]] [illegible]

TOP SECRET [illegible] 46 CIPHER TELEGRAM

[handwritten: 136 37 Copy no. WASHINGTON 54607 9
 40 27 XI 63

54419 54417

Special no. 2005

HIGHEST PRIORITY

Please note [Lee Harvey] Oswald's letter of 9 November, the text of which was transmitted to Moscow over the line [?] of nearby neighbors.

This letter was clearly a provocation: it gives the impression we had close ties with Oswald and were using him for some purposes of our own. It was totally unlike any other letters the embassy had previously received from Oswald. Nor had he ever visited our embassy himself. The suspicion that the letter is a forgery is heightened by the fact that it was typed, whereas the other letters the embassy had received from Oswald before were handwritten.

One gets the definite impression that the letter was concocted by those who, judging from everything, are involved in the President's assassination. It is possible that Oswald himself wrote the letter as it was dictated to him, in return for some promises, and then, as we know, he was simply bumped off after his usefulness had ended.

The competent US authorities are undoubtedly aware of this letter, since the embassy's correspondence is under constant surveillance. However, they are not making use of it for the time being. Nor are they asking the embassy for any information about Oswald himself; perhaps they are waiting for another moment.

The question also arises as to whether there is any connection now between the wait-and-see attitude of the US authorities and the ideas conveyed by [US ambassador Llewellyn] Thompson (though he himself may not be aware of this connection) on the desirability of some restraint on the part of the Soviet press and gradually hushing up the entire matter of Kennedy's assassination. Perhaps that is exactly what the federal authorities were inclined to do when

they learned all the facts and realized the danger of serious international complications if the interested US groups, including the local authorities in Dallas, continued to fan the hysteria over the "leftist" affiliations of Kennedy's assassin and the exposés we would have to issue in this case.

The main question now is: should we give the US authorities Oswald's last letter if they ask for our consular correspondence with him (there is nothing else in it that could be used to compromise us). After weighing all the pros and cons, we are inclined to pass on this letter as well to the authorities if they request all the correspondence, because if we don't pass it on, the organizers of this entire provocation could use this fact to try casting suspicion on us.

Please confirm [receipt].

Agreed upon with A.I. Mikoyan.

26 November 1963
 A.Dobrynin



Document No. 4
Top Secret Cipher Telegram from Anatoly Dobrynin to CPSU Central Committee, 30 November 1963

[Source: Yeltsin Documents, US National Archives and Records Administration.]

LS no.0692061-29
 JS/PH
 Russian

[handwritten number: 113]
 [handwritten: 1062/15124 ciph/12-1-63

TOP SECRET [illegible] 46

[handwritten: 126 116] Copy no. 12
 WASHINGTON 55380 8 50 1 XII 63
 55381 55382

Special no. 2054-2056
 URGENT

Today I met Rusk and handed him photocopies of the embassy's correspondence with Oswald, commenting appropriately on his final letter of 9 November (your special no. 1328).

Rusk thanked me for turning over these documents, saying he greatly appreciated the Soviet side's initiative in this matter. In addition, Rusk inquired if he could make this correspondence available to the newly formed presidential special commission chaired by *Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren*. I replied that we left it totally to his discretion whether to present this material to anyone, as we were sure he would

properly appreciate our step and would act appropriately.

Rusk thanked me again for the photocopies. It was evident that Rusk was quite unprepared for this step on our part, while at the same time (judging from his general behavior) he was pleased with this development.

Rusk asked me, if I could, to find out in Moscow the reasons why the Soviet authorities had refused to grant Soviet citizenship to Oswald when he was still living in the Soviet Union. *I promised to forward his request. Please instruct me how to answer Rusk.*

Rusk noted in conclusion that he hoped for the Soviet side's cooperation if the Warren Commission had any requests or queries relating to its investigation. He, Rusk, would then want to turn to me confidentially.

Rusk also said he wanted to use our meeting to touch on certain other matters unofficially.

1. *Rusk informed me* that yesterday President Johnson had received FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] director [Najeeb E.] Halaby and instructed him to meet with Soviet representatives for a final settlement of technical issues related to a future agreement on the establishment of a New York-Moscow air route. The US embassy in Moscow has been instructed to consult the MFA on the USSR on this matter. Halaby would be ready to come to Moscow 10-11 December.

Rusk then noted that this entire idea belonged to him, since, apart from the issue itself, he thought it important to show that business was continuing under the new president in the same manner as under J. Kennedy. President Johnson agreed with this, according to Rusk.

2. *Rusk then mentioned his meetings with [Soviet Foreign Minister] A.A. Gromyko in New York and Washington at which he raised the issue of the military budget. "I think," he told me, "that soon, in about 10-15 days, I will be able to tell you [the ambassador] in strict confidence the amount the US government plans to appropriate for the military in next year's fiscal budget. It will not be larger than the present amount and might even be less."* Rusk then wondered when we would be considering the budget. He did not pose the question directly, but one could gather that he would also like to get some information on this subject from us as well.

Rusk emphasized several times that his remarks did not mean the US government was now concluding some agreement with the Soviet government on this matter. It could not do this for the reasons that had already been set forth in talks with A.A. Gromyko. Nor could it guarantee that the figures Rusk intends to provide us soon in a strictly unofficial form would not be changed later in some way by the US Congress itself, which constitutionally and traditionally has its rights. But he, Rusk, is continuing to think about the usefulness of such an unofficial exchange of opinions "on mutual intentions."

3. Having mentioned his remarks in the talks with A.A. Gromyko "on the subversive activities of [Cuban leader Fidel] Castro's government," Rusk asked me to convey to him in this connection, in a strictly personal, unofficial form, that

it had been precisely determined that the three tons of weapons seized the other day in Venezuela had come from Cuba. (Rusk said: "We checked out in particular the numbers of the rifles purchased by Castro some time ago in Belgium and seized now in Venezuela.")

"I am saying this," Rusk noted, "not as any representation or comment. Nor can this be the subject of an official talk between us, since Castro's government exercises authority in its own country and it is unlikely that it consults with anyone when it decides to send weapons to one Latin American country or another, although the Chinese (Rusk added parenthetically, as it were) might be mixed up in this." Rusk said in conclusion: "I by no means wish to exaggerate the significance of this incident in Venezuela, it's not that great, but I would simply like to bring this last example to the attention of Mr. Gromyko, with whom I spoke about this matter before. Of course, *I do not expect any answer in this matter, and please don't mention in official conversations and talks what I said today.*"

I told Rusk that the latest events in Venezuela were well known, and if one were to speak frankly, they clearly showed the world once more that the Betancourt regime had no popular support, especially now, on the eve of elections; therefore, would it not be logical to expect (and judging from everything, this is indeed the case) that this regime is prepared to stage any provocation, even an international one, just to remain in power?

Rusk smiled but said nothing more.

A fair amount of time was devoted to discussing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, Rusk did not say anything new compared to his previous statements on this subject. I reiterated our position.

Rusk noted in the course of the conversation that the upcoming NATO meeting in December of this year would be "routine in nature" and, judging from everything, issues relating to the establishment of NATO nuclear forces would basically not be discussed there (Rusk interjected that these issues "are generally discussed through other channels," but did not amplify on this theme).

Rusk said there were no plans yet for a trip to the upcoming NATO meeting by the new president, Johnson, but it has not been ruled out completely. "Evidently," Rusk said as though thinking out loud, "Johnson may instead travel to Europe this spring to meet with a number of heads of states that are US allies. But for the time being, no meetings have been planned specifically between the new president and other heads of state, although there is agreement in principle about such meetings with some of them."

In conclusion, Rusk asked me again to consider our meeting unofficial, as if held "in a family atmosphere." The entire conversation was between the two of us; nobody else was in the office.

Rusk looks very tired; his eyes are red from sleeplessness ("I'm sleeping 3-4 hours a day right now," he remarked), but he himself is animated, in an obviously good mood, and gives the appearance of a person secure about his present position in spite of the change in presidents.


30 November 1963

A. Dobrynin

REPORT: No. 1328 (outgoing no. 33600) of 29 November 1963.

Comrade Gromyko said the embassy could give Rusk photocopies of the embassy's correspondence with Oswald, including his letter of 9 November, but without waiting for a request by the U.S. authorities.

Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963



By Ilya V. Gaiduk

Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict.

The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. Initially, the Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.

CWIHP hosted the book launch for *Confronting Vietnam* at the Wilson Center on 28 April 2004. More information about that event can be found at <http://cwihp.si.edu>

To order this book, consult the Wilson Center Press at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org> or Stanford University Press at <http://www.sup.org>.

Comments on this book

"The subject is intrinsically important. The best features of the book are Gaiduk's utilization of archival documents. I found the materials on Geneva and Laos to be truly fascinating—I was learning as I turned each page."—Larry Berman, University of California, Davis, and author of *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*. "From the time of the war itself, journalists and scholars have attempted to decipher Soviet policy toward the conflicts in Vietnam and Laos from printed sources, mostly the Soviet press and speeches of top Soviet leaders. This is the first work solidly grounded in Soviet archival material. It will immediately supplant all prior studies on the subject."—**George Herring**, University of Kentucky

Mongolian Archives

By Sergej Radchenko

In the spring 2003 issue of *Cold War History* I authored an essay on the Mongolian archives, lamenting the lack of access to historical documents, and incredible red tape suffered by rare researchers, and the fear and trembling of the archivists themselves when it comes to openness and freedom of information in Mongolia. In the six months that followed, in countless meetings with government authorities—faceless bureaucrats, enthusiastic listeners, and powerless sympathizers—I argued, persuaded, promised, threatened, appealed to democratic principles and quoted from Marx and Lenin to break through the ice of fear and indifference and open up Mongolian archives to research. But the archival ice proved to be firmer than the winter ice on the Tuul river that flows through Ulaanbaatar. On the other hand, I learned more about the Mongolian archives than I ever wanted to know.

The Khaan of the Mongolian archives is the National Archives Directorate (in Mongolian, *Undesni Arkhivyn Gazar* or UAG), which in reality exercises much less power than its promising name would indicate. The UAG officially oversees 34 archives, including all of the ministerial archives, the government archive and the provincial (or *aimag*) archives. But the lines of authority in this arrangement are severely compromised, because ministerial archives take instructions from their respective ministries and not from the UAG.

The only archive subordinate to the Directorate is the Central National Archive (*Undesni Tuv Gazar*), a vast depository of some 700,000 folders. The Central National Archive itself has 6 branches, including the general historical department, the audio and visual archive and the historical archive of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The general historical department would excite a Mongolia specialist; it holds, for instance, a large collection of ancient undecipherable documents, such as the 1675 border agreement between the Mongolian and the Manchurian khans. From more recent history, the department offers copies of documents on the Soviet-Mongolian relations from the 1920s-early 1950s, obtained from Russia's RGASPI. There is little of interest to a Cold War historian in these collections. The audio and visual archive has a blockbuster collection of official films, celebrating the Soviet-Mongolian friendship. By far the most important place for Cold War research is the party archive. The MPRP, still in power, passed its old papers (everything up to 1990) to the Central National Archive in 1998. These materials include Central Committee plenums, documents from party departments, records of the Politburo discussions and the Mongolian leaders' personal papers. Some of these documents, for instance, Yumjagin Tsendenbal's personal papers, are stored without any order, still to be catalogued. Other materials, however, are distributed across fonds, subdivided into registers (*tov'yogs*) and folders (*khadgalakh negj* or *kh/n*).

Researchers who managed to gain access to this archive are generally allowed to see materials from the Central Committee departments, records of plenum discussions, and politburo resolutions. Of these, plenum materials are of particular importance for Cold War historians, as MPRP plenums were often used as a podium for attack against Tsendenbal and the unbreakable Soviet-Mongolian friendship. Fonds 1 and 4 are also very useful, as they contain a large collection of Tsendenbal's memoranda of conversations with foreign ambassadors and politicians (for instance, Tsendenbal's meetings with the Soviet, Chinese and the North Korean ambassadors). Politburo transcripts and Tsendenbal's personal papers (including his personal diary and most important memcons) are all off limits to researchers. Yet, even access to "open documents" is highly problematic and depends more than anything on researcher's own connections.

The Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, only on paper connected with the UAG, is a treasure trove for Cold War historians; it holds extensive day-to-day records of Mongolia's foreign relations from the early 20th century until our day. The archive's 30,000 folders (*kh/n*), spread across some 145 fonds contain valuable evidence on Mongolia's relations with its closest neighbors, China and the Soviet Union, accounts of landmark events (such as the 1971 Lin Biao incident), countless records of conversations between Mongolian and foreign leaders and all diplomatic correspondence. Following the Russian usage, secret materials are marked by a zero in front of the fond number—for instance, "02" stands for the secret Soviet-related materials, and "05" for Chinese-related materials. Distinction between "secret" and "open" materials is purely philosophical. Access to any documents is difficult at best. Declassification is governed both by the 1998 Mongolian Law on Archives (with its thirty year rule) and internal directives, which prescribe much tighter secrecy, no less than 60 years for documents of any importance. One way or another, declassification in the Foreign Ministry Archive, as in many other Mongolian archives, works only on paper. After enduring considerable red tape, this author was allowed to look at some of the open materials—mundane diplomatic correspondence mingled with a few noteworthy items (for instance, Vyacheslav Molotov's original diplomatic credentials and hand-written records of Klement Voroshilov's talks with the Mongolian leaders in 1957). At the same time, several Mongolian scholars have benefited from a much better access to this archive.

Another interesting archive for Cold War research is the Government Archive, located in the magnificent main government headquarters, built (I am told) by the Japanese prisoners of war in the 1940s. As I mentioned in my earlier piece in *Cold War History*, the Government Archive is the central depository of the Mongolian Council of Ministers records, and its holdings mainly cover economic issues. However, the

archive also has a large number of Deputy Prime Minister's memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders and ambassadors, some of which touch on political issues. The Government Archive reportedly has an interesting collection of classified documents from the Cold War period, but this author has not yet been able to get access to them.

To mention a few other useful archives: the Defense Ministry Archive is halfway open to some researchers. It holds immensely interesting documents on Mongolia's relations with the Warsaw Pact countries and records of joint Soviet-Mongolian military exercises in 1979, in response to the Sino-Vietnamese War. More curious documents are found in the Central Intelligence Archive, including intelligence and reports on the Lin Biao incident (with many photographs). Access to this archive is utterly impossible, all the more so after recent scandals with unauthorized release of materials related to repressions in Mongolia in the 1930s, but experience suggests possible workarounds.

Since access to the archives in Mongolia remains difficult and frustrating, I frequently found it much easier to work with private document collections, eagerly shared by retired Mongolian policy-makers who also offered valuable commentaries to these documents, over a bottle or two of Mongolian *arkhi*. Some Mongolian historians have also collected important materials over the years and published them openly. The most interesting example is Tsedenbal's personal diary, published in abridged form in 1991 by B. Sumya.¹ Some records of conversations between Tsedenbal, Choibalsan, and Stalin were published in the early 1990s in the central newspapers, at the high tide of the Mongolian *glasnost*.²

Overall, Mongolian archives contain very important evidence on the Cold War, especially on the Sino-Soviet split. For decades Ulaanbaatar had been the Soviet voice in Asia. The Mongolians sided with Moscow in the quarrel with Beijing despite Chinese political and economic pressure. Indeed, Mongolian leaders were often more explicitly anti-Chinese than their Soviet comrades. This fact alone shows the tremendous role of cultural differences and antagonisms between neighboring Asian nations. Mongolian elites, however, were in disagreement over the country's future. Whereas some leading figures insisted on ever closer relations with the Soviet Union, to the point of accession, others urged caution and even suggested to play on the Sino-Soviet differences to chart an independent course. These disagreements were often at the center of power struggles in Ulaanbaatar, indicating a much more complex political landscape of Moscow's relations with its closest allies than previously thought. Mongolian archives also reflect on Soviet foreign policy, evidenced in dozens of records of conversations between the Soviet leaders and Tsedenbal, for he had seemingly closer relations with Moscow than any other leader of the socialist commonwealth. Last but not least, Mongolia's unique geographic position at the heart of Asia allowed Mongolian leaders frequent meetings with Asian powerbrokers—Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, Ho Chi Minh and others. Mongolian archives therefore hold valuable evidence on foreign relations of Asian countries at the time when many

Asian archives remain completely inaccessible to scholars.

In partnership with the Civic Education Project and the Mongolian Institute for Internal Studies, the Cold War International History Project and its partners, including the George Washington University Cold War Group, London Cold War Study Centre, National Security Archive, and the Parallel History Project, held an exploratory workshop on "Mongolia and the Cold War" in Ulaanbaatar, on 19-20 March 2004. The workshop will provide a forum for discussing Mongolia's evidence on the Cold War, exchanging views on freedom of information and access to historical documents in a democratic society, and for considering possibilities for future collaboration between Mongolian and Western scholars and historians. The workshop's local co-sponsors are the American Centre for Mongolian Studies, Civic Education Project - Mongolia, National University of Mongolia, Open Society Institute, and the United States Embassy. Organizers hope that the workshop and the subsequent publication of selected Mongolian documents will contribute to the international Cold War scholarship, encourage research in the Mongolian archives, and advance the cause of freedom of information in Mongolia. For more information, please visit the workshop's website: http://serrad.by.ru/mongolia_workshop.shtm or contact CWIHP Associate Sergey Radchenko at S.S.Radchenko@lse.ac.uk. Further information is also available at the CWIHP website at <http://cwihip.si.edu> where translated documents obtained for the conference are slated to be published.

Sergey S. Radchenko is completing his PhD as the London School of Economics. He is the author of CWIHP Working Paper No. 42, "The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split" (November 2003), available at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.

NOTES

¹ B. Sumya (ed.), *Gerel Suuder: Yu. Tsedenbalyn Huviin Temdeglel* [Light and Shadow: Yu. Tsedenbal's Personal Diary], Ulaanbaatar, 1991.

² For instance, "Conversation between Joseph Stalin and Yumjagin Tsedenbal" (5 September 1952), *Unen* N9 (23 January 1992), p. 2.

Todor Zhivkov and the Cold War: Revelations from His Personal Papers

In cooperation with the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), the Cold War Research Group-Bulgaria gained access to the personal papers of longtime Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov in 2002. A first result of the research on the private papers of one of the longest-serving Communist leaders is a new CD-ROM on “Bulgaria and the Cold War. Documents from Todor Zhivkov’s Personal Records,” published by the Group in 2003. The collection covers the entire period of Zhivkov’s reign from his election as Communist party leader in 1954 through the collapse of communism in Bulgaria in 1989.

The CD-ROM contains more than 700 pages of previously unknown stenographic notes of Todor Zhivkov’s conversations and correspondence with over thirty foreign state and political leaders from all five continents spanning more than three decades. The documents contain new evidence on a key political and military conflicts throughout the world during the Cold War years.

The documents presented in a sampling below include a diverse array of conversations between the Bulgarian leader and foreign counterparts, including Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (24 January 1969), Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro (27 April 1970), Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (22 April 1980), US Undersecretary of State John Whitehead (4 February 1987), Chinese leaders Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping (6-7 May 1987), and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou (22 April 1989).

Future document samplers from this collection to be published by CWIHP online (<http://cwihp.si.edu>) will focus on events in the Middle East and in the Third World. Included in that collection will be conversations with Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, Syrian president Hafiz al-Assad, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and many leaders of the leftist guerilla movements from the countries in Central America and Africa. Also among the documents in the collection are several classified government decisions to make arms deliveries to Third World countries. The documents give new evidence for the role Bulgaria played in regional conflicts throughout the period, in particular in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974.

Additional publications from the collection will scrutinize Bulgaria’s relationship with the Soviet Union. While frequently seen as the “yes-man” in the bloc, Zhivkov’s conversations and correspondence with Brezhnev in 1973 and 1978/79 as well as with Konstantin Chernenko in 1984 will highlight some of Zhivkov’s internal and privately aired disagreements with the Soviets. The documents also reveal some of the methods he used to try to obtain from the Soviet leadership the concessions he most wanted.

The CD-ROM collection was prepared by a group of Bulgarian scholars and archivists (Jordan Baev, Boyko Mladenov, Kostadin Grozev, Mariana Lecheva) in coopera-

tion with the Central State Archive – Sofia and the Cold War International History Project. The collection’s English language translations were edited largely by Nancy L. Meyers (CWIHP).

The CD-ROM was introduced to the Bulgarian public during a visit to Sofia by CWIHP director Christian Ostermann in the fall of 2002 and has received widespread media coverage in all major Bulgarian newspapers and several radio and TV shows. For further information, contact Dr. Jordan Baev at baevj@mail.orbitel.bg.



DOCUMENT No. 1

Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Delhi, 24 January 1969

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 378-B, File 249; translated by Dr. Rositza Ishpekova, edited by Dr. Jordan Baev.]

Stenographic Report

Official talks

Between the President of the Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria Todor Zhivkov and the Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi
Delhi, 24 January 1969
11.30 A. M.

The talks attended:

From Bulgarian side – Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marii Ivanov, Minister of Machinery construction, Yanko Markov, Vice-President of the National Assembly, Milko Balev, Chief of the Prime-Minister’s office, Ognyan Tihomirov, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Trade, Hristo Dimitrov, Bulgarian Ambassador in Delhi;

By Indian side – Fahrudin Ahmed, Minister of Industry, Mohamed Kureshi, Deputy-Minister of Trade, Surendra Singh, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, etc.

INDIRA GANDHI: I would like once again to greet you and the attending people and to say how happy I am that you spared some time to come to our country.

As I already told you the other day we attribute great significance to our friendship with Bulgaria.

When I was in Bulgaria I acquainted you with some

aspects of the situation in our country.¹ Now I would like to acquaint you with some difficulties we have in leading our people ahead. [...]

Regarding the international situation.

Vietnam has advanced a small step ahead. Hopefully, this will lead to improving the situation there. Yet in spite of the negotiations the situation there is still very tense, full of explosions. Whatever happens – no matter whether the negotiations succeed or not – the situation in Southeast Asia remains equally difficult.

We back up peace in Vietnam. Changing the situation always creates certain difficulties. The countries from this region are receiving help from the USA at this moment, but I consider it an artificial force. Settling the problems via peaceful means would mean that the problems could be settled without an artificial force.

Recently I was in London at the conference of the British Commonwealth countries.² There I met the prime ministers of many countries – Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. They said they would like to have some defenses or some agreement in this respect, since they didn't feel safe enough. These countries had a meeting last year, but since nothing came out, they suggested having a new meeting.³

We think that each group would actually increase the tension in this part of the world.

As far as Western Asia /the Middle East/ is concerned we share common views and hence I have nothing to say. We are in close contact with Nasser and we see that he has gone significantly ahead in acknowledging some of Israel's demands – for instance the one regarding acknowledging the country Israel etc. Maybe the internal conflicts in Israel are an obstacle to and make the settling of the conflict there even more difficult.

After visiting Eastern Europe, I visited Latin America last year as well.⁴ I am of the impression that the Latin American countries, although being in the USA's sphere of influence and strongly dependent on them, are trying to free themselves from that influence. And we would have to help them, so that an opposition could be created. Of course, posing the question for all Latin-American countries should not be considered right, since some of them have different stances.

Our relationships with all countries are good, with the exception of two of our neighbors.

We are doing our best to find ways to relieve the tension, since it's not good to have neighbors with which we are in a state of hostility. Actually nothing in particular has been done in this respect. We must mention here the latest declarations of [Pakistani President] Ayub Khan. We will do our best to use every possible gesture in order to normalize the relationships between our two countries.

This is all I would say for the time being. You would probably want us to clarify some of the major issues.

We would readily hear your information and more specifically we would like to hear something about the attitude of Yugoslavia and Romania towards the Warsaw Treaty countries and about the situation in China and Albania.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I would above all like to thank you for the information. I would once again like to express our cordial gratitude for the invitation to visit your country and for the cordial and friendly hospitality you are showing us. We will tell our people about this hospitality and attention. We are deeply convinced that this will be highly appreciated in Bulgaria. We wish to develop a multilateral cooperation with India.

I would like to inform you in the same order you informed us.

You were in Bulgaria and you are aware of the problems we have to solve. That is why I will be brief. [...]

I will elaborate on some issues concerning the international situation.

We are worried by the war in Vietnam. We help the Vietnamese people as far as our abilities allow us to. Of course, the major help is offered by the Soviet Union, since Vietnam is fighting with Soviet arms. We will hardly imagine the struggling Vietnam's success without the Soviet Union's help. In spite of the Vietnamese people's heroism, the Americans could defeat it, since the USA's economy is 900 times stronger than that of Vietnam. But the Vietnamese people are heroically fighting with the help of the socialist countries and we are simply astonished by its heroism under such conditions.

We appreciate that the Vietnamese issue has now entered the phase of political resolution. Of course, there might be surprises. As you said, there might be explosions as well. But now things are going in the direction of political regulation. [US President Richard] Nixon will hardly take another course of action. But the negotiations will be extremely difficult. Contradictory interests are meeting. The issue could be solved on the basis of a compromise. But what kind of compromise? That is the problem. The fact that the Americans now are undertaking actions to conquer the villages in South Vietnam, which are now in the Vietcong's hands, must be stressed. Obviously their aim is to ensure a government working in their favor. The final result is difficult to predict. A lot depends on the progressive [segments of] mankind, on the struggle of the peaceful forces. The Vietnamese comrades are convinced that a political solution of the issue should be sought. There was a time when they were under Chinese influence. But now they back up a political solution of the issue. At present this already depends on the Americans. But they will probably withdraw their army from Vietnam when they are able to provide for them economically.

You correctly noticed that our positions regarding the Middle East are similar. We are in favor of a political solution of the issues there. The [Egypt], which is the major, decisive force among the Arab countries, got far ahead in terms of its conception and suggestions. After the UN's decision in 1967 they made their positions more concrete in the spirit of the UN's decision. There are countries, of course, such as Syria and others, which have more peculiar views. But this fact is not decisive. The major force is [Egypt], supported by the majority of Arab countries. We must admit that [Egyptian

president Gamal Abdel] Nasser shows political wisdom in this case. Nowadays, in our opinion, tension is created by the extremist forces in Israel. But, to be honest, we must admit that the Americans back them up. If the Americans move in the direction of a political solution of the issue, it will be solved very quickly, the same way the war was ceased. After the Americans told the Israelis to put an end to the war, they stopped their military actions. This is absolutely clear. I have been following the development of the problem concerning the war. After the Americans had been told they were going too far in the war, [US President Lyndon B.] Johnson issued a command and in a couple of hours an end was put to the war. The Americans should obviously not be allowed to take advantage of their military success. Otherwise a precedent will be created and the political solution of the issue in the interest of all countries from this region, in the interest of all other countries and of strengthening the peace throughout the world, will be inhibited.

I would like briefly to discuss the problems in Europe, since we live in this region.

Last year was a very dramatic year for Europe. I would say that a dangerous situation was created. As you know, enormous NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces are concentrated in Europe. If a Third World War breaks out, its outcome will be determined precisely in Europe. Any complication of the situation in Europe now or change of any kind of the ratio between the forces will turn out to be disastrous. Hence we conduct a policy of oppressing these forces that contribute to the international situation's complication. These forces are concentrated above all in Western Germany. They are revanchist forces.

I will not go into details in this question. Yet I would once again like to emphasize that what happened in Czechoslovakia [i.e. the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion in August] and in Europe and what is happening now—the conduction of big maneuvers, the concentration of new military units on the borders with the socialist countries—is extremely dangerous.

Regarding the Balkans. Fortunately or unfortunately Bulgaria is situated in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. They say that all of its neighbors took something from Bulgaria in the past, that they cut off living parts of it. But we do not raise such issues. We aim at making life for the people within the present boundaries of Bulgaria better. In spite of the fact of it being a small country, Bulgaria is a peace factor in this region. Not even a single Balkan issue can be solved without Bulgaria. The transportation links pass through our country, the Danube River also passes through Bulgaria, the major rivers in Turkey and Greece come from Bulgaria. Thus as a result of a lot of historical and geographical conditions, Bulgaria has become a country that can both complicate and improve the situation on the Balkans. We can turn the rivers for Turkey and Greece back, but don't do that, of course. On the contrary, we suggest undertaking measures for utilizing their water together.

Recently there has been an easing up of the political atmosphere on the Balkans. Whatever happens, this process

could not be reversed. For instance, a military junta has assumed power in Greece [in April 1967] that has no social support in the country. But it is forced to talk of good neighborly relations, of peace on the Balkans. Now they even make more declarations than us.

Our relations with Turkey are developing well. This holds true of our relations with Yugoslavia and Romania as well. After the military junta came into power in Greece there has been certain stagnation in the development of our relations, yet recently there has been some improvement. The different events that take place, the fuss that has been made on the Balkans, should be considered and estimated as a state of affair events. Of course, there are a lot of forces and contradictions on the Balkan peninsula. But we see no serious reasons to complicate the situation. Of course, a major role is played by the international situation.

Regarding your question about Yugoslavia and Romania.

In the last couple of years our mutual cooperation with Yugoslavia has advanced significantly. We are in constant contact. We have had meetings with Tito a couple of times. But sometimes there are certain questions, which vex our relations. One of them is the so-called Macedonian question. Some nationalist circles in Yugoslavia have taken advantage of this question. We uphold the view that the Macedonian question has been historically inherited. Raising this issue and aggravating the situation is not beneficial to our countries and peoples. On the contrary, we must use it to strengthen the friendship and cooperation between the two countries and peoples. The question should be left to the scholars, to the historians to discuss. But we must not tackle this problem from a historical perspective. This has been one of the issues we have reached an agreement on with Tito.

The second issue we have reached an agreement on concerns the formation of a Macedonian national consciousness that should not be done on an anti-Bulgarian basis, as it is now. All previous statistics—Turkish, Serbian, etc.—spoke of 1,200,000 Bulgarians. We do not raise this question, but they sometimes do. They make a lot of fuss. We show patience, because if we start answering the situation will become worse. We agree with Tito's recent declarations that there could be no peace and good relations on the Balkans without good relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. We support this view and our efforts have been directed towards overcoming some difficulties that have cropped up as a result of the Macedonian issue and the events in Czechoslovakia.

Our bilateral relations with Romania are marvelous. Our economic cooperation is extending. There is a cultural exchange between us. Their delegations constantly visit our country and our delegations—their country; that is we constantly exchange experience. Yet we have diverging opinions on some issues related to the international situation. We openly discuss these issues with comrade [Romanian president Nicolae] Ceausescu. But neither have I influenced him in any respect, nor has he influenced me, although we frequently go hunting together. [...]

The major thing that our relations both with Yugoslavia and Romania should be based on is the constant extension of our contacts and links. We are doing our best in this respect.

We are not well acquainted with the issues regarding Asia. As far as the attempts at creating a military group in this region are concerned, I completely share your view.

You are acquainted with our views regarding China. It's a pity that the things are the way they are in the country, which has the largest population in the world. Our relations with China are not well developed. The same goes for trade with [China]. Of course, we prize our friendship with the Chinese people and in the future we'll do our best to restore the old friendship and cooperation with the great country of China.

We might discuss with you some question regarding the bilateral cooperation.

INDIRA GANDHI: Our cultural relations with you are good, but our economic relations must be improved.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Yes, I agree with you.

INDIRA GANDHI: I would once again like to thank you for you responding to our invitation and coming to India. What you said about your country and Europe was very interesting for us. I am sure your stay here will be interesting and pleasant.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: It is already very pleasant. We feel in India as we would in a friendly country.

(1:00 p.m.)



DOCUMENT No. 2

Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Zhivkov and Italian Foreign Minister Aldo Moro, 27 April 1970

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, fond 378-B, file 269. Document obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Rositza Ishpekova.]

TALKS

Between Comrade Todor Zhivkov and Aldo Moro, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy 27 April 1970

[Stenographic Notes]

Today, the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, comrade Todor Zhivkov, received Mr. Aldo Moro, Italian Foreign Minister, who is making an official visit to our

country. The meeting was attended by:

Ivan Bashev – Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Lambo Teolov – Bulgarian Ambassador in Italy;
Parvan Chernev – Head of Fourth Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Giuseppe Purini – Italian Ambassador in Bulgaria

TODOR ZHIVKOV: This is your first visit to Bulgaria. We greatly appreciate your coming to our country. [...]

ALDO MORO: Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to thank you for the invitation to visit your country and for your courtesy now. I would also like to say that this visit is an expression of our good attitude to and interest in your country. What we greatly value in your country, among other things, is the obvious development of all sectors of your economic life. That is what made me accept your invitation to visit your country. After the long government crisis, this is my first visit abroad. I am grateful that you invited me and gave me the opportunity to make this visit at a time convenient for me. I would also like to admit that our relations are good in all spheres of life, but I also think there are great opportunities for further development. Making a survey of our relations in all spheres of life, I came to the conclusions that there isn't even a single sphere in which there is no cooperation between our countries. But as I already said, there are even greater opportunities that we will continue to discuss in our talks with Mr. Bashev. Later we will continue to discuss these opportunities via our ambassadors, who have done quite a lot for the development of our relations. A couple of days ago I visited your pavilion at the fair in Milan, where I tasted your wine and cheese for the first time. I had the chance to speak to your representative and was assured that our exchanges are developing [well] and there are additional opportunities. So that we must now do more to help realize these new opportunities. There are projects for further cooperation. I would like to say that as far as we are concerned, we shall discuss these opportunities in great detail. We have signed a trade agreement, which ensures the development of our relations.

As you said there are problems related to peaceful mutual coexistence and cooperation in Europe. This is an issue we will be discussing in greater detail. We consider bilateral relations very useful in the preparation of a wider European meeting. I think that a new atmosphere has been created in Europe. Of course, not all difficulties have been overcome. But we cannot deny the existence of an attempt among the peoples and governments to come to know each other better. There is a will and hope for the establishment of relations based on trust. Our trust has been increasing and we must support it via concrete acts. We would like to extinguish all dangerous war zones. We also consider a war out of the question. Peace is not something passive. We have taken the appropriate route. We are all involved in a competition and our actions are contributing towards achieving this common goal. I consider the latter to be a contribution to the develop-

ment of our contacts with all countries and above all the ones that favor such a dialogue. This is actually a dialogue about Europe and the world. Hence I am grateful for your invitation. I do hope that this visit will be a step forward along the path of peaceful mutual coexistence that can be very fertile.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We think that we might cooperate successfully with Italy, we might cooperate to ensure peace in Europe. The issue of European security is an enormous one. We think that a rational solution to this issue might be found, which will be decisive for the development of the world, for avoiding a Third World War which would definitely be a nuclear war. Second, we might cooperate successfully with Italy in the region of the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Bulgaria is not a big country, but fortunately or not, it is situated in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula and no issue can be solved without it. Our country has proved many times that it supports understanding between the Balkan countries. Peace on the Balkan Peninsula can be achieved only if it is connected with peace in the Mediterranean and vice versa—peace in the Mediterranean can be ensured only if there is peace in the Balkans. These two things cannot be separated. And I believe that the talks with our minister of foreign affairs in this respect will be interesting. We are interested in close cooperation with you.

As far as our bilateral relations are concerned, it would be appropriate to discuss the problem of their development on a qualitatively new basis. As state and social figures we have to be realists and to know that the possibilities for the further trade development between our countries have been exhausted. Because the trade is now unilateral to some extent. It is based on the import of machines and equipment from Italy, which we will be much interested in in the future and the export from our country mainly of agricultural products. There obviously exists some kind of a contradiction that must be overcome. How do we see the overcoming of this contradiction? We must direct our efforts towards specialization, especially in the sphere of industry. There should be an exchange of industrial products in both directions, and also of machine-building products. Some Western circles are not well informed and do not have an accurate idea about our country. Bulgaria is viewed as some kind of agricultural country that, in spite of its moving ahead, still remains agricultural. This idea is radically false. I will now illustrate my opinion with a couple of facts. According to some data from the UN Economic Committee, Bulgaria is first in the world according to some criteria and second – after Japan, according to other. What I have in mind is the rate of development. [...]

Let's take as example electronics. We signed agreements in the period 1971-1975 to export electronics to the Soviet Union valued at 700 million rubles. [...] Now we have been working hard to open six electronics plants. This means that by the middle of the year we will have 10 electronics plants.

I'm giving these examples not to praise our country – we are experiencing a lot of difficulties and hardship. We, the present leaders of the state, are ordinary people. What is most important is that Bulgaria is developing at a rapid rate.

[...]

So Bulgaria should not be underestimated. It is not a big country, its population is about 8.5 million, yet we have one ambition – to catch up with the advanced countries. I consider it a noble ambition. It goes without saying that a country that has set forth such ambitions cannot be thinking of war. On the contrary, its foreign policy is directed towards the elimination of war, towards the preservation of peace. To be honest, we must admit that communism will rule in the world not by means of war. It will win without a war. I have no intention to persuade you, I would just like to put forth this thesis. It is peace.

ALDO MORO: Mr. President, I would like to emphasize two things. We first of all consider peace to be a global necessity. Hence there can be no peace in Europe, which is not related to the peaceful conditions in the Mediterranean. Within this framework, we agree with the idea about Bulgaria's role in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. I would like to say that we appreciate Bulgaria's efforts to have good-neighborly relations with the other Balkan countries. We also appreciate its contribution to ensuring peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. But we will be discussing this issue with Mr. Bashev.

The second thing I would like to dwell on is the fact that we appreciate Bulgaria's efforts directed towards its economic development. You said your aim was to reach the advanced countries. I would like to say that Italy is well developed in only one of its parts, in another—the southern part, it has to solve the same problems, as you have to solve. So that there is a mutual interest to exchange experience—and I consider the cooperation between us in this sphere of general interest. We can exchange experience; can come to know each other better. I think that there is still some way to develop our economic relations, there is the possibility to quantitatively and qualitatively balance our exchange. The principle of liberalization that is our guiding principle promotes the development of exchange of goods. [...]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I absolutely agree with what Mr. Moro said here. We value Italy as a well-developed industrial country. I think that it occupies seventh place in the world according to its industrial potential. We are quickly developing our productive forces now and we are interested in buying plants and equipment from Italy and we do believe that we will find a beneficial solution. I hope your visit will be helpful in this respect. We are confronted with a big question. I think you are confronted with it too. Respectively that we are far behind the Americans in the sphere of technology. We are not well acquainted with the American industry and technology. But we are well aware that what is happening in Japan widely applies American techniques. Let me give you only one example. A couple of years ago an enormous plant for fertilizer production was built in Vratza. A Belgian trade company supplied it. It is already working. There are 400 people working in such a plant in Japan, while in our country their number is 1,500. You are probably also concerned with such problems. [...] This is the essence of the problem that we are confronted

with. Europe is lagging behind America by 1.5 to 2 times. These are problems with which both you and we are confronted. [...] We will be buying machines and equipment from Italy, those we consider good.

ALDO MORO: These problems are ours as well. [...] It is our task to achieve a higher level of technology and to be in step with the times...

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I thank you for your visit and for the talks we had. I would once again like to express our pleasure with your visit. Please send both my and my party government's greetings to your prime minister and to your government. We are convinced we will be going ahead and will cooperate.

ALDO MORO: Thank you for receiving me.



DOCUMENT No. 3

Memorandum of Conversation between Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov and the President of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Yasser Arafat at Zhivkov's Residence in Damascus, 22 April 1980

[Source: *Central State Archive, Sofia*. Document obtained by *Jordan Baev* and translated by *Rositza Ishpekova*.]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I am happy to greet you and express my contentment that we are meeting again.

We are visiting your region. You directly observe the events here, you are better aware of the way things are here and the way they are developing. What are we going to do further on?

We consider the relationship between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the PLO to be good. Our present meeting will further enhance the development of this relationship. I would like to assure you that we will do whatever depends on us in this respect.

It so happened that I was the first among the first leaders of the fraternal socialist countries to visit Castro in Cuba, to visit Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, as well as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos immediately after the Chinese aggression [in February 1979]. This is the way our party has brought us up.

We spoke with [Syrian President] Comrade Hafiz al-Assad both yesterday and today, tomorrow we will continue our conversation, and on Thursday we are going back to Bulgaria. The talks we are having are carried out in an open, friendly atmosphere. We still haven't discussed the Palestinian question. Tomorrow we are continuing our talks.

YASSER ARAFAT: I thank you for this meeting, comrade Zhivkov. I would once again like to express our gratitude for Bulgaria's support for the just struggle of the Arab people of Palestine and the rest of the Arab countries, which are living in a complicated period of their development and which have been exposed to an increasing pressure on the part of the imperialist countries. Your present visit is a reflection of the principled and permanent support that Bulgaria lends to the national liberation movement and to the progressive regimes. It is not by chance that it was you who was the first state leader from the socialist community to officially accept me.

I thank you for coming to Syria at this difficult moment. Syria is being turned into the major target of the imperialist invasion in this region, which necessitates lending support to overcome the difficult situation that was created. It has to bear all the difficulties in the struggle. It is not by chance that the imperialists are directing their efforts against Syria. It is the socialist countries' duty to be alongside it. I am totally convinced that Syria will cope with the difficult situation and come out of the difficult situation. Your visit will exert a favorable influence not only on Syria, but on Lebanon as well.

You are acquainted with the resolutions of the last [12-15 April 1980 Fourth Summit] conference of the countries of the "Steadfastness Front" in Tripoli.⁶ It is true that we did not achieve everything we wanted there. But the resolutions are an important step ahead. I am speaking not only on behalf of the PLO, but also on behalf of all participants. Both PLO and Syria have presented a working draft.

We can definitely state the following: we are taking into account the present situation in the Arab world, so the resolutions of the conference in Tripoli are a positive fact. Many criticisms were directed at the conference, people declared it would be a total failure. They said that the "Steadfastness Front" was born in Tripoli and will die in Tripoli. They relied on the contradictions between the PLO and Libya.

The conference took place thanks to the great efforts made personally by Hafiz al-Assad to create the necessary conditions and to overcome the contradictions between PLO and Libya. At least fifty percent of the major contradictions between us have been successfully solved; the talks on the settlement of the other issues are under way.

What is most important is the victory of the anti-imperialist spirit at the conference in Tripoli. The struggle of the Arab peoples preserved its character and its anti-imperialist orientation. It is this orientation that the conference follows. It will give an impetus to the struggle of the Arab peoples. The conference drew a divide between the friends, on the one hand, and enemies and imperialist agents in the region, on the other. Our friends are the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union. [Libyan leader Col. Muammar] Qaddafi is going to visit the Soviet Union to present the resolutions of the conference. The aim is to consolidate and deepen even to a greater extent the relations with the socialist community, led by the Soviet Union. The conference's resolutions create even better conditions for the fulfillment of the latter aim.

The remaining resolutions of the conference will also help us to oppose the imperialists' offensive. The USA have

not abandoned their intentions in the region – indicative of this fact are their actions in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and others; the creation of a fast action corps; the Carter doctrine [aimed at the protection of vital US interests in the Persian Gulf region]; the way they take advantage of the Afghanistan problem; the way they take advantage of the contradictions between Iran and Iraq; the way they increase the tension in South Lebanon in order to cause a collision between Israel and the PLO.

Under these circumstances the results of the conference of the countries of the “Steadfastness Front” are successful, its resolutions are positive.

Assad put a lot of efforts in trying to ensure the success of the conference. We hesitated whether to go to Libya. We insisted on its taking place in Damascus since the major struggle is carried out in Syria.

As far as the situation in the Arab/Persian Gulf is concerned – what is important is not how the Gulf will be named, but that there should be no American military bases around it.

Dangerous are also the relations between Iraq and Iran, since they not only concern the relations between the two countries, but they have an impact on the relations between all the countries in this region. Jordan and Saudi Arabia are Iraq’s neighbors, the Gulf countries are also its neighbors. There are difficulties in bringing the Arab countries in closer relations with Iran.

[President Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew] Brzezinski once said that the USA would be free to act when contradictions between Iran and Iraq arise.

The contradictions between Iraq and Iran are dangerous. The conflict may give the USA the opportunity to fulfill their aims in Iran. They have become even closer friends with Iraq, with [Iraqi leader] Saddam Hussein.

I would be glad if you can elaborate on your forthcoming [May-June 1980] visit in Iraq.

The [1978] Camp David agreement [between Egypt and Israel] reached a dead end. This was admitted by the Jews in America and Israel. It has been emphasized in declarations of the Jewish leaders.

[Egyptian President Anwar el-] Sadat has been making new concessions to the USA and Israel, and his actions and behavior are creating new dangers: he has been trying and has managed to loosen the loop around the American diplomacy in the Arab East. There is a dangerous element, consisting of three parts: Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank of the Jordan River.

There has been a new division inside the occupied territories. People are coming out with a new, more flexible platform in the Israeli elections. It will doubtlessly make things difficult for us. The Labor Party, [under Party leader Shimon] Peres might win.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Will the situation change drastically?

YASSER ARAFAT: The Americans will bless it. A change has been noticed in [Israeli President Ezer] Weitzman’s behavior,

who is openly criticizing [Israeli Prime Minister Menachem] Begin’s policy.

What is most dangerous?

There are two points.

First of all, the construction that was under way in the occupied Arab territories has been stopped.

Secondly, a possibility exists that Israel might reach an agreement with Jordan, the spirit of Camp David might be restored, and Jordan might start negotiations again. This will doubtlessly disrupt the equilibrium of forces in the region. We are making efforts to oppose that.

The Iran–Iraq conflict is only beneficial to imperialism. It might cause a polarization in the Islamic world by creating anti-Iran attitudes in the Arab countries supported by Iraq, such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan and others.

This could in the long run lead to the Arabs’ losing Iran’s support. Hence we support the settling of the conflict, since the Palestinian cause is the one that suffers losses from it.

We have supported the Soviet Union. Imperialism, and more specifically the USA, have been trying to take advantage of the events in Afghanistan and to instigate a belligerent attitude of the Arab and Muslim people against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The PLO played a significant role at the conferences of the Islamic Foreign Ministers, held in Islamabad [on 26–27 January 1980] and in Morocco [in May 1979]. The PLO delegation raised its voice against the attempts to place the Soviet Union and the USA on an equal footing and against the condemnation of the Soviet interference in Afghanistan there. Moreover, the Palestinian delegation at the conference in Morocco demanded that the USA be condemned for their help for the Israeli occupation of the seized Arab lands and Jerusalem above all, which is one of the most sacred places for the Muslims all over the world. It also demanded that the Soviet Union should be thanked and that the Palestinian question should be considered one of primary importance. As a result of this tactic the attempt to condemn the Soviet Union failed at the very beginning. We were expecting a severe battle at the annual meeting of the conference of the Islamic foreign ministers in Islamabad. We put efforts into trying to make the countries from the “Steadfastness Front” meet before Islamabad and sign an agreement.

We will now have to think over the new Iran initiative regarding Afghanistan. They suggest sending a neutral international commission there, which would investigate the facts concerning the foreign interference in the country. A resolution was adopted to cease diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. If the resolution for creating and sending such a commission to Afghanistan is adopted this will practically mean canceling the present resolution for excluding Afghanistan. Apart from that it would be easy for the Afghan government to gather and reveal the necessary facts, doubtlessly proving the foreign mercenary interference, they would show whether there were actions which necessitated the coming of Soviet troops. We informed the Soviet comrades about this initiative. We ourselves still haven’t made a decision on this

resolution—we haven't refused the Iran comrades, we haven't given a positive answer either. This idea will be put to discussion by Iran at the forthcoming conference of the Islamic foreign ministers.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I thank you for the interesting information, Comrade Arafat.

Recently I visited Libya where I had talks with comrade Qaddafi.⁷ Now I am visiting Syria and I am having friendly and useful talks with comrade [al-]Assad.

I would once again like to assure you now, as I did at our previous meetings, that Bulgaria will invariably support the Palestinian cause. Since the very beginning we have supported both morally and materially the Palestinian cause. I invite you, Comrade Arafat, to come and visit Bulgaria at a convenient time.⁸

The case with Iraq is the following. There was fighting for personal reasons between Iraqi students—communists and Baathists—in Sofia [in December 1979]. Two young people were killed⁹—a Baathist and a communist. Iraq's reaction was nervous, it took a lot of measures, froze all our relations, and withdrew its students—both Baathists and others. We showed tolerance and kept cool. As a result they again sought contact with us. Our foreign minister visited Baghdad in response. Through him I sent a short message to Saddam Hussein. What was observable in the talks was a desire—both on their and our part—to normalize the relationship between our two countries. They have officially invited me to visit Iraq. We haven't discussed this question with our leaders. But obviously my visit there—at least I think so—will be useful for developing the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Iraq and for the common Arab cause. We followed the same line in Iraq as we did in the other Arab countries, and this is well known.

Without making a detailed analysis of the international situation and of the USA's and Carter's anti-Soviet and anti-socialist campaign, I would like to note some points.

The reasons for this campaign are the events in Afghanistan. I told both Qaddafi during my visit in Libya and my Syrian friends now: the case does not only concern the events in Afghanistan.

Things started before Afghanistan.

What do I have in mind?

I have in mind NATO's decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in several European countries.¹⁰ In 4-5 minutes these missiles can cover our country, the European part of the Soviet Union, the whole Arab East. They will reach any Arab country in only for 4-5 minutes from Italy. Moreover they fly at a low height and cannot be detected. This sets a new task before us. If this American adventure continues, Western Europe will experience a catastrophe. If these missiles are deployed, we have to take adequate countermeasures. We don't have nuclear missiles in Bulgaria; the Soviet Union has nuclear missiles. Let's take the Federal Republic of Germany as an example. In order to damage the intermediate-range missiles located in Germany, we have to cover each centimeter of its territory with nuclear power. With NATO's

decision to produce and deploy intermediate-range missiles, the whole policy of disarmament, [the June 1979] SALT II [agreement], collapses.

We are fighting also for the peoples in Europe and the Arab East. We cannot put up with these adventurous actions; we cannot allow everything to collapse tomorrow.

Consequently, this is a new moment in the international situation, caused by the American imperialists. The American imperialists have been exerting an enormous and utterly brutal pressure on the Western European countries to make them follow their course.

The second problem concerns the Arab East, the Far East, and the Indian Ocean.

A new situation has been created here as well. The Americans have been setting up their bases in these regions, a new infrastructure is being created, and military units are being sent. Their aim is to interfere in any Arab country, if they consider their interests to be in danger. The American imperialists have been approaching the Soviet Union and our borders.

A new moment is also Sadat's separatist deal. [The September 1979] Camp David [agreements] created a new situation.

There is a new moment in Asia as well. Now the Americans have given this region to the Chinese, but not at random. The USA is concentrating its forces in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and the Indian Ocean.

We neither dramatize these events, nor are we scared. The Americans are well aware of the fact that they cannot lead a war here in this region. There are millions of armies here. They can frighten us with airplanes, ships etc, but war is won by millions of people. Vietnam's example illustrated that. The Americans do not have millions of people fighting there.

There is still one more new moment. In spite of the American imperialists' efforts they cannot restore the years of the "cold war" in its old variant. It is detrimental to the American people. The people will not allow this situation to continue long. It carries much danger of confrontation which might lead to a world conflict.

You are acquainted with our position regarding your region—it is a principled, consistent one.

You are well aware of the new situation in the region. You have put a lot of efforts into making the just deed of the Arab peoples, Palestine's cause, win. Syria's responsibility is also great but you have also put a lot of efforts as a permanent front country.

The enemy's conspiracy is large-scale. What is important at the moment is to strengthen the unity of the PLO—both militarily and politically. This is something I said to Qaddafi as well. The military and political tactics should be flexibly combined. The problem concerns Palestine—will the long-suffering people of Palestine manage to create its own state? The problem should be solved now. Hence unity is needed, both in the occupied territories and beyond their boundaries.

You are approaching the victory. It is necessary to com-

bine the military and political tasks with extreme socio-economic measures. This is of particular importance to the population in the occupied territories. Any centrifugal force in the Palestine resistance movement is a great danger to the Palestinian and common Arabic cause. The “Steadfastness Front” should be strengthened: it is the heart of the Arab people’s struggle. But at the same time all forces should be mobilized. The other contradictions between the Arab countries should come second in importance. This holds for the disagreement between Syria and Iraq as well. Even a country such as Saudi Arabia takes into consideration your country and the relations you have with it are justifiable. Otherwise it would back American imperialism. Your abilities are big. The socialist countries support you.

What influences the situation in your region and in the world is the fact that presidential elections are due in the USA [in November 1980]. The situation in the region is further complicated by the Camp David agreements. This fact further requires strengthening of the revolutionary forces. [...]

Why do the Iraqi leaders insist on my making an official visit? I don’t want to make guesses. But it is difficult to live in isolation now. I think that if the results of such a visit are even minor, it will be a positive step. [...]

The USA started moving its fleet up toward the region, but the Soviet Union also moved up its units. Otherwise the Americans would strike Iran. They would also strike us, Bulgaria. They will strike us.

Bulgaria is near your region. That is why we are anxiously following what is happening here.

We firmly support the unity of the Palestine resistance, led by you, Comrade Arafat. This is something we stated in Libya as well. They took as a basis our official statement there. Essentially no notes were made. There were only some discussions on the level of the work groups. The full text of the official statement, adopted by both delegations, including the passage about PLO as the only representative of the people of Palestine, has been published in our press. But they have not published this passage in Libya. I declare now in front of you once again that the full text of the official statement has been published in our press.

I would once more like to stress that you should by all means strengthen your unity. If you let them defeat you now, you will give a big present to the imperialists. History would condemn you for this “present.”

YASSER ARAFAT: We have a democratic spirit and we hold firmly to our unity. [...]

DOCUMENT No. 4

Memorandum of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the State Council of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, and US Undersecretary of State John Whitehead, 4 February 1982

[Source: Central State Archives, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 392. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova and Baev.]

TALKS

Between Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the State Council of the PR of Bulgaria, and John Whitehead, US Under Secretary of State, Sofia, 4 February 1987

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Mr. Whitehead, may I take the liberty to welcome you and those accompanying you; I would like to express the government’s satisfaction, as well as my own personal satisfaction, with such a top-level visit of the Under Secretary of State of the USA and note that it is the first of its kind in the whole history of the relations between our countries and our peoples.¹¹ We do appreciate it. I am deeply convinced that your visit, the talks and negotiations we’ve had, will be a step forward in the future development of the relations between our countries and our peoples. Our relations have not been burdened so far, there are no problems between us, apart from problems of a political nature. I think the latter are clear enough and there is no reason for them being tense in the future. Moreover, we have no common border. All problems that seem to burden our relations are of such a nature that can be settled adequately.

Thus, I do not see any problems relating to our bilateral relations that could not be settled, apart from the fact that that we cannot transform our social order; and I do hope that you will not achieve such a change in Bulgaria. We haven’t even considered such a task.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: We do not mind accepting your country as part of our system; moreover we now notice signs indicating that your country is undergoing transformation, particularly in the economic sphere; this transformation seem to be directing your economic development towards our economic model and system. We understand that the economic enterprises in your country are assuming greater independence. Yet taking into consideration the fact that this is a matter of domestic affairs, we would not like to interfere.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Since we already touched upon this issue, let me say a few words in this respect. Every aspect of your economic and social life suits us: the organization of production, etc. We are ready to implement your achievements in Bulgaria, except for the so-called profit centers. Under our economic system the entire profit goes into the state

budget, whereas in your country it goes to the private owner. There is a different mechanism of distributing wealth in your country. Distribution is the only difference between us. All other aspects suit us. In my opinion any functionary that would not adopt your experience is stupid. The sooner we get rid of such fools, the better-developed the economy will be.

In terms of our political structure, and the top-level posts in particular, we do not need a chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Council; these should be combined in a single post.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: Noteworthy changes are obviously under way.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: They are noteworthy indeed. It's a pity I do not have much time. I'm fighting time at present.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I do not agree with you. As far as time is concerned, I think that there are many years before you. You have already set a record in terms of the length of time that you have been in office. I hope you will achieve greater results in this respect in the future.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I am the doyen among the first and general secretaries of the communist parties in the socialist countries.¹² I dare say that I am the vice-doyen head of state in the world. It is only the Japanese emperor [Hirohito] that has had a longer term in office than I do.¹³ I'll paraphrase a Latin American writer so that I can explain to you the nature of my struggle against time:

Time is a river that keeps undermining me,
yet I am a river as well.
Time is a tiger that tears me apart,
yet I am a tiger as well.
Time is a fire that burns me
yet I am a fire as well.

Unfortunately time is a reality, and I am Todor Zhivkov—a servant of God.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: These words were so beautiful. I hope that despite your position of vice-doyen after Hirohito, you will become doyen in terms of your impact on public opinion, since Hirohito is much older than you.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: His power is different in nature from mine. There is a difference, a small one, but yet a difference. Even more so since our church tower is smaller than theirs. Fortunately or unfortunately, we are a small country at the center of the Balkan peninsula. Now we are having the chance to meet a representative of a country with a high church tower; I therefore have the pleasure to give you the floor.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I thank you for giving me the floor. Let me start with a comment on our first issue, namely the eco-

nomical transformation in your country. This obviously tends towards the economic model of our world. [...]

Please allow me to tell you something about the goal of my visit. I was empowered by President [Ronald] Reagan and State Secretary [George] Shultz to deal with Eastern European countries. The two visits to this part of the world are part of my job. I visited Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary in November. Bulgaria was the last country I had left to visit during my tour of Eastern Europe, after Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The goal of my visit is to listen to these countries' official positions, and understand them and get to know them; moreover, I bear in mind the fact that US relations with these countries have been very good recently. My government would like to improve and further develop these relations. It is true that essential differences between our countries and our economic systems exist; these are differences in the economic, political, and social systems. We do not share a common view of what human rights are. Yet these differences should not hinder [us from] maintaining civilized relations with Bulgaria. The latter have been somewhat cool recently.¹⁴

Thus the major goal of my visit is to contribute to breaking the ice in our relations. I hope that my visit will set the stage for a process of improving our relations.

We have already made certain progress in this respect. The talks with your deputy foreign minister and your foreign minister specified other measures that may be taken relating to the improvement of our bilateral relations. Each party in these talks laid down its expectations in terms of what the other should undertake with a view towards taking a step forward in the development of our relations. We call it a "step-by-step" process; we believe that it would eventually result in improving relations between our countries.

During our talks with Mr. [Petr] Mladenov, your foreign minister, we discussed a number of issues relating to international affairs, including the bilateral relations between each of our countries and the Soviet Union; we also discussed the issue of arms control and regional conflicts. We discussed the problems in certain parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, Vietnam. We provided information to each other on each party's position regarding these international issues. I listened with great interest to your foreign minister's statement, which actually presented Bulgaria's official position.

I must admit that we are deeply impressed with the processes under way in your country. The transformation you are effecting, and its growing potential, provide favorable ground for the further development of relations between Bulgaria and the USA.

I would also like to hear your evaluation of the processes taking place in the Soviet Union; what is the essence of the changes there and their relevance for the respective countries and the world in general.

How do you view the world within the next 5 or 10 years?

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you, Mr. Under Secretary of State, for what you said.

I would like to start with the relations between our two countries. I would like to point out that these relations should not be considered in the light of their development so far. Their development up to now is not relevant; we should put an end to past relations and view the problems from a different perspective and thus find their adequate solution.

Would we be able to change perspective and solve the problems relating to both bilateral and international affairs from a different position? That is the major question.

The reasons for the different positions are in both parties—I mean on a global scale. This is the opposite stance on various issues and the stereotype on your part.

Will we be able to overcome our prejudiced stereotyping and lay the grounds for the development of a new type of relations based on today's realities in the world?

Which is the dominant reality? The major reality is the following: taking into consideration today's nuclear arms stock, neither our system can do away with yours, nor can your system do away with ours. This is a brand new reality that neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin had confronted, not to mention any of your presidents.

We are therefore confronting a totally different reality that has not been present in the history of mankind so far. And we must bear this in mind. What is the future road to take, what alternatives are there for further development in the context of this new reality and the coexistence of the socialist community, on the one hand, and the capitalist system, on the other? Should the relations between socialist and Western countries be considered in light of antagonistic regularities, on the basis of antagonism? Our relations should be reformed on the basis of the present realities; they should assume a new character, they should assume a human face. There is no reason why we should not develop mechanisms to foster these relations, to set up rules of the game, and impose these rules and observe them. We have no alternative. This will not be achieved quickly; it will be a gradual process, but we must carry it out. [...]

As for our bilateral relations, the only obstacles to their development are of a political nature. Certain measures taken in Bulgaria, including measures during my term in office, should be exposed to severe criticism, because they were at variance with normal inter-state relations. I have in mind Bulgaria at the time when I have been head of the state and the party. You are aware that many things have undergone changes.

After your visit is over, we will once again look into these issues.

We can assure you that a solution will be found to the questions you raised. Yet, I would request that the Americans for their part undertake the same exercise. For we cannot be sure what the USA will blame us for in the near future.¹⁵ Therefore, every day we anxiously await something new to be blamed on us. That occurs every single day. I will not start a debate on this problem; I am simply analyzing the situation.

Every morning when I get up I pick up the phone to see what your authoritative bodies have blamed on us. We have

been assigned all mortal sins so far. We have not been charged with Christ's crucifixion yet. The CIA and your propaganda have assigned all mortal sins to us. We have even been charged with the attempt to assassinate Christ's deputy—the Pope. We have had trade with the developing countries totaling six or seven billion US dollars and you claim that we have been making a profit from drug trafficking. Good gracious!

Send my best regards to Mr. Reagan and Mr. Shultz. I am of the same age as Mr. Reagan, and as we say there's not much time left for us. We have to undertake measures to improve relations between the USA and Bulgaria.

How would history assess Mr. Reagan's role and my role? I am not going to make any judgment, this is your business and the mission of history; I do hope, though, that he will be given merit for establishing normal relations with Bulgaria and assisting in the development of the socialist order in Bulgaria. This will suffice for his historical mission. So I am asking him to help us. Our achievements in building up socialism will not have a negative impact on US policy, nor will they adversely affect your country, since Bulgaria is a small country, and our church tower is a small one.

As far as our propaganda is concerned, we do not maintain that it is independent. Nothing of the kind. Your propaganda is not independent, nor is ours. There is no such thing as independent propaganda. [...]

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I had been informed that Zhivkov was one of the most conservative leaders of the Eastern bloc. However, the comments you made make me think that you are a proponent of the new thinking. Talking about militarism you formulated a common goal we should all target. And it would be wonderful if you really managed to persuade your Moscow friends that armaments should be cut and completely destroyed. I would like to assure you that the US would immediately adopt such a policy of doing away with militarism.

Now I would like to say a few words about your everyday concerns about America's negative statements about Bulgaria. I must point out that we do not have a negative attitude towards Bulgaria. It is true that there is not much information on Bulgaria available in the US; therefore many statements are made in an environment of an information deficit. Millions of readers have the opportunity to send articles and letters to the US print media, to newspapers and magazines; they have the freedom to speak their minds. There are 90,000 newspapers and magazines in the USA; there are some 535 members of Congress that have to chance to give interviews and express hostile attitudes towards Bulgaria. But that does not mean that the American people and the US government have a negative attitude towards Bulgaria. Therefore you should instead consider such acts of hostility a result of the freedom of press and the freedom of speech. We will try to curb the negative comments about Bulgaria in the US press and the US media in general with a view to lowering the hysteria and the heated debates against Bulgaria. We do hope that you will do your best to curb the negative com-

ments on the US in your press. Since it is diplomacy and good relations that suffer when there is a hostile campaign in the press against either party. [...]

Please let me express my view on an issue; I regard it as the most essential message to bring home to you, the Bulgarian State. This is the issue of human rights and human freedoms. I think that all major differences stem from this issue; it is in this sphere that mutual understanding is most difficult to reach....

TODOR ZHIVKOV: The question of our killing imams and closing down mosques was raised. We asked for more facts. We even showed to the public that the imams who were allegedly killed, were alive. So that means that they have been killed and then they were resurrected. No imam in Bulgaria has been mistreated, neither has any mosque been closed down; all mosques are open to the public instead.

Therefore such an accusation is irrelevant. Another question that has been put forth is the ethnic minority of Turks in Bulgaria.¹⁶ A lot of nationalities have been flowing into the US and Europe, whereas none have come to Bulgaria. Bulgaria had never conquered anyone else's territory. On the contrary—Bulgarian territories have been conquered.

All of the Bulgarian borders have been trimmed, everybody has cut off Bulgarian territories. There exists a certain situation in the US, and a completely different one in Bulgaria. Turks have never flowed into Bulgaria, Turkish troops have invaded our country instead. We deported those that regarded themselves Turks—about 250,000 people. When Mr. [General Kenan] Evren [who had seized power in a bloodless coup in September 1980] came on an official visit to our country, he insisted that the communiqué explicitly state that any deportation whatsoever be ceased, except for 100 cases of separated families. That is how we put it down in writing. I tried to persuade him not to put this text down; I thought there might be more people willing to settle in Turkey and therefore we did not need to shut the doors. However, we did include such a clause. It is well known. When I made my return visit to Turkey later, he raised the same question with regard to an additional 3,000 people. I agreed to this number. Now they are raising the question about 1 million and 500,000 people.

We cannot understand why a problem that should be [only] the concern of Turkey and Bulgaria, has become part of US government policy? You should leave it to us to settle it on our own; you can consult Turkey on this issue since they are your friends, so that we may sit at the table and reach an agreement. [...]

JOHN WHITEHEAD: I can see that this is an emotional topic for you. I have not come to your country to conduct any campaign, nor have I put the blame on you for anything; my goal is not to place any accusations.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I understand you quite well. Thank you. But I had to tell you what the situation actually was.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: The information you provided was very interesting indeed, since it helped us understand your position. Dialogue is an important tool, since it facilitates mutual understanding.

Despite my respect for you, Mr. Zhivkov, I must admit that Bulgaria does not seem ready to discuss human rights issues with us yet.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We are ready, we are completely ready to discuss all problems. We have no differences with anyone, neither the Pope, nor anybody else. We have absolutely no different views on anything, including the religious issue of Islam. There are no contradictions.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: We are completely ready to discuss all problems of mutual interest. We expect that you would respond and discuss the issue of prime importance to us—that of human rights. We had a dialogue with your minister about human rights. We found out about the documents on reuniting separated families. We are glad they have been given the chance to go to their relatives.

I think that we should thus be having a dialogue on all aspects of the human rights issue. We cannot agree to this issue being removed from the agenda. How can we discuss our economic, political, and ideological differences and at the same time ignore the differences between the two countries in terms of the human rights issue?

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you. I am satisfied with our talks, and I hope they will be only the first of a longer series of talks of this kind, talks between Bulgaria and the US. I am deeply convinced that these talks would further stimulate the development of our relations. There is no reason for our relations not to improve. The US is a powerful country, with a mighty scientific potential, with a vital economy. Bulgaria is a small country; as a Bulgarian saying goes, even smaller stones matter sometimes, for they can overturn a car. I don't have in mind the US. I am talking in general. The historical period we are living in attaches an increasingly greater importance to the role of smaller countries.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: Thank you.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I once again thank you. Send my best regards to your leaders, and Mr. Reagan in particular. Make sure you tell him what I said: I don't know how history will judge his mission; I do know, though, that if he helps Bulgaria construct socialism, he will no doubt have had a mission of historical importance.

JOHN WHITEHEAD: That will be a challenge for him.

DOCUMENT No. 5**Transcript of Conversation between Todor Zhivkov, Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Acting Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Zhao Ziyang, 6 May, 1987 in Beijing**

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 395. Document obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova.]

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Top Secret

Meeting of Comrade Todor Zhivkov with Zhao Ziyang, Acting Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and President of the State Council of China People's Republic
Beijing, 6 May 1987¹⁷

ZHAO ZIYANG: Let me welcome you, comrade Zhivkov. We attach special importance to your visit.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: This is my first personal visit to China, and the first top-level visit from Bulgaria.

ZHAO ZIYANG: I guess you have not seen as many people in Sofia as there are in Beijing.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: To be honest, I expected far more people than I see now; I thought it would be like an anthill. Nothing of the kind. I guess there are more people in Shanghai? [...]

ZHAO ZIYANG: Thank you for the useful information on Bulgaria, for your evaluations, Comrade Zhivkov. After we listened to your analysis, we now have a more comprehensive view of Bulgaria. For the last 30 years the leadership of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, with Todor Zhivkov as its head, has achieved significant results in constructing socialism. Your economy has had indeed sustained and high growth rates for an extended period of time. You have gained much useful experience in constructing socialism through reforms.

Your theoretical concept of the *owner* and the *proprietor* of the socialist ownership has provoked much thought on the matter. We have already had your lectures before the professors and academic audience of the Academy of Social Sciences translated and printed.

Generally speaking, we are very happy with your success and wish you even greater results in the future.

Since you began with Bulgaria, let me start my comments with China.

For the last thirty years since establishment of the People's Republic of China, we have made great achieve-

ments. On the other hand, one can learn certain lessons from our errors. There are two major lessons: the first one is too much haste and rashness in our economic development, which resulted in the so-called "Great Leap." Great leaps are normally followed by severe slumps. We have gone through such cycles several times thus far. There hasn't been a sustained level of economic development. On the other hand, we have been conducting a leftist policy, there are too many political movements. After we successfully carried out our nationalization, we focused our attention on construction and housing. The Cultural Revolution was too hasty a measure as well. We are deeply impressed with the stable and normal rate economic development of your country for the last several decades. You have often mentioned the April Policy.¹⁸ I will take the liberty to inform you of the Third Plenum of our Party. The Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party was held at the end of 1978; at this Plenum a thorough analysis of our past experience and the lessons we have drawn was made. We developed a program adopting the policy of constructing socialism in a specifically Chinese manner. This program has two major items: the first is our commitment to (and observance of) the four major principles. I think they may be general principles valid for all socialist countries. The central point of these four principles concerns the leadership of the Communist Party and the socialist road of development.

[...]

The proponents of peace outnumber the proponents of war. A world war may break out, but we may [also] witness a prolonged period of world peace. Our foreign policy is a policy of independence and peace.

There are three basic issues in this policy: the protection of peace is a central issue; having adopted the five principles of peaceful co-existence, our goal is to keep and further develop friendly relations with all the countries of the world; to have an independent position in international affairs. We do not enter into alliances with countries or blocs, and we will not establish relations of strategic importance with any country whatsoever. Although China is a less developed country in terms of its economic development, it plays an important role in world affairs because of its size. We believe that the policy we have been conducting favors the protection of world peace.

On disarmament, it is above all the Soviet Union and the USA, possessing over 95 percent of the nuclear arms in the world that should reduce these arms. We are in favor of the dialogue between them. We hope their talks will be frank and open and an agreement will be reached. As for disarmament, we consider it a topic of prime importance since the future development of the world and of mankind are closely related to it. All countries, irrespective of their size, should have equal rights in this process and contribute to its enhancement. The two super powers should respect the stance of the smaller and medium-sized countries and listen to their position on disarmament.

[...]

As for China's relations with other countries, I suppose

that our relations with the Soviet Union are of interest to you. We are pursuing complete normalization of our relations with the Soviet Union. We would like the relations between the two great neighboring socialist countries to be normalized as soon as possible. The whole world would benefit from this.

A central issue in the normalizing of these relations is the so-called Kampuchea [Cambodia] problem.¹⁹ The Soviet Union supports sending Vietnamese troops to Kampuchea, whereas China provides assistance for Kampuchea's resistance movement. This war has been going on for eight years now. Its coming to an end seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Unless this Kampuchea problem is solved, one can hardly speak of normalizing relations. There is one point of heated debate in the relations between the Soviet Union and China, and that is the Kampuchea problem.

On the other hand, there has been progress in our relations with the Soviet Union in other spheres of life. I think that there will be a step forward in our relations in terms of politics. It all depends on solving the Kampuchea problem.

The factor determining the deterioration of our relations with Vietnam was the occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese troops. Regardless of the [Vietnamese] motives, the fact is that a country has openly sent troops to occupy territories of a weaker neighboring country. By no means can this be considered a correct act. Therefore China cannot support Vietnam on this important international issue; that is why Vietnam considers China to be its greatest enemy and has adopted an anti-Chinese policy. Those who have artificially created this problem must find its solution. If the Vietnamese troops withdraw, the relations between Vietnam and China will [again] become normal. I don't think there will be any progress in these relations unless Vietnam changes its policy of aggression towards China.

We rely on Vietnam's new leaders. We hope they will adopt a sensible and reasonable policy. This war appears to be a catastrophe for the Vietnamese people; it should therefore be brought to an end. It is not in line with the people's interests. A lot of problems will be easy to solve once they have withdrawn their troops from Kampuchea. The relations between China and Vietnam on the one hand, and China and the Soviet Union on the other, will improve. Vietnam's relations with the countries of South East Asia will be normalized. Vietnam's national economy can expand only in a peaceful environment. This is what I wanted to tell you on foreign relations.

You informed us about the policy you pursue on the Balkans to do away with all nuclear and chemical weapons. We can well understand the Bulgarian people's striving for constructing socialism under peaceful circumstances. We are impressed with the effort you put into lessening tensions in the region. Turning the Balkans into a region free of nuclear weapons is a task for the peoples living there.

I took too long to make my comments. Thank you for your attention.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you for the interesting information.

As for our government, we follow what you do in the country and all the reforms you undertake. We can [only] follow these at a distance, of course; and we are neither in charge of any of these changes, nor can we contribute in any way. We would like to congratulate you on all reforms and the significant results you have achieved in China's development, its economic development in particular, and raising the people's living standard. I would like to point out that there is no relevant difference between our views of the state's role as owner and the role of the economic agent as proprietor. I am deeply convinced that the economic policy we are pursuing will yield good results both in China and in Bulgaria in the future. We have to share our experience and account for the results achieved. We will readily share our experience with you and study yours.

[...]

I would like to talk now as one of the veterans of the Communist movement, not in the capacity of secretary general of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. When I was elected first secretary a long time ago, I was of the middle-aged generation; when I met Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in Moscow later [in November 1957], I was the youngest first secretary. My youth is over now. I most sincerely hope that a way to normalize the relations between China and the Soviet Union will be found. We share common aims and ideals. These relations should be settled and regulated and this should happen within my life span. I know this might sound egoistic, yet I would be most honest and sincere in my satisfaction if these relations [problems] could be settled. A lot of problems have arisen; these were accumulated in the course of our historical development. Certain problems have been created by ourselves. Both sides have made mistakes. There should be a way to stand above these problems that might hinder our relations and get us nowhere, regional problems in particular. Let us find a way to solve the regional problems, so that they will not determine our relations. Settling the regional problems should be considered a prerequisite for regulating our relations. Regional problems should be tackled in the course of a friendly dialogue. We could reach an agreement on all other issues. This is my deepest wish both as a Communist and as a veteran.

On Kampuchea, I don't know whether you're aware of the fact that I am the first general secretary who visited Kampuchea in 1979.²⁰ I was on a one-day visit. I visited Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Vietnam's new leaders expressed their willingness to take China's interests into consideration. A dialogue and a solution to the problems should be sought. I am not one to make suggestions, yet I know that dialogue is a necessary tool. As far as I can see, there is a willingness on the part of Vietnam's leaders to begin talks.

As for Vietnam's economic situation at the time of my visit, I must say it was extremely severe. I guess you know that better than I do. Let us find a way to eliminate this obstacle, so that it will not hinder the relations between China and the Soviet Union. I know that the problems will be solved when there are talks. There are a lot of outstanding problems that cannot be solved at once; being realists we are aware of

this.

As for the cooperation between China and Bulgaria, we are ready to stimulate its further development. Bulgaria is a small country; however, we are Georgi Dimitrov's party, and, as I already pointed out, we will follow his legacy. If it was not for this conflict, China would be the most popular country in Bulgaria after the Soviet Union. I believe this will happen. We have had close relations with the Soviet Union in the course of our historical development. The second country, gaining such popularity, is China. You can see how a conflict may hinder our relations. I hope we will forget all this. For it is often the case that the dead save the living. Let us not allow what is already dead to pull us downwards. Our relations should be frank and open, sincere and brotherly of a communist type. We are willing to further develop our cooperation. Please come and visit Bulgaria. We are a small, yet dynamically developing country.



DOCUMENT No. 6
Memorandum of Conversation of Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov with Chinese Leader Deng Xiaoping, Beijing, 7 May 1987

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 395. Obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Kalina Bratanova.]

DENG XIAOPING: You already had talks with comrade Zhao Ziyang and comrade Li Sinyan. They have informed you of the problems we are solving at present. I've been less busy than they have, since they do the everyday routine work.

We are both veterans. Our meeting today can be called the meeting of the veterans. I mean only the two of us, not any of the other of the participants.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We are veterans of the communist movement in general, not only the one in our countries.

DENG XIAOPING: Veterans are called to do more work for the sake of their people, their countries and the communist movement in general. We have made a lot of mistakes in the past, we have even let conflicts break out. The problems must be solved within our life span. Yugoslavia's former president [Josip Broz] Tito, who visited China in 1977, had talks with me then.²¹ I told him: It is true that we had rows in the past, we made mistakes; yet I cannot claim that we have always been right in our judgments.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I absolutely agree with you: the most important task that is before us, the veterans, is to solve the problems and not leave such a bad legacy to the generations to come.

I am very happy that I have the opportunity to visit

China and meet you. I will never forget you and Pan Dzyan; I have known you since our meeting in Moscow in 1957.²² He came to Bulgaria then.

DENG XIAOPING: We met in 1957.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Yes, we met at the conference in Moscow. There was even a very nice meeting we had; I would like to remind you of it, so that our comrades from Bulgaria hear about it. I'll tell you what happened. We had some problems with our comrades from Poland at one of these conferences. The latter made several statements, which were considered to be generally negative in attitude. All participants that then took the floor exposed [Polish leader W³adys³aw] Gomu³ka to severe criticism, but they would not explicitly say his name. Since I was the youngest first secretary then, I fiercely criticized him. Then you came to our delegation and gave us some Chinese tea. Mao turned to me to congratulate me for my speech. He told me I was very smart and clever. "I completely agree with you," he said, "When socialism is a well-established system on a global scale, I'll propose that you become chairman of the World Socialist Federation." I'm telling you that story because I just want to let my comrades know about Mao's evaluation of my work; while my merits haven't been recognized in Bulgaria yet...

DENG XIAOPING: I feel healthy, however, a man of my age never knows when he will leave forever to meet Marx.

I am glad that under comrade Zhivkov's leadership there reigns an atmosphere of sustained political peace and stability. There has been a sustained economic development as well. Maybe nature favors you, maybe the people have created such a favorable economic environment. Yet we have gone through a lot of up and downs in our development. We can claim that when the People's Republic of China was established in the early 1950's, both countries were at the same level of economic development. China was probably poorer than Bulgaria. There were certain cataclysms in Bulgaria that must be the reason for its sustained economic growth.

We made leftist mistakes. In 1957 we struggled against the rightist elements, in 1958 there was "the Great Leap" in the people's commune. We were rash and reckless to a certain extent both in terms of our economic measures and the political activities; there was a leftist tendency. All this was true for our policy in terms of the international communist movement. It is leftist as well. The "Great Leap" resulted in a severe three-year slump. Other factors related to the sphere of international affairs, of course; I won't dwell on these, since you know them. I have in mind the fact that the Soviet Union declared about a hundred bilateral agreements with us null and void. This brought about serious hardships. Yet the major reason for our hardships was our leftist policy. We managed to cope with the slump and restore our previous level of economic development.

In 1962 a meeting was held with 7,000 participants, including all first secretaries of the regional committees. As a result, our economy grew steadily in the period from 1962 to

1965. In 1966, however, the Cultural Revolution began, which lasted ten years. There were serious drawbacks throughout these ten years, both in political and economic terms. One can say that upon the establishment of the People's Republic of China in the late 1950's, in the period 1958 - 1978, the country's development in social terms was stagnated. The annual income of a peasant was about 60 ioans. The average salary of a worker was also about 60 ioans in this period. There was some development in this period. For example it was then that we produced nuclear missiles, weapons and a satellite, [but] social development was stagnant on the whole. It was as late as 1978, when the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee was held; the experience gained throughout the 29-year period was summarized, conclusions were arrived at; on the basis of these present day policy was developed. [...]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I have the pleasure to fulfill a task assigned to me by our party leadership and government: I would like to greet you personally and wish you health and great results. Most of our leaders know you and have met you. I would therefore like to send their best regards and wishes for your health.

Let me once again express my deepest gratitude for your invitation to come and visit your country, for the extreme attentiveness and hospitality towards me and those accompanying me.

DENG XIAOPING: Our contacts and relations are of prime importance. Your country is a small one, yet your experience is very important. The reforms in your country started almost 20 years earlier than ours. Bearing in mind the specificity of your own economic environment, you have been carrying out reforms in a secret manner, I would say.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: You are very precise in your judgment. No one has formulated it like this.

DENG XIAOPING: It's not easy to carry out such reforms.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We have not been hiding. Nothing can be hidden under the sun. I am optimistic and am indeed very glad that our relations of cooperation and fraternity will be restored; we used to enjoy such healthy relations up to the events you just spoke of.

DENG XIAOPING: We must look forward to what's ahead of us.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Yes, it is our future relations that we must consider. Many things took place, some inevitable and objective in nature; others were the result of our own mistakes and weaknesses. Nevertheless we must look ahead.

DENG XIAOPING: That's right.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: We follow the events taking place in your

country and all the deep reforms that have been carried out ever since the historical Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party [in December 1978]. We were deeply impressed with the way you managed to cope with the problem of malnutrition and starvation and provide food for 1 billion and 20 million people within such a short period. It is true that your people have not become wealthy, yet you managed to provide food for them, and there are products in the department stores.

The second thing that draws one's attention is that you made a breakthrough in establishing a free market economy. We were not successful in this respect, although we made an attempt to do that in the early 1960s. Yet we are trying to deal with this problem at present. [...]

Thus our attempts are directed at implementing the resolutions of the latest 13th Congress of our Party that was held last spring. We will be together in our common struggle side by side.

DENG XIAOPING: We share a common aim. We must make efforts together.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Despite all that happened to the relations between our two socialist countries, we are actually following the same path. This is what matters. All other problems can be solved by negotiating in a communist manner.

DENG XIAOPING: That's right. I suggest that we now go and have lunch and continue our talks.



DOCUMENT No. 7

Memorandum of Conversation between the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and the Prime Minister of Greece, Andreas Papandreu, in Alexandroupolis [Greece], 22 April 1989

[SOURCE: Central State Archive, Sofia, fond 1-B, record 60, file 414. Translated by Kalina Bratanova and edited by Jordan Baev.]

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: I once again have the chance to welcome our country's friend Todor Zhivkov and his assistants. I hope that the warmth with which Alexandroupolis's residents welcomed you is indicative of our people's feelings towards you.

I guess that our meetings are of a more specific nature this time; today it is taking place on our territory, the next will be taking place on your territory. I believe that we will have enough time to consider important issues during our talks. It's true that we share a common view of how to preserve world peace, secure understanding on the Balkans and stimulate the development the relations between the Balkan countries.

Mr. Zhivkov, I suggest that tomorrow we organize a meeting with our foreign ministers so that we can discuss the problems concerning our countries, as well as certain global and European issues. [...]

TODOR ZHIVKOV: I think that our present meeting will be fruitful and I am optimistic about it. There are many favorable opportunities so that our delegations can carry out serious work. My and your mission consists of stating our support to and to approval of the results achieved.

I agree to the agenda you offered, I do not mind our delegations starting work today, and our meeting being held tomorrow to discuss certain aspects of our bilateral cooperation, the problems on the Balkans, as well as global and European issues.

We are now meeting as friends and there are no problems between us that might break up our relations. On the contrary: all that has been achieved so far provides solid grounds for our further progress. I believe that we will live up to our wonderful peoples' expectations. Watching your people today and in the past during my previous visits, and, taking into consideration our people, I see that they are very much alike, sharing common views and feelings. And it is often the case that we, heads of state, mislead them; I do not mean you and me in particular, I have in mind heads of state in general.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: Mr. Zhivkov, first of all I would like to thank you for the warm words. Talking about our problems, I must point out that PASOK [Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement], during its 8-year term of office, brought about our people's advancement along the road to peace, democracy and progress. PASOK mainly succeeded in balancing the economic development of the urban and the rural areas. It's equally pleasant to live in the countryside and in the big cities of Greece. It's even better to live in the village. This was not the situation even ten years ago. This is what determines our positive attitude towards you, as you yourself defined it. There is indeed a feeling of respect and love that we cherish towards you.

I would like to mention some other simple truths.

Our government contributed to laying the basis of sustainable peace in the Balkans, although the region is only a micrograph of the world. Your government took this mission up several years later, of course. The Balkans present a mixture of various structures and policies, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Common Market and non-aligned countries such as Albania and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless we succeeded in organizing a meeting in which all Balkan countries participated for the first time. That is a significant achievement.

Yet another truth is that our bilateral relations can be evaluated as excellent. Our countries are an example of a united duet in the Balkan region with no severe problems between them.

I must admit that there is one fact that worries me. That's the unresolved yet both clear and not so clear problems;

certain unclear problems as those relating to the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, between Turkey and Greece; other well-known problems as the ones we used to have with Yugoslavia. The events that have been taking place in the Balkans really worry us. These are related to the events taking place within Yugoslavia concerning the Albanian problem. Our friend Romania has also been creating problems. Since both Greece and Bulgaria are positive factors in the region, we keep asking ourselves whether we might [be able to] help normalize the situation in the region by any means. I think that the stable relations between Greece and Bulgaria provide the grounds for establishing good relations between the Balkan countries in general. This is an important and interesting issue we would like to hear your opinion of.

Another problem is East-West relations. The US has a new government [headed by President George H.W. Bush]. There are no indications so far of any change in the US policy towards the Soviet Union, compared to the times when Reagan was president; however, the Americans are more skeptical about its [the USSR's] policy nowadays. The question is for how long the US will be able to sustain its policy in the totally new situation created by Mikhail Gorbachev's taking power. Therefore the US is uncertain about whether it will maintain its policy for a longer period. There have been fears that changes might take place in the Soviet Union. This is the skepticism I had in mind.

Another issue. The US is making painstaking efforts to prevent a euphoric atmosphere from setting over Europe, i.e. raising hopes for peace and disarmament which would weaken NATO's influence and significance. Serious problems have arisen in NATO; an example of such a problem is the upgrading of the short-range nuclear weapons.²³ This issue has been given due attention on the part of the US. Upgrading presupposes producing new types of weapons, much more effective and with a wider range of action within the medium-range missiles. Therefore this upgrading means producing weapons we have already put aside, the weapons of the so called medium-range action, that have been put out of use both by the Soviet Union and the US. West Germany strongly opposes such upgrading; this position is based on both national and political arguments. This is a problem we will further dwell on.

I must admit that there is some hesitation and caution in the process of ice-breaking between the two superpowers; the former might be an obstacle to the progress of the talks between the two superpowers on strategic weapons. A period difficult to predict and foresee is ahead of us. Our view of the situation is the following: we must reinforce the importance of peace and nuclear disarmament; we shall thus contribute to promptly resolving the problem of the decrease in the number of smaller-range action weapons.

I am convinced that our initiatives and statements on peace and disarmament played an important role. At the present moment they may have an even greater relevance. I believe that we will spend enough time on this issue tomorrow at our talks with the foreign ministers.

To wind up I would like to say that we have taken the

right course; the first clouds have appeared, however; we must do something to clear them away so that the sun can once again shine along our path. Many negative qualities may be attributed to Reagan; yet we must admit that he manifested the political courage to move on and give effect to disarmament. I cannot perceive the same courage in the present US administration.

I hope that if we take our time to talk and reach agreements feasible for our two small countries, we will no doubt contribute to strengthening world peace. Apart from that, we shall take advantage of all the favorable opportunities of our small countries to stimulate the further development of our bilateral relations.

I am happy with your words, Mr. President, that neither the [18 June 1989 national] elections in Greece, nor my short illness were an obstacle to holding our meeting.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: Thank you for everything you said. We shall obviously carry out a more detailed discussion of these issues tomorrow.

Let me make a brief comment on certain issues as well.

I do share your view of the newly established international situation that causes us concern and results in slowing down disarmament. I don't know whether the major factor in this situation is the new US administration's policy of delaying talks with the Soviet Union. All statements, made prior to the talks, are the cause of our concern. An issue that causes concern is about tactical nuclear weapons. What do these weapons suggest? If our two countries have such weapons deployed, then we can destroy each other within a couple of hours. Conventional weapons have reached the level of nuclear weapons in terms of their destructive power. The question is: will we find the appropriate ways and means to preserve the achievements in disarmament so far, or will we push this disarmament process back? This is indeed a question that cannot but cause our concern. We do hope, however, that there are forces both in Europe and the US that will create a new mode of historical thinking, adequate for the new realities, so as to prevent at any cost a thermonuclear war.

As for the Vienna Forum²⁴ and the final documents adopted there, we do approve of them. Moreover, there is a forthcoming session of our Parliament at which legislation for implementing these documents will be passed. We have no objections to these documents, we approve of them, and we are willing to do our best to adapt them to the new global realities, despite our awareness of the obstacles and difficulties connected with our public life. It is quite clear that we have to live a civilized life. All laws that have been drawn up by us together must be observed, otherwise they will be formal.

Therefore world progress towards the prevention of thermo-nuclear war prevention, as well as on environmental and other global issues has yet to be made. A revolutionary step has not yet been taken yet; there is the danger of delaying the process and even pushing it back. This process undergoes ups and downs in its evolution. But the social en-

ergy created in adopting the new political thinking and action in international affairs under Gorbachev's leadership, and the public capital that is being raised in this process, has captured people's hearts as we are witnessing the establishment of a new world order and a new stage in the progress of mankind. Before reaching the agreements of the Vienna Forum, we held the Helsinki summit [in 1975]; unfortunately its agreements were not implemented to the full extent. I think that the Vienna Forum is taking place in the realities of a new world. The only stronghold of the past that has to be abolished, as it hinders the establishment of a modern civilized life style on our planet, is nuclear arms. Even if there is a five-fold cut in the number of nuclear weapons, what is left will suffice to wipe us out completely. Hence the importance of making progress step by step to prevent a delay of the disarmament process or it being pushed back.

[...]

I completely agree with you that there is a new situation in the Balkans. We are of the same opinion that there will be obstacles and hardships to overcome through our joint efforts along our way, which will by no means be easy. I emphasize once again: the Balkans are a region where the two superpowers have their influence; therefore we must remind them to undertake their political moves bearing in mind the region's willingness to live in peace and understanding.

Although I am thus pessimistic [about the global situation], I am even more optimistic about the future development of the region. An optimistic feeling takes the upper hand. We are still young, there is enough time before us to live and go on with our talks. I mean we're biologically young.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: We would not be so active if we were not optimists. I must admit that you look ten years younger than when we last met. You won't reveal the secret of it.

TODOR ZHIVKOV: There is no secret to unveil, one must simply keep working. Man is the product of labor.

As for the situation in our country, great changes have been taking place. Although you have some information available, I would like to tell you that a significant economic transformation has been taking place. We are setting up an economic system based on establishing individual firms. What is the difference between a firm and any other economic agent in the capitalist countries? There is no difference, and if there is, then that means that we have not organized our system well compared to the one in the capitalist countries. The major difference comes at the top of the economic system where there is the state; 50% of the profit goes into the state budget as revenues. There is no other difference. Since our present government is not of a capitalist type. As long ago as primitive society man began free market exchange. He exchanged products; later the market system developed into a feudal and a capitalist one. Since there are commodity-money relations, the market is a necessity. Taking into consideration the objective realities in the world we think that modern technologies and management are the basis of economic devel-

opment and growth. Nowadays the state is the economic agent standing both at the input and output of the economic system. It should not intervene in the middle. These are the imperatives of cybernetics. The state must not intervene in the activities of the firms. Similar reforms are to be carried out in agriculture. An upcoming plenum of our Party on the 4 and 5 May is dedicated to agriculture issues. Our next step will be introducing publishing houses as individual agents in the sphere of culture, etc.

We have set up several hundred firms so far; they will provide the major framework within which our economy will work. Tens of thousands of firms will be established with the respective legal structures: liabilities and responsibilities. The socialist state will stand at the input and output of the economic system. We can thus show you a wealth of companies. Over 100 firms took part in the Hanover Fair, and several hundred representatives of West Germany's firms attended our forum for businessmen.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: The EEC [European Economic Community] has been dealing with the issue of firms. What you just said about the economic organization of firms is of interest to us; I would like to add something more to the topic at our meeting tomorrow; it will not be anything new actually, simply an elaboration of what you said.

I suggest that we now end our talks, since we will have the opportunity to go on tomorrow. Let's go and attend the cocktail and have an official lunch.

NOTES

¹ Gandhi visited Bulgaria in October 1967 during a trip through Eastern Europe.

²The meeting of the Commonwealth nations took place in London in January 1969.

³ Likely reference to the 13th annual meeting of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in April 1968.

⁴ Gandhi began an extensive tour of Latin America in September 1968.

⁵ "National Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation," set up by the hardline leaders of Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Syria and the PLO in Tripoli in December 1977 to oppose reconciliation and a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel raised by Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat's November 1977 surprise trip to Jerusalem.

⁶ A summary of the resolutions can be found in the 28 April 1980 letter from the Permanent Representative

of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mansur R. Kikhia, to the United Nations Secretary-General, published in United Nations, GENERAL ASSEMBLY/Thirty-fifth session/Items 24 and 26 of the preliminary list/Question of Palestine/The Situation in the Middle East, A/35/188, S/13912, 29 April 1980.

⁷ Zhivkov visited Libya in late December 1976.

⁸ Following the collapse of talks with Jordan's King Hussein, Arafat unexpectedly would pay an unexpected 48-hour official visit to Bulgaria in April 1983. He had previously visited Bulgaria in February 1973 and July 1979.

⁹ Several students were reportedly injured. *New York Times*, 29 May 1980, p. A15.

¹⁰ In response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers on 12 December 1979 adopted a "double-track" decision. NATO would deploy in Europe 572 US Pershing II missiles and ground-launched Cruise missiles, all with single warheads. In addition, a broad set of initiatives would be launched to further the course of arms control and confidence-building so as to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe as a whole.

¹¹ Whitehead visited Bulgaria as part of a trip through Eastern Europe in January-February 1987. Whitehead's reportedly personal decision to include Bulgaria in his itinerary had been controversial amid continuing suspicion of Bulgaria's complicity in the May 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II.

¹² Zhivkov had been first secretary of the BCP since 1954.

¹³ Hirohito had been in office since 1926; Zhivkov since 1971.

¹⁴ See footnote 1.

¹⁵ See footnote 1.

¹⁶ Beginning in December 1984, Bulgaria was internationally accused of the forced "Bulgarization of its ethnic Turkish minority in parts of southern and eastern Bulgaria.

¹⁷ Zhao Ziyang paid a return visit to Bulgaria during a five-country 18-day tour to Eastern Europe in June 1987.

¹⁸ Following the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, "the April Policy" signified the results of the plenary meeting of the BCP CC in April 1956 during which Todor Zhivkov seized full power within the Communist Party leadership.

¹⁹ A late 1978 Vietnamese invasion drove the ruling Khmer Rouge into the countryside and touched off more than a decade of fighting.

²⁰ Zhivkov visited Cambodia in the fall of 1979 in an effort to demonstrate the Kremlin's diplomatic support for the new rulers in Phnom Penh.

²¹ Tito paid a state visit to the People's Republic of China on 1-10 September 1987.

²² Deng Xiaoping and Todor Zhivkov met at the November 1957 celebrations of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

²³ West Germany was pressing the United States and NATO for speedy negotiations with Moscow on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia

Conference Report by Yvette Chin, Gregory Domber, Malgorzata Gnoniska, and Mircea Munteanu

The George Washington Cold War Group (GWCW), the Cold War Research Center in Budapest, and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) sponsored the international conference on “**New Evidence from Central and East European Archives on the Cold War in Asia**” in Budapest on 30 October–2 November 2003. The conference, held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, sought to provide a forum for the discussion of new findings on the Cold War in Asia from the archives of the former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Participants included scholars and graduate students from around the world who have recently mined the Central and Eastern European archives, most of which are far more readily accessible than comparable archives in Russia or Asia. The conference was made possible by a generous grant from the Henry Luce Foundation. Additional support was provided by the 1956 Institute, the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, the National Security Archive, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Temple University’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, the U.C. Santa Barbara Center on Cold War Studies, and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center and History Department.

On Friday, 31 October, after a gracious welcome from both **James Goldgeier** (GWCW) as well as the local hosts of the conference, represented by **Csaba Békés** of the Cold War History Research Center (Budapest), the conference moved quickly into the first task for the morning: two paper panels on new evidence about the relationship between the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China. The first panel, focusing on the pivotal year 1956 and chaired by **Malcolm Byrne** (National Security Archive), led off with a presentation by **Dr. Sergo Mikoyan**. Utilizing his father’s personal papers, Dr. Mikoyan outlined Anastas Mikoyan’s numerous trips to China, beginning with an intriguing account of Mikoyan’s first meeting with Mao in February 1949 and including tidbits from further contacts with the Chinese in the mid-1950s through the early 1960s. It is clear that these private papers offer a wealth of new information on the intricacies of the Chinese-Soviet relationship during this period. The participants were left hoping that the documents hinted at in Dr. Mikoyan’s paper would be made public in the near future.

The next paper, presented by **Peter Vamos** (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), focused more specifically on China’s influence on events in Hungary during 1956 and in the normalization process following the Hungarian Revolution. Utilizing Hungarian documents from the 1950s and early 1960s, he added new but inconclusive evidence on the Chinese influence on the 1 November 1956 Soviet decision to send

troops back into Budapest, as well as an interesting anecdote about the use of Chinese students in Hungary as a source of reporting to Beijing on the events. Independent, Canada-based scholar **Lezek Gluchowski** presented new findings from the Polish archives on the Chinese-Polish relationship from 1956–1964, focusing particularly on the support given by the Chinese to temper Khrushchev’s rage against the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) in 1956. Gluchowski also analyzed the initially close relationship between Mao and Gomulka in their shared opposition to the Kremlin. Eventually, Gluchowski concluded, this relationship between the Poles and the Chinese would cool as Poland sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet split.

The second panel of the morning, chaired by **James Hershberg** (GWCW), focused on the East European-Chinese relationship through the Sino-Soviet rift. The panel began with a paper presented by **Carmen Rijnoveanu** of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History in Bucharest (Romanian Ministry of National Defense), which described Romania’s efforts to seek independence from the Soviet Union by attempting to ameliorate the Sino-Soviet schism. **Doug Selvage** of the (U.S. Department of State’s Historian’s Office), presented a paper examining the Polish regime’s efforts to limit the scope of the Sino-Soviet split but also utilize Chinese-Soviet tensions to gain additional leverage in its argument with Moscow on foreign policy issues (the possible admittance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in 1963 and the proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular). The final paper of the morning was presented by **David Wolff**, who added a fresh perspective on the Sino-Soviet split with his study of “Interkit,” the Soviet governmental think-tank set up in 1967 to improve understanding of the Chinese and coordination of China policy within the Socialist bloc.

As both **Odd Arne Westad** (London School of Economics) and **Vladislav Zubok** (Temple University) pointed out in their comments on the first and second panels respectively, these papers added a level of detail to the inter-bloc relationships in the communist world—between the Chinese and the Soviet bloc, between the East Europeans and the Soviets, as well as among the East Europeans themselves. Both commentators also highlighted how interrelated all of the events in the bloc were: both the de-Stalinization efforts begun in 1956 and the Sino-Soviet split cannot be understood simply through the bilateral relations between countries, but need to be seen in the web of relationships between all members of the highly fractured socialist bloc, both East and West. While it remains difficult to understand the Chinese perspective without further access to Chinese archival sources, utilizing

East and Central European sources on these two crisis periods was clearly beneficial for expanding our understanding of the complexity in Cold War intra-bloc relations.

The third panel, chaired by **Csaba Békés**, explored additional new evidence on East-European-Chinese relations during the Cold War. **Jordan Baev** (Cold War Group Bulgaria, Sofia) discussed joint Soviet and Bulgarian efforts to counteract Maoist propaganda. Using fresh documents from the Communist Party, state, diplomatic and security archives in Bulgaria, Baev chronicled Bulgarian policy towards China and Albania at the height of the Sino-Soviet Split. If in the late 1950s the Chinese-Bulgarian relationship could be described as friendly and open, by the early 1960s Bulgaria's relationship with both China and Albania had drastically deteriorated. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov implemented this shift in policy, Baev argued, for both foreign policy and internal party reasons. **Mircea Munteanu** (GWU/CWIHP) presented a paper on the Romanian attempts first to mediate the split in 1964 and later exploit it for its own purposes. Seeking to insulate itself from Moscow's whims, Bucharest chose to effectively lean to one side in the Sino-Soviet split, Munteanu argued. The split offered Bucharest an unexpected but much needed ally in the communist camp in the form of a vociferous CCP. Unable, and, more importantly unwilling, to establish a state-to-state alliance with Beijing, Bucharest did enter into a *de facto* alliance between the two parties directed against the ideological position of the CPSU. In doing so, Bucharest consistently championed policies directed at preventing the Soviets from establishing control over the Socialist countries and thus effectively isolating the CCP within the Communist movement. Polish historian **Wanda Jarzabek** discussed Polish perceptions of China during the later half of the 1960s. After the split became open, Polish-Chinese party relations remained very limited. The Chinese, Jarzabek argued, continuously accused the Poles of betraying them, reminiscing of the times when the PRC had supported Gomulka during the 1956 crisis. It was not until the 1970s, when economic issues took primacy, that relations between the two parties warmed up again.

The fourth panel discussed the origins and the first years of the Sino-Soviet split. Chaired by **Goldgeier**, the panel featured new findings from the Hungarian and East German archives on the CCP's position regarding the Hungarian Revolution. **Hope Harrison** (GWCW) discussed the position of the German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in the emerging Sino-Soviet split. Based on her research in the SED archives in Berlin, the paper showed how the party found itself forced to choose sides in the emerging conflict and attempted to use the conflict between Moscow and Beijing to its own advantage, especially before the conflict burst into the open. **Vámos** continued his morning presentation with additional findings from the Hungarian archives on Sino-Hungarian relations from 1956 to 1972. The documents, he argued, while not providing any smoking guns, flesh out the history and details of the relationship. Romanian historian **Lavinia Betea**, together with British historian **Paul Wingrove**, jointly presented a paper dealing with the psychology of Romanian Communist

party leader Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej's role. Rather than concentrating on archival study, Lavinia Betea argued, historians should spend more time trying to analyze the psychology and personality of leaders. Their discourse is just as important, Betea argued, as the documents found in the archives. Baev rounded up the panel with comments on both the papers presented and the topic discussed.

The last panel of the day concentrated on the role of the Warsaw Pact in Asia. The panel was chaired by **Gregg Brazinsky** (GWCW); **Hope Harrison** commented on the papers. Romanian historian **Petre Opris** opened the discussion with a presentation of his findings on the Soviet attempts to include Mongolia in the Warsaw Pact in the early 1960s. The role of Poland in stonewalling Mongolia's accession in the Warsaw Pact is better known, he argued. Nevertheless, documents from the Romanian archives show the important role that Romania played in preventing the Warsaw Pact's expansion to the East and its transformation into a Soviet-led tool. **Bernd Schäfer** (German Historical Institute Washington) presented a report on the latest finding of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). **Hershberg** presented a paper on the Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet split by Mark Kramer (Harvard University, Davis Center) who was unable to attend the conference.

Chaired by **Oldrich Tuma**, the first panel on Saturday, 1 November, centered on East and Central European evidence on the Vietnam War. In particular, the panel presented evidence on East European attempts to mediate the conflict and on Sino-Soviet competition during the war. **Lorenz Luthi** (McGill University) presented "The Collapse of Sino-Soviet Party Relations and Its Influence on the Early Vietnam War, 1963-66." The U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August 1964 was the greatest military challenge to the socialist camp since MacArthur's landing at Inchon, he noted. But the Socialist camp's reaction to US escalation in Vietnam lacked that kind of verve. The emerging Sino-Soviet split, Luthi argued, prevented a forceful reaction that might have deterred a greater American commitment. Ideological differences per se did constitute the major obstacle for aid to the DRV. One explanation to this phenomenon, Luthi continued, lay in concurrent developments in Chinese domestic politics, in the run-up to and early stages of Mao's Cultural Revolution. **Békés** presented an overview of the Hungarian mediation attempt between the US and the North Vietnamese in 1965-66. Using evidence uncovered by the Cold War Research Center-Hungary, it is clear that Hungary was not a negotiator or a mediator as fraternal Poland or Romania. **Békés** went on to debunk rumors that Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter ever went to Vietnam in the fall of 1965 as a secret negotiator. Furthermore, he continued, the Hungarian leadership felt offended by the North Vietnamese when they did not receive any gratitude in return for their support. **Hershberg** (GWU) examined new evidence on Poland's secret Vietnam diplomacy during Lyndon B. Johnson's 37-day bombing "pause," from December 1965 to January 1966. Hershberg came to the conclusions that the Poles, and Foreign Ministry director-general Jerzy

Michalowski in particular, made a good-faith effort to relay and, to a considerable extent, advocate to Hanoi the American proposal for talks. Nevertheless, like his Hungarian counterpart Janos Peter, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki was not beyond trying to mislead the Americans regarding Hanoi's position in order to prolong the pause. In doing so, Hershberg suggested, Rapacki undermined his own credibility in ways that would rebound against him during a more serious Polish initiative in late 1966 (codenamed "Marigold" by Washington). The Poles, he went on to suggest, like the Hungarians, conducted their initiative not at Soviet instigation but in coordination with Moscow, in a manner carefully designed to fit the Kremlin's known policy preferences. When their efforts failed to convert the temporary bombing pause into a permanent halt and a US-DRV negotiating process, the Poles (like the Soviets and Hungarians) blamed the Chinese for either preventing Hanoi from accepting peace talks or at least reinforcing the belligerent tendencies that precluded a positive response to the pause. Nothing in the new East-bloc evidence has yet emerged to alter the view of most scholars that a "missed opportunity" for peace during the pause did not exist, Hershberg concluded. Preponderant forces on both sides still hoped to achieve mutually incompatible objectives as a result of continued fighting, and tended to view any tendencies toward compromise by the enemy as signs of weakness justifying further military efforts rather than reciprocal concessions as steps toward peace.

Chaired by **Odd Arne Westad** the next panel discussed not only foreign policy but also touched on the much less discussed aspect of internal North Vietnamese policy making and the pressures on the North Vietnamese leaders during the Second Indochina War. **Malgorzata Gnoinska** (GWU), presented a paper titled "Mieczyslaw Maneli and Polish Attempts to Neutralize Vietnam—Rumors Revisited: Poland and Vietnam, 1963." In the fall of 1963, the CIA and the Western press alleged that Mieczyslaw Maneli, the Polish delegate to the International Control Commission (ICC) set up in 1954 by the Geneva Conference, initiated a secret dialogue between Saigon and Hanoi, a claim Maneli denied. Ever since, the episode has remained a matter of controversy and mystery. By using new evidence from the Polish archives, Gnoinska put forth some of the missing pieces to the forty-year-old puzzle. The evidence, she argues, makes it clear that Maneli acted on his own as he was not instructed either by Moscow or Warsaw to act as intermediary. Due to lack of access to Hanoi's archives, Maneli's role remains unclear, however. Nevertheless, she continued, the 1963 rumors were caused by misperceptions that the West had of the communist bloc, and, most importantly, by naiveté, shared by Maneli and the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi, of their governments' policies towards Vietnam in 1963. Finally, Gnoinska concluded, it is plausible that Maneli's meeting with Ngo Dinh Nhu, and the rumors which stemmed from it, led indirectly to the coup of 1 November 1963 that claimed the lives of Nhu and his brother Diem. Using evidence from the Sofia archives, Bulgarian historian **Boris Stanimirov** discussed Bulgarian aid to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia during the Indochina War, 1963-75.

Hungarian historian **Balázs Szalontai** offered his perspective on "The International Aspects of North Vietnamese Internal Policies, 1954-69." Caught between two competing "masters," Hanoi had to find ways to balance them. To exemplify the point, Szalontai emphasized the North Vietnamese dilemma on what kind of land reform to carry out in 1954: the Soviet or the Chinese model? A mixture of both—perhaps leaning towards a Chinese model—the Vietnamese solution was a compromise. Szalontai also discussed the importance of the North Vietnamese leaders such as Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Truong Chinh. The National Liberation Front and the DRV government played, in their relations with the other Communist countries, set roles of "good cop - bad cop." While there was cooperation between the North and the South, Szalontai concluded that the NLF was far from being simply an appendage of Hanoi. The North Vietnamese were more cruel and aggressive than the NLF in their policies, and some within the North Vietnamese leadership were willing to sacrifice the NLF and use them primarily to get "the foot in the door." Commenting on the papers, **Lien-Hang Nguyen** (Yale University) stressed the importance of socialist allies for Vietnam and the ways the North Vietnamese used them for different reasons: they used Poland (and the International Commission of Supervision and Control) and to some extent Hungary, for peace initiatives, while they used Bulgaria for economic aid.

Chaired by **Kathryn Weathersby** (CWIHP), the eight panel dealt with Korea using a variety of approaches, sources, and methods. This attention afforded to North Korea demonstrated how the global Cold War was felt on the national and local levels. **Balazs Szalontai's** "1956—A Challenge to the Leader" showed the complexity of the relationship between the super-power and small powers by focusing on the unique political situation within Korea. Looking at intra-party politics, Szalontai explains how Kim Il Sung could resist Khrushchev's calls for de-stalinization and reform. Similarly, **Sergey Radchenko's** paper "North Korea and Soviet/Japanese Rapprochement in the 1960s" and Bernd Schäfer's "North Korean 'Adventurism' and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972" emphasized regional interests and perspectives. Both showed the significance of the regional perspective in the decisions made by North Korea and provide insights into North Korea's historical behavior in international politics.

In a somewhat different vein, **Rüdiger Frank's** paper emphasized the institutional aspects of intercultural exchange, by looking at East German architecture in North Korea. "Material on North Korea in the Bauhaus Archive in Dessau" used different kinds of archival materials to bring to illuminate relations between institutions, bureaucrats, and experts, rather than diplomats and heads-of-state. Frank shows how the Cold War literally changed the landscape in North Korea. He highlights issues of modernization and ideology in the Cold War in Asia, issues further elaborated by **Gregg Brazinsky's** comments.

The ninth panel, "The Cold War Elsewhere in Asia," added complexity to the the issue of ideology by suggesting the importance of religion, non-alignment, and nationalism.

Belgrade-based scholar **Ragna Boden's** "The Atheistic and the Muslim State—Islam in the Service of Soviet Policy towards Indonesia (1954-1964)" demonstrated how religious themes and images entered into propaganda about the socialist man in a Muslim state. Boden also showed how religion acted as a category in Soviet foreign policy-making, how in-itself it was a political concern and a factor in shaping party power in Indonesia. Looking at the Non-Aligned Movement, Belgrade scholars **Ljubodrag Dimic's** and **Svetozar Rajak's** "Meeting of the Like-Minded: Tito's first trip to India and Burma" draws connections between the Non-Aligned movement and Yugoslav 'deviationism' that complicated bloc relations and challenged regionalism and geographic constraints. They show how Tito's 1954 visit with Nehru (Indian Prime Minister), in a key step on the path to the Bandung Conference the following spring, established principles that encompassed both European values of activism with Indian methods and approaches that emphasized neutralism and pacifism. It was this synthesis that gave the non-aligned movement strength and allowed it to resonate with developing and newly independent nations.

Finally, **Sergey Radchenko's** paper "The Kremlin's Leash, the Mongolian Nationalism, and the Chinese Connection" brought nationalism and national history to bear on Cold War history. He unearthed the story of a 1964 attempted coup against Mongolian leader Tsedenbal and shows how Mongolian nationalism, with its historic suspiciousness of the Chinese, was used by Tsedenbal against his potential ousters. Using interviews and documents from Mongolia, Radchenko's paper demonstrated the importance of national history in the outcomes and contours of Cold War history.

A sample of the documents declassified and translated for the conference is published here. Additional findings for the Budapest conference, including many other translated documents from Central and East European archives on the Cold War in Asia, will be featured in a special issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, to be jointly produced by CWIHP and GWCW.

Yvette Chin, Gregory Domber, and Malgorzata Gnoinska are Ph. D. students in the History department at the George Washington University. Mircea Munteanu is a also Ph. D. student in the History Department at GWU and coordinator of the Romania Initiative at CWIHP.

DOCUMENT No. 1

Record of Conversation between Polish Premier J. Cyrankiewicz and Chinese Leader Mao Zedong, 8 April 1957

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, sygnatura XI A 130, Dept. V China 074/13/58. Obtained by Douglas Selvage; translated by Malgorzata Gnoinska.]

Warsaw 4.15.1957

People's Republic of Poland
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Secretariat [of]
I Secretary of the CC PUWP
Cde. Wl. Gomulka.

Local

Upon the instruction of Comrade Minister Rapacki, the Secretariat is sending [you] the minutes of the conversation with Comrade Mao Zedong along with the attachment which was brought back according to the cable by Comrade Katz-Suchy.

Secretariat
Signature
/W. Lewandowska/

Minutes of the Conversation carried out by the Leader of the Polish Governmental Delegation in China, the PPR Premier J. Cyrankiewicz, with the Leader of the PRC, Mao Zedong, on 4.8.1957 in the Headquarters of Mao Zedong.

First, Premier Cyrankiewicz passed on greetings for Cde. Mao Zedong from the First Secretary of the CC PUWP, Cde. Gomulka, and he passed on a letter from the President of the Council of State, Cde. Zawadzki. At the same time, Premier Cyrankiewicz added that Poland was grateful for the invitation of the Governmental Delegation of the PPR. In reply Chairman Mao Zedong welcomed the delegation fullheartedly and asked about the impression of Canton [Guangzhou].

PREMIER CYRANKIEWICZ: We were one day in Canton. A meeting with Cde. Liu Shaoqi [one of the managerial figures of the People's [Republic] of China, the Vice Chairman of the PRC, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of People's Representatives, the Secretary General of the CCP] took place. Most of us are in China for the first time; it is a great experience for us.

MAO ZEDONG: This is [your] first trip in the East.

CYRANKIEWICZ: When it comes to China, the leading figures of the Polish People's [Republic] already had the opportunity to speak with Cdes. Zhou Enlai [and] Ho Lung. Once

again, I thank [you] for the invitation. We are grateful to Cde. Mao Zedong for [his] interest in Poland [and] for the demonstrated assistance in a difficult situation. Thanks to this we can build socialism better after the VIII Plenum, even though we still have difficulties. The aim of the transformation, carried out in Poland, is to fight what was bad. We have cleansed the moral atmosphere of our construction of socialism, with our relations with other socialist countries, and with the USSR.

[The issue of] the ties between the party and the masses was brought before the VIII Plenum. We fixed this, thanks to which we can build socialism better. In the course of the VIII Plenum, our leadership, headed by Cde. Gomulka, felt gratitude for the understanding demonstrated by Cde. Mao Zedong and other members of the leadership of the Party and the Chinese nation. The assistance in [our] construction of socialism was demonstrated in this way; this has [an] influence on the unity of socialist countries.

MAO ZEDONG: We are members of one socialist family. We want everything to be well in every socialist country and in our socialist family. The party and the Chinese nation show concern for Polish matters.

Last year there was no such understanding within the international socialist movement for the Polish matter and for the work of the Polish comrades as [there is] now. Some comrades were faced with the issue of whether Poland is advancing on the road to socialism. This is a crucial issue. Some were interested in Poland's attitude towards the USSR [and] to other socialist countries. The best argument for any doubts is time. After a short while, it was understood what was going on in Poland. Now this issue does not exist anymore.

I read the Polish-French statement; it is very good. It makes a positive impact on the international communist movement. We discussed the Polish matter with the Czechoslovak delegation. Cde. Shiroki, while in China, said that he believed that Poland was following the course.

Perhaps there are still a certain number of comrades who have doubts as to the direction of development of Poland. I think that if one of the countries does not understand the Polish issues, there is nothing frightening about this. I think that the best method is a patient explanation. Poland should explain its own way.

Each of the socialist countries has difficulties; China has them too. In principle, the situation in China is good, but there are matters to be solved. We have much to do in the area of ties with the masses. Bureaucratism and sectarianism are a nuisance. We are conducting work among the members of the party in order to strengthen its ties with the masses. We also have large economic difficulties. There is a backwardness in this area. One has to work a lot in order to transform life. Changes for the better do not come at once. What economic difficulties does Poland sense?

CYRANKIEWICZ: Poland is undergoing economic difficulties. We made much progress as far as the Six Year Plan, which was a plan to industrialize the country. But the dispro-

portions between industry and agriculture arose. We did not carry out the plan of raising the standard of living, which caused discontent [displeasure] among the masses. Many errors were made in agriculture. We are currently fixing these mistakes. We paid more attention to agriculture. We are allocating more funds to them, which we are getting, among other things, through decreasing investments in industry.

Distortions of democracy took place inside the party. Law and order were violated.

We began to bring back the Leninist norms; to bring back the Party's ties with the masses.

Serious increases in wages took place already last year as well as this year, but this is not efficient in comparison to the needs of the masses. We are telling them that we cannot carry out further increases, because we will be threatened by inflation. We are on the verge of financing pay increases with [the profits from] the amount of goods. The agricultural production decides, to a great extent, the amount of goods, and therefore we want to increase it. A preliminary program of eliminating disproportions between industry and agriculture was put forward in 1954, but the decisive turn occurred only after the VIII Plenum.

MAO ZEDONG: How does the carrying out of the Six Year Plan present itself in Poland?

CYRANKIEWICZ: The plan has been pretty much carried out in industry, but it varies in different branches of industry – what also goes into it is the burden of military production in the global production; we didn't carry it [the plan] out in agriculture; it was unrealistic. It assumed that in the course of 6 years one could increase the production by 40%. This assumption was not based on realistic premises. In addition, we made a series of mistakes which additionally contributed to the fact that we did not achieve what we could have in agriculture. We have not been delivering investment and construction materials [or] a sufficient amount of fertilizers; we demobilized part of the peasants [who were involved] in production by creating conditions of an uncertain tomorrow.

MAO ZEDONG: China is making use of your positive and negative experiences.

Planning in China is still of an experimental nature. The future will show the prospects of planning. We are making fewer mistakes while making use of your experience. Every country is taking a zigzag path to socialism. China also has serious problems in agriculture. The level of production is low. We have difficulties in the countryside. China is a peasant country. Our peasants want to eat and clothe themselves. We have difficulties with supplying the cities. Does this also occur on your side? I know that half of the population in Poland are peasants.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Yes. The difficulties in our agriculture result partially from the fact that many peasants moved to the city, to industry, and that is why there is a lack of labor [lit: hands to work] here and there in the countryside. The work-

ing class has increased numerically. Besides, we have a large population increase – half a million annually. Our agriculture does not yet satisfy the needs of the country. We are importing around 1.5 million tons of grain annually. This is a significant import. Our import is significantly targeted at accelerating the development of animal farming.

MAO ZEDONG: How does your export look like?

CYRANKIEWICZ: We export coal, metallurgic products, machines, textiles (the latter to the USSR where we are procuring cotton), and entire industrial complexes. Machines and entire industrial complexes are our new exports. It takes place primarily to the countries of Asia, among others, to China.

MAO ZEDONG: How about economic relations with the countries of Africa?

CYRANKIEWICZ: We are trying to develop them. We have relations with Egypt, with Tunisia, and other Arab countries. We help Egypt and Arab nations with armament. We have a large armament industry. We don't know what to do with it.

MAO ZEDONG: China also has an overly developed armament industry. Do you want to reduce the armament industry?

CYRANKIEWICZ: Yes. Some of the armament facilities are working in low gear. Some are providing accessory production for the needs of the people.

MAO ZEDONG: One should have some armament, but not too much.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Yes, the Polish people understand this. But, one shouldn't have too much [of it]; we built too large an armament industry and there should be cooperation among socialist countries in this area, so we are not all producing the same thing.

MAO ZEDONG: How does economic coordination look in general between socialist countries?

CYRANKIEWICZ: It's looking better [lit: it's getting on a better track]. We brought up certain motions to the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and the Soviet Union which resulted from previous bad experiences. There was no division of production, but the allocation of tasks [took place], at times, even without asking individual countries. Some tasks were imposed, especially concerning our coal. During our visit in Moscow in 1956, we brought up, along with Cde. Ochab, the matter of correct cooperation. The matter looks better today, but there is still a lack of a positive conception. We want the cooperation to take place on the principle of equality [among] the partners. The matter is looking better.

MAO ZEDONG: How [should we] understand the principle

of equality in cooperation?

CYRANKIEWICZ: It should take place according to the consent of respective countries.

MAO ZEDONG: Is it better now?

CYRANKIEWICZ: Better, but there is still a lack of a positive conception.

MAO ZEDONG: I know that there is also a deficiency of grain and consumer goods in the countries of Eastern Europe, however, there are too many machines.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Yes, Czechoslovakia and the GDR are importing grain. Both of these countries have a developed machine industry. They also have a large production of industrial consumer goods. That is why the standard of living in both of these countries is higher than in ours. Numerically, roughly speaking, one can say that it is twice as high.

MAO ZEDONG: And what does the standard of living look like in these two countries in comparison with that of the USSR?

CYRANKIEWICZ: It is also higher.

MAO ZEDONG: And what does standard of living of the USSR look like in comparison with Poland?

CYRANKIEWICZ: The goods of industrial consumption are cheaper in the USSR. However, the consumption of meat, butter, in general fats, is higher in Poland. But our consumption in this area is lower than in Western Europe, the GDR, the CSSR [Czechoslovak Republic], and in Hungary.

MAO ZEDONG: The consumption is even lower in China. China cannot be compared with any European country. One can only compare with the level before the war in China. It is currently a little better than before the liberation, but not significantly. The average annual consumption of meat (pork) amounts to 5 kilos per head; grain about 300 kg.

CYRANKIEWICZ: On our end, they compare with the neighboring countries; the comparisons are not advantageous. In comparison with the pre-war level, with the overall increase in population growth and consumption, some categories earn less.

MAO ZEDONG: That's true. Those countries are near. One cannot prohibit comparisons. Propaganda should show, however, a systematic increase year by year.

CYRANKIEWICZ: The socialist countries should demonstrate economic superiority, among others, by raising the standard of living. In our propaganda, we are showing our masses that Western countries grew rich on colonial exploi-

tation and were developing during the period when we were under occupation. Some categories of our workers earn less than before the war. It causes dissatisfaction. Another source of discontent is that we promised more than we could give. People do not want to be cheated. Today we are saying that the improvement of living conditions depends on the working class and the people.

MAO ZEDONG: This is correct. We know that Cde. Gomulka and other comrades from the leadership emphasize in their pronouncements that raising the standard of living depends on the efforts of the working masses. Do all workers understand this?

CYRANKIEWICZ: Now better than before because we are telling them even the bitter truth. The party must be strong in order to have a bond with the working class. The current efforts are aimed in the direction of an ideological strengthening of the Party.

MAO ZEDONG: This is necessary. We are currently working on this as well. It is necessary to strengthen the political work and the ideological leadership among the workers, peasants and the academic youth.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Before we did not use this to convince, but we gave orders. This is a big task of the Party.

MAO ZEDONG: One has to know how to talk to the masses. Some don't know how to do this. They know how to give orders. There is a lack of conviction in their pronouncements. Our party is strengthening the work in this area. We have to treat the nation differently, [we have to treat] differently the class enemy. It is easy to violate the border here. The Party seasoned itself in the class struggle. That is why it has experience in fighting the class enemy. Some, if they only find divergences in the bosom of the nation, accuse for enmity instead of convincing that they are using a method of administrative pressure. We have to differentiate these two kinds of divergences with total clarity. The classicists talked little about these two kinds of divergences. Force must be used against the enemy. As for the nation, a method of clever persuasion must be used.

CYRANKIEWICZ: The distinguishing of these divergences is very important for the construction of socialism.

MAO ZEDONG: In China, numbering hundreds of millions of people, these divergences must be solved especially carefully.

CYRANKIEWICZ: The example of China in this area, the activity and the work of Cde. Mao Zedong, means a lot to us.

MAO ZEDONG: One has to beware, however, of an automatic transfer of experiences.

CYRANKIEWICZ: Yes. But, on the other hand there is much convergence of the development of socialism in individual countries. In Poland, last year, if we were to use your nomenclature, serious divergences appeared in the bosom of the nation, and even in the Party. A critique of the previous state [of affairs] took place; [people] began to look for new ways. But we approached this correctly. We solved our problems on our own. These divergences became solved at the VIII Plenum. Otherwise, the class enemy could exploit this. If the Party did not solve these divergences on its own, then it would leave a base for counterrevolutionary activity. It seems that the situation in Hungary was similar in the beginning. But in Hungary the Party, through the lips of "Geröz", defined the dissatisfaction of the working class as the activity of the enemy. Thus, in Hungary, the situation looked the opposite of Poland in the area of conclusions. As a result, the Party did not follow the process of restoration. The class enemy exploited this. This has given a wide field for counterrevolutionary activity.

MAO ZEDONG: In Poland, the Party was following the process of restoration. The situation in Hungary looked different. The Petöfi Club existed in Hungary. It unleashed an unhealthy campaign. The Party and the Central Committee were passive during that period; it was different in Poland. There were two trends in the Hungarian Party. The people revolted. Nagy represented revisionism and he was tied to the Club of Petöfi. The majority of the Party led the process in Poland. The leadership forces in Poland and Hungary were different. In Hungary, at a certain time, the masses rebelled. The Party and the Government ceased to exist. The Party was not able to lead the process of restoration. A base was formed for the activity of the counterrevolution and revisionism.

CYRANKIEWICZ: If one does not follow the process of restoration, one goes astray, because who is to lead if not the Party?

MAO ZEDONG: The Party led in Poland. The restoration was set as a goal. In Hungary, the goal of the Petöfi Club was to break up the Party and the government. (a very detailed conversation on this topic took place during yet two dinners).

CYRANKIEWICZ: On our end, the goal was improving the construction of socialism, the stabilization of our relations with the USSR as was dictated by our national dignity.

MAO ZEDONG: Shiroki agreed that Poland was on the right path. I spoke with him. One has to explain to other fraternal countries and parties in order for them to understand what the crux of the matter was.

CYRANKIEWICZ: We have been doing this and we will continue to do so. The talks between our Party and the English Party took place recently. [Our] governmental visit

will take place in Czechoslovakia in May, and in the GDR in June.

MAO ZEDONG: This is very good. This will give further opportunity to exchange views. If there are differences in the views, then it doesn't matter. One has to leave the matter up to time. There is no need, however, to drag out the matter outside. To an article, for example, immediately answer with an article.

CYRANKIEWICZ: We also think so. We criticized the pronouncements of [Yugoslav leader Josip Broz] Tito in Pula. We told the Yugoslav comrades about this.

MAO ZEDONG: The pronouncements of Tito [and] Kardelj do not have support.

CYRANKIEWICZ: I would like to bring up yet another matter. The Party, the Government, the Polish people warmly invite Cde. Mao Zedong to Poland.

MAO ZEDONG: Thank you. I have received the invitation.

CYRANKIEWICZ: We invited [you] in November of last year. We believe that you will accept the invitation. Your visit in Poland will be a momentous event for the Polish nation.

MAO ZEDONG: In principle, the visit has been agreed upon. All is left is setting the date.

Prepared by:

/E. Sluczanski/

Shanghai, 12 April 1957



DOCUMENT No. 2

Information from Krem Bosev, Charge d'Affaires of the Bulgarian Embassy in Beijing [1970]

[Source: *Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Record 26, File 3330. Translated by Borislav Stanimiro.*]

INFORMATION

From Krum Bosev, Charge d'affaires of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Beijing

Concerning: the Chinese position on the Cambodian events.

The Chinese position on the Cambodian events taken

against the regime of Lon Nol–Matack and in favor of Sihanouk is known to be very cautious and has been developed gradually and continuously in favor of [Prince Norodom] Sihanouk, probably under the pressure of the Vietnamese leadership.

In a talk with comrade Elizavetin, the deputy chief of the department for the East European countries, Li Lian-Xi, has emphasized that the Chinese position had been clearly expressed in the announcement of "Xinhua" on 16 March [1970] about the meeting between [Chinese Premier] Zhou Enlai and the Cambodian ambassador Valentine.

[...]

Another announcement on "Sihanouk" on 30 March is underlined that "the Chinese Government and the Chinese people constantly respect and support the policy of peace, independence and preservation of the territorial unity which is carried out by the state leader of Cambodia, Sihanouk. The Chinese Government has always accepted Sihanouk as a head of the state..."

[...]

In response to a query of a leader of a fraternal embassy (21 March) about the position of China on the Cambodian events, the personal counselor of Sihanouk, Prince Pen Hut had replied quite curtly: "China gives full support to Sihanouk" but in the same time added that more details concerning the Chinese position on that question would be presented by Sihanouk himself during his forthcoming visit in Moscow. Two days later (23 March) the other personal counselor of Sihanouk, General Ngo Hu, in a conversation with Elizavetin underlined a statement of Chinese official person who said: "China can be a larger model for Cambodia."

On the same day (23 March) comrade Elizavetin had a second meeting with General Ngo, requested by the latter, concerning the future intentions of Sihanouk. After the conversation, comrade Elizavetin has gathered the impression that the Chinese leadership showed great caution in connection with the Cambodian events and did not hurry with outlining its position. It became clear that China didn't want the outbreak of new war near its boundaries. At the same time he felt, based on the talk with Gen. Ngo Hu, that the Vietnamese leadership put serious pressure on the Chinese leaders for a more clear and determined position.

At the same time following the personal instructions of Pham Van Dong, the Vietnamese ambassador in Beijing has had an extended conversation with comrade Elizavetin and informed the latter about the Chinese position on the Cambodian events which had been presented in the trilateral meeting of Sihanouk, Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong in Beijing (22-23 March). According to the ambassador of Vietnam, Zhou Enlai had promised total political support to Sihanouk and a large propaganda back-up i.e. committing to Chinese press, radio and television all materials – Chinese or foreign – in support of Sihanouk. In the trilateral meeting Zhou Enlai had promised also weapons. Nothing more, however had been promised including direct military interference with the explanation that China is not neighboring country with Cambodia.

In a conversation of mine with the South-Vietnamese

[NLF] ambassador, comrade Nguyen emphasized: “The Chinese leadership completely and definitely supports Sihanouk.”

During a conversation between Sihanouk and comrade Elizavetin, which took place on 5 April at Sihanouk’s request, the Prince has underlined that he had received assurance from the Chinese leadership that in his speech in Pyongyang, Zhou Enlai would stigmatize strongly the new regime of Lon Nol and would proclaim clear and decisive support to Sihanouk. Zhou Enlai’s visit to the Korean People’s Democratic Republic confirmed that promise.

[...]

By the way, in his conversation with comrade Elizavetin, Sihanouk has emphasized that in the near future China would /probably after the meeting of the four countries of Indochina, which will take place in Guangzhou [Canton] on 12 – 13 April/ announce an official declaration.¹

Here appears the question, why China’s position on the events in Indochina and Cambodia has been developed so carefully and gradually? May be it is still early to give a response to that question but what can be said at the moment is that China made it by its own way – waiting and not directly involving... More specifically that means:

1. The Chinese leadership – in theory and in practice – has been and remains the upholder of the armed resistance, of the people’s war, of lighting up wars. But they have always stood aside from these wars, they want them far from their boundaries and if it is possible in other regions and continents and without their direct participation.

2. There is a reason to think that (such opinions have been expressed by some Arab and other ambassadors) the complicating of tightening of the events in Indochina and the larger engagement of the USA in the region give to China new opportunities in their negotiations with the USA in Warsaw.

3. The events in Cambodia [and] the new situation in the region create conditions for organizing a large anti-American and anti-imperialist front, which in the minds of some Chinese leaders can be under Chinese control.

The events in Cambodia and Indochina, after the evaluation of the Vietnamese leaders and probably and of the Chinese leadership, create conditions for the boosting of the revolution in this part of the world.

Beijing, 24 April 1970

Charge d’affaires:

/Kr. Bosev/

DOCUMENT No. 3

Memorandum of Conversation between the Romanian Party and Government Delegation Led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev, 27 September 1964

[Source: State Archives, CC RCP files, Chancellery, 55/1964, pp. 2-5. Translated by Mircea Munteanu.]

The party and government delegation led by I. G. Maurer stopped in Moscow for a few hours on its way to Beijing. N. S. Khrushchev invited [the delegation] to lunch.

E[mil] Bondaras and P[aul] Niculescu-Mizil also participated from the Romanian side.

A[natoly] N. Kosygin, V. P. Mdjavanadze, V. V. Kuzhnetzov, L. N. Tolkunov, and E. D. Karpeshchenko (translator) were present from the Soviet side.

T. Sinu and G. Marin (translator) participated on behalf of the Romanian embassy.

The lunch was organized by the Guest House of the CPSU CC and the Council of Ministers at 1500 hours. The lunch was followed by discussions which lasted until 2000 hours.

During the lunch, the following issues were discussed:

1. N. S. Khrushchev made a presentation of situation in agriculture for the current year, citing typical (*characteristic*) statistics for all the union republics and some of the regions.

[Khrushchev] spoke of a very good wheat production this year, stating that this year, taking into account the surface, it was a record production.

In 1964, the Soviet Union will not have to import wheat, and in the next four years it hopes to create a one year reserve.

2. Cde. I. Gh. Maurer informed [the Soviet leadership] of the beginning of construction at the Iron Gates hydroelectric plant. He mentioned that a Romanian delegation of specialists [hydroelectric engineers] will arrive in the Soviet Union in the first half of October of this year to negotiate the purchase of [needed] machines. A. N. Kosygin, interrupted the discussion and said that [the Soviets] are prepared for the beginning of the negotiations.

3. N. S. Khrushchev spoke of his visit to an experimental weapons test site. Without going into details, he spoke of a new defensive weapon developed recently by Soviet specialists.

4. Discussing with Mdjavanadze the vacation he took in Romania, Cde. I. Gh. Maurer—addressing Kuzhnetzov—admonished him that he continues to refuse to come spend his vacation there [as well]. N. S. Khrushchev intervened in the discussion and recommended that Kuzhnetzov respond positively to the Romanian invitation.

5. After lunch N. S. Khrushchev continued the discussion, concentrating on the issue of disagreements with the Chinese over the [Sino-Soviet] border. He stated that before *Pravda* published the discussions between Mao Zedong with the Japanese Socialists and the article regarding the position of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government sent a telegram to the Chinese government attempting to confirm the facts published in the Japanese media.

The answer received [from the Chinese]—Khrushchev continued—let it be understood that what was published in the Japanese press was correct.

Khrushchev presented the issue of the territorial conflict as an issue that reached a climactic point. (N. S. Khrushchev spoke of numerous border crossings and of the concentrations of Chinese armed forces on some parts of the Sino-Soviet border). The Soviet prime minister said that if the Chinese side would look at the situation realistically, renouncing their demand to include in a future [Sino-Soviet] treaty of a statement about the unequal character of the treaties signed by the Tsarist governments, the Soviets would be agreeable to consider negotiating some changes in the current border with the People's Republic of China.

N. S. Khrushchev described the history of some of the Soviet regions on the border with China, mentioning the discussions [he] had with the Chinese leadership over time, including the issue of Mongolia.

Speaking about the discussions Mao Zedong had with the Japanese socialists with regard to East German and Polish territories, N. S. Khrushchev underlined that these issues are not currently of interest. It is important to mention that during the discussions about the possible problems that might arise between the Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Poles on one side and between the Poles and the Germans on the other, the Russian prime minister did not, as in the past, mention anything about the S. S. R. of Moldavia.

Making references to the activity of the Sino-Soviet commission on border issues, N. S. Khrushchev said that, after the discussions broke down, no decision was made as to when they would begin again.

6. Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer began to inform [the Soviet leadership] about the Romanian governmental visit in France and the discussions held with De Gaulle. He underline that the principal object of the discussions was the economic cooperation between the two countries. The issue of peaceful coexistence was also discussed. N. S. Khrushchev interrupted him and said: "You see, when you Romanians speak of peaceful coexistence, the Chinese say nothing; when I say something about it, I am immediately attacked by them. Tell us, what is your secret tactic, how did you manage to get the Chinese in you [back] pocket."

N. S. Khrushchev continued about the Chinese propaganda campaign against the CPSU and Soviet leadership, about the various accusations made [against them] and about the necessity to forcefully respond to these attacks. Within this context [Khrushchev] mentioned that lately the CPSU leadership has been accused of intending to hold negotia-

tions with the FRG to the detriment of GDR's interests. "How is it possible for us not to respond to these accusations," asked N. S. Khrushchev.

Cde. I. Gh. Maurer said that it was necessary to look closely at what accusations were brought and an analysis be made if a response is necessary. "For example—Maurer said—it is not necessary to respond to the accusation that the Soviet Union is restoring capitalism since everybody knows that the USSR is building communism."

Kosygin interjected in the discussion and tried to argue that it is necessary to respond to all issues raised by the Chinese leadership. Among other things, he said: "How would you respond if at Romania's borders certain things would be happening [?]" Cde. I. Gh. Maurer responded: "Of course, we would closely analyze the situation and, if warranted, we would take any necessary measures."

N. S. Khrushchev said that "you can be opposed to the public polemics since the Chinese are not attacking you. I'll tell you what the secret is: the Chinese have a tactical plan which calls for leaving out the P. R. Hungary, P. R. Poland, P. R. Romania, and GDR, and concentrating their fire on the USSR, the CPSU, and especially on me."

7. With regard to the issue of the [World] Workers' and Communist Parties Congress, N. S. Khrushchev underlined the need to hold [the meeting], stating that the [the meeting] is not about excluding any part—that is out of the question—but rather about establishing a programmatic document of the Communist and Workers' movement.

After all, [Khrushchev] said, there is no forum out of which a party could be excluded, and the document that might be produced [at the meeting] would only be the continuation of the 1960 Declaration, which was signed, among [many] others, by the Chinese C. P.

Cdes. I. Gh. Maurer and E. Bondaras represented our Party's point of view, underlining that acting with calm, wisdom, and by manifesting extraordinary care with respect to the issues [at hand], it is their opinion that some changes could be expected on behalf of the CCP. Some new elements [in the Chinese position] have been apparent lately, such as the notion and content of [the idea of] the popular commune, [their] accepting of the principle of peaceful coexistence in some of the communiqués signed by the Chinese leadership with the leadership of certain states in Asia and Africa, the reanalysis of the avenues and methods of socialist industrialization.

Within this context, it was suggested that, even though the invitation of a Soviet delegation to the 15th anniversary of the People's Republic of China—from what N. S. Khrushchev described—was not done in quite an appropriate manner, the CPSU leadership showed political maturity by sending a delegation to Beijing.

8. Suggesting that the R[omanian] W[orkers'] P[arty] and the government of R[omanian] P[eople's] R[epublic] has adopted the Chinese theory of self-help in the construction of a socialist economy, N. S. Khrushchev said he is not against

it, mentioning the times when the USSR was the only socialist country.

He said that he does not understand the [North] Korean position, who in theory have adopted the same position, but practically are demanding [economic] aid, [often] proposing deals that are not mutually advantageous. [Khrushchev] continued, stating that he supports intra-socialist economic relations based on the principle of equality and on mutual advantage, and that the CPSU leadership took numerous steps to rectify the flawed practices of Stalin's regime. He gave the *Sovroms* as examples, which—Khrushchev said—“are driving you Romanians up the wall every time you hear about them.”

9. N. S. Khrushchev said that he will be leaving Moscow for a while, being in Gagra [Crimea] to finish the report he will be giving at the CPSU CC plenary session, scheduled for the second half of November or the beginning December.

=====

d. T. Sinu
G. Marin (ss)
emp. Unic
ct. N. Radulescu



DOCUMENT No. 4

Note on the Conversation between the Romanian Party and Government Delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev, 27 September 1964

[Source: 55/1964; State Archives, CC RCP, Chancellery, pp. 52-53; Translated by Mircea Munteanu.]

NOTE

During the discussion with Khrushchev, the following additional points were made in addition to those mentioned above.

[Khrushchev] told of his numerous meetings with Mao Zedong. He said that during one of these discussions, [Mao] expressed his dislike for one of Zhukov's declarations, which stated that in case the Americans would attack China, the Soviet Union will come [to China's] aid. Khrushchev said that Zhukov's declaration was made on the basis of the decision of the CC CPSU Presidium. Mao Zedong said that it was not a just [useful] declaration. If the Americans would attack China, they would get stuck. The Chinese will carry out a prolonged war. The Soviet Union must not get involved, it must stay out of it. Thus the Soviet Union will remain untouched and this would also be good for China.

Khrushchev said he does not agree with that point.

Mao Zedong also explained another theory, which Khrushchev described as strange. If the Americans would attack the Soviet Union, the Soviets should not fight them on the western border; rather they should withdraw to the Urals for 1-3 years. In this way they would tire the Americans, and then, together with the Chinese, they would begin their annihilation.

Khrushchev said that Mao Zedong is completely amiss with the concepts of modern warfare.

Khrushchev also told of his discussions with Mao Zedong concerning the popular communes, [and] the issue of foodstuffs. [Khrushchev] told us that, at the time, he told Mao Zedong only that they have been tried in the Soviet Union and that they did not prove to be to useful. That is why the Soviet Union will not apply these reforms.

When he returned to the Soviet Union [from his trip to China] Khrushchev told the CPSU CC Presidium that there is a catastrophe underway in China.

Repeatedly he said that Mao Zedong is sick, crazy, that he should be taken to an asylum, etc.

Among other things, he said that the main cause of this is Chinese nationalism. To augment his point, [Khrushchev] said that throughout the entire Chinese war liberation, Mao Zedong did not even once visit Moscow. This he qualified as proof of Mao Zedong's nationalism. [Underlined in the original; Translator's Note (TN): Corneliu Manescu, wrote on the back of the document: *This cannot be considered as proof of nationalism*].

During the dinner, and before [the delegation's] departure, [Khrushchev] repeatedly sent cordial salutes for Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the other members of the party leadership.

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